Jack Daniel, CBN 133498
1CENTRAL CALIFORNIA LEGAL SERVICES
2014 TULARE, #600
2FRESNO, CA 93721
209/441-1611 (fax)441-7215
3Attorneys for Defendants
4
5
6
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY MUNICIPAL COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF FRESNO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIREBAUGH DIVISION
7HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY )
CASE NO. C96300004-9
OF FRESNO, CALIFORNIA, a public
)
8body, corporate and politic,
)
Plaintiff
)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
9
)
OF MOTION
VS.
)
IN LIMINE
10
)
V.V.,
)
HEARING DATE: April 23, 1995
11
DEFENDANT
)
TIME: 8:30 A.M.
__________________________________________)
12
13
14
INTRODUCTION
This is an eviction case. Plaintiffs support their eviction based on evidence of juvenile
15
records
obtained by plaintiffs from law enforcement.
Juvenile records are confidential.
The
16
plaintiffs
have violated the defendants' rights in obtaining this evidence. Any continued use of it
17
would
also be a violation of those rights.
18
19
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff initiated this eviction after two incidents involving law enforcement and the son of
20 who is a juvenile. No charges have been filed in the more recent case. The citation points to a
V.V.,
21
violation
of H & S Code 11359, possession of sale of marijuana. The underlying police reports
22
indicate
that a group of four juveniles were approached by the police. They scattered. The police
23
found
three individually wrapped containers of marijuana. The weight of all three packages together
24
combined
was under an ounce. The incident occurred off the premises of the Housing Authority.
25
Plaintiff's employees did not see this incident. They heard about it, though they cannot say
26 they heard about it. They then went to the law enforcement office, asked for and got a copy of
how
27 report. That report included information on the V. boy and three other juveniles. Those
the
28
juveniles
have no connection with the Housing Authority. Shortly after receipt of the reports,
1
plaintiff
initiated the administrative eviction procedures which are a prerequisite to the filing of an
2
unlawful
detainer. To date, no criminal charges have been filed. Plaintiffs have no evidence of this
3
incident
other than that obtained through the release of the police report and the fruits thereof.
4
The other incident which is the basis for this eviction dates from 1994. It involves allegations
5 violations of P.C. 242. Plaintiffs obtained their information about this incident, at least in part, in
of
a6 similar matter as outlined above.
7
At the time plaintiff obtained the documents, there was a standing order of the Superior Court
8
which,
in limited circumstances, purported to allow the release of juvenile police records. It is
9
attached
as Exhibit "A," and incorporated by reference. That Standing Order calls for release of
10
juvenile
records to housing authorities only upon receipt by of a declaration from the housing
11
authority
that the records will be used only for the purposes of eviction proceedings and that the
12
incident
occurred on the premises.
13
Plaintiffs did not file any declaration. Employees of the housing authority are aware of the
14
procedure
for filing a declaration (see declaration of Jack Daniel and attachments thereto, Exhibit
15 incorporated by reference). They released the reports to defendants without redacting the
"B,"
16
information
concerning the juveniles other than the V. boy.
17
The V.s are residents of public housing owned by plaintiffs. As such, they have a right, under
18
federal
law, to continue their tenancy with plaintiff as long as they desire, absent good cause. The
19 agreement and applicable federal law mandates pay only a percentage of their income as rent.
lease
20 amount is well below fair market value in the V.s' case.
This
21
The V.s seek to exclude all evidence of the juvenile's alleged criminal behavior from the trial.
22
Such alleged criminal behavior is the sole reason for this eviction.
ARGUMENT
23
1. The Plaintiffs Violated the Standing
24
25
Order of this Court
We do not agree that the Standing Order of the Court is lawful. However, assuming
26
arguendo
that the Standing Order does comport with the law, the Plaintiffs violated that order. First,
27 Order requires that the plaintiff file a declaration (paragraph 4, "Attachment to Standing Order")
the
28
2
1
before
they receive any police report. They did not do so. Secondly, it is apparent that they could not
2
have
complied with the requisites of such a declaration. They would have been required to declare
3
under
penalty of perjury that the incident occurred on the premises of the housing authority. Because
4 incident occurred off the premises, they could not have done so. Nevertheless, they obtained the
the
5
records
in clear violation of the Standing Order.
