(Draft 20.12.06)
Equality, Priority, and Distributive Justice
Robert Huseby
The Ethics Programme and
Department of Political Science
University of Oslo
(roberthu@stv.uio.no)
Abstract
In this paper I discuss and criticize telic egalitarianism and prioritarianism. First, I
consider some of the weaknesses of egalitarianism, focusing on the leveling down
objection. In particular, I concentrate on a recent attempt to save the equality view
from the force of this objection. In addition I present a continuation of the leveling
down objection, claiming that on some versions, telic egalitarianism is even committed
to the view that it would in one respect be better if some people perished, if this would
lead to a more equal distribution. This argument, however, leans on the premise that
inequality is in it self bad. The paper also considers the merits of prioritarianism. This
view is by many thought to be superior to egalitarianism. Even so, I argue that this
principle faces problems of its own. The paper concludes with a brief defense of the
principle of sufficiency.
Equality, Priority, and Distributive Justice
1. Introduction1
Quite a few political theorists are self-professed egalitarians. Being an egalitarian
implies that one values equality between people. As has become clear over the last
decades, however, equality is in no way a straightforward concept. For instance, there
are many different things that that one might think ought to be equal. What this
equalisandum is thought to be varies a great deal. Contenders include resources,
welfare, opportunity for welfare, capabilities, and access to advantage. I will not deal
explicitly with that debate. Instead I will, in line with much of the literature discussed
in this paper simply assume that some notion of welfare is the most plausible
candidate.2 I will also abstract from the further question of whether distribution of
welfare (equal or not) ought to be conditioned by desert, merit, or responsibility.3
1
For useful comments to an earlier version, I am grateful to Simon Birnbaum, Alexander Cappelen,
Cornelius Cappelen, Eli Feiring, Andreas Føllesdal, Jon Hovi, Raino Malnes, Thomas Pogge, Peter
Strandbrink, Dag Einar Thorsen, Jörgen Ödalen, Gerhard Øverland, and Jonathan Wolff.
2
The choice of equalisandum is always a controversial issue. For further motivation of welfarism, see
Robert Huseby (2006) “Defending the Principle of Sufficiency”, unpublished manuscript. Note however
that good cases can be made also for other equalisandums, such as for instance resources or capabilities.
For further discussions of the currency of distributive justice, see G. A. Cohen 1989. “On the Currency
2
It seems to me that distributional equality is less vital than many egalitarian writers
make it out to be. In the following, I will join ranks with those who suspect the ideal of
equality to rest on weak foundations. In the first part of this paper (Sections 2-4), I will
present some considerations that count against equality. Although these considerations
surely will fall short of being conclusive, I take them to carry enough weight to prompt
the search for alternatives. In the remainder (Sections 5-7), I will consider the principle
of priority. Prioritarianism has become a viable distributive ideal in the last years. One
of the reasons is that this principle avoids some of the most troublesome implications
of egalitarianism. I will argue that priority is nevertheless also problematic. It should
be mentioned that the rejection of equality and priority presented here forms the
negative part of a defense of sufficiency. Although I will not say very much about
sufficiency in this paper, it is this principle that to me seems the best ideal for
distributive justice.4 I provide a brief account of the principle in the last section.
2. Equality
In the following I will discuss equality as it has been developed and elaborated by
(among others) Derek Parfit and Larry Temkin. On this view, equality is concerned
with how individuals compare with each other in certain respects. According to Parfit,
egalitarians accept the
(1) Principle of equality: It is in itself bad if some people are worse off than others.5
of Egalitarian Justice” Ethics 99 (1989): 906-944, Ronald Dworkin “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality
of Resources”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345.
3
See Elisabeth Anderson “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337, Richard J.
Arneson “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism” Ethics 110 (2000): 339-349, G. A. Cohen “On the
Currency of Egalitarian Justice” Ethics 99 (1989): 906-944, Samuel Scheffler “What is Egalitarianism?”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003): 5-39, Larry Temkin “Egalitarianism Defended” Ethics 113
(2003a): 764-782.
4
Huseby (2006).
5
Derek Parfit “Equality and Priority” Ratio X (1997): 202-221, 204. Note that Parfit himself rejects
equality in favor of priority.
3
This principle defines telic egalitarianism. Telic egalitarianism holds that unequal
outcomes are in one respect bad. If two or more persons or groups enjoy different
levels of welfare, then this is bad in some respect even when no one has deliberatively,
or even causally, brought the situation about, and even if no person suffers or
experiences any sense of loss. This is opposed to deontic egalitarianism. The latter
rejects the above principle, and value equality for some “other moral reason”.6
According to deontic egalitarianism, an outcome is not good or bad in itself regardless
of how it was brought about. The outcome is bad if it was produced in the wrong way,
for instance through unequal treatment. I will be concerned only with telic
egalitarianism.7
In addition, equality is often thought to be intrinsically valuable, in the sense that it
is valuable beyond the extent to which it serves to promote other goals.8 It is easy to
see how equality may be non-instrumentally valuable in certain situations. For
instance, it may serve to dampen the potential for conflict over resources between
different groups, or it may serve to secure the foundations for distributional schemes
within political collectives. Nevertheless, such positive side-effects are essentially
contingent, and on the view I am discussing here, equality is valuable even in the
absence of any fortunate consequences.
