The Ethical Situationist
Running head: THE ETHICAL SITUATIONIST
A Social Psychological View of Morality:
Why Knowledge of Situational Influences on Behavior Can Improve Character Development
Practices
Steven M. Samuels
William D. Casebeer
United States Air Force Academy
Contact information:
Steven M. Samuels
HQ USAFA/DFBL
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 6L101
USAF Academy, CO, 80840
Steven.Samuels@usafa.af.mil
William D. Casebeer
HQ USAFA/DFPY
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 1A10
USAF Academy, CO, 80840
William.Casebeer@usafa.af.mil
Ph: (719) 333-2514
Ph: (719) 333-8659
Fax: (719) 333-6711
Fax: (719) 333-2050
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Abstract
Results from research in social psychology, such as findings about the fundamental attribution
error and other situational influences on behavior, are often used to justify attacking the existence
of character traits. From this perspective, character development is either an illusion, an
impossibility, or both. We offer a different interpretation of how these issues interact with
character development concerns. Rather than undermining the very idea of character traits, social
psychology actually sheds light on the manner in which character development can occur. It
reaffirms Spinozistic and Aristotelian points about character, namely that: (1) knowledge of the
fundamental attribution error can help us minimize the influence environment and situation has
on our behavior, and (2) proper habituation only takes place in appropriately structured
environments. Acknowledging these important results in social psychology helps us improve
some of our character education practices rather than destroying their basis.
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A Social Psychological View of Morality:
Why Knowledge of Situational Influences on Behavior Can Improve Character Development
Practices
Social psychologists have long studied human behavior trying to understand the
mechanisms and motivations which cause people to act. Additionally, much of what they study
speaks to moral issues: stereotyping and discrimination, conformity, obedience, interpersonal
relations, judgment and decision making, etc. Yet the field often seems to back off when it
comes to actually investigating and understanding moral and ethical behavior (with the notable
exception of altruistic and helping behavior). This may be due to psychologists basic identity as
scientists. After all, it is the job of the philosopher to explain the normative components of
morality, while the social scientist is supposed to be primarily descriptive. Once scientists enter
the often ambiguous realm of morality, they may perhaps lose their objectivity, and certainly
their neutrality.
This becomes evident as developmental and personality psychology have attempted to
measure morality and then are often accused of some form of bias. Perhaps most notable is
Kohlberg’s (1963) stages of moral development. It is nearly always accompanied in texts by
severe criticism such as it is ethnocentric, subjective in scoring, biased against women and
children, contains implicit political liberal biases, asks about thought rather than measures action,
etc. Different morality scales, such as Rest’s neo-Kohlbergian (1979) Defining Issues Test, also
suffer similar types of criticism.
Social psychological involvement in ethical behavior primarily has taken two slightly
different paths. The first is the study of how people define moral rules, especially in issues like
fairness and justice. This set of research is often used as a launching point for the second path
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where the mechanisms that cause people to act unethically are uncovered. This second path
finesses the issue by studying immoral rather than moral behavior, as there seems to be more
common agreement on what is "evil" than what is "good".
This history of pointing out unusual unethical behavior due to situational pressure has
created many of the field’s classic studies. For example, Milgram’s (1963) obedience
experiments showed that subjects would shock a fellow subject perhaps to death because the
experimenter told them they must continue. Darley and Latané’s (1968) bystander effect showed
that subjects were less likely to intervene in an emergency if there was another subject present
than if they were alone. In fact, even seminary students on their way to give a sermon on the
“Good Samaritan” would not help in a situation when they were in a hurry (Darley and Batson,
1973). In studying these types of behaviors, social psychologists have come under less criticism
than their brethren in other fields, perhaps because society seems to be more comfortable labeling
what is unethical than labeling what is ethical.
Given this background, social psychologists can, and in fact should contribute to the
ethical dialogue by studying human moral behavior in an empirical manner. This is not to say
they should decide what is moral and immoral, as social science is not designed to be normative
moral theory, and psychologists are not ethicists. Nor should psychologists be manipulating
human behavior to their own desired ends in violation of human freedom (Kelman, 1990).
Instead they should examine why people act in ethical manners. That is, psychologists should
not advocate what actions people should commit, but they should highlight the influences on and
impediments to moral action. Philosophers have long realized since to know the good is not
necessarily to do the good (to paraphrase Aristotle, 384-322 BC/1999, p. 100-01), it is important
to discover the non- and sub-cognitive determinants of moral action. In short, psychologists
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should adhere to the field’s definition and study behavior, but that should include ethical
behavior. The pleasant upshot of this will be that rather than undermining the ability to develop
character, social psychology can give philosophers—indeed, all those involved in character
development institutions—needed tools to enable people to take responsibility for their own
development.
