The General Election Campaign
Steven E. Schier and Janet Box-Steffensmeier
Once it became clear that Barack Obama and John McCain would be the major parties’
presidential nominees, many imposing questions surrounded the fall general election contest.
Would race prove an impediment for Barack Obama, the first African American nominee of a
major party in the nation’s history? Would the impressive financial advantage his campaign had
accrued prove decisive in the fall contest? Could John McCain overcome the unpopularity of his
party and its president? How would candidate debates and campaign events affect the 2008
election outcome? Would the vice presidential nominees affect the election result?
Our account relates the 2008 fall campaign’s answers to these questions. Underlying
such uncertainties, however, lay certain conditions that pointed to a Democratic victory in
November. Political scientists produced many models aimed at predicting the presidential
election outcome. By the second half of 2008, virtually all of these models forecast a
Democratic victory in November.1 In eight different prediction models, the most common
variables used to estimate the election outcome were economic conditions and the job approval
of the incumbent president. Both of these influences pointed in the same direction. Declining
economic growth, rising unemployment and the remarkably low job approval of President
George W. Bush all foretold good news for Democrats and bad tidings for the GOP, regardless
of campaign events in the fall. Since the creation of public opinion polling, whenever a retiring
president had a job approval below 45 percent, his party’s nominee lost the White House.
Bush’s approval rating ranked well below that throughout 2008, frequently dipping below 30
percent.
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A sluggish economy contributed to Bush’s low approval, but the unpopular war in Iraq
also served to depress GOP prospects. Though progress in the war had accelerated markedly
because of a U.S. troop surge in 2007, a majority of the American public continued to view the
initiation of the war by the Bush administration in 2003 as a mistake. Just as the party presiding
over a poor economy suffers in presidential elections, so also have the “war parties” in American
history. David Mayhew notes that a war can bring electoral contests about whether it “should
have been fought in the first place” and over the possibility of “incompetent management”
(Mayhew 2005, 480). Both matters plagued the GOP in 2008. Larry Bartels and John Zaller also
found that the drawn-out wars of Korea and Vietnam cost the party in charge a 4 percent loss at
the polls in the 1952 and 1968 elections as the wars dragged on (Bartels and Zaller 2001). The
Iraq war’s 2006 electoral costs for the GOP, when it lost control of both the Senate and House,
placed it firmly in the Korea/Vietnam category. 2008 promised more of the same.
A number of other circumstances also favored Democrats in the 2008 presidential race.
John McCain sought to succeed a two-term incumbent of his party, a feat accomplished only
once since 1932. A historically high proportion of Americans – in some polls as high as 90
percent – though the nation was on the “wrong track.” Polls reported that far fewer Republicans
indicated enthusiasm for their nominee than did Democrats for their nominee. Surveys also
indicated that the percentage of adult Americans calling themselves Republicans, which had
reached parity with Democrats at 37 percent in the 2004 election, was now slumping
considerably and falling five to ten points behind that of their partisan rivals. Almost two dozen
House Republicans had retired rather than face reelection in such a situation (York 2008).
The adverse environment for Republicans was reflected in the fundraising totals for the
parties’ presidential candidates in 2008. During the primary season, Democratic presidential
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candidates vastly outraised Republicans by $787 million to $477 million. Barack Obama led the
Democratic pack during the primaries with an astounding $414 million raised, about twice that
of McCain’s $216 million. Hillary Clinton’s withdrawal from the presidential race in June had
cleared the way for the Obama campaign to focus on the convention and fall campaign. The
campaign chose to opt out of the public financing system, foregoing $85.1 million in public
general election funds to be able to raise unlimited cash from individual contributors, albeit in
amounts no larger than $2,300 per person. This decision would prove to be wise, allowing the
Obama campaign to raise an unprecedented $764.8 million during the 2008 election cycle. With
abundant funds, they would blanket the airwaves with ads and create a get-out-the-vote ground
game in key states that the GOP could not rival.
Flush with cash, the Obama campaign decided to “expand the field” of the race by
establishing dozens of campaign offices not only in crucial swing states like Florida, Nevada,
New Mexico, Ohio and Pennsylvania, but also in traditionally GOP strongholds like Indiana,
North Carolina, Colorado, and Virginia. Though the GOP retained a formidable get out the vote
operation developed in 2004 for 2008, the McCain campaign and national party simply did not
have the resources to match the extensive network of field offices created by Obama’s millions.
No modern general election campaign had ever assembled the funds and expertise to create such
an extensive ground game before. Whatever the events of the fall campaign, a substantial
Obama advantage in cash and organization would persist through the autumn.
Given all this, it was no surprise that the Democratic nominee enjoyed a lead in the polls
over the GOP candidate throughout 2008. Figure 1 shows the pattern of the McCain-Obama
horserace over time. With few exceptions in 2007-2008, Obama was ahead, a trend that would
persist through the general election campaign, except for a brief McCain lead in mid-September.
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But in August 2008 Obama’s lead was usually within single digits, and he was a newcomer to
presidential politics with some vulnerabilities as a candidate. Previous prediction models had not
always foretold the winner; many of them had favored Al Gore in 2000. That suggested that the
race might well go either way, depending upon the events of the fall. Neither campaign could
take its situation for granted; each faced challenges.
[Figure 1 about here]
Campaign Strategies during the Convention Season
Another uncertainty regarding the general election involved the impact of the party
conventions on the presidential race. Traditionally, the “out” party held its convention first,
about a month before the convention of the incumbent party. In 2008, that schedule was
truncated. Democrats moved their convention to the end of August, one week before the GOP
convention of early September. One reason for this move was to avoid possible post convention
difficulties like those suffered by John Kerry in 2004 when advertising by the Swift Boat
Veterans for Truth had damaged his candidacy. Such tight scheduling, however, might also limit
Obama’s post convention “bounce” in the polls. How would back-to-back conventions change
the race? Traditionally the post convention “bounce” produced an improvement in a nominee’s
competitive standing from the low to high single digits. Would that prove to be the case this
time? Both parties located their convention in swing states they hope to win in the fall – the
Democrats in Colorado and the Republicans in Minnesota.
