Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
Joint Forcible Entry Operations
Joint Integrating Concept
Version .92A3
Legend:
Yellow: Changes from GO/FO review
Blue: Senior Concept Developer review
15 September 2004
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
Table of Contents
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Section 1 -- Introduction and Scope
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1.A
1.B
Introduction
Scope
Section 2 – Description of the Military Problem
2.A
Operational Environment
2.A.1 Providing Access
2.A.2 Gaining Operational Access
2.A.3 Forcible Entry
2.B Effects-Based Operations
2.C Operational Art
Section 3 – Joint Forcible Entry Operations – The Concept
3.A
3.B
Synopsis of the Central Idea
Preparing for Joint Forcible Entry Operations
3.B.1 Create organizations and processes
3.B.2 Develop joint leaders for joint forcible entry operations
3.B.3 Train under the right conditions as a cohesive joint force
3.B.4 Shape, develop and maintain infrastructure and resources
3.C Principles of joint forcible entry operations
3.C.1 Start with the end in mind
3.C.2 Gain and maintain Access
3.C.3 Shape the operational battlespace
3.C.4 Establish persistent intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance profile
3.C.5 Overwhelm and overmatch the adversary in order to
achieve end state
3.C.6 Mitigate risk
3.C.7 Achieve desired effects
3.C.8 Achieve decisive conclusions
3.C.9 Provide focused sustainment
3.C.10 Protect the force
Section 4 – Capabilities
4.A
Future Capabilities
4.A.1 Joint command and control
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4.A.2 Battlespace awareness
4.A.3 Force application
4.A.4 Focused logistics
4.A.5 Protection
4.B Immediate Actions
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CONCLUSION
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Appendix A – Assumptions and Risks
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Appendix B – Potential Enemy Capabilities – 2015
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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"…a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness; one
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that is easier to deploy and sustain; one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision
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weaponry and information technologies."
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George W. Bush
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Joint Publication for Forcible Entry Operations (Joint Publication 3-18) defines
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forcible entry as “seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed
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opposition.” This concept envisions joint forcible entry operations in broader terms. The
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concept includes using future capabilities to establish a single lodgment for follow-on
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operations; establishing multiple lodgments for larger-scale, extensive campaigns; or
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forcible entry as a singular operation. The following definition presents the broader
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aspects of joint forcible entry operations:
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Joint Forcible Entry: A joint military operation
conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into
the territory of an adversary as rapidly as possible in
order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or
conduct a singular operation.
The operational environment that will confront commanders in 2015 will be
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challenging. Future adversaries will have learned to apply all of their capabilities and
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resources to deny U.S. forces the freedom of movement and unencumbered access our
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forces, for the most part, have enjoyed to date. Our future opponents will take advantage
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of natural obstacles, will apply force, and will apply diplomatic and cultural pressures on
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regional governments—all to prevent or significantly diminish U.S. force access. Their
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intent will be to disrupt, slow or prevent access, thereby setting conditions for their own
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strategic success.
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The Regional Combatant Commanders will endeavor in peacetime to provide access
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within their areas of responsibility. Where access is denied or restricted commanders will
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need the capability to gain and maintain operational access and conduct forcible entry
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operations to accomplish assigned tasks. Forcible entry will require well-trained, well-
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prepared, interdependent joint forces capable of executing on short-notice. These forces
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will require dynamically tasked, immediately available lift and tailored joint logistics
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support that can operate from strategic or operational distances and can use non-
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traditional support bases (e.g. Joint Seabase).
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Joint forcible entry operations require appropriate organizations and processes that
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facilitate forming, deploying and executing on demand. Critically important: Joint
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forcible entry operations require the development and training of a cadre of joint leaders
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and organizations. Developing these leaders and employing them during exercises and
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actual operations will create that cadre. Joint forcible entry operations training under
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tough, realistic, and stressful conditions will establish and refine organizational processes
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and procedures required for coherent, joint, distributed tactical actions.
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Joint forcible entry operations are guided by the following principles:
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Start with the end in mind
Gain and maintain operational access
Shape the operational battlespace
Establish persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance profile
Overwhelm and overmatch the adversary in order to achieve end state
Mitigate risk
Achieve desired effects
Achieve decisive conclusions
Provide focused sustainment
Protect the force
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Joint forcible entry operations capabilities will continue to be required in the future.
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Therefore, combatant commanders will require a complete menu of joint forcible entry
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operations capabilities. The size and composition of a future joint forcible entry
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operations force are dependent upon the mission assigned, how quickly forcible entry is
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required, operational conditions, constraints, and capabilities of the opposition.
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This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years’ Defense
Plan (FYDP), roughly 2015 and rests upon the following assumptions:
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Assumptions:
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The global war on terrorism will continue through 2015.
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The U.S. will require robust joint forcible entry operations capabilities
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through 2015.
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Potential adversaries will benefit from the ongoing global diffusion and
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proliferation of anti-access technologies, including long-range, accurate
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missiles with supporting information architectures, weapons of mass
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destruction, weapons of mass effects, and inexpensive technologies.
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A determined adversary with sophisticated anti-access capabilities may
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initiate preemptive combat operations on the U.S. C-day in an attempt to
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preempt a U.S. deployment and prevent the introduction of U.S. combat
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forces into its operational area.
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Limitations in overseas port, airfield, infrastructure, and overseas logistics
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hubs will require alternative basing means and alternative means for
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deployment and sustainment of the force.
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Section 1 -- INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
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“We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think
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about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US armed
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forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we
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exercise and the way we fight.”
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U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
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National Defense University, 31 Jan 02
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1.A Introduction. Four strategic conditions will affect joint forcible entry operations
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in 2015:
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First, the U.S. will continue to have global interests and remain engaged with a
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variety of regional players. The U.S. will continue to develop and nurture
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alliances and security cooperation agreements that may provide access, but in
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many cases we will still have to fight for the operational access essential for joint
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forcible entry operations.
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Second, potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial
base and many of the same technologies as the U.S. military.
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Third, potential adversaries will adapt as our capabilities evolve. Future
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adversaries will look for niche capabilities and employ asymmetric methods to
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offset U.S. strengths. They will seek to intimidate allies and friendly nations from
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supporting American military operations. Potential adversaries will continue to
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operate and acquire new modern surveillance systems and advanced cruise
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missiles, ballistic missiles and air defense systems. They may possess
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sophisticated mines and weapons of mass destruction to deter, preempt, delay or
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defeat U.S. power projection operations as noted in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
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Review. These sophisticated anti-access capabilities will be used aggressively in
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the effort to deny the United States access to regions where its interests are
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threatened.
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Fourth, the U.S. cannot always predict where it may have to conduct a forcible
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entry, the type of opponent U.S forces will face or the coalition with which we
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will fight. Forcible entry could take place on the littorals, well inland, or in some
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combination.
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These strategic conditions mandate that the United States maintain a credible joint
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forcible entry operations capability to enter when, where, and how it is needed. Joint
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forcible entry operations capabilities will provide the future combatant commander with
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the options he needs, when he needs them. Joint forcible entry operations may be used to
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establish a lodgment to enable follow-on military operations. Simultaneous joint forcible
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entry operations may be used to establish a set of distributed lodgments to set the
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conditions to support larger-scale, extensive campaigns. Joint forcible entry operations
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may also be executed as a single operation. Each of these situations will present future
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joint commanders with complex and distinct operational challenges.
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Joint Publication 3-18 defines forcible entry as the “seizing and holding of a military
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lodgment in the face of armed opposition.” This definition is too restrictive. It does not
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describe the full set of forcible entry cases. The definition below provides a more
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descriptive treatment of the complex nature of joint forcible entry operations.
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Joint Forcible Entry: A joint military operation
conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into
the territory of an adversary as rapidly as possible in
order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or
conduct a singular operation.
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1.B Scope. Herein we focus on joint forcible entry operations against a high-end
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regional competitor possessing significant military capabilities. No set blueprint for joint
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forcible entry operations exists. Each joint forcible entry operation is unique, driven by
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discrete variables and specific situations. Each joint forcible entry operation will be
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conducted against different opponents, in different geo-political environments, with
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different coalitions, and for different purposes. Regardless, this joint forcible entry
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concept presents a set of principles that future joint force commanders can apply to the
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specific case he faces. The paper will also identify the joint operational capabilities
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essential to execute joint forcible entry operations.
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Section 2 – DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM
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“Future adversaries are seeking capabilities to render ineffective much of the
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current U.S. military’s ability to project military power overseas…New approaches for
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projecting power are needed to meet these threats…conducting distributed operations;
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reducing the dependence of U.S. forces on major air and sea ports for insertion;
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increasing U.S. advantages in stealth, standoff, hypersonic, and network attacks…”
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will be required.
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U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Prepared Statement for the Senate
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Armed Services Committee Hearing on Military Transformation, 9 April 2002.
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2.A The operational environment. Countering an adversary’s anti-access and area
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denial efforts presents the Regional Combatant Commander with a difficult military
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challenge. Future adversaries will take advantage of natural or geographic obstacles,
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employ both overt and covert actions, and use complex defense capabilities to deny
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access or defend against direct Joint or multinational force action. The most complex
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joint forcible entry operations challenge occurs when all are combined.
