Unique crisis response strategies in sports
public relations: Rugby league and the case for
diversion
Toni Brucea,
,
and Tahlia Tinib, 1,
a
Department of Sport and Leisure Studies, The University of Waikato,
Hamilton, New Zealand
b
P.O. Box 66-160, Beachhaven, Auckland, New Zealand
Available online 2 May 2008.
Abstract
Sport is a unique ‘product’ in that most of its messages and images are
conveyed through media coverage rather than through advertising or sales
campaigns. While the coverage is usually positive, media interest becomes
more problematic in high profile scandals which can be very damaging. In
this paper, we propose that the culture of elite men's sport and its
interdependence with mass media creates a situation in which sports
public relations personnel have access to crisis communication
strategies not previously specified in the existing literature. Based on
textual analysis of media coverage of an Australasian men's rugby league
salary cap scandal, we argue that, in certain situations, a sports
organisation may draw upon a crisis response strategy that we term
diversion in order to successfully limit the damage to the organisation's
reputation. In particular, we suggest that the often intense
‘relationship’ that fans have with players may allow team sports to
focus attention on players (and fans) as innocent victims with the result
that negative publicity for the sport overall is reduced.
Keywords: Crisis communication; Rugby league; Sport; Diversion;
Australia
Article Outline
1. The unique arena of sports public relations
2. Rugby league in Australasia
3. Crisis communication: best practice
4. Analysing the crisis
5. Failed strategies
6. Diversion: players and fans as innocent victims
7. Conclusions
References
1. The unique arena of sports public relations
Despite a lack of research there is little doubt that professional sport
is a unique realm of public relations (L’Etang, 2006). First, much of
its publicity occurs through media coverage and is, therefore, much less
controllable than paid advertising or sales campaigns. On the positive
side, the high levels and credibility of media coverage help create and
strengthen strong bonds with fans and feed an “insatiable appetite for
sport material” (McGregor & Harvey, 1999, p. 251). On the down side,
however, ‘negative’ stories can seriously damage the reputation and
popularity of an organisation and affect the bottom line in areas such
as attendance, merchandising, sponsorship and endorsement deals (see
Shilbury, Quick & Westerbeek, 1998).
It is generally accepted that professional sport and the media are
involved in a symbiotic, interdependent relationship where “each depends
on the other for its commercial success and its prominent place in the
popular culture” (Coakley, 1998, p. 380). Although this relationship is
primarily available to male, professional and globally mediated sports,
the value of sport to the broadcast media in particular should not be
underestimated as it has led to exponentially increasing amounts paid for
broadcast rights to major events. Live broadcast sport thus becomes a key
arena for positive public relations for sports organisations, in large
part because broadcasting rights holders “are not in the business of
casting aspersions on the event for which they have forked out large sums
of money” (Barnett, 1990, p. 164).
In contrast, newspapers and broadcast news media are much more likely to
focus on scandals and crises ([Barnett, 1990] and [Rowe, 1999]). The
combination of public interest and extensive media coverage means that
sports public relations practitioners cannot ignore the news media and,
as a result, a second unique aspect of sports public relations is the focus
on reactive rather than proactive public relations (Henley, 1994;
McGregor & Harvey, 1999; Shilbury et al., 1998). Thus, sports
organisations spend much of their time reacting to unplanned events that
may negatively influence public attitudes (Shilbury et al., 1998) rather
than proactively attempting to influence public attitudes.
The intense media scrutiny of professional sports does not mean, however,
that public relations practitioners have no control over how their
organisation, athletes or sport are represented. Although sports
organisations are primarily dependent on the news media for disseminating
their messages, particularly in crisis situations, several studies of
professional sports organisations in North America suggest that the
interdependence between sports journalists and sports public relations
personnel actually offers “a measure of control over what becomes sports
news and how it is reported” (Lowes, 1999, p. 49; Fortunato, 2000).
Further, the growing use of team and league websites introduces a
controllable and more direct form of communication with fans and the media
(see Sallot, Porter & Acosta-Alzuru, 2004). However, although
professional sports operate in a context where it would seem logical to
have well-developed crisis communication plans, it appears that many
sports organisations, including those with professional full-time staff,
continue to operate in a reactive or ineffective fashion rather than
planning and preparing for the kinds of crises that can be predicted
([Helitzer, 1999] and [Marra, 1998]).
