ECON
Recession now key to avoid depression – perception of solving the crisis only ensures a worse crash later
Morris ‘8 (Charles, Practicing Attorney and former banker, 11-22, 2008, “The upside to a serious downturn,” Houston
Chronicle, online: http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/outlook/6126845.html)
Virtually all of America's financial and political artillery has been dragooned into the great task of heading off a recession. This is
exactly the wrong way to go. As painful as it will be in the short run, a recession is just what we need. Our economic model
is broken, and trying to restart it will just dig us deeper into a hole. The massive changes that are required can
be made only through the violent rejiggering that takes place during recessions. That may sound coldhearted, but
there's a precedent . From 1979 to 1981, then-Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker masterminded a nasty slowdown
that broke stagflation — the noxious combination of rising prices and no growth. Among other moves, Volcker pushed the yield
on three-month Treasury bills up to an unheard-of 20 percent, stopping the economy in its tracks. Millions lost their jobs;
Volcker was burned in effigy on the Capitol steps. But when Volcker finally broke inflation's back in 1983, healthy growth
resumed almost immediately, and Ronald Reagan rode the result to a landslide victory in 1984 — a little fact that people worried
about a one-term presidency for Barack Obama should note. The arithmetic of our current problem is pretty simple: From 2000
through 2007, U.S. households borrowed $6.2 trillion, nearly doubling their debt. Most of it was borrowed against houses, and about
two-thirds was spent on things other than another house or paying down mortgage debt — including SUVs, flat-screen TVs and all the
other consumer baubles of an American lifestyle. But when house prices collapsed, the home-equity cash spigot shut tight. U.S.
consumer spending has fallen off the cliff, devastating car companies and shuttering factories throughout China. The Treasury
Department and the Federal Reserve have responded with pyrotechnics. The Treasury has infused hundreds of billions in cash into
banks and other financial players. Even more remarkably, the Fed has distributed more than $1 trillion in new loans and credits to a
broad range of financial and non-financial companies. The automobile manufacturers have now joined the queue, and President-elect
Obama has signaled that he'd like them to be included in the bailout. So far, none of this has worked very well. Banks continue to
tighten credit and lending standards. Even interbank lending came close to freezing up last month — a level of disruption not seen
since the 1970s. All these frenzied attempts at staving off recession seem to be aimed merely at jump-starting the
consumer borrowing-spending binge that underpinned the ersatz growth of the 2000s. But the real need is to
shift to a more balanced system that's less addicted to high-leverage finance
Perception of financial crisis is key to drive widespread saving – that’s the most important factor in
making growth sustainable
Housel ‘8 (Morgan Housel, Contributor to The Motley Fool, a stock/investment analysis firm, 10-23, 2008, “A Silver Lining to
the Financial Crisis,” online: http://www.fool.com/investing/international/2008/10/23/a-silver-lining-to-thefinancial-crisis.aspx)
It's hard to find anything to smile about in the economy these days. Portfolios are in tatters. Jobs are being slashed. The market
can't find a floor. National debt can't find a ceiling. Inflation, oil, home prices … it's not hard to see why the myriad issues draw
comparisons to the Great Depression. Yet beneath the ruckus, one statistic -- perhaps the most vital component of
getting back on a sustainable track -- is doing better than it has in years. People are saving money again. And in a
big way The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports consumers saved an annualized $297 billion in the second quarter -- more
than 10 times higher than the first quarter, and the highest quarterly savings since 1995. From 2004 through 2007, the
average rate was around $85 billion. In the third quarter of 2005, things got really out of hand, with a negative savings rate …
meaning that as a collective body, living paycheck-to-paycheck meant you were ahead of the pack. Thank goodness those
overextended days are gone. It's about time As was the case with oil prices, people don't start changing their ways until the
problem is shoved down their throat. It took $4 gasoline to get people to wake up, and to get innovation from companies like
Sasol (NYSE: SSL) and electric cars from Toyota (NYSE: TM) and General Motors (NYSE: GM) to start being taken seriously.
