HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORY
AND PRACTICE
Section One: Introduction and Human Rights in International Relations
Definitions of human rights (HRs)
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The rights and freedoms all humans possess by virtue of their being human – from
UN Charter.
‘those fundamental moral rights of the person that are necessary for a life with human
dignity’. (David Forsythe)
Universal and inalienable - implies they are not subject to change over time and
express the essential nature of humans.
Reflects priority of the individual over the state – irreducible worth of the individual.
What are these ‘human rights’?
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They don’t represent rights to all things ‘good’ eg HRs don’t refer to rights such as to
have a loving family and friends.
What we know of as rights are a subset of rights.
Read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) to get an idea of
these human rights.
Based on classical liberal view
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‘the good society is based on respect for the equality and autonomy of individuals’
and this respect is ensured through ‘the recognition and application of the
fundamental legal rights of the person’. (David Forsythe)
Liberalism places emphasis on personal rights.
Today HRs are enshrined in legal systems that specify which rights are considered
fundamental.
Development of HRs theory
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Some of the earliest written codes implicitly recognised needs such as freedom and
dignity:
 Hindu and Buddhist texts focus on the human condition.
 Early Confucianism talks about human virtue and compassion.
 In Western political philosophy, the recognition of equal worth of individuals was
included in early Greek and Roman thought.
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Philosophers from the 17th century further attacked religious and scientific
dogmatism, intolerance and censorship.
 Placing faith in human reason, they attempted to identify universal moral
principles that had implications for the understanding of human rights.
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The concept of natural law developed eg Grotius’ understanding of natural law
was that of a law separated from the divine – natural law was defined as a ‘dictate
of right reason’.
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John Locke in late 17th century – the idea of natural rights is perhaps best expressed
in Locke’s writings.
 According to Locke, natural law and the natural rights which flow from that law
are prior to political or social community.
 At the heart of natural law is the need to obey God, however, obedience could
only occur if man was free to act.
 Thus natural law implied that men must possess certain liberties or rights – the
rights to life, liberty and property.
 The role of government was to protect these basic rights.
 Government is produced through an act of consent by those who are governed.
 The central purpose of the establishment of the state is to protect property – this is
why men ‘enter into society’.
 But despite their universal nature, rights-holders were limited to European males
with property.
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Underlying the French and American Revolutions were the individualism and
rationalism of the theory of natural rights
 Basis of individualism – individuals assumed to exist prior to communities in the
state of nature; and moral claims of individuals had priority over groups.
 Basis of rationalism – social change can be brought about by the power of
thought. That is, reason alone, without being assisted by tradition, authority, God,
can bring about change in political life.
 American Declaration of Independence 1776
 ‘…we take these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, and
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’
 France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789
 ‘all men are born and remain free and equal in their rights.’
 Both of these were important steps in the evolution of HRs thinking – they were
attempts to enshrine such thought as guiding principles for new nations.
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Georg Hegel in 19th century – emphasised the liberty of the individual while
promoting community, elevating group rights to status of individual rights eg selfdetermination.
Attacks on 18th century idea of natural rights
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Edmund Burke 18th century – his main criticism was that an abstract notion of rights
was not relevant for politics and all its complexities. Rights should only be
interpreted as those emerging from ancient and traditional laws and liberties, such as
property rights rather than the rights of man.
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Jeremy Bentham late 18th and early 19th century – for him the theory of natural rights
was nonsense and dangerous. Men were not born free but subject to their parents,
and families and societies were unequal. Rights could rise from law, not from nature.
Karl Marx 19th century – argued that natural rights relate only to bourgeois man, not
to every man. Freedom was only possible through community.
Overall, the abstractness of HRs has been at the core of criticisms of the concept.
Development of HRs regime last century and HRs in International Relations (IR)
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There was a lack of focus on HRs in the discipline of IR throughout most of the 20th
century.
The League of Nations made no mention of HRs in its charter or documents.
The UN Charter did recognise HRs but didn’t specify them, and reaffirmed the state
sovereignty principle.
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The UN General Assembly adopted the UDHR in 1948 in response to the horrors of
WW2.
 Therefore, the UN had articles on the need to protect HRs as well as an article on
the need to respect state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs –
there has been an ongoing tension between these.
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With the adoption of the UDHR, a range of rights had been established and written
down, but there was little UN power to enforce them.
 There was no UN action in its first decade, just some reporting.
 Thus there had been an internationalisation of norms, but their implementation
and enforcement remained mostly national.
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In the mid 1970s there was an increase in activity on HRs issues.
 This was triggered by the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1973
and the violent repression that followed – UN HRs working group was set up to
investigate this in 1975.
 The UN Covenants finally entered force in 1976.
 More UN treaties; special representatives and rapporteurs were appointed.
 Election of President Carter in US meant that HRs entered mainstream foreign
policy.
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The 1980s and 90s saw a dramatic increase in numbers of non-government
organisations (NGOs) focused on HRs issues.
 And the end of the Cold War saw an increased level of international action against
gross HRs abuses, particularly genocide.
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By the 2006, 155 states had shown support for the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and 160 states for the International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR).
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But overall, only incremental improvements in international efforts had been
made in response to HRs abuses – state sovereignty in UN Charter.
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Despite HRs finding a place in the UN Charter and the UDHR and the developments
in the 1970s and 80s, IR tended to ignore the study of HRs until the late 1980s.
 Academic interests after WW2 tended to be focused on the Cold War and security
and power issues.
 There has been a focus on positivism in the discipline – political scientists
focused on issues that could be studied empirically and HRs were seen as ethical
concerns and lacking in scientific content.
 It wasn’t until the end of the 1980s that there began more of a push to teach HRs
in political science and to contribute to discussions on HR – and the end of the
Cold War changed the agenda of international politics.
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Today:
 UN HRs bodies are active to some extent.
 The International Criminal Court has been set up.
 Hundreds of international HRs NGOs and many more local NGOs are active.
 HRs have a place in the foreign policies of most liberal democratic states.
 In IR, HRs still tends to be found at the margins of the discipline.
 This reflects that the focus of IR remains primarily on states and their
governments and the high issues of security, power and war.
 HRs are not as marginal as the discipline seems to suggest. Detailed policy
and institutional mechanisms and an enormous array of NGOs and activists
exist to promote the implementation of international human rights standards –
in some cases, these have brought about human rights improvements. This is
an important focus of this course.
Ways of thinking about human rights
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Human rights can be defined and justified from both positivist and normative
perspectives.
 Positivist – individual rights are valid because of the development of binding
international treaties and conventions that give effect to these rights.
 Normative – the focus is on defining individual rights that ought to be protected
based on their moral legitimacy. These rights are considered binding independent
of international treaties and conventions – this relates to the concept of universal
human rights.
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We also need to distinguish between the formal existence of human rights, and their
material existence.
 We might consider that all humans have human rights, but they may not be able to
exercise these rights because they are not upheld by positive law in their country.
 Thus we would not say that they do not have rights, but that they have no material
rights.
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Understanding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
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The political environment in which the UDHR was drafted:
 The Cold War had not yet begun, although tensions between East and West were
increasing leading up to the UDHR being presented to the UN General Assembly
in 1948.
 The US was the clear hegemon, being the only country to still have a strong
economy at the end of the war.
 Due in part to the economic crisis brought about by WW2, an international HRs
discourse was established.
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The establishment of the UN saw a primary focus on collective security – HRs were
peripheral.
 The major powers thought that the UN would refer to a desire to promote HRs,
but had not intended to make a discussion of HRs explicit.
 After the ‘Big 3’ Allied leaders had settled on a draft UN Charter that focused on
collective security, delegates of 50 other UN members were able to have their say.
 At the UN founding conference in San Francisco in 1945, the Latin American
delegates in particular argued for much more emphasis on HRs in the Charter. As
early as 1938, at the Inter-American Conference, these countries had begun
thinking about the need for an international HRs agenda. This interest had grown
out of attempts to establish constitutional democracies in Latin America during
the 1930s and 40s. Despite the Latin American activism, however, such a
declaration of HRs failed to get enough support to be included in the UN Charter.
 At the San Francisco conference, several individuals and NGOs other than the
Latin American countries were also vocal in their support for HRs principles.
 Eg Carlos Romulo of the Philippines pushed for self-determination of colonial
peoples; Herbert Evatt of Australia pushed for the promotion of economic and
social principles, not just a focus on security; Charles Malik of Lebanon was
extremely vocal on HRs principles; and approx. 40 NGOs (most from the US)
participated.
 The final version of the UN Charter, signed June 26, included 7 references to
HRs, including provision to establish a UN Commission on HRs. Part of this
success is attributed to the US becoming more supportive of UN promotion of
HRs, no doubt influenced by the shocking images of the atrocities committed
under the Nazi regime. However, the Charter did not specify the meaning of
these rights, nor who held them, or how they would be monitored or enforced. In
addition, the Charter’s references to sovereignty guaranteed domestic jurisdiction.
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Drafting the UDHR
 There were approx. ‘250 delegates and advisors from 56 countries…accredited to
participate in the construction of the Universal Declaration.’ (Susan Waltz) Their
participation was not equal but the fact that there were so many participants in the
drafting process suggests we should look beyond the roles of the few considered
to be the authors of the draft.
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In January 1946, at the first General Assembly of the UN, a Committee of 9 was
created to make recommendations concerning an international bill of rights,
including representatives from US (Eleanor Roosevelt), France (Rene Cassin),
Belgium, China, India, Yugoslavia and USSR.
In June 1946 a Commission on HRs was established – 18 member states
appointed, including the 5 great powers and 13 members who would be rotated
every 3 years.
Petitions and claims of HRs abuses poured into the Commission in its first year,
and an argument developed within the Commission over how to enforce HRs. It
was decided that enforcement could only be decided after the bill had been
completed (and the first grievances were not heard until many years later).
Further arguments were on whether the bill would be just a declaration (Roosevelt
and US position) or a convention with treaties to be signed by states. A
compromise was reached – the declaration would be developed first, then the
convention and implementation.
There were 3 key figures in the Committee – Roosevelt (facilitated the drafting
process), Malik (Lebanese philosopher and diplomat) and Chang (Chinese
philosopher, diplomat and playwright) – as well as John Humphrey, Director of
the Secretariat’s Division on HRs, met to discuss the first draft in February 1947.
Malik and Chang were reportedly too far apart in their philosophical views to
work together on a draft, and Humphrey was asked to prepare the initial
document. Humphrey and his staff conducted a survey of all existing HRs
documents and proposals given to the UN, as well as the constitutions of most
countries. Most influential was a Panamanian document submitted to the San
Francisco conference, and a Chilean document.
Commission responses to the draft included:
 The USSR rep was opposed to the right to freedom of movement, the right to
a nationality, the right to give asylum to refugees, and the right to protection
against arbitrary expulsion from a country, all of which he considered were
forms of interference in state sovereignty.
 The French rep (Cassin) replied by arguing that interfering in a state was
already implied, if not stated, within the UN Charter as the whole purpose of it
was to prevent another Holocaust.
 Opposition was evident to the declaration being drafted by such a small group
of people, and so Roosevelt enlarged the group from 3 to 8, adding members
from Australia, Chile, France, UK and USSR.
 However, this group soon realised that reducing or revising the 450 page
document was going to be too time consuming for many voices and Cassin
was given the task of drafting the declaration.
Other participants:
 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) recruited
some of the leading thinkers for a Committee on the Theoretical Bases of
HRs. Questionnaires were sent to statesmen and scholars throughout the
world in March 1947. 70 responses were received including Chinese, Islamic,
Hindu, American, European and socialist views. The lists of basic rights,
freedoms or values were remarkably similar – including the right to life,
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protection of health, work, social assistance, property, education, freedom of
thought, self-expression, fair procedures, political participation, freedom of
speech, assembly, association, worship, the press, citizenship, rebel against an
unjust regime, and share in progress.
At most meetings of the drafting committee NGOs who had consultative
status were present, participating in some of the discussions and submitting
drafts of their own. NGOs and others that didn’t have consultative status
could still submit proposals and submissions.
All UN member states could have input into the drafts, and many did respond