The apparent lack of planning is exacerbated in Australasia – the site
of this case study – in large part because the trajectory of
professionalism lags behind that of Europe and North America (Smith &
Stewart, 1999). Indeed, in both Australia and New Zealand, public
relations remains an under-skilled and relatively low status arena which
is often subsumed under marketing. Fears remain that much public relations
work is based on gut feelings rather than research or theory (Singh & Smyth,
2000)2. In sport, McGregor and Harvey (1999) suggest that public relations
has “often been hostage to volunteer enthusiasms and amateur activity
reliant on good will rather than high standards” (p. 251). They point
out that much public relations work is performed by competent players,
coaches, managers or agents rather than by specialist public relations
personnel; in part because “the need for sports PR is little appreciated
among some old-fashioned administrators” (McGregor & Harvey, 1999, p.
254). Further, the devaluation of public relations means that “many
sports officials simply ‘stick their finger in the air’ to see which
way the wind is blowing” rather than using systematic communications
plans (Henley, 1994, p. 212).
2. Rugby league in Australasia
In similar fashion to the public relations industry, rugby league is still
much closer to amateur, volunteer, grass-roots beliefs and administration
than North American or European sport3 despite the National Rugby League
(NRL) competition being run as a fully professional activity with paid
managers, players, coaches and staff. For almost 80 years, the sport has
been membership-based, local community-centred and run by volunteer
administrators (Phillips & Hutchins, 2003). Indeed, it was only in the
1980s that the sport moved from a traditional 52-person
board-of-delegates system to a more streamlined nine-person corporate
management board (Shilbury & Deane, 2000). Thus, in similar fashion to
sports such as English country cricket (see Hopwood, 2005), rugby league's
organisational structures, processes and belief systems remain more
strongly influenced by historical, amateur traditions rather than
business practices.
Ideologically, rugby league is known as a sport for ‘hard men’ and its
value structure tends to reinforce traditional notions of masculinity
such as the ability to inflict and play through pain without complaint,
the valorisation of physical force and strength, and the strategic use
of violence (see Hutchins and Phillips, 1997; Phillips & Hutchins, 2003).
Although the realities of needing to attract a wide range of fans has led
rugby league to market itself beyond its traditional base of working-class
males (Rowe, 1997), the sport is overwhelmingly masculine in its ethos;
an orientation that is reflected in its media coverage. The sport is
strongest in the eastern Australian states, with the majority of NRL teams
and the governing body headquarters based in and around Sydney.4
Since the mid 1990s, elite men's rugby league has been embroiled in
numerous scandals along with the “unprecedented turmoil” resulting from
a media battle for control of pay-TV broadcasting rights which briefly
led to competing national leagues in 1997 (Phillips & Hutchins, 2003; Rowe,
1997, p. 221). Public faith and historically fierce fan loyalties that
had been severely tested in 1997 were further challenged in 2000 when
reductions in the competition from 20 to 14 teams led to unpopular team
amalgamations and a protracted, highly publicised and ultimately
successful legal case by one team for reinstatement. In terms of our case
study, in August 2002 rumours surfaced of serious cheating by the
Canterbury Bulldogs. The allegations of an almost $1million5 salary cap
breach were potentially another blow to rugby league's struggle to reclaim
fans and public support lost during the previous 6 years of organisational
upheaval and litigation.
In 2002, the Canterbury Bulldogs were competing in a 15-team NRL
competition which included 14 Australian and one New Zealand team. Thus,
the competition and primary media coverage included both Australia and
New Zealand. Like many other football clubs, the Bulldogs were associated
with a licensed social club – the Canterbury-Bankstown Leagues Club –
which generated additional club income from profits on food, alcohol and
gambling, and provides a ‘home’ base for fans located in the
working-class, south-west area of Sydney (see Phillips & Hutchins, 2003).