During the summer, the Obama campaign has conducted extensive polling on the
strengths and weaknesses of the two parties’ nominees. They fixed on a strategy that would
prove quite productive in the months ahead: tie McCain as closely as possible to the unpopular
Bush. David Axelrod, the campaign’s chief strategist, in articulating this approach, held that
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America was looking for “the remedy, not the replica” (Lizza 2008). This approach involved
distinguishing Obama from “Washington insiders,” as he had done with great success in his
contest with Hillary Clinton during the primaries. Further, Obama’s research revealed that
voters did not know that much about John McCain. Joel Benenson, the campaign’s pollster,
recalled, “What we knew at the start of the campaign was that the notion of John McCain as a
change agent and independent voice didn’t exist anywhere outside of the beltway.” (Lizza 2008).
The adverse environment for the GOP, limited voter knowledge about John McCain and
large financial advantage made the execution of a fall campaign straightforward for the Obama
high command. But some immediate challenges lay before them. They had to prevent party
disunity at the national convention, introduce their candidate effectively to the public via his
convention speech, and pick a vice presidential nominee who would offset and shortcomings of
Obama as a candidate. To allay concerns about his inexperience, Obama chose Joe Biden, a
thirty-six year veteran of the U.S. Senate and chair of its important Foreign Relations committee,
as his vice presidential nominee. Biden was to prove a jaunty campaigner, but one whose
propensity for verbal missteps would produce difficulties for the campaign throughout the fall.
The convention itself began a bit listlessly, but delegates were roused by endorsement
speeches by Hillary and Bill Clinton. Biden’s speech featured sharp attacks on partisan rivals, a
usual task left to the vice presidential nominee. Referring to McCain, his longtime friend, he
asserted, “John thinks that during the Bush years ‘we've made great progress economically.’ I
think it's been abysmal. And in the Senate, John sided with President Bush 95 percent of the
time.” That fact would become a familiar trope in the Democratic campaign speeches and
advertisements. Obama’s well-delivered speech provided a vast spectacle, filling a football
stadium with thousands of fans and drawing almost forty million television viewers. His
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remarks concluded with a call for change and unity, major themes of his candidacy throughout
2008:
The men and women who serve in our battlefields may be Democrats and Republicans and
Independents, but they have fought together and bled together and some died together under the
same proud flag. They have not served a Red America or a Blue America - they have served the
United States of America. . . . At defining moments like this one, the change we need doesn't
come from Washington. Change comes to Washington. Change happens because the American
people demand it - because they rise up and insist on new ideas and new leadership, a new
politics for a new time.
Political scientist James Stimson estimated Obama’s post convention poll bounce six
days after Obama’s speech at 4.33 percent, a bit under the historic average of 4.9 percent
(Stimson, 2008). One reason for the small bounce was probably the surprising announcement of
Sarah Palin, Governor of Alaska, as John McCain’s running mate on the morning after Obama’s
speech, depriving the Democratic nominee of several days of positive post convention coverage.
Palin had served less than two years as governor and before that had been mayor of the small
town of Wasilla, Alaska. The choice surprised the Obama campaign and the rest of the political
world. Few knew what to expect from her. The Palin pick was one of several attempts by the
McCain to “shake up” the adverse environment of the race.
The McCain campaign during the summer had puttered slowly along, short on funds and
receiving less media attention than did the Obama effort. Top McCain aides understood they
faced a challenging situation. Unlike the Obama campaign, which could readily execute a
simple strategy and message that was likely to bring electoral success, the McCain strategists
faced a much more difficult challenge. Chief strategist Steve Schmidt recalled: “This was a
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campaign that was dealt a very, very tough hand of cards. It was highly unlikely that there will
ever be another campaign in our lifetimes that [will feature] a worse environment than the
environment that John McCain had to run in” (Schmidt 2008). Since no simple message would
work, the McCain campaign focused instead on a series of tactical disruptions that might thrown
their opponent off track and open up new opportunities for them. The main opportunities for
surprises that might change the race lay in the central events of the fall campaign: the vice
presidential pick, the convention acceptance speeches, and the candidate debates.
The McCain campaign began their disruptions with a “celebrity” ad in the summer,
which mocked Obama’s July international trip by comparing him to Paris Hilton and Brittany
Spears. The celebrity label disturbed the Obama campaign, which viewed it as a negative
description that might stick to their candidate. Then came the Palin pick, which caught Obama
campaign off guard. Palin had been Schmidt’s recommendation in order to shake up the race. A
governor with a reputation as a reformer, she gained McCain’s nod after a few conversations.
The immediate public reaction to Palin was positive, augmented by her impressive
acceptance speech at the GOP convention. Her speech both introduced her to the public and
included some barbs regarding Obama’s inexperience. Describing herself as a “hockey mom”,
she ad libbed the following description: “You know the difference between a pit bull and a
hockey mom? Lipstick.” She contrasted her experience with local government to that of
Obama’s as a community organizer: “Before I became governor of the great state of Alaska, I
was mayor of my hometown. And since our opponents in this presidential election seem to look
down on that experience, let me explain to them what the job involves. I guess a small-town
mayor is sort of like a ‘community organizer,’ except that you have actual responsibilities.”
Palin’s strongly conservative positions created enthusiasm among GOP activists, who had been
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cool to McCain since he clinched the nomination in the spring. McCain’s speech was reasonably
well delivered, but proved no match for the Palin and Obama rhetorical successes of the
convention season. He concluded it by referring to his career fighting for reform: “Fight with
me. Fight with me. . . . Nothing is inevitable here. We're Americans, and we never give up. We
never quit. We never hide from history. We make history.” By the end of the GOP convention,
however, the McCain tactical disruption seemed to have worked. The GOP ticket enjoyed a
convention bounce estimated by James Stimson at eight points, doubling that of the Democratic
ticket. By September 8, four days after the end of the GOP convention the average of national
polls put McCain ahead of Obama by three points.
