Appeasement and the Road to War
Effects of World War One
 In diplomatic terms, World War One had a profound effect on the way that nations
conducted their business and relations with each other. Prior to 1914, the major
powers had generally tried to keep a balance of power so that no one or group of
countries became too strong. This balance was achieved through forming alliances.
 By 1918 however, it was believed that the existence of alliances had been a major
factor in causing World War One. This led to new thinking and the emergence of the
League of Nations with its adherence to the policy of collective security.
Collective Security
 Collective security was the idea that peace could be preserved by the nations of the
world acting together to control any aggression and settle disputes. The League of
Nations was to be the main agency for collective security (see textbook, page 6 for
information on the organisation of the League). Woodrow Wilson, President of the
USA, was mainly responsible for the setting up of the League. The League of Nations
was established at the Versailles Peace Conference as part of the Treaty of Versailles.
 In 1919, forty-two countries joined the League. Each of the defeated nations
(Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) were required to sign the charter
of the League of Nations but were denied membership. Russia was also not allowed
to join as it had made peace with Germany in early 1918 and was now a communist
country (Russian Revolution – November, 1917).
 The USA did not join the League of Nations because President Wilson failed to
persuade the American Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles together with its
membership of the League. The League of Nations was therefore weakened from the
outset as the whole idea of collective security was drastically undermined by the
failure of the world’s greatest power to join.
Attitudes of Permanent Council Members
 Britain - feared that the League might require them to apply economic or military
sanctions which they regarded as unjust.
 France – felt that the League wasn’t strong enough and lacked the means to police its
decisions – fearful of the possibility of German rearmament.
 Italy – new Fascist government under Mussolini feared that the League could act as a
brake on Italy’s expansionist aims.
 From the outset, it looked unlikely that collective security would be very successful
as the most powerful member states were either not really committed to it or actually
against it. Therefore, it was going to be very difficult for the League to be a success.
The League of Nations in the 1920s
 In the 1920s, the League of Nations had a number of successes settling disputes
between minor powers e.g. Finland and Sweden in 1921. However, when it came to
dealing with aggression on the part of major powers (and Council Members) such as
France or Italy, the League was less successful.
 The French Invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 (see textbook, page 9) was a clear
indicator of the League’s failures in the 1930s. The League was quite incapable of
dealing with aggression by a large or middle-sized power. Collective security was not
working well in the 1920s. Either it would have to be strengthened or a new strategy
would have to be attempted.
France’s Search for Security
 The French did not regard the Versailles settlement and the League as an adequate
guarantee of their security. Furthermore, the Russian Revolution had denied them
their pre-war ally. Consequently, in the 1920s, they became preoccupied with the
need for security against future German aggression.
 In 1920, they concluded a military alliance with Belgium and they made a series of
alliances with the new small states of Eastern Europe – Poland (1921),
Czechoslovakia (1924), Rumania (1926), and Yugoslavia (1927) – ‘Little Entente’.
 This marked a departure from the ideal of collective security and a drift back to the
bad, old habit of power block politics (Alliance System) which was held to be one of
the major causes of the First World War.
Improvements in International Relations, 1924-1929
 Relations between France and Germany improved with the appointment of Aristide
Briand and Gustav Stresemann as Foreign Ministers. These men believed in
conciliation, rather than confrontation.
 In 1925, Britain, Germany, France and Italy signed a ‘Treaty of Mutual Guarantee’
at Locarno in Switzerland (‘Locarno Pact’). Germany accepted and guaranteed her
frontiers with France and Belgium (including the demilitarized Rhineland), although
she was still unwilling to accept her Eastern frontiers as a final arrangement.
 In 1926, Germany, with the approval of Briand, was admitted to the League as a
Permanent Council Member.
 In 1928, American Secretary of State, Kellogg, together with Briand, drew up the
‘Pact of Paris’ (‘Kellogg-Briand Pact’), by which 62 nations promised not to use
war as a means of resolving disputes – unless in self-defence.
