Joanne Lue
SCU ID: W0796229
Fall 2009 – LARAW
Professor Jamil
August 20, 2009
Heading:
The People v. Marjorie Knoller
Court: Supreme Court of CA
Date: May 31, 2007
Casebook: 158 P.3d 731
Judge: Kennard
Facts:
On January 26, 2001, Diane Whipple was attacked and killed by two Presa Canario
dogs belonging to her neighbors, the defendant Marjorie Knoller and codefendant Robert
Noel. The defendants were well aware of the violent temperament of the dogs and on
many past instances, had been told by professionals including a veterinarian and a dog
trainer that their dogs were dangerous and needed training. The dogs were previously
owned by a past client and friend of the defendants, Schneider. In addition, the
defendants also demonstrated knowledge of the Presa Canario’s violent temperament in
their correspondence with Schneider. On the day of the attack, Whipple was returning to
her apartment and was mauled in the hallway with Knoller present. Knoller and Noel are
convicted of involuntary manslaughter and owning mischievous animals. Knoller is also
charged with second degree murder.
Procedural Context:
The defendants are convicted of involuntary manslaughter and owning mischievous
animals in a jury trial in the Superior Court of Califronia. The defendant Knoller is also
convicted of second degree murder. The defendants move for a new trial, trial court
grants the motion for defendant's conviction for second degree murder and denies the
motion for all other counts. Plaintiff, defendant and codefendant appeal. Court of
Appeal reverses the order and grants defendant a new trial on second degree murder.
Defendant and codefendant petition for review and Supreme Court grants defendant's
petition.
Issue:
Whether implied malice can be based on a defendant's awareness of the risk of great
bodily injury but not death resulting from defendant's actions. Whether the trial court
abused its discretion in granting defendant Knoller a new trial on the second degree
murder charge.
Holding (answer to the issue):
The conviction of second degree murder, based on the theory of implied malice, requires
proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the danger to human life. The
trial court also abused its discretion in granting the defendant a new trial on the second
degree murder charge. The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed and the case is to
return to trial court for reconsideration of Knoller's new trial motion under the correct
definition of implied malice.
Rule:
Implied malice is when the killing is caused by an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.
If a court bases its decision on the incorrect definition/standards/factors, then there is an
abuse of discretion.
Reasoning:
In applying the theory of malice to a second degree murder conviction, the Thomas Test
requires a "high probability of death" as the objective. This standard is too high and the
courts have established the use of the Phillips test which only required that a defendant
acted with a "conscious disregard for human life."
The trial court instructed the jury to apply the Phillips test which states that "malice is
implied when the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which acts was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life." However, when evaluating the new trial motion, it applied language
from the Thomas test stating that the implied malice theory involves "high probability of
death to another human being." Thus, the trial court applied the incorrect definition of
implied malice in granting Knoller a new trial on the second degree murder charge as
this definition set too high of a standard for second degree murder. The trial court also
found that the codefendant Noel was at more fault for the murder than Knoller due to the
fact that he was aware of Knoller's inability to handle the two dogs and he left Knoller to
take the dogs out on her own.