Necessity is the key to innovation, the proverb goes. The same goes for saving. As Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Bear Stearns
will tell you, greed clouded by optimism can be an awesomely overwhelming force. Saving went out of style because, at the rate
things were going, few saw a need to. Why save when your house went up by 20% every year? That's all changed in the past few
months as people are realizing that Visa (NYSE: V), MasterCard (NYSE: MA), and American Express (NYSE: AXP) will make you
richer in your brokerage account than they will in your wallet. As reality sets in for millions of Americans blindsided by home
foreclosures and job losses without a safety net to fall back on, people are scrambling to rebuild and replenish their
personal balance sheets by saving again. And that problem was yours and yours only Which brings up another point: Can we
really put all of the blame for our current woes on Wall Street? Of course, the army of Harvard-stupid Wall Streeters (thanks, Bill)
were leading the charge, orchestrating the disaster we're now facing. They screwed up. They should pay the price. And they are. But
the larger picture is that it wasn't just Wall Street gorging on more debt than they could handle and taking excessive risks. It was
nearly everybody. By 2005, over a quarter of Americans' income went toward revolving debt payments. Debt was the lifeblood of the
economy, and the chickens have come to roost. I dug up a few headlines from major newspapers and magazines, all published
between 2001-2006, that might remind us how overextended we were. Here are a few: * Saving in 2005 Worst Since 1933 * Equity
Shrivels as Homeowners Borrow and Buy * As Personal Savings Fall, a Comeuppance Is Due * The Way We Live Now: Home Sweet
Debt * Our Vanishing Savings Rate * Overwhelming Majority of Americans Feel Consumers Are Taking on Too Much Debt So,
yeah, maybe it wasn't just Wall Street When AIG (NYSE: AIG) gets in over its head, it's a sin, and they're a criminal. When John Q.
Citizen gets in over his head, it's a tragedy, and he's a victim. That blame game is an irony to this debacle that'll likely only prolong
our recovery. But enough pointing fingers. For once, let's focus on the good news: People are saving again! How does that help
the economy? Countries, like people or business, grow wealthier over time by saving money and investing it
wisely. It really is about as simple as that. True, our economy managed to grow over the past decade with little
or no savings. How? We borrowed. And that's why it's falling apart today. When an economy saves money, it
has the resources it needs to invest without borrowing from someone else (Chinese and OPEC nations), and it
creates real wealth. Domestic savings creates a pot of money borrowers can turn to for investments in projects
that eventually create jobs, keep interest rates low, and push the economy along at a sustainable pace. The
important part is that it's our savings -- not savings from foreign nations we became beholden to over the years to sustain our lavish
lifestyles. The bottom line is simple: people -- and economies -- that work hard and spend less than they make
will grow wealthy. People -- and economies -- that borrow heavily and spend more than they make will grow
poor.
Financial crisis is key to momentum for global scientific co-op and innovation
Nature Magazine ‘8 (11-13, 2008, “Danger and opportunity,” Vol. 456, No. 141)
Also encouraging is the emerging appreciation that short- and long-term measures to address the economic crisis need not be mutually
exclusive. Often they can and should be considered simultaneously. After trillion-dollar rescues of the banking system, for example,
many countries are indeed contemplating massive economic stimulus packages. But instead of crafting conventional,
spending- oriented plans focused solely on tax cuts for individuals and spending increases, policy-makers should look for ways to give
the economy a quick shot in the arm while also boosting investment that spurs productivity, growth and innovation.
China seems to be thinking in those terms. Last weekend, Beijing announced a 4-trillion-yuan (US$586-billion) stimulus
package, at least some of which — details remain vague — will go on research tax credits and investments in infrastructure. The
United States, which is debating a stimulus package of similar magnitude, may do likewise: Barack Obama, the US presidentelect, campaigned on the need for major investments in clean energy, education, health and infrastructure, most of which
will have a strong research component. Innovative thinking Good specific ideas are emerging. On 29 October, for example, the
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, a think tank based in Washington DC, outlined eight possibilities in the IT realm.
Among them were increased grants for universities to buy research equipment in 2009, a tax credit for investments in energy-efficient
equipment in 2009 and billions of dollars to buy computers and broadband for low-income families with children at home. In the area
of clean energy, meanwhile, others have suggested the use of stimulus money to spur demand for new technologies, much as
consumer subsidies to use solar energy in Germany have helped drive the growth of solar start-ups — not only in that country, but also
in the United States and China. Indeed, the crisis is providing multiple opportunities for governments to take decisive
action on innovation, and policy-makers should champion those possibilities as they hammer out stimulus packages. Given the
deeply intertwined nature of the modern global innovation system, they should act collaboratively — as they have
already begun to do in addressing the problems of the global financial system. International cooperation at this level has been
all too rare in recent years. But there is every reason to hope that the experience provided by this crisis will be a model
for future efforts to combat challenges such as climate change and water shortage by a world aptly described by
Obama in his victory speech as "connected by our own science and imagination".
