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XIX Annual Strategy Conference (8-10 April 2008)
Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power
All statements within the conference are on the record and may be attributed
BEFORE YOU READ THIS RECORD, read the 1998 Strategy Conference Report by clicking below on:
The Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate, Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1998-1999)
Introduction by the Commandant of the Army War College
Winning the peace, combined with the responsibility for devising the Army’s concepts, doctrines, and
force structures for the future, demand that we seek to understand all the instruments of national
power, and how best to train, equip, and organize across all elements of the federal government.
Keynote Address
Present at the Re-Creation: New Tools for a New Era
Ambassador John Herbst
Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State
It has become clear we are not well-organized for the post Cold War era.
We tried to work with the Soviet Union but discovered that they are not a true partner.
China, proliferation, emergence of missile power in other nations, challenge us with more complex
dangers.
The Eisenhower and post WWII developments gave rise to the Marshall Plan and the United Nations, the
National Security Council and many other new instruments. Each element was contentious and even
revolutionary but they also fought among themselves.
Today we are in midst of transformative process. Post 9-11 we realize that we must confront a radical
religious terrorist threat. In the Cold War we were challenged by a centralizing force. Now we are faced
with a dispersed force. Tendency 1 is the many new nations.
Tendency 2: loose nukes.
Tendency 3: globalization which has undermined government monopolies
T 4: emergence of super-empowered individuals and groups (citing Tom Friedman). Ungoverned spaces
such as Waziristan and tri-border region in South America. Bono, Spielberg.
T5: movement of peoples and connectivity combine to give local events global reach (e.g the Danish
cartoon)
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All this combines to make the most distant and isolated places worthy of our attention. We must
replace and revitalize our tools. DHS, DNI, NSD #44 to improve whole of government
3 D’s: Defense, Diplomacy, Development
USAID has office for military affairs. 60 state officers in DoD, almost equal number in State.
AfricaCom designed as inter-agency command.
Threat of failed states: more than threat of conquering states
FAX HIM the DNI one-pager and a note he can take to Negroponte.
We must do better at managing all US assets while doing outreach to every country and organization
capable of doing good work in the field.
Extremely difficult for an outside state to impose peace. Even small countries with very large influx are
difficult to stabilize.
We have learned that the military alone is not the only instrument nor even, in waging peace, the best
instrument.
SecDef in Kansas said that one of the most important lessons of AF and IQ is that the military alone is
not sufficient to win the peace.
Need strong civilian stabilization team.
Preventive action, prior to crisis, can be helpful
Secretary Rice has stated that we have an interest in helping well-governed states because they can
control their borders and provide for their people. Our foremost interest is to avoid conflict so our
military does not have to deploy.
EMAIL Army Major Gray URL and JFQ URL.
Active Response Corps -- 11 ARC members in State Department, going toward 250 civilians across
civilian departments. AID will get 93. 48-72 hours of decision.
Stand-by Response Corps – government employees on call with training. 10-25% availability. 200-500
people deployable in 45-60 days.
Civilian Reserve Corps modeled on military reserve. Mentioned in State of the Union 2007.
New inter-agency management system for stabilization and reconstruction—create a whole of
government planning, coordination, execution capability. Not intended to respond to political and
humanitarian crisis already managed by others.
Moving in right direction, far to go.
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Jablonsky write: power is contextual. Assets may or may not be effective or relevant depending on the
context.
We all now present at the re-creation and all of us have an opportunity to contribute.
Q&A
German international fellow. Large parts of US foreign policy in defense hands, from beginning of
decision to go into Iraq. S&R is administrative. What needs to be done to improve State influence as a
policy lead?
Amb: not sure I can accept your premise. We have been involved
Econ advisor to PACOM and then CENTCOM. Saw Maoist insurgency coming, but no one would do
anything until it was a crisis. What should have been?
Amb: not my job to critique the past. Our office is trying to create a civilian capability to respond, but
also to address the prevention aspect, the planning aspect, of addressing emergent stability. S&R is not
a policy shop, but rather a capabilities shop.
Dr. Gregors, School of Advanced Studies. S&R must be requested. When will it actually be requested?
Amb: Good question, hypothetical answer. Decision to activate the S&R whole of government
Interagency Management System (IMS) is a policy decision that must be made by President or SecState.
Key West Florida: What are you doing for Gaza, AF, IQ
Amb: when formed in 2004 idea was to focus on future and prevention. However we have sent small
teams out here and there and are looking at creating a new capability in Iraq. Looking at a possible
project for Gaza.
Ukraine: some problems with this joining NATO.
Amb: no longer responsible for policy on Ukraine. Have never been responsible for missile defense.
(knowing laughter). First off, this is a choice for the Ukrainian people. They have been told that if they
choose to join, they will be welcomed. There are safeguards in place to protect secrets.
Retired Army civilian analyst: may have heard an inconsistency between all failed states offering versus
those that impact directly on our national interests.
Amb: ungoverned areas a real concern.
Follow-up question: failed state 15 years ago may not have threatened but times change. How do you
build in the agility?
Amb: it is in our interest to build global capabilities. For example, Australia has an international police
force of 750 or so, quite a commitment.
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Chapel Hill Center for Stabilization & Reconstruction: training program you intend?
Amb: we have created at Foreign Service Institute two week courses for those going to unstable areas.
Most participants right now are military. If we get funds, FSI will be lead, AWC, USIP, NDU, JFCOM.
Initially 2-3 weeks, eventually, for active force, 2-3 months.
MajGen Charlie Dunlap, USAF: compelling people to go places, should people be under UCMJ and other
places?
Amb: they will sign up and know they must go or repay costs of their recruitment and training. This
issue has not been fully defined. Our going in notion is that our civilians will be protected by whatever
military or state security is on scene.
Terry Myers, AID to ICAF: what kind of grant making or funding authorities will S&R folks have? Might
they be commissioned to have long-term benefits especially if killed.
Amb: they will have the skills they need. Contracting capabilities will be essential, one reason AID gets
more people than anyone else. All in active and stand-by will be federal employees who receive
differential and other incentive pay. When civilians are mobilized, they will receive similar benefits.
Brian Woods, senior strategic planner at defense: adding bureaucracy, heavily dependent on civilian
counterparts to the military who are subject to political tampering. How do we avoid political whims of
the day?
Amb: trying to devise a more nuanced way of doing business. On political tampering, I cannot solve that
problem but there will be a single command and control structure for all civilian endeavors, minimizing
cross-purposes.
Stan Rivalas, IDA, retired State. Vision you outline is a challenging one. DoS has been trying to sell this
to Congress and Congress has resisted. What is the source of that resistance and how do you plan to
overcome it?
Amb: Reason 1: creating something new and truly transformational. People don’t understand it.
Reason 2: substantial resistance within the federal government, stepping on institutional toes.
Hellacious inter-agency warfare. Reason 3: traditionally State and AID have been underfunded, funds
we are asking for look like a large increase but in comparison to Pentagon, a tiny fraction. We’ve won
the executive battle, now we need to win the Hill battle. General consensus now leans in our favor.
Senators Luger and Biden, various Representatives, are strong supporters. We were included in the AFIQ supplemental (500 positions), working on getting it passed in the Senate. Hoping to have them ready
for the new President in summer 2009.