to drafts.
In addition, the drafters had examined the constitutions of all states in order to
correlate the articles with the provisions of other states.
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It took 18 months of debate and nearly 100 meetings to create a third draft of the
UDHR that was ready to present to the UNGA in December 1948.
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Tensions over the meaning or the nature of the declaration:
 One of the major areas of debate within the Commission concerned economic and
social rights versus civil and political rights.
 Civil and political rights – eg freedoms of thought, association, speech and
assembly, and the rights to freely take part in elections and government.
 Social, cultural and economic rights – eg rights to social security and
education; access to community’s cultural life; rights to work in employment
of choice; equal pay; rights to food, clothing and shelter.
 This debate was primarily over emphasis – the Communist countries gave
priority to economic and social rights while the majority of other members
wanted a balance between the two sets of rights.
 Another major debate concerned whether there should be a declaration or
convention.
 Both the US and USSR wanted a declaration.
 Roosevelt pushed for a declaration rather than a legally binding convention
which would require Senate approval and this didn’t seem likely.
 The USSR was opposed to any convention that would allow interference into
a state’s sovereignty.
 It was mostly small states that pushed for a convention.
 Other debates concerned language – references to ‘men’ in the drafts was finally
removed (mostly) due to concerns of women delegates; and early references to
‘individual’ were criticised for not emphasising the social nature of beings –
‘person’ was inserted instead.
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Final document and voting
 The Third UN General Assembly adopted the UDHR on 10 December 1948 – 48
votes in favour, none against, and 8 abstentions.
 The abstentions were from the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
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The communist countries claimed the declaration didn’t go far enough – they
wanted it to condemn Nazism and fascism and deny such individuals the right to
freedom of speech and association.
The head of the Soviet delegation also argued that HRs cannot be conceived
outside the state.
The Soviet bloc could have voted against the declaration, however, to do so
would have undermined their desire to condemn Nazism and fascism.
Saudi Arabia’s abstention was reportedly because of their rejection of the
inclusion of equal marriage rights, and the right to change one’s religion.
South Africa’s abstention was because of apartheid, a system that violated various
HRs.
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Section Two: Human Rights Debates - Universalism and Cultural
Relativism
There are various ways in which HRs are said to be universal
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By divine authority – God grants particular rights to all humans. But if you deny the
existence of God, then you cannot claim the universality of rights through divine law.
Due to its foundation in natural law – the idea that we have natural rights by virtue of
being human might appear to be sound for some HRs, but can we make this claim for
all HRs in international law?
Through the existence of positive law – the existence of positive law through ratified
treaties seems to suggest HRs are accepted by most states, but can we say that this
means these rights are universally accepted?
Is there any theoretical basis for claiming that, despite humans belonging to a range
of cultural traditions, HRs represents values all humans can respect? Is it possible to
establish a core set of basic rights that are common to all cultures?
Doctrine of cultural relativity – no universal morality
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‘Cultural relativity argues that each culture or society possesses its own rationality,
coherence and set of values, and it is in these terms only that one can properly
interpret the organisation, customs and beliefs (including ideas about human rights) of
that culture or society.’ (Ken Booth)
Definition of culture: ‘the totality of values, institutions and forms of behaviour
transmitted within a society, as well as the material goods produced by man [and
woman].’ (Roy Preiswerk) This includes worldviews and ideologies.
For cultural relativists, rules about morality vary from location to location, culture to
culture. To understand this variety in morality, we need to understand the cultures
from which each came. These cultures are the source of validity for moral claims.
Thus for a cultural relativist, the argument is self-evident – there are multiple cultures
in the world, each producing their own values. In other words, there can be no
universal values.
Cultural relativist challenges to the universal HRs concept
1. The UDHR is claimed to have Western origins – universal HRs is a Western concept
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The UDHR can be seen as the product of a particular tradition of Western
philosophical thought that has culminated in the idea of man and woman as rights
holder. Since not all cultures share this conception of liberal man and woman,
some argue that the UDHR does not apply to their culture, religion of
philosophical view.
But is this the philosophy behind the UDHR, and is it opposed to other
philosophical views? Many of the articles in the UDHR do reflect expressions of
rights from earlier Western documents eg US Declaration of Independence, the
US Constitution, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
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Such rights include the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, and the prohibition against slavery and torture.
But there was input from a range of small states eg the Latin American
contributions. And the drafters of the UDHR intended the articles to be
interpreted according to different traditions.
However, others argue that the idea of the democratic state underpins HRs
discourse. And there are no specific references to concessions to cultural
variations either in the definitions of the rights or in the limitation clauses.
A further argument is that even if we claim the UDHR has its historical origins in
Western philosophical thought, this does not necessarily mean that it could not be
considered to be universal. HRs having a Western heritage doesn’t preclude the
concept from having applicability elsewhere.
2. Universal HRs not compatible with all cultures’ values
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This argument is based on the view that a society’s culture is the supreme
determinant of the ethical views under which its citizens should live. But why
should belonging to a culture be the major identification point for humans? Why
not class, gender, nation, society or generation? Why not identify more with a
universal community of people suffering the way you do?
The argument assumes that a culture’s values cannot be challenged by those
outside of that culture, even if there is good reason to do so.
The concept of culture has also been challenged. It is difficult to establish the
boundaries of cultures – where do they start and end? Different people have
different conceptualisations of a particular culture. Who can claim the
authenticity of a culture? Usually the most powerful, loudest or fundamentalist
try to.
We can’t assume that HRs will necessarily continue to be incompatible with a
culture over time eg look at the impact of technology on cultures. There has also
been the destruction of cultural practices by economic development in both
Western and non-Western countries.
Asian values debate and the 1993 World Conference on HRs
 The Asian values argument seeks to provide an alternative to the “Western”
model of HRs. The US is particularly characterised as a country that has been
‘shattered by excessive individualism’ as evidenced by increasing crime rates,
drugs, etc. (Joanne Bauer). The alternative proposed is a society ruled by ‘the
strong hand of the wise and benevolent patriarch’ and guided by values such
as obedience, industriousness, and respect for elders, authority and family.
 Economic and social rights are prioritised over civil and political rights, the
community over the individual, and social stability over individual freedom.
 Some of the Asian states prepared for the 1993 World Conference by devising
their own declaration concerning the universality of HRs – the Bangkok
Declaration. This Declaration confirmed the universality of some HRs but
argued that others were founded on the Western ideal of individual autonomy
and did not reflect Asian values. Eg Article 8 – ‘While HRs are universal in
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nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving
process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities, and various historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds.’ The Bangkok Declaration states that ‘the promotion
of HRs should be encouraged by cooperation and consensus, and not through
confrontation and the imposition of incompatible values’. It further
emphasises ‘the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial
integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the
non-use of HRs as an instrument of political pressure.’
However, a group of Asian NGOs also produced a document on HRs,
disputing their state leaders’ Declaration and reaffirming the universality and
indivisibility of all HRs.
At the World Conference, a range of Asian and other states called for
consideration of cultural differences with regards to HRs.
But in the end, the Vienna Declaration reaffirmed the universality and
indivisibility of all HRs and was approved by 172 states: ‘All HRs are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat HRs globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same
footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all HRs and
fundamental freedoms.’
The Singapore government has argued that Asian values mean that democracy
and HRs as understood in the West are not appropriate for Singapore.
 Asian values are taken to be obedience to authority, intense allegiance to
groups, and that collective identity is more important than individual identity.
These values appear to have been advanced for political reasons and have had
little to do with traditional values of the population. There is little political
opposition tolerated in Singapore, and a very paternal form of government that
promotes that Asians want to be ruled by such an elite.
 The Singapore government first appealed to Confucius to give credence to its
Asian values argument (in early 1980s to early 90s) in response to decreasing
support for the government. But few Singaporeans knew much about
Confucius. Confucian studies were introduced at school but were not popular,
and there was a media campaign. Overall, there was public resistance to the
campaign.
 In 1991 a more generic campaign ‘Shared Values’ was introduced, which
included a few Confucian elements in the claims: ‘Nation before community
and society above self; family is the basic unit of society; community support
and respect for the individual; consensus not conflict; racial and religious
harmony.’ This was accompanied by fears that these may justify HRs abuses
and further limit opposition and, once again, these values don’t appear to
represent any tradition or culture.
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Therefore, (as concluded by Neil Englehart) this is not part of the debate
between the West and Asia over HRs and democracy – it is a debate within a
state about what type of political culture is appropriate for that state.
HRs and China’s cultures
 Chinese Confucianism was the state ideology for about 2000 years.
Buddhism, Daoism, Moism and Legalism also had an influence on Chinese
society, but Confucianism was particularly pervasive.
 Some have concluded that Confucianism is not compatible with the idea
of rights (eg Robert Weatherley). This is because it is based on the idea of
‘moral inequality’ where your worth as a human is based on your status in
your family and society. Individuals are also expected to subordinate their
own concerns to those of the collective. This appears to be clearly
incompatible with the basis of universal HRs being that all humans have
equal moral worth.
 Under Confucianism great importance is placed on the duties you have
because of your roles in your family and society. However, these duties
have a reciprocal nature ie a ruler would expect loyalty from his subjects,
but his subjects would also expect benevolence and righteousness from
him. Some highlight that this emphasis on humane rule, and popular
sovereignty, indicates a cultural heritage that could accept the concept of
HRs (eg Julia Ching and Weiming Tu).
 Another strong influence on Chinese society has been Chinese Marxist theory.
Under Marxist theory, HRs are seen as a powerful ideological tool of the
bourgeoisie.
 However, the Communist Party’s focus on securing the equitable
distribution of resources, and the right to work and security, highlights an
early focus on economic and social rights.
 HRs claims in China since 1949
 HRs have been included in China’s Constitutions since 1949, but the rule
of law has not been realised.
 HRs White Papers acknowledge the importance of HRs but still stress
state sovereignty, and that some rights should be given greater priority
over others due to historical and cultural differences.
 There has been an increased level of discussion on HRs since the
Tiananmen Square massacre June 1989 – more open debates since 1990.
Many academics now see HRs as universal, that individual and collective
rights are interrelated, and that both deserve equal protection.
 However, the Chinese government continues to place an overwhelming
emphasis on the state’s rights over individual’s.
 In contrast, some of China’s prominent dissidents argue that there is a
universal concept of HRs. Eg the writings of Wei Jingsheng reflect the
universal HRs concept: human beings’ ‘essential qualities are…a product
of nature. These are “instinctive” and very basic and they constitute a
human “commonality” which is inborn and possessed by all and on which
all other human natures and social relations are based. Human rights and
basic freedoms refer to the satisfying or realising of this part of human
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nature. They are the sum of hopes and aspirations that emerge naturally
and do not need to be taught.’ The writings of Fang Lizhi also reflect
universal HRs concept. He opposes the view that China has “unique
characteristics” and so should not be judged according to “Western” HRs
standards – ‘One of the impacts of the blood and fire at Tiananmen Square
in 1989 is its irrefutable proof of the emptiness of the “Chinese
characteristics” doctrine, and of the shameful moral bankruptcy involved
in viewing such things as understandable and acceptable.’
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Islam and the HRs concept
 Katerina Dalacoura argues that some interpretations of Islam are compatible
with the HRs concept: ‘Islam is not inherently illiberal’ – ‘respect or
disrespect for HRs is a matter of political will and choice, not of a cultural
authentic “essence” which necessarily shapes and constrains societies.’
 There have been various interpretations of Islam – there are those who
interpret the text of the Quran literally, and others who argue it can only be
interpreted according to context. Since the 1970s HRs have become
increasingly debated in Muslim societies.
 Various Muslim thinkers have sought to redefine what Islam consists of in
order to provide evidence of compatibility with HRs.
 Majid Khadduri found that the inequality of men and women and slavery
are opposed to Islam’s notion of equality and brotherhood of man.
 Asghar Ali Engineer believes the Quran promotes the process towards
equality of the sexes, and that Muslims should reform the law to separate
Islam from patriarchy.
 Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim highlights that the sharia was not written until
2nd and 3rd centuries of Islam and so the practices of generations of
Muslims influenced it.
 According to some, Islam can be reconciled with HRs concept if the
perspective adopted is that Islam is capable of being developed and
transformed without violating its essential ‘spirit’. This is in contrast to the
perspective that Islam is a sacred and eternally set of rules. Dalacoura argues
that ‘those who use Islam as a political force and press for a return to “cultural
authenticity” are not traditional elements but…modern ones, part of a worldwide fundamentalist pattern specific to the modern age.’
3. In developing countries, economic, social and cultural rights should have priority
over civil and political rights


