Translocations: Migration and Social Change
An Inter-Disciplinary Open Access E-Journal
ISSN Number: 2009-0420
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The Entrenchment of Ireland’s Laissez-Faire Integration Policy
Gerry Boucher
School of Social Sciences, University of the West of Scotland, gerry.boucher@uws.ac.uk
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In my earlier article for Translocations (Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring 2008), I developed an
argument about Ireland’s integration policy that focused on five main points. First, Ireland
lacked a coherent national integration policy. This national absence meant in practise a
laissez-faire integration strategy that largely devolved integration processes to individuals,
families, local communities, relevant public bodies, NGOs, and businesses that employed
migrants.
Second, the lack of a coherent national integration policy was functional to both main stages
of Irish immigration policy from 1993 to 2008. That is, the lack of a coherent integration
policy was functional to the first stage of immigration policy from 1993 to 2002 during the
‘Celtic Tiger’ boom because it was taken for granted by relevant policy-makers that the boom
would not last, and that once it was over migrants would leave the country of their own
accord. This ‘guest-worker’ presumption was altered for the second stage of immigration
policy from 2003 to 2008, covering the post-Celtic tiger construction driven economy, in
which a more managed approach was adopted for work migrants. This involved the
assumption that low skilled and paid jobs would be filled by internal EU migrants from the
new member states, principally Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, and that non-EU/EEA migrants
would be largely restricted to selected highly skilled, educated and paid occupations. The
approach would include steps to allow them to move from temporary to long-term residence
and eventually citizenship. It was further assumed that these types of immigrants, should they
choose to or be allowed to stay, would integrate more easily into Irish society largely of their
own accord. As such, there was no need to construct a coherent national integration policy,
beyond the more managed immigration approach, especially including a filter to select more
integrate-able non-EU/EEA migrants, since integration would proceed naturally without the
need for too much state intervention. In this sense, immigration policy used as a filter
becomes a substitute for a coherent integration policy.
Third, the dominant Irish national policy discourse to legitimise Irish immigration and
laissez-faire integration policies across both stages is based on a version of Irish nationalism.
This national interest discourse claims to protect the national interest from too many
migrants, too many non-working migrants, and too many non-integrate-able migrants,
particularly if they come from outside the EU/EEA. In particular, Irish national interest
discourse claims to protect the Irish territory, economy and labour market, welfare state,
culture and identity from the potential migrant threat to Irish society.
Fourth, the institutionalisation of this national interest discourse in immigration policy
practise has been accompanied by the non-perception of discrimination against migrants by
immigration policy-makers and enforcers. This involves legal practices of institutional
discrimination against categories of migrants as ‘non-nationals’ (Fanning 2007) based on
differential, stratified sets of less than full citizenship rights (McLaughlin and Boucher 2007;
Morris 2001), much of which is in contradistinction to international human rights agreements
signed by Ireland.
Non-perception can be explained by a number of factors. These include a cultural lens that
views the differential treatment of non-nationals from nationals as ‘normal’ as, for example,
previously existed with respect to racial discrimination of non-whites in the USA before civil
rights in the mid-1960s. Non-perception can also be a rational choice by actors who ‘know’,
or who are aware, of the legal and moral concerns about differentially treating non-nationals,
but who deny these in order to maintain the practises of discrimination. Non-perception by
rational choice is often justified by reference to laws that make the practices of differential
treatment ‘legal’ in the national context, even if these practices are legally questionable with
respect to international human rights accords. More broadly, non-perception by rational
choice is also justified by reference to higher-order concerns such as the national interest. In
this case, actors seek to legitimise the apparent contradiction of differentially treating
nationals and non-nationals, and to normalise its beliefs and practices, because the national
interest over-rides concerns about migrants’ rights. To the extent that this legitimisation and
normalisation succeed among policy-makers, policy implementers and the general public, it
becomes the dominant cultural lens from which actors’ view differential treatment as not only
taken-for-granted but ‘right’ in a moral sense. While remaining neutral to the characterisation
of Ireland as a ‘racial’ or ‘racist’ state, this explanation is similar to Lentin and McVeigh’s
account of state actors who deny racism in their treatment of non-nationals, or ‘racism
without racism’ (2006: 5-6, 17).