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Distance or geographic obstacles may prevent or inhibit access. Political conditions
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or actions can also limit access. Adversaries will attempt to shape the regional
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battlespace in terms of alliances in order to threaten or to prevent our access in a region.
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Most joint forcible entry operations will occur far from our shores. The enemy may
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position forces to defend key joint forcible entry operations’ objectives both well inland
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and along the littorals. This combination of issues presents a complex problem to the
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joint forcible entry operations commander. Future adversaries will use distance in
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conjunction with advances in their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
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capabilities to increase their warning and reaction time. They will use knowledge of
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tactical lift limitations in an attempt to restrict U.S. and coalition maneuver. Adversaries
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will most likely seek to offset our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as
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our precision munitions by embedding their forces within urban areas. They will seek to
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conceal themselves and their assets in complex and difficult terrain. Adversaries may
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operate in mountainous regions, in caves, in the desert or anywhere else where geography
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becomes their ally. Future adversaries may blend in with the indigenous population to
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further complicate access and joint forcible entry operations efforts. They will combine
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distance, demographics and geography to their advantage.
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Attempts to impede joint forcible entry operations may involve overt as well as covert
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and clandestine enemy actions. Overt efforts to oppose joint forcible entry operations
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may range from diplomatic or cultural pressure on regional governments to the use of
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theater or tactical missiles, offensive, defensive, and protective maritime mining,
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terrorism, asymmetric warfare, or the threat or actual use of weapons of mass destruction
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or mass effect. Adversaries will use the full range of their military capabilities to directly
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attack or they may employ hit and hide tactics to prevent or slow the entry of our forces.
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Our adversaries are adaptable. They have learned lessons from past operations and
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will further evolve as they learn from future operations. Adversaries will not wait for the
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U.S. to establish lodgments and to conduct a massive buildup before initiating action.
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Future adversaries may possess robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
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systems that can be used for targeting and for combat assessment. They may combine
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well-developed cruise and ballistic missile capabilities to attack in-theater bases and
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staging areas. Future adversaries will likely employ highly integrated air defense systems
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to protect their offensive capabilities and infrastructure. Additionally, enemy maritime
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capabilities, including mines and subsurface assets, may be used to deny U.S. and
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coalition forces access. Expect future adversaries to use all necessary means to degrade,
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disrupt or deny U.S. use of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
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systems. Combinations of these actions will be used to thwart U.S. attempts to achieve
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military objectives. Potential enemy capabilities in 2015 are addressed further in
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Appendix B.
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Covert and clandestine operations include actions the adversary will employ that can
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be concealed or allow plausible denial.1 These actions may include the use of special
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operations forces, agents, provocateurs, and surrogates to pressure regional governments
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or directly attack U.S. or coalition forces or bases in theater, en route or at home. The
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local populations may even be used to disrupt or deny U.S. and coalition forces freedom
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Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001.
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of action. Such actions may include the use of labor unions, religious gatherings or
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student rallies in the joint forcible entry operations area of operations. Covert actions
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may include cyberspace attacks as part of information operations. Covert activities often
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target the hearts and minds of the local population and attempt to influence U.S. or
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coalition resolve or world opinion. Through information operations, adversaries may use
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neutral countries with cultural or religious ties to advance their cause with the local
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population. Clandestine operations may include the use of spies and deep-planted agents
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within friendly governments and agencies. These actions may attempt to intimidate or
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convince the target audience to support our adversary and oppose U.S. forcible entry or
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the follow-on operations. Whatever the intent, the goal is to elicit local, regional and
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world support against our interests and actions.
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Future adversaries may also employ overt, covert, and clandestine actions around
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bases and ports in the U.S. and during deployment, employment and sustainment
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operations. These actions, coupled with the problems of distance and geography, present
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a complex challenge to joint forcible entry operations.
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Future conflicts will be uncertain at best, and increasingly dangerous. Future
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commanders have to think of access in terms of three major requirements: initial access
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provided, operational access that needs to be gained, and operational access that needs to
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be maintained throughout joint forcible entry operations.
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2.A.1 Providing access. Long-term access is a result of continuous shaping efforts.
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Shaping the operational environment involves the Regional Combatant Commanders,
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Defense Agencies, State Department, potentially the United Nations and other
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international agencies, alliances and coalition partners. All instruments of government
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and international action are applied to ensure access.
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The Regional Combatant Commander conducts cooperative activities with selected
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allies and friendly nations to support military superiority and coalition effectiveness
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across the full range of military operations. His actions enhance multi-national
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interoperability and self-defense capabilities through standardization agreements,
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armaments cooperation, security assistance, foreign technologies assessment programs,
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information and personnel exchanges, and multinational training events and exercises.
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This set of military shaping efforts attempts to establish habitual relationships between
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commanders and forces that are critical to providing access as well as gaining operational
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access or executing the joint forcible entry operations option when required.
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The U.S. military supports the other instruments of government or international
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action in attaining long-term strategic aims. Diplomacy is maintained through consistent
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contact at the Ambassadorial and Envoy level to encourage cooperation and to support
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regional stability backed by U.S. military capabilities. Diplomacy may support access
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through contacts between friendly governments that have diplomatic relations with an
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adversary government. Providing information is a powerful government action. The
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print and broadcast media afford both the U.S. and foreign governments’ opportunities to
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inform public opinion. The economic element of government action includes economic
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aid, grants, loans, trade and other forms of economic action between governments.
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Economic packages can be promised or withheld as necessary to influence access.
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Foreign aid signals U.S. resolve and support, targeting the receiving government and
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population. Foreign trade agreements, including granting or withholding Most Favored
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Nation status, are powerful government actions. The instruments of government action
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are most effective when applied in concert with one another collectively. A future
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concept will describe in detail military actions necessary for providing access.
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2.A.2 Gaining Operational Access. Despite our best efforts to provide access
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wherever and whenever it is needed, operational threats and practical realities may still
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deny the access required for a military operation. A competent adversary will employ
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anti-access and area denial capabilities to deny forcible entry forces easy access to areas
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under his control or influence. The anti-access threat begins at our home stations and
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ports of embarkation and extends globally to the objective area. Area denial capabilities
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also include information warfare, inclusive of deception and threats to space platforms.
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In conjunction with these efforts, the adversary may attempt to establish and enforce an
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operational exclusion zone encompassing areas within his reach. He may target U.S. and
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coalition forces and their ports of debarkation, lodgments, entry points, staging bases,
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operating bases, and logistical support systems. Finally, the enemy may seek to coerce or
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intimidate the U.S. and allies with threats to non-combatants. The adversary orchestrates
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these multiple and diverse capabilities to create friction and to deny, delay or disrupt
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access. Failing to confront any one of these possible capabilities may adversely impact
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U.S. and coalition operations.
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To gain operational access in a competent anti-access and area denial environment,
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the joint force commander employs tailored, interdependent and capabilities-based
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forces. This force, informed by pervasive knowledge, can be immediately employed
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using stealth, standoff, speed and precision. Initial actions employed by the commander
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will shape the battlespace, setting conditions for success. The joint force subjects the
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enemy to, and overwhelms him by, immediate, effects-based, knowledge-enhanced,
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precision engagement and rapid maneuver. In this manner the joint force gains access
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when and where it is needed throughout the geographic and chronological course of the
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campaign.
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2.A.3 Forcible entry. With conditions set for the joint force assault, a joint forcible
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entry operation is tailored to seize and maintain the initiative, maintain operational
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access, accomplish the mission and achieve end state employing an effects-based
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approach. The commander’s intent, derived from assigned strategic aims, identifies the
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required effects. The joint forcible entry operations commander uses accurate and timely
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information to assess where he is in the operation and if he is still achieving the effects he
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desires. He adapts, shifting tasks to his subordinates and adjusting priorities as the
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situation unfolds. Given the operational environment and the mission assigned, forcible
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entry operations set the conditions for follow-on operations; support a larger-scale,
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extensive campaign; or are executed as a singular operation.
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Joint forcible entry operations are not benign actions. We should expect the enemy
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force to use all of its capabilities to fight the entry forces. The joint forcible entry
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operations force uses pervasive knowledge to provide as clear a picture as possible of the
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enemy location and disposition. No enemy “picture” will ever be perfect, but the effect
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we want to achieve is that we can “observe” every enemy action and even his intent.
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That picture must be shared and updated in real time among all elements of the joint
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forcible entry operations force. The commander requires all available knowledge on the
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area of operations and adversary options, reactions and potential complications. In many
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cases, pervasive knowledge will lead to predictive analysis and anticipatory action. Our
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ability to see and understand first enables us to decide and act first. Knowledge will
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never be perfect; uncertainty remains. We must be prepared with less than perfect
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knowledge, but better real-time relevant knowledge minimizes risk, increases the
