=
Aircraft Stores Compatibility
AGARDOgraph 300 – XX Draft V 0.1
RTO SCI FT3
Wing Commander Malcolm G. Tutty, MEng, FIE(Aust), FRAeS
Air Force Headquarters
RAAF Base Edinburgh, SA 5111
Royal Australian Air Force and University of South Australia
Preliminary Draft for discussion and other National Input
AGARDograph 300-XX
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
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1-2
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AGARDograph 300- XX
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Aircraft Stores Compatibility
AGARDOgraph 300 – XX
RTO SCI FT3
Wing Commander Malcolm G. Tutty, MEng, FIE(Aust), FRAeS
Director Simulation, Trials & Ranges - Air Force Headquarters
RAAF Base Edinburgh, SA 5111
Royal Australian Air Force and University of South Australia
malcolm.tutty@defence.gov.au
We are in the midst of another technological revolution – an information age, a time of near-infinite connectedness.
Information storage and retrieval … is the manifest purpose of the digital revolution.
Relationships in these systems are mutual: you influence your neighbours, and your neighbours influence you.
All emergent systems are built of this kind of feedback, the two way connections that foster higher-level learning. …
But it is both the promise and the peril of swarm logic that the higher-level behaviour is almost impossible to predict in advance.
Johnson (2001) pp 113, 120 & 233
Joint “Handoff”of DMPIs in the real world needs testing & practice in the Commands not just in the “M&S Space”
Colonel Ross Roberts, USMC, Commander JFIITT, ITEA C4ISR Symposium, April 2008
Figure 1 A classic F-111 Aardvark Strike Aircraft Stores Configuration
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
ABSTRACT
This AGARDOgragh provides an overview of the contemporary aircraft stores clearance and certification
processes used to establish the extant of network-enabled aircraft stores compatibility.
1.0
INTRODUCTION
1.1
In recent years there has been a revolutionary shift in the focus of the profession of arms.
The shift has occurred away from the platform-centric or systems view popularised by the
politicians and media as to how many tanks, planes and boats are needed for a defence force, to
that of a capability management construct that is to be network-enabled, interoperable and endeffects based. This is being achieved by treating the military capabilities to
implement those operational end-effects as more families of systems that need to
be managed across the whole life cycle. We are today in the middle of this
transformation. In the aerospace domain, air power is, in the main, derived from
‘aircraft’1 and ‘stores’ (ie. weapons – such as the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb
shown at Figure 2 to the right, fuel tanks, and countermeasure dispensibles)2 being integrated and
establishing the extent of the aircraft stores compatibility for the carriage and release operating
limitations of the aircraft stores configurations such as that shown at Figure 1 - which is absolutely
key to achieving such combat capabilities and effectiveness against the enemy.
1.2
The level of interoperability of aircraft and stores is vital to any nation state being able to
fly and fight with other elements of their defence forces and their allies. This AGARDOgraph has
as its central premise the notion that future joint coalition based defence forces will inevitably have
key operational and support systems network enabled with sensor and engagement platforms
connected to it. Therefore, a key question being asked by most nation states is how soon can we
make the more operationally important parts of our joint forces ‘network enabled’ whilst retaining
the level of interoperability between all these families of systems at acceptable levels of cost,
schedule and performance. Standardised aircraft stores compatibility analysis and testing has been
shown repeatedly to accelerate incorporation of these stores on existing aircraft platforms thereby
enhancing an air forces warfighting capability, significantly improving the safety of it’s personnel
and the timeliness of attaining operational readiness.
1.3
The article is primarily based on research undertaken by the author under Royal Australian
Air Force sponsorship at the University of South Australia in cooperation with the NATO
Research & Technology Organisation (RTO). Tutty (2005) addressed the current initiatives of the
military and commercial standardisation organisations that will affect how future aerospace
weapon systems will be integrated to achieve interoperability between joint,
allied, and coalition forces and the approach being taken to ensure that
aircraft stores configurations, such as that shown at Figure 2, are compatible
for carriage and release.
1
2
Which includes: the air or space vehicles’ Data Management System, Navigation, Communication, data links, ground control
station, electronic surveillance and warfare systems such as Radar, Electro-Optic / Infra-red, Acoustics, EW Self-Protection, etc
and the Armament / Ordnance Stores Management / Fire Control Systems.
Note that the term aircraft store is actually much broader as it is any device intended for internal or external carriage and mounted
on aircraft suspension or release equipment, whether or not the device is intended for separation [ie. employment or jettison] from
the aircraft.
1-4
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1.4
However, the task of certifying stores for carriage and separation from aircraft has always
proven to be inherently exploratory, high risk and demanding in terms of lives, cost and time with
much being learned over the decades of aerospace experimentation and flight testing. Despite the
significant advances in analytical tools, Modelling and Simulation (M&S) and test techniques, the
multitude of variables across the engineering and scientific disciplines ultimately
relies on the test team to prove the operational suitability, airworthiness and
effectiveness of the aircraft stores combinations in flight. Therefore this article
draws on the detailed engineering provided in other articles on fixed and rotary
wing aircraft, the air to air and surface missile design principles, good design
principles of Lidwell et al (2005) and is written in conjunction, and is tightly coupled, with the
AGARDOgraph 300-yy on Weapons Systems Testing.
1.5
Delimitation. This article intentionally addresses the current recommended practices used
for determining the compatibility of non-nuclear stores.
1.6
As some readers may know, Australia does not currently indigenously design, develop or
manufacture complete military aircraft or aerospace weapons systems, as such activities are
conducted overseas by our many Allies. So why did an Australian get asked to write this article?
Despite Lawrence Hargraves3 early research in aerospace and various concerted efforts in World
War I and II to generate an indigenous aerospace design and manufacturing industry, much of the
Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) aircraft stores compatibility / clearance work has been
intentionally minimised in many areas by equipment and information being provided by the
original operators of the aircraft who have previously certified weapons similar in type and role to
those intended for use by the ADF. This national strategy also provided a basis for approving the
aircraft stores clearances by analogy and limited testing when complete aircraft and its weapons
systems were purchased from a single country such as the UK and the US for example. This
situation changed significantly in the 1980’s with the ADF introducing air armament into all three
Services that were not currently operated by the original aircraft operators or had not previously
been cleared for use on other remotely similar aircraft4 by other competent military airworthiness
authorities. 5
1.7
These imperatives required Australia to not only be self-reliant in undertaking aircraft
stores compatibility in support of Flight Clearances and the certification of aircraft stores
capabilities, but to be actively engaged in ensuring that international standards and
methods being used that are suitable to the ADF, the Australian environment6 and the
levels of interoperability (ie. common, interchangeable or compatible) identified with
our allies and coalition partners. Historically, this has been primarily conducted via
active involvement in a number of international standardisation fora between the nations
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the four US air forces. The
primary one being that of the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC), The Technical
Cooperation Program (TTCP) in science and technology, and now with the NATO Air Armament
3
4
5
6
In 1889, Hargarves invented the radial rotary engine, which became the standard engine for aircraft up until after WW1. He also
discovered the aerodynamic advantages of a curved wing and led the way to powered flight with his box-kite experiments at
Stanwell Park, NSW.
The prime example is the RAAF becoming the sole operator of the unequalled F-111 Aardvark strike aircraft at Figure 1 since
1997 and the need to integrate standoff weapons to increase the aircraft’s survivability due to the prohibitive costs to
retrospectively incorporate low observable technology.
Further details of the range of aircraft stores combinations being acquired by the ADF now and into the future are covered in detail
at Tutty (2005) and the ADFs Defence Capability Plan 2009 at www.defence.gov.au/capability under Publications.
One should envisage Middle Eastern temperature extremes and conditions in Central Australia with high humidity thrown in as well
for good measure in the Northern Territory of Australia.
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
Panel (AAP) and RTO. The experience and successes with these international engagements and
developments with network-enabled weapons such as described at Figure 2 is clearly why the
author was asked to contribute several articles.
Figure 3. Network-enabled effects-based operations grids
2.0
BACKGROUND
If you are thoroughly conversant with tactics, you will recognise the enemy’s intentions and have many opportunities to win.
Miyamoto Musashi, Samurai Swordsman
2.1
The specialised discipline of aircraft stores compatibility using the latest scientific and
engineering advances was born during the Vietnam era. At that time, combat aircraft conceived
and purposely designed by the US for a nuclear attack mission against quantitatively superior
Soviet Forces blundering through the Fulda Gap in central Europe resulted in a lot of the same
aircraft being used operationally for multiple fighter and attack roles using conventional weapon in
numerous mixed loads or configurations in Vietnam. These mixed loads of aircraft stores
configurations were anecdotely cleared by the air forces in the theatre of operations by trial and
error (including the loss of aircraft) in determining safe carriage and employment envelopes and
