Ethical Language for
Ethical Language – questions
1. Explain cognitivism in ethics
2. What view does non-cognitivism support?
3. Explain the naturalistic fallacy
4. Give examples of the naturalistic fallacy
5. Explain the ‘Is-Ought’ problem.
6. Who wrote: ‘If I am asked, “What is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.’
7. What is ‘Intuitionism’ and what three claims does it make?
8. What is ‘emotivism’?
9. What is Hume’s a) fork and b) microscope?
10. According to Moore, why does ‘goodness’ resist definition?
11. Is it absolutely wrong to impose ones morality on others? (no answer given)
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Ethical Language – answers
1. See box:
Propositions are, roughly, what meaningful declarative sentences are supposed to express (but not interrogative or imperative sentences). Different
sentences, in different languages, can (it is often thought) express the same proposition: "snow is white" and "Schnee ist weiß" (in German) both
express the proposition that snow is white. A common assumption among philosophers who use this jargon is that propositions, properly speaking,
are what are true or false (what bear truth values; they are truthbearers). So if an ethical sentence does express a proposition, then the sentence
expresses something that can be true or false.
To get a better idea of what it means to express a proposition, compare this to something that does not express a proposition. Suppose someone
minding a convenience store sees a thief pick up a candy bar and run. The storekeeper manages to exclaim, "Hey!" In this case, "Hey!" does not
express a proposition. Among the things that the exclamation does not express are, "that's a thief there"; "thieving is wrong"; "please stop that
thief"; or "that thief really annoys me." The storekeeper isn't saying anything that can be true or false. So it is not a proposition that the
storekeeper is expressing. Perhaps it is an emotional state that is being expressed. The storekeeper is surprised and angered, and expresses those
feelings by saying, "Hey!"
An ethical naturalist and other ethical cognitivists might hold that it can be true or false that Mary is a good person; it can be true or false that
stealing and lying are always wrong. On the other hand, if one believes that the sentence, "Mary is a good person." cannot be either true or false,
then one is not a cognitivist.
It is an essential part of ethical naturalism that ethical sentences do express propositions. They are not just feelings, as though we were saying,
"Hey!" or "Yay for Mary!" They are actually expressing propositions that can be true or false. Derivatively, a cognitivist or a realist would say that
ethical sentences themselves are either true or false.
Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/cognitivism-ethics
2. Non-cognitivism says there is NO moral knowledge. Moral statements are expressions of emotion or opinion.
3. See box:
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In 1903, he published a ground-breaking book, Principia Ethica, which created one of the most challenging problems for evolutionary ethics--the
'naturalistic fallacy.' According to Michael Ruse (1995: 223), when dealing with evolutionary ethics, "it has been enough for the student to murmur
the magical phrase 'naturalistic fallacy,' and then he or she can move on to the next question, confident of having gained full marks thus far on the
exam." So, what is the naturalistic fallacy and why does it pose a problem for evolutionary ethics?
Moore was interested in the definition of 'good' and particularly in whether 'good' was a simple or a complex property. Simple properties, according
to Moore, are indefinable as they cannot be described further using more basic properties. Complex properties, on the other hand, can be defined
by outlining their basic properties. Hence, 'yellow' cannot be defined in terms of its constituent parts, whereas 'colored' can be explained further as
it consists of several individual colors.
'Good,' according to Moore, is a simple property which cannot be described using more basic properties. Committing the naturalistic fallacy is
attempting to define 'good' with reference to other natural, i.e. empirically verifiable, properties. This understanding of 'good' creates serious
problems for both Darwin and Spencer. Following Bentham and Mill, both identify moral goodness with 'pleasure.' This means they commit the
naturalistic fallacy as good and pleasant are not identical. In addition, Spencer identifies goodness with 'highly evolved,' committing the naturalistic
fallacy again. (Both Moore's claim in itself as well as his criticism of evolutionary ethics can be attacked, but this would fall outside the scope of this
entry).
Source: http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evol-eth.htm#SH1d
4. Examples:
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Cloning and genetic engineering are wrong because they are unnatural.
Moral arguments for vegetarianism are wrong because animals are eaten in nature.
Homosexuality is wrong/right because it is unnatural/natural.
Darwinian selection occurs is a dominating effect in nature and hence ought to be in society as well -see social darwinism.
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5. See box:
The first philosopher who persistently argued that normative rules cannot be derived from empirical facts was David Hume (1711-1776) (1978:
469):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or
an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
It is this unexplained, imperceptible change from 'is' to ‘ought’ which Hume deplores in moral systems. To say what is the case and to say what
ought to be the case are two unrelated matters, according to him. On the one hand, empirical facts do not contain normative statements, otherwise
they would not be purely empirical. On the other hand, if there are no normative elements in the facts, they cannot suddenly surface in the
conclusions because a conclusion is only deductively valid if all necessary information is present in the premises.
How do Darwin and Spencer derive 'ought' from 'is'? Let us look at Darwin first, using an example which he could have supported.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Child A is dying from starvation.
The parents of child A are not in a position to feed their child.
The parents of child A are very unhappy that their child is dying from starvation.
Therefore, fellow humans ought morally to provide food for child A.