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probability of success and reduces uncertainty.
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The joint forcible entry operations force should also be network-centric. The degree
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to which force entities are networked will determine the quality of information that is
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available to various entities and their ability to interact in the information domain. The
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level of interoperability achieved and the characteristics of command and control
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processes will determine the extent that information is shared, as well as the nature and
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quality of the interactions that occur between and among force entities. Taken together,
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these capabilities and other organizational characteristics will determine the effectiveness
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of the force, its agility, and the degree to which decisions, plans, action, and entities are
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synchronized2. Network-centricity provides all involved with joint forcible entry
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operations immediate information and access to joint maneuver and fires. Additionally,
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network-centricity enhances the commander’s ability to orchestrate the actions of his
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joint forcible entry operations force. The different elements within the force can
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communicate and coordinate their logistical requirements and shift assets to react to
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planned contingencies or to cover unexpected requirements. The importance of the
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networked force and the information flow supporting command and control necessitates
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protecting the network from all threats.
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Joint forcible entry operations are combat operations supported by the other
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instruments of national and international action—diplomacy, information and economic.
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At the strategic level, the scope of providing access includes the full application of all
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elements of government action. The military is a supporting element. At the operational
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level, the scope of joint forcible entry operations is such that the military is the supported
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element of government action. These operations are effects-based in approach and are
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intended to create the perception by the adversary that they are simultaneous in
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execution.
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2
Alberts, David and Hayes, Richard. Power to the Edge Washington, DC: CCRP Publications, June 2003
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2.B Effects-based operations. Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions
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directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crises, and war.
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Effects-based operations focus “coordinated sets of actions” on objectives defined in
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terms of human behavior in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels, and measure
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their success in terms of behavior produced. Effects can occur simultaneously on the
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tactical, operational, military-strategic, and geo-strategic levels of military operations, in
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domestic and international political arenas, and in the economic arena as well.3 Effects-
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based operations encompass the full range of diplomatic, informational, military and
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economic actions that the U.S. might undertake to shape the behavior of the enemy and
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attain the assigned strategic aims.
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Forcible entry forces, tapping the technologies and thinking of network-centric
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operations, can apply the four key ingredients of successful effects-based operations:
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options, agility, coordination, and knowledge mobilization. Decision makers tailor
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actions to produce a useful option to deal with a given situation and employ responsive,
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networked forces with shared awareness and speed of command. Shared situational
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awareness and an understanding of command intent facilitate synchronization and
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coordination of complex actions and effects. Mobilizing knowledge provides timely,
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relevant support to decision makers at all levels.4
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Effects-based operations increase the probability of preventing the enemy from
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interfering with forcible entry forces by focusing on more efficient destruction of the
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enemy’s decision-making capability and his ability to create coherent actions. Through
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the execution of overwhelming asymmetrical attacks, the defeat of enemy will be both
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psychological and physical. To achieve the desired effects, joint force packaging, the
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blending of packaged joint forces and adapting those forces to specific theater
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requirements will be required to shape and sustain the entry forces and allow for a more
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seamless transition to follow-on operations.
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There are several overall objectives to be achieved in support of joint forcible entry
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operations: to prevent the enemy from interfering with the forcible entry operation at any
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point; to overmatch the enemy in all domains when and where the joint commander
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Smith, Edward A. Effects-based Operations, Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and
War, Washington, DC: CCRP Publications, November 2002
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directs; to facilitate transition to follow-on operations, if any, as quickly as possible; and
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to create the sense of simultaneity of actions in the eyes of the enemy.
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To create these effects, the commander must continuously analyze the operating
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environment. This analysis will result in a decision as to how to conduct the joint
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forcible entry operation. Neither simultaneity nor sequentiality of actions is always the
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“right” approach. It is the balance that must be right and is up to the commander to
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“dial” the correct blend.
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Figure 1 that follows illustrates how the commander must set the dial to apply actions and
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create effects, given the mission he is assigned and the situation he is in. Historical
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examples can illustrate how the blend between sequential and simultaneous actions
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results in mission accomplishment. During WWII, OPERATION OVERLORD was
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conducted at the left end of the meter. OPERATION DESERT STORM, more toward
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the left center; OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, more to the right center.
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OPERATION JUST CAUSE was executed more towards the far right side of the meter.
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Figure 1 How a JFEO Commander achieves effects is situational dependent
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Interagency and multinational action at the operational level of war provides the
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commander the opportunity to affect the enemy’s warmaking ability to a greater extent
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than U.S. military action alone. In the application of an effects-based approach to
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operations, the joint forcible entry commander must be cognizant of effects that occur in
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Ibid
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three domains: physical, informational and cognitive. How a joint forcible entry
428
operations commander of the future embodies the effects-based operations approach
429
requires operational art.
17
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2.C Operational art. Operational art begins in the mind of the commander and is
432
implemented through his organization. Joint forcible entry operations will, in most cases,
433
be employed in support of or as an element of Major Combat Operations. Therefore, the
434
operational art described in this section is naturally linked to and supports what has been
435
described in the Major Combat Operations concept. While the joint forcible entry
436
commander is cognizant of this linkage, there are specific considerations he must address
437
relative to the unique characteristics of joint forcible entry operations.
438
The joint forcible entry commander must envision the scope of the forcible entry
439
mission within the broader context of the campaign he supports. He must also visualize it
440
in terms of time, space, cyberspace and physical dimensions. The commander must also
441
understand the actual conditions (friendly and enemy, political and military, domestic and
442
international) that dictate the most appropriate action. Finally, the joint forcible entry
443
commander must visualize, describe and direct a clear, coherent plan that expresses the
444
unitary vision of his senior commanders and achieves strategic aims and operational
445
objectives.
446
The joint forcible entry commander determines the best way to conduct joint forcible
447
entry operations anywhere in the world with globally sourced and interdependent forces.
448
He must visualize the physical space in which he will conduct the forcible entry, and then
449
use that space to his advantage to both defeat the adversary’s attempts to deny entry and
450
set conditions for follow-on operations, if any. The joint forcible entry commander
451
continuously adapts as the situation unfolds.
452
The nature and pace of joint forcible entry operations accentuates the requirement for
453
a well-established informational domain. The joint force commander must also be able to
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communicate information required to maintain international and domestic public support
455
of the operation while simultaneously conducting offensive and deceptive information
456
operations against the adversary. The joint forcible entry commander’s objective in the
457
information domain is to diminish his adversary’s capabilities while retaining and
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expanding his own. The commander requires an information system that is flexible, fully
459
networked and secure. Joint forcible entry operations include the ability to employ
460
computer network operations as appropriate when the opportunity warrants. Finally, the
461
joint forcible entry information network provides the commander the means to observe,
462
decide and act faster than the enemy.
463
Actions taken in the physical and information domains create effects in the cognitive
464
domain. The joint forcible entry commander must have a good understanding of what is
465
in the mind of the enemy, as well as the enemy’s capability and will to fight. His
466
Information Operations plan should exploit every capability in order to outwit and
467
outfight the enemy. Integration of Information Operations, and in particular deception
468
operations, is critical throughout the conduct of joint forcible entry operations. When
469
applicable, the commander attempts to impart to the enemy that the joint forcible entry
470
force could strike any place at any time. Execution of the forcible entry not only defeats
471
enemy capabilities but also conveys a sense of futility in the mind of the adversary. The
472
joint forcible entry commander introduces confusion and doubt in the adversary in order
473
to upset the enemy’s ability to command and control his forces.
474
The joint forcible entry operations commander acts through his organizational staff
475
and subordinates. Because of the expeditionary nature of joint forcible entry forces, the
476
organization must be adaptive and capable of collaborative, parallel planning to include
477
planning while enroute to the objective. The challenge to the commander and his staff is
478
to integrate actions at the tactical level while employing forces from across the globe.
479
Fully integrated within the Regional Combatant Command, his organizational structure
480
should encompass agility, robustness, and the capability to self-synchronize. A self-
481
synchronizing force demonstrates clear and consistent understanding of the commander’s
482
intent, high quality information and shared situational awareness, competence at all levels
483
of the force, and mutual trust throughout the organization.
484
The commander, practicing operational art, creates harmony among the previously
485
stated characteristics. That is to say that the plan developed can be executed by the
486
forces and leaders on hand, within the space available, and leveraging all capabilities in
487
place. The force must be imbued with a sense of a mission and have the trust and
488
confidence of the commander to act with initiative, creativity and audacity. If any of
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these components are inadequate, the commander must be adaptive, adjusting either his
490
aims or plans in order to address these deficiencies.
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Section 3 – JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS – THE CONCEPT
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494
“The idea… is to create a U.S. global military capability where "individuals and
495
units will receive training and experience in joint operations at the strategic,
496
operational and tactical levels…to train as we fight - as a coherently integrated team."
497
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
498
Naval War College Graduation, June 20, 2003
499
500
3.A Synopsis of the central idea. Joint forcible entry operations require a tailored
501
combination of forward-based, forward deployed, pre-positioned and CONUS surge
502
forces. These various force postures will enhance the ability to maneuver from
503
operational and strategic distances. Additionally, using an effects-based approach, the
504
joint forcible entry operations force will employ complimentary force multiplying effects
505
that will result from synchronizing Joint, inter-agency, and possibly multinational forces.
506
Joint forcible entry operations take full advantage of forward presence, a mix of basing
507
options, and operational and strategic maneuver in order to gain and maintain access
508
to ensure entry. Joint forcible entry operations employ distributed operations to attack
509
from multiple directions and dimensions throughout the battlespace. The net result
510
will be a coordinated attack to overwhelm the adversary and achieve the desired effects
511
before the adversary has time to react, thus ensuring conditions for follow-on
512
operations or achieving end state for a singular operation.
513
One challenge facing national defense leaders structuring the future force will be to
514
determine the most appropriate and effective mix of forward-based, CONUS-based and
515
forward-presence forces. The advantageous placement of the force will both enhance and
516
be reinforced by our capability to conduct strategic and operational maneuver. For those
517
forces located in forward locations, intra-theater lift assets will support operational
518
maneuver, while CONUS-based and more distant forward-based forces will use inter-
519
theater lift to support strategic maneuver.
520
Regardless of the lift used, the force will require the ability to attack the adversary
521
from multiple directions, using multiple entry points, and multiple dimensions—air, land,
522
sea, space and cyberspace. To be most effective the attack should appear simultaneous to
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the adversary, achieve at least tactical surprise, and immediately seize the initiative. With
524
appropriate access gained and maintained, multidirectional, multidimensional and
525
simultaneous entry execution should confound and overwhelm the adversary’s decision-
526
making process and contribute to a successful joint forcible entry operation and the
527
adversary’s defeat.
528