That solves all extinction scenarios
Fedoroff ‘8
(Nina, Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID, Testimony
Before the House Science Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, 4/2,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/102996.htm)
Using Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and stability of countries and regions in many parts of
the globe require a concerted effort by the developed world to address the causal factors that render countries fragile and cause states
to fail. Countries that are unable to defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide economic opportunity, are susceptible to
extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and abuses of human rights. As well, the world faces common threats, among them climate
change, energy and water shortages, public health emergencies, environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and
religious extremism. These threats can undermine the national security of the United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are
blind to political boundaries, becoming regional or global threats. The United States has no monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing
world and the scientific challenges facing humankind are enormous. Addressing these common challenges demands common
solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation, common standards, and common goals. We must increasingly harness the power
of American ingenuity in science and technology through strong partnerships with the science community in both academia and
the private sector, in the U.S. and abroad among our allies, to advance U.S. interests in foreign policy. There are also important
challenges to the ability of states to supply their populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human population, rising affluence
in emerging economies, and other factors have combined to create unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such as edible
oils and grains. Encouraging and promoting the use of contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential
goal for US science diplomacy. An essential part of the war on terrorism is a war of ideas. The creation of economic opportunity
can do much more to combat the rise of fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about rationalism as opposed to
irrationalism. Science and technology put us firmly on the side of rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve
people’s lives. We may use the recognition and the goodwill that science still generates for the United States to achieve our diplomatic
and developmental goals. Additionally, the Department continues to use science as a means to reduce the proliferation of the
weapons’ of mass destruction and prevent what has been dubbed ‘brain drain’. Through cooperative threat reduction activities,
former weapons scientists redirect their skills to participate in peaceful, collaborative international research in a large variety of
scientific fields. In addition, new global efforts focus on improving biological, chemical, and nuclear security by promoting and
implementing best scientific practices as a means to enhance security, increase global partnerships, and create sustainability.
Global recession key to spur domestic growth in China – gives political cover for domestic stimulus and
raises relative Chinese competitiveness
Washington Post ‘8 (11-15, 2008, “Experts See Security Risks in Downturn,” online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/11/14/AR2008111403864.html)
Yet many China
scholars also see great opportunity for the communist giant. Even as the global recession cuts
into its export markets, the country continues to experience robust growth at home, thanks to the consumption
habits of its rapidly growing middle class. A hefty economic stimulus will ensure continued, if modest, growth, even if exports
flat line, said Albert Keidel, a former economist for the World Bank and the Treasury Department and now an East Asia expert at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. China already was on track to surpass the United States as the world's largest
economy, perhaps as early as 2030. Now, many experts believe the global recession could help it do so faster. The
implications are enormous for the global economy and for international security, Keidel said. " If we have a long recession and
China catapults itself forward with double-digit growth, those timelines move forward," he said.
That’s key to stop a Taiwan attack
Franck and Melese ‘3
(Raymond E. Franck, Chair, Department of Systems Engineering Naval Postgraduate School, And
Francois Melese, Associate Professor, Defense Resources Management Institute @ Naval
Postgraduate School, December 2003, Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 19, No. 4)
to face a chronic crisis of legitimacy. To pursue Deng’s analogy, the key
question is: what happens if the regime stops catching mice? If economic growth suddenly slows, with attendant
worsening of social problems and failed expectations, the regime may feel compelled to find new mice to catch. Regimes
Despite these achievements, the regime continues
such as Fidel Castro’s in Cuba bolster their legitimacy by diverting public attention to inflated threats of invasion and subversion.4
Similarly, if China’s economy begins to stumble, this might lead the regime to attempt to divert public attention
by taking strong action in pursuit of lost territories – notably Taiwan.
Chinese invasion of Taiwan causes nuclear war
Johnson ‘1
(Chalmers, The Nation, 4-14, Lexis)
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's
minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic
Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese
civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in
Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a
conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese
victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More
seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's
sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have
virtually no deterrent effect.