 The reconciliation which Briand and Stresemann initiated might have given Europe
peace if it had been given time to develop but the death of Stresemann in 1929, the
Great Depression (1929-1935) and the consequent rise to power of Adolf Hitler
meant this was not to be.
Disarmament, 1919-1934
 The League of Nations was keen to promote disarmament as countries such as Britain
and the USA were convinced that the arms race had been a major cause of the First
World War and that disarmament would provide security against further wars.
 However, very little progress was made in the 1920s and it wasn’t until 1932 that an
International Disarmament Conference took place in Geneva, Switzerland.
 The British Prime Minister presented Conference with a detailed plan which set out
the armed forces permitted to every country in Europe. The plan was welcomed at
first but arguments soon broke out over the figures and, in the end, nothing came of it.
 When the British and Italians accepted a French plan in October 1933, the Germans
(now under Nazi rule) withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations. In April, 1934, the Disarmament Conference was finally disbanded.
 Collective action had failed to solve the problem of armaments levels. It is hardly
surprising that statesmen, concerned to preserve peace, should have wanted to try
another approach. This led to the adoption of the policy of appeasement.
The Manchurian Crisis, 1931
 One night in September 1931, an explosion occurred which did minor damage to the
Japanese controlled South Manchurian Railway at Mukden. The Japanese blamed the
Chinese and took over all the important towns in Manchuria. By early January 1932,
they had taken over the entire province. In February, they announced that Manchuria
had become the independent Republic of Manchukuo.
 The Chinese maintained that the Japanese had sabotaged the track themselves as an
excuse for the takeover and took their case to the League of Nations.
 A League Commission was sent to investigate the problem under the chairmanship of
Britain’s Lord Lytton. The USA, France, Germany and Italy were also represented.
 In September 1932, a report was submitted to the League which rejected the Japanese
claim that they had acted in self-defence. It recommended that China and Japan
should negotiate to establish an independent state in Manchuria. Neither side was
happy with this and eventually, in March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League.
 The Japanese regime in Manchukuo was not recognised but they got away with their
act of aggression and this showed that a strong power could attack a weak one
without fear of the League. Britain and France were unwilling to consider sanctions
against Japan because of economic problems at home, the practical difficulties of
waging war a long way from home and because of US reluctance to be involved.
 These events gave confidence to Mussolini and Hitler, and effectively encouraged
them to defy the League in the pursuit of their expansionist policies.
The Abyssinian Crisis, 1935
 After the Manchurian Crisis of 1931, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (present day
Ethiopia) was the next important test for collective security. Benito Mussolini used
the excuse of a boundary dispute between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland to launch
an invasion of Abyssinia. This was part of his plan to create a new Italian Empire.
 At first Mussolini sided with the Western Powers against Hitler. At the Stresa
Conference, in 1935, Britain, France and Italy lined up in favour of the Treaty of
Versailles and against German rearmament. They also reaffirmed their support for the
independence of Austria.
 It was the Abyssinian crisis which destroyed the trust between Italy and the Western
Powers. The conquest of Abyssinia (1935-1936) was the result of the Fascist policy
of expansion and conquest and the Italian desire for colonies. Italian Nationalists had
never forgotten Italy’s defeat by Abyssinian tribesmen in the battle of Adowa in
1896. Placed alongside Italian Eritrea and Somaliland, Abyssinia was seen as an
Italian reserve. Fascism needed the prestige of a military victory. Mussolini’s view
was that ‘a nation, to remain healthy, should make war every 25 years.’
 However, Abyssinia was a member of the League of Nations and the League
condemned Italy as an aggressor following the invasion launched in October 1935. It
imposed economic sanctions - all League members were to ban imports from Italy,
loans to Italy and the supply of war materials. However, the sanctions excluded oil
and coal, essential in waging war.
