Bernard McKenna & David Rooney
University of Queensland Business School, Australia
Critical Ontological Acuity as the
Foundation of Wise Leadership
6th Annual International Studying Leadership Conference
Warwick Business School: Purposes, Politics and Praxis
13th and 14th December 2007
Theme 3: The development of a critical leadership praxis.
Contact
Dr Bernard McKenna
University of Queensland Business School
University of Queensland-Ipswich Campus
11 Salisbury Road
Ipswich Q 4305
AUSTRALIA
Email b.mckenna@uq.edu.au
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ABSTRACT
Leadership theory has fragmented with various types of leadership
(charismatic, transformational, authentic and spiritual etc.) being advocated.
Yet, vital issues of global warming, the Iraq imbroglio, and tectonic geopolitical
shifts (Islam-West divide; China’s spectacular growth), which impact on our
economic and social life are not going to be effectively dealt with using an
“empowering” leadership discourse (itself an appropriation from anticolonialist struggle). Furthermore, events like Enron and the SubPrime
Mortgage Collapse show that greedy, unethical and stupid behaviours are
reflections of the ontologies underlying many normative discourses of
business practice.
This paper argues that effective leadership theorising needs to be informed by
wisdom theory if it is to provide our most powerful leaders with a frame of
reference to guide their deliberations and actions (cf. McKenna, Rooney, &
Boal, in-press). Our paper presents a case for wise leadership rooted in the
neo-Aristotelian principle of eudaimonia, which Nussbaum (1994: 15)
understands as "human flourishing". We argue that human flourishing occurs
in conditions of life-affirming principles that favour democracy, equality, and
equity/fairness, and that these should be markers of business ethics.
While wisdom must be founded on firm axiological principles it must equally
understand how to manage knowledge and its underlying ontologies in a
complex environment (Hunt, Osborn, & Boal, 2007). Using Foucault’s (1972:
191) notion of episteme as “the total set of relations that unite, at a given
period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures,
sciences, and possibly formalized systems,” we claim that organisational
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discourse legitimates, valorises and reproduces (usually tacit) ontologies.
Heracleous and Barrett (2001: 19) call these discursive deep structures that
“are relatively stable, mostly implicit, and continually recurring processes and
patterns that underlay and guide surface, observable events and actions”.
Furthermore, we argue these organisational discourses are themselves the
manifestation of larger isomorphic forces (McKenna, Rooney, & Liesch, 2006;
Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).
Thus, we argue that wise leaders must be able to understand epistemic
structures and their inherent ontologies, a capacity we call ontological acuity.
Such a capacity implies that wise leaders are, in a sense, critical discourse
analysts who can recognise the potential isomorphism of “common sense”
and evaluate normative practice, as needed, by understanding inherent
ontologies. In this way they can provide alternative ways of knowing, deciding,
and acting.
Our interdisciplinary approach incorporates a blend of Aristotelian wisdom
theory (McKenna et al., 2006) psychological theories of wisdom (Staudinger &
Pasupathi, 2003; Sternberg, 1998); complexity theory (Gardner, Avolio,
Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005; Wang & Chan, 1995); structuration theory
(Giddens, 1979); and critical discourse theory (McKenna, 2004). Although
organisational knowledge comprises multiple, often contradictory
assumptions, beliefs, intuitions, memories, cognitions, etc. (Rooney &
Schneider, 2005), its discursive stability can be understood by seeing
organisations as autonomous self-organising systems that emerge within a
bounded context (Chia, 1998; Spender, 1996; Stacey, 2001; Tsoukas, 1996).
This implies that wise leaders must understand organisational knowledge not
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as facticity, but as plastic (re-formulating flows and relations within a
discursive formation).
By understanding wise leadership largely as a capacity for ontological acuity
and life affirming ethics, we argue that organisations are more likely to avoid
the coercive, mimetic, and normative forces that produce unethical and stupid
outcomes.
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CURRENT STATE OF LEADERSHIP THEORY
Current leadership theories have drawn on a variety of factors, including
ethics, cognitive complexity, connectedness, and reflexivity. All of these area
certainly necessary. However, we argue that the essential elements of wise
leadership are encapsulated in virtue-based wisdom of a leader who also
displays ontologcial acuity. It is this capacity for ontological acuity that this
paper focuses on.