Equality is also said to be impersonally valuable. This implies that one outcome
may be superior, in one respect, to another, even if no person in the first outcome is
6
Parfit (1997):207.
7
See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen Lippert-Rasmussen ”The Insignificance of the Distinction between
Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism”, Paper presented at a conference on egalitarianism in Copenhagen
August 21-22, accessed online at: http://trappe13.dynamicweb.dk/Default.asp?ID=188 (2004),
Dennis McKerlie, (1996): “Equality” Ethics 106 (1996): 274-296, and Parfit (1997) for further
discussions of deontic and telic egalitarianism.
8
Parfit (1997), Temkin (2003a), Larry Temkin “Equality, Priority, or What?” Economics and
Philosophy 19 (2003b): 61-87.
4
better off than any person in the latter. Equality can have value independently from the
value it may have for any individual person.9
It is common among egalitarians, however, to accept that there are also other moral
values, for instance utility, that are important, and that these sometimes conflict with
the value of equality.10 Theories that combine equality with other ideals may be
labeled pluralist egalitarian theories.
In spite of the fact that equality has received vast attention from political theorists
and philosophers, Parfit suggests that many egalitarian writings are implicitly more
concerned with sufficiency or priority, than with equality proper.11 Consider the
following societies:12
Society 1: This society is egalitarian. Resources are inadequate, but evenly distributed. As a
result, everyone is starving to death.
Society 2: This society is inegalitarian. Resources are ample. No one starves. Everyone,
including the worst off individuals, have at least some leisure time, and some resources to
spare so that they can engage in personal projects.
If we had to choose between these two societies, we would probably go for the latter,13
even though the first is completely egalitarian. Taken alone, however, the principle of
equality would prefer 1. The fact that strict egalitarianism would favor situations
marked by equality over situations marked by inequality, even if all persons are better
off in the latter situation, is widely referred to as the leveling down objection.14
9
Temkin (2003a).
10
Parfit (1997), Temkin (2003a), Jonathan Wolff “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998): 97-122.
11
Parfit (1997).
12
The example is highly inspired by Harry Frankfurt “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Ethics 98 (1987): 21-
43.
13
See Roger Crisp “Equality, Priority, and Compassion” Ethics 113 (2003a): 745-763.
14
Crisp (2003a), Parfit (1997).
5
The leveling down objection is not restricted to situations in which the worst off
actually suffer. Although it may be thought to have particular salience in such cases, it
is also problematic in other circumstances. Compare society 2 with:
Society 3: This society is egalitarian. Resources are adequate and evenly distributed.
Everyone enjoys a minimally sufficient level of welfare, equivalent to the worst off in 2.
In this case as well, the leveling down objection holds that it would be absurd to
consider 3 to be preferable to 2, since in 2 no one is worse off, but some are far better
off.
The force of the leveling down objection is surely recognized by contemporary
egalitarians. Parfit and Temkin, for instance, argue that the objection can be met if
egalitarians allow for other values, such as utility or efficiency. On this view, society 2
is preferable to both 1 and 3 because the amount of utility is so much greater in 2 (or so
we can assume) that it outweighs the greater equality in 1 and 3.15 This admission is,
besides being reasonable, thought to take the edge off the leveling-down objection.
Even though egalitarians would prefer society 2 to societies 1 and 3 all things
considered, many would concede, as Temkin does, that there is one sense in which
both 1 and 3 is better than 2. On such a view, 1 and 3 are better than 2 in respect of
being equal. That is, 1 and 3 are better in virtue of their equality, although worse in
virtue of their inferior utility. Initially, this idea is plausible enough. Most people
would accept that one solution may be preferable, all things considered, even though
an alternative solution may be superior in one particular respect.
Even so, one may doubt that equality considered by itself makes a situation superior
in any respect to an alternative situation in which no one is actually worse off.
According to Crisp, this very claim counts heavily against egalitarianism. The reason,
he says, is that things that are “independent of the welfare of individuals” cannot be
15
Parfit (1997), Temkin (2003a).
6
morally salient.16 In leveling down situations, some are made worse off, while no one
is made better off. Crisp denies that there can be any respect in which such a situation
can be better.
Note that the problem posed by the leveling down objection is general. If leveling
down is not in any respect good, then equality is not in any respect good (unless
defined contingently). In order to establish that the mere relation between the welfare
of different individuals or groups matters morally in itself, rather than the absolute
level of welfare of either group, the egalitarian needs to claim that equality matters
impersonally. If it wasn’t for this claim, egalitarians would have no way of ever
preferring a situation of equality over any situation of inequality even when the total
utility level is the same.
3. Can Leveling Down be Defended?
If equality must be impersonally valuable in order to be valuable at all, then it rests on
dubious grounds. And this, then, is not dependent on the leveling down objection. The
objection only serves to highlight the implausibility of the view. To see this consider
the argument presented by Campbell Brown.17 Although Brown rejects the leveling
down objection, I think his grounds for doing so can just as well be utilized in rejecting
egalitarianism.