china graph marks on the windshield for aim point offsets in place of ballistic tables and todays
computer generated shot cues!
2.2
In the era of the US applying Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara’s operational
analysis and mass production techniques for non-nuclear armament he had brought from the motor
industry, the four US air forces suffered significant reliability problems with aircraft structures and
the new electronic systems failing repeatedly with abysmal weapons accuracy and effectiveness
compared to the promises and/or expectations of the ever-confident designers and contractors
applying traditional discipline based engineering. How did that come about?
2.3
At the beginning of World War II, 50% of bombs typically fell within three miles of there
intended target during daylight and five miles from the target at night. By the end of the war,
improved bombing techniques and the Norden Bomb sight for Allies helped reduce the circle of
error to about 1,000 yards. This level of accuracy still required that a huge amount of aircraft lay
1-6
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down a ‘carpet’ of bombs destroying a whole square mile of a city just to be certain of hitting a
single military target. Needless to say, collateral damage was often extremely high. By the
Vietnam era, while the accuracy had increased from the World War II and the Korean War
performance, tens of weapons were still required to “service” the desired mean point of impact (or
DMPI). This meant repeated aircraft sorties into what was becoming a very hostile electronic
warfare and surface to air environment with losses increasing commensurately. With the
development of the nuclear bomb, accuracy had became much less important during the preVietnam era. A single aircraft carrying a single gravity-released bomb in its weapon bay was
capable of causing immense destruction to the enemy. As the Vietnam War progressed, these
smaller jets took on a dual air-to-ground role as they were modified to engage the enemy in limited
conventional wars with non-nuclear weapons. These fighters and bombers predominantly carried
their stores externally, which causes a great number of problems for both captive carriage and
weapon separation with bombing accuracy being a tertiary level consideration. The strategy of
leaving it up to the operational forces to find unsatisfactory carriage and release may have worked
up until Vietnam, but the high carriage and release airspeeds at or near Mach 1, when coupled with
high delivery angles for unguided ordnance caused the loss of numerous crew members and
aircraft. Aircraft performance was degraded not only by the weight of the store, but also by the
drag, especially at high dynamic pressures. Flying qualities deteriorated due to the big changes in
aerodynamic coefficients, aircraft centre of gravity, and moments of inertia. The weight and
aerodynamic properties of wing-mounted stores also caused aeroelastic or flutter effects that
seriously undermined mission capability and safety. The stores themselves suffered damage and
structural failures due to the harsh transonic aerodynamic environment. Separations from these
fighter/bombers were no longer from 1 g level flight, but often from steep, high speed / transonic
dives to try and improve the accuracy of the weapons which were having problems with
aerodynamic stability during separation, which not only affected ballistic accuracy, but in some
cases resulted in damaging store-to-aircraft collisions.
2.4
In 1966, the US Air Force recognised that aircraft stores compatibility was a separate
requirement and initiated a new program within the AF Research Laboratories called “SEEK
EAGLE”. The goal of the SEEK EAGLE program was to define and undertake a
formal process for aircraft stores certification. The SEEK EAGLE effort
pioneered the use of wind tunnel testing and analytical techniques to minimise
and increase the safety of flight testing required for stores certification in the
USAF. They also began to compile engineering data on stores and aircraft to aid
in future certifications. The 1970’s saw the development of multiple ejector
racks, which not only solved some of the separation problems (if they had dual
ejector feet), but also allowed aircraft to carry more weapons. This decade also
saw great advances in actually guiding weapons to their intended target. Air-to-air
missiles were developed to home in on either radar or infrared energy while air-to-grounds bombs
were designed to guide toward laser designator energy. These advances in ejector racks and guided
munitions resulted in millions of possible aircraft stores combinations and mixed loads of weapons
that required certification and challenged the test community to keep up with the flight clearance
requirements. Finally in the 1980’s, the SEEK EAGLE effort had a direct impact on improving
weapons accuracy by updating and verifying ballistic trajectory analysis methods, which
subsequently led to the development of the first truly computerised weapon delivery which are
now called the integrated mission planning systems using the same algorithms instead of different,
simplified models.
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
2.5
It took until 1984, however, for a standard (see Brunson (2002) for contemporary views on
what standards should be ie a "common and repeated use rule, guideline or characteristic for
activities or their results aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given
context") to be agreed to by the all the four US air forces (the Marine Corps relies on the US Navy
for its acquisition) as each undertook its own aircraft stores certification programs, often for the
same aircraft and stores. Eventually Charles Epstein (CAPT, USN Rtd)7, serving in the USAF
Armament Research Laboratory at Eglin AFB, FL, succeeded in having the minimum acceptable
certification requirements and test methods guidance in MIL-HDBK-244 (1975), Guide to Aircraft
Stores Compatibility agreed to by all the Services and a tri-service standard published as MILSTD-1763 (1984), Aircraft / Stores Certification Procedures. The publication of this document
also coincided with the author starting his post-graduate career and was soon found to be the most
comprehensive and useful design and T&E framework available for a common understanding as to
critical assumptions.
2.6
The end of the twentieth century brought with it improved weapon aerodynamics and
propulsion systems that increased the standoff range of many weapons and enabled aircrew to
employ them from outside of the enemy’s lethal reach. Survivability was also enhanced by the
revolution of stealth technology, which has driven weapons back inside of internal weapon bays just like they were during World War II. This time, however, the weapons must survive the
punishing 170 dB + aeroacoustic environment and high employment ejection forces required for
employment of stores from today’s high performance aircraft. However, during the US Secretary
of Defence Bill Perry’s anti-standards crusade of the mid-1990’s the standard that brought us an
unprecedented increase in effectiveness and interoperability in the 1991 Gulf War I required
considerable NATO, ASCC and Australian input as well as a focus on ballistic accuracy
verification and safe escape prior to being republished as MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998).
2.7
In countries such as Canada and Australia, the Services relied heavily on the previous
stores certifications on specific aircraft. In the main, this served most nations well, provided the
originating service included the aircraft stores configurations these nations required. The Israeli’s
were probably the first to discover significant accuracy problems with the US F-4 and the F-16
aircraft with some weapons not actually used by the USAF during in-service training and/or real
world operations. Therefore the accuracy figures were not being verified and it was not easy to
retrospectively incorporate physics-based correction factors. This instigated a significant
accuracy verification program on F-4, F-16, F-111A/C/D/E/F/G, F-15E and a lot of other non-US
aircrafts in the 1980’s when the aircraft computers were starting to be able to solve the weapon
ballistic equations in real time. However, whilst the accuracy of the ballistic solutions was
improving it was still relying on wind tunnel models with significant tolerances and fusion
problems between the different models used for free-stream ballistic, near-field separations and in
retrospect were still overly empirical in nature. Even today, stores separations and ballistic
analyses is a high art form rather than a straight forward science driving the need for inexpensive
guided air-to-ground weapons – a topic for another paper focusing on GPS-aided munitions for
example.
2.8
Transformation. Today, rather than 50 different aircraft being sent on a mission to
destroy or service/negate a DMPI as was done in the early 1980’s, today’s shooter aircraft can
7
In fact, Charlie Epstein is the classic voice on the well-known, original ASC “Horror Movie” which sought to highlight
lessons learned the hard way.
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simultaneously hit as many targets as there weapons on the aircraft – this is what has caused the
current tactical use of ‘kill boxes’ cited earlier wherein aircraft are launched with a mixed load of
ordnance without necessarily a primary/secondary target specifically being planned for in advance.
This has fundamentally transformed intelligence and mission planning / munitions effectiveness
assessments as we shall see – driving us toward the network focused warfighting model discussed.
3.0
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
An undefined problem has an infinite number of solutions.
Robert A. Humphrey
3.1
Systems Engineering. What is known as the systems engineering process is basically an
iterative process of deriving/defining requirements at each level of the system, beginning at the top
(the system level) and propagating those requirements through a series of steps which eventually
leads to a preferred system concept, INCOSE SE Handbook (2000). Further iteration and design
refinement leads successively to preliminary design, detail design, and finally, the approved
design. At each successive level there are supporting, lower-level design iterations which are
necessary to gain confidence for the decisions taken. During each iteration, many concept
alternatives are postulated, analysed, and evaluated in trade-off studies. Systems engineering is
involved in all steps and leads during the Mission Analysis, Requirements Analysis, Concept
Analysis, and Conceptual Design phases down into the subsystem level, and integrates many other
activities including design, design changes and upgrades; Goals & Objectives for element iteration;
customer feedback, and operational support. The basic engine for systems engineering is an
iterative process that expands on the common sense strategy of:
3.2