6
7
2. THE RELEASE OF THE POLICE REPORTS WAS
IMPERMISSIBLE, EVEN IF THEY HAD BEEN
RELEASED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE STANDING ORDER
8
BECAUSE THE STANDING ORDER IS VIOLATIVE OF THE LAW
9
The Standing Order purports to conform to the law regarding the release of juvenile records.
10does not do so. Juvenile records are confidential. The California legislature has affirmed "its
It
11
belief
that juvenile court record, in general, should be confidential" and has narrowly tailored all
12
exceptions
to that rule, W & I Code
827(b))(1).
The California Supreme Court recognized that
13
confidentiality
is an important part of the habilitation process and that juvenile records should not be
14
released
without the express approval of the Juvenile Court, T.N.G. v. Superior Court, (1971) 4
15
Cal.3d
767, 776-778.
This express approval permits the court to make an individualized
16
determination
based on the facts of each case, the reason for the release, and an assessment of the
17 the release will have on the individual child.
effect
18
The T.N.G. court held that all records, including those of detentions for a few hours, were
19
subject
to the confidentiality provisions. The T.N.G. court upheld a 5 year waiting period to seal
20 kinds of detentions because the juvenile court would not release such records to third
those
21
parties.
"The decision by the [T.N.G.] court that
827 does not permit the disclosure of information
22 to arrest or detention was one of its essential bases for its holding that
as
781 was constitutional."
23
Wescott
v. Yuba (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 103, 107.
24
The standing order turns that policy on its head and allows for the release of any and all
25
juvenile
records without any individualized consideration by the court or notice to the juvenile.
26
The Wescott court, with T.N.G. clearly in mind, stated that a third party is "required by the
27
language
of the statute to petition the juvenile court for an order permitting inspection," Wescott,
28
3
1
supra,
at 108-109. Again the "proper procedure is to petition the court to review the records in
2
camera
to determine which, if any, may be disclosed" to third parties, Lorenza Juanita P. v. Superior
3
Court
(1988) 197 Cal. App.3d 607, 611. See also the decision in Navajo Express v. Superior Court
4
(1988)
197 Cal. App.3d 981, 986, which also calls for an initial in camera inspection after a petition
5 the third party. The party seeking disclosure must show good cause, In re Maria V., (1985) 167
by
6 App.3d 1099, 1103.
Cal.
7
All the case law holds that the standing order is improper. The cases make clear that a third
8
party
must petition the court, show good cause, and then the court can inspect the records in camera
9 release those records which the Court feels are appropriate for disclosure. Any other method of
and
10
getting
the records violates the law.
11
In addition, the Standing Order purports to legitimize dissemination of juvenile records to
12
governmental
landlords for the purposes of evictions. There is no similar provision for dissemination
13private landlords. Thus, the Order provides less rights to a class of people (public housing tenants)
to
14 it does to other, similarly situated, tenants in private housing. The Order also allows for no
than
15
procedural
due process notice nor hearing for the juvenile or her family before the release. As argued
16
below,
this violates the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.
17
The Courts have felt strongly enough about the dissemination of juvenile records as to
18
prohibit
release of such records even by people who obtained them legally, In re Tiffany G., (1994)
19 Cal.App.4th 443, 5 Cal.Rptr. 8. Here the records and information ere obtained illegally, further
29
20 of them is clearly illegal.
use
21
The plaintiffs have violated the Standing Order and W & I Code Sec 827 et seq.; their
22
seeking
and obtaining of the police records was clearly illegal.
3. THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTIONS IN THIS CASE
23
ALSO VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER
24
25
THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The confidentiality for minors is greater than the cases discussed above. None of them were
26
litigated
in the context of California's constitutional right to privacy and the rights to due process and
27 protection
equal
28
4
1
The right to privacy, standing alone, makes the seeking out and procuring of the police
2
record
illegal. In conjunction with the confidentiality provisions of W & I Code Sec 827 et seq., our
3 becomes even more compelling.
case
4
The Supreme Court has informed us as to what the elements of a violation of the
5
constitutional
right to privacy are in Hill v. NCAA, (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 - 37. Those elements are:
6 A legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (3) a serious
(1)
7
invasion
of privacy interest. All three clearly exist here.