John Martin, special IG for Iraq reconstruction: pre-conflict, conflict, post-conflict: State, Defense, no
post-conflict similar department. SCRS good step in the right direction but should we be elevating AID?
Amb: AID does critical development and humanitarian work but not permitted by law to be involved in
key elements of S&R. Certainly that is a logical possibility. Analogy for what we are doing is that of
creating a joint command without abolishing the services.
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Maj Sean McCormick, C&GSC: how do we define acceptable or necessary state of government in terms
of democracy, before assisting them.
Amb: critical question. There are no uniform answers. No solutions that can be applied to all. Key is
understanding the country and its culture, reinforcing traditional style of governance and its
functionality.
Retired Army, student: institution building, civil society, a decades long process. How much can S&R,
laudatory as it might be, contribute to these long-term programmatic needs.
Amb: testified on this, books I recommended: Huntington Political Order (45 years old), Fukiyama’s
Nation-Building, and Rand book on nation-building. We need to be modest and humble. Must be
nimble and responsive to what your own country will accept.
Female: what are key allies and partners doing along same path?
Amb: problem of failed states widely understood. Dozen or so offices comparable. Chinese have
tremendous capabilities. India may be engaged. Lead countries not US (7 million budget). Canadians
have 230 million). Australia going to 1200 international police.
Justice: status of any state investigation of fallen security personnel or PRC deaths?
Amb: state not really engaged. Don’t know answer to your question.
Eddie Baron: 60-70% success so far in getting integrated civilian agency endeavors. Chances?
Amb: chances are good if we get the resources.
Mike Jeffers from National Intelligence Council: difficult to incentivize people now, how will we do this
in future with any more success?
Amb: public perception inconsistent with reality, result of one town meeting. This is however a
legitimate question. We want to create an activist cadre of 250 people who will know when they are
recruited that they will be spending 9 months a year in difficult and dangerous places. Going to open
this to national foreign service personnel, smart, language skills, already vetted.
PANEL 1: The Historical Background
Chair: Dr. Conrad Crane
Panelists: Dr. Douglas Stewart, Dr. Jennifer Sims, Dr. Andrew Erdmann (LtCol Nate Fryer replaced)
Crane: real purpose of history is to figure out how everything got so screwed up in the first place
(laughter).
Stewart:
national security reform is more gardening than architecture. Begin by touching on the
revolutionary nature of the National Security Act of 1947. Found that could not understand this until I
went back to 1935, understanding of how 150 years of national security got overturned, turned away
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from State dominance and concept of national interest as a guiding concept. In 1930’s new focus on
alternative concept that was resolved in 1941 and Pearl Harbor. Focus on never again being suckerpunched.
Three new ideas:
1. Permanent place for military at high table in war and peace
2. Need for national intelligence collection and coordination
3. Need for civilian-military coordination
Three points of contention
Truman wanted joint military, “one team, all the reins in one hand” but this was disputed.
So also was concept of national intelligence and information coordination.
Finally, dispute over need for need to coordinate economic and scientific assets of national power.
System we actually ended up with:
1. Military dominance of the new national security bureaucracy. Pol-mil became Mil-pol.
2. System that never achieved anything close to the mandate for intelligence coordination.
3. Accepted from beginning by Congress, media, and public as the explicit instrument for serving
the President. Two fundamental problems: 1) designed around concept of coordination rather
than command & control; and 2) when President’s policies are unpopular, Congress and public
begin to intrude on this presidential architecture
4. Debate on coordinating instruments of national power came to nothing. Equivalent focus on
managing economic power vanished by the end of the Eisenhower administration
9-11 was a burning platform for finally getting it right, but it did not have the same shock effect on the
public or even the bureaucracy that Pearl Harbor did. Side comment: most important outcome has
been rise of an autonomous Vice President doing his own analysis.
Mention of Hoover Commission for need for Vice President for Foreign Affairs.
Two concluding thoughts:
1. Any thinking on restructuring must understand the history.
2. Any effort would do well to follow the earlier model and use of an intensive study of the British
Empire—such study even more valuable today. Triumphalism, indecision, recrimination have
been our lot, equivalent to British Diamond Jubilee.
Sims: I was shocked by the disconnect between government,, where intelligence was recognized as a
source of power, but in academia it is virtually ignored. Uncertainty is a given in academia’s view of the
world. Keegan’s book on intelligence and war representative of the academic disregard, neglect, and
lack of understanding of the importance of intelligence.
I think of three eras:
Era of Military Intelligence. From founding to WWI. Institutionalized.
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Era of National Naiveté. From WWI to WWII. Military got it, but Army and Navy competed. State did
not, shut down black chamber. National civilian leadership did not see need. But WWII underscored
need for dedicated civilian and military capabilities.
Era of National Technical Intelligence. From Pearl Harbor to 9/11.
during the Cold War. Enormous technical strides in space.
Focused on preserving stability
Another narrative has come out: Legacy of Ashes, Spying Blind. How do we measure success. We have
not developed a theory of intelligence. Incremental change is not transformative. Need theory. What’s
the point? Raider’s of the Lost Ark and sword example. US intelligence does not have a good grip on
net assessment and strategic warning.
A few thoughts:
First, definition, intelligence is the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information for decisionmakers. Intelligence does not require secrecy. Purpose of intelligence is to gain decision advantage
over an adversary—it’s about the competition. We are too focused on accuracy and detail, fifteen pages
most not relevant.
Four key ingredients: Collection (command and control, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination);
ability to anticipate and warn the decision maker; transmission—the ability to partner with decision
makers. In absence of trust, intelligence will be used. Finally, capacity of selective denial. We have
equated counterintelligence with total security, have lost our touch.
We talk too much about stove-pipes, but sensors including those placed by clandestine service not fully
orchestrated.
Concerned about the new mantra of need to share. Question is do we know when and how to use
compartments and when not to use them.
Fryer: strategic deficit—serial under-appreciation for net assessment and strategic development.
Grand strategists needed. Too many assume there is a consistent grand design. Post Cold War we have
no strategy, no standing plans for broad integrated actions or long-term competition. US has not
devoted necessary political and intellectual energy to grand design? Has it created such a grand design?
No. We need such an endeavor to deal with the extraordinarily complex world that faces us now. US
decision makers assumed primacy. We are not exercising US influence in an intelligent cost-effective
effective manner. National interest is not strategic, but rather dominated by individuals and political
whims of the day. Our material capacity is not matched by our non-material capacity. Others expect us
to act as extremists; we do not understand this and suffer from imprudent denial of reality that US is
often viewed with suspicion and greater resistance.
Two important realities:
1. Constant resistance and denial must be anticipated. We must avoid confusing competition with
personal attacks on idealism. Policy decided in a fever or in the short-term will disappoint.
2. Great Powers cannot be effective without a long-term design.
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In the end, what is most important right now in the USA is that we employ our assets in a haphazard
manner with a short-term perspective. Must recommit to a long-term strategic plan that allows us to
manage down long-term conflict and destabilization.
Crane: we still do not have a national strategy. The field manual invites political leaders to take
responsibility. Military improperly configured. Intelligence failed.
Key West: panel has not addressed how our spending is over-emphasizing military in the US budget.