Leadership theory has fragmented, with various types of leadership
(charismatic, transformational, authentic and spiritual etc.) being advocated to
enhance managerial and organisational practice. In the past decade,
charismatic, transformational, authentic, and spiritual leadership scholars
have dealt with issues about ethics, trustworthiness, and the capacity to
contribute to the common good (Bass, 1990; Howell & Avolio, 1992; Avolio &
Bass, 1995; Bass, 1997; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Luthans & Avolio, 2003;
Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005;
Kriger & Seng, 2005). Charismatic theories (e.g., Hinds, 2005; Driscoll &
McKee, 2007; Markow & Klenke, 2005) are individualistic, operating on such
factors as affect, loyalty, identity, commitment, motivation and performance of
the organisational member who are expected to identify with the leader (Boal,
2004). Generally, charismatic leaders emerge because their particular vision
is enthusiastically adopted or in times of crisis. Essentially, the success of
this leadership depends on the extent to which individuals’ perceived needs
and values are articulated through the interpretative framework established by
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the leader. Transformational leadership (Avolio & Bass, 1988; Avolio & Bass,
1995; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Avolio, Bass, & Dong, 1999; Harvey, Martinko,
& Gardner, 2006), acknowledging that leaders significantly impact on
organisational values (Gottlieb & Sanzgiri, 1996; Grojean, Resick, Dickson, &
Smith, 2004), is particularly concerned with the ethical dimension of
leadership (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999: 182) and so is different from
transactional leadership, which uses contingent reinforcement to direct
organisational behaviour. Authentic transformational leadership (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999; Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005;
Harvey, Martinko, & Gardner, 2006) elaborates transformational leadership
theory, but identifies values as a central concern. These values are
“connected to friends, family, and community whose welfare may be more
important to oneself than one’s own” (Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith,
2004: 186). Not only do authentic leaders “possess self-awareness of, and
act in accordance with, their values, thoughts, emotions, and beliefs” (Harvey,
Martinko, & Gardner, 2006: 1), they are future-oriented (Luthans & Avolio,
2003). Empathy and emotional sensitivity are important characteristics of
authentic leaders (Michie & Gooty, 2005; Kellett, Humphrey, & Sleeth, 2006).
Clearly, spiritual leadership is values-based, and considers such matters as
transcendence, spiritual practices that develop higher ethical sensibilities,
contemplative wisdom, humility (Reave, 2005; Collins, 2001), and timeless
qualities (Whittington, Pitts, Kageler, & Goodwin, 2005). It emphasises
possibly more than other leadership theories, the significance of balance,
harmony, and unity (Kriger & Seng, 2005).
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Although promoting admirable traits, transformational, charismatic, spiritual
and authentic leadership literatures do not effectively show how wise leaders
deal with the complexity of contemporary organisations. Boal & Hooijberg’s
(2000) Integrative Model of Strategic Leadership combines the key elements
of interest in organisational complexity as well as social, behavioural and
ethical considerations. However, applying wisdom theory, McKenna, Rooney,
& Boal’s (in-press) critique and reconceptualisation of this paper took up the
concern of how effective leaders deal with complexity ethically. In this paper,
it is assumed that effective leadership incorporates ethical values,
selflessness, vision, and transcendent capacities, as well as considerable
cognitive capacity. The particular cognitive capacity we identify in this paper
is ontological acuity.
WISDOM-IN-LEADERSHIP THEORY
This paper argues that wisdom needs to be a characteristic of effective
leadership theory. Our starting point is to locate ethical considerations as the
primary concern. We adopt Aristotle’s virtue ethics and wisdom theory as
appropriate guidelines for successful and ethical business in contemporary
times. Underlying Aristotle’s virtue ethics is the principle of eudaimonia, which
Nussbaum (1994: 15) understands as "human flourishing". Essentially,
Aristotle argues that in seeking eudaimonia, or the good life, we will act
virtuously because this brings about a fulfilling and happy life - it is rational.
Furthermore, virtue is preferred because one should do “what one does just
because one sees those actions as noble and worthwhile” (Hughes 2001, p.
89). Thus, we argue that human flourishing occurs in conditions of life-
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affirming principles that favour democracy, equality, and equity/fairness, and
that these should be the affirmed teleological markers of business ethics.
Although strongly rooted in Aristotelian theory, our theory of wisdom in
leadership is strongly interdisciplinary as it also draws on knowledge theory,
psychological theories of wisdom, complexity theory, structuration theory, and
critical discourse theory.
Aristotelian Wisdom Theory
The components of Aristotelian wisdom of most relevance to leadership
theory are phronesis (prudence), aesthetics, techné, balance, and virtue.