Brown wants argue that the leveling down objection fails. To this end he starts with
the following question: What is it for something to be better in a respect? He suggests
a comparison with two cricket players, Pollock and Cairns, and says that although
Pollock is a better bowler, Cairns is a better all-round player, all things considered. If
we imagine that as far as these players’ hypothetical twins (Pollock* and Cairns*) are
concerned, bowling prowess is the only relevant difference, (that is, difference in any
16
Crisp (2003a): 747. Crisp calls this The Welfarist Restriction. Fully stated it goes like this: “[i]n
choices affecting neither the number nor the identities of future people, any feature of an outcome O that
results in any individual in that outcome being (undeservedly) worse off than in some alternative
outcome P cannot count in favor of O, except to the extent that another in O might be made (not
undeservedly) better off” (Crisp 2003a:747-8).
17
Campbell Brown “Giving Up Levelling Down” Economics and Philosophy 19 (2003): 111-134.
7
“all-rounder-making respects”), between the two. He then stipulates that there are no
more than two respects of this kind: “bowling prowess and batting prowess”.18
My proposal is that in order to see what the claim that Pollock is better than Cairns in
respect of bowling prowess comes to, we need to entertain these three propositions: (a)
Pollock* and Pollock do not differ in respect of bowling prowess; (b) Cairns* and Cairns
do not differ in respect of bowling prowess; and (c) Pollock* and Cairns* do not differ in
respect of batting prowess. Given (a), (b), and (c), Pollock is better than Cairns, in respect
of bowling prowess, just in case Pollock* is better than Cairns*, all things considered. In
this way, we can analyse an in-a-respect betterness claim by reducing it to a
(counterfactual) all-things-considered betterness claim.19
When applying such reduction to the leveling down scenario, we must stipulate two
hypothetical states A* and B* which do not differ in any respect other than the respect
of equality. All other possibly relevant aspects, such as total welfare or utility are equal
for A* and B*.20
Browns example has the following features: In situation A group x have a welfare
level of 10, while group y has a welfare level of 2 (A10/2). In (leveled down) situation
B, both groups have a welfare level of 1 (B1/1). Situation A* is equal to A (A*10/2),
while in B* both groups have a welfare of 6 (B*6/6). Thus, A* and B* are equal in all
relevant respects (in this case total utility) except the respect of equality. The purpose,
of course is to underline that B is, in fact better in one respect than A, because, if all
other relevant respects were neutralized then B* would be better than A*, all things
considered. Therefore, it is not implausible to argue that B is in one respect better than
A. In addition, Brown argues that denying that B is in any respect better than A, is
equivalent to denying that B* is in any respect better than A*. This leads him to
conclude that
18
Brown (2003): 115.
19
Brown (2003): 115.
20
Brown (2003): 122.
8
if there is disagreement over A* and B*, then we need not bother with A and B; all the
leveling down business becomes quite redundant. For, if it was false that B* was better
than A*, all things considered, then that in itself would be perfectly sufficient grounds for
rejecting egalitarianism; hence there would be no point in considering what the right thing
to say about A and B was.21
There is nevertheless reason to doubt whether this reduction of sentences really tells us
much more than we already knew. There is no question that more equality obtains in
1/1 than in 12/2. No one could deny that. Therefore, it seems also to be true that it is
correct in a certain sense, to say that 1/1 is better than 12/2 with respect to equality. I
do not think that proponents of the leveling down objection in general are unable to
agree that some object x can be better than another object y in respect of r. Instead,
what they would argue is that the leveling down objection brings out the weak
foundations that equality rests upon.
What Brown’s argument does bring out with clarity is that the problem, if any,
revealed by the leveling down objection goes all the way down. It is a general
problem. Arguing that there is no respect in which 1/1 is better than 12/2 is equivalent
to saying that there is no respect in which 6/6 is better than 2/12. But this is true, of
course, only so long as the respect in question remains the respect of equality. One
might perfectly well agree that 6/6 is preferable to 12/2, but this need not entail that the
reason is that 6/6 is more equal. One might think, for instance that in 6/6 the half who
increased their share (from 2) benefits more than the half who got their share reduced
(from 12) suffered. But this is a contingent matter. Here equality is instrumentally
valuable in a way that it would not be in 12/2 versus 1/1.
What Brown underlines, in essence, is that 1/1 is more equal in distribution than
12/2. He does not show that there is a respect in which 1/1 is better than 12/2. In order
to show this, it seems, he must show that equality (in distribution) is intrinsically
valuable. If there is more x in A than in B, then this does not imply that A is better than
B. And this further, and vital, argument is still missing. To compare: If God one day
21
Brown (2003): 124.