Stewart: a lot of debate about the relationship of the budget to national security. In 1930’s Luce and
Roosevelt were so impressed with control economies that they considered need for a dictatorship, but
after WWII we were so impressed with results of free-wheeling capitalism that we fell into path of not
paying attention to our needs.
Sims: budget a vital aspect but if we consider intelligence to be only secret intelligence, we lose focus
on state need for open intelligence. We have an accounting approach that fits with Congressional
jurisdictions, and have a cultural reluctance, e.g. at State, to shift resources, e.g. secret intelligence
wants to own intelligence and state does not want to receive resources for “collection.”
Fryer: in 2004 DoD recognized need for divesture but divesture loses money. Unless you have a process
that forces hard decisions, won’t be fixed.
Stewart: Marshall objected to National Security Act directions as intruding on State’s constitutionallymandated responsibilities and his concerns were borne out: DoD became the automaton of the NSC.
Question: our policy makers fail to focus on enemy centers of gravity.
Sims: we do not have a good record in identifying deception, and we don’t want to do it ourselves.
Strategy requires a fusion between policy makers and intelligence expertise. We keep trying to draw a
red line between policy and intelligence. Deception is about knowing the small small thing you want to
keep secret and then slightly modifying the truth.
Air Force Academy: We all recognize that irrational plays a role. Increasing drive from media.
Fryer: we become the victims of cumulative small strategic failures. We have to find a way to separate
real core interests from the moral compelling impulses.
Sims: I don’t think you can get a strategically rational approach unless you can get Congress to buy in to
its own role as an enabler of the executive’s competency.
Mark Peterson, OSD/USAF: Terror is a tactic. Is there a better way to define the enemy?
Fryer: USA has entered a period of persistent conflict.
Retired Navy: What is our national end state?
others?
Have we defined it? How do we earn buy-in from
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Fryer: US grand strategy has to recognize capacity and strategy of other actors. Primacy is scary, has to
be managed gently. Also, we have to ask ourselves if we are not over-militarizing our competition, while
competitors have moved on and focuses on economy and other arenas.
Sims: what is the national end-state domestically? Federal level is reticent to really address the
domestic side of what do we know, what do we need, rules of the road, players and stakeholders, etc.
Need to address ethics and methods of achieving this in an open society.
Stewart: Need to achieve “good guy” perceptions and collaboration in that context.
LUNCHEON SPEAKER: Dr. John Hillen
Theme: there’s a lot of different battlefields out there. There is one battlefield that we are not doing
well: counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, stabilization & reconstruction.
Have many different tools, different policies, but three biggest shortfalls, as identified by the Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates:
Diplomacy
Development
Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communication
Sustainable development is another whole world, its own language, culture, alternative livelihoods,
long-term, indigenous empowerments.
Going to talk about five maps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
World’s most poorly-governed and unstable regions. Lack political and economic infrastructure
that can provide for all levels of society. Things that provide reliability.
Regions that suffer from endemic social problems: disease, mortality, migration.
World’s most violent flashpoints and hotspots.
Surging populations 6 billion going to 8 billion, most in mega-cities, within 50 miles of coast
Distribution of critical natural resources (whole other discussion about water)
What does this mean? Paraphrasing Churchill, they are producing more history (instability) than we can
consume. We are going to have to intervene, and intrusively.
Security has been redefined and we are going to have to intervene continuously and sustainably.
Four reasons:
1. Shrunken world. Poor governance travels.
2. Heightened sensibilities—exponentially different beyond original CNN effect, with competing
narratives—with completely different values and perspectives on what matters
3. When you combine poor governance and disorder with other dynamics (e.g. politicized ethics)
you get more instability. This is a problem facing much of the Islamics. We have to ask
ourselves: if the Islamic worked like Japan, would we have so many emerging radicals?
4. Super-empowered individuals and ability to gain access to weapons of mass destruction
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All sorts of military challenges out there—from the Barbary Pirates onwards we have been engaged. I
want to pose three national security challenges
1. Unemployed young men: recruits for gangs
2. Unruly environments and bad government—lack of water, electricity, rule of law
3. Lack of social services—opens doors for gangs with services and a cultural history. Lack of
access to education and health services. Creates a vacuum into which our adversaries can
move. Short life expectation can fuel risk taking and separation. Physical effects of disease.
All of this spirals downward, challenges us, offers opportunities to others who devise an alternative
narrative.
Emphasis on HIV and disease such that every year you are dealing with a completely different group of
people. The churn is unimaginable by most.
Uniformed culture and development culture have grown apart.
Three cycles constantly spinning and changing:
1. Individuals
2. Institutions
3. Xxx
If you don’t focus on this constantly, it will go into a death spiral. Has to be applied at all times including
in the middle of hostilities. Has to be done in every level all the time.
Step 1: We’re in the same business. BUT our pol-mil institutions are out of synch with reality as well as
our top-down command and control. Action is taking place in the field, where one lance corporal can
have a strategic effect. In general, my critique is that we are far too structured. Too many lanes in the
road that the battlefield and the adversary refuses to separate out. Does not lend itself to command
and control. Who does what when, where’s the hand off point? Different in every village. State still
structured for Wesphalian world. Pentagon share of development business has risen from 6% to 22%
but Pentagon has not figured out how to do training,
Great lesson of life is that no one is in charge. We have to get that figured out.
Piece we get is providing security in hostile environments.
We also get the aid and development environment.
We also get the non-development community investing in high-risk emerging markets
Problem is that to succeed you need to be able to do all three of these all the time.
Talked with Africa Command. He’s the prime constituent for $6B a year in AID funds earmarked for
Africa. Also he gets that he can invite and influence CEOs who could be shown the value of aligning their
investments. Whole new area of thinking.
So, where do we go from here?
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We know we need to integrate sustainable operations.
We know that military cannot do these.
We know that the rule of law has to be established or the target area will not climb out.
Need more solutions—flexible funding authorities
There is no oversight committee for the inter-agency process. Congressman Skelton understands the
process, and says oversight cannot “see” interagency—it has to have a home within a Congressional
jurisdiction.
We are way behind the power curve and NOT GETTING IT DONE.
Q&A Off the Record.
From the audience, one important comment: Wildfire funding and emergency management is an
example of Congressional and inter-agency funding “as needed”
PANEL 2: Contemporary Strategic Environment
Chair: Professor John Troxwell
MG Anthony Cucolo
Dr. Montgomery McFate
Dr. Nora Bensahel
Cucolo:
The Information Domain—Key Terrain in the 21st Century.
Piece of terrain to be held, ceded, or lost.
Overseas in support of full spectrum operations or at home to keep public informed.
The enemy is ON the information domain. Taking down Al Qaeda media outlets is part of the battle.
Taliban truth twisting—creating hate and discontent in part because you cannot get a NYT reporter into
remote provinces, and the stringers are often agents of the opposition. Enemy has no rules—will do
anything, including using dead bodies to make a point. Enemy is faking YouTube videos of US soldiers
raping and so on.
“Virtual Caliphate” 6,500 active extremist web sites. Use the Internet as a safe-haven for recruitment,
training, dissemination, financing. Video game, “Sonic Jihad.” Demographic for this video is the upper
middle class males both overseas and US.