8
The confidentiality of juvenile police records is clearly a legally protected privacy interested
9 established by W & I Code
as
827 et seq., and the case law interpreting it (see discussion above in
10
Section
2). As the Supreme Court has noted:
11
A particular class of information is private when well established social norms recognize the
12
need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified
13
embarrassment or indignity. Such norms create a threshold reasonable expectation of privacy
14
in the data at issue. As the ballot argument observes, the California constitutional right of
15
privacy 'prevents government and business interests from [1] collecting and stockpiling
16
unnecessary information about us and from [2] misusing information gathered for one
17
purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us. Hill, supra at 35.
18 plaintiff has engaged in both of the activities prohibited by the privacy right. It has "collected
The
19 stockpiled" unnecessary information. For example, it now has in its files not only information
and
20
about
an juvenile detention (where no charges have been filed) in which the V. juvenile was
21
mentioned,
but also information about the other juveniles.
Plaintiff has also clearly misused the
22
information.
At this point, the only legitimate use of the information is for the state to determine
23
whether
to file charges and what charges to file. It would be legitimate (and highly likely) for the
24
filing
district attorney to review this police report, for example, and refer the case to informal
25
probation
with a charge of simple possession (given the extremely small amount of marijuana
26
allegedly
involved here (under an ounce for four co-defendants).
27
In fact, the plaintiff in this case has usurped the legitimate authority of the D.A. and made the
28
5
1
decision
that this case involves "possession for sale of a narcotic."1 We find it doubtful that any such
2
charge
will be filed. In any case, it should emanate from the district attorney, not plaintiff. Although
3
misuse
is not a required part of the first element, it is present here. The first element is clearly
4
present.
5
The second element is that there be a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court
6 Hill set out several factors for determining whether the was a reasonable expectation of privacy.
in
7 the factors call for this Court to make a finding that such an expectation exists.
All
8
One such factor is the circumstances surrounding the invasion of privacy, Hill, supra at 36.
9
Among
the circumstances that the Hill Court noted might lead to a diminished expectation of privacy
10 advance notice of the invasion (as in sobriety checkpoints). No such circumstance exists here.
were
11
In addition, The Hill Court remarked that "customs, practices, and physical settings
12
surrounding
particular activities may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy." Hill,
13
supra
at 36. For instance, they found the atmosphere of a collegiate locker room diminished the
14
expectation
of privacy. Nudity was commonly expected in such a setting (though the Court still
15
found
that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in that case). Again no such circumstance
16
exists
here. Unlike the athlete plaintiffs in Hill, the V.s had never been notified that they would be
17
stripped
bare of their statutory and constitutional rights. The V.s had a right to expect that juvenile
18
records
would be kept confidential.
19
Finally, the Hill Court spoke of the presence or absence of opportunities to consent
20
voluntarily
to activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the
21
participant.
The athlete plaintiffs in Hill were voluntary participants in athletics. The schools were
22 only voluntarily engaged in sports, they were part of the membership of the organization which
not
23
insisted
on the invasion of privacy, the NCAA.
24
No such consent or voluntariness exists here. Unlike participation in intercollegiate sports,
251"Possession for sale of a narcotic...off premises" is the
only lease provision that plaintiffs can possibly charge this
26incident violates.
27
1
28
6
1
which
is voluntary and not an indispensable need, the provision of decent housing by a parent is
2
required
by law and an indispensable need.
3
The V.s clearly have a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs would not snoop into and
4
obtain
records of their child's detention; the second element is met.
5
6
The final element for a privacy case is that a serious invasion of privacy interest occur:
Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual
or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the
privacy right. Hill, supra at 37.
7
The Court found, for example, that observed urination and retention of a sample was such a serious
8
invasion. We have an even more serious invasion here. Plaintiffs have invaded records of a kind
9
that have been always been considered confidential. The legislature and the Courts have considered
10
the confidentiality of juvenile records to be so important that they have declared that they outweigh
11
other constitutional claims. If charges are filed and a trial were held, for instance, the public would
12
not be admitted, despite the Sixth Amendments guarantees of a public trial. The press would not be
13
able to report the names of the juveniles despite the First Amendment.2 Despite the right to a fair
14
trial, Defendants cannot get the records of juvenile co-defendants without approval of the minor or
15
the court, Wescott, supra.