Aristotle proposed phronesis as the form of practical wisdom, and sophia as
the form of philosophical wisdom, both of which need to inform wise action
(Kekes 1995: 16). By phronesis Aristotle means “intuition and scientific
knowledge” [NE, 1141a19], where intuition is more than “gut feeling”. Intuition
requires discernment (Schuman, 1980, in Noel, 1999: 279-280) and insight
(Dunne, 1997) which are crucial in balanced practical deliberation: phronesis
is the means “by which instrumental rationality is balanced by value
rationality” (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 285). The dynamic balance that Aristotle
espoused is also central to Sternberg’s (1998) psychology-based views of
wisdom (see also Labouvie-Vief, 1990). This requires experiential richness, a
creative and imaginative capacity, and logical coherence. Apparently
contradictorily, balance also requires acknowledgement, not suppression of
emotions. Aristotle’s wisdom concepts were entirely in the Hellenistic tradition
(apart from the Stoics) in acknowledging the validity of emotions in our
judgment and virtuous action: “virtue is expressed not merely in fine action but
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in fine emotions as well” (Sherman, 1997: 24). Hellenists understood the
social construction of emotion, and that there was an underlying psychology
of emotion. However, these emotions must be open to scrutiny (Kekes 1995:
10). Anger, for example, may be justified when an injustice occurs, but
achieving what is right must be balanced by good judgment (Eflin 2003; see
also Sherman, 1997, ch. 2).
Because Aristotelian wisdom must be practical, Aristotle identified
constructive work (poiesis) as an essential element of our humanity. Techné
is the practical knowledge of expert makers who can rationally explain their
activity: a person displaying techné “understands the principles … underlying
the production of an object or state of affairs” (Dunne, 1997: 244). Hence,
techné requires instrumental rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 287). While
essential for an organisation to operate, techné alone is inadequate as it must
be balanced by phronesis, virtue, and aesthetics. Aristotle understood
aesthetics as the psychological and social processes that activate sensoryemotional dynamics that can enhance transcendent knowledge. Thus
aesthetics in an organisational sense could be seen as an “aesthetic a priori
synthesis of feeling and image within intuition” (Croce, 1995: 31), and as
something that is “distinguished … from practical, moral, and conceptual
activity as intuition” (p. 49; italics in original). Strati (2000) understands
organisational aesthetics similarly, such that rational and intuitive/aesthetic
knowledge are not symbiotic, for the “aesthetic approach emphasises that
rational analysis neglects extremely important aspects of quotidian
organizational practices” (Strati, 2000: 16). To sum up, then, techné needs to
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be balanced by transcendence, the capacity to go beyond the explicit and the
literal, and the norm: “One can go beyond both common sense and present
science, to grasp the dynamic structure of our rational knowing and doing,
and then formulate a metaphysics and an ethics” (Lonergan 1957: 635). The
final component of Aristotelian wisdom is virtue (Aristotle, 1984). This need
for virtue, which emerges from an ancient commitment to values and ethics, is
consistent with recent psychological theory about wisdom (Sternberg & BenZeev, 2001). For example, integral to Sternberg’s three-part Balance Theory
of Wisdom is virtue, or socially valued behaviour: the “balance” that he speaks
of “all hinges on values. Values therefore are an integral part of wise thinking”
(Sternberg, 2001:231). It manifests as concern for others, being thoughtful
and fair, admitting mistakes, and also learning from them (Baltes, Staudinger,
Maercker, & Smith, 1995; Sternberg, 1990).