In this paper, we analyse the crisis communication strategies used by the
Bulldogs and suggest that, although the organisation generally failed in
its attempts to control media coverage, its approach (perhaps
accidentally) introduced a strategy, diversion, that has not previously
been discussed in the literature but which may be unique to the sports
context. However, before presenting our analysis, it is important to
briefly summarise the existing crisis communication literature.
3. Crisis communication: best practice
Historically, crisis communication has been the responsibility of public
relations personnel who are able to draw upon research that provides
strategies and solutions for effectively communicating with stakeholders
before, during and following an organisational crisis. Much of the public
relations literature focuses on practical recommendations for predicting
and preparing for crises, developing crisis management plans (e.g.,
Helitzer, 1999), and for effective communication during a crisis. However,
this approach is increasingly being challenged by those arguing that a
narrow vision of public relations as a communications activity should give
way to a focus on building and managing relationships with key
stakeholders ([Ledingham, 2006] and [Ledingham and Bruning, 1998]). This
argument is supported by research that suggests the importance of
establishing strong relationships with stakeholders that will “build
reservoirs of good will, alliances, and shared understanding” (Ulmer,
2001, p. 594; see also Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). Such relationships may
not only prevent crises in the first place but also lessen the effects
or limit the duration of crises when they do occur (Fearn-Banks, 1996).
Further, although Ledingham (2006, p. 472) argues that such relationships
“may take decades … to solidify”, there is significant evidence of
strong relationships between sports teams and their key stakeholders such
as fans, volunteers, media and sponsors. Teams such as the Bulldogs, which
formed in 1935, have had many decades to solidify connections based on
sporting passion and tradition, and many key stakeholders have
well-established, even daily, exposure to the organisation whether
directly or via the mass media.
Overall, however, crisis public relations is dominated by practical,
experience-based, post-crisis communication strategies that constitute
“everyday knowledge” or “accepted wisdom” (Coombs, 2006, p. 174).
Summarizing the literature, Coombs (2006) suggests that the main lessons
are “be quick, be consistent and be open” (p. 172). Speed is vital to
avoid information vacuums that can be easily filled with misinformation,
while a consistent message, whether delivered by one or more spokespeople,
supports believability ([Coombs, 2006], [Coombs, 2001], [Small, 1991] and
[Ulmer, 2001]). Advance planning is also identified as important. Davis
and Gilman (2002) state that, “Without the benefit of advance planning,
an organisation will scramble to come up with a response. This suggests
a lack of command and can result in inaccurate or incomplete messages,
which add to the damage of a crisis” (p. 38). Openness or truthfulness
is emphasized by Fearn-Banks (1996) who argues that, “if your
organization has erred, it is usually better to reveal the mistake at once,
apologize, and make amends….Cover-ups make a crisis persist” (p. 65).
It should be noted, however, that merely having a good crisis
communication strategy on the books is no guarantee of successful
implementation (Marra, 1998). Instead, it appears that the way in which
an organisation engages in crisis communications will reflect its culture
which is the result of formal and informal codes of conduct, values,
beliefs, practices, norms, jokes, taboos and language ([Fearn-Banks, 1996]
and [Kauffman, 2005]). As Fearn-Banks (1996) argues, “the culture
determines to some degree how people within the organisation behave” (p.
13).
Much of the post-crisis literature focuses on post-crisis apologia or a
discourse of defense in which the organisation attempts to absolve itself
from guilt and repair its image (Benoit, 1997; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal,
2002; Coombs, 2006; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). Benoit's image restoration
theory includes five categories of strategies: denial, evading
responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the event, corrective
action and mortification (Blaney et al., 2002; Coombs, 2000).6 The
categories include a variety of options such as categorically denying
involvement, finding a scapegoat, blaming the victim or stating that the
organisation was provoked into taking the action it did. Other options
include bolstering, in which an organisation focuses on its positive
qualities, minimizing the seriousness of the offense, differentiating
itself from other organisations that have committed similar but more
serious offences, attacking the accuser, linking the action to a larger
context where more important values are at work, and apologizing ([Benoit,
1997], [Blaney et al., 2002] and [Cowden and Sellnow, 2002]). Fearn-Banks
(1996) emphasizes the importance of learning from a crisis and putting
in place changes that help prevent similar crises in the future. However,
none of the research has, to our knowledge, identified the most successful
approach used by the Bulldogs – that of presenting the players (who were
implicated in the scandal) and fans as innocent victims; a strategy which
successfully minimised the overall damage to the organisation.