The Difficult Truth of Social Psychology
Social psychologists often face an uphill battle when their results run contrary to folk
wisdom. Convincing people that a major cause of their behavior is not their personalities but the
situation in which they find themselves can be truly challenging. Yet the power of the situation
is perhaps the foundation of much of social psychological theory and the classic studies of the
field (see Ross & Nisbett, 1991 for an in-depth examination). When people look for causes of
behavior, they tend to ignore the situation and blame (or credit) that which they do notice: the
person. This is especially the case in individualistic cultures, such as those of the United States
or Western Europe: “members of these cultures typically overestimate the impact and predictive
power of observed or assumed individual differences in traits such as charitableness…they are
apt to rely heavily on overly broad and simplistic notions of good or bad ‘character,’ both in their
attempts to understand past behavior and in their efforts to predict future behavior” (Ross and
Shestowky, 2003, p. 1093).
This bias, attributing causes of behavior to actors (i.e., to internal, dispositional factors)
rather than the situation (i.e., to external, environmental factors) is the fundamental attribution
error. Additionally, when searching for the causes of immoral behavior, Wegner and Vallacher
(1977) suggest that people become even more motivated as they need a stable concept of moral
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responsibility for evil acts; attributions of moral responsibility require that we posit the existence
of a free moral agent uncoerced by purportedly “trivial” environmental stimuli.
This perspective leads to an intriguing question. If the situation is a major cause of our
actions then how can people be held responsible for their own ethical behavior? In fact, this
reasoning may lead one to expect that moral behavior is dominated by external not internal
factors, that ethical behavior is entirely dependent upon the situation. It is a position most
ethicists shun, as it threatens to undermine the assumptions of agency that make moral talk
possible at all. If situations are the primary, or only, determinant of action, and are not the result
of an agent’s character traits or free choices, it becomes more difficult to hold persons
responsible for their behavior. Following this line of thought, Ross & Shestowsky (2003) argue
that when such theory is applied to law, “consideration of mitigation in determining appropriate
punishment and treatment should be based on a full appreciation of the power of the relevant
situational forces…” such that liency might be considered for Nazi prison guards, Hutu
perpetrators of genocide, and terrorists (p. 1102-1103). If true, not only are our conceptions of
agency undermined, but also some philosophers contend the very idea of stable character traits
that can be developed is eradicated.
This radical situationist position is interpreted by Gilbert Harman as demonstrating that
there is no such thing as a character trait; there simply are no stable internal regularities that
contribute to behavior. He argues this has two entailments. First, it is more difficult (on his
view, it would be well nigh impossible!) to hold people responsible when things go awry: “When
things go wrong, we typically blame the agent, attributing the bad results to the agent’s bad
character…a greater understanding of the agent’s situation and how it contributed to the action
can lead to a greater tolerance and understanding of others” (2000, p. 177). Second, moral
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education becomes impossible. He bluntly states, in a one sentence paragraph titled “Moral
Education,” “If there is no such thing as character, then there is no such thing as character
building” (2000, p. 177.) Harman argues that we would do well to dispense with the idea of
character, at least as traditionally construed. If we must be virtue ethicists, he insists, we should
be the kind of virtue ethicists that do not make judgments about character traits.
The problem with this line of reasoning is Harman has made two rather devastating
errors. First, Harman appears to have only read one side of this discussion. By only citing social
psychology and not evaluating the field of personality psychology, he handicaps himself by not
gathering all the evidence before reaching a conclusion. Social psychology often demonstrates
the power of the situation by finding those circumstances that surprise intuition and overwhelm
personality. Personality psychology describes areas of personal consistency and provides a
wealth of information about them. One example of research supporting the trait approach to
personality has revealed a large portion of personality can be summarized by five unique traits:
extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, negative emotionality, and openness. Referred to
as The Big Five, research in this area has given overwhelming support for some level of
personality consistency.
Another example demonstrating personality consistency over time showed that
willingness to delay gratification at ages 4 and 5 correlated with parental ratings of adolescents
over 10 years later on coping, academic, and social competency. Even taking into account
school-related competencies (using SAT scores), those who were able to delay gratification
longer were rated as better able to cope with a number of personal and social problems (Shoda,
Mischel, & Peake, 1990).
