Westerners Living in Hanoi , Vietnam:
‘Privileged Migrant Minority’ or ‘Adapted but Excluded Foreigners’?
Séverine Minot
Sociology, Ph.D. Candidate
York University (Canada)
Research Fellow, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies
Vietnam National University, Hanoi
seve88@yorku.ca
Abstract:
Processes of migrant adaptation, experiences of inclusion/exclusion and the possibilities of
‘integration’ in host countries are modulated by the convergence of personal/group characteristics
(forms of capital and variables of social positions), the structural context of power relations, and the
relative configuration of privileges/disadvantages. To understand how Westerners adapt to life and
work in Hanoi, and to examine whether integration is possible for them, requires considerations on
general and specific features of their receiving contexts. Here, I show that privileges/disadvantages
are contextually configured and that experiences of inclusion/exclusion may be determined in part,
by specific structures of power relations. In presenting an outline of the Vietnamese and Hanoian
ethnoscape, financescape, mediascape, ideoscape and technoscape (Appadurai, 1990 and 1996) and
in providing additional insight into what might correspond to the Vietnamese politico-legal field
(Bourdieu, 1987 and 2005), I emphasize a relativistic reading of privilege/disadvantage, particularly
in relation to inclusion/exclusion. Drawing on six months of field observations in Vietnam and
Hanoi, and on an extensive surveying of textual content on local and national realities, I apprehend
Vietnam and Hanoi as receiving contexts for Western expats, and argue that complex conditions in
various spheres of life and work have significant bearing on what constitutes a
privilege/disadvantage. Despite the fact that Western expats living and working in Vietnam (and
Hanoi) represent an elite migrant minority, their personal and collective adaptation to Vietnam and
Hanoi, does not eliminate the conditions that contribute to exclusion and that prevent integration.
Keywords: Western Expats, Vietnam, Privilege, Adaptation, Exclusion
Moving to a strange land always entails challenges related to adaptation and integration. Indeed,
these challenges will differ widely based on the relative privilege of migrants. Many forms of
cultural capital such as education, employability, linguistic competencies, status, citizenship, etc.
will intersect with economic and symbolic forms of capital, thus influencing possibilities/constraints
for the deployment of social capital. (Bourdieu, 2002) Of course, other variables of social position,
such as gender, class, race and ethnicity, will also contribute to the configuration of privileges and
1
disadvantages, which in turn (re)produce patterns of power relations and orient strategies of
adaptation. Basically, the characteristics of migrants, modes of adaptation and experiences of
inclusion/exclusions are necessarily dependent on the contextual intersubjective dynamics that are
played out in various social, political and economic spheres of activity. This means that processes of
adaptation, experiences of inclusion/exclusion and the possibilities (and forms) of ‘integration’ in
host countries are modulated by the convergence of personal/group characteristics (forms of capital
–and their relative deployment– and variables of social positions), the structural context of power
relations, and the relative configuration of privileges/disadvantages (perceived and performed –or
exercised). The information presented here was generated over a period of six months, through field
observations and an extensive textual review of contents from statistical reports, policy
papers/statements, newspaper articles, governmental, scientific, corporate and public websites,
narratives, Internet blogs, discussion forums, magazine articles, etc. Using the conceptual
framework of Appadurai, I outline the Vietnamese and Hanoian ethnoscape, financescape,
mediascape, ideoscape and technoscape1 (Appadurai, 1990 and 1996), in addition to providing some
insights into what might correspond to the Vietnamese politico-legal field.2 (Bourdieu, 1987 and
2005)
Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of deterritorialization, Arjun Appadurai (1990 and 1996) proposes a
different conceptual scheme, whereby relations and structures can be mapped out and understood in the context of
particular cosmoses that may correspond to particular ethnoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes and
technoscapes.
2
Bourdieu’s field theory provides a frame of analysis, which corresponds to specific fields of social relations. In Social
Structure of the Economy (2005) he describes fields as real and/or figurative social spaces that are normally structured
through the power plays of agents (or actors, actants and collectives). This theory can potentially be applied to any
social environment where an implicit and explicit order establishes parameters of interaction and normative expectations
about the roles of agents. In applying his theory to socio-economic examples, he explains how agents (buyers, suppliers,
customers, clients, businesses, corporations, etc.) are positioned within as well as between particular market fields based
on the forms and volume of capital they have access to (i.e.: financial, cultural, technological, juridical, organizational,
commercial, social and symbolic) and on the ‘location’ of their interests. (Bourdieu, 2005: 194)
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2
The Problem
In Hanoi specifically, there is a saying that stipulates that “Once a foreigner, always a foreigner!” In
the pages that follow, I explain why this is relatively true. My primary argument is that migrants
may effectively ‘adapt’ to a foreign receiving society, though they may not be able to integrate it
and may continue to be excluded in various ways due to salient conditions imposed by the receiving
context itself. To be clear, the very dialectic of inclusion/exclusion may need to be revised because
of its underlying conflation with privilege/disadvantage. Indeed, much of the scholarship assumes
that disadvantaged migrant are excluded and that privileged migrants achieve ‘integration’ more
rapidly/easily. Notably, part of the misconceptions fostered in the scholarship is that privileges and
disadvantages are ‘consistently’ determined by the general position of social actors within society,
rather than ‘contextually’ determined by relational power structures. 3 As I will show, privileges that
ostensibly facilitate adaptation, may also work to exclude, and inhibit possibilities of integration.
Receiving societies are influenced by their own complex histories and the interplays of postcolonial
struggles, armed conflicts, politico-economic transformations, governance, market (in)stability, and
the shifting forms of citizenship and nationalism. (Bayly, 2004; Vertovec, 2004; Schwenkel, 2006)
In Vietnam, these antecedents create complex realities and tensions between particular segments of
Westerners and Vietnamese nationals.4 Here, I propose to examine the ethnoscape, financescape,
mediascape, ideoscape and technoscape of Vietnam, with a focus on Hanoi, and provide insight into
the structures of the Vietnamese politico-legal field. These, I suggest, are interconnected terrains
By extension, the (historical) ‘location’ and the context of social, political and economic interactions may determine
the ‘circumstantial positionality’ of social actors, and therefore the ‘playing out’ of relative forms of
privilege/disadvantage –because privileges/disadvantages are always socially and ‘comparably’ produced. This, points
to a larger problematic: that of defining in what ways are privileges and disadvantages related to adaptation, to
integration, and to the negotiation of inclusion/exclusion. The adjacent question I pose is whether the concept of
‘minority’, as a power dynamic and/or as a demographic situation, can be used to theorize the experience of Westerners
in Vietnam.