Psychological Theories of Wisdom
The most important contributions from psychological theory to a theory of
wisdom come from Robert J. Sternberg and the Berlin School (the late Paul
Baltes and the Max Planck Institute in Berlin). Contemporary psychological
theory strongly reinforces the Aristotle’s characterisation of wisdom, the five
characteristics of which are outlined in Rooney & McKenna (in press). Three
of these shared wisdom characteristics are particularly relevant. Firstly, both
Aristotle and wisdom psychology assert that complementing reason there
must be a metaphysical quality that does not bind it only to the rules of
reason. Psychologists, Baltes and Staudinger (2000), use the concept of a
“metaheuristic”, not metaphysics, to describe this feature, which actually
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combines two heuristics: one that “organizes, at a high level of aggregation,
the pool (ensemble) of bodies of knowledge”; and another at a more explicit or
detailed level used by “individuals in planning, managing and evaluating
issues surrounding the fundamental pragmatics of life” (Baltes & Staudinger,
2000: 132). This implies that wisdom must be practical. A wise person can
draw on rich factual, or declarative, knowledge about “the fundamental
pragmatics of life” (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). This declarative knowledge
provides the basis of prudence. For Aristotle, a prudent person is “one who is
able to deliberate well concerning what is good and expedient for himself [sic]
… which are good and expedient for living well [in general]” (Aristotle, 1984:
Bk 6, 5: 1140b, 105). These pragmatics include “insight into the social nature
and incompleteness of human existence, the variability of life goals,
knowledge about oneself and the limits of one’s knowledge, and insight into
how knowledge is translated into behaviour” (Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2003:
240). The capacity for “being tolerant of ambiguous situations”—what
Sternberg (1996) calls a “progressive style”—is one of the most salient
predictors of wisdom according to Baltes & Staudinger (2000: 129). This
metaheuristic capacity is also associated with imagination and creativity,
enabling those who have this capability to “see” beyond normally held
assumptions about reality. This capacity to manage uncertainty arises from a
wise person’s understanding that life is contingent, constructed from various
perspectives, is ontogenetic, and historically situated (Baltes & Staudinger,
2000). Both Baltes and Staudinger (2000) and Sternberg (1990) assert that
wise people realize the limits of human information processing and that the
future cannot be predicted through technical applications (Baltes &
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Staudinger, 2000: 126; Sternberg, 1990: 157).
Secondly, wise people, Aristotle claims, while respecting experience and
tradition, are epistemologically sceptical (NE: Bk 6, 1142b: 9, 25-28), or at
least curious. Sternberg (1990: 157) asserts that wisdom is “more than just
cognitive skills” because it requires “an attitude toward knowledge as [much
as] knowledge itself”, a form of fluid intelligence (Sternberg, 1990: 323).
Thus, a wise person needs, from time to time, to be sceptical of the given
“facts”, and of orthodoxy, tradition, majority view, or “common sense”.
Furthermore, the wise person may need to evaluate the salience (i.e.,
relevance and strength) of facts in a given situation.
Accepting the validity of a reflexive “gut instinct” is the third feature of wisdom
shared by Aristotle and contemporary psychology. This means that sensory
and visceral responses can be important and valid components of decisionmaking. Empirical evidence in brain science, consciousness studies, and
emotional intelligence (Wade, 1996; Ashkanasy, 2003) supports the
proposition that “gut” level intuition can be valuable in making judgments.
Baltes and Staudinger’s (2000: 123) research into folk-psychological
approaches to wisdom reveals a “coordinated and balanced interplay of
intellectual, affective, and motivational aspects of human functioning”.
The strong congruence between Aristotle’s theories and modern
psychological theories and empirical evidence relating to wisdom provide a
strong degree of validity about our model of wisdom. Clearly, it goes far
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beyond mere knowledge, although knowledge is extremely important.
Organisational Knowledge
To be a leader, then, requires at least techné (practical knowledge) and
phronesis (practical knowledge balanced by non-rational forms of knowing).
As the context of this knowing is within organisations, it is important that this
context is well understood. Although organisational knowledge comprises
multiple, often contradictory assumptions, beliefs, intuitions, memories,
cognitions, etc. (Rooney & Schneider, 2005), its discursive stability can be
understood by seeing organisations as autonomous self-organizing systems
that emerge within a bounded context (Chia, 1998; Spender, 1996; Stacey,
2001; Tsoukas, 1996). This implies that wise leaders must understand
organisational knowledge not as facticity, but as plastic (re-formulating flows
and relations within a discursive formation). Yet organisations are quite
stable, and discourses are relatively consistent because an organisation can
be envisaged as “an autonomous self-organizing system that emerges as the
outcome of the interaction of different types of knowing within a bound and
deliberately created context” (Spender, 1998: 246; Stacey, 2001).
Understanding organisational knowledge not as facticity, but as flows,
relations, and patterns that are contextualized in particular complex systems
has important implications for leaders’ decision making. These flows and
relations are articulated through discourse, and as discourse is used at the
organizational level (i.e., the texts of conversation, documents, email,
websites, etc), we can understand it as situated action (Marshak &
Heracleous, 2005). Recent ethnographic research into the finance industry
9
shows how this constructedness of discourse can be seen even in an industry
where huge amounts of “objective” data and a strong ethic of individualistic
decision-making is assumed to be the norm (Pryke & Du Gay, 2007; see also
MacKenzie, 2001; Knorr-Cetina, 2006).