9
removed all the colors in the world except green, there would be no denying that more
green would obtain in the world. The world would, in one sense, be better in respect of
greenness. One might of course try to argue that Green World is better than Ordinary
World, but that would require a justification for the goodness of green. The crucial
question of course, is whether greenness is in fact good. The same goes for equality. If
equality is intrinsically and impersonally valuable, 1/1 is in one respect better than
2/12 (and 49/50 for that matter). Throughout his analysis, Brown actually presupposes
that equality is good. If he is correct, then he is correct all the way down. If he is not,
on the other hand, he is wrong all the way down. If equality is not intrinsically
valuable, then 6/6 is no better than 2/12 for reasons of equality. Brown seems to deny
this. He assumes that to the extent that we would prefer 6/6 to 2/12, we are more or
less committed to the view that there is some respect in which 1/1 is better than 2/12.
But this need not be the case. We might have instrumental reasons to prefer an equal
situation E to an unequal situation U that has nothing to do with equality as such, and
that does not commit us to the view that any situations in which equality obtains is in
one respect better than any situation in which equality does not obtain. If it is the case,
for instance, that the level of sufficiency is located above 2, but below 6, the principle
of sufficiency would clearly say that 6/6 is better than 2/12.
4. The Wiping Out Objection
The real question remains of course. Is equality in distribution important at all?
Compare the welfare of two societies. These societies occupy Parfit’s “divided world”.
This means that they are separated and now nothing about each others’ existence.
(a) Half at 100, Half at 200,
and
(b) Both at 150,
In order to focus on the right issue here, remember that the total amount of utility in 4
and 6 are roughly the same, so that no society is superior to the other on that score. The
10
sole difference between the two is that 6 is egalitarian and 4 is not. In both societies all
persons have a sufficient amount of resources to lead a decent and worthwhile life.
(Assume that the level of sufficiency is well below 100.) No one’s existence is at stake,
and no important needs are unmet. Is 6 morally preferable to 4? Many egalitarians
would claim that this is the case. To them, equality is intrinsically valuable.
Those who hold 6 to be preferable to 4 must answer why, when everyone has
enough of what is important, it would be better in itself that everyone had equally
much of it. Clearly, no reference to needs or basic resources is appropriate in order to
answer this question. No one lacks anything that is vital to lead a decent life. It is the
fact that inequality obtains that must be explained to be bad. Temkin argues that
concern for equality is best seen as a part of a concern for “fairness that focuses on
how people fare relative to others”.22 It is thus the relation between A and B that makes
a situation bad with respect to equality.
Why is there anything bad about your being better off than me in some relevant
respect? It is certainly not clear to me that this is the case. And as long as it is not clear,
then I have no ground to think it bad that you are better off than me. And if I have no
such ground then I have certainly not any grounds for claiming compensation from you
because you are better off. If I had no complaints before you came along, then I should
have no complaints after.
Remember that situations marked by inequality may be bad even if the inequality is
not bad in itself. But any reason other than that equality is intrinsically bad, are
instrumental reasons. Such reasons say that inequality is bad because it has bad effects
for some people. And if so, it is not really inequality that is bad, but the effects. Thus,
if these effects could be removed without equalization, inequality would stop being
bad.
Pluralism or not, it is quite hard to get a hold on egalitarianism. If inequality is bad
in some respect, even if everybody’s situation is improved, and even if the relevant
groups are oblivious as to each other’s existence, then it is hard to see why inequality
is bad. In 4 something is bad. If the better-off group in 4 did not exist, then everything
22
Temkin (2003a):
11
would be fine. This means that if I am the only person on earth, and I am perfectly
happy, having everything I need, and no complaints about anything, there is nothing
wrong, at least as far as equality is concerned. But if suddenly, without my knowledge,
another creature comes into existence on another continent, or even in another part of
the galaxy, and this creature is even better-off than me, even happier, and even more
content, then something bad comes into existence. This sounds quite strange. One
reason it sounds strange is that there is nothing about me or my condition that is
changed. I have no knowledge about this other creature, and we stand in no relation to
each other whatsoever.
And since the badness of inequality does not hang on any change in my condition, it
seems that it would be hard to distinguish between egalitarianism relating to features
that are not part of my condition. Remember that something can be bad without it
being bad for me, it is simply bad in itself, independently and beyond any effects it
may have on me or anyone else. If this is so, it is hard to see why inequality is only bad
in select spaces. If we argue, say, that as far as equality goes, welfare is what matters.
Why should only inequality of welfare be taken as intrinsically bad if it is bad for no
one in particular? Why shouldn’t also inequalities of resources be bad, insofar as it
occurs, when it is also an inequality that is not bad for any one in particular? How
about inequality in height or color, or the number of stars versus the number of
planets? Temkin, of course, rejects this. And he may be right in doing so. But it is not
obvious how to draw the line here, and it seems that some explanations are missing.
And further, even if the leveling down objection does not serve to refute
egalitarianism, then it might be worthwhile to consider the Wiping Out Objection to
equality. Let us start with the premise that inequality is bad in itself, independently and
beyond the extent to which it is bad for anyone. Call this the principle of the Intrinsic
Impersonal Badness of Inequality (BI). This principle states that inequality is bad, and
that it has negative moral value. The BI principle has at least two connected
implications;
12
1 A state of affairs marked by inequality is, in this respect bad, regardless of what other
properties the state of affairs might have.