This argues that civil and political rights are less important than basic needs,
therefore civil and political rights can be denied to citizens until full social and
economic development is achieved.
Some leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore have argued that political
leaders in developing countries should be committed to the eradication of poverty
above all else. If any opposition to the government threatens to slow down the
government’s efforts to promote economic development or plunge the country
13
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into civil strife, then in Lee’s view tough measures can and should be taken to
ensure political stability.
Thus the argument is that economic development, and its focus on realising
economic and social rights, needs stability which requires an authoritarian state
and respect for traditional values.
However, many authoritarian states have failed to achieve economic development
and stability. Eg the Pinochet government in Chile and Suharto regime in
Indonesia resulted in downturns in economy. It is also difficult to argue that there
are economic and social costs to putting government efforts into stopping civil
and political rights abuses such as torture, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial
killings. According to Amartya Sen: ‘Some relatively authoritarian states [eg
South Korea and China] have had faster rates of economic growth than some less
authoritarian ones [eg India, Costa Rica, Jamaica]. But the overall picture is
[more complex]…statistical studies give no real support to the claim that there is
a general conflict between political rights and economic performance.’
Other challenges to the universal HRs concept
4. It is natural for humans to tend towards conflict and seek to resolve conflict through
violent means (realist argument)
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According to this argument, if we accept human violence as natural, then HRs
abuses are inevitable.
However, according to Ken Booth, anthropological studies have shown some
peaceful societies have existed. Let us focus on how societies have changed and
continue to change, giving us the potential to improve and create a more caring
society eg the HRs improvements brought about by women’s rights campaigners
and the anti-slavery movement.
Humans have histories and create their futures based on the decisions they make
and actions they take. Therefore, if we view resolving conflict in a violent way as
having been a choice, it is possible to choose to resolve conflicts in a peaceful
way instead. This highlights the potential for universal HRs to evolve within our
cultures and societies.
Richard Rorty argues that the world has changed since discussions on rights in
past centuries – we need to forget about HRs foundationalism. Rorty favours a
pragmatic view of philosophy, as opposed to making claims about the knowledge
of the nature of humans: ‘the emergence of HRs culture seems to owe nothing to
increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental
stories’. For Rorty, HRs has emerged as a culture since WW2 due to our
reactions to the suffering of others, our empathy, rather than an increase in ‘moral
knowledge’. After the atrocities of the 20th century, the culture of human rights
has become a reality, constructed not through a recognition of innate human
dignity or reason, but through a shared sentimentality which has emerged from
hearing these stories and formed the basis of a new shared discourse. Therefore,
we should stop trying to understand what it means to be human and instead focus
14
on using our imagination to create a better world. We should also focus on our
‘sentimental education’, ie, acquaint ourselves with those different from us.
So, can we consider that it is possible to have universal HRs?