16
The consequences are also extremely serious. No one could argue that the ability to
17
participate in intercollegiate sports is as important as the right to have decent shelter for a family.
18
The plaintiffs clearly have a prima facie case that the evidence to be used against them was
19
obtained illegally under the California constitutional right to privacy. We leave to defendants to
20
raise any possible defenses and reserve the right to assert any rebuttal to those defenses in our reply
21
brief and at oral argument. What is clear here is that plaintiffs have violated the applicable standing
22
232It is ironic, indeed that the filing of this complaint by
plaintiffs has made public information that the Courts of
24this jurisdiction keep confidential. If a charge is filed in
this case, those proceedings will be conducted
25confidentially. Here, when we do not even know if the D.A.
will decide if the evidence is sufficient to justify filing
26charges, the trial and record is open to the public.
27
1
28
7
1
orders
of the Superior Court, state statutes, and state and federal constitutional provisions in order to
2 the evidence they have already used against the V.s in the administrative hearing and that they
get
3 to use again in the trial of this case.
plan
4. ANY USE OF THIS EVIDENCE WILL
4
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS,
5
6
AND TO THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF LAWS
The V. juvenile is similarly situated to juveniles whose criminal conduct is litigated in
7
Juvenile
Court. Indeed, he is similarly situated in this case to himself when and if his charges are
8
filed
and prosecuted in Juvenile Court. He is also similarly situated to juveniles who have been
9
detained,
released and not charged but who live in residences owned by private landlords.
10
In the Juvenile Court, the V.s would be afforded the right to confidentiality. The media
11
would
have limited, if any access. The public would have no access. All the litigants would be
12 bounds of confidentiality.
under
13
If the V.s lived in non-governmentally controlled housing, their private landlord would have
14 right to access to juvenile records. As noted above, the Standing Order allows governments that
no
15
control
housing to obtain data about juveniles which would not be released to private landlords. It
16
would
be strange indeed if tenants and juveniles were afforded less protection when the government
17their landlord, given that the normal rule is that the federal and state Constitutions limit the power
is
18 the state more strictly than they do that of private actors (on those rare occasions when
of
19
constitutional
restrictions apply to private actors at all).
20
There is no reason that this evidence should be admitted in this Court. The V.s cannot be
21
stripped
of their rights just because the Housing Authority has chosen to evict them and illegally
22
obtain
evidence in the course of that eviction. Given that there is no sufficient reason to support this
23
disparate
treatment, it violates the V.s rights to equal protection as guaranteed them by the Fourteenth
24
Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sec 7 and Article IV, 16 of the California
25
Constitution,
Pyler v. Doe, (1982) 457 U.S. 202; People v. Glaze, (1980) 27 Cal.3d 859.
Every
26
person
has an equal right in litigation with every other and a discrimination that is merely arbitrary in
27
1
28
8
1 nature is a constitutional violation, Payne v. Superior Court, (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 132 Cal.Rptr.
its
2
405.
The procedures of the courts must operate to afford all similar situated persons like modes of
3
procedure
Daigh v. Shaffer (1936) 23 Cal.App.2d 449. There is no logical reason for the courts to
4
protect
confidentiality on 10th Street in Fresno and to violate in any other Court. Similarly, there is
5 reason to afford less protection to public housing tenants than to private tenants. The laws
no
6
requiring
juvenile confidentiality are of a general nature. As such, they must operate equally on all
7
persons
on which they operate at al, People v. Ventura Refining Co., (1928) 204 Cal. 286, reh. den.
8 Cal 296. Where only a few are afforded the protection of the law and some are not, the operation
204
9 the law destroys the uniformity of the law and renders the conduct unconstitutional, Ex parte
of
10
Clancy
(1891) 90 Cal. 553.
11
This is particularly true in this case because the right involved here is fundamental and
12
embedded
in the California constitutional guarantees to privacy. With such a fundamental right
13
involved,
only a compelling state interest can justify the diverse treatment of similarly situated
14
classes,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, (1942) 316 U.S. 535.
15 addition, the garnering of juvenile records, whether done pursuant to the Standing Order or not,
In
16
violates
the V.s rights to procedural due process. As argued above, the V.s have a clearly established
17 to privacy. The plaintiffs, a governmental entity, have stripped them of this without any notice,
right
18 to be heard, or chance to appeal. In order to comply with due process, a proceeding must give
right
19 parties adequate means to assert their rights, People v. Broad, (1932) 216 Cal 1, cert den. 287
the
20 661. The V.s were entitled to a notice that plaintiffs planned to take the action they did,
U.S.