 Moreover, in December 1935, the British and French foreign ministers, Samuel Hoare
and Pierre Laval, put forward a compromise proposal (Hoare-Laval Pact) giving
Italy over a half of Abyssinia if Mussolini agreed to stop the war. When the news of
this leaked out, there was a storm of protest in Britain, as it seemed a betrayal of the
Abyssinians and a surrender to aggression. Hoare was forced to resign but the damage
to the League’s credibility was long-lasting. It showed the extent to which the British
and French governments were afraid of upsetting Mussolini, whom they saw as an
ally against Hitler. Indeed, the German army was able to take advantage of the
Abyssinian crisis by reoccupying the Rhineland, contrary to the treaty of Versailles.
 Undeterred by the League, the Italians used aerial bombardment and poison gas to
subdue the Abyssinians. By May 1936, their forces occupied Addis Ababa. Mussolini
defiantly proclaimed the existence of the Italian Empire. When the Abyssinian
Emperor Haile Selassie came to Geneva, to protest at the League of Nations, he was
greeted by booing from Italian journalists. Italy had successfully defied the League of
Nations in a war of aggression.
 The significance of this crisis was that it showed the inability of the League of
Nations to stop a country that was determined to use force to achieve its aims. It
showed that the ‘Pillars of the League’, Britain and France, put self-interest before
collective security.
 Many historians consider the crisis over Abyssinia to be the rock on which the
League was wrecked. A.J.P. Taylor wrote in his book, ‘The Origins of the Second
World War’ that the real death of the League was in December 1935 (Hoare-Laval
Pact) – “One day the League had seemed a powerful body imposing sanctions, the
next day it had lost its influence.”
 From this point onwards, the Western Powers abandoned the pretence of solving
disputes through the League and instead turned to the policy of appeasement. Hitler
must have noted how, as in the Manchurian Crisis, Britain and France had appeared
weak, indecisive and unwilling to act. This apparent weakness may have encouraged
him to act aggressively in later crises. Italy and Germany drew closer together and in
October 1936 the Rome-Berlin Axis was announced.
Appeasement
 Another idea for preserving the peace, favoured by a growing number of political
leaders especially in Britain and the USA, was appeasement. This has been defined
as “… a disposition to avoid conflict by judicious concession and negotiation”
(Professor Keith Robbins - Glasgow University). The difficulty lies in deciding when
concessions are well-judged and reasonable and what these concessions should be.
 In the inter-war years, the use of appeasement as a policy for keeping the peace
unfortunately led to the breakdown of collective security and the failure of the League
of Nations. Concessions were repeatedly made at the expense of small nations in an
attempt to buy off more aggressive powers such as Japan, Italy and Germany.
 The main reasons why the British government undertook a policy of appeasement in
the 1930s are as follows:
(1). They believed that Germany and Italy had been mistreated in the peace settlement
of 1919 and that concessions had to be granted to correct decisions made in anger and
bitterness at the end of a long and destructive war.
(2). They believed that the people of Britain and the Empire e.g. Canada, were weary
of war and would not accept another, even in support of collective security.
(3). They believed that the British economy had been too severely damaged by the
Great War and the Great Depression (1929-1935) to sustain another major war.
(4). They believed that the armed forces of Britain and France were neither prepared
nor equipped for war and needed time to rearm.
(5). They believed that Russian Communism or Bolshevism (extreme Left) rather
than Fascism (extreme Right) was the main threat to western democracy.
(For more information on the reasons behind appeasement, see textbook, pages 54-58.)
Hitler’s Foreign Policy, 1933-1935
Aims of Hitler’s Foreign Policy
 The main aims of Hitler’s foreign policy were set out in the 1920 Nazi Party
Programme and in Hitler’s book, ‘Mein Kampf’ (‘My Struggle’), written in 1924.
 The short-term policy was to remove the terms of the Treaty of Versailles which
placed restrictions on Germany. Hitler knew this might take 10 years or more to
achieve but would be very popular with the German people. For example, he was
determined to create a ‘Gross Deutschland’ (‘Greater Germany’) which included
Austria and the German minorities living in Czechoslovakia, Poland and other states.