2 Of two states of affairs, marked by different levels of inequality, that state of affairs with
the highest level of inequality is the worse one, as far as inequality is concerned.
The leveling down objection seems to leave people with conflicting intuitions. The
purpose of introducing the wiping out objection is primarily to press things a bit
further, in order to see whether this would help us to reach a firmer conclusion.
The BI holds that there is something wrong with the following situation:
(c) Group A at 250, group B at 240
even though both groups are well beyond the level of sufficiency which is located
somewhere below 100. Indeed, both groups are just fine, even happy. In addition they
populate Parfit’s divided world. They have no clue as to each other’s existence, and
there is no possible way in which A could distribute a small part of its resources (or
welfare) to the slightly worse off in B. Thus, the inequality in question, and its inherent
badness, is bad in a strictly intrinsic and impersonal way.
Suppose then, that a big meteor falls from the sky and wipes out all traces of Group
A, without causing any problems for B. Half the population of the earth is gone. Is this
situation better in any respect than the situation that obtained before the meteor
crashed? It seems that egalitarians are committed to think so. And there is no reason
not to make it even worse. If we rewind and alter the story somewhat, we could
imagine a giant meteor that wipes out both groups, and thus the entire population of
the world. There is now less inequality than there used to be. Egalitarians are
committed to the odd idea that there is one respect in which it would be better if a
meteor destroyed all human life. Less dramatically, of course, we could imagine a
range of other factors, for instance a highly contagious disease, causing either group or
both to perish. Although, of course, no egalitarian would want this all things
considered, I take the objection to count against the view.
13
The wiping out objection might strike some as implausible. First, it assumes not
only that equality has value, but that inequality has disvalue (BI).23 Second, some
would perhaps argue with Temkin that human beings are not only the objects of moral
concern, but also the source of such concern. And since an empty world obviously has
no humans in it to be sources of moral concern, one might object that an empty world
cannot be better than an unequal but inhabited one. And of course, this sounds
plausible enough, but it does not seem to refute the objection. First, even if the
objection was valid, it would only serve to refute the example in which the entire
population is wiped out, not the example where only half the population suffers a
brutal fate. Second, the BI does not depend on there being any humans left in the
world, since it assumes that it is good if less badness (inequality) obtains.
If, on the other hand, someone claimed that an empty world would in one respect be
better because more equality obtained, then we could plausibly argue that no positive
value can exist in an empty world if it is true that human beings are the source of moral
concern. But to say that an empty world has less disvalue in one respect, than a
populated unequal world, seems to be true, given the premises.
It might also be objected that the same argument goes for all other impersonal
disvalues. This sounds true so let us assume that slavery is impersonally and
intrinsically bad, and has moral disvalue. A world in which slavery obtains, then, must
be in some respect worse than a world wiped out by a giant meteor. An empty world
lacks the disvalue that obtains in slave societies. But note two things. First, slavery
seems unambiguously bad, while inequality seems bad only sometimes. And when it
does, this is usually explainable with reference to other values. It does not seem totally
unreasonable to argue that an empty world is in one respect superior to a world marked
by intense and wide-spread suffering. Second, slavery is easily explainable in terms of
personal disvalue. We do not have to (although we may) assume that slavery is bad
independently and beyond the extent to which it is bad for slaves (and perhaps for
slave-owners, in some sense), in order to see that it is bad. Perhaps slavery is only
personally bad. Either way, it seems that much less hangs on this distinction in the case
23
McKerlie (1996), Parfit (1997).
14
of slavery than in the case of inequality. The reason, of course, is that inequality, when
it obtains between groups that are well off and know nothing about each other, is not
bad for anyone, and that is exactly why one wonders why it is bad at all.
We should also note that a similar objection may be mounted against the sufficiency
view. According to sufficientarians, it is bad if someone is not sufficiently well off.
Imagine then a world in which billions are happy and an unfortunate handful of
individuals are insufficiently well off. It is bad that these people are not sufficiently
well off. In an empty world, this badness would not obtain, so there is one sense in
which an empty world is better than a world in which billions are happy and a few are
insufficiently well off. This conclusion is perfectly acceptable. It is bad not to be
sufficiently well off. In an empty world this badness would not occur. Similar
hypothetical judgments could be made for all things that are bad. Joe’s toothache is
bad. In an empty world this badness would not obtain. We prefer, of course, a
populated world in which Joe’s tooth ache, but it is unproblematic to judge it as bad.
The same is not true of inequality between happy, well-off people that are unaware of
each others’ existence and the (slight) discrepancy between their levels of welfare.
5. Prioritarianism
The leveling down objection has for many been the main obstacle to accepting
egalitarianism. Because of this, several attempts have been made at circumventing it.
As mentioned, pluralism is one way of doing this (Temkin). Another strategy is to
argue that equality is only valuable if achieving it is Pareto-optimal (Mason).
Alternatively, one could argue that leveling down is not absurd (Temkin, Brown), or
that we should only level up (Casal). These strategies differ in one important respect.
Some avoid the implications of leveling down completely, while others accept, them
and argue that these implications are less implausible than many think. I think both
strategies are problematic. If equality is intrinsically and impersonally valuable, it is
hard to see why it is only valuable in cases not involving leveling down. And accepting
leveling down is implausible for the reasons given above.