One method for contributing to the aforementioned desired effects is Joint Seabasing.
529
Joint Seabasing represents the ability to rapidly employ networked expeditionary joint
530
forces; contribute to assuring access and entry; project, support and sustain distributed
531
and dispersed offensive and defensive combat power from the sea; and significantly
532
reduce reliance on land bases within the Joint Operating Area. This capability mitigates
533
risks associated with joint forcible entry operations. Joint Seabasing is an emerging
534
concept consisting of a system of systems, ships, forces, offensive and defensive
535
weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics. Joint Seabasing, various fixed facilities,
536
rapid expeditionary basing, and CONUS-bases, provide the potential for forward
537
deterrence and provide national leaders and joint force commanders the set of options
538
required. This set provides the joint forcible entry commander with operational reach for
539
a credible and rapid response for forcible entry operations in an anti-access environment.
540
The set also poses multiple problems an adversary must be prepared to solve
541
simultaneously.
Access, or the adversary’s attempt to deny access, is central when planning for
542
543
military operations. The following diagram conceptually frames the tasks that create the
544
framework for successful joint forcible entry operations.5 Figure 2 illustrates that
545
shaping operations are continuously ongoing. Shaping may take form during peacetime
546
operations in the diplomatic, information, economic, or military arenas. One of the
547
important objectives of peacetime shaping is to provide access in the geographic area.
548
Shaping will not only be prevalent during forward presence but during operations to gain
549
and maintain operational access. The extent to which forward presence is required will
550
be situationally dependent. Events might transpire that a significant forward presence
551
will be established to deter aggression or to provide access or the reverse might be true.
5
The tasks, and the capabilities that enable them, will be the focus of rigorous experimentation directed by
DepSecDef memorandum dtd 12 Dec 03, Forcible Entry PDM II Study, and JROCM 199-03 dtd 20 Oct 03.
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In almost every case, however, if access is denied and the need for forcible entry
553
operations arises, forward presence may be used as a springboard to gain and maintain
554
operational access. Operational access sets conditions for opening entry points and
555
assault by establishing the necessary control of air, sea, space and cyberspace required to
556
deliver forcible entry forces. Continued access will be required to receive follow-on
557
forces or transition to follow-on operations should the need require. Sustainment will be
558
paramount throughout the entire operation. Although an apparent sequential series of
559
actions was just described, ensuring access and executing forcible entry tasks may be
560
simultaneously executed depending on the range, depth and persistent nature of the anti-
561
access capabilities of our adversary. This construct is illustrated by overlapping tasks.
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
Figure 2 Joint Forcible Entry Operations Tasks in context with access
571
572
The following series of diagrams depict the three types of joint forcible entry
573
operations treated in this concept. Each of the diagrams suggests a number of actions to
574
be accomplished. These actions are guided by the enduring principles described in
575
section 3.C. The actions are non-prescriptive in nature. There is no standardized solution
576
to meet all contingencies. These tasks are not necessarily sequential; they may be
577
executed near simultaneously to gain surprise and momentum, reduce risk, and achieve
578
success. The commander should develop his specific plan of “how to” conduct joint
579
forcible entry operations using the principles applicable to his unique situation.
580
Figure 3 depicts using joint forcible entry operations to establish a single lodgment to
581
support follow-on military action. A single lodgment joint forcible entry operation may
582
begin by establishing forward presence or by repositioning deployed expeditionary
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assets. Either the entire or selected portions of the Joint Task Force for forcible entry
584
may move forward. In some cases, a headquarters element could be formed forward to
585
establish communications links and reachback capabilities.
586
23
The joint forcible entry operations force will prepare, or shape, the operational area.
587
Preparing the operational area may include insertion of special operations forces or other
588
agency assets. The special operations forces or inter-agency assets provide intelligence,
589
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and may conduct direct action operations.
590
The enhanced intelligence capabilities provide improved, accurate and timely information
591
that helps defeat anti-access strategies and helps preposition lift and sustainment. The
592
Joint Force Commander will gain and maintain operational access to the battlespace he
593
deems necessary for joint forcible entry operations and supporting operations. Setting
594
conditions for joint forcible entry operations and supporting operations requires close
595
coordination. The entry force may open several entry points. Some will be used to
596
approach objective areas from multiple directions; others may be used for deception.
597
Forcible entry point lodgments allow a smooth transition without operational pause to
598
follow-on force arrival. Follow-on operations may commence and the lodgment
599
expanded to support sustainment of the follow-on operations.
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601
602
603
Figure 3 Joint Forcible Entry Operations to Establish a Single Lodgment for Follow-on Operations
Figure 4 depicts joint forcible entry operations using multiple entry points to establish
604
multiple, interconnected and distributed lodgments to support a larger-scale extensive
605
campaign. Most of the actions previously discussed for establishing a single lodgment
606
are also applicable for multiple lodgments. Multiple entry points will also be required for
607
this operation to support moving forces to different objectives or deceptions. Receiving
608
follow-on forces for larger-scale, extensive campaigns require close coordination.
609
Establishing and sustaining the joint forcible entry operation and the follow-on forces
610
requires agility, coordination and strategic and operational lift that does not necessarily
611
rely upon fixed air and sea ports. By conducting forcible entry into remote coastal or
612
austere landing areas, we force our adversary to react to the joint forcible entry operation
613
where he does not expect it. This reaction provides the forcible entry force a measure of
614
protection and time to further develop the situation as the enemy reacts.
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615
616
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Figure 4 Joint Forcible Entry Operations to Establish Multiple Lodgments for Large Scale Follow-on
Campaign
618
The multiple lodgment operation is the most complex and challenging scenario for
619
forcible operations. Joint forcible entry operations to establish multiple lodgments may
620
require different joint forcible entry forces operating in close proximity to each other and
621
requiring well-coordinated execution. Establishing multiple lodgments through joint
622
forcible entry operations could require a single joint forcible entry force, or multiple joint
623
forcible entry forces under the overall command and control of single joint forcible entry
624
operations commander.
625
Figure 5 presents a joint forcible entry operation situation where a lodgment is not
626
established for follow-on operations. This type of joint forcible entry operation uses a
627
force that directly attacks the objective or distributed objectives as a singular mission.
628
Examples of singular operations where joint forcible entry operations may be required
629
range from assaults, raids or evacuation operations up to large-scale operations.
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Figure 5 Joint Forcible Entry Operations as a singular operation
632
633
3.B Preparing for joint forcible entry operations. The U.S. may no longer have a
634
“grace” period while transitioning to war. In this case, there is no “time-out” to catch up
635
and absolutely no reprieve from being strategically and operationally prepared. The U.S.
636
prepares by creating adaptive organizations and processes, emphasizing an expeditionary
637
posture and rapid surge capabilities, and developing and educating its leaders. Joint
638
training should be conducted under realistic conditions using collaborative planning and
639
continuous assessment. Preparing for success requires adaptability, flexibility, creativity,
640
and audacity.
641
642
3.B.1 Create organizations and processes. A near-immediate response to
643
developing crises enhances the probability of success by friendly forces. Little time may
644
be available to stand up a traditional Joint Task Force, identify forces, deploy to the area
645
of concern, and conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration as is the
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current practice. The dynamic nature of joint forcible entry operations may require the
647
creation of at least one standing Joint Task Force Headquarters with assigned component
648
commands specializing in joint forcible entry operations. Commanders could then assign
649
rotational forces that would be available for immediate response. This headquarters and
650
subordinate forces will refine the concept as well as train and exercise together to master
651
expertise in the joint forcible entry operations mission and be ready to respond
652
immediately. Such a standing force allows rapid, dynamic, and aggressive response
653
diminishing the adversary’s advantage of anticipating our actions. Additionally, the
654
standing Joint Task Force Headquarters will benefit from deliberate planning and
655
repetitive, focused training.
656
657
3.B.2 Develop joint leaders for joint forcible entry operations. By their nature
658
joint forcible entry operations are distributed and decentralized. Although centralization
659
may accommodate some aspects of joint military activity, the reliance on decentralized
660
decision-making and execution expands in importance during joint forcible entry
661
operations. The dynamic nature of a joint forcible entry operation demands leaders who
662
can anticipate and adapt; are agile, flexible, and audacious. For example, in the initial
663
period of a forcible entry operation, organic ground fire support assets are limited.
664
Ground forces will be extremely dependent on the joint force for fire support. Trained
665
leaders will enhance the effectiveness of joint forcible entry operations.
666
Future joint forcible entry operations leaders will require not only mastery in their
667
own specialization in joint forcible entry operations, but also require an in-depth
668
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of joint, inter-agency and coalition
669
partners. These leaders must be able to think on the move, adapting to an ever-changing
670
environment. At all levels, leaders must be skilled as communicators, flexible thinkers,
671
and in empowering others during the ebb and flow of joint forcible entry operations.
672
Working together as a team, well in advance of a crisis requiring joint forcible entry
673
operations, enhances teamwork and mitigates the stress of execution under fire. The
674
future joint forcible entry operations force will practice adaptive command and control
675
and resourceful teamwork under realistic conditions so they are ready when called upon.
676
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3.B.3 Train under the right conditions as a cohesive joint force. Joint forcible
678
entry operations are “tip of the spear” operations. Joint forcible entry forces, more than
679
any other force, will have to transition from peacetime to combat quickly. Joint forcible
680
entry operations training strengthens joint, interagency, and multi-national coordination
681
and prepares the force for the unique and demanding aspects of their operations.
682
Training involving the U.S. military, the interagency community, and multinational
683
partners expands our capabilities to conduct forcible entry. Training under realistic
684
conditions contributes to building trust, confidence, and shared understanding among the
685
joint forcible entry operations partners who will execute joint forcible entry operations.
686
Training should be geared to stimulate synergy, adaptability, and opportunism. These
687
are critical attributes for leaders and forces charged with the joint forcible entry
688
operations mission. Training forces to accept and cope with uncertainty, risk, change,
689
friction, chaos, and the fog of war is likewise critical to joint forcible entry operations.
690
This training will enhance the development of individuals and organizations that
691
intuitively improvise and adapt to joint forcible entry operations requirements.
692
693
3.B.4 Shape, develop and maintain infrastructure and resources. Through global
694
engagement the U.S. will continue to develop long term conditions and capabilities that
695
provide the foundation for access. Coherent involvement of the interagency and
696
multinational communities creates powerful partnerships. Interagency and multinational
697
support is essential to acquiring basing rights, developing airports and seaports of
698
debarkation, and establishing a network of contingency bases tailored to specific mission
699
needs (i.e., aerial strike, air assault, fixed-wing air-landed air assault, etc.). Fielding
700
assured access capabilities, advanced force delivery means, and reducing lift
701
requirements through tailored, capabilities-based modular force packages are enablers
702
that provide joint forcible entry operations forces speedy access to objective areas.
703
The U.S. and coalition partners will employ various means to ensure the use of
704
needed lines of communication and infrastructure. Forward deployment and presence of
705
U.S. forces reassure friends and allies and tend to dissuade potential adversaries. These
706
forward-deployed forces are likely to be the first responders to counter anti-access and
707
area denial strategies. Forward presence capabilities depend on establishing long-term
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708
basing rights within the Regional Combatant Commanders areas of responsibility. These
709
bases may include a combination of fixed, long-term, continuously available facilities
710
and bases that are available on an as-needed basis  joint sea basing or joint
711
expeditionary land basing, for example.
712
Providing the kind of access required by joint forcible entry operations forces
713
necessitates rapid maneuver capabilities. Key to providing access is the development of
714
assured access and lift capabilities that enable strategic and operational maneuver. This
715
lift must also provide the joint forcible entry force the capability to go where the enemy is
716
not; go where the joint forcible entry commander wants without relying on the
717
predictable use of air and sea ports.6 Additionally, creating tailorable, modular forces
718
that require little or no reception, staging, onward movement, and integration provides
719
the foundation for conducting joint forcible entry operations when required. These lift
720
and tailorable, modular force packages must operate from the existing fixed bases, sea
721
bases and austere bases. The tailorable, modular force packages assembled to execute
722
joint forcible entry operations must seamlessly and rapidly reinforce, reconstitute and or
723
reconfigure as the mission progresses and the situation changes.
724
The joint forcible entry forces will be expeditionary, more deployable, more
725
maneuverable and survivable. These fast, agile forces will reduce logistics demand by
726
displacing mass with tempo and responsiveness. A joint logistics system that employs
727
speed, accuracy and agility, combines Service capabilities, and creates a small footprint
728
supports distributed operations. Rapid integration of technological advances in
729
alternative fuels, multi-power systems and materials sciences (composites, etc.) will
730
provide the next generation of smaller, lighter, faster and less energy consuming
731
platforms. These new weapon systems should additionally offer increased precision,
732
effectiveness, firepower and reliability further reducing required lift. Better intelligence
733
will help meet logistics requirements, especially for common bulk items such as water
734
and fuel, in the operations area reducing the need to ship from CONUS or from
735
intermediate supply bases.
736
6
Lift capabilities will be developed through experimentation process
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3.C Principles for joint forcible entry operations. Figures 3-5 depicted the general
738
shape of forcible entry operations. While described in sequence for clarity’s sake, many
739
of the actions are executed simultaneously. A forcible entry operation begins with the
740
establishment of a forward presence and the conduct of shaping operations—overt,
741
covert, and clandestine. When directed, the joint force gains operational access and
742
opens multiple entry points — some for actual use, others possibly for deception
743
purposes. Access is maintained and entry points are kept open as long as they are needed
744
to conduct and sustain forcible entry operations or introduce follow-on forces and their
745
sustainment.
746
While every joint forcible entry operation will be different, the following principles
747
attempt to capture what will be common to some degree in every joint forcible entry
748
operation. They provide a set of tools that commanders may use to help guide their
749
thoughts. Not every principle is “new.” Most are evolutionary applications of new tools
750
or methods to classic principles of military art. Joint force commanders use these
751
principles when planning, preparing and executing joint forcible entry operations tasks.
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762