A Series of Unfortunate Events
The McCain lead would quickly dissipate due to a unique combination of events. Some
were expected, such as the inevitable decay of the convention bounce. Some were self-inflicted,
such as a series of McCain campaign miscues, including Palin’s poor media “rollout” and
McCain’s abrupt behavior during the nation’s financial crisis. That crisis was truly an
unprecedented event. It was not just unique in 2008, but had never before occurred in the midst
of any general election campaign in American history. The international financial system faced
a dramatic threat to its stability of the sort it had never encountered in the decades since it had
effectively globalized.
Before these tumultuous events transformed the presidential race, the McCain campaign
ran into trouble. Though Sarah Palin’s nomination had garnered much attention and interest in
the GOP ticket – the television ratings for the GOP convention matched that of the Democratic
convention – she had no experience with presidential politics and very limited knowledge of
international affairs. The McCain campaign then made a series of mistakes in addressing these
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shortcomings. In the weeks following the convention, she avoided press conferences and only
spoke at campaign rallies. She was limited to two high profile media interviews, first by ABC
anchor Charles Gibson and later by CBS anchor Katie Couric. Palin was cautious during the
Gibson interview and did not display an abundant understanding of global issues. Her comment
that her international experience came from Alaska being on the Russian border received
widespread derision.
But the Couric interview was worse for Palin. Reportedly, she objected to the invasive
staff role during her preparation for the Gibson interview, and did not prepare extensively for
Couric. Her lack of knowledge received embarrassing exposure when she could not name a
Supreme Court decision with which she disagreed, and could not discuss McCain’s record as a
governmental reformer in any detail. This led to harsh but funny depictions of her by actress
Tina Fey on Saturday Night Live and a steady decline in the number of American indicating in
polls that they considered her a qualified to run for vice president or that they had a positive
opinion of her as a candidate. Later in the campaign, Palin gave many more media interviews
and press conferences without incident, drawing into question the McCain media strategy for her
in September. In retrospect, it seemed a serious stumble by a campaign that could afford few
miscues.
Joe Biden also earned derisive treatment on Saturday Night Live for his verbal gaffes
during the campaign – such as his description of FDR addressing the American people on
television in the 1930s, long before television arrived in American homes – but polls consistently
indicated that a majority of respondents viewed him as qualified to be president. Though Palin
performed soundly in the vice presidential debate on October 2, surveys all revealed that the
public through Biden had won. Palin continued to outdraw McCain during her campaign
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appearances and she remained a strong favorite among Republicans. Over the course of the
campaign, however, independents, moderates and suburbanites – crucial groups of swing voters
– steadily viewed her more negatively. By Election Day, she was not the unambiguous positive
for the McCain campaign she seemed to be at the GOP convention. Sarah Palin made history,
though, by becoming a major player in the campaign overnight and the first female GOP vice
presidential nominee.
The big blow of history came in the global financial crisis of September 2008, the largest
such crisis in seventy years and the first occurring in the midst of a presidential general election
campaign. The crisis originated in the housing market, where the federal government for years
had encouraged high-risk “subprime” mortgages. Packages of these mortgages had been
“securitized,” made into investment vehicles, offered to investors by financial institutions. At
the time, it was widely thought that securitization would make the issuance of such risky
mortgages less of a gamble. By 2008, it was clear that this was not the case. A U.S. monetary
policy pursued by the Federal Reserve Board had made the cost of credit negligible for several
years prior to 2008. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), federally created corporations that underwrote
mortgages, had engaged in risky mortgages for years, assuming that the creation of mortgagebacked securities would shield them from losses. As the housing market slumped in 2007-2008,
mortgage-backed securities and the financial condition of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became
parlous. This led to a collapse of several major American financial institutions in September
2008, a crisis threatening the very operation of the international financial system.
On September 7, the federal government took control of the operations of Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae, accepting responsibility for their swollen liability of some $5 trillion in
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mortgages. Then on September 15 came the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment
house, a Wall Street titan, brought on in part by its holding of suspect mortgage-backed
securities. The reaction of American and international stock markets was severe; the very
confidence of global financial securities seemed in question. The next day, the federal
government announced a $5 billion emergency loan to rescue the stressed American
International Group investment company in order to prevent a further collapse of international
financial markets. Two days later, the Bush administration announced a $700 billion plan for the
government to buy mortgage-backed securities in order to inject funds to the finance companies
that had overinvested in them. This, it was hoped, would restore confidence in these companies
and, in turn stabilize the national and international financial systems. That plan required
Congressional approval.
It is at this point the presidential politics directly intersected with the crisis. Though the
economy was the foremost public concern throughout 2008, the crisis boosted its mention as the
most important problem to the highest level since the 1980 recession (Jones 2008). It became
the preeminent issue in fall 2008 as gas prices and the Iraq war fell as public concerns. In this
situation, each presidential candidate faced a challenge. McCain, who previously had admitted
his limited understanding of economics, needed to demonstrate a reliable competence in
addressing the issue. Obama, a relative newcomer to national politics, had to respond in a way
that instilled confidence in his ability to be president. McCain stumbled at the outset of the crisis
by claiming in a speech “the fundamentals of our economy are sound” when world financial
markets were teetering. His campaign’s penchant for seeking tactical advantage also led him to
undertake audacious actions. On Wednesday, September 24, McCain agreed, upon Obama’s
initiative, to sign a joint statement of principles about how to address the crisis. Immediately
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after agreeing to this in a phone call, however, McCain suspended his campaign, urged
cancellation of the first presidential debate because of the crisis, and flew to Washington. All of
these actions were a surprise to Obama, who responded by urging that the debate go on as
scheduled because, “It’s going to be part of the president’s job to be able to deal with more than
one thing at once.”