15
However, prioritarianism provides a solution. Prioritarianism should not be seen
however, as merely a way of avoiding the leveling down objection. It is an
independent principle in its own right. But it does provide what many egalitarians want
from a distributive principle, without falling prey to the leveling down objection
Prioritarianism was singled out as a philosophically viable alternative to equality by
Derek Parfit in his Lindley Lectures. There he formulated the following principle.
(2) The Principle of priority: Benefiting people matters more the worse off these people
are.24
This principle leaves some important questions open. For instance, how much priority
should be given to the worse off? On some versions, the worse off have absolute
priority. In that case, benefits to the worse off (regardless of whether the worse off are
well off or not) outweighs any gains, however large, to any number of people on
higher welfare levels.25 Other versions hold that the size of the gains and the number of
people receiving them is relevant. In the following I will take account of only this
latter version. In the following I will set aside absolute prioritarianism. This principle
is clearly implausible. One reason is that it demands that the worst off person should
always be prioritized regardless of how resources could be used to benefit others who
are also badly off in absolute terms. If the worst off-person for some reason is very
inefficient in converting resource into welfare, then huge amounts of resources would
nevertheless have to be extended to him even if his welfare level increases only
slightly as a result, and even if many others could improve their welfare substantially
had they gotten the resources instead.
As noted by Parfit, the principle of priority presupposes a rejection of equality in
order not to be reducible to it. Any egalitarian would agree to (3), because following a
24
Parfit 1995, Bertil Tungodden “The Value of Equality” Economics and Philosophy 19 (2003): 1-44,
24. This formulation differs from (1) and (2) in that it is ambiguous as to how to rank social outcomes.
25
See Crisp (2003a).
16
policy of prioritizing the worst off leads naturally to equality. 26 But since prioritarians
do not believe that equality is intrinsically valuable, they must think that prioritizing
the worst off is important for “other reasons.”27
The similarities between priority and sufficiency are also striking. Many
sufficientarians would also accept (3), in all situations where the worst off are
insufficiently well off. Prioritarians, however, tend to reject any sufficiency line as a
natural cut-off point for moral concern.
Prioritarianism holds that “…everything else being equal, an outcome in which a
benefit falls at a lower level is intrinsically better than an outcome in which an equal
benefit falls at a higher level.”28 This means that the moral value of a benefit of a given
size diminishes with the increasing welfare level of the person who receives it. In this
sense, benefits are weighted, such that they have a diminishing marginal moral value.
As a principle for ranking outcomes, Holtug suggests
(3) Overall Outcome Welfare Prioritarianism. An outcome is intrinsically better, the larger
a sum of weighted benefits it contains, where benefits are weighted such that they gain
greater value, the worse off the individual to whom they accrue.29
What is still unclear is at what rate the moral value is discounted. Holtug’s not
unreasonable assumption is that “…moral outcome value is a strictly concave function
of welfare…”30
26
Marc Fleurbaey “Equality versus Priority. How Useful is the Distinction?” (2001) Typescript,
accessed online at
http://mora.rente.nhh.no/projects/EqualityExchange/Manuscripts/tabid/57/Default.aspx. Fleurbaey,
2001, p. 6-7.
27
Parfit (1995): 22, cited in Tungodden (2003): 24.
28
Nils Holtug “Prioritarianism” (2005): 10. Typescript, accessed online at
http://www.fpr.ku.dk/Files/Filer/egalitarismandpluralism/Prioritarianism_Holtug.pdf#search=%22nils%20holtug%.
29
Holtug (2005): 12.
30
Holtug (2005): 13. There could of course be alternatives to this view.
17
Either way, weighted prioritarianism31 allows for the possibility that larger gains at
a higher level of welfare, outweighs smaller gains at a lower level. It is commonly
assumed that sufficientarianism (and absolute prioritarianism) does not.32 In fact, one
of prioritarianism’s main bones of contention with the sufficiency view is that the latter
would prefer even the tiniest gain to a person who is insufficiently well off, to the most
enormous gain to many that are already well off.
6. Some Objections to Prioritarianism
Prioritarianism includes several appealing features. Nevertheless, I think that there are
some important considerations that count against it. First, there are some well-known
intuitive objections. Why should a benefit to the very well off morally matter more
than a benefit to the extremely well off? Sometimes prioritarians argue that since the
moral value of benefits is concave, the moral weight of a benefit to the very well off is
only marginally weightier than similar benefits to the extremely well off. Since this
difference is so small, it is hard to detect by way of intuition.33 Casal discusses several
responses to the objection that differences between the very well and the extremely
well off are unimportant. Her “least conciliatory response” is that
…it is simply not true that we are completely indifferent to inequalities among wealthy
individuals. For example, whenever there is an earthquake or some other tragedy, most
think that it is the wealthiest that ought to make the greatest donation. Sufficientarians
cannot explain such plausible convictions.34
I am not convinced that this objection is widespread. At least not in the upper ranges.