Global financial crisis is vital to reduce the key drivers of Amazon destruction
Butler ‘8 (Rhett A. Butler, operator and writer of Mongabay.com, seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and
wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on
conservation and development, 10-8, 2008, “Slowing global economy will reduce Amazon deforestation,” online:
http://news.mongabay.com/2008/1008-brazil.html)
The global financial crisis will likely slow forest clearing in the Amazon rainforest, said Brazil's environment
commodity prices combined with tighter credit and increased aversion to risk will undermine the
economics of activities — including logging and agricultural expansion — that are key drivers of deforestation in
the Brazilian Amazon. Forest clearing in the region has shown an increasingly tight correlation to beef and soy prices in recent
years. Both products are produced on cleared rainforest lands. "It's true that the reduction of commodity prices reduces
(deforestation) pressure," Minc told Reuters at the Reuters Global Environment Summit in Brasilia.
minister. Falling
Solves extinction
Takacs ‘96
(David, The Idea Of Diversity: Philosophies Of Paradise, 1996, p. 200-1.)
So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think
about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we
play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “ It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the
Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate,
and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the
Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the
famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with
no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to
maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious
assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable
expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct
economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for
cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural
disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be
unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring
a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a
whimper.
HEG
Hegemony ensures U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts and nuclear war – withdrawal prevents
automatic deployment to honor alliances.
Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 169
Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war
that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the
United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the
Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being
entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American
homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the
danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.
Regional threats ensure balancing behavior – even if the U.S. does not scare states into military buildup,
its security guarantee can never be strong enough to dissuade it in all instances.
Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 151
Up until now, other states have foregone overt counterbalancing because they benefit from American
hegemony. However, Washington's ability to provide other major states with collective goods—in both the
security and economic spheres—is a wasting asset. Although other states have relied on U.S. security
guarantees to protect them against regional rivals and instability, the credibility of America's extended
deterrence commitments is increasingly problematic. As other major states experience growing doubts about
whether they can count on the United States to protect them, they will move—and, indeed, in some cases
already have--to acquire military capabilities so that, if necessary, they can defend themselves without U.S.
assistance.67 When other major states build up militarily as a hedge against abandonment by the United States,
they open a second avenue to multipolarity. Regardless of how multipolarity comes about—as the result of
balancing against the United States, or as a result of others arming themselves as a hedge against regional
rivals—the consequences for America's hegemonic grand strategy are the same. Precisely because multipolarity
is antithetical to the Open Door world that the United States seeks, the aim of American grand strategy is to
prevent the other major powers—even U.S. allies—from gaining autonomy in the realm of security.
U.S. HEGEMONY BAD FRONTLINE***
Multipolarity is inevitable in a world of either American hegemony or withdrawal – engagement fosters a
violent war-filled transition.
Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190
Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power
safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are
growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—
rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to
prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving
creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to
multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and
going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments
abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the
United States in great power Eurasian wars.
American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the
transition smooth and avoids great power wars – sooner is better than later.
Charles A. Kupchan, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of
Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search
Premier
As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this
transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on
U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective
management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction
of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers
would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions.
They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and
steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate
the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and
vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to
promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin
America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia.
Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States
will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with
American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and
East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer
to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic
multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the
decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining
whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently
been the precursor to great power war in the past.[*]
U.S. HEGEMONY BAD FRONTLINE***
Their impact is silly – U.S. engagement actually increases the likelihood of war in Asia and Europe –
these areas can easily secure themselves.
Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M.
Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control
Studies (DACS) Program Spring
1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4
The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S.
military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world, disengagement will not cause great
power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may
actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments
require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars
are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers
overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that
withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence,
America’s major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a
sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors.
The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country’s attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting
But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages.
Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with
Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of
Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which
offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71
would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia
. The prospect
for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it
exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world’s GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world’s GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it
expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw
from Europe, even Germany, Europe’s strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.
Potential to redeploy solves all of their offense.