According to Fairhurst (2007), successful leaders reflexively “monitor the
ongoing character of social life … vis-à-vis specific norms, rules, procedures,
and values in interaction with others” (p. 14). In other words, leaders not only
have elevated levels of formal knowledge (e.g. a senior engineer in an
engineering firm or a senior public servant’s knowledge of policy and
regulations), but also have processual knowledge (“know-how” that is situated
or context dependent (Gourlay, 2006: 1426) and which incorporates norms,
procedures and social patterns), and intuitive knowledge (ability to understand
tacit matters, “gut” feelings)1.
Organisational Complexity & Epistemic Structures
Leaders constantly have to deal with the complexity of organisational
knowledge, which is inscribed in organisational discourse. Underlying this
discourse is an episteme that comprises an overarching set of historically
situated relations that unite the discursive practices that shape fundamental
assumptions about reality and what is accepted as reliable knowledge of that
It is important to note that intuition is now increasingly recognised as an important
leadership requirement for “in extremis” leaders (i.e., people whose jobs involve a
heightened possibility of death for them or their followers). Such institutions as the fire
brigade and U.S. marine corps and Westpoint Military Academy are incorporating this in
their training. There is some debate, however, as to whether the phenomenon is intuition
or “recognitional decision making”, based on previously learned (conscious or
subconscious) cues.
1
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reality (Foucault, 1972:191). Because this episteme is an “a priori organising
principle” (Bannet, 1989: 164) regulating the boundaries of what is
discursively possible in organisational sites, leaders need to be able to
reflexively understand and critique the inherent ontologies that inhere in these
epistemes. We call this capacity ontological acuity. Possessing this capacity,
wise leaders become, even if unwittingly, critical discourse analysts. This
acuity provides wise leaders with new insights beyond the isomorphic
tendencies of organisational discourse when this is needed. Thus, they can
evaluate normative practice and its underlying episteme to provide alternative
ways of knowing, deciding, and acting.
The inherent complexity of leadership is exacerbated by contemporary extraorganisational conditions such as globalization, geo-political realignments,
changing technologies, and the like. As well, organisational leaders
increasingly need to respond to public demands for greater ethical and
environmental accountability (Doh & Guay, 2004). Within organisations, there
is increasing pressure on managers to “leverage intellectual capital into the
business equation” (Kridan & Goulding 2006: 213). This “intellectual capital”,
or more broadly organisational knowledge, is regarded as a primary resource
for decision making (Montibeller, Shaw & Westcombe 2006) because it is the
means by which organisations can understand, contemplate, articulate, and
manage problems and challenges. However, Rooney and Schneider (2007:
19) make the point that ICT-focused approaches (cf. Alavi and Leidner (2001:
114) to knowledge management are inadequate. They argue that knowledge
managers must take advantage of the dynamics at work in knowledge
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systems, many of which have nothing to do with ICT. Yet managerial
discourse about knowledge management is dominated by technological and
mechanistic metaphors such as “knowledge repositories” and “knowledge
transfer”. This managerial discourse is predicated on a limiting and safe or
comfortable ontology of knowledge, but one that fails to acknowledge that
sense-making and facilitating knowledgeable actions are more likely to
enhance learning, transfer, sharing, and innovation. Approaches to
knowledge management that understand ICTs as a significant technology and
medium, but which must be understood within a much more broadlyconceived understanding of a knowledge organisation (Brown, Massey &
Boling 2005; Edvinsson 1997) are more likely to be effective.
Using this orientation to knowledge management requires considerable
capability to deal with complexity. Considered from a psychological
perspective, leaders need behavioural and cognitive complexity to be able to
respond effectively to organisational needs. Behavioural complexity identifies
a person’s capacity to cope with “the interplay of a volatile, complex, and
potentially ambiguous environment” (Satish, 1997: 2048). Cognitive
complexity is founded on differentiation, or the “number of dimensions used
by individuals to perceive environmental stimuli”, and integration, “the
complexity of rules used by individuals in organising the differentiated
dimensions” (Wang & Chan, 1995: 35). However, ontological acuity is not just
a cognitive and behavioural phenomenon, although these are necessary
components of wisdom. Ontological acuity is a capacity to understand the
categorical and epistemic foundations of knowledge systems and the context
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in which this foundation derives its meaning, or “common sense”. To practice
this acuity, a leader needs reflexivity and agency. Reflexivity, in a sense, is a
capacity to transcend the here and now. Such an approach implies the
important sociological concepts of structure and agency that are better treated
in sociological terms than psychological ones.
