EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS
IN THE PHILIPPINES, 2001-2006
The arbitrary deprivation of life is reprehensible and unjustifiable; killings
perpetrated in the guise of “maintaining peace and order in society,” or
“combating terrorism,” or “protecting the stability of the nation,” are
unacceptable excuses for the killings of suspected criminal offenders, journalists
and opponents of the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, now taking
place throughout the Philippines. This report contains information relevant to
understanding the phenomenon of extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary
executions in the Philippines. Where appropriate and available, documents and
other materials, including copies of laws, executive orders and administrative
orders, integral to this report, are appended.
Killings of Political Opponents
The number of political opponents summarily executed remains in dispute.
Philippine government bodies tasked to investigate political killings admit there
are about 100 or so victims killed between 2001 and 2006. The human rights
community, on the other hand, claims there are between 1031 to 8192 victims for
the same period.
The disparity between figures cited by government and the human rights
community can perhaps be traced to non-cooperation by victims’ families and
witnesses with government agencies. Victims’ families and witnesses fear
Data supplied by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines.
Data supplied by KARAPATAN; KARAPATAN admits that their documentation includes those
killed during military operations.
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reprisal; some claim they were warned against providing information on the
killings of their loved ones. Others have no faith or have lost trust in the very
agencies tasked to investigate the killings, believing, rightly or wrongly, that
these agencies—or other agents of government—are responsible for the killings.
Hence many witnesses and victims’ families have not cooperated with
government agencies investigating the killings.
The disparity between figures cited by members of the human rights community
is perhaps best explained by two factors: first, one group includes those killed
during military operations while the other does not; second, each group
documents cases of victims within their respective spheres.
Women and men who have opposed the present administration have fallen
victim to political killings; data from human rights groups indicates more men
than women have been killed. Attached are statistical tables on the killings of
political opponents, based on data provided by two human rights organizations
(Annex 1).
Most victims of political killings were shot to death.3 The modus operandi of
political killings follow similar patterns: victims first receive death threats,
sometimes via unsigned letters or through text messages received on their
mobile phones. Victims then notice some form of surveillance on their homes,
offices or places they frequent, complaining to their families or to their
organizations of persons following them. In some cases, leaflets labeling the
victim as a “communist-terrorist” are distributed within the community where
the victim resides. In other cases, soldiers conduct “public meetings” where they
present a version of the power point presentation “Knowing the Enemy” and read
aloud the names of “wanted persons” listed in the “Military Order of Battle;” some
victims were reportedly among those listed in the “Military Order of Battle.”
Victims are shot, sometimes in public places, sometimes at home, by assailants in
teams of between 4 to 6 armed men, in civilian clothing, riding motorcycles with
bonnets or bandanas covering their faces.
Some victims of political killings belong to—or are affiliated with—organizations
identified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as “enemies.”
Sometime in 2005, a power point presentation entitled “Knowing the Enemy,”
produced by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
became available to the public. The power point presentation consists of 335
Data supplied by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines indicates that 102 of 103 victims were
shot; 1 victim was stabbed; data supplied by KARAPATAN indicates that 817 of 819 victims were
shot to death, while 2 victims were stabbed to death.
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slides; among others, it presents what it calls the “strategic development of the
Communist Party of the Philippines;” it also identifies the alleged “echelon of
alliances” of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the “role” these
“alliances” play in the “protracted people’s war.”
The power point presentation does not only identify the alleged “echelon of
alliances,” but names some 54 organizations and groups, calling them “legal
fronts” or “legal front organizations” of the Communist Party of the
Philippines—thus, “enemies” of the state. A copy of the power point
presentation is attached as Annex 2; the list of organizations identified in the
power point presentation is attached as Annex 3.
Also in 2005, the Headquarters of the Northern Luzon Command of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines released a book entitled “Trinity of War Book III.” The
book, like the power point presentation discussed above, presents the history
and strategies of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the “Philippine
Revolutionary Movement.” It also delves into the “echelon of alliances” and
describes the facets of work of the Communist Party and its “echelon of
alliances.” The book contains a series of annexes entitled “Watchlist CPP-NPANDF Allied Organizations;” many organizations in the “watch list” are similarly
identified in the power point presentation; copies of the lists of “CPP/NPA/NDF
Legal Front Organizations,” “Listing of Being Infiltrated Sectoral Organizations
in Cordillera and Ilocos Region,” “Listing of Being Infiltrated Sectoral
Organizations in Cagayan Valley,” “Listing of Being Infiltrated Sectoral
Organizations in Central Luzon,” and “List of Sectoral Front Organizations in
NOLCOM AOR (Yearend 2004)” are attached as Annexes 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, 4-D and
4-E.
