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Scholarly Work on the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 1990s: A Review of
Three Books
Name: Nils Hoffmann
Class: Class: HIST 164b – The American Century: The US and the World Since 1945
Instructor: Prof. David Engerman
Semester: Fall 2004
Assignment: Graduate Level Paper
Date: December 7, 2004
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I.
Introduction
A wealth of literature exists on the Cuban Missile Crisis. An interesting wave of new
books was published during the 1990s – after previously disclosed documents became
available. Therefore, we are now better able than ever to examine the probably most
dangerous moment in the history of mankind, and to understand the forces that were at
work during the tense days in October 1962.
Different scholars still evaluate the events in different ways: They ask different
questions, and they give different answers. They highlight different aspects, and thus they
arrive at different conclusions about the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this paper, I will analyze
three books on this crisis, all published during the 1990s. One is Mark White’s Missiles
in Cuba, the others are Robert Smith Thompson’s The Missiles of October as well as the
second edition of Graham Allison’s classic Essence of Decision, co-authored by Philip
Zelikow. The three books have striking similarities in their evaluation of the events, but
also striking differences. So the three books taken together give an interesting and
insightful overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
II.
A Review of the Three Books
a. Creating a Framework for Analysis
It is useful to frame a number of central questions which structure the many aspects
involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. These questions help to order the overall
information and make a comparison of the different arguments advanced in the three
books easier. Obviously a crucial question is why the Soviet Union decided to ship
missiles to Cuba. There is considerable disagreement in the literature about this question,
which obviously has to be understood to grasp the crisis. Other questions that must be
traced in the literature are the author’s evaluation of why the Kennedy administration
perceived the placement of missiles in Cuba as a crisis, why it chose to act by imposing a
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“quarantine”, and how the authors explain apparent inconsistencies and puzzles that have
not yet been fully accounted for.
These questions are helpful because they structure the overall information, and they
help highlight similarities and differences in the interpretations of the different authors.
With these questions in mind, let us now consider the three books in turn and analyze the
arguments they put forth. A comparison will then highlight similarities and differences.
b. Applying the Framework
Mark J. White’s Missiles in Cuba gives an account of the Cuban Missile Crisis that starts
with some background: The Kennedy administration’s Cuban policy up to October 1962.
The book thus places the actual crisis into a broader Cold War context. White describes
the aggressive policies of the American administration towards Cuba, like the failed
invasion at the Bay of Pigs or Operation Mongoose, which was designed to oust Castro.
This focus on America’s Cuba policy is important for White’s argument about
Khrushchev’s motive to ship missiles to Cuba. White writes that “the Soviet premier’s
chief motive was the defense of Cuba” (31). This rationale was mentioned by
Khrushchev himself, and it was later confirmed by influential members of the Soviet
administration. Knowledge about Mongoose, the assassination attempts, as well as
American maneuvers in the Caribbean contributed to the fear that an end of Castro’s rule
might be near.
Despite the obvious focus on the defense theory, which serves as White’s most
important explanation why the missiles were brought to Cuba, White acknowledges two
other possible reasons for the decision: An improvement of the strategic situation as well
as possible leverage over Berlin (White 35-38). White mentions these reasons and also
argues that they were important considerations Khrushchev had, but he does not explore
them further. He goes great length at showing how the defense of Cuba was on
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Khrushchev’s mind, but does not show the same care with regard to the other two
theories. This must certainly be regarded a shortcoming of White’s book, as will be
shown later.
Then White turns to the actual crisis on thirteen days in October 1962. In his account
he nearly exclusively concentrates on the American side of the story: The headings of the
chapters, “Week One: How to Respond”, and “Week Two: How to Defuse” highlight this
fact. This narrow focus is certainly due to the fact that too little is still known about the
Soviet side and its considerations during the crisis.
Why did the administration perceive the presence of missiles as a problem in the
first place? Why, according to White, did the administration have to act against the
construction of the missile sites? He does not address the question directly. White
switches directly to the discussions in the Executive Committee of the National Security
Council (ExComm), without addressing the question why the missiles were seen as a
major problem. But one can nevertheless draw conclusions from what he states about the
deliberations in the White House. Obviously a major reason why Kennedy had to react
was that he had issued threats with regard to offensive missiles in Cuba over the previous
months. Kennedy had to act because the of administration’s rhetoric: “Not only would
that inaction erode America’s credibility overseas, with allies as well as enemies, it
would, perhaps more disconcertingly, damage the administration’s image before the
American people” (White 80). The image and credibility of the United States thus seem
to have played an important role, White argues.