One argument is that there already is a certain degree of universality of HRs.
 Most states have accepted UDHR and many of the conventions and treaties. Most
states accused of HRs abuses don’t reject HRs norms but defend themselves
within its discourse.
 But does this just reflect that states recognise the power and influence of Western
countries and their discourse on HRs, and that agreeing to a set of HRs is
necessary to benefit from membership of the international community?

Perhaps we can argue there is a fairly high degree of compatible values between
communities – most humans, in whatever culture, tend to agree in many areas on
what is right and wrong behaviour and duties towards others. This is particularly so
in terms of extreme abuses eg torture, extrajudicial killings. Should this be the basis
of our universality?
Should we promote further acceptance of universal HRs, and if so, how?


Can we argue that there are ‘right’ sides to be taken on issues? According to Peter
Singer the answer is yes, we can, if we take a long-term perspective. Eg slavery,
terrible working conditions, women as chattels, and racism are all now receive
widespread condemnation. But can we say that these practices are universally
condemned?
‘If the ultimate aim of HRs diplomacy is to persuade others of the value of HRs, it is
more likely that the struggle to promote HRs can be won if it is fought in ways that
build on, rather than challenge, local cultural traditions’ (Daniel Bell). HRs activists
may need to pay closer attention to local justifications of HRs in order to further their
acceptance. A long term commitment to HRs is more likely if it is built on traditional
cultures.
15
Section Three: Bringing About Human Rights Improvements in States
UN Human Rights Bodies
Some of the UN bodies that include a focus on human rights are:

UN General Assembly – the centre of the UN system that sets guidelines for the
organisation. The GA must give final approval to all HRs treaties.