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Enemy is using virtual caliphate for message. Although we can win the information battle in the global
media, we can lose to timely persistent lies, half-truths, and misinformation.
Truthful timely public and internal communication with public.
Every soldier is a communicator.
We are fighting for will of the US people to support us, and perception of our forces.
The enemy is misinformation, disinformation, lies and half-truths, any threat to OPSEC and privacy,
complacency, ignorance.
McFate: Addressing the Cultural Knowledge Gap. Will talk about future knowledge environment,
information needs, culture gap, what needs to be done. I see the future operational environment
disconnected from the global economy, with non-territorial organizing principle. Tribes, groups, are
what matter. USG is going to have to become more effective at conducting operations in these
environments, in active consort with local civilians. Have to have knowledge of history and culture of
the locality where you are operating.
1942 OSS called for systematic description of social dynamics.
1965 Defense Science Board called for intensive study of publics
DoD Directive 3000.05 mandated inclusion of tribal etc.
Speaker has been working the human terrain challenges.
Findings of study:
1. Military personnel want to understand the social structure (who’s who)
2. Cultural beliefs, values, customs, behavior that helps make sense of the world (what makes
them tick)
3. Cultural forms such as myths, narratives, and symbols (what’s will all the tea drinking?)
4. Self-assessments generally red to orange
Still a lack of government funding. Of total DoD research budget 1% spent on social sciences. Less than
every other government agency less Smithsonian.
Even new money is budgeted for modeling tools, without the benefit of data. Intelligence community
and state department are assumed to be doing this, but not actually. Focus is on bad actors, few
resources are dedicated on green layer of human terrain (indigenous public). IC Social-Cultural
Dynamics Working Group. Five year time-time.
There is no coordination of research across agencies. Research funded to meet own requirements,
often duplicative or irrelevant. USD Stability Operations Social Science Research & Analysis Council.
Might need to move coordination up to White House.
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Human Terrain System (HTS) being tried as experiment, focus on non-lethal packages including medical
care, intended to increase local support for the warfighter. First attempt in speaker’s knowledge to
integrate cultural knowledge. Right now at brigade level, would like to go to battalion level and better.
24/7 answers, e.g. tribal studies. Academics across t he US on contract.
Estimate that by using HTS, we have reduced kinetic operations by 60-70%.
Emergent requirements from Africa.
Hard question posed by speaker: how to you migrate this understanding up the policy chain?
We still have a knowledge gap, very bad and detrimental to US national security.
Better understanding, fewer bullets.
Bensahel (RAND). Critical to understand organizational and institutional problems with building civilian
capacity. Bad news: none of these efforts to change are going well. Some progress made.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Bureaucratic turf-wars. All favor coordination and refuse being coordinated.
Core organizational placement—innovators too low
Money is power
Secondments from other agencies leads to tumultuous personnel situation.
Solutions:
Need to create budget for rotationals
Need to create incentives for rotationals
Need to create flexible contingency funding
Need to manage rather than seek to resolve.
Challenges facing US military and especially US Army: not known for ability to adapt. Army has shown
an impressive ability to adapt. New counterinsurgency and operations manuals
Lesson Army drew from Viet-Nam is that “we don’t do anything that is political, we stick to Fulda Gap
challenges. Army likely to go back to its traditional approach after Iraq.
STEELE: we must be honest about what we are spending money on, understand reality, and be open
about how we plan to change what we spend money on.
Q: Does blogging pose a threat to security?
A: Yes but we are huge fans of blogging—Army senior leaders are huge fans. Blogging can influence
international and home public perceptions “straight from the heart.”
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PANEL III: Addressing the Military Instruments
Chair: Dr. Alan Stolberg
Dr. Joseph Collins
MajGen Charles Dunlap Jr.
Capt Thomas Culora
Col Robert Killebrew
LtCol John Nagl
Collins: Four factors on future of military: international, economic realities, domestic political
World has gotten more complex, we have never been able to predict how things will come out. We
have to be flexible. Takes a decade to create military capabilities. Wide mission set.
Economic realities: the huge deficit, debt, financial problem, decaying industrial and infrastructure are
all going to impact on military budget in near term. Vast problems in social security and medicare.
Economy out of balance, middle class eroding.
Political reality: January 2009 new sheriff, new priorities. Health care will require huge expenditures and
be a major competitor for funds. Anticipate major, deep, continuing cuts in defense budgets. At same
must prepare for wars we cannot predict.
DoD needs to achieve major economies at same time that it is fighting two wars. Cannot be a balanced
power when we spend under $100 billion on State, AID, and security assistance. DoD supplemental was
larger than combined budget. All the services are going to have to cut major systems.
Dunlap: Future conflict will be on the low end and we will be astonished by how it develops and turns
out. However, need to remember that a Nation state is the only one capable of destroying the Republic.
Google Norman Rangel, The Great Illusion. I’m concerned that we will lose sight of the importance of
keeping a big war force. Caution on over correction toward counter-insurgency. Now recognized that
big war and small war require different capabilities and mind-sets.
It is easier to get approval to drop a bomb, than it is to do a press release.
We need to develop operations that can be done with the smallest possible footprint.
We need to consider Nagl idea of a 20,000 (multinational) corps for small war.
Pendulum has also swung too far against technology. That’s still an advantage.
New in air power is rise of persistence and precision.
Anticipate difficulty in getting US troops into many places, need proxy plan.
Need a professional and brutally honest roles and missions debate.
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Culora: Navy, for the first time, did not write up strategy in a back room, but went out and talked to the
public to learn what they expected from the USN. First presented to international maritime conference.
Five elements:
1. Win wars
2. Prevent major conflict
3. Contain smaller conflicts
4. Sustain and foster relationships
5.
1. Forward presence (sustainable). A challenge. Helps build relationships and understand AO.
2. Deterrence
3.Sea control (after things go bad) and maritime security (constant)
4. Global shocks?
5. Humanitarian assistance (both reactive and proactive—sending gray bottoms on humanitarian
assistance missions.
6.
Natural tension
1. Inter-agency mis-alignment: USN can find capabilities for HA, but cannot get other agencies in time
2. Not well-aligned within Navy staffs, e.g. not ready to deal with NGOs
3. To do and be good at HA, might sacrifice capability for combat, which is the one thing that will get a
Navy officer fired.
Killebrew: End game of these persistent wars will be advisor wars. Thousands of advisors. We have a
void in strategic thinking. New administration could spend a year getting its act together. Growing
consensus that we will see hybrid warfare—there will not be a lot of barriers among different kinds of
conflict.
Three big baskets:
1. Nuclear
2. Major non-nuclear warfare (not conventional)
3. Irregular warfare (has been divided into so many categories have lost track).
I see services working hard to deter the first two kinds of war, but engaging in type 3.
Col David Maxwell at Fort Bragg, super mind. Says we do not “win” insurgencies or “do” counterinsurgency, but rather we help others do it. Primary difference between first two and the third is that
on the third, we help others, do not do it for them.
Greatest success is those wars that do not start at all. Must do more in helping other countries stand up
their own capabilities so that we do not have to intervene. Great deal of incoherence in this dialog.
Most of our thinking is in big war counter-insurgency.