21
Randone
v. Appellate Dept. of Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, cert den. 407 U.S. 924. In
22
addition
to notice, the V.s were entitled to a hearing about the issue of whether the juvenile reports
23
should
have been released.
There can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or
24
expediency
when the minimal requirement of a hearing has been neglected, Re Lambert (1901) 134
25 413.
Cal.
26
Plaintiffs have trampled the V.s constitutional rights in this case. Their conduct is
27
1
28
9
1
clearly
illegal.
2
3
4
5. SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
AND BECAUSE FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF IT IS
ALSO ILLEGAL, THE COURT SHOULD RULE IT INADMISSIBLE
A. The Court should find the evidence inadmissible
because it was illegally obtained by plaintiffs
5
Although the exclusionary rule does not automatically apply to non-criminal proceedings, it
6
should apply here. The use of evidence obtained by deceitful means on part of others (even those not
7
employed by the agency is impermissible, Redner v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
8
(1971) 5 Cal. 3d 83, 94-97, 95 Cal. Rptr. 447, 485 P.2d 799. The inadmissibility is even clearer
9
where, as here, the agency seeking to use the evidence is the party that obtained it illegally. "An
10
agency is barred from using evidence obtained by entrapment and other evidence 'inconsistent with
11
the dignity of its proceedings and the fair administration of justice.'" Patty v. Board of Medical
12
Examiners (1973) 9 Cal. 3d 356, 364-365, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473, 508 P.2d 1121
13
Although the criminal rules of evidence do not apply as a body to non-criminal trials,
14
selected rules may be held applicable. The most important rule is probably the exclusionary rule. It
15
does not apply in every trial but may be applied in selected cases. In fact, even prior to Mapp v. Ohio
16
(1961) 367 U.S. 643, when there was no exclusionary rule recognized in California law; the
17
California courts ruled that, in certain circumstances, illegally obtained evidence should not be
18
admitted in civil trials, Kohn v. Superior Court (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 459; 55 P.2d 1186.
19
The decision whether to apply it should rest on (1) how nearly the purposes of the trial
20
approach the goals of criminal law enforcement, (2) the social cost of extending the exclusionary rule
21
to the case in question, and (3) whether applying the rule in the case in question would tend to deter
22
unlawful conduct by investigators, as the rule is intended to deter unlawful conduct by the police
23
when they investigate criminal activity, Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 210, 226-229, 113 Cal.
24
Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991].
25
All three of the Emslie factors argue for inadmissibility. The trial in this case, as will be
26
argued below, very closely approaches the goals of a criminal trial, i.e. punishment and forfeiture for
27
1
28
10
1 alleged criminal act. The social cost is minimal. At most, we are requesting that plaintiffs
an
2
petition
the Juvenile Court, so that the experts in the nature of juvenile proceedings can have a say in
3 release of the information (and so that the laws and constitution can be obeyed). Finally, a ruling
the
4 inadmissibility will clearly deter the actors who obtained the evidence illegally. The deterrent
of
5
effect
is clearly the ultimate purpose for excluding evidence, Elkins v. U.S. (1960) 364 U.S. 206,
6
217.
That purpose must be served here. Plaintiffs must be deterred from repeating their illegal
7
behavior
by this Court's ruling that the evidence is inadmissible.
8
An illustrative case is Dyson v. State Personnel Board, 213 Cal. App. 3d 711, 719; 262 Cal.
9
Rptr.
112. There the evidence seized in this case was in no way the independent product of police
10
work.
As here, the search was initiated on the basis of allegations of criminal misconduct made to the
11
agency.
It was directed by and the evidence was seized and held by the agency. The agency
12
introduced
it in evidence in the administrative disciplinary hearing. The Court ruled the evidence
13
inadmissible,
Dyson at 719.
B. In addition, the Court should rule that the
14
evidence is inadmissible because this case
15
16
is a forfeiture and quasi-criminal in nature
Even though this Court should rule the disputed evidence inadmissible in any civil case, it
17
should
do so particularly in this one, which involves a forfeiture of the V.'s lease.