understanding a problem before you attempt to solve it,

examining alternative solutions (do not jump to a "point design"), and

verify that the selected solution is correct before continuing the definition activities or
proceeding to the next problem.
The basic steps in the systems engineering process are:

Define the System Objectives (User's Needs from the systems level Operational Concept
Documents (OCD) and subsystem level Concept of Operations (Conops));

Establish Performance Requirements (Requirements Analysis);

Establish the Functionality (Functional Analysis);

Evolve Design and Operations Concepts (Architecture Synthesis);

Select a Baseline (Through Cost/Benefit Trades);

Verify the Baseline Meets Requirements (User's Needs); and

Iterate the Process Through Lower Level Trades (Decomposition)
3.3
The context of systems engineering applied by ASCENG in support of major acquisitions,
introduction into service and supporting in-service operations, is summarised in the systems engineering
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
process at Appendix B and the top level overview of the functional flow block diagram (FFBD) at
Appendix C. A useful way to conceptualise systems engineering using the approach recommended by
ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) is to think of two systems - the product system and the producing system. The
product system is the system being developed - like introducing a new mission system or aircraft stores
combination into service where you have a classic ‘system of systems’ hierarchy at work. On the other
hand, the system that enables the developing is the producing system. It is mainly the ‘producing system’
that needs to be considered so as to ensure that the engineers provide ‘developed systems’ that work with
other systems with no unacceptable "emergent properties" and can therefore certify the extant of this in
design approval certificates. All ADF authorised engineering organisations with a stake in meeting the
Operational Concept have a top-level engineering management system framework based on ANSI/EIA
STD 632 (1999) (and MIL-STD-499B and MIL-STD-1521B (1985) prior to that8) and the consistent
approaches of Blanchard and Fabrycky (1998) that can be easily tailored to the scope of the aircraft stores
certification effort being proposed. Upon receiving any tasking, ASC organisations such as ASCENG,
scope the range of technical and flying support expected and tailors the project planning activities according
to the amount of expected work. It also conducts a Risk Assessment reviewing all the technical, cost and
schedule criteria (developed from the software industry) using the criteria at Appendix D.
The
establishment of these business rules are vital to all the potential organisations involved being able to
quickly scope out the level of support required in the timeframe and anticipated budget available. The
ADF has been successfully halting projects in recent years when the allocated funds patently do not match
the performance requested with the expected budget allocations and the level of (im)maturity of the
contending systems.
The involvement by all parties, including representatives of the ultimate User, in the Conceptual /
Functional Design Review will commit to an architecture (which may already exist hopefully and be
properly systems engineered for an Operational Concept that is analogous to an existing ADF
OCD/Conops), the Preliminary Design Review is the ‘design-to baseline’ where we commit to
Configuration Item functionality and the Critical Design Review is our ‘build-to baseline’ that commits us
to manufacture. Appendix B has been extremely useful over the year to ensure that all parties actually
understand when some of the 'systems engineering products' actually need to be prepared, reviewed and
approved. The degree of formality used in the design reviews and studies needs to be agreed in the projectspecific Engineering Management Plans especially for all safety critical items (ie, anything with explosives
in it and/or slim margins of safety in the structures), based on the experience levels and stability of the
organisations involved in the subsystems and similar sized projects. Much is based on the trust between
the organisations involved to keep the Operational Concept for the system and it’s associated measures of
performance. If considerable personnel turnover is expected over the life of the projects implementation
then more formality is usually needs to be put in place to address such risks9.
3.4
Significant Changes.
3.5
The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility includes an engineering review, called a 'Judgement
of Significance' in Australia, by qualified ASC Design Engineers to determine what impact it will have on
the following engineering disciplines for each aircraft stores combination required to determine if a
8
INCOSE advice to the Systems Engineering Society of Australia (SESA) is that the enterprise level ANSI/EIA STD 632 progress as
an ISO standard separate to ISO 15288 has been “slow”. A draft of the US DoD benchmarks for current systems engineering
approaches and Technical Reviews, MIL-STD-499C and draft of MIL-STD-1521C respectively have been postulated by the USAF
as replacements within the US DoD. Note that MIL-STD- 499B formed the basis for what is now ANSI/EIA STD 632 and MIL-STD1521B is still used during almost all defence related reviews. Should such documents gain common acceptance again, it should be
several years before they may be useable as a framework.
9
This in turn creates a conundrum wherein the extra rigour, if not properly supervised, reduces effectiveness in trying to achieve the
efficiency! Their seems to be a trade-off curve between efficiency and effectiveness where one may be too efficient sacrificing your
effectiveness and where too much rigid bureaucracy kills efficiency and also has a corresponding secondary effect of impacting
effectiveness, since you are not improving the warfighting capability when nothing makes it to the field or it gets there after the war is
over! Courtesy Colonel W.D. Hack (2009)
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‘significant change’ as defined in MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998) (and summarised in Appendix A) is made to an
aircraft stores configuration in the areas of:

Fit & Function iaw MIL-STD-1289D (2003);

Structural & Environmental iaw inter alia MIL-STD-8591 (2003) and MIL-STD-810F (2000);

Aeroelasticity;

Captive Compatibility, Flying Qualities & Performance;

Employment & Jettison; and

Ballistics and OFP Validation & Verification, Safe Escape & Danger Areas (Safety Templates).
3.6
This engineering review is most important for establishing such a degree of
interoperability. Use of the ‘significant change’ criteria now gives the design engineers some
tolerances that enable minor changes to be progress without the huge systemic and organisational
overheads of traditional ‘point design’ engineering done without interchangeability and prior
thinking in mind. Use of such methodologies clearly shows the maturity of any organization
processes and leadership.
ALITITUDE ( ft)
30,000
CARRIAGE
300 KCAS
20,000
400 KCAS
500 KCAS
EMPLOYMENT
10,000
600 KCAS
700KCAS
0
0
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
MACH NUMBER
Figure 4. An Aircraft Stores Configuration Operating Limitation
3.7
Depending on the maturity of the stores and/or aircraft, there are four separate
compatibility situations involved when authorisation of a store on an aircraft is required. The four
situations, in order of increasing risk, are:

Adding ‘old’ inservice stores to the authorised stores list of ‘old’ aircraft.

Adding ‘old’ stores to the authorised stores list of a ‘new’ aircraft.
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY

Adding ‘new’10 stores to the authorised stores list of an ‘old’ aircraft11.

Adding ‘new’ or modified stores to the authorised stores list of ‘new’ or modified aircraft.
3.8
The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility will determine the operating limitations that will
then be used by the aircrew in their Flight Manuals as shown at Figure 4 (which also happens to be that of
the aircraft stores configuration shown at Figure 2. The aircraft stores configurations and expected
operating limitations are always included in any good OCD / Conops as they may not need to be the
maximum that the aircraft and stores can achieve (ie. Parent pylon versus multiple ejector rack
configurations typically will have different limits).
For more mature aircraft and/or stores, and
consequently those with less risk, the process is specifically tailored against the OCD / Conops such that
only those phases required to be conducted to introduce the store into service need to be undertaken. For
example, if all the aircraft stores configurations have been successfully demonstrated or certified by known
T&E and airworthiness certification agencies to operating limits that satisfy the User’ s Operational
Requirement, an aircraft stores combination could be introduced directly into service with minimal risk.
While this strategy has been extremely successful in minimising the work with a specific aircraft stores
configuration in an acquisition process that is platform-centric, it is less successful in the author’s view
when viewed in the context of designing interchangeable stores on fewer platform types.
Figure 5 An Aircraft Stores Weapon Danger Area - for US air to ground ordnance training using a 99.99%
Containment at 95% Confidence Level
3.9
Using the well established ‘significant change’ criteria and the maturity of the aircraft stores
combination, engineering personnel can now integrate the operational requirements against the current
Engineering Management Plans for key system segments and predict the sequence of organisational
interactions necessary to optimise the schedule. This will enable the capability to be entered into service
and minimise the programmatic risk whilst ensuring the required levels of operational suitability and
10
11
Or adding new aircraft stores configurations and/or expanding the flight operating envelope.
It can also be argued that depending on the novelty / technology readiness level (TRL) of the ‘new’ aircraft or ‘new’ store - that
the second or third situation may actually need to be reversed. Store performance/integrity and unique (but undiscovered) aircraft
characteristics/environment can increase/decrease the risks between these two scenarios. This may in fact be the case for any
complex adaptive system and aircraft using active separation control techniques for example.
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effectiveness. Although, this is not formalised until after the Critical Design Review in an ASC Similarity
Survey, experienced personnel realise that selecting more mature aircraft and stores is fundamental to
minimising the risk to cost, schedule and performance and the amount of systems engineering required to
make configuration management, drawings and publications are made available with the equipment. One
key strategy for defence acquisition in future, is for smaller steps be taken in capability improvement
through Pre-Planned Product Improvements and a spiral concept throughout the systems life to meet
changing needs and OCDs, especially for avionic systems where computing power improvements clearly
outstrip the timeliness of the traditional defence acquisition processes. However, such a strategy needs to
be managed carefully as poor configuration management and logistics support may mean training, spares
and Technical Orders lag the changes such that confusion reigns. When managed properly within the
engineering and test communities incremental small changes introduce less risk in fielding new capabilities
in a timely manner.
3.10
The success of such a strategy to establish clear baselines with tolerances for ‘significant changes’
to control the update and amendment of extant ASC Engineering Data Packages and the associated ASC
Flight Clearances, is fundamental to the order of magnitude increase in new aircraft stores combination
being cleared as a result of the decision to update aircraft Operational Flight Programs (OFP) and the
acquisition of ADF unique aircraft stores configurations. During this process it is important to ensure
adequate integration between aircraft and store Authorised Engineering Organisations is undertaken by the
acquirers, to ensure a whole of system approach is maintained and Acquirer short sightedness is tempered
appropriately to support the sustainment phase. This will ensure that either the aircraft or weapon subsystems are not traded off or compromised without input from all key parties – ie the Operational User and
logistics infrastructure in addition to the engineer and tester. If it is required, the ASC authority will
independently conduct such reviews if not planned in the ADF Project Design Acceptance Strategy already
to ensure the whole of systems approach is maintained throughout the life-cycle.
Article I.
Results of Task Risk Assessment
Results
P-3 / FOSOW & LWT Nov 2005
for
tas
69.4%
k:
Results of Task Risk Assessment
Results for task:
AP-3C / MU90 Apr 2007
Overall
21.3%
Overall
I. Product Requirements
10.0%
I.
Product Requirements
75.0%
II. ASCENG Resources
12.5%
II.
External to Engineering Resources
67.2%
III.
35.7%
III.
Complexity of Engineering Exercise
Acquisition Staff Involved in the
Project
Method of Acquisition Forecasting
66.7%
Complexity
of
Clearance
Exercise
90.0%
IV. Staff involved in the Project
20.0%
IV.
71.4%
V. Method of forecasting
7.1%
V.
55.6%
VI. Method of Monitoring
22.2%
VI.
75.0%
VII.
16.7%
VII.
Development
adopted
Process
Method of Acquisition System
Monitoring
Acquisition System Development
Process Adopted
80 Questions of 80 answered.
Figure 6 ASC Risk Assessment Model Outcomes - using Tutty (2005)
3.11
As engineered systems became more complicated/complex including a multitude of software and
personnel interactions, the engineering disciplines and organisations involved sometimes became
fragmented and specialised in Conops (or Checklists management) to cope with this increasing complexity.
AGARDograph 300-XX
1 - 13
AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
Some organisations focused on the optimisation of their products and have lost sight of the overall system.
Each organisation perceived that their part must be optimal, using their own disciplinary criteria, and may
fail to recognise that all parts of a system do not have to be optimal for the system to perform optimally.
This inability to recognise that system requirements can differ from disciplinary requirements is a constant
problem in major systems developments. The systems engineering process can be viewed as a major effort
in communication and management of complex teams of experts that lack a common paradigm and a
common language. Two of the vital tools that a systems engineer doing aircraft stores compatibility needs
therefore, is to be able to conduct appropriate:


Risk management of all the constituent elements of the system.
Experimentation & systems modelling at the necessary level of fidelity across the broad range of
engineering and programmatic disciplines – this will be addressed further at AGARDOgraph 300yy.
3.12 Not only are these tools vital to the ultimate systems performance and safety in its use but
they are two of the most commonly misused terms12 and sources of ‘activity traps’13 if used
inappropriately or in the place of positive management and active decision making for the system,
its subsystems and for the super-system that it belongs to. Appendix D is also extensively used
iaw MIL-STD-822, by the ADF for air armament system safety (and Weapons Danger Areas such
as shown at Figure 5), aviation risk management and capability development assessments. Figure
6 shows results of two different risk assessments using the methodology discussed at Tutty (2005)
and Say-Wei Foo and Arumugam Muruganantham (2000) which have also been successfully used
by Australian industry in the two studies held 18 months apart. The method includes recognition
of resources, trained personnel, the complexity of the exercise, the maturity of the acquisition staff,
prior engineering and testing results, method of acquisition and the system development process
used in the time allocated. The initial assessment was for a stand-off missile and a light weight
torpedo to be integrated in less than 24 months onto the AP-3C and the second one was for just the
light weight torpedo in a realistic time scale. The figure shows that the methodology used clearly
shows the significance of the time imperative to actually achieve such a capability rather than just
the focus normally taken on just the technical systems equipment itself.
12
13
Probably even more so than systems engineering itself!
Scientists and Engineers caught up doing ‘busy’ work and not knowing when enough is actually enough. Usually because of risk
aversion, poor experience or their inherent personality traits.
1 - 14
AGARDograph 300- XX
=
Representation of
Operations
Campaign
“Organisations” of Teams Tactics
Theatre
Teams of Teams Tactics
Mission
Team Tactics
Engagement
Individual Tactics
Network Enabled
Figure 7 Knowledge abstraction of network enabled and the military representation of operations - graphic
is courtesy Farrier, Appla & Chadwick (2004).
4.0
AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY PROCESS
4.1
Until the mid 1990’s, Australia, like almost all other western nations at this time, certified aircraft
stores configurations based on the aircraft platform at the 'Engagement' or subsystem level of the
representation at Figure 7.
MIL-STD-1763, in particular, was very specific in tying aircraft stores
certification to the promulgation of the appropriate Technical Orders etc, but the actual process relied on a
Flight Clearance Recommendation (for T&E) or a Certification Recommendation (for service/fleet release)
being issued by an organisation undertaking the aircraft stores compatibility assessment and little, or no,
formal paperwork from the airworthiness or operational authority. In Australia, this was slightly different
with the airworthiness organisation issuing what was called at the time an “Aircraft Stores Clearance
Certificate”. This document was originally based on an Aircraft Research & Development Unit (ARDU)
Test Report and a very long checklist of engineering issues that required over 50 signatures from each of
the engineering discipline specialists; a sign-off process that took normally six to twelve months, unless the
operational authority personally intervened with the Senior Logistics Engineer Officer (SLENGO)
responsible for the engineering checklist! A very interesting ‘process’ as the more operationally relevant
aircraft stores configurations with far greater risks, gave the engineers little to no time to do any engineering
before the SLENGO wanted to know why he hadn’t signed the ‘certificate’. Anecdotally, the UK system,
from which the old Australian one was indubitably drawn, is still like this. The impact of Ground Test
Equipment and Mission Planning Equipment was reviewed, but as quite distinct systems that were always
the responsibility of separate organisations, they were simply a check box that had in reality a human
interface before flying the particular configuration. With today’s integrated systems that are being updated
significantly every six to twelve months at least, such a process would clearly be untenable with no chance
of self-synchronisation and thus would be a clear safety risk as it would fail to draw the correct implications
from other safety critical systems.
4.2
Australia changed the thrust of this so-called and quite immature ‘process’ in the early 1990’s as
part of the development of the technical and operational airworthiness systems embodied now in AAP
7001.053 (2003)14 and AAP 7001.054 (2003)15. They retained the need to certify a baseline for an aircraft
14
US = MIL-STD-516B, UK=XXX, CA=XXX
AGARDograph 300-XX
1 - 15
AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
store, but separated the Flight Clearance (ie, the aircraft stores compatibility done by ASCENG) and the
“certification” of the capability by the Technical and Operational Acceptance as well as the ILS agencies
embodied at the platform or Mission level for the representation at Figure 7.
4.3
An overview of the integrated methods by which endorsed operational requirements for an aircraft
stores capability are satisfied and the relationship with aircraft stores compatibility is provided in AAP
7001.067 (2004) in the form of a functional flow block diagram and framework for a project involving
certification of a ‘new’16 stores capability on a ‘new’ aircraft diagrams (as shown at Appendix C). The
flowcharts of Appendix C are then specifically tailored to suit the risk mitigation strategy and the maturity
of the aircraft stores combination being acquired so that analyses and review of existing technical
information prevents any duplication of ground qualification or flight tests by the ADF to meet ADF
airworthiness and Type Certification needs iaw DI(G) OPS 2-2 (2001) and safety and design criteria of the
following: AS/NZ 4360 (2000), DI(AF) OPS 1-19 (2002), AAP 7001.053 (2003), AAP 7001.054 (2003),
Leveson (2002), MIL-STD-882C (2002), DEF (AUST) 5679 (1992), MIL-A-8591H (1995), MIL-STD1289D (2002), RTCA DO-178B (1992), RTCA DO-254 (2000), SAE ARP 4754 (1996-11) and SAE ARP
4761 (1996-12).
4.4
However, to ‘certify’ something we need to clearly establish a ‘certification basis’, ie at least an
Operational Concept we need to address. The principle elements of ADF airworthiness and the technical
regulation processes at the top level are:
•
the selection of a design standard – such as DEF-STAN 00-970 and MIL-HDBK-1763 being
cited as such;
•
determination of the certification basis;
•
preparation of a Certification Data Package (CDP);
•
an evaluation of the CDP against the certification basis;
•
preparation of a case for the issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC);
•
preparation of a case for the issue of a Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) for each airframe
subject to the AMTC;
•
formal release to service; and
•
regular review of the certification status.
4.5
Every Australian State aircraft now receives an Australian Military Type Certificate
(AMTC) from the Airworthiness Authority based on a recommendation of an Airworthiness Board
(AwB) review of the Type Record. Once an AMTC17 is granted for the aircraft type all subsequent
modifications requiring Major Changes18 to the Aircraft Type will need to be granted a
15
16
17
18
US = J????????, UK= DEFSTAN 970-00, CA=XXX
In the context of this article a ‘new’ store or aircraft constitutes one that the ADF has had no previous design disclosure for or has
not operated inservice or one that has undergone significant modification.
IAW AAP 7001.053 (2002) Reg 2.5.4 - The Design Acceptance Representative (DAR – Aircraft CENGR) shall apply to the TAR for
a Type Certification Recommendation where a new AMTC is needed when the design changes to an aircraft type are so
extensive that the aircraft requires a substantially complete investigation of compliance.
See DI(G) OPS 2-2 and AAP 7001.053 (2002) Reg 2.5.3 – Major Changes are those that:
• Introduce a new capability, or significantly vary an existing capability
• Design changes to the Type Design have an appreciable affect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability,
operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product.
1 - 16
AGARDograph 300- XX
=
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)19by an Airworthiness Board. Minor Changes20
modifications and Deviations will be approved by the DAR. So the current aircraft configuration
at any point of time should be thought of as the AMTC + STC + Modification + Deviation.
5.0
RECOMMENDED AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY PRACTICE
Reducing the time to evaluation of a system almost always leads to lower costs, greater flexibility for change, improved overall
performance, and less risk.
When the prototype approach for system development is used, ultimate production of the system must be considered throughout the
design and evaluation phase.
“Kelly” Johnson (1989). American Aerospace Guru21
5.1
Initiation of Operational Needs. Any ADF Unit or Element seeking an aircraft stores capability,
for either a new aircraft stores configuration, an expanded carriage or employment operating limitations, is
able to do so by raising an Operational Concept Document (OCD) iaw the DCDM (2006)22 and the AIAA
G-043-199223. This is shown at Appendices B, C and D with respect to the resulting systems engineering
activities and the typical capability system life cycle timeline currently expected by the acquisition system
for a major new capability respectively.
5.2
Such requests are recommended for approval and prioritisation in the ADF by the appropriate Force
Elements Group (ie Air Combat, Surveillance and Response, Army Aviation, Naval Aviation, Aerospace
Operational Support, etc) and Commands (ie the HQs for Air, Maritime & Land Commands), and endorsed
by Director General Aerospace Development24 through the normal chain of command25.
5.3
The request for a new or enhanced/modified aircraft stores capability then results in the Acquisition
Authority performing a ‘Requirements Analyses’ as per ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and the INCOSE SE
Handbook (2006). These requirements are included in the detailed Operational Concept Document and/or
Conops covering such information so as to establish the specific essential and desirable aircraft stores
configurations, operating limits26 and the associated Critical Operational and/or Technical Issues and
Measures Of Effectiveness required for the capability being sought. Further information may be required
than that indicated to justify specific acquisition requirements, however, AAP 7001.067 (2004) 27 identifies
those issues that historically have substantially affected the airworthiness and the operational suitability,
effectiveness and preparedness of the proposed aircraft stores capability. Should particular information not
be available, then the introduction of the capability into service may be delayed depending on the cost
implications associated with the level of capability being sought.
5.4
Even at the early stages of certifying a capability the various agencies (ie the Users, defence