Three things you have to think about in lower order IR:
1. Role of Ambassador and country team (military pays lip service to pol-mil integration)
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2. Difference between an advisor who lives in the country, and short-term training teams. The one that
really matters is the language-qualified team that stays in-country and transmits military knowledge.
Slam on anthropology.
Good news is that the Army is trying to get ahead of what they see coming as a change with respect to
Irregular Warfare. Strategic direction may come soon, Army is rediscovering military assistance teams
and constructive engagement.
Four things Army is doing or could be doing: Still have to recover and maintain military skills to fight
major and non-nuclear wars. Beyond that:
1. Army has to get behind way we do stabilization as an inter-agency team
2. How do we poop out MTTs to failing countries
3. Get back in the business of sending advisors out (many countries not eager for this)
4. Need more allied students in US military schools—nothing else we do is as effective as having future
leaders of countries and armies be graduates of Leavenworth, Carlisle.
Nagl: The Army and Counterinsurgency
Unprepared: Secretary Gates assessment as spoken 10 October 2007, regarding unconventional warfare
relegated to the margins.
Gen Jack Keane 18 April 2006: Army purged insurgency after Viet-Nam. We have responsibility.
Organizational learning: process by which an organization ingests new knowledge
2006 Quadrennial Review: DoD must become highly adaptive and continuously assessing challenges
DoD 3000.05 Stability operations require comparable priority to combat operations.
Engines of change: doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, facilities.
Have done well in doctrine and training, rest are not up to speed.
No specialized blocks in counterinsurgency at C&S.
SOF cannot do standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—now a mission up to entire
Army.
Sidenote: we need an advisors corps equivalent to 18th Airborne, transition teams that are in permanent
being.
Consensus on the Need for Change. SecDef expects asymmetric for some time to come, while others
push back with “not so fast.” Need to find the balance.
Consensus is the key to organizational learning. True learning does not go away. Rest of government
needs to change also.
Organizational culture and politics oppose adaptive change.
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Stolberg: summative comments. See above. How to make it happen?
Collins: Discipline service appetites and cut the fluff. Army has a dilemma about big war forces such as
artillery and heavy armor. Need to move some big war stuff into reserve and bring infantry from
reserve into active. Increase reserve strength as part of end strength. Need wholesale examination of
naval aviation. Marines buying aircraft that make sense for Navy but not for Marine Corps. Need better
look at real costs. VSTOL?
Dunlap: not expecting high-tech peer competitor warfare is likely, but rather that downside of being
wrong is catastrophic. How do we shape our force so that we give real options to our decision makers?
Culora: Approach we need to take is to assure that everything does more than one thing. Can no longer
afford to buy gold-plated one things. New perspective on partnering. Dual use must grow.
Killebrew: For first time, Army is able to compete on par with Air Force. Combatant commanders are
fighting service chiefs for resources. Non-nuclear conventional is approaching costs and consequences
of nuclear war. Must deter.
Nagl: Focusing on how we use a small number of advisors to partner with other countries. No way we
will ever win wars with only US. Foreign soldiers cost efficient.
BANQUET KEYNOTE: Admiral Blair
Loose alliance of former officials, including Jim Locher, now have the faith of zealots. Goldwater-Nichols
and Special Operations, know a specious argument when I see one.
What I want to do tonight is go back to some of the basics of why this is a good idea and cover some
basic actions to improve the situation. I like making new mistakes.
Concept of inter-agency integration is not a solvent for every challenge. Desperately needed when
responsibilities overlap. We flounder on important activities that need to be done well. Concept of
inter-agency integration is not a universal solvent for every function we have in national security. Not
essential that planning and policy be done in an integrated process. In a democratic process can be
messy. Political tug and haul, but once decision is made, THEN you need an integrated process to
execute the plan. You need this in an area where resources and skills overlap, and you need it where
there is not an established model, and you need it when you have to get down to the tactical level and
to be good, have some sort of inter-agency collaboration.
At the tactical level there is no time for a Constitutional, legal, policy, political review. Decisions at the
tactical level in real time cannot be based on rules of engagement crafted before-hand at the strategic
level.
Stabilization & reconstruction activities are characteristic of where inter-agency collaboration at the
tactical level need to be most flexible.
Transnational threats (criminal, terrorist, piracy, human trafficking, cyber-attacks, drugs) also require
great flexibility.
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Case study, terrorism in Asia, PACOM asked State, CIA, Military Groups asked by CINCPAC to re-evaluate,
only one message, for State saying exceeded authority. But no one else was asking this question
Second example, sent survey team to place X, and it became clear that the best thing we could do was
support a circular road around the island, using local labor. Legally and financially impossible. I had the
authority to put a Tomahawk missile every 100 meters, but did not have the authority to spend $75K on
a road. We got it done eventually with State and AID help, but reality is that we have enormous
obstacles.
In our inter-agency process, we violate the first principle of planning, that it should be done by those
who have to carry out the plan.
What we need is inter-agency group that sets strategy and guidelines, but then the team that will
actually execute needs to create the plan they will execute.
Dayton Accords a good example. Wesley Clark was the military member, constantly checking with his
bosses to ensure military portions could actually be carried out.
Stovepipe plans make it hard by definition.
How do you plan your security unless you know what your reconstruction plan is? Cannot have
reconstruction without security. So part of our problem is lack of integrated plan. Another problem is
application of resources to the plan. If the money cannot be put into the right pockets, the plan will not
be executed.
The ultimate financial flexibility is real money.
The final piece is the part of authorities—who has the authority at the tactical level. At some point
when priorities run high, resources run low, and time is pressing, you have to make decisions.
Somebody has to be in charge. It cannot be referred to Washington where busy people in different time
zones have trouble dealing with local realities.
UN has a good model UN appoints a Secretary General’s Special Representative, military and all other
commanders work for the one guy ON THE SCENE.
After execution comes feedback. Why are we only relying on two people for a report on Iraq? One for
military, one for political? NEED a Czar, one throat, one belly-button.
Q: what do you think about including State in rotations of CINC jobs?
A: inter-agency task forces could definitely be opened up. In order to have a non-military officer in
charge, would have to make it an inter-agency command. Depends on chores to be done. Africa and
Southern Command fall into the arena of possibilities. Need a selection process. Cannot just throw
presidential candidates into it
Q: OSINT 96%
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A: Distinguish between general information (unclassified) and action information (knowing what
specific actor doing. Blending intel skills (will make up answers) and journalist/academic skills (o the one
hand, on the other hand, no direct answer), need to put both into one office, one report.
Q:
A: Security, law enforcement, development—a pattern. Difference between being a good cop and
being a good cop teacher. Need to develop a corps of people who can do, and develop a multinational
approach. Funding for contingencies is very low. It really boils down to authorities, someone has to be
in charge.
Q: GMU, conflict prevention. Is there a part of government that has proponency for prevention.
A. Military has deterrence role. But there is no place where inter-agency proponency can be brought to
bear to help a failing state avoid failing.
Q: Follow-up, who pays?
A: When it is an activity above day to day operations, then it should be a supplemental in which the
objectives are laid out.
Q: retired foreign service officer. Could you address roles of the private sector, NGOs, corporate.
A: many of the skills needed will not be in government. Banking, agriculture, will not be in government.