McCain’s rush back to Washington did not go well for him. At a White House meeting
both he and Obama attended the next day, it was clear that bipartisan consensus on the bailout
plan did not exist. House Republicans did not agree with its provisions. McCain urged that their
perspectives be heeded in the bailout negotiations, but the candidate himself never became a
major participant in deliberations over the bailout package. Meanwhile, he quickly dropped his
objection to the first debate and flew to Jackson, Mississippi to participate, despite the fact that
the crisis was no closer to resolution. Three days later, on Monday, September 29, House
Republicans voted in large numbers to insure the failure of the bailout plan on the House floor.
This triggered a big downturn in stocks around the globe, and more frenzied negotiations. A
revised plan passed on Friday, October 2 and was quickly signed into law. Both Obama and
McCain voted for the bailout plan. Stocks, however, remained depressed throughout the
remainder of the campaign season, and a parade of bad news regarding rising unemployment and
negative economic growth arrived in September and October.
The Obama campaign had hoped that McCain’s actions would label him as unstable and
erratic in a crisis, and polls indicated that public views of McCain’s leadership abilities declined
with the financial crisis. Obama, who was generally constructive during the crisis, urging fellow
Democrats to support the rescue plan, saw his leadership scores improve. The greater problem
of the crisis for McCain, however, was the very presence of the economic problems themselves.
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The economic issue had benefitted the Democrats all year and recent events had made those
issues dominant for the remainder of the campaign. Polls indicated considerable public
opposition to the bailout plan itself. By suspending his campaign and rushing to Washington,
McCain had managed to associate himself strongly with both with a serious problem, the
financial crisis, and the controversial solution to it. Obama, whose reaction to the October
economic events was less impetuous, suffered less from the crisis and now had a powerful
economic issue buoying his “change” message. McCain’s tactical gamble did not pay off.
The Debates
Presidential debates are one of the major “flex points” in the general election season
because they directly expose the candidates in verbal competition before millions of Americans.
Such situations create mass opinions, giving both campaigns a rare opportunity to reset the race.
The McCain campaign hoped to illustrate through the debates that Obama was not up to the job
of president; that he was dangerously inexperienced. The Obama campaign sought demonstrate
their candidate’s presidential readiness and to tie McCain closely to the unpopular George W.
Bush. The first debate, on September 26, involved foreign policy and featured the two
candidates at rival lecterns. The vice presidential debate on October 2 featured an identical
podium format, and was not limited to a particular subject. The second presidential debate On
October 7 presented the candidates in a town hall format, ambling about and answering audience
questions. The final, October 15 debate placed the candidates at a table with a single moderator,
answering questions and engaging in direct dialogue over economic issues. Polls and most
audience surveys of the debates indicated that the Democratic candidate won every debate.
Partisans predictably labeled their party’s candidate the winner, but, importantly, independents
consistently viewed the Democrat as winning the debate as well. Perhaps the circumstances
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surrounding the election – an unpopular president, a slumping economy, an unpopular war in
Iraq – stacked the deck prohibitively against a successful Republican debate performance. Or
perhaps Obama and Biden were just better debaters than McCain and Palin.
The debates did not involve any memorable “gotcha” moments that changed the course
of the campaign. Such events are rare in the history of general election debates. Obama, for his
part, succeeded in appearing presidential and allaying doubts about his leadership ability. His
rhetoric placed him in the mainstream on many issues. One of his most successful moments,
measured by audience reaction, came at the end of the third debate, when he stressed personal
responsibility in education: “But there's one last ingredient that I just want to mention, and that's
parents. We can't do it just in the schools. Parents are going to have to show more responsibility.
They've got to turn off the TV set, put away the video games, and, finally, start instilling that
thirst for knowledge that our students need” (Sullivan 2008). He repeatedly linked McCain to
the unpopular George W. Bush, not only during the debates, but also in many of his campaign
ads that were flooding the airwaves at this time.
McCain in the first debate asserted that Obama’s willingness to meet with hostile foreign
leaders “without preconditions” amounted to dangerous diplomacy. That failed to move voter
sentiment, as did his mention in the final debate of Obama’s past association with 1960s radical
William Ayers. He did present another criticism during the final debate that proved more useful
to his campaign. McCain introduced an individual who would figure prominently in the
campaign’s final weeks: “Joe the Plumber,” specifically Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher, a
plumber’s assistant from Holland, Ohio. Wurzelbacher was captured on tape raising concerns
with Obama about his campaign’s proposal to raise taxes on those making more than $250,000 a
year. Obama in response said: "It's not that I want to punish your success. I just want to make
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sure that everybody who is behind you, that they've got a chance for success, too . . . When you
spread the wealth around, it's good for everybody." Citing the incident, McCain challenged
Obama: “You were going to put him in a higher tax bracket which was going to increase his
taxes, which was going to cause him not to be able to employ people, which Joe was trying to
realize the American dream [sic].”
The Endgame
By the end of the debates, on October 20, Obama enjoyed an average lead of six points in
national polls. The Obama strategy of reassurance had worked. The economy, in desperate
straits, remained central to voters’ minds. His campaign’s impressive ground game was
outstripping GOP efforts in all major states and his superior campaign funding allowed him to
outspend McCain on the airwaves by considerable margins as well. Under the harsh scrutiny of
the campaign media, Obama had not made any major mistakes. McCain’s attempts to make
Obama appear to be the “dangerous” choice had not succeeded, and his own judgment was now
called into question regarding his actions during the September financial crisis and his choice of
Sarah Palin as a running mate.
The McCain campaign, however, had found two tactical opportunities to employ in the
final stage of the campaign. Obama’s “spread the wealth around” became an opportunity to
revive worries about possible tax increases. Joe the Plumber himself joined the campaign trail
for McCain. The campaign expanded the critique to suggest that Obama was a sort of socialist.
Sarah Palin, on the stump two days after the final debate, claimed: “Senator Obama said he
wants to quote ‘spread the wealth.’ . . . Friends, now is no time to experiment with socialism. . . .