UN Security Council – is responsible for maintaining international peace and
security, and in the 1990s interpreted its mandate to include cases of gross HRs
abuses as threats to international peace and security.

Human Rights Council (formerly Commission on Human Rights)
 The Commission was established in 1946 and until this year had 53 state
members who met annually for 6 weeks. The HRC has replaced the Commission
due to criticisms that the latter was too political and ineffective.
 The Human Rights Council (HRC) began its work 2006 – some of its procedures
and mandates are the same as for the Commission, some are new. As with the
Commission, the HRC prepares recommendations on human rights situations,
drafts international instruments and investigates received communications on
human rights abuses. Groups set up by the Commission to investigate human
rights problems in specific countries have been carried over to the HRC.
 If the HRC pursues a HRs violation matter it may communicate its concerns to the
state, resolve to collect more information, ask the state to respond to complaints,
draft and possibly adopt a resolution, ask the Secretary-General to appoint a
Special Representative to assess the situation, and/or ask the Security Council to
examine the matter. Its activities may bring about HRs improvements through the
“shaming” of states.
 The HRC meets more often than the Commission did (at least 3 sessions per year
for at least 10 weeks) and can call special meetings. The General Assembly now
elects the 47 members of the HRC (formerly members were elected by the UN
Economic and Social Council - ECOSOC). And the HRC has the status of the
other UN councils. There is a provision to suspend a state’s membership of HRC
for gross and systematic HRs abuses, and the HRC is to carry out Universal
Periodic Reviews of states’ HRs practices.
 Despite these changes, some argue that the HRC resolutions on Israel and Sudan
highlight that it continues to be a political forum.

Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
 The Sub-Commission reports to the HRC – it has been carried over from the
Commission with its mandate to be reviewed after one year. It has 26 expert
members elected by state members of the CHR, each serving for 4 years, and
meeting annually for 3 weeks. It has 8 Working Groups. Eg the Working Group
on Communications considers complaints brought by individuals or groups
against governments that are accused of HRs violations.
16
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The Sub-Commission is viewed as being fairly impartial and has resulted in
greater attention being placed on some HRs abusing states. However, it has been
criticised for being too slow, the confidentiality of the process, being focused only
on states revealing patterns of abuse, and being too willing to grant concessions
and extra time to states pretending to cooperate.

High Commissioner for Human Rights
 This is the focal point for human rights activities of the UN – the High
Commissioner’s office promotes universality of human rights, their international
cooperation and education, and field operations. The High Commissioner is able
to deal directly with governments to promote the protection of HRs – the position
has a mandate to deal with all governments on all issues.

Treaty monitoring committees
 Each of the major UN Conventions has a Committee that monitors the compliance
of states who are parties to the treaty. Each Committee is comprised of HRs
experts who act in a personal capacity. Complaints by individuals or other states
may be heard by a Committee, depending on the treaty and ratification status of
the relevant optional protocols.
 The main UN treaties have mandatory reporting procedures for signatory states,
usually every 4 or 5 years. But ratifying and reporting does not necessarily mean
that the HRs practices of these states are improving, although at least HRs
standards have been set, there are tools for criticism, and some legislation and
practical improvements have resulted.

International Labour Organisation formulates and promotes the implementation of
international labour standards. Members are states, and employer and worker groups.
Regional Human Rights Systems
Other than the UN HRs bodies, there are also some regional HRs systems including
regional HRs Commissions and Courts of HRs.

The Organisation of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe, and the African
Union (AU) have all created separate codes of HRs and taken steps to ensure their
enforcement in Courts of HRs. The OAS HRs Court and the European Court of HRs
are established and conduct proceedings. Enough AU members ratified a protocol to
create an AU HRs Court in Jan 2004 and work was due to begin late 2006.
Human Rights Non-Government Organisations
NGOs are organisations, generally independent of governments, that have their own
sources of funding (and may receive some government funding).

NGOs are typically comprised of individuals who are dedicated to working on
particular issues consistent with particular principled ideas or values. Numbers of
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international HRs and/or humanitarian NGOs are estimated to be about 250 –
numbers of domestic NGOs are enormous.
It has mostly been Western-based NGOs that have been the largest and these have
traditionally focused mostly on civil and political rights, and international
humanitarian law. Eg until its recent mandate change to include economic and social
rights, Amnesty International (AI) largely focused on civil and political rights.
NGO activities have included the collection and dissemination of information on HRs
abuses, HRs advocacy, the publication of information on HRs abuses for education
purposes and to provide a public record, the provision of support services for victims
of HRs abuses, and the participation in and/or lobbying of UN human rights bodies.
As with the UN HRs bodies, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of HRs NGO
activities independent of state and UN actions. Some have focused their efforts on
assessing the effectiveness of HRs regimes or transnational HRs networks in bringing
about HRs improvements – both focus on HRs as norms.
What are norms?
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Norms are ‘collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity’
(Risse, Ropp and Sikkink). Norms define and communicate what is acceptable
behaviour for members of a particular group or community. Norms also reflect the
identity of the members of this collective.
We often speak of an international community in regards to norms and actions based
on these norms eg “the international community failed to respond to the humanitarian
crisis…” But what is this international community, and to what extent can we say it
exists?
 Realists would argue there is no such thing as an international community. For
realists there are no norms of behaviour in the international system of states
except to act according to national interests (defined primarily in terms of power)
– altruism and self-sacrifice are not motivations for state actions.
 Others, such as constructivists, argue that an international society exists and this
society is governed by norms. That is, state actions are constrained and enabled
by a set of norms and laws. One of the key norms in international society is
sovereignty – a norm that involves mutual recognition (states ought to recognise
the sovereignty of other states) as well as legal status. Even though this norm
may be violated, the fact that those who violate it feel compelled to explain why
they have violated it suggests an agreement on the existence and value of the state
sovereignty norm. This suggests that there are norms present in international
politics that affect the actions of states and other actors.
But do norms other than state sovereignty exist? Are there norms that apply to actors
other than states? To what extent can we say that such norms exist? If they do exist,
how do we account for them? How might they contribute to our understandings of
international politics?
There are different arguments regarding the role of HRs as a set of norms governing
behaviour within international politics – one focuses on HRs regimes and power
considerations, and another focuses on transnational HRs networks and HRs norms.
18
Human rights regimes
Regime theory became established as a way of understanding areas of cooperation or
interdependence in IR in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

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
Regime – ‘the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area.’ (Stephen Krasner)
Therefore, an international HRs regime encompasses actors who promote particular
HRs norms and rules that guide actors’ behaviour. According to Krasner, the purpose
of international HRs regimes is ‘to encourage some states to adopt policies that they
would not otherwise pursue.’ For Krasner, ‘whether states adhere to such
regimes…is a function of the extent to which more powerful states in the system are
willing to enforce the principles and norms of the regime.’
Therefore, Krasner argues that the realist approach best explains the relative success
of HRs regimes. That is, HRs regimes are only effective in getting states to adhere to
HRs policies to the degree that more powerful states promote the norms of that
regime.
This approach focuses on states as key actors in bringing about norm socialisation.
But what about other actors, both international and domestic? Do they have a
significant role to play in norm socialisation in international politics?
Transnational Human Rights Networks and the Spiral Model
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s spiral model provides an explanation of the phases a state may
progress through in terms of human rights improvements brought about in response to
pressures from domestic and international actors.



This is a constructivist model – constructivism stresses the importance of ideas and
norms in international politics. Constructivists vary widely in their ideas and
research, but the basic assumptions that underlie their work are:
 Ideas (particularly shared ideas) as well as material factors have a major influence
over human interactions – state identities and interests cannot be fully explained
by material factors.
 There is a constitutive relationship between actors and shared ideas – that is, the
identity and interests of a state are both influenced by these shared ideas as well
as have an influence over the nature of those ideas.
 This constitutive relationship provides restrictions on that state’s behaviour.
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink argue that HRs norms may produce positive change over
time in states that are violating these rights regardless of culture, economics, and
other particularities of time and space. This is because HRs norms, which are gaining
international legitimacy, affect how political actors define and pursue their identities
and interests.
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink based their model on the case studies of 11 states inc.
Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Uganda, Chile, Guatemala, Poland and
Czechoslavakia.
19
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Each phase highlights how a network of domestic and international human rights
NGOs, UN bodies and states promoting international human rights norms may be
able to influence a target state’s practices through socialisation processes.
 Socialisation processes are explanations of how states understand, interpret and
act on lessons that are taught by other actors. Through these processes, the target
state’s identity, interests and practices may be changed. A state’s identity is how
it defines itself compared with other states, and this provides guidance for
behaviour in different situations. Therefore, the spiral model focuses on how
ideas can influence a state’s identity, interests and practices.
The spiral model seeks to explain the role of states and other international and
domestic actors promoting international norms in bringing about human rights
improvements in a target state.
 Networks of domestic and international actors first need to join international
regimes, allowing for information on human rights abuses to reach primarily
Western citizens and governments. This enables the formation of a transnational
human rights network.
The model focuses on 2 core rights – the right to freedom from extrajudicial
execution and disappearance, and the right to freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest
and detention.
Phase One – Repression and Network Activation


Phase one commences when the HRs abuses of a state significantly increase eg the
overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1970s, and the violent repression in
South Africa under apartheid.
If information on these abuses can get out of the country, the situation can progress to
phase two.
Phase Two – Denial
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