Start with the end in mind
Gain and maintain operational access
Shape the operational battlespace
Establish persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance profile
Overwhelm and overmatch the adversary in order to achieve end state
Mitigate risk
Achieve desired effects
Achieve decisive conclusions
Provide focused sustainment
Protect the force
763
764
3.C.1 Start with the end in mind
765
766

Determine the final purpose of the forcible entry
767

Derive from that purpose the desired effects in terms of:
768
-
Task organization
769
-
Courses of action
770
-
Distributed marshalling and delivery plans
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The joint forcible entry commander begins by determining the final purpose of the
772
forcible entry, either to support follow-on operations or as a singular operation. From
773
that purpose the commander develops operational objectives that translate into desired
774
effects. He then crafts the course of action. The distributed marshalling and delivery
775
plan supports final preparations to maneuver the forces to the objective area. All
776
supporting actions focus on the final purpose.
777
31
The joint forcible entry commander must ensure he clearly communicates the final
778
purpose of the mission to his subordinate commanders to ensure singular focus. The
779
actions of the entire joint forcible entry force should be intent on achieving that purpose.
780
781
3.C.2 Gain and maintain operational access
782
783

784
Establish necessary control of air, sea, space and cyberspace required to gain
operational access
785

Thwart enemy efforts to establish operational exclusion zones
786

Overwhelm the enemy through right-timed employment of rapid maneuver
787
and precision engagement capabilities
788

Collaborate with Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group
789

Use immediately employable forces to conduct operations that neutralize
790
competent anti-access capabilities when and where freedom of movement and
791
maneuver is needed to set conditions for direct delivery, sustainment and
792
support of distributed forcible entry forces
793

Use stealth, stand-off, speed, precision, and pervasive knowledge to force our
794
way through the anti-access exclusion zone and defeat the adversary’s area
795
denial forces
796
Gaining operational access is a condition upon which the conduct of forcible entry
797
operations depends. It includes continued application of all elements of government
798
power. These activities are coordinated with the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group
799
(JIACG) to ensure synchronization with the planning staff of the commander. In most
800
cases, future adversaries will defend centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and their
801
multi-dimensional, multi-directional approaches with competent anti-access capabilities.
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802
Joint forcible entry operations depend upon the ability to move through the battlespace in
803
order to employ distributed operations and attack from multiple directions and
804
dimensions. Even more critical, most of the capabilities upon which entry forces depend
805
also require the ability to move or maneuver through the battlespace to accomplish
806
interdependent tasks. The joint force will knock down anti-access threats and forces
807
setting conditions as directed. The opening of multiple entry points and lodgments can
808
continue to expand access into the battlespace as required. A multidimensional joint
809
interdependency exists between providing, gaining, and maintaining access.
810
811
3.C.3 Shape the operational battlespace
812
813

814
815
Create a networked, integrated force that includes intelligence, strike and
sustainment forces with robust command and control

816
Integrate inter-agency and multi-national capabilities during planning and
operations
817

Exploit the capabilities provided by Special Operations Forces
818

Employ Information Operations assets to shape the battlespace environment
819

Maximize the use of all intelligence assets
820
Shaping actions are ubiquitous. Shaping occurs throughout joint forcible entry
821
operations ─ from forward presence through transition to follow-on operations. The
822
commander must be cognizant of the shaping efforts that have occurred in attempts to
823
provide access, but in preparing for forcible entry his focus will be on creating a
824
networked, integrated force to execute shaping actions that enable gaining and
825
maintaining access. These shaping actions are designed to set the conditions necessary
826
for successful forcible entry. Shaping actions in this context also pertain to actions
827
required to open entry points and sustain the force.
828
Commanders prepare, or shape the operational battlespace through detailed
829
integration of all assets at their disposal. The commander must draw critical information
830
from multi-national and interagency sources. Human intelligence in conjunction with
831
other intelligence assets, Special Operations Forces and Information Operations provide
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832
capabilities that must be employed early and continuously to fully prepare the operational
833
battlespace and set conditions for operational and sustainment forces.
834
835
3.C.4 Establish persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance profile
836
837

Focus on the commander’s critical times, places and decisions
838

Use intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance products to support
commander’s decisions from start to finish
839
840
The speed, precision and associated high risk of joint forcible entry operations
841
requires the joint forcible entry commander to have superior intelligence, surveillance
842
and reconnaissance support. The commander applies information from all available
843
sources during critical times and at critical locations to make informed, timely decisions.
844
The establishment of a persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance profile
845
assists in setting the conditions for success in all phases of forcible entry and follow-on
846
operations.
847
848
3.C.5 Overwhelm and overmatch the adversary in order to achieve end state
849
850

Gain pervasive knowledge that allows the Joint Forcible Entry Operations
851
Commander the ability to see and understand first, enabling him to decide and
852
act quicker than the adversary
853