He then gives a detailed account of the discussions in the ExComm, which led to the
discussion why a blockade was adopted as the American reaction. White stresses the rifts
within the administration – between those favoring an airstrike, and those favoring a
more diplomatic solution, like a blockade. Finally, the group that favored a blockade
grew more important – and the president changed his mind from an advocate of an air
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strike to an advocate of a blockade during October 18. According to White, the main
reason was that an air strike would be comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
and the US would be an international pariah. Moreover, a blockade left all other options –
air strike, invasion, and diplomatic solution – still open (White 94).
Then, White examines how the crisis was defused. He acknowledges that President
Kennedy showed great caution and skill during the second week of the crisis – “qualities
that had often been lacking in his handling of the Cuban situation before October 1962”
(White 115). Besides caution and skill, Kennedy was willing to trade the Jupiter missiles
in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba. The deal was made perfect during a meeting between
Robert Kennedy and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on October 27 (White 140141). White devotes much attention to the deal and to Kennedy’s willingness to trade the
missiles. This focus makes up most of the chapter on crisis diffusion, where less attention
is paid on ExComm deliberations. He then concludes his book with a brief account of
which changes the crisis brought about in the relationship between the two superpowers.
Early stages of what later came to be called “détente” can be traced in the aftermath of
the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 is certainly the high point
of this phase (White 146-155). White thus concludes the book as he started it: He places
the thirteen days of crisis into a broader Cold War context.
Robert Smith Thompson’s account of the crisis starts even earlier than White’s. He
begins his narrative with the first explosion of an atomic bomb in 1945. Thompson then
focuses on the development of the Cold War, intertwined with an evaluation of the career
of John F. Kennedy. Like White, Thompson thus places the 1962 crisis into a greater
Cold War context. But in contrast to White, he also shows how Kennedy’s worldview
and, more specifically, his view of the Soviet Union, evolved and helped to bring about
the crisis. Kennedy developed the views of a hard-liner, and he followed an aggressive
policy towards the Soviet Union – and then Cuba. His provocations therefore were a
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major factor which brought about the missile crisis, argues Thompson (for example 121).
This impression is reinforced by the continuous mentioning of Kennedy’s quest for
uncompromising toughness throughout the book.
An interesting fact about The Missiles of October is that Thompson not only
concentrates on the Cold War context of the missile crisis. He also sees the crisis over
Cuba in a regional context and thus highlights that a focus on the Cold War can only give
an insufficient explanation why the crisis broke out. The regional context is, according to
Thompson, an essential explanation why the Kennedy administration could not simply
live with the missiles but had to react. The perception did not only have to do with the
Cold War and the threat posed by the Soviet Union in general. In addition to this reason,
Kennedy had to act against the missiles because of the regional implications. Since the
Monroe Doctrine the United States has always regarded Latin America as its backyard,
and this relationship is especially true with regard to Cuba. Thompson tells the story of
how Cuba was essentially seen as a part of the United States prior to Castro’s revolution.
Before this revolution the “Cuban-American bond seemed unbreakable” (Thompson 56).
Thompson’s approach is so insightful because it explains the outbreak of the crisis better
than the focus on the Cold War context alone. Only because of the perceived relationship
between the US and the countries of the Western Hemisphere – and obviously because of
the close proximity to the US - was the threat so grave and American action so necessary.
Thompson excellently combines these two contexts and thus gives a more accurate view
why the crisis broke out. Both the Cold War context and the regional context brought it
about.
In his evaluation of the actual crisis, Thompson does not offer many new insights
compared to the analysis White gives. His explanation why the Soviets shipped missiles
to Cuba reflects White’s arguments: The defense of Cuba, as well as the possibility to
magnify the Soviet Union’s striking power, were Khrushchev’s most important
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considerations (Thompson 144). Besides this evaluation of Soviet motives, Thompson
also exclusively focuses on the American side, and on the actions and reactions in the
White House. He also describes how different fractions within the administration fought
over which policy should be followed, and Thompson’s findings are comparable to these
of White.