4
… based on race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, status, language, education, occupation, social and cultural capital, not
to mention class and gender. And I concur that these variables will influence the structure of power relations and orient
patterns of cooperation/cohabitation between Western expats and Vietnamese nationals in various spheres of social life.
3
3
that inevitably modulate processes of adaptation and experiences of inclusion/exclusion for Western
expats residing in and around Hanoi. I demonstrate that the configuration of privileges/
disadvantages is circumscribed by specific conditions and ‘located’ structures of relations.
The Ethnoscape
Foreign presence has indeed left its mark on Vietnam, notably due to over one thousand years of
Chinese domination and more recently, close to one hundred years of French colonialism, followed
by the first Indochina (anti-French) war (1946-1954) and the second Indochina (Vietnam-American)
war (1969-1975). Vietnam has a long history of resistance against ‘invaders’ and the nation is proud
of its sovereignty.5 Yet, Vietnam itself has long been ‘divided’, between the historically procommunist forces of the North and the pro-liberal South. Between 1975 and 1992, Vietnam, which
was reunified under a rigid communist dictatorship, was completely closed off to the West, safe for
Soviet, East German and Polish communist allies. During this time, a significant number of
Vietnamese fled their country as political refugees; this would later be coined the boat people crisis.
Well over a million Vietnamese fled the country illegally; and though many of them perished on the
way, many others found asylum in Canada, the U.S., Australia, West Germany, the U.K. and France
mainly. It is only since 1992, that the government ratified a constitution allowing Vietnamese to
‘associate’ with foreigner and pardoning those who left illegally under the dictatorship and allowing
them to return without reprisal.
The Vietnamese ethnoscape can be characterized, first, by examining the racial and ethnic
composition of the country, notably how Westerners fit-in the ‘national picture’. Vietnam’s
demographic composition is quite homogeneous from the point of view of racial differences, though
“Being Vietnamese is being capable of resisting above all any assimilation and foreign ideology and being proud of
having in his veins the blood of the Dragon.” Translation of part of a Vietnamese poem by Dang Anh Tuan
(http://perso.limsi.fr/dang/webvn/anglais.htm)
5
4
many Vietnamese and Southeast Asian ethnicities and cultural minorities coexist along side the
dominant Kinh group. According to CIA Factbook data, the Kinh or Viet represent 86.2% of the
total population, which stands at 86,116,560 (July 2008 est.). Ethnic minorities include the Tay
(1.9% of total population), the Thai (1.7%), the Muong (1.5%), the Khome (1.4%), the Hoa (1.1%),
the Nun (1.1%), the Hmong (1%), and others groups in smaller proportions (4.1%). The 1999
census (See General Statistics Office of Vietnam) indicated that there were only forty thousand
foreigners living in Vietnam at the time, though there is reason to believe that this figure has
significantly increased since then. Unfortunately, the General Statistics Office of Vietnam does not
compile data on long-term foreign sojourners. Data gathering for the subsequent phases of this
project will thus include surveying Western national embassies and consulates to examine and
cumulate the number of registered Western expats residing in Vietnam for a minimum of one year.
Ultimately Vietnamese citizens are, to an overwhelming proportion, of ethnic South- and EastAsian decent and perceptions of foreigners today, especially of Westerners, are guided by the huge
influx of tourists. In 2007, more than 4.2 million foreign tourists visited the country, most of them
making stops in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city. (General Statistics Office of Vietnam) While there are
no real statistics of the proportion of Westerners, the General Statistics Office of Vietnam conducted
a random sample survey of tourists leaving the country in 2005: of 8195 tourists surveyed, 52.6%
were Westerners.6 From this same survey, it was uncovered that on average (per trip), Westerners
spend twice as much money compared to other foreign Asian tourists.7 This of course sets the tone
6
This includes people from Europe: Hungary, Poland, Russia, Austria, Belgium, England, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland; from America: the U.S., Canada
and Greenland; and from Oceania: Australia.
7
On average for their total trip costs, foreign Asian tourists disbursed 234$ USD, compared to 515$ USD for
Europeans, 504.8 $ USD for North Americans and 466.7$ USD for Australians and New Zealanders. (See Graph
“Average expenditure (out of tour) per foreign visitor in Vietnam by item of expenditure and by nation” at General
Statistic Office of Vietnam) N.B. This data, does not take into account length of stay, which could differ between tourist
cohorts and which could also influence the level of expense per trip.
5
for high economic interests in targeting Westerners, especially white people either for crime
(making them a target for scams, pick-pocketing, robberies, etc.) or forms of harassments
(Westerners are often surrounded by pushy merchants or ‘begrudged’ –sometimes insulted– if they
don’t spend money). Westerners are generally perceived as ‘good’ but ‘naïve’ spenders, which they
are quite often! Conversely, Westerners quickly fatigue, and often show discontent because, of the
aggravation of always being careful not to get ‘ripped off’, thus not knowing whom to trust in so
many life circumstances. In fact, it may be that being a ‘visible’ minority, legitimately perceived as
a transient elite, causes difficulties of adjustments with regards to establishing relations with
Vietnamese, relations that go beyond these limited perceptions, attitudes and dynamics. This may
well indicate that the position of Westerners in the Vietnamese ethnoscape relativizes the experience
of ‘financial privilege’ in that it may incur negative social experiences and be a hurdle to the
development of genuine friendship with Vietnamese nationals.
However, Vietnamese nationals may well be justified to consider Westerners’ sojourns as
temporary, especially in that currently at least, policies limits foreign work/residence visas to one
year, notwithstanding the newly implemented three-year work permit. In Vietnam and Hanoi,
Western long-term residents have no choice to renew their visas periodically, especially considering
that medium-tem contract work is the main modality of employment for foreigners. The Ho Chi
Minh Department of Planning and Investment makes clear that “employers who employ foreigners
[should] train appropriate Vietnamese citizens to take on their roles over time. To this end work
permits are for a 3 year maximum, with an option to renew for another 3 years.” (Ho Chi Minh,
Department of Planning and Investment) The average length of time of Visas procured to
Westerners is between one and three months.