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Harman’s second major error is his misreading of the psychology literature he does cite.
Using studies similar to those discussed above (Darley and Batson, 1973; Milgram 1963; Ross &
Nisbett, 1991; etc.), Harman ignores the fact that some people do behave as expected. Again, the
richness of social psychology (and the fundamental attribution error) is that people underestimate
the power of the situation. None of these sources state personality does not exist, only that it is
overestimated. No social psychologist would deny that personal consistency can reach
correlational levels of .3 across situations explaining roughly 10% of the variance. The
discussion revolves around what that means in terms of predicting behavior in future situations.
In fact, it would be apropos to point out that those people in the Milgram study who chose to stop
administering the shocks and those in Darley and his colleagues’ studies who stopped and helped
are displaying the consistent behavior we do expect.
Perhaps a critical component enabling us
to be free moral agents involves a capacity to be sensitive to how environmental variables may
influence our action. Perhaps part of good character is defined by having the wherewithal to
avoid peers who will likely get you into trouble and to seek out environments which are
conducive to ethical behavior.
Following this line of reasoning, we maintain that the existence of the fundamental
attribution error does not undermine the very idea of character traits. Instead, it places more
focus on the purely cognitive character traits common to both Aristotle and Plato: the responsible
use of reason as a tool to regulate our behavior. Careful study of the fundamental attribution
error can actually increase our ability to lessen the influence that the environment has on our
action, cause us to avoid environments where we know our behavior will become less desireable
or unpredictable, and actively work to cultivate the kind of environments where virtuous
behavior is both encouraged and made possible by appropriate stimuli regularity (for more
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discussion, see Doris 2002, especially chapters 5 – 7; Doris argues that “…reflection on
situationism actually enhances normative competence, because it facilitates effective
deliberation” p. 146).
The Moral Advantages of Being Aware of Social Psychology
Awareness of the relative impact of the person and the situation may be able to give
people the necessary impetus to overcome powerful situations. That is, now that the illusion of
personality as the sole cause of behavior has been uncovered, people might be more likely to
detect, and thus affect the different influences of behavior. Once they are able to see what
environmental factors have the potential to influence, they may be better prepared to make a
decision based on their true beliefs and feelings. The fundamental attribution error does not
undermine attributions of responsibility, the existence of character traits, and the idea of
character development; rather, it increases our capability to make all three of these things
possible.
This is a familiar theme from the work of the classic virtue theorist Aristotle. In order to
develop virtue, one must be given a chance to practice being virtuous. This means cultivating a
millieu where the environmental factors that influence human behavior make virtuous behavior
the norm rather than the exception. Attention to how you react in these environments is
important. People should be aware of the personality/environment interaction, for only then can
they modulate their behavior accordingly so as to boost the likelihood that they will take virtuous
action. As Aristotle states in his Nichomachean Ethics (in a passage that makes reference to his
doctrine of “The Golden Mean,”), “We must also examine what we ourselves drift into easily.
For different people have different natural tendencies toward different goals, and we shall come
to know our own tendencies from the pleasure or pain that arises in us. We must drag ourselves
The Ethical Situationist 10
off in the contrary direction; for if we pull far away from error, as they do in straightening bent
wood, we shall reach the intermediate condition” (384-322 BC/1999, p. 29).
All we have done so far is assert that knowledge of the fundamental attribution error will
enable character growth: is it in fact easier for someone who understands the limitations of
personality to make their personality matter? Again, only people who recognize and understand
the subtle power of the situation can truly take control of their ethical choices. Truly
understanding the situation may allow people to overcome biases. For example, Ross, Lepper,
and Hubbard (1975) found that beliefs fraudulently created in an experiment persevere despite
normal debriefing. It is only under process debriefing, where subjects are made to understand the
processes behind the creation and perseverance of the false beliefs, that the effect is eliminated. In
a similar sense, a process understanding of the fundamental attribution error may help to decrease
the very power of the situation when ethical decisions (or any decisions for that matter) are
involved. If this is true, then students of social psychology increase their chances of becoming
ethical actors.
Two US Air Force Academy students also appeared to apply social psychology in this
manner as they used the idea to investigate their values. The first was troubled by the
deindividuation that occurs in this military setting, and how it could affect her. In her paper, she
wrote, “I realize that circumstances will influence me, and I need to be aware of them and how
they can affect my behavior.... To accomplish this I must have my values set clearly in my mind
so that they are the first things I encounter when processing information, and thus will I base my
decisions on them.”