854
Create multiple dilemmas for the adversary: be audacious, tough, fast and
strong
855

Conduct asynchronous or patternless operations
856

Employ tactical deception and surprise
857

Attack from multiple directions and dimensions; move forces swiftly with
858
859
stealth and lethality

860
861
Use multiple entry points and routes; move with rapidity to the objective area
if a lodgment is established

Maximize the effects of information and deception operations
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
34
862
The joint forcible entry operations force is most effective when utilizing the full
863
capabilities of our strategic and operational lift to support multi-directional approaches.
864
Additionally, effectiveness significantly increases by employing the full spectrum of U.S.
865
military and interagency capabilities, including information and other domains.
866
Attacking the enemy where he least expects it implies knowing where the enemy is
867
located, what his capabilities are, and what his options are. By attacking the enemy
868
where he least expects it, the joint forcible entry operations commander adversely affects
869
the adversary’s ability to observe, orient, decide and act. The picture our operation
870
should paint in the enemy’s mind is an asynchronous one. While our operations must
871
retain unity of purpose and coherency of action, our unity and coherency should not be
872
recognizable from the enemy’s perspective. To him, we should be “patternless,” thus
873
diminishing his ability to react effectively. These adverse effects can be manifested via
874
combinations of surprise, seizing the initiative, psychological and disruptive shock and
875
information operations.
876
Joint forcible entry forces will employ lift to attack and maneuver from operational
877
and strategic distances using multiple entry points and approaches to overwhelm and
878
confound the adversary. Our advantages in vertical lift, stealth and lethality will be
879
maximized to envelop and attack the adversary from multiple directions further adding to
880
his confusion and defensive dilemma.
881
Joint forcible entry operations forces must be bold and audacious in accomplishing
882
their tasks. Future joint forcible entry leaders must develop the strength of character and
883
conviction to guide their actions. These leaders mitigate risk and take action based on a
884
thorough knowledge of the operating environment. Paramount is the support of the
885
higher-level military commanders to accept and defend decisions made in the heat of
886
battle.
887
888
3.C.6 Mitigate risk
889
890
891

Conduct a detailed risk assessment to identify high-risk, high-value assets and
single points of failure
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
892

893
894
Use intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance products to detect, assess,
and warn of impending actions of the adversary

895
Conduct counter reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition
operations
896

Retain operational and tactical flexibility to react to the unexpected
897

Develop and rehearse a detailed, collaborative and effects-based operational
898
899
plan

900
901
35
Take action against enemy anti-access capabilities to ensure success of joint
forcible entry operations
Risk mitigation is relevant to all operations but is critical for joint forcible entry
902
operations given the nature of these missions and the uncertainty of the military
903
environment. The distances from which the force is delivered, supported and sustained
904
constrain forced entry operations. Planning for these constraints must be taken into
905
account to mitigate the risk. Maintaining persistent intelligence, surveillance and
906
reconnaissance will establish a common picture of the operational area throughout the
907
joint forcible entry operations force. At the same time, the adversary’s reconnaissance,
908
surveillance and target acquisition capabilities should be significantly impaired. A
909
common picture will enhance the force’s capability to see and hit the enemy, as well as
910
enable the force to see and maneuver from impending danger. Furthermore, dynamic
911
tasking for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and protection assets should be
912
established prior to execution.
913
914
3.C.7 Achieve desired effects
915
916

Articulate an effects-based commander’s intent clearly
917

Use current operational net assessment to facilitate effects-based operations
918

Create and exploit favorable asymmetries; Fight with overmatching power in
919
all domains
920

Empower tactical forces to act decisively on the commander’s intent
921

Establish dynamic tasking of strike assets
922

Identify then disrupt, delay, destroy and disorient the enemy exclusion zone
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
923

924
925
926
Use intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance products to determine
whether the desired effects are achieved

Create simultaneity of effects as viewed from the enemy’s perspective
Joint forcible entry operations require the right force with the right capabilities at the
927
right time. The force must be tailored so that it is lethal, yet properly sized such that it
928
can be delivered and sustained. Properly identified and allocated forces that habitually
929
train and exercise together as a team will directly enhance effectiveness.
930
36
The Regional Combatant Commander communicates the desired effects through his
931
intent. Once the Regional Combatant Commander defines and communicates the
932
parameters of the mission, the joint forcible entry operations commander plans and
933
executes within those parameters. Empowered by commander’s intent and in receipt of a
934
timely common operational picture, subordinate joint forcible entry operations
935
commanders will be able to visualize how well the force is achieving the desired effects
936
or to adapt as necessary to ensure the effects are achieved.
937
938
3.C.8 Achieve decisive conclusions
939
940

Align operational objectives with strategic objectives
941

Articulate goals and fight until the end-state is achieved
942

Use intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance products to determine when
943
the final purpose is achieved
944

Plan for smooth transition to future operations
945

Seamlessly and rapidly reinforce, reconstitute or reconfigure for follow-on
946
947
948
operations as required

Employ rapid battlefield assessment capability
The joint forcible entry operations commander focuses on the desired effects as its
949
end-state. These effects dictate the duration required to accomplish the objectives. The
950
joint forcible entry operations commander tenaciously sustains continuous pressure for as
951
long as it takes. Prudent planning bounds the mission and articulates the commander’s
952
objectives. The joint forcible entry force must be adaptable to change and prepared to
953
rapidly reconfigure for any follow-on operation that occurs. Joint forcible entry
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
954
operations conclude when the Commander’s end state is achieved through the
955
accomplishment of specified objectives and the planned withdrawal, redeployment,
956
extraction, or transition to a follow-on mission is completed.
37
957
958
3.C.9 Provide focused sustainment
959
960

961
Establish the smallest logistical footprint but deliver with speed, accuracy and
efficiency
962

Eliminate strategic, operational and tactical boundaries
963

Distribute to the point of requirement
964

Integrate a joint deployment, employment and sustainment process which
dynamically “senses” requirements and is adaptive and responsive
965
966
967

Ensure freedom of movement for sustainment platforms
Joint forcible entry operations forces require the ability to rapidly deploy and be
968
sustained anywhere they execute and for as long as necessary in order to enable campaign
969
execution without the necessity of extensive force buildup or operational pauses. The
970
joint forcible entry operations force should be capable of deploying and employing with
971
the smallest possible logistics “footprint” in or near the operating area. This requires new
972
capabilities to command and direct resources, fully integrate the joint deployment,
973
employment and sustainment planning process, exponentially improve situational
974
awareness and provide dynamic logistics, which includes the use of precision all-weather
975
aerial delivery. The result is sense and respond logistics that are faster, adaptive, more
976
responsive, and that execute movement and sustainment operations through multiple
977
means. Additionally, this requires leveraging future technological advancements that will
978
reduce the requirement for lift and sustainment while increasing employment options and
979
flexibility.
980
Joint forcible entry operations forces will depend less on developed ports and large
981
destination airfields and more on smaller, distributed logistics bases and joint seabasing.
982
The force will exploit pre-positioned assets, afloat or ashore, to include enemy
983
infrastructure, to substantially improve speed and agility. The ultimate goal is to provide
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
984
faster, more focused, better-integrated logistics with on-demand support to the joint
985
forcible entry operations force.
986
38
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
987
39
3.C.10 Protect the force
988
989

Protect forces from point-of-origin to the battlefield
990

Establish multi-dimensional battlespace dominance
991

Use battlespace awareness capabilities to detect, assess and warn of impending
992
actions of the adversary

993
994
Develop a detailed and collaborative plan to protect personnel, physical assets
and information
995