6
Another particularity with regards to the position of Westerners in the Vietnamese ethnoscape
touches upon the experience of Viet Kieus. Viet Kieus are overseas ethnic Vietnamese who have
been naturalized as citizens of Western countries mainly; and many of them are returning to live and
work in Vietnam. On one hand, Viet Kieus are exempt from having to obtain a visa or work permit,
which provides them with a certain privilege –that of an ‘honorary membership’ which is based on a
form of sui-generis Vietnamese ethno-cultural citizenship. Viet Kieus thus represent a segment of
the Western expat population, though they are not viewed as ‘transient’ and though they are not
assumed to be ‘big spender’. However, they may legitimately be seen as having benefited from
Western education and standards of living and as having been relatively (or substantially)
‘acculturated’ –thus, assuming that Viet Kieus (especially the younger ‘born abroad’ generation),
like other foreigners, have a rather limited understanding of ‘being Vietnamese in Vietnam’. On the
other hand, Vietnamese nationals still harbor negative sentiments towards Viet Kieu. “ “Viet Kieu,”
asserted my HCM City neighbor, his mouth turned down with distaste, “are simply no good.” He
would not elaborate, but merely shook his head as if to say I’d never be able to understand. His is a
sentiment one hears less often since Viet Nam’s economy started booming, but still there remains a
barely palpable undercurrent of resentment here towards the millions of Vietnamese who whether
by choice or circumstance have made their homes outside of the country. A new generation of Viet
Kieu, however, [is] pouring into this emerging market economy and doing something to reverse that
negative image.” (Buckley, 2006; NHA Magazine [Online])
In fact, for Viet Kieus, the complexity of ‘place making’ in Vietnamese society, as ‘relative equals’
and as ‘legitimately belonging’, represents a continuous process by which power relations,
perceptions of self and of the other, political perspectives, as well as cultural mannerisms and
philosophies must be negotiated in subtle ways. (Carruthers, 2002) Being a Western and
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Westernized Vietnamese encompasses geo-political advantages but psychosocial challenges that
emanate from constantly managing both a bi-focal cultural lense, and relative positions of
marginality (with other Westerners and other Vietnamese). Moreover, the contextual positioning of
Viet Kieus destabilizes the use of referent such as ‘home’ and ‘host’ country, in ways that cannot be
compared to the experiences of other Western expats. It follows that the configuration of
privileges/disadvantages differs not only on the basis of Westerners relative position within fields of
social, political and/or economic relations, but also on the basis of inter-subjective perceptions and
dynamics. For Viet Kieus, and Western expats in general, border crossing requires strategic
adaptation, notably the ability to develop and foster a dual consciousness that allows contextual bior multi-cultural embodiments; even though bi- or multi-cultural-ness can bring about experiences
of marginalization for not fully belonging to either groups.8 (Thomas, 1996)
Considering that Hanoi, which recently absorbed neighboring provinces and districts (as of August
2008, Ha Tay province, Vinh Phuc's Me Linh district and 3 communes of Luong Son district along
with Hoa Binh were amalgamated to Hanoi’s administrative jurisdiction), has a new total population
of 6,232,940 and that millions of tourists ‘pass through’ each year, the huge influx of foreigners and
especially (big-spending) Westerners represents the backdrop against which perceptions of (nonAsian, non-Vietnamese) Westerners are formed. Basically, white or black people who are settled in
Vietnam, and in Hanoi, are always inevitably seen and treated as tourists outside of their familiar
8
Yet, albeit the availability of cross cultural training to help prepare expats for the requirements of strategic adaptation,
many Westerners cannot adjust adequately to environments as different as Vietnam, to conditions so challenging. Some
return home before the end of their contract, others stay, though admit to their diminished performance at work and the
general inability to develop a consciousness that combines awareness of one’s own culture, positionality in the culture of
‘others’ and openness/knowledge/respect for the host country culture. (Thomas, 1996) A “further complication is a lack
of understanding of the process of adaptation. […] If we don’t understand the processes involved in cross-cultural
adaptation, it is very difficult to predict who will succeed and who will fail.” (Kealy, 1990: 3) This of course refers to a
concern over human resource management. Yet, as long as ‘adaptation’ is related to ‘effectiveness’ rather than ‘identity’
and ‘reflexive self-development’, then the need for ‘familiarization’ and ‘responsive behavioral adjustments’ is
circumscribed to the problem of ‘performance’ rather than the negotiation of inclusion/exclusion in host-country social
settings.
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social circles (which may include friendships and regular encounters with Vietnamese nationals and
other foreigners –mobile or stable). This can be contrasted to the multicultural and multiethnic
backdrop of cities such as Toronto, L.A. or New York, where phenotype can no longer be used to
stereotype ‘at first glance’ foreigners against country nationals because such cosmopolitan receiving
societies are highly heterogeneous. Phenotypical composition and divisions are crucial in an
analysis of ethnoscapes, for they mark the ‘visible’ indicators of perceived differences, which are
sustained by a gamut of constructs and ideas about the meanings of these visible markers.
In fact, Thomas (1996) argues that Western dispositions, especially that of white middle-upper class
males, correspond to sets of psychological privileges, in the forms of assumed (taken for granted)
entitlements. But overseas, “[t]o the extent that they are treated, instead as outsiders, that is, as the
“other” or as “deviant” in the foreign culture, [privileged expats] may […] be placed in a situation
that is comparable to that of subordinate group in their own culture, yet may not have available to
them the coping strategies for dealing with this new status. Their situation [however] stands in
contrast to that of subordinate groups who recognize their outsider status because it has been
reinforced [in politico-economic and ethno-cultural history and in dominant structures of
inequalities…].” (Thomas, 1996: 216) From this point of view Westerners may well be on the
margin oscillating between ‘privileged statuses’ and a ‘migrant minority position’. Thus, a crucial
link between the ethnoscape and the ideoscape may reside in that phenotypical divisions also entail
engrained ways of thinking about the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, whereby subject positions may influence
the values and standards “against which others should be judged and to which others should aspire.”
