Introduction to Social Philosophy, Lecture 12
John Dupré
Functional Explanation
The general form of a functional explanation is:
1. F (an institution, custom, etc.) has consequence C (for a society, class, etc., S)
2. F benefits S/contributes to the survival of S/is essential to the survival of S
3. F exists because it has consequence C
This is a form of teleology, explanation in terms o goals, purposes, ends, etc.
The central objection to functional explanation is that it appears to involve time-reversed causation.
The consequence, or the benefit form that consequence, occurs after F and it seems bizarre to think it
could cause F. Especially because the consequence or the benefit may not happen for quite
independent reasons.
Two (Relatively) Unproblematic Cases
1. Individual intention
It seems unproblematic to say e.g. that my desire to win caused me to buy the lottery ticket. No one
imagines that winning is what causes me to buy the ticket (it's rather likely that I won't win).
Presumably it is present mental states directed at the future (somehow?) that cause my present action.
2. Biological function
We are generally not troubled with statements like:
A. 'the function of the heart is to circulate blood'
However, the status of this claim is philosophically controversial. One view is that the organism is
obviously a complex system capable of maintaining its integrity in a variety of circumstances, and the
function of parts of the organism is their role in maintaining this integrity.
A different view holds that attribution of functions depends on natural selection. On this view A says
that the reason the heart exists is because it circulates blood, and ancestors who had their blood
circulated were more liable to survive and reproduce than those that didn't. This view has an obvious
way of satisfying condition 3 of the general account of functional explanation. It's less clear how the
first view will do this.
The first view of functions fits with what Hempel describes as functional analysis.
(Bibliographic note: The first view is generally associated with Robert Cummins [Journal of
Philosophy 1975, pp. 741-764]. The second is associated with Larry Wright [Teleological
Explanations, U. of California Press, 1973]. Philosophers sometimes refer to these as Cumminsfunctions and Wright-functions respectively.)
Sociological Function
With these various options available we can ask whether any of them help to explain sociological
functions.
Sociological as intentional functions. Some institutions are designed deliberately and their function is
presumably to do what they were designed to do. E.g. the railways were designed to move people and
goods around (and once they did so). The fact that the ability to move around was perceived as a
benefit straightforwardly explains why the railways exist. But these are not the most interesting cases.
Consider the claim:
B. 'the function of religion is to maintain social order'.
Although there are conspiracies, no one (as far as I know) maintains this to have been one.
Sociological Cummins-functions
It could be shown that religions do in fact maintain social order. If we then had reason to believe that
societies were integrated self-maintaining systems we would have shown that maintaining social order
was the Cummins function of religion. But as noted showing that something is a Cummins fucntion
doesn't obviously explain why it is there.
Sociological Wright-functions?
The great advantage of Wright functions is that they come with a mechanism that connects the benefit
to the existence of the functional feature. Various such mechanisms have been suggested for social
functions including selective ones. (More on this next week.) Clearly though there is no mechanism in
social science as widely acknowledged as natural selection in biology.
An alternative strategy is to argue inductively that what contributes to the survival of the system will
come into existence. One might hold that:
'If F provides a vital function for a system S then F will come into existence'
is (for suitable S) an empirical law.
Something like this will get us from Cummins functions to explanation. There is however a major
problem:
The Problem of Functional Equivalents
Arguments like the preceding suffer from the problem that is not typically true that any particular C
will be needed to serve the function that C in fact serves.
(More formally the argument has roughly the form:
F implies C; C; therefore F. This is invalid, technically the fallacy of affirming the consequent.)
What is required is that F is necessary for C, whereas typically it will only be sufficient for C.
Perhaps religion maintains social order, but so might massive repression. Similarly for biology: fur can
provide insulation, but so can blubber, etc.
The conclusion here is that functional explanation can typically explain only why some feature with
consequence C exists, not the particular feature F.
This is related to a major problem for functional explanation in biology. Selective explanations are too
easy to think up.
Note on Functions and Functionalism
Functionalism (Parsons, Radcliffe-Brown) is the view that all elements of society are mutually
supporting and reinforcing, and their role in the system explains their existence. Clearly such a view
supports functional explanation by insisting that societies are systems of the right sort for functional
analysis. However functionalism is not necessary for there to be some true functional explanations. Its
rejection, however, makes it important to show how such particular explanations are to be legitimated
(possibly that a particular mechanism can be implicated).