Darwin (1930: 234) writes that "happiness is an essential part of the general good." Therefore, those who want to be moral ought to promote
happiness, and hence, in the above case, provide food. However, the imperceptible move from 'is' to ‘ought’ which Hume found in moral systems,
is also present in this example. Thus, Darwin derives ought from is when he moves from the empirical fact of unhappiness to the normative claim
of a duty to relieve unhappiness.
The same can be said for Spencer whose above argument about the survival of the fittest could be represented as follows:
1. Natural selection will ensure the survival of the fittest.
2. Person B is dying from starvation because he is ill, old, and poor.
3. Therefore, fellow humans ought to morally avoid helping person B so that the survival of the fittest is guaranteed.
Even if both premises were shown to be true, it does not follow that we ought to morally support the survival of the fittest. An additional normative
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claim equating survival skills with moral goodness would be required to make the argument tenable. Again, this normative part of the argument is
not included in the premises. Hence, Spencer also derives 'ought' from 'is.' Thomas Huxley (1906: 80) objects to evolutionary ethics on these
grounds when he writes:
The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil
tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to
what we call evil than we had before.
Source: http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evol-eth.htm#SH1d
6. G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica (2004)
7. See box:
Intuitionism says that "good" is an indefinable notion. The basic moral truths are objective; they hold independently of what anyone may think or
feel. We should pick out our moral principles by following our basic moral intuitions.
These questions are about Chapter 4 of Harry Gensler's Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (London and New York, Routledge: 1998). These
materials are copyrighted (c) 1998 by Harry J. Gensler; but they may be distributed freely.
"Good" is indefinable and objective
Intuitionism makes three claims: (1) "Good" is indefinable, (2) there are objective moral truths, and (3) the basic moral truths are self-evident to a
mature mind. Let me explain these claims.
1. "Good" is a simple, indefinable notion. Suppose that someone defines "good" as "socially approved." We should ask, "Are socially
approved things necessarily good?" The answer clearly is "no," which refutes the definition. We can refute other definitions of "good" in a
similar way. Since "good" is indefinable, we can't prove moral conclusions from non-moral premises alone.
2. There are objective moral truths -- moral truths that don't depend on human thinking or feeling. "Hatred is wrong" is an example. Hatred
is wrong in itself. It would still be wrong even if everyone approved of it. It's an objective truth that hatred is wrong.
There are self-evident moral truths
3. The basic moral principles are self-evident truths -- known truths that require no further proof or justification. To apply these to concrete
actions requires further information. It's never self-evident what we ought to do in a concrete situation.
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To arrive at the self-evident principles of morality requires reflection and intellectual maturity. The test of such principles isn't their initial
plausibility, but whether a careful examination uncovers implications that clash with our intuitions.
Source: http://www.jcu.edu/philosophy/gensler/et/et-04-00.htm
7. Value-judgements are nothing more than expressions of emotion (e.g., 'Bush is evil' really means 'Boo Bush!!'); an extreme form of
subjectivism.
8. See box:
Hume has a procedure for determining if ideas are legitimate or illegitimate.
It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it
is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavoured to
explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and
precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition,
which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most
simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of?
By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual
view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and
sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their
correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics,
by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our
apprehension, and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry.
So, on Hume's account, any complex idea should be divisible into simple ideas, and any simple idea should be traceable back
to an antecedent impression. So, if you have doubts about the legitimacy of an idea, you can determine if the idea is legitimate
b y determining what its parts are and tracing those parts back to their antecedent impressions. If you can do this the idea is a
Hume's microscope
legitimate one. If you cannot do this, that is you cannot find an antecedent impression for the idea, it is very like illegitimate -a sophistry or an illusion. Hume, as we shall see, uses his microscope in examining ideas of causality -- to search for the antecedent impression of
such ideas as 'necessary connection' 'power' and 'force.'
Hume distinguishes two different kinds of truths. The first are relations among ideas. These are mathematical ideas such as squares have four
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sides, and the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Such relations among ideas are necessary. But they also tell us nothing
about the world. While we may know with certainty that the square on the side of a right triangle which subtends the right angle is equal to the
squares on the other two sides, that does not tell us if there are any right triangles in the world. One mark of this kind of truth is that its negation is
a contradiction. This follows from the fact that relations among ideas are necessary. So, it is possible to demonstrate that the proposition '2 + 2
does not equal 4' (the negation of '2 + 2 = 4') when combined with the definitions of numbers and other relevant propositions, leads to a
contradiction. The second kind of truths are matters of fact. In contrast to relations among ideas, matters of fact are contingent, and hence their
negations are not contradictions. Matters of facts provide us with genuine information about the world. Here are some examples of matters of fact:
"John has a cold." "Australia is a large continent lying in the Pacific Ocean in the Southern Hemisphere north of Antarctica." "There are still a few
depleted salmon runs in the rivers of the Pacific Northwest." "Some roses are not red." "NATO is bombing Serbia." Hume divides all propositions
into one or another of these categories. This division into two is Hume's fork. Both the fork and the microscope play important parts in Hume's
investigation into the nature of causality and the problem of induction.
Source: http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/distance/hume/comment1.html
10. People can have different moral opinions WITHOUT logical contradiction. That said, there is a close similarity in how people reach moral
conclusions and the conclusions drawn.
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