(Thomas, 1996: 218) So it is clear that the structure of the ethnoscape may also contribute to the
reproduction of forms of racialization, ethnocentric attitudes (behaviors and ideologies) as well as
internalized psychological privileges that impinge inclusion and promote exclusion. As a
9
parenthesis, it should be noted that whiteness is privileged in Vietnam, first as a ‘body esthetic’ and
second, as a marker of status.9 Lets just say that here, ‘the concept of black is beautiful’ has not
taken root! This creates complex conditions by which both black and white Westerners may
experience positive versus negative forms of discrimination. Black Westerners may thus also
experience racism in different ways; thus influencing the configuration of privileges/disadvantages,
and experiences of inclusion/exclusion, which is why my projected research also delves into the
racialized experience of black Western expats living and working in Vietnam.
The Financescape:
As I started to show, the ethnoscape intersects with the financescape, in that economic interests
modulate relations between most Vietnamese nationals and Westerners, not only through the
provision of ‘tourist services’ and an enormous range of purchasable and experiential ‘souvenirs’,
but also in terms of ‘everyday’ commercial exchanges –these are more relevant to the reality of
Western epxats. In the case of Westerners living in Vietnam and Hanoi especially, (the following
does not consistently correspond to the situation of Western-Asians and Viet Kieus), patterns of
economic relations are structured by:

the benefit, in most employment situations, of a higher rate of pay, because salaries are set
according to a two- or multi- tiered earning scale based on nationality (and one’s home-country
average pay in the corresponding field and level of employment) or based on distinct rates for
Vietnamese nationals and foreigners.

the ‘necessity’ to bargain very hard to obtain fair prices for basic supplies, market goods and
services. Westerners in Vietnam almost never pay the same rate as Vietnamese nationals or other
Whiteness is important to many Vietnamese –as apparent by the huge quantity of skin whitening products sold in
stores and markets, and by the common practice of diligently avoiding exposure to the sun –with face masks (even out
of traffic), long-rimmed motorbike helmets, umbrellas, long sleeve shirts (even in 40 degree weather).
9
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foreign Asians–unless they have very good ‘contacts’; and prices–except in big grocery store,
‘modern’ shopping malls and most restaurants– are often established arbitrarily in the context of a
predominantly informal economy;

the implication of having to pay the higher rate of an ‘official’ two-tiered pricing system for
some services, goods and utilities. Though this system is being phased out and already abolished in
national institutions like Vietnam Airlines, Vietnam Railways, Vietnam’s telecommunications
services; it is still in effect for some types of housing/accommodation, some health care services,
children’s education, university –which is no different from the West–, admittance to museums and
tourist attractions, and electricity; and
 the fostering of more ‘expensive tastes’ (based on Western cultural and class-based preferences i.e.: in choices pertaining to food/restaurants, entertainment, clothing, and home furnishings) and of
an elite lifestyle that entails hiring the services of Vietnamese nationals (as maids, servants,
prostitutes, childcare attendants, pet-sitters, drivers, interpreters/translators, security guards,
Vietnamese language tutors, etc.).
These various dynamics influence the configuration of privileges and disadvantages, because in
some circumstances Westerners are obviously facing ‘exclusionary’ practices –either advantageous
or disadvantageous, while in other situations, their own ‘way of living’ creates a divide between
themselves and the great majority Vietnamese nationals.
Beyond the scale of interpersonal dynamics, the finanscape is also structured by power relations in
the fields of investment, industry, commerce, development, and in the adjacent fields of labour and
politics, all of which involve Western expats in various capacities. Though I cannot extend myself at
length on this here, it is worth noting that there are complex and tense relations between the forces
of international and Western capital and Vietnamese society, and that Westerners who live in
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Vietnam are ‘the face’ of ‘international pressures’ for social, political and economic (not to mention
infrastructural change). Massive and rapid transformations have swept the nation since the 1992
new constitutional act, but also since the 1986 Doi Moi –literally ‘renovation’– reforms. Notably a
significant rise in consumerism is evident in Hanoi, though this is unfolding in the midst of a
controlled, reluctant and partial loosening of economic constraints by Vietnam’s single party
communist government. (Dixon and Kilgour, 2002) It is only since may 2008 that the Vietnamese
government started considering allowing Westerners to buy property –which must be aligned in
some way, to the national policies that prohibit large corporations to buy land. Throughout the 90s,
state owned enterprises in Vietnam “have been rationalised [sic] and reformed, [though the state still
maintained control] of key sectors of the economy, including forestry, mining, cement, chemicals,
and heavy industry as a whole, while diversifying into new areas, such as business services;” (Dixon
and Kilgour, 2002: 603) thus incurring substantial growth in the state’s share of the GDP (from
29.4% in 1990 to 43% in 1999). Yet, albeit a remarkable rate of growth and increased interest in the
international community in securing foreign investments deals with Vietnam, unclear regulations
and inconsistent administration and controls have, over time, actually caused instabilities in levels
and sources of foreign investments and in the strength of the national currency (Vietnam Dong VND). Many economic and development policies in Vietnam do not correspond to those that define
Western standards and norms, causing a disjuncture between the way Westerners (expect to)
conduct business and the national framework of industrial and commercial operations, notably with
regards to labor, decision-making, problem and conflict resolution10, the distribution of power in
10
With respect to Vietnamese social practices, and their disjuncture with Western modes of problem and conflict
resolution, it is important to note that for the Vietnamese “[c]ommunication patterns are often subtle and repetitive.
Respect is a primary value and disagreements are seldom directly expressed. Courtesy is important and smiling [even in
tense and conflictual situations] is common. Laughing is not necessarily an indication of humor, but can also be a
reflection of [unease in situations of] disharmony or conflict. Pointing and gesturing for people to move in certain
directions are both considered rude […and it] is very important to the Vietnamese people not to be publicly corrected or
chastised, to “Lose Face.” (Kaleidoscope: Vietnamese; University of North Carolina Greensboro, no date [Online])
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bureaucratic hierarchies, responsive policy formulation and effective and time sensitive
implementation. (Dixon and Kilgour, 2002)
Moreover, the spirit of the ‘free market’ –because it is not free in Vietnam– does not seem to
‘overdetermine’ the distribution of resources; rather, it seems that it might be based on the proximity
and alignment of authority and political influence (thus modulating access to capital, bank loans,
technical support, administrative assistance, etc.). “This reflects the continuing very uneasy
relationship with the international system as a whole and the World Bank, IMF, and USA in
particular –a situation that has to be seen in the context of the ingrained distrust and fear of foreign
domination which resulted from the country's experiences during almost the whole of the 20th
century.” (Dixon and Kilgour, 2002: 605) The authorities of Vietnam are facing increased pressures,
not only to improve standards of living, income levels and labour conditions, but also to continue
implementing political changes that bolster national and international market interests and those of
an emerging ‘Westernized’ Vietnamese economic elite. (Dixon and Kilgour 2002: 611)
The Mediascape:
Of course, the emergence of a global consciousness in Vietnam (beyond tourism and foreign
investments) is also attributed to the increased access to information, notably through the messages,
imageries and representations featured on global television, the Internet and international news. The
mediascape clearly intersects with both the ethnoscape and the financescape, by (re)producing and
featuring a whole range of Vietnamese, Asian and Western subjectivities (mainly) 11 –notably some
that reinforce and others that challenge ethnic stereotypes and racialization along side various
11
Vietnamese television networks VTV often broadcast Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Thai programs though all its
news notably Vietnam National News programming is controlled by the state. Thus, increasingly accessible satellite
television makes available countless Western channels which –though still monitored for content by the state– feature a
myriad of Western programs –CNN, TV5, Hallmark channel, StarMovie –as well as programming that is adapted to the
Asian Market –i.e. MTV Asia.