Whatever you call his tax plan and that redistribution of wealth, it will destroy jobs. It will hurt
our economy.” Another tactical opportunity came in the form of a statement by Biden recorded
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at a Democratic fundraiser: “Mark my words. Mark my words. It will not be six months before
the world tests Barack Obama . . . The world is looking. . . . Watch, we're gonna have an
international crisis, a generated crisis, to test the mettle of this guy.” The McCain campaign
jumped on this to claim that Obama was in fact a risky choice, a person whom could not be
trusted to keep American secure.
The Obama campaign, for its part, was able to rely on arguments at the end that had
worked for them throughout the fall campaign. On October 26, Obama claimed that McCain’s
recent criticisms of President Bush, aimed at distancing himself from the president, were “like
Robin getting mad at Batman.” The Obama campaign’s unprecedented funds allowed them to
purchase a half-hour for a primetime program on several national networks on the Wednesday
before the election. Most of the program concerned the economic problems of voters in a
number of swing states such as Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, with the candidate explaining how
his policies would improve their situations. He explained his policy specifics while expressing
empathy: “We measure the strength of our economy not by the number of billionaires we have
or the profits of the Fortune 500, or by whether someone with a good idea can take a risk and
start a new business, or whether the waitress who lives on tips can take a day off and look after a
sick kid without losing her job.”
McCain, for his part, had to appear on interview shows to get some rival exposure.
During the final weeks, the McCain campaign increased its ad buys to match those of Obama,
after being badly outspent for months. In the last days of the campaign, McCain and Palin
hurriedly visited many states that previously had been safely Republican – Indiana, Missouri,
North Carolina and Virginia – while also traveling to traditional swing states like Ohio, Florida
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and Pennsylvania. The travel schedule revealed, far more than any candidate’s rhetoric, that the
GOP ticket‘s prospects were dimming.
The Election Result
Election night delivered a solid victory for the Democratic ticket in both the popular vote
and the Electoral College. Obama and Biden garnered 52.9 percent of the popular vote and 365
electoral votes to the GOP ticket’s 45.7 percent and 173 electoral votes. A Democratic ticket had
gained 50 percent of the popular vote for the first time since 1976. Turnout was estimated at
about 131.3 million, constituting between 61.6 and 63.0 percent of eligible voters, depending on
varying estimates of the total eligible electorate. That comprised the highest turnout since the
1960s, a testament to Obama’s massive field organization. Even so, it was only slightly higher
than 2004’s 59.6 percent turnout (Center for the Study of the American Electorate 2008;
McDonald 2008). Figure 2 reveals that nine states voting for the GOP in 2004 went Democratic.
In several of these states, as evident in Table 1, the swing to the Democrats was pronounced.
Comfortable 2004 GOP victories in North Carolina, Virginia and Florida were transformed to
narrow Democratic wins. Narrow 2004 GOP wins in Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico and Colorado
became lopsided defeats in 2008. Ohio, traditionally a swing state in recent elections, swung
from narrowly GOP in 2004 to narrowly Democratic in 2008.
[Figure 2 and Table 1 about here]
Most remarkably, though the GOP had carried Indiana by 21 points in 2004, Obama’s
extensive ads and ground game there helped him squeeze out a narrow 25,000 vote statewide
win. In examining the Indiana results, analyst Michael Barone concluded: “Organization
matters. I was not sure how much the Obama organization could deliver in actual votes. The
answer turns out to be a lot. The Indiana results are very impressive” (Barone 2008). Barone
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noted that lopsided swing in that state probably resulted from the lack of a strong GOP
organization resulting from the state’s previously reliable GOP voting pattern. In the
traditionally competitive state of Ohio, in contrast, where the GOP had long been organized for
hard-fought contests, the Obama swing was much smaller. The Obama organization proved its
ability to greatly “expand the playing field” much to their advantage. In contrast, McCain made
no inroads into the Democratic Electoral College base. His campaign made concerted efforts in
the final phases of the campaign in two traditionally blue states – New Hampshire and
Pennsylvania – but lost both decisively.
Throughout his 2008 campaign, Obama decried the polarization and division besetting
America. He first criticized it in his celebrated 2004 address to the Democratic National
Convention: “The pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into Red States and Blue States;
Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats. But I've got news for them, too. We are
one people . . .” One ironic result of the 2008 popular vote was that, despite Obama’s impressive
victory, the statewide results evidenced even more polarization than in 2000 and 2004, in fact
more than had any election since 1948. Counting the number of states where the winner’s share
of the statewide vote was at least ten points higher or lower than his nationwide vote, 2008
produced eighteen states with such polarized results, compared to sixteen in 2000 and fifteen in
2004. Only one election from 1948-1996 (in the tumultuous year of 1968, with fifteen) featured
more than eleven such polarized states. What does this mean? Obama’s great popularity in blue
states and Palin’s strong appeal in red states may have augmented polarization in 2008.
Polarization does not just result from George W. Bush’s presence on the ballot, but instead may
be an enduring feature of our politics. Unity, a major theme in Obama’s campaign rhetoric, may
not be so easy to achieve during his presidency (Cost 2008).
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The Obama win hinged on the support of four demographic groups: African Americans,
Latinos, young voters, and highly educated voters. Table 2 reveals that Obama scored
resounding (95 percent) support among African-Americans, whose ranks grew from eleven
percent of the electorate in 2004 to thirteen percent in 2008. Some analysts claimed before the
election was that Obama’s race might cost him votes. Only nine percent of voters, however, said
race was a factor in their presidential vote, and a majority of them favored Obama. Latinos also
voted much more Democratic in 2008 than in 2004 (increasing from 53 to 67 percent) and their
percentage of the electorate increased by one percent. Since the Latino share of the American
population and electorate is bound to increase in coming years, that is very good news for
Democrats. One of the most remarkable shifts in the election was the large margin Obama
gained among voters aged 18-29. His 24-point advantage was vastly larger than John Kerry’s
nine-point edge in 2004. Young voters, like Latino voters, portend the future of the American
electorate. Obama narrowly carried college graduates, a group that the GOP won regularly in
previous elections, and also carried those with post-graduate degrees by a whopping eighteen
points, besting Kerry’s 2004 margin by seven points. These groups also will grow as a
percentage of the electorate in future years should education levels continue to rise, as is likely.