One unintended, although rather obvious, effect of the Irish national interest discourse
applied through the non-perception of institutional discrimination is that migrants are more
likely to perceive themselves as second-class non-nationals, unfairly treated and unwanted in
the Irish nation. This is particularly the case for asylum-seekers and temporary workers, and
less so for the select few migrants with ‘Green Cards’ or on the recently re-established intracompany transfer scheme. Another unintended, although not unexpected, effect is that those
migrants who are allowed to, and choose to, stay in Ireland and eventually become Irish
citizens, will remember and pass on this second class treatment by the Irish state to their
families and descendants in Ireland. Further, to the extent that the Irish national interest
discourse and legal institutional discrimination of non-nationals become a taken for granted
part of Irish public culture, it can also be expected that stigmas and stereotypes related to
non-national backgrounds will become both sources of discrimination against migrants and
their descendants, and integral features of their identity to be struggled against and
challenged, individually and collectively (Song 2003).
The fifth point is the stated long-term intent of the second stage of more managed Irish
immigration policy to learn from the experiences of older European countries of immigration
in order to avoid the societal problems related to the lack of integration or social exclusion of
a significant minority of second and third generation descendants of immigrants. While this is
a laudable goal both for migrants’ descendants and Irish society, it is not at all clear how the
combination of second stage immigration policies, laissez-faire integration, Irish national
interest discourse, non-perception of discrimination, and the effects of all these on Irish
public culture and migrants’ current processes of integration will result in achieving this
long-term goal? It is far more likely given this combination that Ireland will follow the
European path of partial integration and exclusion, with some migrant/ethnic minority groups
becoming more integrated and less excluded than others, reflecting Irish national and local
conditions, individual and group characteristics, and transnational relations with sending
countries (Morawska 2003).
In the same month that this article was published, the economic crisis brought on by the
collapse of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market radically altered Ireland’s economic and
societal landscape, making the Celtic Tiger boom seem a distant memory of a time long ago
in a faraway place. Arguably, the Irish government’s response of financial socialism for the
banks and non-IMF sponsored public sector cutbacks has (so far) satisfied the international
credit agencies (Elliot 2010), and may seem prudent in the future if the short-term pain leads
to long-term economic gain. However, the short-term pain of the past few years has been
truly devastating with a total state bailout estimated at almost €83 billion (Irish Times 2010),
GNP down 11.3 percent in 2009, unemployment up to 13.4 percent in March 2010, and the
return of net emigration for the first time in Ireland since 1995 with over 7,000 more people
leaving than migrating to Ireland (CSO 2010).
Yet, in spite of the deep-seated economic crisis and the return of net emigration, over 83,000
immigrants came to Ireland in 2008 and 57,000 in 2009 (ibid). Thus, Ireland is now both a
country of net emigration, and one of continuing immigration. Further, the current population
figures suggest that the net loss of emigrants in 2009 is far less than the net gain of almost
106,000 migrants since the 2006 census (ibid), which recorded a 196,000 net increase of
migrants from 2002 to over 420,000 or over 10 percent of the population at that time (OMI
2010). As such, the figures indicate that there are approximately 99,000 more immigrants net
since 2006, and around 295,000 net in total since 2002. If there was ever proof needed that
the guest-worker strategy of Ireland’s first stage immigration policy was misguided, this is
surely it. That is, like all other liberal states that have implemented guest-worker or
temporary labour market programmes, these policies almost inevitably lead to both increased
migration and to permanent migration, particularly due to family reunification (Martin et al
2006). This also suggests that Ireland needs a coherent integration policy more than ever,
particularly since according to the 2006 census migrants to Ireland come from 188 different
countries (OMI 2010).