The second student looked at “situational spirituality” as he examined his attitudes after a
fundamentalist Christian gathering and retreat. He discussed his turmoil after experiencing a
The Ethical Situationist 11
speaker at the Christian men’s group “Promise Keepers” using behavior modification techniques
(either intentionally or unintentionally) previously discussed in class. When the speaker asked
everyone who would dedicate their lives to Jesus to stand up, the student noticed that everyone
rose. He realized that it would have been almost impossible not to stand, and noticed the
similarity between the request and Kurt Lewin’s (1952) use of group pressure and behavioral
commitment. Lewin, one of the fathers of social psychology, had asked groups of housewives
during World War II to make a public commitment by raising their hands to serve organ meats to
their families, which significantly increased their behavior to do so. This student finished his
paper with this enlightened thought: “I think in many cases that a person can be lulled into
thinking that he has found the truth simply because he fits into the group, follows the norms, and
does what he thinks he should do. So perhaps in this case, God to this person is nothing more
than a series of social influences.... It is so critical to evaluate one’s own personal spiritual
journey and see if it is merely a result of social forces, or if it is truly a walk with God.”
A Prescription for Ethical Training
It seems clear that these two students know they need to take responsibility for their own
behavior. They both commented that they came to this realization by recognizing how their own
previous behavior was influenced by the situation. These Pinnocchios seem to have taken the
first step toward cutting what strings could be cut by recognizing the strings do exist. In fact,
past the simple liberation from constraining situational influences, consummate students of social
psychology concerned with boosting their chances to act morally would be able to fashion
additional countervailing strings that push them toward more positive behaviors or away from
negative ones. Rather than undermining attributions of agency, such an attitude actually supports
attributions of responsibility. I take moral responsibility for the structure of my environment, and
The Ethical Situationist 12
I take care not to expose myself to environments where I know my chances of exhibiting
character irregularities increase. Like Alcoholics Anonymous, you admit you have a drinking
problem (analagously, recognize the power of the situation) and then avoid environments, such
as bars, past drinking buddies, etc., where your problem manifests itself. That is, you can change
your own environment so you are able to exhibit the regularities in behavior you would like, and
avoid environments that will disenable your control.
Thus, the fundamental attribution error undermines neither agency nor the existence of
character traits. Knowledge of it is power—power to take responsibility for your own behavior
by shaping the environment accordingly. Spinoza articulated this point in his Ethics when he
noted, “In so far as a man is determined to action from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, to
that extent he is passive; that is, he does something that cannot be perceived solely in terms of his
own essence, that is, something that does not follow from this own virtue. But in so far as he is
determined to an action from the fact that he understands…[that action] follows adequately from
his own virtue” (1677/1992, p. 166). Spinoza asserts correctly that knowledge is power over
one’s self; only by knowing the causes of one’s actions (be they internal or external) can one be
held responsible for the power those causes have over our behavior. To become full moral
agents, therefore, we must endeavor to understand the causes of our behavior, and this will
involve taking seriously the results of social psychological research.
As Spinoza scholar Seymour Feldman explains, “Thus, on Spinoza’s view, what makes a
person an agent is self-knowledge; lacking such knowledge, an individual is merely a passive
recipient of external and internal stimuli to which he responds either blindly or inadequately.
Self-knowledge, however, means realizing that we are elements within a complicated and diverse
The Ethical Situationist 13
system of modes. Again, psychology is part of natural science; and ethics must be grounded in
these sciences” (Spinoza, 1677/1992, p. 16).
In an ethical example of this Spinozistic insight in action, the U.S. Navy initiated the
Naval Aviation Anonymous Safety Reporting Program (NAASREP), where someone can
anonymously report a potential mishap they may have either witnessed or been a part of. Similar
programs at the FAA and NASA have been very successful. The Navy recognizes that having
core values of “Honor, Courage and Commitment” are not always sufficient to overcome
situational pressures all the time. The Navy might point to what Kurt Lewin called channel
factors, small but important situational characteristics that help bridge the gap from attitude to
behavior. Some examples of channel factors are self-addressed stamped envelopes for returning
magazine subscriptions (especially if you check the “Bill Me Later” box); a TV remote control
increases channel switching since viewers no longer have to get up from the comfort of their
chairs; or having a call phone makes it more likely you’ll call 911 when you see an accident.
NAASREP created a channel factor that insures the safety of Naval personnel when
circumstances might overwhelm reporting by even honorable people.