science, stores SPO, flight test, ASC agency, etc) should be actively engaged by the Originator to assist in
trade-off studies as described in more detail in AAP 7001.067 (2004). ASCENG formally addresses this
trade-off by providing assistance in the preparation of the Operational Requirements Document and by
preparing a Provisional ASC Similarity Survey28 for the Originator and User of the proposed OCD/Conops.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IAW AAP 7001.053 (2002) Reg 2.5.5 - For Major changes to an aircraft Type Design not great enough to require an new
AMTC, the DAR shall provide Design Acceptance Certification and apply to the TAR for an STC Recommendation.
IAW AAP 7001.053 (2002) the DAR is to assume that all changes to the Type Design that are not Major are therefore Minor!
‘Kelly’ Johnson was responsible for the P-38, U-2, SR-71, so reading his book CITED here is an imperative for all budding
aerospace engineers - it has wonderful insights at Chapter 16 as to why he and Lockheed were so successful in those days with
such a diversity of aircraft. Similarly King (2001) makes for essential reading for any proactive engineer, regardless of discipline.
US = CJCS 3170.01, UK=XXX, CA=XXX
There is an important principle to be noted here in citing American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) for preparing
an OCD. The OCDs prepared for Major aircraft acquisitions (ie over $AUD 20 M) may not have sufficient granularity for the air
armament being proposed to identify the details required. OCDs for Major aircraft acquisitions will typically refer to subordinate
subsystem OCDs that will include the specific air armament needs.
If a significantly enhanced capabilities are being sought in the view of higher HQs.
US = XXXX, UK=XXX, CA=XXX
See Figure 1 for an example of an operating envelope respectively showing the carriage and employment limits that will
eventually be promulgated in the Aircraft Flight Manual or Dash 1 during Aircraft Stores Certification.
US = CJCS 3170.01, UK=XXX, CA=XXX
A document summarising the technical review of the aircraft and store documentation to determine if sufficient engineering and
test data is available to support an ASCENG Flight Clearance by similarity or analogy. If insufficient technical information is
available or the data does not support a clearance to the limits requested in the ASC Operational Requirement then the Similarity
AGARDograph 300-XX
1 - 17
AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
The Provisional ASC Similarity Survey provides an assessment of the certification basis and airworthiness
impact in a format that ensures all necessary issues required for the ASC Similarity Survey and ASC Flight
Clearance are addressed as early as practical to reduce the overall cost, schedule and performance risks to
the Commonwealth and Contractor. Note that the Provisional ASC Similarity Survey does not constitute
design certification (from a formal engineering perspective), as it need not be based on full design
disclosure of the actual aircraft or store that is introduced into service. During the early stages of
developing aircraft and weapons, limited technical information may be finalised depending on the maturity
of the aircraft and/or stores. However, the technical information that is available is used by ASCENG to
ensure that the capability certification process is tailored and based on the risk management strategy and the
maturity of the aircraft stores combination and the approved Operational Requirement. This has repeatedly
ensured that the total cost of the certification effort is minimised and that a qualitative edge over our
potential adversaries is established.
5.5
All ADF aircraft stores certification is based on having an approved Stores / Explosive Ordnance
(EO) Design Certificate, a Safety Case covering the Safety & Suitability for Service (S 3) for the EO, an
ASCENG Flight Clearance and an ILS Plan. All certified aircraft stores configurations are reviewed and reissued/amended when a ‘significant change’, as defined at AAP 7001.053 / MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998), is
made to an aircraft stores configuration.
5.6
The functional flow block diagram (FFBD) summarised at Appendix C identifies the interactions
necessary from all activities to achieve an operationally sustainable aircraft stores capability to meet the
endorsed Operational Concept. The efficient progress of the Aircraft Stores Certification effort, be it for the
purpose of a concept demonstration, an OT&E or for combat operations, relies on the appropriate agencies
undertaking the action(s) required of their organisation and proactively communicating progress and
intentions when necessary. These activities are documented in a number of organisations processes that
have been repeatedly accredited against ISO 9000 (2000)29 for their suitability as a quality management
system. All ADF and supporting contractors involved in aerospace engineering activities are required by
the regulations in AAP 7001.053 (2003) to meet and be independently accredited against the latest ISO
9001 (2000) standard for quality management. ASCENG provides detailed systems engineering support to
the acquisition during Requirements Elicitation/Definition, Concept/Functional Design Review, Preliminary
Design Review and Critical Design Review during the ADF’s Systems Engineering & Test Requirements
Determination phases, as shown graphically at Appendices B and C) to reduce risk.
5.7
ADF capability management and fiscal processes are being reviewed against Capability Maturity
Models such as CMMi (2000) at the ‘Level 3: Defined’ level as a minima. Verifying that the effectiveness
of the aircraft stores capability meets the approved OCD is primarily the responsibility of the appropriate
User with funding and resources provided by the DMO. Before an Aircraft Stores Capability is certified for
particular aircraft stores configurations is accepted for use by a User, the FEG certifies that safety,
engineering, operational, configuration management and logistic support processes, and all training
requirements for all personnel involved have been satisfied. The Aircraft Stores Certification addresses all
these issues in a single document for the User Commanders endorsement. The identification of acceptable
ILS arrangements to meet preparedness requirements is the responsibility of the cognisant aircraft and store
System Program Offices involved. It should be noted that the Aircraft Stores Certification declares the
User Commander and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives acceptance that the ILS Plan
committing to the capability is adequate to satisfy the effectiveness and preparedness (ie readiness and
sustainability) criteria in the OCD. This is most appropriate as it is the User Commander who approves the
OCD which should have established the need in the first place.
5.8
One of the complications for achieving a network-enabled capable force is how to baseline your
existing peacetime force structure (with limited to no networked communications) against future proposals
Survey shall identify the information and testing necessary. The format and content of a Similarity Survey is the same as for an
ASC Flight Clearance.
29
See Brunson (2002) for a more complete explanation of the ISO agencies and what “ISO” means.
1 - 18
AGARDograph 300- XX
=
using senior staff that only understand hard copy orders via their chain of command! One of the major
cultural changes needed in most of, if not all, defence forces is the challenge in moving from such
hardcopies to a network-centric wartime mindset within the chain of command when young Generation Y
staff who want to look up the material when needed on his laptop/palm device and get the training when he
needs it.
5.9
This has implications for multi-country aircraft and weapon platforms such as the F-16 and
F-35 JSF when unique country aircraft stores configurations are certified by country X or Y being
recognised in the “master” aircraft flight manual and the certification seamlessly accepted by other
nations as being acceptable to them. To address this situation, it is planned to develop a STANAG
to replace MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998), so that the NATO countries that care about interoperability
can experiment with and prove when they have achieved it such that such configurations are
accepted by all nations.
6.0
COMPLEXITY & FUTURE NETWORK ENABLED OPERATIONS
The tenets of network centric operations are:
1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
2. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness.
3. Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.
4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
Alberts & Hayes (2007)
The C4ISR Paradigm of Command, Control, Communications and Computers for ISR is now already heading to
C2, Cooperate and Collaborate for ISR
ITEA C4ISR Symposium, April 2008
6.1
The term ‘system’ is, however, highly overused, with it being casually applied to everything from a
Home Entertainment System, to the affairs of government of a nation (System of Government) and to the
planets orbiting the Sun (Solar System). Added to the mix is the use of adjectives for ‘systems’ such as
‘simple’, ‘complicated’30 (presumably those that aren’t ‘simple’) and ‘complex’31 often without a definition
or description of what is meant. Truly complex systems are fundamentally different to complicated systems.
Complicated systems (such as aircraft, ships and vehicles) may usually today be reduced to their parts for
both design and analysis purposes so that their behaviour and even any emergent properties can be
predicted to a high degree of certainty and confidence. Complexity Science32 is the emerging field
potentially providing some better insights into the fundamental principles and theory for complex
engineered systems and their patterns of behaviour frequently using anti-reductionist ways of thinking. It is
suggested by DSTO at Moon (2007) that the salient features of systems displaying complex behaviours
include:
 Interactions that are non-linear and include feedback loops.
 They are open systems where there is a net flow of flux (energy, matter or information) across the
system boundaries; although specific boundaries may be difficult to determine and depend on the
perspective of the observer.
 There can be nesting where component systems are themselves complex systems. The component
systems may be connected so as to a form small-world network with a multiplicity of connections.
30
31
32
Used to describe an intricate system with many components that each perform specific, usually highly specialised, functions and
are designed for operation as part of a larger system: they are not intended to operate as separate, autonomous systems.
One not describable by a single rule. Structure exists on many scales whose characteristics are not reducible to only one level of
description. Systems that exhibit unexpected features not contained within their specification. Systems with multiple objectives.
See http://www.calresco.org/glossary.htm as of 21 Aug 2007.
The study of the rules governing emergence, the constraints affecting self-organisation and general system dynamics in nonlinear
adaptive interacting systems. The study of the collective behaviour of macroscopic collections of interacting units that are
endowed with the potential to evolve in time.
AGARDograph 300-XX
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY

Complex systems display emergent phenomena33 and have ‘memory’ in the sense that prior states
influence present states (formally they are said to exhibit hysteresis).
6.2
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are special cases of complex systems that are designed to have
the capacity to change and ‘learn’ from experience. Today they are often a form of systems containing
many autonomous agents who self-organize in a coevolutionary way to optimise their separate values.
Complex systems often use networks that may be seen as being configured for an overall purpose. They
would, ideally, be designed to provide versatility, robustness and potential for growth (ie scalable 34) rather
than optimised for narrow functionality. The extensive research will need to address the experimentation of
aerospace mission systems35 in the joint aerospace environment – which does mean addressing the concerns
of Gartska (2000), Kopp (2004), Tutty (2005), and Moon et al (2006) by interfacing and cooperating36 with
land and maritime environments.
6.3
The weapons systems ground & flight test methods discussed at AGARDOgraph 300-yy will there
be fundamental to validating and verifying whether the proposed joint systems architectures being
developed today will actually work in the hands of all our warfighters.
7.0
CONCLUSIONS
7.1
This article has drawn on the numerous scientific and engineering aeronautical, structural,
electrical, information and so on disciplines discussed in detail elsewhere in the encyclopaedia to provide a
comprehensive overview of the contemporary aircraft stores clearance and certification processes used to
establish the extant of current and future network-enabled aircraft stores compatibility.
7.2
Aircraft stores compatibility as a discipline has always addressed the safe and effective carriage
and release of aircraft stores and now addresses the end to end functionality and accuracy of the supplied
weapons system to ensure the operational suitability and effectiveness of the increasingly network enabled
weapons.
7.3
While the engineering and scientific disciplines will always remain important, the functionality
associated with network enabling and information management will fundamentally drive the
interoperability of future joint defence force aerospace operations. ...
33
34
35
36
Those behaviours, features or functionalities that pertain to the network in its totality and cannot be attributed to individual
elements. They may be patterns of behaviour, structural features or functionalities arising from the connection of the elements into
a network and the subsequent interaction of those elements. Peer-to-peer networking on the Internet is an example of such an
emergent phenomenon.
The property of a system or network which indicates its propensity to be readily enlarged, physically or functionally. The term is
used in telecommunications and software engineering to indicate whether a system’s performance can be increased in proportion
to the capacity added.
Which includes: the air or space vehicles’ Data Management System, Navigation, Communication, data links, ground control
station, electronic surveillance and warfare systems such as Radar, Electro-Optic / Infra-red, Acoustics, EW Self-Protection, etc
and (obviously) the Armament/Ordnance Stores Management / Fire Control Systems.
The idea that two agents can increase both their fitnesses by mutual help rather than by competition. This assumes that resources
adequate for both exist, or are created by the interaction, and relates to synergy and 'compositional evolution'.
1 - 20
AGARDograph 300- XX
=
Figure 8 F-22 employing an AIM-9M Sidewinder Missile
8.0
BIBLIOGRAPHY / REFERENCES
AAP 7001.053, 2003, Technical Airworthiness Management Manual, RAAF, Commonwealth of Australia
(CoA), Canberra, Australia.
AAP 7001.054, 2003, Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual, RAAF, CoA, Canberra,
Australia.
AAP 7001.067, 2004, ADF Air Armament Manual, draft, RAAF, CoA, Canberra, Australia
AIAA G-043-1992, Guide for the Preparation on Operational Concept Documents; American Institute for
Aeronautic & Astronautics, Washington, USA.
ALWI-2, 2004, Final Report, Follow-up Study, Aircraft, Launcher & Weapon Interoperability (ALWI-2),
NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG), Air Group 2 on Air Weapons, NATO Industrial Advisory
Group, 7 April 2004.
ANSI/EIA STD 632, 1999, Process for Engineering a System, American National Standards Institute /
Electronic Industries Association, Washington, USA.
AS/NZ 4360, 2000, Risk Management, CoA, Canberra, Australia.
Blanchard, S.B. & Fabrycky, W.J. 1998, Systems Engineering & Analysis, 3rd Ed, Prentice Hall
International Inc, USA.
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AIRCRAFT STORES COMPATIBILITY
CJCS 3170.01D, 2004, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 March 2004 [Online, accessed 15 January 2005].
URL:
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/directive_index.htm
Brunson, N, et al, 2002, A World of Standards, Oxford University Press, UK.
CMMi, 2000, Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) for Systems Engineering Product & Process
Development, Continuous Representation
DCDM, 2006, Defence Capability Development Manual, Canberra, Australia. See
www.defence.gov.au/capability under Publications.
DEF (AUST) 5679, 1992, Procurement of Computer-Based Safety Critical Systems, Department of
Defence, Canberra, Australia.
DEF STAN 00-970, 1999, Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft, UK Defence
Standardisation Agency, UK.
DI(G) OPS 2-2, 2001, Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management, Department of Defence,
Canberra, Australia.
DI(AF) OPS 1-19, 2002, Aviation Risk Management, DoD, Canberra, Australia.
Donnelly, J.J., 2000, Best Value Solutions: A Systems Engineering Perspective, SESA 2001, ©
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Farrier, A SQNLDR, Appla, D & Chadwick, J. 2004, As Easy as ABC, ADF Experimentation Symposium,
Defence Science & Technology Organisation, June 2004
Garstka, J.J. 2000, Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory, Joint Staff
Directorate for C4 Systems, US DoD, Washington, USA [Online, accessed 10 May 2004]. URL:
http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm
Hayes Dr R.E., Alberts, Dr D.S. 2002, Experimentation; Code of Best Practice, Command and
Control Research Program, [Online, accessed 1 September 2006]. URL: http://www.dodccrp.org
INCOSE SE Handbook, 2000, Systems Engineering Handbook, International Council for Systems
Engineering, Version 2.0 Edited by R.B. Wray, Seattle, WA, USA
INCOSE SE Handbook, 2006, Systems Engineering Handbook, International Council for Systems
Engineering, Version 3, Seattle, WA, USA
ISO 9001, 2004, Quality Management, ISO, 2004
ISO/IEC 12207, 1995, Software Life Cycle Processes, ISO and the International Electro-technical
Commission [Online, accessed 15 December 2004]. See URL: http://www.12207.com/
ISO/IEC 15288, 2002, System Life Processes, International Organization for Standardization and
the IEC [Online, accessed 15 December 2004]. See URL: http://www.15288.com/
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=
Kelly, Clarence L, 1989, More than my share of it all, Chapter 16, “Kelly” Johnson with Maggie Smith,
Smithsonian Books, 1989, ISBN 0-87474-564-0
Johnson, Dr S, 2001, Emergence – The connected lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, Scribner, New
York, New York.
King, W.J., 2001, The Unwritten Laws of Engineering, edited by James Skakoon, ISBN 0 7918 01624.
Kopp, Dr C. 2004, Myths, Facts and the RAAF Force Structure, Air Power Analysis 2004, 19 November
2004, See URL: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2004-04.html
Leveson, N.G., 2002, System Safety Engineering: Back To The Future
Technology, June 2002.
,
Massachusetts Institute of
Lidwell, L. Holden K., Butler, J., 2005, Universal Principles of Design: 100 ways to Enhance Useability,
Influence Perception, Increase Appeal, Make Better Design Decisions, and Teach through Design,
Rockport Publishing Inc, Massachusetts, USA, ISBN 1-59253-007-9
MIL-HDBK-244A, 1990, Guide to Aircraft Stores Compatibility, US Department of Defence
(DoD), USA, dated 6 April 1990.
MIL-HDBK-1763, 1998, Aircraft Stores Compatibility, Design and Test Requirements, US DoD, USA
MIL-STD-499B, 1994, Systems Engineering, US Department of Defence (DoD), USA Draft 6 May 1994.
MIL-STD-810F, 2000, Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests, US DoD, USA.
MIL-STD-882C, 2002, Standard Practice for System Safety, US DoD, USA.
MIL-STD-1521B, 1985, [US] Technical Reviews And Audits For Systems, Equipments, And Computer
Software Distribution, , US DoD, USA. dated 4 June 1985.
MIL-STD-1553B, 1996, Interface Standard for Interface Digital Time Division/Command Response
Multiplex Data Bus, , US DoD, 15 January 1996, Notice 4
MIL-STD-1760D, 2004, Interface Standard for Aircraft/Store Interconnection System, US
Department of Defence, 2004
MIL-STD-3014, 2004, Mission Data Exchange Format, US DoD, USA. [Online, accessed 21 July
2004], See URL: http://mil-std-3014.navy.mil
Moon, T Dr, 2007, private correspondence
Moon, T., Smith J., & Cook, Prof S., 2006, Technology Readiness & Technical Risk Assessment
for the Australian Defence Organisation, SETE 2006 Conference Paper, Brisbane, Australia
RTCA DO-178B, 1992, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Washington, USA.