However, the economic crisis and the Irish government’s responses have, if anything, served
to entrench Irish laissez-faire integration policy. Even for ‘nationals’, the government’s
public sector rollbacks have reduced the scope of the state’s equality infrastructure for
citizens by eliminating the NCCRI, returning the Combat Poverty Agency to direct state
control under the Department of Social and Family Affairs, and severely cutting funds to the
Equality Authority. Before the economic crisis, the government did create an Office of the
Minister for Integration [OMI] in 2007, albeit headed by a junior Minister of State not a full
cabinet Minister, explicitly ‘set up to develop, drive and co-ordinate integration policy across
Government Departments so that our immigrants are fully integrated into Irish society’ (OMI
2010). OMI also published, Migration Nation, its flagship policy statement on integration
strategy and diversity management (OMI 2008).
As the sub-title of the document indicates, though, this is less a statement about how to
construct a coherent integration policy and more of a pledge to devise an integration strategy
in the future. Thus, in the Foreword to the document, Peter Sutherland writes that
‘commitment to work with civil society and others...across different Departments of State...is
a base off which we can build a real integration strategy’ (ibid: 5). Further, the Ministerial
Statement of Policy shows that integration measures are an adjunct to second stage
immigration policies based on ‘laws that control and facilitate access to Ireland for skilled
migrants.….a formal pathway to Permanent Residency and Citizenship for those who
qualify’, and ‘a streamlined asylum process’ (ibid: 9). One example of the adjunct status of
integration measures is the statement that ‘Citizenship and long-term residency’ are to be
made ‘contingent on proficiency in the spoken language of the country’, or English (ibid).
If enacted, this would be an interventionist policy of coercive nationalist assimilation similar
to those already adopted in more draconian form in many EU member states, aligning
national language proficiency to immigration selection and access to citizenship. More
progressively, there is a commitment to new integration structures, namely an expert
Commission on Integration, a Ministerial Council on Integration, and a Task Force on
Integration (ibid). There is also a restatement of the long-term integration goal of ‘avoid[ing]
the creation of parallel societies and urban ghettoes’, and indications that this requires a more
coherent integration policy through ‘a mainstream approach to service delivery to migrants’
and ‘a strong link between integration policy and wider state inclusion measures’ (ibid: 9-10).
These ‘key principles’ are not underpinned, though, by a clearly articulated policy, specific
policy measures and, importantly, funding commitments. The remainder of the stated
integration measures follow the laissez-faire integration approach. Thus, there is statement of
principle about ‘a partnership approach between the Government and non-governmental
organisations, as well as civil society bodies’ (ibid: 9). Significantly, the only mention of
additional expenditure concerns ‘funding from Government and [the] Philanthropic sector to
support diversity management in Local Authorities, political bodies, sporting bodies and
faith-based groups who deal with migrant needs on a daily basis’ (ibid).
Following the economic crisis, though, the government cut the budget of OMI by over a
quarter to €7.67 million for 2009 (GOI 2009; OMI 2010). At this level, the OMI’s
expenditures come to 0.00002 of total government expenditure for 2009. Since, on average,
sixty-five percent of government expenditure goes to labour costs (GOI 2009), this leaves
only €2.68 million for the government to actually spend on integration programmes for 2009.
This is supplemented by funds from the EU administered by the Office of the Minister of
State for Integration, namely €2.35 million from the European Refugee Fund and the
European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (OMI 2010).
Further, the government reneged on the most progressive aspect of the integration proposals
by deciding not to fund and implement the three new integration structures. The economic
crisis rationale for this was clearly stated by the former Minister of State for Integration, John
Curran, on the Office’s website: ‘the Minister does not now propose to establish the three
new bodies referred to in Migration Nation because such a move would be inappropriate in
current circumstances when State bodies are being rationalised or abolished’ (OMI 2010). Of
the institutional proposals, this leaves only the Cross-Departmental Group on Integration of
senior civil servants from ten Departments, the CSO and OMI. This is chaired by the Minister
of State, and was ‘established to assist the Minister for Integration to drive forward the
integration agenda in relevant Departments and agencies’ (OMI 2010).