HOWEVER, you need to know the job , we need to bulk up the capability to contract for work and know
what to ask and what to pay. Contractors know how to do the job themselves, what we really need is
contractors who can help other indigenous personnel to do the job.
PANEL IV: Addressing Civilian Agency Capabilities
Chair: Professor Frank Jones
Mr. John Winant
Ms. Merriam Mashatt
Mr. Donna Hopkins
Dr. Leif Rosenberger
Jones: DoD recognizes it cannot do it all. In 2006 report, calls for revitalization of civilian agencies and
integrated statecraft.
Winant: Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group oversees two elements, the Integration
Planning Cell and the Advance Civilian Team. This is a new system for interagency management. Our
key problem is how do you staff the system . Three levels. Active (11 at this time, trying to expand to
250), Stand-by (270 now, want 2000), and Reserve. Mission of reserve would be to re-establish rule of
law, re-establish government institutions. Key areas planning and program management, criminal
justice and policing, business recovery, essential services, diplomacy and governance, diplomatic
security. We are achieving broad bi-partisan support in Congress. Intent is to avoid need to commit
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military resources, but if we must, intent is to give military a strong civilian counterpart. URL is
www.crs.state.gov. Focus is on strategic success.
Mashatt: Asked to give perspective of a domestic agency. 1930’s view of interagency was State,
Defense, and AID. The fourth D equals Domestic Capacity. 100+ departments, agencies, bureaus,
boards, commissions. Challenge is to think of 4th D as an equal partner. The commonality is the link to
domestic business, academia, other organizations that can be invited to support a strategic plan for any
given country. No planning capability. There are no planners at the Department of Commerce. Our
relationship with private sector is a regulatory one, not a contractual one. Private sector comes to DoC
for help in dealing with trade obstacles.
“Whole of government” means, to a domestic agency, upfront involvement in planning and
implementation. First time we have been invited to the table long before anything happens. Challenge
for us is that we don’t have planners. What we do best is long-term technical assistance to the host
nation government. Do not want to be a body shop. Do not want to go into field without any tether
back to the domestic environment. The real value of a domestic agency is in helping achieve quality,
improve program conceptualization and implementation. Value-added is state-side reachback to
regulators and technical experts. DoC has 15 different agencies and bureaus across international trade,
census, patents and trademarks, statistics, standards, oceans and atmosphere, export controls,
telecommunications. Common link is private sector and US economy. My challenge is to figure out how
we can add value to stabilization & reconstruction endeavors overseas. We have points of contacts in all
our bureaus. We have created an essential tasks matrix bases on S&R matrix.
Examples: Commercial Law Development Program; International Trade Administration; census, NOAA
(early warning on malaria), telecommunications mentoring, patent mentoring. Long-term relationships.
Strategic view of the 4th D: State, DoD, AID NSC are the traditional focus, but we do not have money or
leadership for working in parallel. I would argue that having a tiger team with representatives from
each domestic agency would help. We need minimalist funding but we do not have funding.
Same process that provides continuity of government and contingency response overseas can be
integrated and draw on all elements of the USG. Domestic agencies want to help but not sure how to fit
in. Check out the State and AID joint strategic plan, available on the web. Legislation before Congress
on partnerships, shared authorities. Delicate. Must be carefully managed. Inter-agency counterinsurgency initiative and pol-mil strategic planning are two major endeavors. We owe it to the nation to
better understand what we are doing overseas and how it impacts. Counterinsurgency is not a subset of
stabilization but we cannot afford to lose the specificity of focus. Outreach, training, policy
development. Conference on a comprehensive approach to modern conflict. We have a lot to learn
from other countries.
Handbook for senior civilians on understanding counterinsurgency.
Counterinsurgency is a useful forcing function for nurturing interagency and multinational collaboration
and sharing of knowledge.
Rosenberger: games
networking games.
agencies play: zero sum, mandate, positive sum, analysis, future is now,
ZERO SUM GAME: Fighting over resources, winter and losers, DoD is a winner because Congress thinks
of State as a talk shop, while DoD is a “can do” place. Military dominance of budget, policy, overseas
presence is increasing.
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MANDATE GAME: There are problems with Goldwater-Nichols. NSPD-44 created issues. Guys who
know nothing about joint operations have to spend a tour to check the box. We need to beef up the
Foreign Area Officer program so individuals responsible for multinational understanding and
collaboration actually know what they are talking about. Counter-terrorism dominated by military, and
even within military argument of which J’s should dominate, with real neglect of the civilian people and
their perspectives. Civilian issues handled as a call center rather than a collaboration center with a
capability for deep analytic production.
POSITIVE SUM GAME: Need to integrate State and Treasury with DoD, get added to the DoD campaign
plan. Need to get beyond ideological and turf battles. Unemployed young men is the challenge, we
need to do whatever it takes to get them off the streets and gainfully employed. Need to brief Congress
as a team and demand “whole of government” funding for a “whole of government” approach to global
stabilization and reconstruction.
ANALYSIS GAME: Economics is a discipline, not an agency. EARN respect with analysis that proves right,
useful, timely. Get economics moved from J-5 to command group. Need to connect economics to
security. PACOM home page, Asia Pacific Economic Update.
FUTURE IS NOW GAME. Unless you are making the boss’s life easier every single day, you are not part of
the solution.
He’s at CENTCOM now. Pitch www.oss.net/CCC.
PACOM is peace command, CENTCOM is a war command. Reactive, no time to be proactive.
NETWORKING GAME. I could not survive without the Treasury and other guys. Now we have to ramp it
up, it’s not about just US networking but rather multinational. Dutch impressive. I am convinced you
have to go bottom up [Send him the epoch b slide).
LESSONS LEARNED: Win the analysis game, master the partnership game, live the future is now game,
develop horizontal leadership network. Coin of the realm is mutual trust.
Q&A
Jones: How does President and his Cabinet foster a strategic culture across the government? How do
we achieve an understanding of what it means to be secure as a Nation?
Winant: Talk of need for a QDR for civilian agencies. Most agencies do not do planning. Need to
continue to demand “whole of government” approach.
Mashatt: DoD *needs* civilian participation in planning. State leadership course, senior NSC person
scared them, systemic problem, he can only guess at 30 out of 100 issues. We can do better.
Hopkins: It’s about leadership. There is no national narrative that can unify effort. We need a
completely different perception about national security. Have to stop thinking about physical protection
of Fortress America. Need a strategy of national resilience.
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Rosenberger: Need holistic view that includes economics and social factors. We do not have enough
renaissance people to connect the dots. Educational system is at fault. Need more inter-disciplinary
work. Private sector is the primary actor, need to find ways to get them.
Q: Haiti, we spent a billion dollars, but they are still a failed state. Need to study this and Venezuela.
A;
Rosenberger: Briefing on culture and language does not comprise cultural ability. We’ve drunk the koolaid and started to believe our own bullshit.
Rosenberger: Financial early warning signals helpful. Current account deficits a key indicator. 3% no
problem, 5% warning, 8% and up a real alarming situation.
Q: DoD not included in S&R stand-by, is this deliberate?
A: They have been involved all along, but not included (because focus is on the civilian agencies).
Q: Steele on where to go for a strategic plan that addresses ten high level threats, twelve policies.