Defeat the adversary’s electronic warfare threat capabilities
996

Rehearse the plan to identify shortfalls; fill the gaps
997

Conduct force protection exercises that prepare forces to defend and recover
998
from adversarial actions
999
With increased emphasis on rapid global force projection, protection of the Joint
1000
Force must be assured from locations of origin to points of employment. Joint forcible
1001
entry operations are missions that demand clear guidance, total support and
1002
empowerment to the lowest levels of on-scene command. Force protection is required
1003
across the entire spectrum of operations: air, land, sea, space, and cyber-space, to include
1004
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE).
1005
Protection of joint forcible entry operations forces extends beyond the responsibility
1006
of the tactical commander. In peacetime, combatant commanders establish measures and
1007
procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces. In wartime, combatant
1008
commanders carry out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of strategic aims. Force
1009
protection responsibilities are modified as necessary in order to ensure the security of
1010
assigned forces and protect U.S. interests in their areas of responsibility.
1011
Force protection is significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and
1012
information gathering.7 In addition to intelligence gathering, the commander must
1013
designate forces responsible for acting on this intelligence. Finally, the force protection
1014
plan is developed, rehearsed and exercised in a collaborative environment.
1015
7
Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, 16 Jul 97
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1016
40
Section 4 – CAPABILITIES
1017
1018
“We need rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces, capable of reaching distant
1019
theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly,
1020
successfully and with devastating effect. We need improved intelligence, long-range
1021
precision strike, and sea-based platforms to help counter the “access-denial”
1022
capabilities of adversaries.”
1023
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
1024
National Defense University, January 31, 2002
1025
1026
4.A Future Capabilities Sections 4.A.1 through 4.A.5 list the essential joint
1027
forcible entry operations capabilities. The capabilities are categorized by functional
1028
concepts of joint command and control, battlespace awareness, force application, focused
1029
logistics, and protection. To execute future joint forcible entry operations, the forcible
1030
entry commander and his force require the ability to:
1031
1032
4.A.1 Joint command and control capabilities
1033
1034
4.A.1.a Conduct dynamic and persistent joint command and control that supports
1035
planning and execution, from pre-execution through en route transit, execution at
1036
the objective area and transition to follow-on operations.
1037
4.A.1.b Plan, rehearse and synchronize missions between the deploying force, the
1038
objective area, joint forces, interagency and multi-national forces en route to an
1039
objective by accessing the global information grid to update the common
1040
operating picture.
1041
4.A.1.c Conduct collaborative decision-making under conditions of ambiguity,
1042
friction and stress.
1043
4.A.1.d Achieve coherency of action at decisive points supported by planning and
1044
decision-making tools and common rules of engagement.
1045
4.A.1.e Fully integrate fires and maneuver at the joint point of action.
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1046
4.A.1.f Expedite mission changes and fully informed decision-making through
1047
reach back.
1048
4.A.1.g Provide logistics command and control with complete global network
1049
visibility.
41
1050
1051
4.A.2 Battlespace awareness capabilities
1052
1053
4.A.2.a Translate pervasive knowledge and predictive analysis into anticipatory
1054
decisions and precise actions that achieve desired effects.
1055
4.A.2.b Provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that
1056
integrate all intelligence capabilities, including human intelligence assets, into the
1057
overall intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture.
1058
4.A.2.c Provide a networked force linked and synchronized in time and purpose
1059
that can capitalize on near-instantaneous information and near simultaneous
1060
dissemination to turn information into action through a common operating
1061
picture.
1062
4.A.2.d Provide the joint forcible entry operations commander with field
1063
assessments that give him immediate information critical for decision making,
1064
entry point selection, force disposition, fire support and protection schemes.
1065
4.A.2.e Train with interagency and multinational partners to develop habitual
1066
associations and personal relationships to expand the network.
1067
4.A.2.f Find, isolate, and neutralize enemy elements that seek refuge in complex,
1068
difficult terrain, such as urban areas.
1069
4.A.2.g Detect and expose enemy covert and clandestine activities designed to
1070
disrupt, delay, and hinder the joint forcible entry operation.
1071
4.A.2.h Provide positive force identification.
1072
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1073
42
4.A.3 Force application capabilities
1074
1075
4.A.3.a Fully integrate joint fires and maneuver through kinetic, non-kinetic,
1076
lethal and non-lethal weapons to achieve desired effects, while minimizing
1077
collateral damage.
1078
4.A.3.b Conduct offensive information operations in order to defeat the enemy
1079
without direct force.
1080
4.A.3.c Use air and sea lift to bypass fixed, predictable air and sea ports of
1081
debarkation and deliver forces in places the adversary does not expect.
1082
4.A.3.d Quickly establish or upgrade joint contingency air bases and sea bases
1083
that support tailored mission requirements.
1084
4.A.3.e Execute immediate response with modular, tailorable force packages pre-
1085
positioned in strategic locations.
1086
4.A.3.f Conduct joint forcible entry via vertical envelopment8 and surface
1087
amphibious assault across the global battlespace from strategic, operational and
1088
tactical distances.
1089
4.A.3.g Provide near-continuous force application ranging from localized small-
1090
scale effects, to persistent effects that can dominate defined geographic regions in
1091
order to deny the enemy freedom of action.
1092
4.A.3.h Defeat or bypass enemy access denial strategies to enable the use of
1093
multi-dimensional battlespace.
1094
4.A.3.i Immediately deliver forces in multiple unpredictable locations with
1095
sufficient combat power to achieve decisive effects.
1096
4.A.3.j Rapidly deploy and employ mounted forces that are lethal, mobile and
1097
survivable.
1098
4.A.3.k Produce desired effects using precise fires and maneuver in order to limit
1099
the demand on logistics sustainment.
1100
4.A.3.l Seamlessly and rapidly reinforce, reconstitute or reconfigure joint forcible
1101
entry forces.
1102
8
Vertical envelopment for this joint forcible entry operations concept includes the means to introduce land
forces via air.
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1103
43
4.A.4 Focused logistics capabilities
1104
1105
4.A.4.a Deliver and sustain the joint forcible entry operations force, in all weather
1106
conditions, to objectives independent of existing infrastructure, from remote and
1107
austere bases; from sea-bases; and across strategic and operational distances.
1108
4.A.4.b Rapidly deploy the joint forcible entry force across the global battlespace,
1109
with little or no RSOI constraints, and transition to immediate employment in the
1110
objective area.
1111
4.A.4.c Provide a dynamic planning, tasking and execution process that supports
1112
the force flow and sustainment of the force.
1113
4.A.4.d Seamlessly and rapidly reconstitute or reconfigure joint forcible entry
1114
forces and sustain operations.
1115
4.A.4.e Establish additional contingency airfields or ports, or significantly
1116
increase the existing throughput capacity.
1117
4.A.4.f Reduce supply and re-supply demands through weapon systems with
1118
increased precision, effectiveness, firepower and reliability.
1119
4.A.4.g Recognize and rapidly apply technological advances that reduce the
1120
demand for all classes of supply in order to enhance joint forcible entry
1121
operations: e.g., reduce demand on fossil fuels, miniaturization of ordinance, etc.
1122
4.A.4.h Provide what is needed, where it is needed, and when it is needed, to
1123
distributed forces through enhanced capabilities such as predictive logistics,
1124
reachback, improved throughput systems and precise delivery systems.
1125
4.A.4.i Rapidly treat, stabilize and evacuate casualties.
1126
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1127
44
4.A.5 Protection capabilities
1128
1129
4.A.5.a Disrupt, delay, destroy or disorient enemy fires through persistent, precise
1130
and timely counter fires.
1131
4.A.5.b Protect the joint force from all threats to include chemical, biological,
1132
radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives as it deploys, transits, engages, and
1133
redeploys in a multi-dimensional battlespace.
1134
4.A.5.c Provide on-call, immediate-response extraction airlift requiring little or no
1135
airfield infrastructure support.
1136
4.A.5.d Positively identify all entities in the battlespace that includes friend, foe
1137
and noncombatants.
1138
4.A.5.e Disrupt, delay, destroy or disorient the full range of enemy
1139
reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.
1140
4.A.5.f Disrupt, delay, destroy or disorient electromagnetic threats.
1141
4.A.5.g Protect the joint collaborative network from all forms of attack.
1142
1143
4.B Immediate actions. Following are several recommended actions that might be
1144
considered for immediate implementation. These recommendations are derived from
1145
several sources: the various writers and reviewers of the concept, analysis of lessons
1146
learned of ongoing operations, and from the results of Joint experimentation to date.
1147
These are suggestions as to ways we might “jump start” while building the long-term
1148
capabilities described in section 4.
1149
4.B.1 Assess the requirement for a Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters to
1150
refine the concept and develop leader and organizational expertise with assigned
1151
rotational forces.
1152
4.B.2 Identification of joint forcible entry packages that conduct routine joint
1153
training, which will develop habitual operating relationships.
1154
4.B.3 Practice joint forcible entry operations using the forcible entry Standing
1155
Joint Task Force Headquarters in selected Combatant Commanders exercise
1156
programs.
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
45
1157
4.B.4 Institute joint forcible entry operations in professional military education
1158
courses and programs of instruction.
1159
4.B.5 Develop a future concept that discusses shaping the strategic and
1160
operational environment.
1161
4.B.6 Rapidly field the hardware and software systems and doctrine that enhance
1162
the joint force’s ability to integrate fires.
1163
4.B.7 Place properly trained and certified “Joint Terminal Controllers” with
1164
current forcible entry forces capable of controlling and executing fires from all
1165
domains: air, land and sea.
1166
4.B.8 Integrate with appropriate service representatives to identify joint seabasing
1167
issues for experimentation.
1168
4.B.9 Research and develop heavy lift alternatives that enable tactical maneuver
1169
from operational distance.
1170
4.B.10 Research and develop over the horizon (OTH), beyond line of sight
1171
(BLOS) and on the move (OTM) communications.
1172
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1173
46
CONCLUSION
1174
1175
“Improvement will require not only technological solutions, but also cultural change—
1176
a willingness to challenge standard practices, and question current organizational
1177
patterns and command practices.”
1178
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
1179
1180
The complex nature and challenges of the future operational environment will require
1181
commanders to employ creative ways to conduct military operations. They will no
1182
longer have the time to move large force packages and their mountains of sustainment
1183
slowly into a region to build up to an overwhelming force. Future adversaries will use all
1184
of their available capabilities to prevent, disrupt or delay access to an area or areas. The
1185
enemy’s preference will be to defeat us before we have time to act or react. The
1186
adversary will use all means available to deny us freedom of action and maneuver.
1187
Future commanders will rely more and more on the ability to conduct joint forcible
1188
entry operations rapidly and forcefully from multiple directions and multiple dimensions
1189
to overcome access denial strategies. The dimensions include air, land, sea, space and
1190
cyberspace. A joint forcible entry operation will achieve one of three purposes: establish
1191
a lodgment for follow-on operations; establish multiple, networked lodgments to support
1192
larger-scale, extensive campaigns; or conduct a singular operations. Future commanders
1193
need the capabilities inherent to complete joint forcible entry operations.
1194
Joint forcible entry operations begin with a coherent plan with clear and achievable
1195
aims and objectives. There are common characteristics and processes relevant to all joint
1196
forcible entry operation, but each will be unique and distinct requiring its own mission
1197
analysis, plan and preparation. Forcible entry requires tactically proficient, cohesive,
1198
properly equipped and right sized forces. Joint forcible entry operations will require
1199
dynamic execution, blurring the lines between deployment, employment and sustainment.
1200
The joint forcible entry operations force requires the dexterity to deploy from a cold start
1201
and execute immediately on arrival. The dynamic nature and fast pace of joint forcible
1202
entry operations make it imperative that there be harmony throughout the force and
1203
throughout all phases of the operation.
1204
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1205
47
APPENDIX A – Assumptions and Risks
1206
1207
This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years’ Defense Plan
1208
(FYDP), roughly 2015 and rests upon the following assumptions:
1209
1210
Assumptions:
1211

The global war on terrorism will continue through 2015.
1212

The U.S. will require robust joint forcible entry operations capabilities
1213
through 2015.

