Core Question:
What led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964?
Author: Elizabeth Mancini
School: Middletown High School
District: Middletown, CT
Overview:
In early August of 1964, the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson went to the American people,
claiming North Vietnamese forces attacked US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin in an unprovoked attack.
LBJ used the incident to push the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. The resolution gave
LBJ the authority to use military force against Vietnam. This led to a rapid escalation in the number
or troops and funds committed to the war in Vietnam. Most historians question the accuracy of the
administration’s presentation of events.
Document Summary:
Document 1: “Promoting the maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia,”
August 6, 1964
Document 2: Excerpt of “LBJ Papers, NSF/CF Vietnam,” August 4, 1964
Document 3: Excerpt from James Stockdale’s memoirs, In Love and War
Procedure:
Select the way your lesson will “open up the textbook”:
Direct Challenge (using primary documents to challenge textbook facts or interpretation)
TEXTBOOK SELECTION
(Fearon’s United States History)
By 1964, the South Vietnamese government was very shaky. It was corrupt and unpopular. Many of
the South Vietnamese were communist fighters from both the North and South Vietnam. The
VietCong wanted to take control of South Vietnam. They received support from Ho Chi Minh in the
North. Lyndon Johnson had become President after Kennedy’s assassination. He poured thousands
of men and billions of dollars into South Vietnam.
In August of 1964, Johnson said that North Vietnamese ships had attacked American ships off the
coast of North Vietnam. Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnam. Congress gave
President Johnson power to escalate American involvement. This move was called the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution…
DOCUMENT PACKET
Document 1
…"11:40 AM: …McNamara describes the five options listed on page 5 above. McNamara informs the group that he has
issued orders to have mines moved from Subic Bay into Da Nang. …McNamara and Bundy discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of a sharp limited blow such as air strikes and/or the continuing pressure of mining the North Vietnamese
coast. McNamara tells LeMay that the JCS should work up recommendations for immediate action…
"12:04 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green (State Dept.) and Vance move to McNamara's office…At this meeting the
options are essentially refined to three:
"1. Sharp limited strikes against such target as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc.
"2. Continuing pressure, i.e., mining the Vietnam coast.
"3. A combination of both.
At 12:40 p.m., according to the chronology, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, and Green arrived at the White House …
McNamara briefed the NSC and the President on the available details of the attack on the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy.
"Secretary McNamara: North Vietnamese PT boats have attacked the DeSoto Patrol consisting of two U.S. destroyers,
the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy, approximately 65 miles off North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin….So far, we have no
casualties. Nearby U.S. aircraft carriers are providing continuous air cover…
Later in the meeting, the discussion again turned to the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin:
"The President: Turning again to the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin, he asked that nothing be made public for the time being
The drafting of the strike execute message continued throughout the afternoon of August 4 amid some confusion about
the actual course of events in the Gulf of Tonkin. At 1:27 p.m., the Maddox reported that "a review of the action makes
many reported contacts and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak weather effects' on radar, and 'over-eager' sonarmen
may have accounted for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported by the Maddox, and the Commander
suggests that a 'complete evaluation' be undertaken before any further action.
"4:47 PM: McNamara, Vance and the JCS meet to marshal the evidence to overcome lack of a clear and convincing
showing that an attack on the destroyers had in fact occurred. They conclude that an attack had taken place. In this
regard five factors are considered:
"1. The Turner Joy was illuminated when fired on by automatic weapons.
"2. One of the destroyers observed cockpit lights.
"3. A PGM 142 shot at two U.S. aircraft.
"4. A North Vietnamese announcement that two of its boats were 'sacrificed.' [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]
"5. Sharp's determination that there was indeed an attack.
Vocabulary
Source: Unknown. "A Gulf of Tonkin Chronology, August 4, 1964." The Vietnam Era. Woodbridge, CT: Primary
Source Media, 1999. American Journey. U.S. History In Context. Web. 16 May 2013.
Document 2
On August 5, 1964, the President of the United States transmitted to the Congress a message (H. Doc. 333, 88th Cong,.
2d sess.) requesting the Congress to take appropriate action to carry out certain recommendations relative to preserving
the peace in southeast Asia. The text of the message follows:
Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate
attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against
gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with
substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.