These so-called “watch lists” contravene the 1987 Constitution, which mandates
full respect for the political beliefs and aspirations of all Filipinos;4 the
Constitution not only upholds the rights of Filipinos to form and join
organizations, but also encourages them to do so.5 The Constitution even forbids
the arrest and detention of persons “solely by reason of [their] political beliefs
and aspirations.”6
Also, there are no existing laws that authorize the identification of organizations
as “enemies.” Republic Act 1700,7 the Anti-Subversion Law, which, among
others, outlawed “subversive organizations,” has since been repealed by
Section 18(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
Section 8, Article III, in relation to Section 23, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
6 Section 18(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
7 As amended by Presidential Decrees Numbers 885, 1736, 1835 and 1975; revived by Executive
Order No. 167 and amended by Executive Order No. 276.
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Republic Act 7636 (Annex 5).8 No “anti-terrorism” bills, which propose to
outlaw “terrorist organizations,” have yet been passed by Congress.
In addition, it is unclear what standards, if any, were applied to warrant the
inclusion of organizations like the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines, founded on February 15, 1945 as the Catholic Welfare Organization,
primarily to address the aftermath of the Second World War,9 or the Free Legal
Assistance Group, founded in 1974 to provide free legal services to victims of
human rights violations in the martial law era, in the so-called “watch list of
enemies of the state.”
It is also unclear, who, specifically, included or ordered the inclusion of
organizations, and what capacities, if any, such entity or individual possesses.
Neither is it clear what process, if any, was followed. The identification of an
organization as an “enemy” based solely on the discretion of the members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines is dangerous, as the killings of political
opponents indicate.
The identification of organizations as “enemies” appears part of the
government’s anti-insurgency campaign. Primary responsibility to suppress the
insurgency and address serious threats to internal security rests with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; 10 this may be inconsistent with Section 3, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, which mandates:
“Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and
the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory.”
Arguably, this provision may be interpreted as limiting the role of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to the defense of the country from threats by external or
foreign aggressors.
This interpretation was apparently adopted by the
Philippine Congress when it enacted, in 1990, Republic Act 6975 (Annex 6).11
Section 12 of this law assigned the Department of the Interior and Local
Government—and the Philippine National Police—the “primary role of
“An Act Repealing Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Seven Hundred, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Anti-Subversion Act,” 22 September 1992.
9 The Catholic Welfare Organization was later reorganized into the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines on January 31, 2968.
10 Section 3, amending Section 12 of Republic Act 6975, 25 February 1998.
11 “An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes.”
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preserving internal security, leaving to the Armed Forces of the Philippines the
primary role of preserving external security.”
However, this interpretation was abandoned in 1998, with the enactment of
Republic Act 8551 (Annex 7).12 Section 3 of this law relieved the Department of
the Interior and Local Government—and the Philippine National Police—of
primary responsibility over internal security matters and mandated the
Philippine National Police to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines
through “information gathering and performance of ordinary police functions.”
The support role of the Philippine National Police was further strengthened in
2006 by the adoption of Executive Order 546 (Annex 8), 13 which directed it to
provide “active support” to the Armed Forces of the Philippines even in combat
operations.
The National Internal Security Plan, the guiding policy document on “threats to
internal security,” was written sometime in 2004 and has since been “enhanced;”
it is a “classified” document, not available to the public.14 FLAG has, however,
requested copies of portions of the Plan—or other documents that discuss the
Plan—that are not “classified.”
One document claims that the National Internal Security Plan is implemented
under the overall direction of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal
Security (COC-IS);15 the power point presentation “Knowing the Enemy” however
claims the National Internal Security Plan is overseen by an Inter-Agency
Technical Working Group and the Cabinet Clusters on Poverty, Security and
Economy.
“An Act Providing for the Reform and Reorganization of the Philippine National Police and for
Other Purposes, Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Nine Hundred
and Seventy-Five Entitled ‘An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes.’”
13 “Directing the Philippine National Police to Undertake Active Support to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in Internal Security Operations for the Suppression of Insurgency and Other
Serious Threats to National Security Amending Certain Provisions of Executive Order No. 110
series of 1999 and for Other Purposes,” 14 July 2006.
14 Information supplied by Defense Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor, in a telephone
conversation with Maria Socorro I. Diokno, on 4 January 2007. During the conversation, Ms.
Diokno requested copies or portions of the “enhanced” National Internal Security Plan, as well as
copies or portions of Oplan Bantay Laya I and II, that are not classified documents. As of the
date of this report, no documents were provided Ms. Diokno.