If recognizing this power can indeed help people to overcome it, what can be done to help
others reach this realization? How can others take more control over their behavior? The first
step, once again, is to become aware of the power of the situation. Training can, in fact be
effective, especially if it involves understanding the process and mechanisms underlying the
information (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). Beaman and colleagues using social
psychological lectures were successful in increasing rates of shoplifting reporting (Klentz &
Beaman, 1981) and increasing helping behaviors (Beaman, Barnes, Klentz, and McQuirk, 1978).
When one of the author's Social Psychology class specifically focused on the fundamental
The Ethical Situationist 14
attribution error and why people do not help, students report that they were able to overcome
both of these biases in specific situations up to two years after they took the class. 86 students
who had taken the course over a period of three semesters were emailed by the professor and
asked two questions. 86% responded (n = 74). The first question was if learning about helping
behavior lead them to help in any situation in which they believed they would not have otherwise
helped. 72% of the respondents (n = 53) answered in the affirmative, with nearly 85% of those
(n = 45) being able to specifically state the situation. The second was if learning about the
fundamental attribution error lead them to overcome it in any situation in which they believed
they otherwise would not have overcome it. 64% of the respondents (n = 55) answered in the
affirmative, with over 69% of those (n=38) being able to specicically state the situation.
Perhaps a more parsimonious solution than making social psychology a required course at
all universities would be to incorporate the concept of the power of the situation into ethical
training. Ethical training is now becoming more prevalent in a number of different industries,
both public and private. Social psychologists should volunteer to be on committees where ethics
are discussed. They should help create parts of training regimens that focus on the situation in
addition to those that attempt to develop the inherent “goodness” of the person. Most people
have no problem acting ethically in clear cases, but what about in extreme situations? The
question becomes much more complex in such a setting, and the desired ethical behavior so
much more difficult to achieve. In some ethical situations, knowledge of the power of the
situation is already being put to use. The Stanford University Judicial Affairs office gives
situational tips on how to prevent cheating: “pick an exam room big enough for alternate seating;
consider allowing students to bring one index card to an exam with anything they like on it”
(McCormick 2003, p. 69).
The Ethical Situationist 15
Social psychologists should use the tools they have already toward the goal of ethical
training. For example, they have used attitude inoculation techniques to prevent smoking, by
using the power of peer groups and role play. They have the added advantage that they do not
need to change attitudes as most people already believe themselves to be ethical. Such programs
reinforce people's need for consistency between their attitudes and their future behavior. To
highlight this lack of consistency, techniques involving hypocrisy, previously shown to increase
condom use to prevent disease (Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994), could be used to
keep people’s behaviors in line with their beliefs. Additionally, social psychologists have
demonstrated the power of modeling to promote socially desired behaviors (e.g., Cialdini, 1990).
Social psychologists also can work with other psychologists to include situationism in
studying ethical behavior. Cialdini & Kenrick (1976), for example, have built a social development
scale of pro-social behavior. Beaman and colleagues revisited behaviorism to identify proper
reinforcement schedules to maximize altruistic behaviors (Beaman, Stoffer, and Woods, 1983).
Personality psychologists are also becoming more sophisticated as they examine person-situation
interactions. Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda have discovered that while personalities are not
necessarily consistent across situations, they have consistent idiographic patterns in overall levels
of situation-behavior relationships (i.e., if this situation occurs, then this person will act this way).
For example, while someone does not act compassionately all the time, they may always act very
compassionately at home, somewhat compassionately at school, and never compassionately during
sports. Thus, each person has a stable intraindividual behavior pattern that takes into account
changes in situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Conclusion
The Ethical Situationist 16
Thomas Huxley (1929) wrote when considering what a child does and does not know,
“begin with the most important topic of all—morality, as the guide to conduct” (p. 243). Just
because the situation can have undue influence over people does not mean it must exert that
influence. Social psychologists and philosophers (indeed, all those involved in moral education
and development) can integrate this starting point for education by using their tools and
knowledge to educate their students on the paths and barriers to ethical behavior. The power of
the situation can perhaps be overcome by understanding and acknowledging its potential
influence. Through this improved insight, social psychologists can help to create systems in
which ethical behavior, as well as development, is more likely to occur. Contra some
interpretations of the impact the fundamental attribution error has on character development, a
clear truth can emerge: knowledge improves the chances for ethical behavior over ignorance.
Aristotle and Spinoza were right all along, and social psychology has vindicated, rather than
undermined, some of their critical insights about moral judgment and character development.
The Ethical Situationist 17
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