Hopkins: How President chooses to use his staff matters a great deal. NSC, the structures we already
have can be made to work. Can tell Congress that we need a cross-cutting Committee, crossjurisdictional authorities.
Rosenberger: Commander’s Advisory Group. Things break down when you get to lower-level issues. At
the very top with the highest priorities, things work. On war plans, Treasury not allowed to see war
plans, cannot task State. Leadership without authority. We need mandate to coordinate at the lower
levels.
Q: Mission inputs.
Hopkins: we do try to get Country Team inputs for DoD. Mission strategic plans are fundamentally interagency documents.
Q: Special Ops University. Problem of mobilizing government, on the subject of grand strategy, are we
at a point in time where we can harness all the elements of national power?
Hopkins: yes, we need one. The national leadership must provide the narrative that will nurture a
strategy.
Mashatt: if we do not understand the strategy and how we c an add value, it becomes virtually
impossible to send people, the right people in the right numbers.
Rosenberg: national security starts at home. We have been neglecting our own country. We have to
rethink and redefine national security. We have to address out own problems. This does not mean
going into neo-isolation, we have to be more selective.
PANEL V: Addressing civilian non-agency capabilities
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Chair: Ambassador Cynthia Grissom Efird
Mr. Richard McCall
Ms. Beth Cole
Mr. Doug Brooks.
McCall: recreating state institutions is not enough. Must build localized institutions that are locally
owned, and based on localized dialog and consensus. Create an enabling environment. “Whole of
government” strategic planning is not being done, needs to be done. Need stronger and more robust
effort. [Read his paper in a drone, most of it incomprehensible.]
SEND whole of government meme and one pager to next president.
Cole (USIP): Herding lions, cats, and kittens. First USIP liaison to Army’s peacekeeping institute at
Carlisle. There is a good news story: working group on working in non-permissive environments.
We live in age of 24/7 media coverage. Attack on UN headquarters, attack on Red Cross, kidnapping and
murder of a senior NGO woman have led to a profound change in attitudes and new willingness to
collaborate.
After 9/11 all environments are non-permissive. We are all going to be targets. Defining roles and
responsibilities will be a continuing problem.
NGOs now have security officers and are sending personnel to security training.
Our goal is to leverage the relative merits of all actors in non-permissive environments.
1. Need to understand their own perceptions of their roles and responsibilities.
2. Have to figure out how to work these relationships day in and day out.
UN has amazing capabilities. Present everywhere. They are growing and starting to establish integrated
mission planning process. If are not looking at the UN, understanding what they have, and integrating
that into our plans, we are making a mistake.
It is all about partners, about figuring out how to integrate maximum range of partners into our
campaign plan.
UN Common Suppliers Database
UN Suppliers Task Force
NGOs are probably one of the most misunderstood actors out there. 38,000 of them. Children Care,
Mercy Corps, very large, significant budgets. They have doctrine, a code of conduct. SPEAR document
on humanitarian assistance standards. Guidelines are well developed. They have rules and adhere to
those rules.
Quote from senior NGO on Africom: “They have a grave concern about the militarization of foreign
assistance. They will push back on this point. They do believe military has a role in stabilization, but
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their temperature goes up if military gets involved in development. Need capabilities that will stick
around for the long-term. Blurring of roles and responsibilities of concern. Military should focus on
training security forces, counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency.”
ACBAR list of NGO members of Afghan Coordinating Body on relief.
Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian
Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. Many issues covered, such as clothing,
fraternization, behavior, protocol for visitation, ride-sharing, etcetera. Many issues need to be
deconflicted with voluntary rules of the road, recommendations for cooperation. Trying to figure out
permanent liaison to combatant commanders, as well as tactical liaison.
Brooks: Advertisement: Journal of Peace Operations. Topic is playing with hire. Any national military
that expects to be relevant beyond its borders will need to work with private sector. Reasons to use
contractors:
Surge capacity
Limitless resources
Experience-retired military
Capabilities, specialization
Flexibility
More control, less risk
Use of locals
Faster, better, cheaper
Note: This non-profit organization represents Private Military Contractors (PMC) and should be
understood in that context. In fairness to the PMCs, they do what they are incentivized to do, and they
follow rules (or not) as specified by whoever is paying them.
LUNCHEON SPEAKER: James Locher
Subject of this conference is an important one. My perspective is that we have an excessive
dependence on military with negative consequences.
There is a broader agenda beyond inter-agency reform. Talking about redefining and transforming the
entire structure of national security including domestic security.
This must be a priority for the next President. Our institutions are outmoded and not capable of
supporting modern needs.
Secretary Gates has said that we have tried to overcome 20th century problems with processes and
capabilities designed in the aftermath of WWII.
Much has changed since 1947, and I am not at all certain that the National Security Act of 1947 was very
effective as a starting point.
Set-backs from 9-11, Katrina, AF, IQ, are representative of a system failure. Not a lack of talent or
commitment. They are working incredibly hard with enormous dedication.
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They try to move our agenda forward in a dysfunctional system Dozens of problems, focus on three key
ones.
1. We cannot integrate our diverse capabilities and knowledge. We are dominated by outmoded,
bureaucratic, in-ward-looking. Stovepipes, or cylinders of excellence, are foundations for change, but
we need very strong integrating mechanisms that enable us to work horizontally. We have a vertical
government that favors parochial desires of departments and agencies. A miniscule corporate
headquarters with only advisory role, faced by massive bureaucracies.
2. Our civilian capabilities are under-resourced, nor are they culturally nor administratively prepared to
fulfill their responsibilities. Our national security definition is out-dated. NSC focused on diplomacy,
defense, and intelligence. Treasury attends, but does not have authorities. National security needs to
include finance, environment, health, and more.
3. Congress is the third problem. It is more stove-piped than the executive. It cannot do “whole of
government” and they are actually worse off because they never had their own National Security Act of
1947. These problems are not new. We have seldom been able to integrate all the instruments of
national power.
In sum, horizontal challenges and vertical government. Our shortcomings have become more obvious in
recent years. Two answers.
1. Complexity has sky-rocketed. Stove-pipes cannot adapt and respond. Gap between demands and
capacity is widening. Newt Gingrich, a member, says we have met the enemy, and it is our bureaucracy.
2.
What is to be done? We need sweeping reform. We need a 21 st Century government for 21st century
challenges.
There is a great deal we can learn from the business community.
Development of horizontal teams. 50% of business coordination is now horizontal, leveraging all
elements of the corporation.
Three sets of reforms:
1. New presidential directives. Enormous changes can be made at the beginning with directives.
2. New National Security Act of 2009. One key provision likely to require merger of the two councils.
3. Amendments to Senate and House rules. Select Committees on Inter-Agency Affairs, seven
committees in Senate and eight in the House, plus Appropriations, whose chair and ranking member
could comprise the Select Committee. They would empower and oversee the inter-agency space.
Must understand our history and understand the underlying assumptions. Individuals are not given
special training before sending individuals to inter-agency assignments.
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Next key element is to identify the problems and their causes. This is not usually done in Washington.
95% of the intellectual work is in identifying what’s wrong—not the symptoms but the causes.
Our methodology will look at all the elements. Structural changes are what we have done in the past.
We need to think about vision, values, processes, at every level. State and local, leadership and
organizational culture, personnel incentives and structure.