15 Department of National Defense, Accomplishment Report January to June 2004, at
http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html
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The strategic framework of the National Internal Security Plan is what is referred
to as the “holistic”16 or “whole of government”17 approach to internal security.
The Accomplishment Report of the Department of National Defense for the
period covering January to June 2004 describes the strategy thus:
“The strategy of the Holistic Approach is a coordinated,
synchronized, interrelated and mutually supporting campaign of
the whole government machinery and its resources to uplift the
socio-economic condition of the Filipino people, particularly those
at the local levels.” 18
The “holistic” or “whole of government” strategy to internal security has four
major components: (a) political, legal, diplomatic; (b) information; (c) socioeconomic and psycho-social; and (d) security. It is pursued through Internal
Security Operations Plans, employing the operational strategy of “Operations,
Intelligence, Civil Military Operations, … in coordination with civilian
government agencies”19 that seek to “clear, hold, consolidate and develop
insurgent areas.” 20
Apparently part of the “political, legal, diplomatic” component of the National
Internal Security Plan is the creation of the Inter Agency Legal Action Group
(IALAG) through Executive Order 493 (Annex 9),21 tasked “to provide effective
and efficient handling and coordination of the investigative and prosecutorial
aspects of the fight against threats to national security.” FLAG believes the
creation of IALAG signals unwarranted intrusion by the military intelligence
community into principally civilian functions.
IALAG is led by the National Security Adviser; its members include
representatives from the Departments of Justice, National Defense, Interior and
Local Government, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, the Armed
Department of National Defense, Accomplishment Report January to June 2004, at
http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html
17 4th Whereas Clause, Executive Order No. 546, “Directing the Philippine National Police to
Undertake Active Support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Internal Security Operations
for the Suppression of Insurgency and Other Serious Threats to National Security Amending
Certain Provisions of Executive Order No. 110 series of 1999 and for Other Purposes,” 14 July
2006.
18 http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html
19 Department of National Defense, Accomplishment Report January to June 2004, at
http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html
20 General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Knowing the Enemy power point
presentation, 2005.
21 “Providing for the Creation of the Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) for the
Coordination of National Security Cases,” 17 January 2006.
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Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of
Investigation, and such other units tasked by the National Security Adviser.
IALAG’s principal task is to “coordinate all national security cases.” Executive
Order 493 classifies the following as “national security cases:” rebellion, sedition
and related offenses, and “national interest cases that threaten national security.”
It is important to note that no similar body was created to “coordinate” the cases
against those responsible for the killings of political opponents, journalists and
suspected criminal offenders. No additional funds were appropriated for this
purpose.
Other activities conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in many parts
of the country also seem to be part of the “psycho-social” and “security”
components of the National Internal Security Plan. In some parts of the country,
residents are required to present their residence certificates upon demand by
soldiers; even children and minors are reportedly required to present residence
certificates (known in local parlance as cedula), even if the law on residence
certificates does not require persons below 18 years of age to secure these
certificates.22 Failure to present cedulas is perceived by soldiers as tacit admission
that the person failing to present a cedula is part of the insurgency, hence said
person is often arrested without warrant, or interrogated without the presence of
counsel, or placed on a “watch list,” or otherwise harassed. Persons placed on a
“watch list” or “order of battle” are “invited” to present themselves before the
military at a military camp “to clear their names.” These persons are then
“questioned,” “interrogated” or “investigated” by soldiers without the presence
of counsel; some are tortured; others who may be released are “required” to
report to military camps, sometimes twice a day. In other parts of the country,
checkpoints manned by “civilian volunteers,” including persons who have been
forcibly required to man checkpoints, or by soldiers, are often set up in strategic
points throughout the province, to monitor all entries and departures; at these
checkpoints, persons are often subjected to “questioning.” These actions often
take place in areas with the highest numbers of extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions; as a result, residents, including families of victims and
witnesses to the executions, are in a state of constant fear; it is not surprising
therefore why victims’ families and witnesses refuse to cooperate with
Residence certificates, now known as Community Tax Certificates, are governed by Sections
156 to 164, Article VI of the Local Government Code. Section 157 mandates that every inhabitant
of the country aged 18 or over, who has been regularly employed on a wage or salary basis for at
least 30 consecutive working days during the calendar year, or who is engaged in business or in
an occupation, or who owns real property with an aggregate assessed value of PhP 1,000 or more
or who is required by law to file an income tax return must pay community tax. See Section 157,
Article VI, Local Government Code.
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government in the investigation of cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions.
Killings of Journalists
The number of journalists killed from 2001 to 2006 also remains in dispute. The
Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility reports that 28 journalists were
killed during this period,23 while the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines reports 49 journalists were killed;24 the Commission on Human
Rights25 claims 36 journalists were killed between 2001 and 2006. The
inconsistency between these figures can perhaps be explained thus: one group
documents only those killings traceable to the work of the victim as a journalist
(“killed in the line of duty”), while the other group documents killings of all
journalists, regardless of motive behind the killing.