This is where there is the international dissemination of information on human rights
abuses, and the lobbying of international human rights NGOs and democratic states
commences. Eg following Idi Amin’s overthrow of Uganda’s first Prime Minister
and the subsequent execution of opponents, AI, the International Commission of
Jurists and journalists published information internationally on these abuses.
Eventually support from states and the UN for action against Amin was achieved.
The target state usually denies the allegations and/or validity of international HRs
norms, and invokes the state sovereignty principle. The target state may try to
persuade its citizens that the criticisms are coming from ignorant foreigners eg
President Suharto in Indonesia used anti-colonial language to discredit calls by the
East Timorese human rights network for self-determination.
But denial is still considered to be part of socialisation – at least the state
acknowledges the damage to its international reputation and the HRs concept is not
usually rejected outright. The dominant socialisation process in this phase is
instrumental adaptation. This is where the target state makes some concessions in
response to domestic and outside criticisms, possibly making bargains with critics
20
and/or beginning to engage in a HRs dialogue. But the target state is expected to take
actions to achieve its goal of quelling the criticisms, and this may include making
some concessions, without necessarily believing in the validity of the norms.
Phase Three – Tactical Concessions
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Getting a state from phase 2 to 3 is described by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink as the most
difficult transition. Progress to phase 3 depends on the vulnerability of the state to
international pressures and the strength of the transnational network. If pressure by
the network can be maintained, the state may feel compelled to make tactical
concessions. Eg the Philippines under Marcos’ rule was vulnerable to international
pressures as it relied on military aid from the US. After network lobbying, the US
government reversed its previous support for the Marcos regime that had declared
martial law in 1972. Marcos subsequently lifted the night curfew it had imposed and
released 500 people imprisoned under martial law.
It is expected that the socialisation processes of both instrumental adaptation and
argumentative discourses occur in this phase, with the latter becoming more
dominant. Argumentative discourses is where the target state becomes increasingly
likely to take its critics and their criticisms more seriously, and the target state and its
critics engage in arguments over the substance of the criticisms and the target state’s
justifications of its human rights record.
The primary opportunity to improve HRs in phase 3 is via the mobilisation of
domestic HRs groups. However, state backlash can occur and effectively deter the
activities and growth of these groups. Eg before finally giving in to pressures to end
apartheid, South Africa first introduced further repressive measures to try to curb the
HRs movement in the country.
Phase 3 ends when the state begins to institutionalise HRs norms into its practices.
Phase Four – Prescriptive Status
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
This is reached when the target state no longer contests the validity of international
HRs norms in HRs discussions. Various indicators that this phase has been reached
include the ratification of conventions and optional protocols; the constitution and
legislation reflecting HRs norms; the setting up of HRs institutions; and criticisms of
HRs no longer being labelled outside interference.
The argumentative discourses socialisation process is expected to continue to
dominate in this phase.
Risse et al found 7 of the states they examined reached phase 4 – Uganda, South
Africa, Poland, Czechoslavakia, Chile, Guatemala and the Philippines. Eg in
response to the efforts of a transnational human rights network, Chile ratified a
number of UN and American Conventions in the late 1980s-early 1990s which gave
Chilean citizens the right to complain to international bodies concerning human rights
practices. The Chilean government also held democratic elections in 1990.
21
Phase Five – Rule-Consistent Behaviour
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This phase is reached if transnational pressures continue and encourage the target
state to have HRs practices reflecting HRs norms and supported by rule of law.
The dominant socialisation process is institutionalisation and habituation where
international HRs norms are no longer contested and are institutionalised within
domestic practices.
Limitations on progress to phase five include when the target state remains under
dictatorship – systemic changes are needed to facilitate the continuation of practices
that respect and promote HRs regardless of leader(s).
Progress to phase 5 was found in 7 states – Uganda, South Africa, Poland,
Czechoslavakia, Chile, Guatemala and the Philippines.
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink highlight the need for states to continually strive for phase
five – both the target state and transnational network need to be vigilant.
Blocking Factors to Progress Through the Model

There may be no progress through the model if the target state is significantly
resistant to international pressures, and/or state elites perceive norms to be a threat to
their power and try to mobilize nationalist sentiment.
Alternative explanations to the spiral model explored by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink

Can norm socialisation be explained by the interests, pressures and capabilities of
great powers? Realist explanations centre on the influence of great powers on target
states – international regimes are thought to be created to promote the interests of
great powers. Risse et al found that great powers only promoted international HRs
norms to the extent that they had been persuaded to do so by international HRs
networks. They also argue that such an account does not explain why great powers
themselves have internalised HRs norms over the past few decades.

Can HRs acceptance be explained by rising middle classes in countries that are
modernising? Modernisation theories argue that economic development brings about
various changes within society that lead to democratisation and the rule of law eg
through an increasing middle class that calls for political liberalisation. Risse et al
found little support for these theories. In some of the countries studied, norms were
internalised following economic crisis rather than economic development. In other
countries, economic growth followed the internalisation of HRs norms.
A successful case in bringing about HRs improvements – South Africa and the end
of apartheid rule
This case is held up as a good example of successful HRs activism. However, there are
some features of this case that differentiate it from others.
22
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The National Party was elected by the white electorate in South Africa (SA) in 1948.
The apartheid system was invented as a way of keeping control over the economic
and social system – the 1948 race laws institutionalised racial discrimination. The
National Party carried out many HRs abuses during its rule to 1994. It abused many
civil, political, economic and social rights of 75% of the population eg arbitrary
arrests and detentions, press censorship, and torture and extra-judicial killings.
It took two massive incidences of HRs abuse to place SA on the international agenda,
that is, to progress it from phase 1 to phase 2 of the spiral model.
From Phase One (Repression & Network Activation) to Phase Two (Denial)
1. The 1960 Sharpville township massacre
 A rally was held by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) involving a large group
refusing to carry their passes – this led to police panic and the deaths of 69
unarmed demonstrators and other protesters killed elsewhere.
 Massive domestic protests and international outrage of abuses in SA followed for
the first time. Eg there were huge rallies and the mobilisation of the antiapartheid movement in London. The UN condemned the killings and applied
some diplomatic sanctions. The UN Convention against apartheid was also
established in 1973 and the Convention against racial discrimination in 1965. The
UN Security Council recommended an arms embargo. The driving force of
international action was the newly independent African states, some of the other
developing countries, and the Soviet bloc. SA was forced to withdraw from the
Commonwealth in 1961. A range of NGOs in US, UK, Canada and New
Zealand, and churches and trade unions, focused on anti-apartheid lobbying,
including actions that led to SA being expelled from Olympic Movement 1968.
 But most Western states remained opposed to economic and diplomatic sanctions
in the 1960s and 70s (Nordic countries were the exception, providing support to
exiled liberation movements). This was due to the leftist tendencies of liberation
groups and their increasing preference for armed struggle.
 Responses of the SA government included a denial of the abuses and claims that
outsiders should not interfere in domestic affairs. There was also a harsh increase
in repression including a state of emergency declared days after the Sharpeville
massacre. Approximately 2000 activists were arrested and the African National
Congress (ANC), PAC and SA Communist Party were outlawed. Nelson
Mandela and some of his colleagues were captured in 1962 and sentenced to life
imprisonment in 1964.
 But there were some small concessions – the SA government didn’t deny the
validity of the norms of self-determination, rule of law, or representative
democracy. Instead, it promoted its interpretation of these eg in 1961 the selfgoverning homelands were explained as being “national self-determination”.
2. The Soweto massacre 1976
 69 students were killed by police during demonstrations against Afrikaans being
imposed as the language of maths instruction in black schools. This led to
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violence in townships across the country, many demonstrations, and 750,000
students boycotting classes.
The harsh repressive response left 1,000 dead and 21,000 arrested by 1977.
Increased international scrutiny and condemnation of SA government resulted,
plus increased support for the exiled liberation movements. The UN Security
Council agreed to adopt a mandatory arms embargo in 1977.
Responses of the SA government to this included increasing the repression. But
by 1978 the SA government recognised the need for reforms to appease its critics.
This indicates the socialisation process of instrumental adaptation, and the
concessions made were significant enough to indicate progress to phase three.
Phase Three (Tactical Concessions)
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The SA government’s reforms to appease its critics included some extension of trade
union rights but with strict controls over unions (however, this resulted in the growth
of politically powerful trade unions), and some promotion of the rights of black urban
residents. Reforms also included the announcement of a tricameral legislature (with
separate white, “coloured” and Asian chambers to govern their “own” affairs, and a
subordinate role for “coloured” and Asian representatives on a small range of
concerns), and the creation of black local authorities to be responsible for delivering
services to segregated townships.
These concessions split the NP into conservatives and those promoting the
concessions. They also produced the largest uprising in 1984 over attempts to bring
in the tricameral parliament and black local authorities, and a successful boycott of
Indian and coloured voters. A nationwide strike in 1984-86 represented a full
domestic opposition mobilisation in the form of the United Democratic Front (UDF)
which included 575 opposition organisations. International support for the UDF
came from Western states and NGOs. There was also an increase in political
violence eg ANC’s armed struggle escalated with guerilla attacks, and an increasing
socialist influence on the domestic movement.
The SA government responded to these developments by declaring a state of
emergency and imposing press censorship to quell the insurrection. It also continued
to try to destabilise the newly independent states of Angola and Mozambique.
International condemnation continued to increase and more support was given to
opposition groups in SA and in exile. Western governments began to adopt more
forceful responses to the SA government, due in part to NGO pressures.
The SA government was forced into making more radical changes due to increasing
international pressures, a growing economic crisis because of financial sanctions,
increasing domestic opposition, and the defection of white capital owners. This
indicates the socialisation process of instrumental adaptation.
The SA government also began meetings with Nelson Mandela in 1987. The
incoming President de Klerk accelerated these in 1989, and unbanned the ANC and
released Mandela in 1990. This indicates the socialisation process of argumentative
discourses – the SA government was beginning to seriously engage with its critics
over its HRs record.
24
Phase Four (Prescriptive Status) and Phase Five (Rule-consistent Behaviour)

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

In this phase there was a negotiated transition to democracy 1990-94. Sanctions were
important in changing the political landscape of SA with de Klerk following the steps
outlined by the imposers of the sanctions in 1990-91. These included repealing the
state of emergency, releasing all political prisoners, unbanning the ANC and other
political parties, eliminating apartheid laws, and initiating negotiations for a new
political system. The sanctions were lifted and the international legitimacy of the NP
increased, weakening the position of the ANC which advocated continuing sanctions.
Sanctions framed what would be negotiated – democracy. No attention was given to
addressing the deep inequalities of apartheid. This reflected civil and political rights
being the dominant rights, rather than economic rights – nationalisation and
redistribution of capital were not favoured.
Violence continued throughout the negotiations, reflecting the ongoing mistrust of
both sides – state security services tried to destabilise ANC. Eventually both sides
compromised and SA held democratic elections with universal franchise in 1994.
The new ANC government’s commitment to rule-consistent behaviour was evident in
the inclusion of the bill of rights in the constitution, the outlawing of the death
penalty, and the setting up of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These
actions indicate the socialisation process of institutionalisation and habituation.
What does the case of South Africa tell us about the spiral model?