4. Analysing the crisis
This study utilises textual analysis as a method for critically analysing
media constructions of reality ([McKee, 2001] and [Turner, 1997]).
Without direct access to the organisation's internal documents and
meetings, analysing the Bulldogs’ planning or intentions for crisis
communication is impossible. However, given the dependence of sports
organisations on the news media for disseminating information during a
crisis, analyzing publicly available sources such as media coverage and
organisation websites offered a fruitful method for analysing the
Bulldogs’ public relations strategies during the 18-day salary cap
scandal. Therefore, based on almost 150 news stories, letters to the
editor and television news broadcasts in major Australian and New Zealand
news outlets,7 we use media texts as sources for assessing what image
restoration and crisis management tactics the Bulldogs used, and consider
their ‘success’ in terms of the image of the organisation. Our analysis
is based on the assumption that the media do not merely reflect reality
but construct particular kinds of realities which represent dominant
cultural beliefs (Hall, 1984). Because the news media has high credibility,
the ‘facts’ as reported by the media are likely to have strongly limited
the ways in which this crisis was understood by those interested in or
affected by it (e.g., [Hall, 1980], [Hall, 1984] and [McKee, 2001]).
Therefore, this analysis also focuses on how the media reported the events,
considering both the tone of representations and whether the organisation
experienced success in controlling the framing of the stories (see also
[Fortunato, 2000] and [Lowes, 1999]).
Although we examined the texts in chronological order to investigate how
the strategies and representations evolved, and considered them in light
of Benoit's image restoration strategies, our focus in this paper is on
a new strategy – diversion – which we suggest offers a powerful way for
sports organisations to retain support for their ‘product’ – the sport
and players – even if administrators come under significant pressure.
However, by contrasting this crisis with a later sex scandal involving
the same team, we point out that this strategy is more effective in certain
situations; primarily those during which the players are, or can be
represented as being, innocent victims of activities outside their
control.
5. Failed strategies
In order to contextualise our presentation of diversion as a new sports
public relations strategy, we briefly assess the ‘standard’ crisis
communication strategies employed by the Bulldogs, which included denial,
attacking the accuser, provocation, scapegoating, corrective action and,
belatedly, mortification. Overall, our analysis revealed that the
Bulldogs’ crisis communication strategies demonstrated little, if any,
understanding of public relations best practice. Indeed, the Bulldogs’
approach to the crisis resulted in an almost complete loss of control over
the organisation's image, with the limited exception of diversion.
In stark contrast to crisis communications best practice which emphasizes
the importance of a consistent message, the two organisations involved
in the scandal employed up to five different official spokesmen who did
not always present the same message. For example, while the Bulldogs were
solely focusing on denial, the Leagues Club spokesman (unsuccessfully)
attempted to also attack the accuser by linking the leak of incriminating
documents to a disgruntled developer ousted from a combined
Bulldogs-Leagues Club building project.
The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that the denial strategy was quickly
shown to be a lie. Once it became apparent that a paragraph showing
significant existing and planned salary cap breaches of more than
$1million had been deliberately removed from documents previously
presented to the NRL, the Bulldogs image restoration strategies changed
to provocation and mortification. For example, the Leagues Club spokesman
read a statement from the Bulldogs – “We … have made submissions of
mitigating circumstances that the club would like the league to take into
consideration” (Davies, Walter, McClymont & Masters, 2002, para 11) –
which also included mortification: “We apologize unreservedly to fans”
(para 12). Both of these strategies also ultimately failed. First, the
‘mitigating circumstances’ were not identified and nor did they ever
emerge into the public domain. Second, as the increasingly negative and
unsympathetic coverage over the next 2 weeks revealed, the apology was
not accepted as legitimate by fans, the media or the NRL. Throughout the
crisis, the failure of the Bulldogs to effectively use the one media format
over which they did have control – their website and its general news
section, Dogbites – further demonstrated their lack of understanding of
public relations practice and reduced their opportunities to challenge
the media framing of the issue. Unfortunately for the Bulldogs, their
turnaround – from denial to admission of fault (albeit with provocation)
– clearly violated crisis communications best practice which suggests
that they should have admitted to the overspending as soon as the breach
was discovered, therefore maintaining a clear and consistent message.