More men journalists than women journalists were killed. Attached are data and
statistical tables on the killings of journalists, based on reports of media
organizations (Annex 10).
The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility conducted a study into the
killings of journalists from 2001 to July 2006; 26 it found that broadcast journalists
were more vulnerable to summary executions than journalists in other media;
most victims were killed near the place of work or their homes, suggesting they
had been under some form of surveillance prior to their killing. Most victims
worked in the provinces, with the highest number of killings occurring in
CALABARZON, Bicol and Zamboanga Peninsula. In 8 cases, police officers or
local government officials were identified as the perpetrators; only one case was
successfully prosecuted.27
The National Union of Journalists of the Philippines reports that 48 of the 49
victims were shot; one victim was stabbed to death. No persons have been
arrested, charged or tried for the killing of 20 journalists. Murder trials are
ongoing for the killings of 23 journalists; among those accused for murder are
Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Journalist Killings Under the Arroyo
Administration (2001-2006), 2006, at 4.
24 Based on Matrix “Filipino Journalists Killed February 2001-2006” prepared by the National
Union of Journalists of the Philippines.
25 Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, Annual Report January to December 2005, at
14.
26 Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Journalist Killings Under the Arroyo
Administration (2001-2006), 2006.
27 Police Officer 1 Guillermo Wapile was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the
murder of Edgar Damalerio, a radio commentator for dxKP-Pagadian, managing editor of the
Zamboanga Scribe, and host of a cable TV program “Enkwentro.”
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bodyguards of local government officials, a police intelligence operative, a
retired army sergeant, alleged members of the Abu Sayyaf, and alleged members
of criminal syndicates or gangs. Those responsible for killing 3 journalists were
convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.28
In the killing of one journalist, two suspects were arrested and charged but the
case against them was later dismissed.29
Killings of Suspected Criminal Offenders
Summary executions of suspected petty criminals in Davao City began sometime in
1995, with the emergence of a vigilante group known as “DDS” or “Davao Death
Squad.” DDS is believed to be composed of police personnel, or persons with
connections to the police, such as former law enforcers or police assets; in some
cases, perpetrators have actually been identified as police officers. Local
government officials and local police officials have publicly denied the existence
of the death squad.
The Coalition against Summary Executions, a multisectoral alliance of
organizations based in Davao City formed in 2003, monitors summary
executions in the city. The Coalition reports that 480 persons, including
children,30 were summarily executed between 2001 and 2006. Of the 480 victims,
15 are women and 465 are men. 38 of the 480 victims are children; the youngest
recorded suspected petty criminal executed was only 14 years of age. Victims
are suspected repeat offenders who have allegedly committed violations of the
dangerous drugs law, or theft, or are believed to be members of gangs. Attached
are statistical tables on summary executions in Davao City based on data
provided by the Coalition against Summary Executions (Annex 11), as well as
the list of children summarily executed in Davao City from 1999 to 2006 (Annex
12).
Most victims of summary executions in Davao City were shot with a .45 caliber
gun, although on some occasions, guns involved included a .9mm pistol, .38
caliber revolver and M16 rifle. These guns are normally standard-issue weapons
of soldiers and law enforcers. Other victims were stabbed to death. Some
Police Officer 1 Guillermo Wapile was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the
murder of Edgar Damalerio; Wapile was dismissed from the police service in 2003; in 2006,
Edgar Belandres was convicted for the murder of Allan Dizon and was sentenced to death (with
the repeal of the death penalty law, his sentence is now life imprisonment); Gerry Cabagay,
Randy Garcia and Estanislao Bismanos were convicted for the murder of Marlene Esparat and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
29 The case against Patta Muksan and Abduwarid Adda was dismissed on February 14, 2003.
30 Section 4(c) of the Juvenile Justice Law (Republic Act 9344) defines a “child” as “a person under
the age of eighteen (18) years.”
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victims were found with their hands tied, their eyes blindfolded, and their
mouths gagged with masking tape, or their bodies attached to objects, or their
heads decapitated; on some occasions, cardboards or other sign boards with
inscriptions like “I am a thief; Do not copy what I do” were found on or near the
body. Some victims were killed minutes after their release from jail.