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

A network of domestic and international actors appeared able to pressure the SA
government to bring about HRs improvements in the area of civil and political rights.
The SA government became socialised according to these international HRs norms –
the idea of universal civil and political rights came to matter.
This was a case of the effective use of sanctions, supported by some in the private
sector as well as eventually by powerful Western states.
But there are unique features of this case. Anti-apartheid sentiment was shared across
developing and developed countries, indicating widespread strong reactions to
racism. Anti-racism was more widely accepted before many other HRs abuses
became an international target. The campaign was also largely propelled by
developing states and non-state actors, not just Western NGOs and states, linking in
with anti-colonial struggles for self-determination and the revolutionary aspirations of
domestic and international opponents of white rule – the goal was socialism.
Thus the case of SA appears to provide evidence that the spiral model can explain
why some states may bring about certain HRs improvements, but the case of SA also
has features that may not apply to other states.
Is the spiral model a useful explanation of norm socialisation?
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The authors conclude that shaming and lobbying by transnational HRs networks were
the key actions that led to changes in state behaviour in the countries they examined.
The authors also conclude that the model applies regardless of region, country, socioeconomic system, culture or political regime – does it?
25
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Risse, Ropp and Sikkink mostly focus on the most “universal” HRs and in the case of
SA the norm of anti-racism – would the process of socialisation be the same with
other rights?
The authors argue that ideas and norms have the power to bring about changes in
state behaviour in conjunction with more material factors such as economic and
military pressures. This is in contrast to Krasner’s argument that HRs regimes are
only effective in getting states to adhere to HRs policies to the degree that more
powerful states promote the norms of that regime. Is the promotion of HRs norms by
the more powerful states the overwhelmingly important factor in bringing about HRs
improvements, or is it the HRs norms themselves that is the most important factor?
The model begins with domestic groups who record HRs abuses and bypass their
state to coordinate efforts with international HRs networks. Is the existence of these
groups necessary? What if there are no such domestic groups because the repression
is so severe?
Humanitarian Intervention
Humanitarian intervention can be defined as ‘the threat or use of force across state
borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and
grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own
citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied’
(Holzgrefe and Keohane)
History of humanitarian intervention
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There were examples of humanitarian intervention in the 19th century, eg in the 1820s
French and British governments gave a degree of naval support to the cause of Greek
independence from Ottoman rule due to reported Turkish atrocities.
Prior to WW2, intervention into another state without consent was prohibited, even
for humanitarian reasons. After WW2 the UN Charter reaffirmed this – Article 2(7)
provides that ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United
Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter.’
Despite this, there were interventions. Although most of the self-proclaimed
humanitarian interventions prior to 1990 were of dubious legitimacy, several could
have been based on humanitarian grounds. Eg Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in
1978 and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978.
Discussion on the need for collective (as opposed to unilateral) intervention led to
efforts to establish this after the end of the Cold War.
Throughout the 1990s the Security Council (SC) increasingly defined gross human
rights abuses as threats to international peace and security. According to Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, sovereignty is not a barrier to action taken by the SC as part of
measures in response to ‘a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression’. Since 1990 three main types of humanitarian issues have been cited in
SC resolutions as grounds for international concern:
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1. Murder and deliberate infliction of suffering on civilians, prisoners and others.
2. Refusal of parties to a conflict to allow or assist humanitarian relief activities.
3. Violence and threats of violence against humanitarian workers.
Since 1991 there have been at least 9 crises in which humanitarian issues were
referred to in SC resolutions, after which military action was authorised by either the
SC itself or major Western states. Throughout the 1990s the SC authorised
humanitarian interventions into Northern Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia,
Haiti, and Rwanda. The SC also endorsed missions for peace implementation in
Albania, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Congo.
But one member of the SC can always veto any action and this is why NATO didn’t
seek SC authorisation before intervening in Kosovo. Russia and China supported the
Russian-sponsored resolution condemning NATO in a subsequent session of the SC.
Some argue that the Kosovo intervention was justified and lawful as the horrendous
abuses required action, and it was collective rather than unilateral action so it was not
just one state pursuing its own interests. Afterwards, the SC gave its support to the
intervention when 12/15 member states voted against Russia’s resolution, and another
resolution effectively approved the NATO action.
Failures of the SC to authorise intervention have been due to both domestic and
international political constraints.
Humanitarian Intervention Case Study: Somalia
The US military intervened on humanitarian grounds in Somalia in December 1992.
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This was to enable humanitarian aid to reach those afflicted by a famine and civil war
– there had already been 300,000 deaths. Lawlessness and anarchy were rife in
Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu. President Bush Senior authorised US forces to
impose order and allow UN humanitarian aid to be distributed. This was endorsed by
the UN Security Council. 3,000 marines initially arrived in Somalia, followed by
28,000 other soldiers plus 10,000 troops from other countries. Within one month
enough order had been established to distribute food and numbers of soldiers
gradually reduced to 5,000 by May 1993.
The US handed authority over to a new peacekeeping authority (20,000 soldiers and
8,000 support staff) to facilitate a transition to peaceful self-rule, as well as to
continue to maintain order (known as UNOSOM II). But the dominant warlord
General Mohammed Farrah Aideed clashed with UNOSOM II. 24 Pakistani soldiers
in UNOSOM II were killed by the General’s forces and the conflict intensified. In
October 18 US soldiers were killed, 78 injured and 500-1000 Somalis killed or
injured. President Clinton, under US Congress pressure, announced all US troops
would be withdrawn by end of March 1994. All UN forces withdrawn by end of
March 1995.
Were these interventions morally legitimate? For realists, there were no US interests
in Somalia and so it shouldn’t have intervened. For HRs advocates, intervention was
necessary to prevent suffering and spread of conflict.
 The first intervention seemed legally and morally legitimate as there had been
widespread suffering and no state in Somalia, it used UN-backed limited force,
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and restored order to allow relief work to continue. This was the first to be
authorised by the SC without the intervened state’s consent.
But was the second intervention legitimate? It didn’t involve the warring parties
themselves in the solution to the conflict.
Genocide Case Study: Rwanda
Just after US troops were withdrawn from Somalia following the failed second
intervention, reports came that a campaign of genocide had begun in Rwanda. This time
there was no significant humanitarian intervention.
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Sovereignty is not a barrier to action under the 1948 Genocide Convention:
Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish.
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
 Killing members of the group;
 Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
 Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
 Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
 Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article VIII: specifies that any contracting State ‘may call upon the competent organs
of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.’
But despite the Genocide Convention allowing for UN military action on genocide,
and reports that senior UN officials and the US government were aware of the
genocide in Rwanda, no significant military intervention was organised.
2,500 UN military personnel were in Rwanda to observe the peace treaty signed
between the Hutu government and Tutsi armed opposition group in August 1993 –
the UN troops were there when the genocide began in earnest in April 1994. Most of
these troops were withdrawn when the genocide spread throughout the country. In
addition, the UN had known in January 1994 that there was a campaign of genocide
against the Tutsis being planned by Hutu extremists. Over 800,000 people were
brutally killed in 100 days.
In November 1994 the SC called for an international criminal tribunal to be set up.
The tribunal’s focus on bringing about criminal justice seemed an expedient solution
to the problem of what to do about the violence without endangering the lives of
soldiers of the major powers. The tribunal has focused on bringing to justice the
alleged architects of genocide and secured the first conviction for genocide in the
world, and related systematic rape to genocide. However, there have been problems
with the tribunal, including selective justice – it did not hear cases of Tutsi violence
against Hutus which occurred prior to the jurisdiction dates of the tribunal. Neither
did it address the developments that led to the violence in Rwanda, and why
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particular crimes were committed. The tribunal has made slow progress in arresting
and prosecuting those deemed responsible for crimes, has suffered from a lack of
funding, is in a relatively remote location in Tanzania, and some witnesses have been
killed upon their return to Rwanda.
International attempts to do something about particular campaigns of genocide have
largely involved the international criminal justice system.
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These include cases put before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for
investigation, such as the situation in Darfur.
Since 2003 Sudanese government forces and militias backed by the government have
been fighting with rebel forces. As a result, more than 2 million people have been
displaced, 200,000 are thought to have been killed by the violence and 1000s of
others have died because of malnutrition and preventable disease due to the violence.
There has been a recent escalation of violence by the government-backed militias
against the rebel forces and innocent civilians, despite a Peace Agreement signed by
some of those fighting.
The Sudanese government has refused permission for a UN peacekeeping force but
has accepted African Union (AU) peacekeepers – but they are inadequately resourced
and, along with humanitarian workers, have been targeted by some of the militias.
Despite the escalating violence, there have been no SC resolutions authorising a
humanitarian intervention into Sudan – instead the SC referred the case to the ICC.
The ICC is nearing the completion of its investigation of crimes in Darfur.
Is this an adequate international response? Will such Tribunals/Court proceedings
deter future cases of genocide? Perhaps trying to understand genocide will help to
answer these questions.
Trying to Understand Genocide
According to Kristen Monroe, there are certain facilitating conditions and psychological
preconditions that seem to be common in acts of genocide.
Facilitating conditions of genocide:
 When there are significant differences within a society between different ethnic,
racial or religious groups.
 When there are unstable political and/or economic conditions – in these
circumstances, scapegoats may be sought; links may be drawn between minority
groups and enemies.
 When there is the ability to hide a campaign of genocide from the world.
 When the leaders of the dominant group take advantage of these conditions,
deliberately organising a campaign of hatred and violence.
Psychological preconditions of genocide:
 When some group is identified for destruction and there are clear differences
understood between this group and the rest of the population – this group is
considered to be a threat.
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When there is a principle or ideology that legitimizes the scale of the violence eg antiSemitism and the myth of Aryan superiority for the Germans regarding the Jews.
When dehumanisation occurs – members of the target group are not seen as human,
or not giving rise to any sense of human obligation.
A critical factor for those who carry out genocide is also identity and group ties.
Refusing to participate in such an act of violence involves acting in an asocial way,
leaving the dirty work to others in your group. Refusing also leaves you open to
being ostracised and in a hostile environment, you rely on others in your group for
support and contact. By not participating, you are stating that the others are wrong.
Will international criminal tribunals or the ICC deter future acts of genocide?
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Genocide is brought about through systematic planning – leaders of societies are the
key perpetrators. Therefore, it is critical to get societies’ leaders supportive of the
ICC and under its jurisdiction (or criminal tribunals).
Some argue that providing justice through the ICC can assist in bringing about peace
within communities. The ICC could promote justice by assigning specific individual
guilt, acknowledging victims, and establishing a record of what happened. Justice via
the ICC could also allow refugees to return home. But this assumes that states are
willing to give up some of their sovereignty to bring about restraints on their
behaviour to benefit all.
Others argue that military force is the only effective way of deterring genocide. The
military might of the few most powerful states is crucial as the law has little or no
impact on human behaviour.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
The ICISS was set up by the Canadian government in September 2000 in an attempt to
promote international unity over humanitarian intervention.
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The ICISS report starts with the principle of non-intervention, but then argues that
when a population ‘is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.’ The report concludes that states have a ‘responsibility to protect’, that is, to
intervene in cases of gross human rights abuses.
The report argues that we need to build an international consensus on reframing
intervention as compatible with sovereignty. Intervention is necessary when a state
does not protect its citizens. But this is not intervention into its internal affairs, it is a
‘substitution for the government’ – assistance for that government when it is
unwilling or unable to do so. To intervene in these circumstances is the responsibility
of the international community, but this outside assistance can only be temporary
until some type of sovereign authority is re-established, and so sovereignty is still
important. Sovereignty is therefore conceptualised as the state’s responsibility to
protect its citizens, not a right. However, this assumes that a society will be able to
return to a form of sovereignty, that a responsible state can follow a failed state.
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The report also views intervention as strengthening the SC rather than undermining it.
The Commission recommends the 5 permanent SC members not use their veto in
matters where their vital state interests are not involved. If the SC does not deal with
a proposal for intervention, or in a reasonable time, the Commission suggests that the
General Assembly can consider it, or regional/sub-regional organisations could take
action and seek subsequent authorisation from the SC.
The report has been criticised for not adopting a more universal consensus, even
though much effort was put into the international composition of the commission and
submissions. There were supporters of the report in general from the West, subSaharan Africa and Latin America. From East Asia there was a more cautious
response, although China rejected the notion of humanitarian intervention altogether.
Russia had only lukewarm support for the report. The US was opposed to the report,
reflecting its involvement with Iraq and desire to avoid commitments not reflecting its
national interest. Overall, almost all governments did not want to commit themselves
‘to criteria that would require military action’.
Current debate on humanitarian intervention
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Those opposed to intervention argue that the concept of responsibility to intervene
has the potential to define some states as civilised and others as uncivilised. Another
argument is that our first responsibility should be to international order and
humanitarian intervention undermines international peace and security by
undermining state sovereignty – but can there be international peace and security if
genocidal regimes are permitted? One pacifist argument against humanitarian
intervention is based on the destruction and suffering that military actions cause – but
is it possible to learn from earlier operations to increase the likelihood that future
interventions will have far fewer casualties?
Those indifferent to or sceptical about intervention argue there has been a lack of
focus on humanitarian intervention issues since Sept 11, and the “responsibility to
protect” doesn’t address a lack of political will to intervene.
Optimists about intervention argue the ICISS Report is an important first step,
reflecting a general international consensus, and now a strategy is needed to mobilise
the necessary political will.
Future of humanitarian intervention