When there is an earthquake we tend to think that all those with available resources
31
Since this is the only version I consider in this paper, the qualifier “weighted” will be dropped.
32
I discuss this further below.
33
Holtug (2005).
34
See Paula Casal “Why Sufficiency is not Enough”, (2006) Typescript accessed at
http://mora.rente.nhh.no/projects/EqualityExchange/Portals/0/articles/Casal%20Why%20Sufficiency%2
0Is%20Not%20Enough%20Ethics%20Final%20DraftCasal.pdf.
18
should pitch in. It is not obvious to that Bill Gates ought to donate more than, say,
Donald Trump. But it is true of both these persons that they have enough resources to
donate a substantial amount without suffering important losses, and without
jeopardizing their welfare. It may also be true that we can make the judgment that the
better off people are, the more they have to spare, without making the judgment that
benefits to the very well off have more moral weight than benefits to the extremely
well off.
Further, if it is really true that benefits carry moral weight also when given to the
very well off, it is also true that many such benefits are more important than fewer
benefits further down the line. If, by some turn of events we have to choose between
giving a substantial benefit to each of many very well off people, or give the same
benefit to someone who is insufficiently well off, we might be forced to benefit those
who are very well off. This seems to be the wrong conclusion. Similarly, since
prioritarianism is said to be a non-relational concept, we might even have to conclude
that it would be better to give a large benefit to the best-off person in the world, than a
much smaller, but non-trivial benefit to the worst-off person in the world. To me it
seems wrong to assign moral weight in this way to benefits to the very well off. And it
further seems hard to come up with convincing reasons why there is moral value in
such benefits, and what could justify that this value sometimes outweigh the value of
important benefits to those who are really badly off. This objection, to be sure, implies
some form of lexical priority to the worst off. Many people shy away from lexical
principles, and I cannot here argue in favor of it. It should be noted, however, that I
think such a principle could be justified.
Second, it seems to be implausible not to place any special emphasis on those who
are insufficiently well off. Egalitarians may accommodate this through a pluralist
account, but the same is not true of prioritarians. Prioritarians agree that more weight
should be given to those who are worse off, but this is true regardless of whether the
worse off are badly of or very well off.
Third, prioritarianism is extremely implausible when applied to difference-sized
populations. Derek Parfit has argued that if we value both the quality and the quantity
19
of welfare, we may be forced to accept what he calls the repugnant conclusion.
Consider two different sized-populations. In A many people lead very good lives. In B
there are more people, but their lives are merely good. The problem is that if the
population in B is large enough, it will be regarded as better than A. This may not
seem unreasonable at first, but the problem is that for any population X there will exist
an alternative possible population Y which is judged better than X even though the
quality of life is lower than X. The reason is that the population in Y is bigger or much
bigger. The combined quality and quantity of Y outweighs the quality and quantity of
X. At the end of the scales we find population Z which is extremely large, but in which
people’s lives are barely worth living. By transitivity, Z is preferable to A, in which
much fewer people lead very good lives. Many agree with Parfit that this conclusion is
repugnant.
Now consider overall outcome welfare prioritarianism. This theory holds that
outcomes ought to be judged on the basis of the moral value of the benefits that exist in
them. This theory, then, does not only imply the repugnant conclusion, it practically
embraces it. Since this form of prioritarianism gives extra weight to benefits lower
down on the scale, it would judge outcome Z to be superior to A more readily than
Parfit’s quality/quantity view would do. This objection counts heavily against the
view.
There is however, also another sense in which Prioritarianism does a poor job with
regards to the repugnant conclusion. Utilitarianism values welfare. If a person has a
negative welfare level, then he or she only counts negatively in the utility calculus.
That’s why, in Parfit’s population Z, people have lives barely worth living, and lives
that are barely worth living are still worth living. On Prioritarianism however, what
counts are weighted benefits. It seems clear that people with lives that are definitely
not worth living could still have benefits. Say for instance that a person is in constant
severe pain, and for this and other (by stipulation sufficient) reasons, has a life not
worth living. If we give this person strong painkillers, this must surely count as a
benefit to that person even if her life is still not worth living. We could imagine that
her life simply is closer to being worth living when she has painkillers, than when she
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does not have them. This means that for Prioritarianism, outcome sub-Z, in which an
extremely large population in extreme pain with access to painkillers that ease this pain
to a certain extent35 is better than population A in which quite many people lead very
good lives. Prioritarianism thus entails the extremely repugnant conclusion. This
conclusion should worry even those who doubt that the repugnant conclusion is
repugnant.
It would be possible of course, for prioritarians to argue that only benefits at a
positive welfare level counts. But this would go against the grain of the whole idea
behind it. Unlike utilitarianism, Prioritarianism aims at benefiting the worse off, and
that’s why benefits to the worse off matter more morally. It would be implausible to
hold a prioritarian view that denied the value of benefits to those who are the worst off
of all, namely those with lives not worth living.
7. Maximin
There are different versions of prioritarianism however. One well-known variant is the
maximin principle. In its traditional Rawlsian guise, this principle is a distributive
principle regulating the workings of the basic structure of a domestic society.