The modus operandi of summary executions in Davao City follows a similar
pattern: victims are normally placed on some list (Police Order of Battle). Victims
on the list, or their nearest relatives, are then “visited” by unnamed men, who
“warn” the relative or the victim, to “desist” from continuing in criminal activity
or face the consequences. Like the assailants of the political killings, the
perpetrators operate in teams of 2 to 4 armed men in civilian clothing, with heads
covered by bonnets or bandanas, on board motorcycles. The manner of death
now appears to be changing; recent information from Davao City indicates that
victims are no longer shot, but stabbed to death.
Summary executions of suspected criminal offenders also now occur in Cebu
City and Metro Manila. In Cebu City, since December 22, 2004, 176 persons—
mostly suspected criminals and ex-convicts—were shot and killed by armed men
on board motorcycles, bearing .45 caliber pistols, with faces covered by helmets
and/or handkerchiefs.31 While no group appears to be monitoring the extent of
summary executions of suspected criminal offenders in Metro Manila, media
reports incidents of bodies of suspected criminals found in different parts of
Metro Manila.
Inadequacy of Investigation, Prosecution and Punishment of Those
Responsible for the Killings of Political Opponents and Journalists
The creation of the Melo Commission under Executive Order 157 (Annex 13)32 and
the Philippine National Police Task Force Usig33 has done little to solve the
killings of political opponents and journalists. Both bodies have not sufficiently
overcome questions of partiality, competence, independence and integrity that
have been posed by families of victims and members of the national and
international human rights community.
Linette C. Ramos, “Councilors Question Cops on Killings,” Sun Star Network Online,
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/net/2006/11/08/councilors.question.cops.on.killings.html
32 “Creating an Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings,” 21 August
2006.
33 Created by order of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, on
or about 1 June 2006; see Statement of Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye at http://www.gov.ph
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When measured against the standards34 set forth in the United Nations Principles
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, both bodies miserably fail to meet even the most basic standards. No
member of the family of any victim is represented in either the Melo Commission35
or Task Force Usig.36 Families of victims—or their representatives—have been
denied access to information from either body, and have not been allowed access
to hearings conducted by the Melo Commission wherever and whenever officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or Task Force Usig, have testified. The
rules of procedure followed by both bodies have not been made public.
"[A]ny Government's practice that fails to reach the standards set out in the
Principles may be regarded as an indication of the Government's responsibility,
even if no government officials are found to be directly involved in the acts." 37
The inadequacy in investigating the killings of political opponents and
journalists is all the more unjustifiable when viewed in relation to the country’s
crime efficiency (solution) rate: official statistics (Annex 14) 38 from the Philippine
National Police reveal that 8 out of every 10 index crimes 39 committed in the
country are solved. Yet, the killings of political opponents and journalists remain
largely unsolved.
In contrast, while cases of extrajudicial killings where victims are believed to be
affiliated with “legal front organizations” of the Communist Party of the
Philippines are not solved, cases where offenders are believed to be members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines are speedily solved. A case in point is
People of the Philippines/PNP Region 8, Camp Kangleon Palo, Leyte v. Sison, et. al., IS
No. 06-116, for multiple murder.
On August 26, 2006, the 431st Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered and
unearthed a mass grave site at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kailisan, Inopacan,
Under the UN Principles, a proper investigation must meet the following basic standards:
promptness; impartiality; thoroughness; protection; representation of family of the victim;
publication of findings; and independence.
35 The Commission is composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Melo as Chair, Director
Nestor Mantaring of the National Bureau of Investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno,
Ms. Nelia Teodoro Gonzales, a member of the Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines, Bishop Juan de dios Pueblos, and Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as General Counsel; see
Section 2, Administrative Order 157.
36 Task Force Usig is composed solely of members of the Philippine National Police.
37 Cited in United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions (also known as the Minnesota Protocol).
38 Crime Statistics released by the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management,
Philippine National Police.
39 Index crimes refer to crimes against persons (murder, homicide, physical injuries, and rape)
and crimes against property (robbery and theft).
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Leyte. 67 “severely deteriorated skeletal remains” were discovered; these were
believed to be victims of “mass killings” by members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New Peoples’ Army between 1985 and 1991.
By November 3, 2006, some 2 months after the discovery of the skeletal remains,
12 counts of multiple murder were filed against 72 named individuals and
“several other John Does and Jane Does.”
Lack of Investigation, Prosecution and Punishment of Those
Responsible for the Killings of Suspected Criminal Offenders
Unlike the killings of political opponents and journalists, no special body was
established by the Palace to investigate the killings of suspected criminal
offenders in Davao City, Cebu City and Metro Manila.
City Councils of Davao and Cebu passed numerous Resolutions calling for the
investigation into the killings. The Coalition against Summary Executions in
Davao City has repeatedly held dialogues with local government officials. These
efforts have met with little success, as many cases of summary executions remain
unsolved.