RTCA DO-254, 2000, Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Radio Technical Commission for
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Aeronautics, Washington, USA.
SAE ARP 4754, 1996-11, Aerospace Recommended Practice - Certification Considerations for HighlyIntegrated or Complex Aircraft Systems, Society of Automotive Engineers Inc, USA.
SAE ARP 4761, 1996-12, Aerospace Recommended Practice - Guidelines & Methods for Conducting the
Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems & Equipment, Society of Automotive Engineers
Inc, USA
STANMAN , 2002, ADF Standardisation Manual, DoD, Canberra, Australia.
Say-Wei Foo and Arumugam Muruganantham, 2000, Software Risk Assessment Model, National
University of Singapore, IEEE International Conference on Management, 2000
Stephenson, J, 1991, System Safety, Van Nostrand Reinhold, NY, NY.
Tutty, M.G., 2005, Australian Aircraft Stores Capabilities in a Network Enabled World, University
of South Australia, 31 January 2005
9.0
KEY WORDS
Air armament, aircraft stores compatibility, aeroacoustics, aeroelastic, aircraft flutter, aircraft
loads, aircraft stores certification, armament system software changes, ballistics, captive flight
profile, carriage and release, carrier suitability, electromagnetic effects, hazards of electromagnetic
radiation to ordnance, employment, jettison, environmental testing, fit and function, flying
qualities, weapon integration, operational flight program, safe escape, static ejection, store mass
properties, store separation, structural integrity, vibration and endurance, wind tunnel, human
factors, systems engineering, risk management, validation and verification.
10.0
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The author joined the RAAF as an engineering cadet in 1980 and has served in the Air Force and Australian
Public Service in a multitude of engineering and test roles including an exchange tour with the 3246 Test
Wing / TY until the Gulf War OT&E I, then as Director ASCENG for over 800 aircraft stores combinations
for over 20 aircraft types that have serviced so many DIMPIs / targets it is now best described
conservatively by the power law: P>x =x – PetaDIMPI’s Serviced, and the Director of the worlds largest
land-based Woomera Test Range prior to joining the dark side for an outstanding time as Chief Engineer for
Maritime Patrol and Force Applications, Tenix Defence Aerospace for the AP-3C Orion $1Billion upgrade
and was in the Active Reserve as the Red Weapons Analyst, Defence Intelligence Organisation. In 2008,
he was invited to rejoin the RAAF as Director Trials & Range Management, AFHQ. He has a Bachelor of
Electronic Engineering with Distinction from RMIT and a Masters in Systems Engineering from the
University of South Australia. He is doing a PhD in his spare time. He was Listed in Who’s Who in the
World for Science & Engineering in 2003, and has been a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society and the
Institution of Engineers (Australia) since 2002. His interests include: his family, reading, shooting, flying,
the study of haute couture and aesthetics, golf, travel, drinking good red, bourbon and beer, and
investigating novel applications of air power.
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11.0
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The AGARDograph is dedicated to the unequalled contribution that Charlie Epstein, Captain,
USN and US Civil Service Rtd, has made in the application of science and engineering to
enabling the revolution in aircraft stores combat effectiveness and the implications that has now
had to the application of all Allied air power.
Kevin Christensen, qtp, LtCol USAF, SETP
William D. Hack, MEng, Colonel, USAF, ASC SME
Ron Haack, qtp, WGCDR RAAF Rtd, QANTAS Captain
Al Piranian, NAVAIR, USN, ASC and air armament standardization SME
Ben Shirley, AFSEO, USAF, ASC SME
Neal Siegel, NAVAIR, USN, ASC & T&E SME
Mark Washusen, qfte, WGCDR, CO ASCENG, RAAF
Tom Milhous, USN Rtd, USN, air armament SME
Mac Robertson, CENGR BAESystems / Tenix / ADO
Robert Arnold, Technical Advisor, 46 Test Wing / Armament Center, Eglin AFB FL
Tracy White, AMOG Consulting, systems safety engineering SME
UK
CA
Other Nations
ANNEXES:
A.
Definitions and Acronyms
B.
Aircraft Stores Compatibility Systems Engineering Reviews
C.
ASC FFBD Top Level
D.
Air Armament Risk Matrix
A first-rate theory predicts, a second-rate theory forbids and a third-rate theory explains after the event
Alex Kitiagorodski
FT3-01
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ANNEX A:
DEFINITIONS & ACRONYMS
ADF. Australian Defence Force
Aircraft. Man made machines that fly. This includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft/aeroplanes both
inhabited and uninhabited.
Aircraft Store. Any device intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension
and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft.
Aircraft stores certification. An engineering, operational and logistics activity that results in the
documentation by the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives that specified
aircraft stores configuration(s) are operationally suitable, effective and that the preparedness status of the
established integrated logistics support meets the endorsed Operational Requirement for the aircraft stores
capability. Formal approval for authorisation and Release to Service of an aircraft stores configuration is
accomplished through publication of appropriate technical orders and manuals and the provision of training
in use of the systems.
Aircraft Stores Compatibility. The ability of each element of specified aircraft stores configuration(s) to
coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or
functional characteristics of each other under specified ground and flight conditions [at the Engagement or
subsystem level].
Aircraft Stores Configuration.
An aircraft stores configuration refers to an aerospace platform,
incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific suspension equipment and aircraft
store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft stores configuration also includes any
downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an authorised employment
or jettison sequence(s).
Aircraft Stores Clearance. Primarily a systems engineering activity used in most NATO countries to
formally document in a Flight Clearance, or similar document, the extent of aircraft stores compatibility
within specified ground and flight operating envelopes determined by the Technical Airworthiness
Authority.
Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance. A document issued by the Technical Airworthiness
Authority that explicitly defines the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare, load, carry,
employ and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating
envelopes. This document is a mandatory basis required by most NATO nations for release to service of
the aircraft stores configurations. DI(G) OPS 02-2 Paragraph 39 states “Before any aircraft stores
configuration may be flown, an aircraft stores compatibility [flight] clearance, authorised by the ADF
TAR (or delegate) is required. The OAA is responsible for developing operational procedures and revising
training programs to integrate the store in to the operating system.” The ADF TAR has delegated the
responsibility for approval of ASCENG Flight Clearances to Director ASCENG at AOSG iaw AAP
7001.053 Regulation 1 Annex A and Regulation 3.5.9.
Aircraft & Stores Compatibility Engineering Data Package (ASCEDP).
A document that, for
specified aircraft stores combination, documents all stores and aircraft CEDPs covering all engineering
and operational aspects relevant to aircraft stores compatibility iaw MIL-HDBK-1763 (1998) as a source
for production of technical orders. An ASCEDP is requested for all State aircraft stores combinations.
Analogy. A form of reasoning in which similarities are inferred from a similarity of two or more things in
certain particulars. Analogy plays a significant role in problem solving, decision making, perception,
memory skills, creativity, explanation, emotion, and communication. It is both the cognitive process of
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transferring information from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another particular subject
(the target), and a linguistic expression corresponding to such a process. In a narrower sense, analogy is an
inference or an argument from one particular to another particular, as opposed to deduction, induction
and/or abduction where at least one of the premises or the conclusion is general. The word analogy can
also refer to the relation between the source and the target themselves, which is often, though not
necessarily, a similarity, as in the biological notion of analogy. Wikipedia (2009)
Armament. Force equipped for war, military weapons and equipment, process of equipping for war.
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964)
ASC. Aircraft Stores Compatibility
ASCENG. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Squadron. The Royal Australian Air Force
agency responsible for airworthiness and suitability standards, planning, conducting, approving and
supporting operations for all ADF State aircraft stores configurations.
Avionic architecture.
An avionic architecture describes the form, fit, function, and interface
characteristics of the hardware and software elements that characterise the airborne mission system.
BKPM. Bad Karma per minute.