Institutions ought to be designed so as to allow differences in resource levels (basic
goods) only to the extent that this would lead to a better position for the worst off.36
It is perfectly possible however to construe the maximin principle in telic terms.
(4) It is better, the better off the worst off person is.
35
We can assume that in this situation people are unable or unwilling (for some conscientious reason) to
kill themselves.
36
For recent discussions of the maximin as a prioritarian principle of distributive justice, see Casal
(2006), and Thomas Pogge “Can the Capability Approach be Justified” (2006) Typescript accessed at
http://mora.rente.nhh.no/projects/EqualityExchange/Portals/0/articles/pogge1.pdf
21
In order to bring this principle into line with the ones discussed above, we could hold
that better off means, again, better off in terms of welfare. On this principle, resources
should be distributed in a way that maximizes the position of the worst off.
Unless conditioned or weighted, the maximin is a lexical principle involving the
same implausible implications as was discussed above. If, on the other hand, it is
weighted, problems of aggregation occur. It seems that prioritarianism is caught
between a rock and a hard place. It is implausible whether or not it allows
aggregation.37
Leaving the issues of lexicality and aggregation aside, however, there are still some
problems facing the maximin. First, the principle is insensitive to distribution above
the minimal level. Of course, the mere fact that the position of the worst off is to be as
good as possible, puts some constraints on the range of actual permissible
distributions, but it does not limit the range of possible permissible distributions.
Second, the principle is agnostic between the following two distributions. In the
first, one person is extremely badly off, while billions are very well off. In the second,
billions are as badly off as the single person in the first distribution and one person is
as well off as the billions in the first distribution.
Third, if the billions in the second distribution are slightly better off than the worst
off in the first distribution, then maximin actually prefers the second distribution even
if almost everyone is insufficiently well off whereas almost everyone are sufficiently
well off in the first distribution.
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have critically examined the principles of equality and priority as
distributive ideals. I have argued that both principles face severe problems. This
suggests that we have reason to consider alternatives. In my view, sufficiency stands
37
Note that the same is true, to a certain extent, of sufficientarianism. In my view, however, the problem
is nevertheless manageable on the sufficiency view, because aggregation is disallowed above the
sufficiency threshold.
22
out as a viable candidate. Sufficiency has throughout figured as a more or less implicit
challenge to equality and priority. I will here briefly suggest some of its virtues.
First, sufficiency, unlike equality, focuses on people’s level of welfare, not on how
their welfare levels compare to others. Second, it provides, unlike prioritarianism, a
cut-off point for moral concern. The principle assesses distributions in terms of total
weighted negative discrepancies from the sufficiency threshold. In other words, telic
sufficiency holds that it is bad if some individuals are insufficiently well off, and the
worse the more individuals are insufficiently well off, and worse the further
individuals are from the sufficiency threshold. Outcomes are morally evaluated only in
relation to the badness of shortfalls.
Sufficiency is a modest principle, in the sense that it is indifferent between all
distributions in which all individuals are sufficiently well off. Even though this may
strike defenders of other telic theories as a flaw, in my view it is a virtue, because it
leaves adequate room for deontic morality. In fact, it is a natural corollary to deontic
morality. It gives sense to the idea that we have moral obligations to aid those that are
insufficiently well off, even when we are not responsible for this fact. Many people
share this view, but it is not always explicated as a telic part of morality. And if it is, it
is not always combined with deontic restrictions.38 It is further reasonable to assume
that in many ways it corresponds to positive duties. It also corresponds to the idea that
positive duties are weaker than negative ones, and that some positive duties are
nevertheless morally authoritative.
This correspondence can be explained in the following manner. Negative duties are
duties not to harm. This generally holds at any level of well-being for the harmed
person. One is not allowed to hit a person even if he enjoys a high welfare level. The
opposite is not true of positive duties. We are not obligated to increase the welfare
level of someone whose welfare level is already high. Thus, we have strict duties not to
steal minor goods from giant stores, but no duty to share our lottery prize with our
sufficiently well off neighbour, even though owners of giant stores are often very well
38
That said, I claim no originality in explicating this idea. I think however, that this view merits further
specification.
23
off, while our neighbour is (I assume) not, and even though our minor theft is close to
imperceptible to the store-owner, while our potential benefit to our neighbour would be
huge. We should however, benefit (with or without lottery prizes) those who are
insufficiently well off, in particular those are the furthest from the threshold. The
world’s poor are prime examples.
Telic sufficiency is also appealing in a further way. It places a limit on our duty to
benefit (even though in our actual world, with millions and millions living in absolute
poverty it is still demanding). A similar limit is not inherent in utilitarianism,
prioritarianism or egalitarianism. Sufficiency then, is plausible to those who think that
we should benefit the poor, but who do not think that morality demands that we always
prioritize the worse off, or that all outcomes that are unequal are unjust, or that welfare
should be maximized at all times. In short, sufficiency, in combination with standard
deontic morality is plausible to those who hold the following two views. a) It is wrong
to harm others, and b) it is bad if someone is not sufficiently well off.39
39
For a fuller account of the principle of telic sufficiency, see Huseby (2006).
24