Obama also narrowly carried the suburbs, a crucial area of swing voters. Obama carried every
state where he equaled or exceeded his national level of fifty percent of the suburban vote. The
future of the 2008 Democratic coalition, judged by these demographic trends, seems bright. Exit
polls reported that overall, the Democrats enjoyed a seven point advantage over Republicans in
the 2008 electorate – 39 to 32 percent – up from a 37-37 tie in 2004, the biggest partisan shift
across two consecutive elections since exit polling began.
[Table 2 about here]
19
In contrast, where did McCain score well? McCain carried white voters, but the white
proportion of the electorate shrank by three percent – from 77 to 74 percent – and McCain’s
margin among them was five points less than gathered of Bush in 2004. He also won rural and
older voters by comfortable margins. The rural population is not growing as a proportion of the
American population. Older voters will not help build future Republican majorities unless some
of the more Democratic younger voters change their minds over time. For future electoral
success, the GOP will have to reach beyond older, white and rural voters. McCain suffered from
the two central factors mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: George W. Bush’s low job
approval and concerns over a declining economy. McCain won every state where Bush’s job
approval was over 35 percent in the exit polls and lost every state where Bush’s job approval was
below 35 percent (except Missouri, which McCain carried by less than 4,000 votes). Fully 85
percent of voters were “very worried” about economic conditions, and Obama carried these
voters by ten points, 54-44 (Cable News Network 2008).
The scale of Obama’s success in the 2008 is unusual and impressive. He greatly
expanded the number of states in which his party was electorally competitive for the presidency.
He won comfortably among groups that will make up a steadily larger proportion of future
electorates. He increased his margins among his partisans while also converting groups of swing
voters, such as independents, moderates and suburbanites. He did this by raising vast sums,
deploying it ably to flood the airwaves with ads and create the largest grassroots organization in
modern campaign history, all the while personally demonstrating constant message discipline, in
contrast to running mate Joe Biden’s occasional gaffes. One of the greatest accomplishments of
the Obama campaign was its paucity of mistakes. That may seem unimportant, but consider the
cost of the McCain campaign’s mistakes during the fall campaign and the smooth running
20
Obama campaign seems all the more remarkable. Oh, and one more unusual fact -- all this was
accomplished by the first African American to win the White House in our nation’s history.
The Broader Consequences
Do the solid Democratic presidential and congressional victories of November 4, 2008
betoken a long-term transformation of American politics? Election scholars coined the term
“realignment” to connote an unusual election or series of elections that reconfigures electoral
politics for the long term. Such elections feature sharp changes in issues, party leaders, the
regional and demographic bases of power of the two parties that create a new competitive
situation in national elections. The last definitive realignment occurred in 1932, when a Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s landslide election brought new groups -- African Americans, blue collar
workers -- into an enlarged Democratic coalition and reshaped electoral competition around a
variety of new social welfare issues. The “New Deal coalition” dominated American politics
until the 1960s, when it gradually was displaced by an era of more evenly contested presidential
and congressional elections. Might the big Democratic victory of 2008 be the start of a partisan
realignment?
We won’t know the answer to that for several years, because enduring changes are only
evident after much time has passed. Even so, there are reasons to doubt that realignment began
in 2008. Realigning election feature sharp changes in voting behavior and party allegiances get
rearranged. No such sharp shifts occurred in 2008. Political scientist Larry Bartels analyzed
state results in 2008 and found them very similar to those of the close election of 2004.
Democrats just gained a few more votes among groups across the board; no big shifts in
allegiance occurred. The overall shift in the Democratic margin was 29 points in 1932 compared
to 9 points in 2008. Bartels found the 2004-8 continuity greatly contrasted with the shifting
21
state patterns of the 1932 election (Bartels 2008). The Democratic gains in Congress were more
similar in size to the GOP gains in the midterm election in 1994, which was not a realigning
election, than they were to the mammoth Democratic gains of 1932.
Further, the election did not result from the surging popularity of the Democratic Party,
but rather from the unpopularity of the GOP. In a November 2008 survey, Democrats were
about as popular with voters in 2008 as they were in 2004, when they lost the presidency and
Congressional seats, while the GOP had dropped in popularity by a big margin (Democracy
Corps 2008). Overall, it seems the unprecedented financial crisis of September 2008 magnified
a narrow Democratic lead into a substantial November victory. Figure 1 reveals that Obama’s
lead surged in late September. Scott Winship draws the appropriate conclusion: “Without the
financial crisis, the already weak economy might not have been enough to give Obama his swing
states [several of which he won by very narrow margins]. In that case, we would have seen our
third straight “50-50 Nation” election. Barring financial crises every four years, that’s no recipe
for realignment” (Winship 2008).
Prospects for the Parties
To prosper, the GOP really must move on from the issues and leaders of 2008. The
unpopular George W. Bush will leave the White House, opening up possibilities for new leaders
and new coalition construction. But that task will not be easy. The GOP traditionally enjoyed a
reputation as the superior party at government management and the maintenance of national
security. The many miscues of the George W. Bush presidency – Iraq and Hurricane Katrina, for
example – have deeply tarnished that reputation. The immediate concerns of American involve
their endangered economic security. The GOP, traditionally the party of limited government and
free markets, is not positioned well to meet those needs in the short term. A rethinking of the
22
GOP policy agenda must occur for the party to expand its electoral prospects in the future. And
that rethinking is best led publicly by new leaders better able to appeal to a demographically
changing electorate.