When neither mortification nor provocation worked as strategies, the
Bulldogs attempted to use their CEO as a scapegoat. However, despite his
resignation, the media began to focus extensively on the role of the entire
nine-man Bulldogs management team. Almost 40 articles between August 19
and 24 explicitly blamed Bulldogs management for the breach. Numerous
headlines between August 20 and August 25 demonstrated a strongly critical
slant: August 20 – Boot the Dogs out; August 21 – Kick them out; August
24 – League just could not tolerate blatant cheats; August 25 – Cheats
must not prosper. These headlines appeared to reflect popular sentiment,
as evidenced in comments by the NRL chairman who stated that “the public
reaction to this has been very strong and we must listen to them. At the
end of the day, the game must come first … The tea ladies, the people
in tipping competitions, the kids, people who I see on building sites are
saying, ‘Kick the bastards out’ …” (Masters, Mascord, Magnay &
Halloran, 2002, p. 42). Similarly, the general consensus in the Sydney
Morning Herald open forum website letters on August 20 was that Bulldogs
and Leagues Club management should be punished: “… the people
responsible (the suits) should pay the consequences”. The media also used
the NRL CEO to give credibility to the framing of the Bulldogs as
intentionally cheating. His description of the breach as “deliberate”
and “elaborate” (Walter & Masters, 2002, p. 34) was used in 27 articles
and on all three New Zealand television news broadcasts. The use of these
and other terms such as blatant, calculated, unlawful, systematic,
cynical, devious, unconscionable, duplicitous and deceitful reinforced
the negative representation of the Bulldogs management and compounded the
loss of control over their image and representation.
The negative publicity continued even after the Leagues Club spokesman
and entire Bulldogs Board resigned as a form of corrective action after
the Bulldogs received the harshest penalty in the 94-year history of the
competition – being fined heavily, stripped of 37 competition points and
denied the chance to play in the competition finals. This form of
corrective action clearly failed as a public relations strategy because
the media continued to frame those responsible in a negative manner, most
obviously in the following description in the Sun-Herald: “They acted
with a sickening and shameful degree of self-interest and now the club,
the team, the players and the fans are paying the penalty on their behalf”
(Winning back, 2002, p. 20). Similarly, despite the Bulldogs’ website
claiming the Leagues Club spokesman had resigned in the interests of the
club he loved, Sydney media framed him as defiant, brazen and duplicitous
and as the “architect of the disaster” (Honeysett & Payten, 2002, p.
17). The climax to the crisis, which was dubbed Bulldog-gate, appeared
to be the Bulldogs’ decision not to appeal the NRL punishment; a decision
for which the NRL congratulated the organisation while also employing a
discourse of corrective action which emphasized the need for the Bulldogs
to establish new systems for the future.
However, although the Bulldogs almost completely lost control over how
the crisis was represented, their ongoing focus on the innocence of the
players, combined with the empathy for players and fans evident in the
media coverage and NRL statements, worked to ensure that the global
community of rugby league fans was not alienated from the sport and paved
the way for the Bulldogs to begin to restore their image and relationship
with fans. Thus, in our analysis, a new crisis communication strategy –
diversion – comes to the fore, as players and fans are represented as
innocent victims of an intentionally dishonest management board.
6. Diversion: players and fans as innocent victims
From early in the crisis, the Bulldogs attempted to create a discourse
that diverted attention away from management by focusing on the players,
and later the fans, as innocent victims. Although Bulldogs management were
not successful in shifting media attention away from their cheating, the
strategy of highlighting the negative impacts of harsh penalties on
players and fans added another dimension to the public understanding and
media framing of the crisis. Diversion provided an opportunity for the
Bulldogs organisation to connect with their fans and to limit the overall
damage to the sport and team, because the aspects of the organisation with
which fans most relate – the players and on-field performance – could
be divorced from the scandal.