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corresponding ideologies (I come back to the ideoscape a little further)– and by influencing the
conduct (and profitability) of business in many industries including those of the telecommunication
industry (I return to this in the section on technoscape). While virtually 100% of Westerners living
in Vietnam have access to and use the Internet, only 20.6% of Vietnamese nationals were
considered ‘Internet users’ in 2007; thus, compared to barely 0.3% of the population in the year
2000. (Vietnam Internet Information Center)
This of course represent a huge advantage for
Westerners, not only because their skills (related to computer literacy and English proficiency) are
in demand on the job market, but also because familiarity with the usages of the Internet facilitates
access to countless resources while enabling the maintenance of networks (colleagues, families,
friends) that bolster social capital; a situation of privilege, which should positively affect adaptation.
However, because Vietnamese media is broadcasted mainly in Vietnamese, (in most newspapers, on
national television and radio and, in the world of Vietnamese publishing, and also –in Hanoi–
through daily loud-speaker announcements by authorities), Westerners who do not know the
language are inevitably in a situation that excludes them, by virtue of their limited access to most of
the media content of Vietnamese society; therefore they are ‘missing’ part of the cultural reality of
Vietnam and Hanoi.12
The last decade marks an unprecedented increase in people’s access to information. “The
Vietnamese government had for a long time been very cautious about allowing free access to online
information, considering it ‘a potential source of harm to the political, social and cultural integrity of
the country’.” (Internet World Stats). And though Internet access may not be subject to same
stringent restrictions as in China, free speech is not yet a reality in Vietnam, especially considering
that critical political voices are still systematically repressed. Vietnamese authorities continue to
(there is one nation-wide bilingual –English/Vietnamese- newspaper, one Hanoi -based bilingual English/Vietnamese
newspaper and one Hanoi -based English newspaper and one Ho Chi Minh-based English newspaper, and all of these
are state controlled)
12
14
arrest people, and imprison nationals and foreigners for disseminating politically subversive content,
though concomitantly, government officials deny that this is taking place. 13 Westerners and
Vietnamese nationals benefit from increased access to global media, though contents are monitored
and filtered. What's more, all local and national media are controlled by state regulations and
supervision,14 including radio, television, the Internet; even the worlds of art, literary publications
and entertainment are censored when need be. One can imagine that Westerners (except for those
who have experienced life under an authoritative communist regime) may not understand the full
implications of censorship (in political practice and public expression), taking the privilege of free
speech ‘at home’ for granted, and not necessarily realizing that this privilege is somewhat revoked
on Vietnamese soil and for all Vietnamese in Vietnam.15
The Ideoscape:
It follows that the ideoscape of Vietnam and Hanoi is permeated by rigid political ideologies, albeit
tangible efforts by political authorities to make changes (in some sectors of the political economy)
in accordance with national and international pressures. Again, the theme of ideology in Vietnam is
much to broad to be covered in detail here, though major ideological (trans)formations characterize
Vietnam and Hanoi particularly, as receiving societies. Major politico-economic differences set the
The U.S. government has been trying to ‘verify’ various cases of prisoners of conscience, especially the case of Pham
Hong Son (an American-Vietnamese), who already spent 42 months in a Vietnamese prison (on a 13 year sentence -later
reduced to 5) for downloading a paper entitled "What is Democracy?" from a U.S. State Department Web site, then
translating and disseminating it to friends. “The government insists it is not repressing religious or political rights.
"Some people may argue that Vietnam does not have freedom and democracy and only has a one-party system. But you
know, our ultimate goal is to maintain political stability and serve the interests of the people," Prime Minister Phan Van
Khai said in a June [2005] interview. "We do not agree with arguments from the outside that there are prisoners of
conscience in Vietnam. We do not have any prisoners of conscience in Vietnam." (Nakashima, 2005; Washington Post
Foreign Service, 29/9/2005: A14)
14
This includes Voice of Vietnam a state radio broadcaster, VTV the principal state television broadcaster, VTC a state
sponsored digital TV service, Vietnam News Agency the official national news agency, Tuoi Tre a daily newspaper
targeting Vietnamese youth, Vietnam Net, VnExpress, and 24h.com.vn popular online newspapers, Nhan Dan the official
Communist Party newspaper, among others.
13
15
Understanding how indoctrination works hand in hand with censorship and being sensitive to its social,
political and economic effects is important in ‘knowing’ how to navigate life and relate to others in an
authoritative communist context.