Structuration Theory and Agency
Structuration theory is especially appropriate in explaining complex material
and discursive organisational interactions that acknowledge relationships of
power. According to Giddens’s (1984) theory of human agency, social
systems become institutional to the extent that people reproduce practices,
which are based on “sets of rules and resources that individual actors draw
upon in the practices that reproduce social systems” (Giddens, 1971: 172).
These provide structures that both enable and constrain action. In other
words, unlike Althusser’s reductive and deterministic concept of the
ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1971: 169), Giddens’s (1984) theory
postulates a “duality of structure”, in which structure and agency are intricately
related in a “recursive way” (pp. 25ff.). Although agents may decide things
intentionally, the social fabric in which they exist is reproduced unintentionally.
Thus, despite the claims of some that Gidden’s structuration theory and other
“constructionist” theories of organising cannot accommodate the individuality
of agents’ intention, knowledge, and rational action (Caldwell, 2005: 110), this
is clearly not the case. There are two implications of this for a theory of
wisdom. Firstly, structuration theory applied to organisations acknowledges
relationships of power in a way that much leadership and wisdom theory has
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failed to do so far. Secondly, structuration theory lends itself to (critical)
discourse theory because the recursivity between organisation and agent
primarily manifests in discourse (as well as in material ways).
Critical Discourse Theory
So far, we have theorised organisational knowledge as flows, relations, and
patterns contextualized in particular complex systems that are articulated
through discourse (Marshak & Heracleous, 2005). Dominant discourses in an
organisation are founded upon an episteme. In short, organisational discourse
legitimates, valorises and reproduces (usually tacit) ontologies that inhere
within the episteme. Heracleous and Barrett (2001: 19) call these discursive
deep structures that “are relatively stable mostly implicit, and continually
recurring processes and patterns that underlay and guide surface, observable
events and actions”. However, these discourses themselves operate within a
wider context of macro-discourses. They are often ideologically based, as
McKenna and Graham (2000) show. As well, these organisational discourses
often form part of a larger set of discourses that produce isomorphic effects
(McKenna, Rooney, & Liesch, 2006; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).
To be able to step outside these ideological and isomorphic strictures requires
considerable ability, an ability that we claim strongly characterises wise
leadership. Malan and Kriger (1998: 246) acknowledge such a characteristic
when they say that a major executive challenge is “to filter and interpret the
noise from within their own organizations and determine the salient points on
which to act”. Ontological acuity certainly requires that leaders filter the
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enormous amount of knowledge present in organisational discourse. Such
knowledge may often be simply data and information (cf. Cecez-Kecmanovic,
2004), and all knowledge is ideologically invested in some way. Those
uncomfortable with the notion of ideology would, nonetheless, accept the
proposition that all knowledge makes sense only within an assumed episteme
and the appropriate ontological structures that accompany it. For example, the
presence of the words quark and gluon would occur in a discourse about
subatomic matter within the epistemic framework of quantum field theory,
more specifically quantum chromodynamics to explain the interactions
between quarks and gluons. Furthermore, the diachronic nature of discourse
is evident in the fact that “subatomic” as a concept was not even possible until
modern atomic theory was first established by John Dalton in the early
nineteenth century, replacing the ancient work of Democritus and the later
alchemists, and then elaborated in the twentieth century by Heisenberg.
Importantly, quantum scientists readily understand and accept the changing
epistemic structure of quantum science even as they work within it.
So it seems relatively uncontroversial to argue that wise organisational
leaders would also be expected to understand the diachronicity of discourse
and the current epistemological assumptions. Rabinow explained discursive
diachronicity in this way:
from time to time, and always in time, new forms emerge that catalyze
previously existing actors, things, temporalities, or spatialities into a new
mode of existence, a new assemblage, one that makes things work in a
different manner and produces and instantiates new capacities. A
form/event makes many other things more or less suddenly conceivable
(quoted in McKenzie, 2005: 388).
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It is important that our notion of ontology is Heideggerian (and Platonic) in the
sense that transcendence is acknowledged as “the gateway to ontology”
(Pietersma, 2006: 565) and that the claims to knowledge inherent in those
ontologies rest on assumptions (Pietersma, 2006: 563). In other words,
people who possess ontological acuity have a capacity to transcend the hereand-now to be able to see the logic of categorisation (often tacitly understood)
of the material world and their relationships to one another. At a deeper level,
one might then pursue the epistemological foundations of such a logic.