In the meantime, summary executions of suspected criminal offenders in Davao
City and Cebu City continue unabated, while those responsible are not held to
face the bar of justice.
Impunity
That impunity exists in the Philippines is beyond doubt. Impunity is largely
traceable to the lack and inadequacy of investigation discussed above. Several
factors impact on the inadequacy of investigation. For one, there are “34
agencies performing police functions each of which usually has specific
functional and geographical jurisdiction defined by law.” 40 The number of
agencies with similar mandates led the Philippine National Police, through its
“Integrated Transformation Program,”41 to propose a project entitled
“Rationalization of the Institutional Framework of the Police System.” This
project seeks to “remove duplication, fragmentation and overlapping of policing
functions in the government and clearly define functional delineation and
coordination; reintegrate core policing functions in the PNP, NBI and other law
CPRM Consultants Inc., Conduct of Further Study on Operations and Linkages of the 5 Pillars
of Justice, Final Report, March 2006, at 2-3.
41 Philippine National Police Integrated Transformation Program, “Transforming the PNP into a
m ore Capable, Effective and Credible Police Force;” see A Primer on the PNP Integrated
Transformation Program, 2006.
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enforcement agencies and define the delineation of jurisdictions among these
agencies; define the oversight institutional framework for the police system in
general and the PNP in particular insuring the preservation of the PNP’s unity of
command and internal administrative authority (linkage with the Office of the
Presidential Adviser on Police Matters will likewise be looked into).” Clearly, the
overlapping of police functions impacts on the adequacy or inadequacy of
investigations into extrajudicial killings.
Another factor is the inadequacy in the capacities of law enforcers to properly
investigate the killings. In practice, police tend to focus on a suspect then gather
evidence to incriminate him/her, rather than gather evidence and let the
evidence point to the culprit. The use of shortcuts and planted or recycled
evidence, and other police irregularities, is also common. The Supreme Court
itself recognized: “The practice of planting evidence for extortion as a means to
compel one to divulge information or merely to harass witnesses is not
uncommon.”42 The failure to maintain the integrity of the crime scene and
inadequately trained crime investigators in proper collection, preservation and
handling of evidence are other factors that contribute to the inadequacies in the
investigations of extrajudicial killings.
The introduction of forensic evidence into the Philippine criminal justice system
is long overdue. While forensic evidence, particularly DNA evidence, has
already been accepted by the Philippine Supreme Court,43 there are, as yet, no
rules that prescribe what evidence is admissible and how that evidence should
be evaluated.
There are three forensic DNA analysis laboratories in the country: the National
Bureau of Investigations DNA Analysis Laboratory, the Philippine National
Police DNA Analysis Section, and the UP-NSRI DNA Analysis Laboratory.
These laboratories are all located in Metro Manila, thus hampering access to
forensic DNA technology especially for those in far flung provinces. In addition,
only 2 of the 3 laboratories are currently operational: as of September 2006, the
DNA analysis equipment of the National Bureau of Investigation was not
functional.44
People v. Sapal, G.R. 124526, 17 March 2000.
Tijing and Tijing v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. 125901, 8 March 2001; Tecson and Desiderio v.
COMELEC, et. al., G.R. 161434, 3 March 2004; People v. Vallejo, G.R. 144656, 9 May 2002; People v.
Yatar, G. R. 150224, 19 May 2004.
44 Based on the oral report given by representatives of the National Bureau of Investigation
during the EC Post Project Monitoring Meeting, held on 26 September 2006, at the UP-NSRI,
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.
42
43
14
Yet another factor that hampers independent, impartial and credible
investigations into extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is Executive
Order 46445 (Annex 15). This order directs all heads of departments of the
executive branch, all senior officials of the executive departments, all generals,
flag officers and “such other officers in the judgment of the Chief of Staff” of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, officers of the Philippine National Police with
the rank of chief superintendent or higher and “such other officers in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP,” senior national security officials “in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser,” and “such other officers as may be
determined by the President” to secure the President’s prior consent before
appearing before the Senate or the House of Representatives. As a result,
officials of government, including the military and the police, have consistently
and deliberately failed to attend any legislative investigation into summary and
arbitrary executions, citing the “lack of the President’s prior consent” under this
Executive Order. This Order was challenged before the Supreme Court,46 which
invalidated Sections 2(b) and 3 of the Order, ruling that “the infirm provisions of
E.O. 464 … allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering
its reasons therefore. By mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible.” Despite this ruling, the executive branch still resorts to this
Executive Order.