15
North of the country, including and especially Hanoi, apart from the center and the South. The procommunist North (including Hanoi) constitutes a particular environment that differs not only from
Ho Chi Minh, but also from the political economies of most Western countries. The history of
Vietnam and the antecedent actions of the Communist party16 coupled with deep national pride and
the politico-economic transformations of the last twenty years, make the national and Hanoian
ideoscape a complex terrain of contradictory and paradoxical points of views, that influence fields
of practice and the structure of relations (in production, labor but also in politics, law enforcement,
social control, surveillance, etc.). But the Vietnamese ideoscape today and its relation to ‘foreign
presence’ in the country cannot be understood without accounting for ideological struggles that go
back further, notably to the experience of colonization (the imposition of French structures of
domination and exploitation, the Romanization of the Vietnamese language, the Catholicization of
Vietnamese society, the institutionalization of a European style of education, etc.), colonial
modernity (the institutionalization of medicine –competing with traditional beliefs17, the imposition
of the modern Christian calendar year, the efforts of Vietnamese intellectuals to articulate a modern
“Since Vietnam regained independence in 1945, history has recorded at least four harrowing experiences: 1. After the
Japanese surrender to the Allies in 1945, [… and the French capitulation] the communist party [… wanting to secure the
seat of power for itself] staged a ruthless campaign against all nationalist factions [albeit the initial plan to establish a
nationalist coalition government]. 2. In 1969, the communist party endorsed the creation of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam as a neutralist political entity […] based on the principle of
equality, democracy and mutual respect. […] Less than three months after the fall of Saigon, [and albeit plans for a
national election for a national assembly –unifying South and North Vietnam] both the PRG and its elder sibling, the
National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF), were disbanded by the northern [communist] unifiers,[who, again
secured the seat of power…]. 3. The Paris Agreement in 1973 included a Hanoi -instigated article which called for the
creation of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, and which publicly proclaimed the commitment of all
signatories to resolving Vietnam’s domestic problems through a peaceful process of political talks […] fighting resumed
almost immediately after the signing of the peace agreement. […] Hanoi ignored the peace agreement [and instead…]
conducted a series of military operations which accelerated the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975. 4. At the May
15 victory celebration [in 1975], Politburo member Pham Hung representing the Workers’ Party, solemnly appealed for
national unity and reconstruction [… and] called on all soldiers, officers, and officials of the old regime to undergo a
period of reeducation “from three days to thirty days”, it was accepted as a magnanimous and humane treatment. In
reality, the reeducation period was prolonged for up to fifteen years or more to those deemed “stiff-necked
reactionaries”. [See Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1986),]” (Le Xuan, 2002; Yale
Global Academic Papers)
17
“Traditional Vietnamese medicine is based on the premise of air, fire, water, earth, and metal, with associated
characteristics of cold, hot, wet, and dry. Elements must be kept in balance similar to Chinese traditions of yin/yang and
hot/cold.” (Kaleidoscope: Vietnamese; University of North Carolina Greensboro, no date [Online])
16
16
cultural identity distinct from that of the colonizers18) and the post-colonial condition (fighting for
particular kinds of sovereignty on a divided geo-political terrain, envisioning particular ‘national’
orientations,19 while having to contend with the historical, ethnocentric/Eurocentric construction of
Westerners as ‘superior’ or at least ‘self-important’ –First with the French, then the Americans and
later with the influx of Western experts and self-absorbed Western tourists– and ostensibly, the
orientalist construction and ‘consumption’ of Vietnamese subjects/objects).
With regards to Vietnamese and Hanoian ideoscapes, other major areas of analysis, which can only
be mentioned in passing here, are 1) the constitutive diversity of the Vietnamese spiritual and
religious landscape and the ideologies that either support or revile doctrinal differences within the
nation;20 2) the (traditional or emergent) ways of thinking and the values/beliefs that support
particular structures of social relations, and produce specific forms of cultural and social capital –
notably those that are tied to the configuration and transformation of gender roles, household
Since the cultural revolution of the 1930s, many Vietnamese intellectuals worked hard against ‘French ignorance’
toward Vietnamese subjectivity, (Bayly, 2004) thus translating Vietnamese texts into French as “a way of dealing with
the humiliation of colonial domination and [as] a way of putting Vietnam back on a civilisational [sic] par with the rest
of the ‘modern’ world.” (Goscha, 2004: 135)
19
“This tension between ‘modernisation’ [sic] and ‘Westernisation’ [sic] on the one hand and the need to rethink
‘tradition’ and ‘authenticity’ on the other was not unique to Vietnam. The difference is that in the context of French
colonial domination, of censorship and surveillance, Vietnamese intellectuals did not have the real chance to
‘nationalise’ [sic] these borrowings from the West, like their Japanese or Thai neighbors could. The Vietnamese did not
run their own country independently, since the French had claimed that role for themselves.” (Goscha, 2004: 168) So
when historical convergences allowed the Vietnamese to finally contemplate the possibilities of sovereignty and cultural
redefinition, the model of domination and the experience of exploitation and censorship, may have been more salient
than the doctrines of European liberalism, capitalist production or those of old (lost?) frames of traditional values; which
could have stirred the organization of Vietnamese society differently, if it hadn’t been for the historical interplays of
forces involving Chinese dynastic domination, modern colonialism, authoritative communism, industries of warfare (the
contemporary proliferation of arms production), capitalist/ neoliberal imperialism, the Vietnamese disposition towards
resistance and the utopian construction of political ascendancy.
20
“While individuals, by and large, enjoy freedom of religion in Vietnam, there are restrictions on non-authorised [sic]
religious groups. Non-recognised [sic] […] Protestant groups, particularly in the Northern and Central Highlands
regions, have faced severe restrictions and – at times - repression. The leaders of the breakaway Unified Buddhist
Church of Vietnam remain under de facto house arrest. In positive (if modest) steps forward, a 2004 Ordinance on
Belief & Religion sets out a legal framework for official recognition of religious groups, while restrictions on some
Protestant groups have been eased. In November 2006, the US removed Vietnam from its list of Countries of Particular
Concern on religious freedom.” (Foreign Commonwealth Office) Reported 2005 estimates on the distribution of
religious affiliations, indicated proportions of 9.3% Buddhist, 6.7% Catholic, 1.5% Hoa Hoa, 1.1% Cao Dai, 1.1%
Christian-Protestant, 0.1% Muslim, while 80.8% of the Vietnamese claim no religious denomination. (Harris, Moran
and Moran, 2007)
18
17
practices and family dynamics, modes of cohesion, forms of social trust, types of group membership
and networking strategies (Dalton et al., 2002); and 3) the assumptions, convictions and
philosophies that already orient and will continue to influence the collective consciousness of
generations and communities of interest, and their variegated attitudes towards prevailing structures
of power relations. It follows that within the context of the ideoscape, various categories of
Westerners (women, homosexuals, unmarried older men/women, etc.) will occupy particular
positions in these structures and that social perceptions will influence the configuration of their
relative privileges/disadvantages, thus potentially generating experiences of inclusion/exclusion.
