Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
“The NPT and the Middle East”
Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein
Washington, D.C – Oct. 28, 2013
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Thank you for inviting me to speak today in my personal and academic capacity to reflect
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Middle East, and on how to move forward
with the Middle East conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone, free of
nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. I believe the topic of nuclear weapon
free zones is of utmost importance, all the more so given the transformative changes
underway in the political landscape of the Middle East. We cannot underestimate the level
of frustration that has built up around this issue, and yet restoring confidence in the
process remains important to the health of the non-proliferation regime. This requires state
representatives to approach the issue in a manner that respects the principle of equal
commitment to regional and global security and creates a regime that, at root and in the
long term, is unambiguously non-discriminatory. In my brief comments, I intend to address
three issues: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Middle East, how to move
forward with establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, and the impact
of current developments in the Middle East on the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee.
The “Arab Spring” undoubtedly altered fundamental dynamics in the Middle East, with
significant implications for the political and security settings of the region. Public opinion
increasingly plays a more prominent role in Arab societies and, in this respect, will have a
fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security policies. Consistent with
these changes, parliaments—particularly through their committees on foreign affairs, Arab
affairs, and national security—are expected to play a more prominent role in foreign policy
issues. Presumably, nuclear issues will receive considerable attention. Such dynamics
may bring greater pressure to bear on progress on the subject of the zone and may serve
as positive game-changers in broader disarmament and non-proliferation discussions. As
recently witnessed, the flow of masses in the streets is a sign of a desire for deeper
engagement in the policymaking and security concerns in the Middle East.
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1. Eighteen years have elapsed since the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Review and Extension Conference adopted a resolution on the Middle East that
called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the region. The
resolution was an integral, inextricable part of the fundamental deal around the indefinite
extension of the Treaty and, for many States, it constitutes the fourth pillar of the NPT
regime. The resolution is one reason many States feel aggrieved with the lack of progress
on the subject of the zone and the apparent low priority given to the matter prior to 2010.
Unfortunately, no practical ground steps have been taken to implement this resolution.
2. The NPT is fundamental to achieving global nuclear disarmament and reinforcing nonproliferation goals in the Middle East. Its aim towards “universality” remains a pressing
issue; it is simply unsustainable to expect NPT member States to continue to exercise
restraint and endure ever-increasing burdens to prove peaceful use when neighboring
States outside the NPT benefit from nuclear cooperation and seemingly brandish nuclear
weapons with impunity at the expense of regional security. Nuclear disarmament in the
Middle East should occur in a manner consistent with global efforts to implement the steps
leading to total nuclear disarmament as agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review
Conferences.
3. The 1995 resolution was and still remains part and parcel of the agreement to indefinitely
extend the NPT. Nearly two decades have passed since the resolution’s inception and
continued failure to implement it will likely have serious consequences for proliferation in
the region and for the credibility of the Non-Proliferation regime.
4. As we approach the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review
Process of the NPT, it is necessary to enter a phase of substantive and procedural
preparation for the Middle East Free Zone Conference. The 1995 Resolution and the 2010
action plan provide guidance on the mandate of the conference, Rules of Procedure from
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the NPT review process or the UN General Assembly can serve as a model for
conference proceedings, the venue—Helsinki—is already known, internationally agreed
principles exist on the establishment of NWFZs, the States of the Middle East are clearly
identified and thus the delimitation of a zone is well known. The nature of obligations is
also quite clear. This effort should launch a sustained and serious process. It should
involve concrete, timely steps and measures linked to the successive sessions of the NPT
Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Process and with a view to convening the
conference at the earliest possible date.
5. The 2010 NPT Review Conference allowed for the adoption by consensus of an action
plan on the Middle East. Notwithstanding the facilitator’s efforts to convene the
conference, however, little progress has occurred on the subject of the zone in the past
three years. Each successive session of the Preparatory Committee should review the
2010 action plan, as well as reports by the facilitator. Evaluation of the views of States
Parties to the NPT regarding the progress made towards establishing the zone should be
an integral part of any outcome documents of the successive sessions of the Preparatory
Committee. In this regard, the outcome document of the 2014 PrepCom must include a
section on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 action on the
convening of the conference.
6. Though limited progress has been made, there is still need for intensified work in order to
finalize the agenda, modalities, and rules of procedure for a conference on the Middle
East zone. Further preparation is necessary on issues of verification and compliance.
What verification and compliance mechanisms exist? Which institutions will be responsible
for ensuring verification and compliance? What are the implications for non-compliance?
Other issues such as security guarantees, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and
nuclear safety and security must also be addressed.