After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for
a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in
southeast Asia.
These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in
southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President
Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in
February 1955….”
Vocabulary
Source: "Promoting the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia." Government, Politics,
and Protest: Essential Primary Sources. Ed. K. Lee Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, and Adrienne Wilmoth Lerner. Detroit:
Gale, 2006. 132-135. U.S. History In Context. Web. 16 May 2013.
Document 3
Headnote…
James Stockdale was a fighter pilot stationed in Vietnam flying missions the
day of the events in the Gulf. This is an excerpt from his memoir.
…"Have a look at this. This is what Herrick, the commodore on the Maddox, has been putting out, flash precedence, plain
language to Washington and the world in general tonight." (Stockdale is given a log after he has returned from a mission
over the Gulf on August 4)
I was handed a few sheets of a rough communication log—on which were transcribed all the messages from the Maddox
since I had left the ship. Alongside each message was the time of its receipt. For most of the two and a half hours, there
had been a message every few minutes—except they had come more frequently near the end. At first glance it looked like
the same stuff I had been hearing on my cockpit radio all night—"Taking boat to port under fire with main battery ...
Torpedo bearing zero-eight-zero degrees," etc. But as I studied the document, I realized that this was not the record of
Clem's blow-by-blow; there were also things in it that I wasn't getting on the air, the sort of stuff the commodore was
probably shouting to his radioman inside the pilothouse.
The document as a whole read like a monologue of a man turning himself inside out. For the first hour or so, it was all
assertive, all Clem McCarthy-type stuff. Then every so often a message of doubt, a message expressing reservations,
would pop up—about sonars not operating properly, about radars not locking on targets, about probable false targets,
about false perceptions due to lack of visibility. But still, it mainly reflected the tone of victimized vessels being attacked—
that is, until I got to the last page and a half; then, as I read down them, everything seemed to flip around. There was
denial of the correctness of immediately preceding messages, doubt about the validity of whole blocks of messages, ever
more skeptical appraisal of detection equipment's performance, the mention of overeager sonar operators, the lack of any
visual sightings of boats by the destroyers, and finally there were lines expressing doubt that there had been any boats
out there that night at all. The commodore urged a complete evaluation of the mixup before any further action be taken….
{August 5, 1964- Stockdale is awoken by a crew member.}
The captain wants you to start getting ready to lead the big one, sir. It's now a quarter of five, sir; we set our clocks ahead
one hour in the night. Please get up, sir; your target is Washington's priority number one."
"What's the idea of the strikes?"
"Reprisal, sir."
"Reprisal for what?"
"For last night's attack on the destroyers, sir."
I flipped on my bed lamp and the young officer left.
I felt like I had been doused with ice water. How do I get in touch with the president? He's going off half-cocked.
As I spattered my face with cold water and pulled on my khaki trousers, I felt like I was one of the few men in the world
who really understood the enormity of what was going to happen. The bad portents of the moment were suffocating. We
were about to launch a war under false pretenses, in the face of the on-scene military commander's advice to the
contrary. This decision had to be driven from way up at the top…. It was all straight shot…
The fact that a war was being conceived out here in the humid muck of the Tonkin Gulf didn't bother me so much; it
seemed obvious that a tinderbox situation prevailed here and that there would be war in due course anyway…
Vocabulary
Source: Stockdale, James B. "Excerpt from In Love and War." The Vietnam Era. Woodbridge, CT: Primary Source
Media, 1999. American Journey. U.S. History In Context. Web. 16 May 2013
Some of the language and phrasing in these documents have been
modified from the originals.
CAPTURE SHEET
Insert Historical Question
What led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in
1964?
Read each of the documents. Based on the information presented, answer each of the questions
below AS THEY PERTAIN TO EACH DOCUMENT.
Document
What happened in the
Why was the
What questions about
Gulf of Tonkin?
Resolution passed?
the incident does the
document raise?
Textbook excerpt
Document 1
Document 2
Document 3
Based on the information from each of the three documents, what do you think led to the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution?
Assessment
Look back at the Fearon’s textbook excerpt. What additional information would you add, given what
you learned from the documents? How could you rewrite the excerpt to make it a more accurate
account of the events leading to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?