Barbara Conry (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute) 2/5/1997 "U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism
for World Policeman" CATO INSTITUTE http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1126
A more critical issue is the evolution of the international system after U.S. hegemony. Washington can exert considerable influence (though
not full control) over the development of that system. Although a number of different scenarios may be acceptable to the United States, Washington should make certain that any global system that succeeds American hegemony has two
important characteristics. First, international power and responsibility must be decentralized; the transfer of U.S. global influence and responsibilities to another state, alliance, or global organization such as the United Nations should not be
permitted. It is as unrealistic to base the international system on the illusion that some other country or international organization can effectively lead the world as it is to depend on U.S. global leadership. Second, the international system must
Such a system could take several forms. One possibility is the
strengthening of regional security organizations, such as the Western European Union. Regional security organizations are an effective way of keeping order among member states and
include a means of checking aspiring hegemons. Regional Security Organizations
can also take care of contingencies in their general areas. Had the European countries not been so dependent on NATO, for example, the WEU should have been able to subdue the crisis in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict had been perceived
. Regional organizations could also serve as potential partners to the United States in the event of a
serious threat to their mutual interests elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, regional security organizations require a high degree of cohesion among member states and
as a wider threat to Europe
therefore are not possible in many parts of the world. The WEU is probably the only such organization that is viable in the near future, although effective regional security organizations encompassing some Latin American and Asian countries are
not inconceivable. In much of the rest of the world, however, there is little evidence of the cohesion and common interest that would be a precondition for a functioning regional security organization. Spheres of Influence An alternative to
regional security organizations is the creation of spheres of influence. The notion of spheres of influence has in the past carried a rather sinister connotation and could still be troublesome if a dominant regional power sought to subvert its
neighbors, especially if it subsequently aspired to challenge other major powers. But as long as dominant powers restrict their activities to typical "great power" behavior--which would generally mean shoring up security and prestige but not
expansionism--there is nothing inherently evil about spheres of influence. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have pointed out the feasibility of spheres of influence. Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California has written,
Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we
should, as Charles William Maynes has argued in Foreign Policy, encourage a policy of "regional self-reliance [that] would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role." In other words, we must
accept the reality of the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence--a tradition that we scrupulously insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe Doctrine. [61] Spheres of influence make sense because the
world's major powers have an interest in, and usually the ability to maintain a degree of order in, their regions. There is always some risk that the leading power in a particular sphere of influence may abuse its position or develop expansionist
The decentralization of international power, however, should ensure that the United States, other major
powers, or regional security organizations--acting alone or in concert--could check unacceptable behavior on
the part of a dominant regional power. Balance of Power Yet another alternative is the establishment of regional balance-of-power arrangements, which may be appropriate in the Middle East, for
ambitions.
example. There are serious obstacles to the creation of a viable regional security organization in that area--as demonstrated by the problems the Gulf Cooperation Council has faced--and there is no clear dominant power around which a sphere of
influence is likely to develop. Instead, the locus of power tends to shift among the larger states. The United States has in the past sought to manipulate the balance of power by bolstering certain countries as a means of checking others. That risky
strategy had disastrous consequences with respect to Iran and Iraq, and, given the unpopularity of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and those regimes' close identification with Washington, it may well backfire again. Allowing the balance of
power in the region to evolve without U.S. interference would help shield the United States from the consequences of violent and sudden shifts in the balance but could still be expected to prevent a regional hegemon from rising. As University of
Chicago political scientist Stephen M. Walt pointed out in The Origins of Alliances, Compared with the other hypotheses examined in this book, the general hypothesis that states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threat
was the clear winner. Its merits were shown in two important ways. First, balancing was far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states. Second, the importance of
ideological distinction declined as the level of threat increased; ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other. [62] The tendency of states to balance
against a prospective hegemon, instead of "bandwagoning," has been evident in the Middle East. As Walt observed, "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft . . . , the advantages of seeking
allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East. . . . the ascendancy of ambitious regional powers (such as Iraq under Nuri al-Said and Egypt under Nasser) consistently led other
regional actors to join forces . . . to resist the attempt." [63] The strategic environment of the Middle East of the 1990s remains conducive to balancing, as an assortment of similarly sized powers--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran-continue to share an interest in preventing the rise of any single power to primacy. The United States may have to tolerate a degree of instability as power shifts among those states, but American vital interests should be reasonably safe as long as
the region. If a hegemon were to arise, especially if it were clearly hostile to U.S. interests, the
United States would still have the option of acting alone or joining forces with European and other powers to
deal with that problem.
power remains diffused throughout