Throughout the crisis, Bulldogs spokespeople presented the players as
having done nothing wrong. The popular Bulldogs coach further reinforced
the theme of innocence by stressing that the players had the right to feel
proud of their on-field achievements. The organisation's use of diversion
was successful in that media coverage supported this framing by quoting
fans, players and rugby league administrators as being concerned for
players: “This breach was engineered in a boardroom and the NRL's grenade
should explode there and not out on the field where innocent players would
be cut down by the shrapnel” (Fenech, 2002, p. 61). Quotes such as this
generated some sympathy for the Bulldogs’ organisation as a whole; with
the players represented as ‘suffering’ far more from the outcome of the
crisis than those who were responsible for it.
In addition, rugby league fans were also regularly represented as victims
in the scandal. Once it became clear that the punishment was likely to
be severe, including eliminating the team from the competition finals,
the media focus shifted to include the impact on fans. Representative
comments on the Sydney Morning Herald website open forum included the
following: “The players and fans have done nothing wrong, but they are
the ones that will be hurt the most” and “It's not fair to the
players…and the fans, as they are not the ones who put themselves in this
situation.” One columnist focused primarily on the fans, writing, “We
feel utterly sad for the members and supporters. Sport is not a religion
but it is a chapel for unqualified loyalty and trust. Supporters have
invested money and emotion into the Canterbury Bulldogs and have been
betrayed absolutely” (Smith, 2002, p. 52).
We suggest that diversion may be particularly appropriate and effective
in sports crisis communications, in part because few other organisations
have a product, the players, with whom supporters have such an emotional
attachment. Although closest to Benoit's bolstering strategy – which
emphasizes good traits or past acts that might offset the current damage
– focusing on the innocence of players and fans is a way of distracting
or diverting publics from other negative aspects of the breach and
redirecting the focus of media images of the organisation. For example,
one Bulldogs player was described as emotionally breaking down during an
interview, a framing that reinforced the image of the players as
distressed victims. Twelve articles between August 20 and 24 also
represented the players in this way, supported by quotes from players from
other teams arguing the Bulldogs did not deserve to be kicked out of the
competition. It should be noted that diversion was not always successful,
as some letter writers and journalists challenged the notion of the
players as victims. For example, one newspaper suggested that:
…comments that the players were innocent parties and were not playing
for money cannot be taken seriously…Collectively the players were
receiving salaries way above the going rate and no fan of the game can
seriously believe that the players, and their managers, did not know what
was going on. (Breen, 2002, p. 42)
Despite these rare challenges, however, the diversion strategy was
effective, and further enhanced by its consistency with the NRL's position
that rugby league and Bulldogs fans were innocent victims. For example,
as the penalty was handed down, the main media focus was on the emotionally
charged official statement given by the NRL CEO which was quoted in the
majority of stories in broadcast and print media. Numerous newspapers
carried extensive quotes from the statement and New Zealand's TV3
broadcast the comments live:
This is unquestionably a bitter day for Rugby League. Indeed the game has
had its heart broken in a tragic and unexpected way. There is no question
that persons within the Bulldogs have let down their players, their fans
and their club desperately. The NRL feels deeply for the players and fans
of the Bulldogs who are victims in this but it feels just as strongly that
the players and fans of other clubs in the finals should not risk their
dreams being shattered because a club was allowed to get away with breaking
the rules. (TV3, 2002)
The CEO's comments cemented the discourse that Bulldogs management had
truly been intentionally dishonest, as well as reinforcing a contrasting
representation of the NRL as authoritative, credible and acting in the
best interests of the sport. The punishment was represented by the media
as fair and appropriate, and supported by expert opinion in the form of
quotes from respected members of the rugby league community. Although
there is little evidence that this consistency of message was a combined
communications effort, it does illustrate a shared desire by both
organisations to maintain the positive images associated with players by
fans and, therefore, to provide some protection for the sports product
and the long-term sustainability of the team and NRL competition.