ONTOLOGICAL ACUITY IN PUBLIC POLICY & PRACTICE
Public policy and practice is a site that demands ontological acuity among its
leaders. Not only do public administrators have to deal with complex issues
on a day-to-day basis, but they also are publicly accountable, and have to
negotiate the nuances of their political masters who themselves seek public
endorsement through re-election to government. In October 2007, a major
news item shocked Australia. A two-year old boy had been found murdered
and placed inside a suitcase that was dumped in a public place. The mother
was charged with the murder. Ensuing news items claimed the paternal
grandmother had sought help from the New South Wales (state) Department
of Community Services [DOCS]. The father, an indigenous man, who was
separated from the mother, had only recently been released from jail on
parole. The child lived with the paternal grandmother, and had been murdered
by the mother during an access visit (Baker, 2007). DOCS then became the
focus of a media campaign, some of it critical arguing that the lack of care and
capability provided by the department’s officers had contributed to the child’s
death.
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Clearly, a range of people from the case officer up the chain of administrative
command to the senior public servant and the minister responsible for the
department some role to play in answering questions about the case. A
respected radio current affairs station ran a story (Kerin, 2007), the contents
of which should have indicated that, regardless of the case officer’s culpability
or otherwise, the context in which such a horrible event could occur needs to
be seriously considered. The Minister admitted that his department had
received a number of calls about the boy and stated that he would have an
internal investigation. It was also revealed that the department’s helpline
receives 240,000 calls each year, or 657 a day, and that the caseworkers are
“at the front line … dealing with children [within] dysfunctional families”. This
figure represents one in 15 children in New South Wales reported to DOCS
every year.
How would a leader show ontological acuity in this sort of case? Without
knowing more of the specifics, it is hard to be explicit. However, from the
outside, the major concerns would be to look at the way in which
organisational discourse and practice operated in these circumstances. A
departmental inquiry would be held as well as a coronial inquiry, as is
appropriate. But what would we learn from such inquiries if the case worker
had in fact performed her duties in the manner specified by the department?
How would New South Wales society be any better off for such inquiries being
held? These are the more complex issues that an ethical public administrator
with ontological acuity would need to ask. From a discourse perspective, one
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would ask what episteme underlies the formalised systems that guide DOCS
caseworkers in the field. What assumptions underlie DOCS guidelines to
caseworkers for making decisions2. For example, in the realm of rights and
responsibilities, is there an assumed right of a mother to have access to her
child even when the mother is seriously drug-dependent or psychologically
troubled? If so, why? From what assumptions and values does this assumed
right derive? Given the father’s indigineity, what cultural issues of family roles
(e.g., the paternal grandmother took responsibility for the child, but lived in a
country town) should be considered? To what extent does a caseworker have
to balance compassion, the rights of the child and parent, responsibility to
society, legal sanction, judgments about good intentions and the like in every
case they attend. Given the 657 new helpline calls a day, how much time
does a caseworker have to make these judgments? Do they become burntout and tired so that their judgment is impaired? Should they be debriefed?
These are the more immediate issues that a humane and competent senior
public servant or government minister would address. But they would not be
sufficient to indicate wise judgment. There are wider issues of political and
social context that are beyond the agentic control of the case worker, and
must be considered by those in authority. For example, if it is true that DOCS
is understaffed, is this because of a government commitment to “small
government” that is inherent in the New Public Management (NPM) that
became the orthodoxy for most Western governments from the 1980s (Lane,
Please note that I am making absolutely no assumptions or judgments about this
particular case or the people involved as I have no knowledge other than that obtained
from the media. These are questions that I believe should arise when such a terrible
event occurs.
2
18
2000; See also Peters, 1991; Christolph, 1992; Minogue, 2000)? If so, do
those responsible for adhering to the epistemic propositions of NPM
acknowledge the fundamental shifts away the prior form of governance that
produced:
socioeconomic progress, law and order, poverty alleviation, employment
generation, and public well-being; and the maintenance of values such
as impartiality, equality, representation, integrity, fairness, welfare,
citizenship, and justice (Haque, 2000: 600).