1214
Potential adversaries will benefit from the ongoing global diffusion and
1215
proliferation of anti-access technologies, including long-range, accurate
1216
missiles with supporting information architectures, weapons of mass
1217
destruction, weapons of mass effects, and inexpensive technologies.

1218
A determined adversary with sophisticated anti-access capabilities may
1219
initiate preemptive combat operations on the U.S. C-day in an attempt to
1220
preempt a U.S. deployment and prevent the introduction of U.S. combat
1221
forces into its operational area.

1222
Limitations in overseas port, airfield, infrastructure, and overseas logistics
1223
hubs will require alternative basing means and alternative means for
1224
deployment and sustainment of the force.
1225
1226
Risks:

1227
1228
envisioned for 2015 will not be feasible.

1229
1230
The vulnerability of afloat prepositioning stocks of 2015 could jeopardize seabased joint forcible entry operations.

1231
1232
Without a range of adequate basing options, joint forcible entry operations
Army air assault capabilities will be ineffective if their forward staging bases
are more than 150 miles from their objective areas.

Without an adequate and sufficient on-call airlift capability executing,
1233
sustaining and extracting forcible entry forces from operational and strategic
1234
distances may not be feasible.
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
1235

1236
1237
48
Without an adequate number of joint contingency air bases, required tailored
air operations to support joint forcible operations may not be available.

Without an adequate Theater Air and Missile Defense capability on C-day an
1238
adversary with sophisticated anti-access capabilities may be able to effectively
1239
defeat a U.S. strategic deployment to conduct joint forcible entry operations.
1240

1241
1242
Without rapid inter-theater lift the reinforcement and sustainment of a
lodgment may not be timely.

Without the critical enabling capability of Regional Combatant Commanders
1243
to exercise Joint Theater Logistics Management the intratheater deployment
1244
and sustainment of joint forcible entry operations forces will be significantly
1245
less efficient and effective, especially after first 30 days when naval forces
1246
normally become dependent on a joint logistics pipeline.
1247

Without an adequate number of combat logistics and sealift ships, sustainment
1248
of large-scale joint sea-based joint forcible entry operations may not be
1249
feasible.
1250

Without adequate counter measures an adversary with an effective and
1251
survivable low-altitude air defense system can deny U.S. assault forces a
1252
vertical assault option and disrupt the air sustainment of a lodgment.
1253

Without ability to rapidly project a maritime shield against asymmetric anti-
1254
access threats (mines, small boats, etc.), joint forcible entry forces may not be
1255
able to successfully gain entry to enemy territory.
1256
1257
1258

Without a link to the Joint National Training Center, required training can not
be accomplished.
Action Officer-Level Draft for Collaboration Purposes Only
49
1259
1260
APPENDIX B – Potential Enemy Capabilities – 2015
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
Recognizing victory over the United States through force-on-force combat is
unrealistic, adversaries are designing capabilities and doctrine to deny or limit U.S. forces
ability to gain access to a region. Most potential adversaries conclude that by developing
the ability to limit and/or interrupt access, it will be possible to reduce U.S. military
capability to a manageable and, in certain cases, vulnerable level ― if only for a limited
time.
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
Adversaries are devising new and different ways to engage the United States.
They will adapt to counter or degrade the United States’ overwhelming strengths —
airpower, technology, precision, strategic reach, and sea control employing various
methods organized around the seven operational designs described below. Threats will
employ many distinct, though inextricably linked dimensions at all stages of conflict to
deny or control U.S. access to the region. In turn, the U.S. must adapt and improve
forcible entry capabilities to overcome these known or anticipated anti-access efforts.
1274
Threat Operational Designs
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
Strategic Attack. Defensive operations at the operational and tactical levels will often be
combined with strategic attack. Strategic attack is any enemy action designed to have
direct effect on American national will, leadership, and strategy. Future adversaries will
continuously employ strategic actions, such as information operations, terrorism, crime,
attacks on coalition and supporting nations, and economic sabotage, to wear down
America’s will to fight. Strategic attack will seek to exploit seams in alliances and
coalitions, focusing on the most vulnerable partners. Strategic attack will be conducted in
the U.S. homeland, on the battlefield, and anywhere in between, but in all cases will be
fully integrated with tactical and operational design.
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
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Operational Exclusion. Potential adversaries are developing operational methods to
counter US involvement, attempting to limit the extent of U.S. involvement, or cause
early termination by collapsing international and national support. Based on their
perceptions of historical patterns of deployment and employment, future opponents will
apply operational exclusion to prevent U.S. forces from obtaining and using operating
bases in the region, and in doing so, delay or preclude American military operations.
Increased threats to forward bases raise the risks to forces, hindering operational phasing
and diminishing host nation support for protection of the U.S. lines of communication.
Elements other than conventional belligerents—for example, terrorist groups or criminal
elements—are also likely to conduct operational exclusion, either for their own purposes
or to support operational exclusion of others. In the latter case, such operations would
signal sympathy or accomplish complementary goals.
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Access Limitation. Along with constant operational exclusion actions, an adversary will
attempt to limit or disrupt access to the area of conflict, CONUS and/or OCONUS. The
threat will conduct attacks continuously on our forces using all available means to strike
key or critical force components, such as air and sea ports of embarkation/debarkation,
staging bases, and lift. Success in this endeavor to extend the battlefield will greatly
improve an enemy’s ability to disrupt, delay or defeat U.S. forces.
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Shielding. Along with controlling or limiting the introduction of large, highly capable
U.S. forces, adversaries will also attempt to manage the conflict environment. Shielding
tactics involve systems, terrain and methods designed to offset the effects of precision
long-range air and missile attacks, giving the opponent a degree of operational freedom
and a way to preserve his military capabilities. Opponents recognize that defeating the
United States is not a matter of winning battles, but rather of not losing the military
power necessary to preserve the regime, while pursuing strategic and operational victory.
The longer an enemy delays an effective U.S. response, the greater the chances for
success.
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Systemology. Force-on-force combat exposes the enemy to U.S. strengths. To avoid
this form of combat, the enemy will focus on denying U.S. forces the ability to conduct
networked “system-of-systems” operations. Potential opponents will understand that
American forces derive their overwhelming force effectiveness from the synergy of their
systems functioning together. Opponents will attempt to take advantage of such
“systemology,” employing multi-dimensional, simultaneous, and sequential actions
across a wide spectrum of operations to destroy or damage discrete U.S. capabilities in
order to cause the greatest degradation of the overall force. An opponent will accomplish
this by finding and attacking those critical links, nodes, seams, and vulnerabilities in U.S.
systems that offer the best opportunity to “level the playing field.”
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Strike. Future opponents will use maneuver adaptively. Although the threat strategy
against the United States is primarily defensive in nature, it will allow for offensive
maneuver during periods of opportunity including adverse weather. Enemy maneuver
will focus on massing effects rather than forces. This adaptation will allow opponents to
gain the benefits of maneuver and mass without exposing themselves to the United
States’ overwhelming advantage in standoff precision. However, opponents will employ
maneuver in this manner only when tactical decision is likely.
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Recon and Surveillance Fires. Reconnaissance fires, the principal strike component of
systems warfare, link intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to long and shortrange precision fires from dispersed locations. As critical nodes, links, and
vulnerabilities are discovered through reconnaissance, the threat employs fires to engage
these decisive points, creating significant effects while avoiding force-on-force combat.
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Threat Strategies. Having anticipated the possibility of U.S. intervention in regional
conflicts, opponents’ forces, tactics, and strategy will be designed around the ability to
exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and patterns while countering or mitigating strengths.
Adversaries will integrate less conventional capabilities such as paramilitary forces,
“hugging” civilian populations, terrorism, and weapons of mass effects while dispersing
and shielding conventional forces.
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Understanding the ready availability of technology and the limitations of their
resources, potential opponents will develop investment strategies that provide them the
means to achieve their regional and extra regional goals, while accounting for the need to
counter the United States’ overwhelming conventional military capabilities. Generally they
will invest in off-the-shelf technologies first, seeking a few high-tech niche systems such as
information and communications technology, intelligence collection systems, counter-
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mobility technology, modern air defenses, and precision munitions, all of which enhance
their anti access capabilities.
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It is clear from analysis and published thought on warfare design that future threats will
develop asymmetric strategies that allow them to oppose the United States in the future.
Opponents will seek to gain advantage by moving quickly and acting early, expecting to
preempt or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy, economic pressure, and information
operations. By limiting the United States’ ability to influence the situation, opponents
expect to degrade the synergy of any military operations that follow. Possessing the ability
to rapidly project power whether with airborne, air assault or other forces, the U.S.
demonstrates its willingness to conduct forcible entry operations to overcome these threat
strategies.9
9
References: TRADOC Pam 525-2-60, The Operational Environment and the Threat.