In addition, witnesses, survivors and families of victims, need fuller protection,
despite the Witness Protection Program created under Republic Act 698147
(Annex 16). The program suffers from infirmities and weaknesses. Penalties for
the harassment of witnesses in the Program are insignificant: a fine of PhP
3,000.00 (or US $61.1148) or imprisonment of between 6 months and 1 year or
both, for harassing, delaying, hindering, preventing or dissuading a witness from
testifying.49
“Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule of
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes,” 29 September
2005.
46 Senate of the Philippines, et. al. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, and allied cases, 20 April 2006.
47 “An Act Providing for a Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, and for Other
Purposes.”
48 US Dollar : Peso Exchange Rate as of 26 January 2007: US $ 1 : PhP 49.09.
49 Section 17, Republic Act 6981, “An Act Providing for a Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program, and for Other Purposes.”
45
15
In addition, while the law grants witnesses several rights and benefits,50 these
rights and benefits, in practice, are meaningless.
FLAG has had occasion to represent five witnesses admitted to the Witness
Protection Program.51 While the law grants witnesses the right to “secure
housing facility until he has testified or until the threat, intimidation or
harassment disappears or is reduced to a manageable or tolerable level,” FLAG
saw that the witnesses were housed in cramped, uncomfortable and un-secure
conditions; they were given small rooms in the compound of the National
Bureau of Investigation, and had to insist to be provided with access to water
and other utilities; they also had to provide their own appliances. While a
contingent of security personnel were assigned to watch over all the witnesses of
the program housed at the compound, not one armed guard was assigned
outside the door to the rooms of the witnesses at all times. There were many
occasions when FLAG lawyers were able to go directly to the quarters of the
witnesses without anyone stopping them or asking them to sign a log. Even
worse, some of the accused high-ranking police officers even visited the
witnesses at the NBI compound, threatened them, and attempted to bribe them.
The law grants witnesses the right to “free medical treatment, hospitalization
and medicines for any injury or illness incurred or suffered as a result of being a
witness in any private or public hospital, clinic or institution,” yet the FLAGassisted witnesses had to pay for all medical and hospitalization expenses for
themselves and their families.
The law provides witnesses assistance, “wherever practicable” to “obtaining a
means of livelihood,” and financial assistance to support the witness and his/her
family “in such amount and for such duration as the Department [of Justice]
shall determine.” The FLAG-assisted witnesses were indeed provided financial
assistance, but in insignificant amounts, such that the witnesses were compelled
to sell soft drinks, candies or cigarettes to the persons lining up daily to secure
clearances. In many instances, they were harassed by NBI security for selling
these items, which were then confiscated from them.
Because of these incidents, four of the five witnesses left the program; they
recanted their testimony, issuing affidavits disowning their earlier statements
Section 8, Republic Act 6981, “An Act Providing for a Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program, and for Other Purposes.”
51 Kuratong Baleleng Case; this case involved the murder of 11 persons believed to be members of a
robbery/kidnapping syndicate by elements of the Philippine National Police; 26 officers were
charged with murder, among them the then Chief of the Philippine National Police, and several
other police generals and officers.
50
16
implicating the accused, and dismissing FLAG as their lawyer. Only one witness
remains in the Program.
Another cause of impunity is the lack of credibility of—and concomitant lack of
public trust in—the institutions of government who are seen to “protect” the
interests of persons in power, rather than of the citizenry. Related to this is the
widely held public view that justice is not dispensed in the country, hence the
spate of summary executions of suspected criminal offenders. If, as is widely
believed, those responsible for the summary executions of suspected criminal
offenders have links to the police, then this indicates that even members of the
institution entrusted to enforce the law have themselves lost faith and trust in the
criminal justice system in the country.
In addition, the costs of litigation are rising, partly due to the amended the Rule
on Legal Fees52 (Annex 18). The new scale of legal fees imposed by the amended
Rule increased by 25 to 4900 percent the costs of seeking justice in the
Philippines. FLAG sought the suspension of the amended Rule (Annex 19),
submitting that “the new scale of legal fees is excessive and thus: (a) restricts
access to justice; (b) diminishes substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution; (c)
discriminates against the poor; and (d) prevents attorneys from rendering the best
possible representation to their clients.”53 The Supreme Court subsequently
suspended several sections of the amended Rule; nonetheless FLAG continues to
seek the review and suspension of the other provisions not affected by the
Court’s suspension.
Finally, impunity is encouraged by the tendency to view everyone who opposes
the government as either a “communist” or a “terrorist,” which is prevalent
among members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National
Police, the National Security Council and the Executive branches of Government.
Recommendations
FLAG has long called for the end to extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary
executions in the Philippines. In FLAG’s view, to prevent and eradicate the
killings of political opponents, journalists and suspected criminal offenders, the
following steps must immediately be taken:
First, the current anti-insurgency and peace and order (anti-crime) policies must
be subjected to public scrutiny, through the release of pertinent security
documents and the conduct of public hearings. The immediate reform of
52
53
Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC (Rule 141, Legal Fees).