 Success in this short-term strategy would lead to success in his long-term policy
which was racial and territorial. It was chiefly aimed at gaining territory in the East at
the expense of ‘inferior races’ – ‘Lebensraum’ (living space). This strategy would
lead to Jews being exterminated, Slavic races being turned into a slave labour force
and Communism being crushed. New economic resources would become available to
Germany which would strengthen its people and help develop ‘the Master Race’ i.e.
the superior Germanic race.
Hitler and Disarmament/League of Nations
 In international relations, Hitler tried to present himself as a peaceful man acting in
defence of the German people. In February 1932, the League of Nations had finally
got a disarmament conference under way in Geneva.
 In May 1933, Hitler demanded parity in armaments (equal sized armed forces) with
the French, stating that it was unfair that Germany had been forced to disarm whilst
France had not. If France refused to disarm, then Germany would begin to rearm.
 The French were unwilling to disarm as they were acutely aware of their inferior
industrial resources and smaller population, and were obsessed with security as a
direct result of invasions by Germany in 1870 and 1914.
 Hitler withdrew Germany from both the Conference and the League of Nations in
October 1933. He claimed that these organisations were merely a French conspiracy
to keep Germany a second-rate power, incapable of self-defence. This was another
blow for the idea of collective security as another major power was now no longer a
member of the League of Nations. In April, 1934, the Disarmament Conference was
finally disbanded.
 Many British politicians were openly sympathetic towards Germany because they felt
guilty about the severity of the Treaty of Versailles. In November 1933, a plebiscite
(a vote) showed that the German people overwhelmingly supported Hitler’s actions.
Anschluss Postponed, July 1934
 Since coming to power, the Nazis had financed and encouraged the Austrian Nazi
Party. The Austrian Nazis ran a campaign of intimidation, terrorism and violent
propaganda. Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor was finally forced to have the party
banned. On 25th July 1934, the Nazis assassinated Dollfuss as part of an attempted
coup d’etat/Putsch (armed rising) intended to force the union with Germany.
 The Italian government, led by Benito Mussolini, was alarmed at this development.
The Italians had no desire for a common frontier with Hitler. The South Tyrol,
gained by Italy from Austria through the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919, had a
substantial German minority. Mussolini also feared that Hitler would use Austria as a
base to undermine Italy’s influence in the Balkans. Consequently, 100,000 Italian
troops were massed on Italy’s border with Austria. Hitler was taken aback by the
intensity of the reaction he had caused and was forced to disown the Putsch.
German Rearmament
 In March 1934, the published German military budget showed substantial increases,
indicating that Germany was rearming.
 In March 1935, Hermann Goring, one of Hitler’s ministers, revealed the existence
of the Luftwaffe (airforce) and general conscription to the armed forces was
reintroduced. Both of these actions were against the Treaty of Versailles.
Reaction to German Rearmament
 In response to these developments, there was an attempt to reassert collective
security. In April 1935, the French organized a conference at Stresa in Italy attended
by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Italy.
 A formal protest against Hitler’s flouting of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of
Versailles was issued. However, the ‘Stresa Front’ was short-lived, wrecked by the
quarrel which arose from Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia).
 The Soviet Union was also worried about Hitler’s behaviour. In September 1934, she
joined the League of Nations and in May 1935, she signed a ‘Mutual Assistance
Pact’ with France.
 The British attitude to German Rearmament was to try and limit it by negotiation
rather than stop it by force or threat i.e. appeasement. In June 1935, Britain and
Germany signed the ‘Anglo-German Naval Agreement’ by which Britain agreed
that Germany could build up to 35% of Britain’s naval strength and could equal the
submarine strength of the British Empire. This was despite the fact that the Treaty of
Versailles had forbidden Germany to have any U-boats at all.
 The effect of this agreement was to destroy the Stresa Front. Both the French and the
Italians felt that Britain was unpredictable and unreliable, and likely to make
conflicting agreements with her friends and her supposed enemies.