One might also ask whether the justification for such changes to NPM are
even appropriate for representative government. Indeed, there is a growing
critique questioning whether applying business principles and practices to the
public sector is appropriate (Haque, 2000: 600; see also Richards, 1996), and
considerable evidence to show that many neo-liberal ideals tend to conflict
with the values and beliefs of a society committed to providing a reasonable
standard of living including good health care and other services for all
regardless of means. In particular, neo-liberalism assumes that individuals
are seen as “economically motivated, autonomous, and equally equipped to
compete for resources with little responsibility for the well-being of others”
(Petera et al., 2007; see also Coburn, 2000). From this individualist
perspective, it also assumes that the free-market forces and private motive
are more appropriate than the collective public good. Given that there is
increased inequality in an economy that is strongly market-based and
opposed to welfare and public expenditure and that inequality reduces social
cohesion and reduced quality (even length) of life (Davey-Smith, 1996; Kaplan
et al, 1996), there are clearly grounds to challenge the ontological
assumptions that inhere in the orthodox discourse of contemporary public
19
administration.
Having considered the wider social and political context within which a
departmental officer such as a DOCS caseworker has to operate, it is now
important to consider another two elements of wisdom that must accompany
ontological acuity, judgment and balance. Even relatively traditional accounts
of public administration identify judgment and balance as vital to the role of
public servants especially at senior ranks. Bertelli and Lynn (2006: 44), for
example, claim that these characteristics are needed because “No
combination of structures and processes for enforcing administrative
responsibility can extinguish the element of judgment from public
management”. Harold Laski (1923) also spoke of a necessary “administrative
discretion” as “the essence of the modern State" (quoted in Bertelli and Lynn,
2006: 32). Balance, too, is a necessary requirement because a senior public
servant does not and should not make judgments on limited criteria such as
profit motive. In a “pragmatic democracy”, as Arthur Macmahon called it, there
are various factors to consider including the publicly expressed will of the
people represented by the type of government elected, contesting laws, the
ongoing role of the organisation (to surveil, provide, administer, police, etc.)
vested interests, and competing groups. Responsible and balanced
judgement, Bertelli and Lynn (2006: 44) claim, is often best exercised “in the
absence of definitive rules [which] is not a sign of regime failure … rather,
that public managers recognize and accept their responsibilities, allowing
them to credibly commit to responsible judgment.” Such capacities reinforce
DuGay’s argument that much of the NPM discourse is simply
20
incommensurate with the discourse of good administrative governance, and in
many instances should be rejected.
The accountability to which public administration is subjected is both a
necessary requirement in a democracy, but when pushed to an extreme
where regulations and procedures and the threat of (quasi-)judicial action
govern every aspect of decision-making, accountability becomes disabling for
those wishing to exercise good judgment and balance. As Bertelli and Lynn
(2006: 43) argue, the “density of such controls and interests is erroneously
thought to ensure democratic control of administration”. This is because wise
judgment based to some extent on intuition and ethical outcomes would often
not be legally defensible.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed that wise leadership requires, among other things, a
commitment to virtuous action, cognitive complexity, and the capacity for
ontological acuity. This acuity is evident in a leader’s capacity, at appropriate
times, to understand the episteme that is inscribed in organisational discourse
and practised in the enactment of formalised systems. It is this discourse and
daily enactments that describe the boundaries of orthodox practice. To
critically evaluate the discourse and the articulated justification of practice
means that the wise leader must ask: what do I need to believe, explicitly or
implicitly, to allow this statement to be true? Similarly, one would need to ask
what values need to be embraced to desire a particular outcome. Are these
reasonable beliefs and values? To be able to ask such questions requires a
21
transcendent capacity, the ability to step outside the boundaries of one’s
usual discourse and to understand it from a naïve perspective.
We have considered this in the case of public administration and a particular
case where a child under administrative surveillance was, nonetheless,
murdered. The administrative and political responses were predictable,
although necessary. The case would be investigated both internally and
independently by a coroner. Perhaps blame will be laid with the caseworker
or a superior or with administrative processes, and public declarations will be
made about learning from this tragedy. Things will take their course. But it is
unlikely that senior administrators will be encouraged to be reflexive, to
question the whole edifice on which a set of procedures was built. To
challenge the political assumptions might be regarded as treacherous, or, at
the very least, politically naïve. Clearly, such deep reflexivity must be
balanced by the need for administrative processes to remain operative,
resting on a given deep epistemic structure, and so there must be discretion
in the use of reflexive practice. Nonetheless, it is crucial for wise practice to
occur that those in leadership positions be allowed to develop such reflexive
capability. This implies sufficient agency within a supportive environment.
Whether there are governments brave enough to allow this to occur is a
matter of conjecture.
22
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