Capability. Ability to implement power. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964); a quality that enables the
achievement of an outcome. ADF
Certification. The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance
of a product, against predefined requirements and standards, to the satisfaction of the certificating
authority… DI(G) OPS 02-2 and AAP 7001.053 (2003). The act of issuing a certificate that
provides assurance that an entity, including product, service or organisation, complies with a
stated specification, standard or other equipment… DI(G) LOG 08-15.
Certification Basis. The set of standards which define the criteria against which the design of
aircraft or aircraft-related equipment, or changes to that design, are assessed to determine their
airworthiness…..AAP 7001.053 (2003). DI(G) OPS 02-2 refers to AAP 7001.054 for a similar
definition.
Commonality. A state achieved when groups of individuals, organisations or nations use the same
doctrine, procedures and equipment. AAP 6
Compatibility.
The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific
conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. The capability of
two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or
environment without mutual interference; or capable of orderly efficient integration with other elements in
a system. Concise Macquarie Dictionary (1988)
Concept.
n. a thought, idea, or notion, often one deriving from a generalised mental operation.
Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1988)
Conops. Concept of Operations
DMO. Defence Material Organisation - responsible for the ADF's acquisition and sustainment.
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DMPI. Desired mean point of impact – a euphemism traditionally called a target.
Effects-Based Operations. Coordinated sets of actions [in the cognitive domain] directed at
shaping the behaviour of friends, foes, neutral in peace, crisis and war. Smith (2002) The
application of military and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired strategic and
operational outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post conflict situations. Ryan & Callan
(2003)
Function. A task, action, or activity expressed as a verb-noun combination (eg Brake Function:
stop vehicle) to achieve a defined outcome. Electronic Industries Association (1999)
Functional Requirement. A statement that identifies what a product or process must accomplish to
produce required behaviour and/or results. Electronic Industries Association (1999)
Integration. The merger or combining of two or more lower-level elements into a functioning
and unified higher-level element with the functional and physical interfaces satisfied.
Interchangeability. The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil
the same requirements. A condition which exists when two or more items possess such functional and
physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being
exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining items, except for
adjustment, and without selection for fit and performance. NATO AAP 6
Interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide the services to and accept services
from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate
effectively together. The three levels of standardisation for interoperability as used by the NATO are:
Common, Interchangeable and Compatible.
ITEA. International T&E Association
Network Enabled Operations. A network-centric force has the capability to share and exchange
information among the geographically distributed elements of the force: sensors, regardless of platform;
shooters, regardless of service; and decision makers and supporting organizations, regardless of location.
In short, a network-centric force is an interoperable force, a force that has global access to assured
information whenever and wherever needed” 37. Gartska (2000)
OCD. Operational Concept Document.
Operational Effectiveness.
The degree of mission accomplishment of a system when used by
representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of the
system, considering organisation, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat, including
countermeasures.
OFP. Operational Flight Program
Operational Suitability.
The degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in field use
considering availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, reliability, peacetime training and
37
Garstka (2000) notes that ‘a force with these capabilities is not known to currently exist in any of the US Military services or in the
armed forces any our Allied or Coalition partners.’ Which is still true today.
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wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human factors, logistics supportability, documentation, and
training requirements.
RAAF. Royal Australian Air Force
RTO. NATO's Research & Technology Organisation
Standard. A description of a process, material, or product meant for repeated use in one of more
applications covering: materials, processes, products and services. STANMAN (2002)
System. A combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes.
A system may be considered as a product or as the services it provides. In practice, the
interpretation of its meaning is frequently clarified by the use of an associative noun, e.g. aircraft
system. Alternatively the word system may be substituted simply by a context dependent
synonym, e.g. aircraft, though this may then obscure a system principles perspective…..ISO
15288. An integrated set of elements to accomplish a defined objective. These include hardware,
software, firmware, people, information, techniques, facilities, services, and other support
elements.
Systems engineering. Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the
realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in
the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with design synthesis and system
validation while considering the complete problem, e.g.:
Conceptualisation
Cost & Schedule
Performance & Design
Training & Support
Test
Operations
Manufacturing
Disposal
Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a team effort forming a
structured development process that proceeds from concept to production to operation. Systems
Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of
providing a quality product that meets the user needs.
Significant Change.
A significant change to either an aircraft or store form, fit, function and
qualification limits, requiring reassessment of aircraft/stores compatibility is caused by the following
criteria:
a.
Any change to the external aerodynamic shape of the aircraft or store that may affect physical fit,
performance, flying qualities and/or separation characteristics.
b.
Any change in basic aircraft or store structural characteristics, including the addition/deletion of any
antennae, vents, drains, probes or ducts that may affect the store in any way.
c.
Any change to the aeroelastic or wing mass distribution characteristics of the aircraft.
d.
Any change in the aircraft Basic Weight Configuration that affects the carriage and employment of a
store or stores combination.
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e.
A 12.7mm (0.5") or greater change in store C of G (excluding any allowable tolerances).
f.
A 5% or greater change in store weight.
g.
A 10% or greater change in store pitch, roll or yaw moments.
h.
Any change in functional concept, including weapon delivery mode changes.
i.
Any degradation in the Electromagnetic Radiation environment affecting the electromagnetic
compatibility of the aircraft/store configurations.
j.
Any degradation in the HERO characteristics of the aircraft or store.
k.
Any change in electrical/electronic connector characteristics or their location.
l.
Any change in store suspension lug location.
m.
Any change in arming wire or lanyard routing.
n.
Any change in aircraft or stores fuze safing, arming design or Hazard Classification Code.
o.
Any change in aircraft or stores environmental qualification or tolerance.
p.
Any change in aircraft thrust or stores ballistic and/or propulsion characteristics.
q.
Any change in stores explosive fill or casing affecting blast performance or store fragmentation
patterns.
r.
Any change in aircraft or store OFP software or SMS changes that affects the operation,
employment or accuracy of the store.
s.
Any change to the aircraft, store or Safe Escape Manoeuvres that causes an increase in the
Minimum Safe Release Height or Weapon Danger Area/Zones (Safety Template) during
employment of the store.
t.
New nomenclature for either aircraft or store.
u.
Individual changes that do not necessarily make a significant change which, when considered
cumulatively, result in a significant deviation from the design specification of the presently certified
aircraft and/or store are considered to constitute a significant change. The term ‘aircraft’ also
includes the aircraft Stores Suspension Equipment. AAP 7001.053 (2003)
T&E. Test & Evaluation. See Chapter 8.7.10 eae 544.
Technical Integrity. An items fitnesss for service, safety and compliance with regulations for
environmental protection…..DI(G) LOG 08-15.
TTP. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
Similarity. State of being similar, a point of resemblance.
Uni SA.
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V&V. Validation & Verification
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