The foundational precepts of Vietnamese ideoscapes are also embedded in language and the textual
expression of ideas. This is a clear disadvantage for Westerners, if they don’t speak the language
and if they are not sensitive to countless symbolic subtleties. Certainly, additional research is needed
to theorize and empirically examine the linkages that exist between ideological differences, the
configuration of privilege/disadvantage, processes of migrant adaptation, and experiences of
inclusion/exclusion.
There is however, substantial evidence that ‘overseas professionals’ are likely to misunderstand the
workings of host-country structures and their normative expectations, and that they are required to
undergo a ‘resocialization’ process to avoid facing conflicting demands between roles and selfconcept. (Lee and Larwood, 1983) Notably, it was found that “expatriates deliberately seek an
accommodation with the host country that does not alienate them from important values in their
country of origin.” (Lee and Larwood, 1983: 664) So we can at least submit at a more general level,
that Western expats may adjust their attitudes and transform dimensions of their identity
contextually, but that they are purportedly more likely to maintain key behavioral and ideological
dispositions that correspond to their ‘Western character’ and home-country frames of reference.
18
The Technoscape:
I implicitly pointed to the development of major infrastructural transformations and new growth in
technological demand, in the section on mediascape (with regards to mass communications,
networking capabilities, etc.) and the financescape (with regards to industry and production). Again,
the intersection between scapes is evident. In relation to the mediascape for example, it should be
noted that major developments in the telecommunications industry are bolstering the national
economy as well as international business, while generating unprecedented transfers of technology
and knowledge. Notably, Microsoft Corporation committed to establish its first Vietnamese
information technology training center in Hanoi, as part of the Post and Telecommunication
Technologies Institute, while in Ho Chi Minh, the company iSpace opened a training center for
computer technicians, offering a six-month ‘hardware’ program for 225$ USD and an eight-month
‘network security’ program for 430$ USD. (Internet World Stats) These developments parallel
many other transformations affecting Hanoi, and Vietnam particularly.
The government of Vietnam is well aware that the promotion of technology and knowledge
transfers is essential to the country’s development. As such, it implemented key policies meant to
liberalize (to some degree) related market spheres. With the 1988 Ordinance of the State Council
and the 1991 Decree of the Council of Ministers on the Transfer of Foreign Technology, Vietnam
has worked to formalize the modalities of exchange between foreign stakeholders coined as the
“transferors” of technology and know-how, and national parties, coined the “transferees”. This is
indicative however of Vietnam’s reliance and dependence on foreign technologies, on foreign
expertise, and on foreign capital (more generally). At the micro level and considering the presence
of Westerners in Vietnam, the dependence on foreign know-how, and on foreign technologies
speaks to a tacit dynamic between Western expats, who are perceived as the ‘producers and
19
importers’ of such forms of capital, and the Vietnamese, who de facto are constructed as the
beneficiaries. The flipside of the coin is that on one hand, Westerners may still foster the belief that
developing countries are certainly in need of the expertise which the expatriates have to offer"
(Neville, 1970) On the other hand, it implies that knowledge transmission is often a one-way
process: Western professionals are justified in acting as 'experts' or 'authorities'.
Be extension, the structure of power relations within Western organizations/corporations established
in developing countries is bound to reflect to some degrees the inequalities I just described. “In this
unusual social interface between highly educated technicians from rich countries and communities
in extreme poverty, relationships of power and inequality are enacted in ways that profoundly shape
[…] policies and programs. […] In addition to their expatriate staff, [NGOs and foreign businesses]
usually employ small armies of "nationals", from […] professionals and office workers to drivers
and guards" (Pfeiffer, 2003: 726) Such dynamics may create tensions “between local and expatriate
employees [causing] the local staff to be less willing to be cooperative or supportive of the
expatriates with whom they have to work. Without local support, expatriates may experience greater
difficulty adjusting to their new jobs and the new environment […]." (Toh and DeNisi, 2005: 132)
It follows that occupational fields and organizational cultures may impart particular attitudes
regarding the ‘other’ and the receiving society; and that Westerners may again be placed in a
position of privilege, which paradoxically sets them apart ‘as experts’, while requiring them to
foster ‘inclusive thinking’ if they are to successfully promote knowledge transfers. (Kealy, 1990)
The Politico-Legal Field:
This summary analysis of these various ‘scapes’ can be supplemented by a succinct look at current
politico-legal conditions in Vietnam. The politico-legal field in Vietnam is a nebula of arbitrarily
enforced sets of controls. In this field, Westerners experience very contextual privileges and
20
disadvantages, because there is a constant uncertainty as to how rules will be enforced. For example,
with regards to traffic laws, Vietnam, but Hanoi particularly, is quite a chaotic setting, whereby
Westerners make a ‘leap of faith’ every time they drive or cross the street. To be clear, traffic laws
in Hanoi are seen as suggestions. People run red lights all the time. People drive against traffic in
one-way streets. Motorcyclists opt for driving on the sidewalk to avoid road jams. And it is common
for drivers to swerve into the oncoming traffic lane to pass someone in their own lane during rush
hour. Drinking and driving is common and even tolerated by Vietnamese police. These conditions
speak to a Vietnamese and Hanoian rapport to laws, rules and ‘social order’ that is completely
different from that of Westerners. Adjusting to such a chaotic urban scene may well be challenging,
especially with a mindset on how things ‘ought to be’ -as a comparative judgment relative to what
Westerners are used to in the West. The traffic police in Hanoi is generally instructed to leave
Westerners alone (though many of them drive motorbikes without a license –authorities are not
administratively equipped to control this –nor the systemic traffic problems), though for small
infractions (such as running a red light), police do sometimes attempts to stop foreigners and
demand money ‘on the spot’ –which they will personally pocket.21 Conversely, being found guilty
of causing an accident while driving without a license may incur a 3 to 10 year jail sentence. 22
The following blog entry is quite revealing on subject of Westerner-Vietnamese police relations: “The Vietnamese
police are really quite pleasant people - I've spent entire evenings drinking rice whisky while negotiating for the return
of my bike - but the police have pitifully small salaries and this is one of the perks of their profession. So understand the
game - this is all about money - specifically how much you're willing to part with. You're not going to rot in jail for
months before anyone knows what happened to you and you're not going to be taken out the back and tortured. So if you
do get arrested, relax. here's what to do: 1) Always bribe the first man who asks for your papers; the more officials
involved, the higher the eventual price tag. This rule I learned early... 2) Never hand over original papers you aren't
prepared to buy back. 3) Be friendly and cheerful. You WANT to give them money. Their children are probably hungry.