While this reflects the need for a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to integration (OMI 2008:
13), and could become the basis for the development of a coherent national integration
policy, it does not reflect the stated partnership approach without the three shelved integration
structures. It is also not clear what ‘agenda’ is to be driven forward beyond the platitude of
fully integrating immigrants into Irish society, and the few national and EU funding mandates
for local and social partnership driven projects that conform to the existing devolved, laissezfaire integration policy.
Thus, the OMI Funding Review on the Office’s website states that ‘the new integration
policy focuses particularly on the role of local authorities, sporting bodies and faith based
groups in building integrated communities’ (OMI 2010). Besides funding these bodies ‘to
encourage integration related activities at the local level’, further funding was provided for
English language support, ‘an Action Strategy to support integrated workplaces’
implemented by the business and trade union social partners, and by EU funded integration
projects for refugees, third-country nationals and immigrant workers (ibid). Finally, funds
under the National Action Plan Against Racism 2005-2008 were transferred from AntiRacism and Diversity Plans (ARDs) into Local Authority Integration Plans (ibid).
The organisation of Irish integration policy-making as part of Ireland’s managed migration
strategy suggests that it is best understood as a new social policy area within Ireland’s mixed
economy of welfare, with the added component of European subsidiarity in terms of EU
integration policy. Thus, Irish integration policy reflects Kiely’s analysis that, ‘social policies
[in Ireland] developed on a piecemeal basis with no comprehensive or integrated plan. The
state responded to specific needs only in response to political pressures to do so, and
reluctantly’ (1999: 4). As such, Irish integration policy has developed to meet a new need
after much political pressure, which has been met reluctantly, in terms of institutions and
particularly funding, on the basis of Ireland’s mixed economy of welfare or a, ‘mix of direct
state provision, coupled with services provided by the private, voluntary and informal sectors
often with substantial financial support from the state either in the form of direct financial aid
or tax reliefs’ (ibid: 6).
The additional European component, principally in terms of extra funding for specific,
targeted initiatives, also reflects Irish policy practise since joining the then EEC in 1973 to
leverage EU funds to meet, or part finance, policy area needs characterised by relative state
and/or market failure. The best example of this is the use of Structural Funds to develop
Ireland’s infrastructure. However, this strategy has also been used for social policy initiatives
such as poverty and social exclusion (ibid: 7). In the case of EU integration policy, the model
used has been the open method of coordination (De la Porte et al 2001) based on subsidiarity
of policy and funding to national and local levels, involving the state, social partners and civil
society organisations in targeted small-scale, short duration projects. This European model of
integration policy fits in well with the Irish mixed economy of a welfare approach to
integration as a new social policy area.
Overall, while there is some policy action on integration even in times of economic crisis, it
remains fragmented, ad hoc, localised and too dependent on nationally funded small-scale
local projects and EU funds, even if now officially administered by an Office of State. And
while there are some indications of the need for a more coherent national integration policy
focused on social inclusion, involving expert, NGO, civil society and migrant group
representatives in the process of integration policy-making, the economic crisis has been used
to shelve the latter, and the former remains more or less a statement of principle. Further, the
reduction in the state’s equality infrastructure for poverty, anti-racism and anti-discrimination
more broadly, again due to the economic crisis, decreases even further the state’s ability to
foster integration based on social inclusion.
As such, it is not clear how the entrenchment of Ireland’s laissez-faire integration policy will
be able to achieve the state’s goal of fully integrating immigrants and their descendants into
Irish society, while avoiding the European path of partial integration and exclusion, and the
latter’s parallel societies and urban ghettoes. Long-term integration based on substantive
equality and social inclusion requires more than a laissez-fair approach. In this sense, equality
and integration are not luxuries, but essentials to a well-functioning and socially cohesive
national society.
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