7. Conclusions
Of interest in this case study is that the Bulldogs’ lack of truthfulness
and the breakdown in trust between those running the organisation and the
fans and media did not, as might be predicted (see Shilbury et al., 1998),
significantly affect the bottom line in areas such as attendance. Indeed,
average home attendance more than doubled in the year following the
scandal. While the attempt to cover up the salary cap cheating did, as
Fearn-Banks (1996) argues, extend the crisis and rebound negatively on
management, it did not appear to seriously disrupt the fans’ existing
relationship with the club as a whole. Indeed, the success of diversion
as a crisis strategy bolsters the argument that public relations should
focus on building quality relationships rather than on technical
communication practices ([Hopwood, 2005] and [Ledingham, 2006]). By
protecting the players and coach, with whom fans have the strongest
emotional connection, and sacrificing the management team, the
organisation ensured that the relationship with at least one key
stakeholder group would continue. Indeed, the increased spectator numbers
the following year may reflect the strength of this relationship as fans
turned out to demonstrate their support for the players and, incidentally,
contributed to the rebuilding of the organisation.
At the same time, the analysis demonstrates the importance of good crisis
communication with all stakeholders in the sports realm. In this case,
although the organisation's blatant premeditated dishonesty did not
result in wholesale rejection of the team, its poor crisis management
alienated other key stakeholders such as the media and turned fans against
the management team. The result was that the print and broadcast news media
in both Australia and New Zealand clearly constructed a limited and
negative representation of the Bulldogs organisation as ‘cheaters’.
Neither possible provocations for committing the breach, such as the
unfairness of a salary cap, nor the initial claim of mitigating
circumstances received much media coverage. However, the effect of the
penalty on both fans and players was widely publicised.
The crisis communication strategies employed by the Bulldogs did not
reflect best practice and may have exacerbated the negative outcomes of
the crisis. The Bulldogs, in initially agreeing to open their books for
auditing but denying the allegations, seemed more dishonest when it was
discovered that they had violated the salary cap; an approach likely to
have alienated stakeholders more than necessary (see Fearn-Banks, 1996).
The Bulldog's initial strategies suggest that they had gone to great
lengths to conceal their cheating and did not believe they would be caught.
Although the punishment might not have been different had the Bulldogs
been honest from the outset, it seems likely that a truthful and consistent
message from the beginning would have greatly minimized any damage done
to stakeholder relationships, particularly with the media, and to future
profitability and viability. However, the use of a strategy not previously
identified in the research literature – diversion – in relation to the
players and fans did allow the Bulldogs to regain some control over the
tone and framing of some reports. We suggest, however, that this strategy
would not have been as effective had it not intersected with the views
of the NRL and the wider rugby league community.
Certainly, the failure of the Bulldogs communication strategies in the
heat of the crisis suggests that the importance of public relations was
not fully understood – if it was even included in strategic plans for
the organisation. This finding reinforces Hopwood's (2005) research on
English country cricket which discovered that public relations is not
“formally implemented to the extent that it should be” (p. 202). Further,
the Bulldogs, as Hopwood argues about some cricket clubs, not only
internalised problems and issues but appeared “content to rely on history,
tradition and, perhaps mythology, to assuage potentially damaging image
and reputation issues” (2005, p. 206). As suggested earlier, this lack
of appreciation for the importance of public relations can be traced back
to the historically volunteer organisation of rugby league. Indeed, media
coverage during the crisis made a strong case that NRL clubs and their
associated Leagues Clubs have long operated more as ‘personal fiefdoms’
run by individuals than as ‘corporations’, and that management
demonstrated little understanding of expectations for personal and
economic accountability within a professional sport environment. Thus,
the Bulldogs communications approach clearly reflected the values,
beliefs and assumptions of the organisation ([Fearn-Banks, 1996] and
[Kauffman, 2005]) which one media article described as “infamous for its
internecine political rivalries and bitter personal squabbles” (Walter
& Masters, 2002, p. 34). The use of diversion, however, may have helped
alleviate the ‘bottom line’ effects of the crisis (in terms of
attendance in ensuing years), by drawing upon the positive relationships
built up over many years between the fans and the most visible
representatives of the organisation, the players.