18
There can be no mistake that this is a suit for forfeiture. It is an attempt by the government
19 terminate a tenancy that otherwise would run the life of the tenant This is no plain vanilla lease,
to
20
either.
It is a federally subsidized and regulated lease which, under federal law, cannot be terminated
21
absent
good cause. It thus in theory extends in perpetuity.
If the V.s are evicted they stand little
22
chance
of getting another subsidized tenancy, particularly since plaintiffs are practically the sole
23
provider
of such housing in Fresno County and because an eviction for good cause permits plaintiff
24 deny subsequent applications for subsidized housing by the V.s. Besides, no applications for any
to
25 subsidized housing and there is a waiting list of several years. (See declaration of Debra
such
26
Delgado-Smith,
Exhibit "C", incorporated by reference).
27
1
28
11
1
The loss of this tenancy is a penalty of thousands of dollars. In contrast, the criminal case, if
2 is filed, will likely be filed as possession of marijuana in an amount under an ounce. The
it
3
maximum
penalty for such an offense is a small fine or diversion. Where the civil remedy being
4
sought
by the government is so much greater than the civil penalty, it is clear that the case is a
5
forfeiture
and thus quasi-criminal in nature, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth (1965)
6 U.S. 702, 700-703; 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1250-1251. The California Courts have followed the same
350
7 of reasoning, People v. Moore, (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 674, 680; 72 Cal.Rptr. 800.
line
8
Even absent the disparity, where the civil penalty standing alone is so great in value, there is a
9
quasi-criminal
proceeding. Wherever there is "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
10
[criminal]
offense" there is a punishment for purposes of double jeopardy considerations, U.S. v.
11
Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989). Since a punishment can be enforced by a government only through
12
quasi-criminal
proceedings, it follows that any payment to a sovereign must also be quasi-criminal in
13
nature.
The forfeiture of the lease and its attendant subsidies in this case are such a payment.
14
As the Court pointed out, the law had for some time been that "proceedings instituted for the
15
purpose
of declaring a forfeiture of a man's property by reason of an offense committed by him,
16
though
they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal." One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, supra at
17 citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
697,
18
If this Court agrees that this is a forfeiture action, then it must rule that the illegally obtained
evidence is inadmissible:
19
"...[since] suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by the commission of offenses against
20
the law, are of this quasi -criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all purposes of the fourth amendment of the constitution, and of that portion
21
of the fifth amendment that declares no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself," Boyd v. U.S. (1886) 116 U.S. 616, 634.
22
Defendants may argue that they have violated a mere procedural requirement - that they
23
would have received the reports had they filed their declaration or petitioned the court. The Boyd
24
Court has already summarily rejected that argument:
25
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
26
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedures. This can only be obviated by adhering
to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
27
1
28
12
liberally construed." Boyd at 635.
1
This Court must follow the lead of the Boyd ruling and declare the evidence obtained by plaintiff as
2
inadmissible.
3
C. THE COURT SHOULD RULE THE EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
4
BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE AND
5
6
DISSEMINATION OF IT IS A VIOLATION OF LAW
In normal suppression cases, the Court finds itself in something of a dilemma. The judge
7
must
rule on how to correct a past wrong, often knowing that if they suppress the evidence a guilty
8
defendant
will go free. That dilemma does not present itself here.
9
First, we are not just facing a wrong committed in the past. Any use of the confidential
10
information
by the plaintiffs will continue to violate the V.s' rights. As noted above, dissemination of
11
juvenile
material, even if obtained legally, is a violation of the law, In re Tiffany G., (194) 29
12
Cal.App.4th
443, 35 Cal.Rptr. 8. The same is true under the privacy right. The Court should not
13 continued violations of the law.
allow
14
Also, the V. juvenile has not even been charged with the drug violation. The criminal courts
15 him and, in fact, this motion will have no bearing on whether or not evidence can be used
await
16
against
him in that case, should charges be filed.
17
18
6. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, this Court should rule that all of the evidence of the juvenile
19
crimes
should be ruled inadmissible. Inasmuch as this is the sole evidence to support the eviction,
20 Court should dismiss this action.
the
21
22 5, 1996
April
_________________________
23
Jack Daniel
Defendants' Attorney
24
25
26
27
1
28
13