We have traditionally hired Cabinet Secretaries who have been competitive. We have watched
Secretary of State and of Defense be at war with each other for decades. There is no national security
mission that can be accomplished by a single department. Often as many as seven must come together.
We will develop an integrated set of recommendations, and then we will give a great deal of attention
to implementation and the sustainment of implementation over the next ten years.
Change is never easy this will be challenging. Defenders of the status quo want to preserve the existing
prerogatives, just as the military services opposed Goldwater-Nichols.
At meetings they defend their parochial orientation rather than seek to come together to meet the
national need, which should be supreme.
95% of the experts say things cannot be done. It take a great deal of visionary leadership and the
application of change management techniques.
There is a major political dimension to what we want to do. Brute sanity will not be enough. We will
work the political system very very hard.
Sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
Brent Scowcroft
19 others
300 working, almost all pro bono on 14 working groups.
Secretary of Defense and Homeland Security and DNI are supporters.
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.
Signed cooperative agreement with Department of Defense, $2.4M
15 members in House Working Group
10-12 Senators, 30+ House supporters
Interim report on 1 July. Focus will be on problems and consequences.
Final report on 1 September, will address a full range of alternative solutions.
Then we will turn our attention to drafting presidential directives, legislation, and amendments and
implementation plans, to be delivered to the President-elect shortly after the election results are
known.
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The Congress right now is not prepared to play a leadership role.
We’re working with the three presidential campaigns. Senator McCain has called for a civilian follow-on
to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Hoping to make this a campaign issue. You cannot be elected President of the USA without having a
plan to achieve national reform within first 100 days.
National security reform must happen. We cannot preserve our national security without having 21 st
century capabilities.
Time for action is now.
Q&A
Q: National security QDR
A: I don’t want to discuss solution. Our project is really focused on problems.
Q: OMB as part of the problem and to what extent?
A: Really fundamental reforms need to occur at OMB, especially with respect to national security. They
focus on departmental inputs. Need more guidance from President and his key staff. Budget will not be
fixed by the Congress. The fundamental changes will have to be made within the Executive so as to
match resources to what it is we are trying to do.
Q: Have you identified possible risks of integration.
A: There is a huge issue of separation of powers, but within the Executive there is no Constitutional
obstacle to integration, and Congress has no inter-agency oversight vehicles. Congress knows very little
about the inter-agency space, and they need to learn, this is why we have proposed to them a select
new jurisdiction. Effective oversight for horizontal inter-agency operations will need to be developed.
Q: HBO series on John Adams. 7,000 mile screwdriver. Does study look at this problem? Is the field
practitioner perspective represented?
A: Yes, but the problem you are addressing is a leadership issue. We don’t spend a lot of time preparing
civilians for leadership. They tend to be great specialists. Challenge for us is how do we develop
effective civilian leaders.
Now, the Project on National Security Reform is not going to fix everything.
Q: Can other countries provide us with examples of efficiencies, agility, etc.
A: We had that thought at the very beginning. There is no government that has figured out how to
change for industrial age to information age organization. We are looking for best practices to spark our
imagination. Our working groups did literature surveys.
Prepared by Robert Steele, bear@oss.net, 703.266.6393. Improvements invited, will integrate and re-post.
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Q: Staffing the President is the primary time eater at the National Security Council level. Will there
ultimately still be a confidential staff responsive to the President?
A: Current NSC staff would stay as is. Most of the rest of the things need to be outside the office of the
President. One idea I would like to bring to you is where we are. We are at December 6 th, 1941, the
last day when Navy and Army refused to have unity of command. President is still the one person that
can demand inter-agency responses. Model of lead agency has never worked when president delegates.
Czar is the third model, small staff, bureaucracies use Congressional allies to frustrate that delegated
authority.
Q: National Security Advisor can fight Secretary of State, not be accountable to Congress.
A: We’re looking at the history. We have not completed that analysis. You are correct about the
differences that exist but I cannot offer you any additional insights at this time.
PANEL VI: Rebalancing Strategy (in DC) or Execution (on the Ground)?
Chair: Col John Agoglia
Mr. James “Spike” Stephenson
Ms. Kathleen Hicks
Ms. Michelle S. Parker
Stephenson: Our system simply does not work. Lagging very very badly in executing a strategy that we
have more or less right, against asymmetric. Stabilization & Reconstruction is not going to get the
funding, the staff, the skills mix. Military is training PRTs rather than on many other tools needed to
counter insurgency. The vast number of deployments to failed states is NOT going to include the
military.
Hicks: Principals care about the end they are seeking. Budget management tends to leave the answer
to the end of the line. We don’t do strategy. We have to think through how to get to the outcome we
want. We need feedback. NSC focuses on crises, short-term. Everything done at business unit level.
Very little follow-up on policy execution. Impossible to answer the question: how does your budget
support the President’s policy objectives? We cannot answer the question: what is being spent in any
given country by all elements of the US Government? Multiple authorizers and appropriators. High
negative incentives for cooperation. No coordination of hearing schedules among committees with
overlapping jurisdiction. Need fixes on Congressional side. From appropriation to enactment, too many
things change (two years as the general lag). No holistic picture of what they are doing.
Learn more about strategy, threats, policies, and challengers at Earth Intelligence Network. Note
especially the free weekly report, GLOBAL CHALLENGES: The Week in Review.
Parker: PRT differs from country to country. May appear integrated, but in most cases is largely a case
of co-location, not truly integrated. Need NSC position. Need proper training. Need to decide if we are
going to have experts or if we are going to out-source. Finally, where is intelligence—shouldn’t they be
the fourth D?
Prepared by Robert Steele, bear@oss.net, 703.266.6393. Improvements invited, will integrate and re-post.
29
Agoglia: Military is not the only element in national security. We have to understand the linkages
between the sectors. We have no integrators in government as well as in private sector. Finally,
strategic consensus is vital. Militarily and economically we are robust. Diplomatic apprentices,
information operations neophytes, asymmetric warfare challenging. Lack of unity effort in each of the
27 country plans in the CENTCOM AOR. We’re not good at developing a carrot-stick strategy, nor at
orchestrating education. We don’t have a vision, don’t have a message. How did we get from 9/12 to
where we are now. We need to focus on preventing conflict, helping failed states before they destroy
themselves. Where in the USG do we do indications & warning? Different places do different things,
but no integration, no central whole of government perspective. Only things being funded right now are
AF, IQ, and Horn of Africa. Need to listen to and work with NGOs, private sector. Latter is innovative.
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See free information on strategy, threats, policies, and challengers at www.earth-intelligence.net.
See especially the free weekly report, GLOBAL CHALLENGES: The Week in Review and the 30 Forecasts
(10 high-level threats, 12 policies requiring harmonization, eight challengers who must avoid our errors).
See also 30,000 pages on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) at www.oss.net.
To master OSINT quickly, use the one page of links at www.oss.net/BASIC.
To search across topics, over 750 speakers, use the table at www.oss.net/LIBRARY.
To understand why we must reduce secret intelligence from $70 billion to $12 billion, while creating an
Open Source Agency under diplomatic auspices, read the chapter at www.oss.net/OSINT-S.
Prepared by Robert Steele, bear@oss.net, 703.266.6393. Improvements invited, will integrate and re-post.