The failure of the Bulldogs to learn from the past (see Fearn-Banks, 1996)
was evident less than 2 years later when allegations of gang rape by
players exploded onto the front pages of newspapers in February 2004. The
refusal of the Bulldogs management and players to take the allegations
seriously – most evident in their attempts to blame the victim and in
the players wearing casual attire such as t-shirts to formal police
interviews (e.g., [Bulldogs assault, 2004] and [Magnay et al., 2004]) –
resulted in overwhelmingly negative media coverage (see Prent, 2004). The
situation was exacerbated when the Australian national team captain made
a joke based on word-play related to ‘rape’ (Bulldogs assault, 2004).
According to Prent (2004), although no charges were laid, the media
highlighted police statements “that ‘insufficient evidence’ does not
equate to a confirmation of the innocence of the accused”; and the team's
claim that “the players had been vindicated, and their innocence proven”
was “not well received on the whole” (p. 25). Overall, it was clear that
diversion was much less effective in this case. Yet, at the same time,
it should be noted that within a culture of elite male sport where women
are often seen as sex objects or ‘groupies’ (see [Curry, 1991] and
[Messner et al., 2000]), at least a segment of the public and media
supported the diversion strategy – representing the players as innocent
victims of a ‘slut’ who agreed to consensual group sex but later changed
her mind (see Prent, 2004). Indeed, even in the face of a crisis involving
the players, average home attendance figures in 2004 only dropped by about
1400 spectators (to an average of 19,693) as the team on the field competed
well enough to reach the NRL finals.
Overall, we conclude that this case study allows us to identify a new
crisis communications strategy in sports public relations; one which has
the potential to limit damage to the organisation overall, even if
management come under fire. Diversion appears to work because it draws
on the passion resulting from the “intense personal relationship” that
fans have with players and teams (MacLean, 1996, p. 139). Such
relationships appear to be experienced by fans as existing independently
of the individuals who might be running the organisation. This unique
relationship means, however, that diversion may be a strategy with limited
applicability beyond sport, except perhaps in industries such as music
and entertainment where fandom is a key component of the ‘product’. In
the sporting context, diversion appears to work best when management are
presumed to be at fault and is less effective when players or fans are
believed to the cause of the crisis. However, given that rugby league,
like many elite male team sports, is firmly embedded in a male sporting
culture where fan idolisation of players means that much of their
behaviour is excused or forgiven, it is not surprising that diversion is
a successful strategy and one that sports organisations should seriously
consider integrating into their public relations planning.
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Corresponding author. Tel.: +64 7 838 4500; fax: +64 7 838 4555.
1
Author is an aspiring fiction writer who has just completed her first
novel.
2
The differences between Australasia and North America are clear. For
example, a recent Australian sports management text does not include a
section on public relations, nor is it mentioned in the index (Smith &
Stewart, 1999). In contrast, not only does a major North American sport
management text (Mullin, Hardy, & Sutton, 1993) contain a chapter on
public relations, but the major text designed for sport public relations
professionals (Helitzer, 1999) is now in its third edition. Mullin et al.
(1993) point to the centrality of public relations in North American
sports when they state that it “must play an integral role in both the
strategic planning process…and the implementation and management of the
strategic plan” (p. 262).
3
Indeed, two-thirds of the Australian sports work-force in 1997 was
estimated to be volunteers, and just over 10% of sports administrators
were paid (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999).
4
In contrast, women's rugby league is virtually invisible in Australia.
Indeed it was only in 1998 that the national governing body agreed to
affiliate women's teams. For a brief history, see the Australian women's
national team web page:
http://www.sportingpulse.com/assoc_page.cgi?c=7-2131-0-0-0&sID=29161.
5
All dollar amounts are in Australian dollars.
6
Coombs (2004) defines these slightly differently – as deny strategies
(denial, scapegoating), diminish strategies (excuses or justification),
rebuilding strategies (compensation offers or apologies) and reinforcing
strategies (bolstering, ingratiation via praising stakeholders) – but
the overall trend is the same.
7
These include seven Australian media outlets (the Australian
Associated Press, Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph, Sunday
Telegraph, Australian, Courier-Mail, Sun-Herald) and four New Zealand
newspapers (the New Zealand Herald, Waikato Times, Sunday Star Times and
Sunday News) as well as all three New Zealand national television news
broadcasts and some Australian web-available television coverage.