4) Accept the negotiations for what they are; you are purchasing your freedom and your possessions. How much you
pay is a function of how long you are willing to sit, how desperate you look, and whether you can make them laugh.”
(PBS blog) This blog entry is however a little out of date, and currently, on the streets of Hanoi , it is customary for
Western expats who might get stopped by police, to politely excuse themselves for not speaking Vietnamese and drive
away. The police still attempts to arrest tourists who rent motorbikes in order to extort money, though Westerners who
live in Hanoi , usually know what to do.
22
“The penalties for driving offences should be clearly understood. For example, driving without a proper license may
involve severe penalties. Experience has shown that such penalties might be as much as a three year jail sentence for
driving unlicensed, up to ten years imprisonment for driving unlicensed and causing an accident, and up to twenty years
imprisonment for driving unlicensed and causing an accident resulting in death.” (Australian Embassy in Vietnam)
21
21
Traffic is but the tip of the iceberg, in terms of understanding how policy and regulatory frameworks
structure relations between Western expats on one hand, and Vietnamese society, Vietnamese law
enforcement and Vietnamese nationals on the other. In addition to differences regarding the lack of
free speech and restricted political freedoms, corruption is endemic in Vietnam, so those who can
afford to bribe or engage in ‘strategic collateral plays’ are significantly advantaged in some respect;
though Westerners may be relatively disadvantaged as they may be targeted and harassed on
illegitimate bases. Based on the results of the 2008 CPI (Corruption Perception Index), an
international survey targeting experts and business people, Vietnam is in the 123rd position on 180
countries surveyed. Still in the lower third of the overall distribution, Vietnamese authorities are
aware that corruption threatens the stability of the political system. (Van, 2008; Vietnam Net
Bridge) Understanding how corruption structures the relation between Vietnamese nationals and
Vietnamese authorities is important as it provides insight into the politico-economic culture of
Vietnam and Hanoi.
The politico-legal field of Vietnam is extremely complex, not to mention ‘different’ from those of
Western nations. It is a field that clearly destabilizes and modulates the privileges/advantages of
Western expats. Adaptation to the politico-legal realities in Vietnam and Hanoi requires that
Westerners make important ‘adjustments’ in their assumptions regarding rights and liberties. In
some instances, the law targets foreigners, singling them out and providing exclusionary conditions
(some advantageous and others not), while in other cases, Westerners are subject to the exact same
restrictions as Vietnamese nationals. It is true that experiences of inclusion/exclusion are subjective
though they do relate to the way laws/rules, and their contextual enforcement, incur privileges or
22
disadvantages. In Vietnam, the saying “It is not what you know, but who you know that counts!”
reflects well the relative positioning of Westerners in the matrix of social controls.
In fact, differences between ‘Western national contexts’ and the Vietnamese and Hanoian contexts
may in fact profoundly confront the habitus23 of Western expats. Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is
specifically relevant here, because living in developing countries for extended periods of time
(while having been ‘socialized’ in the ‘Western First World’) entails facing the circumstantial
irrelevance or incongruence of Western habituses. Westerners who live in Vietnam may need to
examine the internal logic that determines many of their ‘cultural dispositions’ and adjust (or
recalibrate) many of the things they can ‘take for granted’ at home, including the right to privacy,
freedom of expression, even convictions about what constitutes a ‘desirable’ social order. In light of
important differences between Western and Vietnamese consciousness (as nuanced forms of
politico-cultural identities), Westerners may legitimately feel compelled to create (or take advantage
of) spaces and opportunities that bolster their cultivated habitus; which also explains why
Westerners living overseas (like so many migrant communities all over the world) tend to establish
networks of institutions, organizations and businesses that cater to their needs, preferences and
priorities – and sometime specifically on the basis of nationality (every third Friday of every month
Canadians in Hanoi meet for dinner). This is why expat communities are actually fertile grounds
where Western-ness and Western (national) cultural forms/identities are produced and reproduced;
thus, notwithstanding the exclusionary effects of boundaries (thick or thin, flexible or rigid) between
23
The habitus refers to patterns of behaviors, as well as sets of internalized ideas and acquired preferences that are
produced by historically located processes of social conditioning. (Bourdieu, 1977 and 1977 [1972]) Essentially, the
habitus is a “system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring
structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations
necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience
to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor.”
(Bourdieu, 1977: 72)
23
categories of Westerners (between nationalities or based on axes of difference), and between
Westerners and Vietnamese nationals. Finally, whether living and working in the developing world
and Vietnam specifically transforms the habitus is a question of identity transformation and
reflexive behavioral adjustments that transcends ‘the moment’; one that starts with adaptation and
may lead to the reformulation/remodeling of the habitus over time (thanks to and creating situations
of inclusion), but which by no means eliminates exclusion or guarantees integration.
Conclusion:
In this paper, I sought to develop and share a particular understanding of Vietnam and Hanoi as
receiving contexts for Western expats; and argued that complex conditions in various spheres of life
and work have significant bearing on the configuration of privileges/disadvantages, and on specific
experiences of inclusion/exclusion. I showed that the Vietnamese and Hanoian ethnoscape,
financescape, mediascape, ideoscape, technoscape, and politico-legal field produce specific
conditions that modulate power relations between Western and Vietnamese actors, actants and
collectives. As the base of my arguments, I postulated that 1) the configuration of privileges and
disadvantages in Hanoi, Vietnam cannot be generalized to a general subject position within a
receiving society as a whole and that critical analysis warrants the need to delve into the
circumstantial conditions that structure power relations; 2) that adaptation may not overcome the
structural forces that produce divisions between Vietnamese nationals and categories of ‘foreign
others’; 3) that, although there is a relationship between privileges/disadvantages and experiences of
inclusion/exclusion, this relationship should not necessarily assume a positive correlation between
privilege and inclusion; and 4) that integration in Hanoi and Vietnam is profoundly impinged, if not
prevented altogether, by a variety of conditions within the Vietnamese and Hanoian ethnoscape,
financescape, mediascape, ideoscape, technoscape, and politico-legal field.
24
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26
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http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/2008/09/805273/

Vietnam Internet Network Information Center
http://www.vnnic.vn/english/
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