Future humanitarian interventions are threatened by deaths of intervening forces not
being popular at home, limited resources, and the need for involvement of the US
military in anything large-scale. The war in Iraq has damaged political support for future
interventions on humanitarian grounds. However, perhaps there is still at least some
level of global support for intervention in cases of gross human rights abuses, despite
Sept 11, Afghanistan and Iraq eg calls for intervention into Darfur. We need to persevere
and continue to debate what is best to do: ‘Extraordinary and excruciating dilemmas are
raised by some of the situations we observe across the world, but throwing up one’s
hands at the horror of it all or raining down curses on all the world does not help us to
address them.’ (Michael J. Smith)
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Section Four: State Human Rights Dilemmas – Refugees and Asylum
Seekers
Definitions
Refugee
 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – refugees are those who are
outside their country of nationality and unable or unwilling to return to it due to a
‘well founded fear of persecution’ by their state because of their political beliefs,
race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group.
 The Convention only relates to those who are outside their country – not internally
displaced people.
 Those seeking refugee status must prove there is a well-founded fear of persecution if
they are returned to their state. The definition applies only to persecution by the
person’s state, not other actors. There are only a limited range of reasons for which a
person may be persecuted under the Convention eg it doesn’t include women fleeing
persecution because of their gender.
 The Organisation of African Unity expanded on this definition to include those
fleeing famine, natural disasters or ongoing war:
‘every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to
seek refuge in another place outside his country of nationality’
Asylum seeker
 Those who seek asylum at or inside another state’s borders.
 Principle of non-refoulement under the Convention – states cannot refuse entry to an
asylum seeker if to do so would mean the person has to go back to the state where
they are likely to face persecution. But, under the Convention states do not have a
duty to admit refugees – this often forces refugees into temporary arrangements.
Economic migrants
 Those arriving at other states seeking a better standard of living.
 Should we deny refuge to those seeking to escape a life of poverty?
A dramatic increase in claims for asylum in Western states since the 1980s
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There were approximately 13,000 claims for refugee status in Western Europe per
year in the 1970s. These claims dramatically increased in 1980s and by the end of
2005 there were 374,000 claims for refugee status throughout Europe.
This figure is relatively low compared with the total number of refugees throughout
the world by the end of 2005 – 8.4 million. However, this figure excludes others who
have been internally displaced or have not satisfied the UN definition of refugee but
are considered to be ‘of concern’ to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) – in 2005 there were 12.4 million of these people. Therefore, by the end
of 2005 there were 20.8 million people of concern to the UNHCR.
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Increases in refugee numbers since the 1980s have partly been a reflection of greater
communication and ease of transportation between developing and developed
countries. Democratic states have generally responded to increased numbers of
asylum seekers by preventing and deterring their arrival.
States have to deal with questions such as: Who has priority of asylum with scarce
number of places? Should we restrict rights of refugees in order to maximise number
of places overall? If so, to what extent? Should we give greater priority to asylum
seekers over other refugees because of their proximity? Should we discriminate
against those seeking migration because of economic hardship?
Refugees and State Borders
There has been a conflict between asylum seekers claiming refuge from persecution and
to gain an adequate standard of living, and citizens of a state wanting to limit access to
state’s resources and territory.
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Over the past 30 years, Western states have restricted the rights of refugees to enter
and settle, while still acknowledging they have legal responsibilities under the
Refugee Convention.
The state system means that individuals need to belong to a state to ensure their
protection. Thus the state is central to the future welfare of those fleeing persecution
and seeking refuge, and state borders are most significant. Borders define who can
live within a state and who is not allowed to; they define belonging. Refugees,
particularly onshore refugees or asylum seekers, challenge these notions of borders.
Approaching Refugees from Different Moral Perspectives
(based on Matthew J. Gibney)
1. Partial or Communitarian View
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According to this view, ‘states [are] distinct cultural communities possessing a right
to self-determination which justifies priority for the interests of citizens over those of
refugees in entrance decisions.’ This ‘right of states to self-determination grows out
of a claim about the entitlements of men and women to give public expression to their
shared culture.’ (Gibney)
This promotes the benefits of shared culture in that it provides a secure and stable
form of identity, and it shapes our sense of self and our lives. How we regard
ourselves is influenced by how well our shared culture is faring – whether it is
prospering or being threatened. This influences the choices that a cultural group
makes about what is morally desirable for its group, eg whether to protect the
“integrity” of its cultural community from outsiders.
This view promotes the virtue of the state as having the sovereign right to decide who
will enter, and implies that outsiders entering the state may threaten the
distinctiveness of the cultural community.
Partialists tend to share the view that a legitimate refugee policy should reflect the
values and interests of a state’s citizens. Some consider that these values and
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interests are reflected in the results of democratic processes – what the electorate
accepts is legitimate.
Challenges to the adequacy of partialism as a moral perspective:
 The assumption that states have a single national identity to protect denies the
ethnic and cultural diversity of many states.
 The fact that people in control of a state may be able to protect its borders is
mostly due to their (or their predecessors’) luck in seizing a particular piece of
land, or their use of force to do so.
 Why should the rights of citizens of a state have priority over citizens of the
world? Why should we differentiate between those inside and outside of a state?
 We also need to consider the influence of a state over “cultural identity” (“us”
versus “them”), that a state’s identity is likely to change over time, and whose
conception of a culture’s identity should be privileged?
 If we can show that refugees have been harmed and that the state they are trying
to enter is responsible for that harm, then perhaps we could see states as having a
duty to accept outsiders for entry – the state as agent.
2. Impartial or Liberal View
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According to this view, states are considered to be “cosmopolitan moral agents” that
have to take into account the interests of citizens and outsiders equally.
Liberals tend to support this view by promoting the importance of individual liberty
and that we are all citizens of a shared humanity. Liberals also tend to highlight that
borders have helped to reproduce poverty and so free international movement is
justified.
Under the impartial or liberal view we can see a focus on human commonality as
opposed to the partial view’s emphasis on cultural particularity.
Thus under the impartial view, states have to give equal weighting to the interests of
their citizens and to those who wish to leave their own states and enter theirs.
Challenges to impartialism as a moral perspective:
 Some argue that most people identify more with being citizens of a particular
state than citizens of a shared humanity. There is a special bond between fellow
citizens of a state that gives rise to a sense of having greater obligations to our
fellow citizens than to others.
 If liberals promote the right of individuals to emigrate, there must also be a right
to immigration. Could states and their institutions cope with the greater level of
movement of those seeking asylum across borders that would accompany rights to
immigration?
 Some highlight that liberal states promote the free international movement of
goods and services but restrict the international movement of people. Thus they
highlight that at least some liberals are inconsistent in their views on the
desirability of free international movement.
Refugees and Liberal Democratic States
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Democratic states now tend to consider that the needs of their own citizens have priority
over the needs of outsiders – this limits their ability to respond to refugees.
Other factors that have affected democratic states’ responses to refugees:
 It is harder to resist claims when an asylum seeker is in or at the borders of the state,
or the state has contributed to their plight.
 The costs involved with assessing the status of refugees and detention policies.
 The rate of economic growth and unemployment within the state.
 The degree to which refugees share an ethnic and cultural background with the
majority of citizens of a state.
 The perceptions of numbers of refugees arriving.
Seeking Asylum in Europe
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Large numbers of refugees started to arrive in Europe in the 1970s – from Chile,
Uruguay, Argentina and Indo-China. Unplanned arrivals increased in the 1980s
reflecting an increase in internal conflicts worldwide, and the decreasing economic
growth in Western Europe meant fewer migrants were accepted. There was a peak of
700,000 arrivals in Western Europe in 1992 – more than 60% arrived in Germany,
with most not facing persecution but seeking a better life.
Germany amended its constitution in 1993 to remove the guarantee of right to asylum
after shouldering more than its fair share of refugees – Germany’s share of refugees
in Western Europe fell from 63% in early 1990s to 23% by 1999. Other German
initiatives included measures to prevent the admission of refugees and facilitate their
return. Other Western Europe governments followed and implemented measures
such as requiring asylum seekers to have proper documentation; fining transport
companies found carrying asylum seekers; building the capacity of Central European
governments to assess claims and provide protection; applying more strict
interpretations of the Convention; automatically detaining asylum seekers; and
restricting employment and family reunion rights.
Asylum seekers turned to people smugglers to try to secure refuge somewhere safe.
The common EU policy with Maastricht Treaty in force in 1993 meant that internal
barriers to commerce and free movement of people were removed. But restrictions
on asylum followed with fears that the number of refugees arriving would massively
increase. A number of EU conventions and directives since the early 1990s have
sought to tighten and coordinate admission policies.
Seeking Asylum in the UK – the Kurds
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The Kurds have been one of the most heavily repressed minorities over the past
century. They have resided mostly in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The massacre of Kurds
in Iraq in 1988 killed 6,000 and 40,000 fled to Turkey – 100,000 thought to have been
killed by Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq during the 1980s.
Repression in Turkey led to Kurdish protests against the government. Martial law
was effectively declared in a Kurdish region of eastern Turkey in 1989, leading many
to seek asylum elsewhere.
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There was also a mass exodus of Kurds from Iraq in 1991 after an anti-government
uprising failed to topple Hussein – 1.4 million are thought to have fled to Iran and
Turkey. The publicity of this exodus led to the adoption of a UN resolution
condemning the repression of Kurds in Iraq and a European Parliament resolution
condemning the repression and supporting troops to guarantee safe zones.
However, efforts by Kurds to seek asylum in Western countries like the UK were not
so well received. There was no large-scale resettlement programme in the UK for
Kurds – possibly due to their Muslim backgrounds and the anti-communist leaning of
the Thatcher government. Instead, safe havens for Kurds in Iraq were focused on.
Sections of the UK press, government and community questioned the motives of
Kurdish refugees – they were accused of being economic migrants. Some Kurds
appear to have been denied refugee status in the UK when they had grounds for
fearing persecution in Turkey. But there were also great difficulties for those given
asylum in the UK – many didn’t speak English and had to adjust to urban life, many
suffered health problems associated with torture and trauma, they were susceptible to
racist attacks, and many faced difficulties finding work and adequate housing.
Seeking Asylum in Australia
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By 1978 more than 3.5 million immigrants had arrived in Australia, reflecting the
view that Australia needed to populate to protect itself from invasion, to make the
most of its natural resources and to develop its industries.
Australia has a history of being somewhat sympathetic to the plight of refugees. Eg
Australia was one of the first to sign the 1951 Convention and accede to its 1967
protocal, committing itself to the principle of non-refoulement. In the late 1970s the
Australian government accepted 2,000 Vietnamese refugees who arrived by boat, and
facilitated the UNHCR and US responses to resettling other Vietnamese refugees
from Thailand and Malaysia so that onshore arrivals would be minimised. By 1981
Australia had accepted 50,000 Indo-Chinese refugees and the government committed
itself to accepting 15,000 more per year. Between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s
Australia accepted 10-12,000 refugees per year for resettlement.
But by the late 1980s, onshore or unauthorised arrivals to Australia had dramatically
increased – 27,000 asylum seekers arrived between 1989 and 1991 compared with
520 between 1982 and 1984. This alarmed the government and refugee resettlement
numbers were decreased, and prevention and deterrence methods introduced.
Legislation was passed permitting all those arriving by boat to be detained, often in a
remote area, until they left Australia or were given an entry permit. Asylum seekers
were labelled as “queue-jumpers”.
Further action to prevent the arrival and admission of refugees was adopted by the
Australian government in 2001. The government prevented the Norwegian ship the
Tampa from landing in Australia with the 438 Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers it had
rescued from a sinking boat. Australian military personnel instead took the asylum
seekers to Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Most were later found to be genuine
refugees. Legislation was introduced removing the right to claim refugee status on
any Australian island off the mainland, and any right to permanent residence for
unauthorised arrivals. There was an extraordinary level of support for the
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government’s actions within Australia – the government used it to their electoral
advantage.
Numbers of asylum seekers arriving in Australia have been relatively low – in 2000
Europe had over 400,000 people seeking asylum while Australia had just over 4,000,
and there were millions in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. Since the onset of the
legislation outlined above, Australia has received very few onshore arrivals.
The mandatory detention policy and temporary protection visas given to these
refugees has added to the trauma many have already experienced in their own
countries.
Whilst the majority of Australians appeared to support Australian government actions
to deter asylum seekers arriving by boat, a growing number of Australians have
expressed outrage. A collection of NGOs has emerged to campaign on behalf of
these asylum seekers. Some UN HRs bodies have also communicated their concerns
to the Australian government eg the UNHCR. This collection of NGOs and activists
have contributed to some changes in government policy eg most remote detention
centres have now been closed and all children and their families were released from
detention into community release programmes in July 2005.
What do these cases tell us about these states and refugees?
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We can see the partial view reflected in these government policies – the policing of
borders to prevent unauthorised arrivals, strict quotas on offshore refugees (if any),
and the promotion of the state as having the sovereign right to decide who will enter.
Approaching Refugees from a Humanitarian View
According to Gibney, another way of viewing refugees is from a humanitarian view –
‘states have an obligation to assist refugees when the costs of doing so are low.’
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Low costs = minimal sacrifices needed to be made by citizens of the state, reducing
the likelihood of a backlash against refugees. Eg when the inflow of refugees doesn’t
threaten the livelihoods of a state’s citizens or put a significant strain on social
security programmes.
But we also need to consider the economic advantages of immigration. Some
economic studies have found that many economies have benefited from immigration.
Responsibilities for states arising from the humanitarian approach:
1. Governments should search for ways to provide more protection for refugees at
low cost. In particular, boosting resettlement programmes.
2. Governments should still protect refugees arriving at their border because until
steps are taken to increase resettlement and share the burden, they need to meet
their moral obligations under the non-refoulement principle.
3. Governments should encourage a better reception to refugees from citizens and
greater international cooperation in sharing the burden.
4. Governments should work towards overcoming the causes of refugee flows.
5. Refugees should also be involved in how their “problem” is defined and what are
acceptable solutions to them.
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