The Democrats now have an unusual opportunity to dominate national policymaking for
the first time since they controlled the Congress and Presidency in 1993-4. But they have asked
for, and gained, the power to address a daunting set of problems. America was headed into its
deepest recession in almost thirty years as Obama took office, making economic stimulus a top
priority for the new president. But other troublesome issues crowded the agenda: health care
reform, environmental problems, historically large governmental deficits, ongoing military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, international terrorism. How soon must government by
Democrats produce results meeting the American public’s approval in order for the party to
retain its hold on power? And when will Republicans be seen to offer a credible alternative?
The answers to such questions are hostage to events, as was the 2008 presidential election. As
Walter Dean Burnham, a leading scholar of American elections put it: “There’s a huge amount
of instability that’s built into the electoral system right now. Hegemony tends to erode pretty
quickly” (Harwood 2008).
Works Cited
Bartels, Larry. 2008. Election Debriefing. Center for the Study of Democratic Politics.
Princeton University. http://blogs.princeton.edu/election2008/2008/11/election-debriefing.html
(accessed November 7, 2008).
Bartels, Larry M. and John Zaller. 2001. “Presidential Vote Models: A Recount.” PS: Political
Science and Politics 34 (1): 9–20.
23
Cable News Network. 2008. “National President Exit Poll.”
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/president/ (accessed November 10, 2008).
Center for the Study of the American Electorate. African Americans, Anger, Fear and Youth
Propel Turnout to Highest Level Since 1964. American University.
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/E
E414B16927D6C9E85257522004F109D?OpenDocument
Cost, Jay. 2008. “Electoral Polarization Continues Under Obama.”
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/horseraceblog/ (accessed November 20, 2008).
Cox, Ana Marie. 2008. “McCain Campaign Autopsy.” Daily Beast, November 7.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2008-11-07/mccain-campaign-autopsy//p/
(accessed November 7, 2008).
Democracy Corps. 2008. “Post-Election Survey with Campaign for America’s Future.”
http://www.democracycorps.com/download.php?attachment=dcor110508fq1.pdf (accessed
November 25, 2008).
Harwood, John. 2008. “The End of Political Dominance.” New York Times, October 27.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/politics/27caucus.html?ref=todayspaper (accessed
October 27, 2008)
Jones, Jeffrey. 2008. “Economy Runaway Winner as Most Important Problem.”
http://www.gallup.com/poll/112093/Economy-Runaway-Winner-Most-Important-Problem.aspx
(accessed November 22, 2008).
Lizza, Ryan. 2008. “How Obama Won.” New Yorker, November 17.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/11/17/081117fa_fact_lizza?printable=true (accessed
November 17, 2008).
24
McDonald, Michael. 2008. 2008 Unofficial Vote Count. George Mason University.
http://elections.gmu.edu/preliminary_vote_2008.html (accessed December 11, 2008).
Stimson, James A. 2008. Bounce and Counterbounce. University of North Carolina – Chapel
Hill. http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/comment.htm (accessed September 22, 2008).
Sullivan, Amy. 2008. “Undecideds Laughing At, Not With, McCain.” Time magazine
Swampland blog http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2008/10/16/ (accessed November 20, 2008).
York, Byron. 2008. “John McCain, Against the Wind.” National Review online, October 27.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjI1MDk3NzU1NjI1ODQ1Mjc1NWFkNGNlMTMxYTc3
NzY= (accessed October 28, 2008).
Winship, Scott. 2008. “America the Polarized.” The New Republic, November 6.
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=68e1a802-539d-4443-9a73-4901ce151188 (accessed
November 6, 2008).
25
Figure 1: National President General Election Poll Trend: Obama and McCain
Source: pollster.com. The polling trend lines go through the "middle" of the data, with an
average error of zero. The trend estimate smoothes out daily fluctuations in the polls; it is not a
raw average of daily polls. The figures listed above the graph are the final, election day poll
estimates for each candidate. Created by Charles Franklin, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
26
Figure 2: Electoral Vote Map for the Two Major Parties, 2004 and 2008
27
28
Table I:
Popular and
Electoral
College Vote
results in the
2004 and 2008
Presidential
Elections
State
Electoral Vote 2008
Electoral Vote
2004
Popular Vote 2008
McCain
Bush
McCain
Obama
Kerry
Obama
Popular Vote 2004
Popular Vote 2008
(%)
Popular Vote
2004 (%)
Bush
McCain
Bush
Kerry
Obama
Kerry
Alabama
9
9
1,264,879
811,764
1,176,394
693,933
61
39
63
37
Alaska
3
3
192,631
122,485
190,889
111,025
60
38
61
36
Arizona
10
10
1,132,560
948,648
1,104,294
893,524
54
45
55
44
Arkansas
6
6
632,672
418,049
572,898
469,953
59
39
54
45
4,554,643
7,441,458
5,509,826
6,745,485
37
61
44
54
1,020,135
1,216,793
1,101,255
1,001,732
45
54
52
47
California
55
55
Colorado
9
Connecticut
7
7
620,210
979,316
693,826
857,488
38
61
44
54
Delaware
3
3
152,356
255,394
171,660
200,152
37
62
46
53
Dist. Of Col.