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7. To minimize any negative impact on the NPT process, there is a special responsibility on
the Depositary States that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution and the UN Secretary
General to take concrete steps to implement the Resolution as well as the 2010 Action
Plan on the Middle East. To maintain credibility, the conveners should honor their
commitments and hold the conference without further delay. Regional states expect a new
date as early as possible and conveners would be prudent to announce a conference data
before the start of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT
Review Conference.
8. The technical dimensions of the zone should be emphasized at this stage as well. The
following technical provisions of the free zone in the ME should be addressed:
 Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities,
facilities, and devices under international verification mechanisms;
 Renouncing nuclear weapons by refraining from conducting indigenous
development and activities related to nuclear weapons;
 Prohibiting the transfer or stationing of any nuclear explosive devices in the zone;
 Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone and the role of the CTBTO in this
regard;
 Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only;
 Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards;
 Establishing the necessary relevant institutions, mechanisms, and entities to
uphold a zone, free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; and
addressing the role of the IAEA and other relevant organizations (including the
OPCW and CTBTO) on verification and compliance issues.
9. The failure to hold a Conference in 2012, as stipulated clearly in the 2010 Action Plan, is
a failure to implement a key NPT commitment. Egypt's withdrawal from the second
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PrepCom aims to send a strong message of dissatisfaction with the lack of seriousness
in dealing with the issue of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons, a central
component of regional, Arab, and Egyptian national security, which has an impact on
international peace and security. As a strong supporter of the NPT regime, Egypt is very
concerned about the ramifications of the non-fulfillment of commitments on the credibility
and sustainability of the NPT regime.
10. In Egypt’s statement to the United Nations General Assembly September 2013, Egypt
announced a three-step initiative to activate international and regional efforts to establish
a zone in the Middle East, free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction:
First, request all countries in the Middle East, as well as the five permanent members of
the Security Council, to deposit official letters to the Secretary General of the United
Nations confirming their support for declaring the Middle East a region free of weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Second, States of the region that have not signed or ratified any of the international
conventions on weapons of mass destruction should commit, before the end of this year,
to simultaneously sign and ratify the relevant conventions. They should also deposit an
instrument to that effect to the Security Council. This would translate into the following:
 That Israel accedes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state, ratifies
the Chemical Weapons Convention, and signs and ratifies the Biological Weapons
Convention;
 That Syria ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention and takes the remaining steps
it pledged in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention;
 That Egypt ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention, and signs and ratifies the
Chemical Weapons Convention provided all countries of the Middle East complete
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accession measures to the international conventions prohibiting weapons of mass
destruction and the relevant arrangements.
Third, accelerate international efforts to ensure that the delayed 2012 Conference to
establish a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East is held swiftly,
preferably before the end of this year or by Spring 2014 at the latest. The Secretary
General, the three depositary States of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the
facilitator should intensify further their efforts to hold a conference within this timeframe.
11. Participation in the Middle East Conference should be inclusive. The conference should
include Israel, Iran, and members of the League of Arab States, as well as the nuclear
weapon states and other relevant international organizations such as the IAEA, the
OPCW, BTWC, CTBTO, UN-ODA and the NPT Chair. A more constructive approach
towards engaging all the countries of the region is required to guarantee full participation
in the Middle East Free Zone Conference. I still believe that the conference and the
process that follows should be inclusive to allow for a more genuine, candid, and
necessary discussion on nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back,
transparency, accountability, and verification. There has not been such interaction for
many years and all opportunities that exist to make this happen should be utilized.
12. Finally, recent events in the Middle East—particularly in Syria—should inspire policy
makers to accelerate worldwide efforts for disarmament including a serious push to move
forward with the nuclear-free zone in the region.
Thank You
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Annex I
1. LAS was very keen to engage with other countries in the region, with the right terms of
reference, as stipulated in the Arab ministerial meeting last January that called for what
the Arab world views as justified and equitable requirements that abide by the mandates
both stipulated and adopted freely in the final document of the 2010 NPT review
conference, and as adequately stated in the prerequisite guidelines for attending the
proposed "Extended Consultations" in the Arab Ministerial Resolution 7580 on January
13th, 2013 which stipulated the following:
 Emphasized that the postponement of the 2012 conference on the establishment of
a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a breach of the obligations of the organizers of the
conference before the international community towards the implementation of the
1995 resolution on the Middle East, and the implementation of the 2010 NPT review
conference final document.
 Any participation in “Extended Consultations” will be according to the agreed terms
of reference in the Action Plan for the Middle East contained in the 2010 NPT Final
Document, including the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is the mandate
for the 2012 ME conference.
 The importance of the establishment of a set date for the conference.
 Holding the consultations under the auspices of the United Nations and with a set
agenda.
 Those countries that formally announce their participation in the conference are the
ones to attend the consultations.
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