FLAG Letter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., dated 10 September 2004.
17
security and crime control policies must include the active involvement of
different sectors of Philippine society.
Second, an impartial and focused investigation into the summary executions of
suspected criminal offenders in Davao City, Cebu City, and Metro Manila must
be immediately undertaken. Such investigation should look into the existence,
roles, leadership, composition, funding, etc. of the Davao Death Squad and
similar groups who are responsible for the summary executions, and take
immediate steps to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes.
Third, the practice of using “orders of battle,” which identify—without charging—
persons as “enemies of the Filipino people” or “criminals” must immediately cease.
The “order of battle,” or similar lists, whether used to “suppress threats against
internal security” or to “maintain peace and order,” is tantamount to an
execution list. There is no standard that defines when, how or why a person is
listed in an “order of battle.” Neither is there any procedure for a person listed in
an “order of battle” to have his/her name de-listed. Neither is anyone who
prepares, releases or otherwise basis his/her actions on the “order of battle” ever
held accountable for abuse.
Fourth, the practice of identifying organizations as “enemies” must stop. Like the
“order of battle,” affiliation with any organization previously identified as an
“enemy” renders one vulnerable to extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution.
Fifth, all acts committed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police that violate fundamental rights and freedoms must be
immediately stopped; these acts, include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Requiring civilians, including minors, to present cedulas (residence
certificates) upon demand;
b. Improperly setting up checkpoints;
c. Requiring citizens who are not facing any judicial charges to report
to the military twice daily;
d. All other acts that violate fundamental rights guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution and international human rights treaties ratified
by the Philippines.
Sixth, the Inter Agency Legal Action Group [IALAG] must be immediately
dismantled.
18
Seventh, the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act must be reviewed and
strengthened, with a view towards increasing the penalties for the harassment of
witnesses admitted to the program, and providing for better enforcement
mechanisms.
Eighth, the Revised Rule on Legal Fees must be reviewed and suspended, in
order to afford all, especially the poor and the marginalized, full and genuine
access to justice.
Quezon City, Philippines, 31 January 2007.
MARIA SOCORRO I. DIOKNO
Secretary General
19
Annexes
Annex 1
-
Statistical Tables, Killings of Political Opponents
Annex 2
-
“Knowing the Enemy”
Annex 3
-
List of Organizations Identified in “Knowing the Enemy”
Annex 4-A
-
“CPP/NPA/NDF Legal Front Organizations”
Annex 4-B
-
“Listing of Being Infiltrated Sectoral Organizations in
Cordillera and Ilocos Region”
Annex 4-C
-
“Listing of Being Infiltrated Sectoral Organizations in
Cagayan Valley”
Annex 4-D
-
“Listing of Being Infiltrated Sectoral Organizations in
Central Luzon”
Annex 4-E
-
“List of Sectoral Front Organizations in NOLCOM AOR
(Yearend 2004)”
Annex 5
-
Republic Act 7636, “An Act Repealing Republic Act
Numbered One Thousand Seven Hundred, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Anti-Subversion Act”
Annex 6
-
Republic Act 6975, “An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes”
Annex 7
-
Republic Act 8551, “An Act Providing for the Reform and
Reorganization of the Philippine National Police and for
Other Purposes, Amending Certain Provisions of Republic
Act Numbered Sixty-Nine Hundred and Seventy-Five
Entitled ‘An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police
under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and for Other Purposes’”
Annex 8
-
Executive Order 546, “Directing the Philippine National
Police to Undertake Active Support to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in internal security operations for the
suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to
20
national security amending certain provisions of Executive
Order No. 110 series of 1999 and for other purposes,”
Annex 9
-
Executive Order 493, “Providing for the Creation of the
Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) for the
Coordination of National Security Cases”
Annex 10
-
Statistical Tables, Killings of Journalists
Annex 11
-
Statistical Tables, Killings of Suspected Criminal Offenders
In Davao City
Annex 12
-
Lit of Children Summarily Executed in Davao City, 19992006
Annex 13
-
Executive Order 157, “Creating an Independent Commission
to Address Media and Activist Killings,” 21 August
Annex 14
-
Crime Statistics, 2001-2006
Annex 15
-
Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle
of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule of Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”
Annex 16
-
Republic Act 6981, “An Act Providing for a Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, and for Other
Purposes”
Annex 17
-
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (Rule 141, Legal Fees)
Annex 18
-
FLAG Letter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., dated 10
September 2004, on A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (Rule 141, Legal
Fees)