3
3
14,821
210,403
21,256
202,970
7
93
1
89
9
29
Florida
Georgia
27
15
Hawaii
Idaho
27
3,939,380
4,143,957
3,964,522
3,583,544
49
51
52
47
15
2,048,244
1,843,452
1,914,254
1,366,149
52
47
58
41
120,309
324,918
194,191
231,708
27
72
45
54
400,989
235,219
409,235
181,098
61
36
68
30
1,981,158
3,319,237
2,346,608
2,891,989
37
62
45
55
4
4
4
4
Illinois
21
Indiana
11
11
1,341,667
1,367,503
1,479,438
969,011
49
50
60
39
7
7
677,508
818,240
751,957
741,898
45
54
50
49
Iowa
21
Kansas
6
6
685,541
499,979
736,456
434,993
57
41
62
37
Kentucky
8
8
1,050,599
751,515
1,069,439
712,733
58
41
60
40
Louisiana
9
9
1,147,603
780,981
1,102,169
820,299
59
40
57
42
Maine
4
4
296,195
421,484
330,201
396,842
41
58
45
53
Maryland
10
10
956,663
1,612,692
1,024,703
1,334,493
37
62
43
56
Massachusettes
12
12
1,104,284
1,891,083
1,071,109
1,803,800
36
62
37
62
Michigan
17
17
2,044,405
2,867,680
2,313,746
2,479,183
41
57
48
51
Minnesota
10
10
1,275,409
1,573,354
1,346,695
1,445,014
44
54
48
52
Mississippi
6
6
687,266
520,864
672,660
457,768
57
43
59
40
Missouri
11
11
1,445,812
1,442,180
1,455,713
1,259,171
50
49
53
46
Montana
3
3
241,816
229,725
266,063
173,710
50
47
59
39
Nebraska
4
5
448,801
329,132
512,814
254,328
57
42
66
32
1
30
Nevada
5
New Hampshire
4
New Jersey
15
New Mexico
5
New York
31
North Carolina
15
North Dakota
3
Ohio
Oklahoma
20
7
Oregon
5
411,988
531,884
418,690
397,190
43
55
51
48
4
316,937
384,591
331,237
340,511
45
54
49
50
15
1,545,495
2,085,051
1,670,003
1,911,430
42
57
46
53
343,820
464,458
376,930
370,942
42
57
50
49
2,576,360
4,363,386
2,962,567
4,314,280
37
62
40
58
15
2,109,698
2,123,390
1,961,166
1,525,849
49
50
56
44
3
168,523
141,113
196,651
111,052
53
45
63
36
20
2,501,855
2,708,685
2,859,764
2,741,165
47
51
51
49
7
959,745
502,294
959,792
503,966
66
34
66
34
5
31
7
7
699,673
978,605
866,831
943,163
41
57
47
52
Pennsylvania
21
21
2,586,496
3,192,316
2,793,847
2,938,095
44
55
49
51
Rhode Island
4
4
165,389
296,547
169,046
259,760
35
63
39
59
South
Carolina
8
8
1,034,500
862,042
937,974
661,699
54
45
58
41
South Dakota
3
3
203,019
170,886
232,584
149,244
53
45
60
38
Tennesee
11
11
1,487,564
1,093,213
1,384,375
1,036,477
57
42
57
43
Texas
34
34
4,467,748
3,521,164
4,526,917
2,832,704
55
44
61
38
Utah
5
5
555,497
301,771
663,742
241,199
63
34
73
26
98,791
219,105
121,180
184,067
31
68
39
59
Vermont
3
3
31
Virginia
13
Washington
11
West Virginia
5
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Totals
13
11
5
10
3
173
10
3
365
286
252
1,726,053
1,958,370
1,716,959
1,454,742
47
53
54
46
1,098,072
1,548,654
1,304,894
1,510,201
41
58
46
53
394,278
301,438
423,550
326,541
56
43
56
43
1,258,181
1,670,474
1,478,120
1,489,504
43
56
49
49
160,639
80,496
167,629
70,776
65
33
69
29
58,343,671
66,882,230
62,028,719
59,028,550
46
53
Sources: Cable News Network and New York Times.
32
Table 2: Group Support in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections
2008
Voters %
2004
Voters %
Characteristic
For McCain
(%)
For Obama
(%)
For Bush
(%)
For Kerry
(%)
Party
39
37 Democrat
10
89
11
89
32
37 Republican
90
9
93
6
29
26 Independent
44
52
48
49
Ideology
22
21 Liberal
10
89
13
85
44
45 Moderate
39
60
45
54
34
34 Conservative
78
20
84
15
Ethnic Group
74
77 White
55
43
58
41
13
11 Black
4
95
11
88
9
8 Hispanic
31
67
44
53
2
2 Asian
35
62
44
56
Sex/ethnicity
36
36 White men
57
41
62
37
39
41 White women
53
46
55
44
5
5 Black men
5
95
13
86
7
6 Black women
3
96
10
90
Sex/marital status
33
30 Married men
53
45
60
39
32
32 Married women
50
47
55
44
14
16 Unmarried men
38
59
45
53
33
21
22 Unmarried women
29
71
37
62
Age
18
17 18-29 years old
32
66
45
54
29
29 30-44 years old
46
52
54
46
37
30 45-59 years old
49
50
51
48
16
24 60 years and older
53
45
54
46
35
63
49
50
Education
4
4 Not a HS Grad
20
22 HS Graduate
46
52
52
47
31
Some College
32 Education
47
51
54
46
28
26 College Graduate
48
50
52
46
17
Post-Graduate
16 Education
40
58
44
55
Religion
54
54 Protestant
54
45
59
40
42
40
65
34
58
40
26
White
22 Evangelical
74
24
77
22
15
Attend church
42 weekly
67
32
70
29
27
27 Catholic
45
54
52
47
12
Attend church
12 weekly
50
49
55
44
21
78
45
74
25
73
36
63
37
60
42
57
2
White Protestant
3 Jewish
Family Income
6
12
8 Under $15K
15 $15,000-$29,999
34
19
22 $30,000-$49,999
43
55
49
50
62
58 Over $50,000
49
49
56
43
41
32 Over $75,000
49
49
57
42
26
18 Over $100,000
49
49
58
41
21
24 Union Household
42
57
40
59
15
18 Veterans
54
44
57
41
Size of Place
30
32 Urban
35
63
44
55
49
53 Suburban
48
50
51
48
21
16 Rural
53
45
58
40
Most important
issue
63
20 Economy
44
53
18
80
10
15 Iraq
39
59
26
73
19 Terrorism
86
13
86
14
26
73
23
77
9
9
8 Health Care
Source: National exit polls collected by Cable News Network.
35
1
Eight different 2008 general election prediction models are discussed in PS Political Science
and Politics, Volume XLI Number 4 (October 2008), pp. 679-722.
36