Nevertheless, Thompson’s account is somewhat more complex in analyzing forces
that were at work during the crisis, as well as in evaluating Kennedy’s policies. To make
this point clear, two examples should be noted: Firstly, Thompson pays attention to how
the American allies as well as the American public reacted to Kennedy’s policies. And
public opinion was indeed a major factor involved in the crisis and must be taken into
account when analyzing the crisis. Thompson argues that “what was emerging in
Washington was political pressure, pressure from the Republicans, the Pentagon, and the
press alike, pressure on Kennedy to end the missile crisis, to end it fast, and to end it with
a victory. Kennedy had to produce” (320). Mentioning the Pentagon is interesting in so
far as it shows that even inside the administration there were forces, like some generals,
who wanted a military solution. Kennedy thus not only had to react towards the Russians.
He also had to contain these influences in his very camp. Certainly there was a lot of
pressure on Kennedy, and Thompson shows that the president did not merely act in a
vacuum independent of outside influences. He was constrained and influenced by these
various influences.
A second interesting point is that Thompson – like White – focuses on the missile
deal to end the crisis, but that he does so from a different angle. He stresses one aspect
that White’s book does not account for. Thompson consistently mentions how Kennedy
wanted to be tough on Cuba (for example, Thompson 309). This focus on toughness is
really a red thread in his account of the crisis. And against this background the deal
appears in a somewhat different light: It was not only the Soviet Union which blinked
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when the countries were eyeball to eyeball. Both leaders blinked. White writes that
Kennedy was more cautious as before October 1962, and thus hints at the change in
policy towards Cuba. Nevertheless, Thompson stresses this point more and thus adds an
interesting detail to the analysis of the crisis.
The accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis given by White and Thompson can,
despite their merits, not account for many puzzles that still remain when the actions of the
American and the Soviet administrations are analyzed. Allison and Zelikow offer a
fundamentally different approach to the topic, and their book thus presents a fine
opportunity to grasp the dynamics and factors more fully, and to solve many of the still
remaining puzzles. In many ways Essence of Decision thus is the most complex of the
three books reviewed here, and it therefore merits special attention.
Allison and Zelikow analyze the crisis based on three distinct models – the rational
actor model, the organizational behaviour model, and the governmental politics model.
The book is composed of three theoretical chapters developing these models, as well as
three practical chapters, in which these models are applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This approach has one major benefit: The two books already discussed mainly follow the
rational actor approach that Allison and Zelikow discuss as model one. The accounts
focus on actors, and how they make rational decisions based on cost-benefit analyses. But
Allison and Zelikow go one step beyond this method. They not only discuss how the
administrations behaved as rational actors – this discussion in their book largely leads to
the same results the other two books came up with – but carries the analysis one step
further and thus offers interesting new insights. These insights help to understand many
puzzles of the crisis that previous evaluations could not account for with their narrower
focus.
Within each model, Allison and Zelikow ask three questions and answer these
questions according to the theory laid out in the theoretical chapters. The questions are
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why the Soviet Union put missiles in Cuba, why the Kennedy administration chose to
react with the imposition of a blockade, and why the Soviet Union withdrew the missiles.
Even within the rational actor model, Allison and Zelikow offer a different explanation
for an important question: Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba? The two
authors doubt that the defense theory offers good explanation. Based on a wealth of
evidence they contradict White and Thompson and conclude that two reasons offer far
better explanations: the idea that missiles in Cuba would change the strategic balance of
power, and the idea that the missiles could be used as a strategy for success in Berlin.
According to the authors it is not realistic that the missiles were sent to Cuba to defend
the island: There were far too many missiles sent to the island. Troops or tactical nuclear
weapons – to be employed in greater secrecy – would have been a better means to defend
Cuba (Allison and Zelikow 87). The argument Allison and Zelikow put forth is indeed
very convincing and raises doubts about the claims of the other authors. It is reinforced
by the plausibility with which Allison and Zelikow defend with the other hypotheses,
missile power and Berlin. The United States was in fact far superior in missile power, and
Cuba offered a possibility to counter this superiority (Allison and Zelikow 91-99). And
Khrushchev continuously mentioned Berlin before the crisis – but dropped the issue
afterwards. This clearly indicates that Berlin was on his mind and was directly linked to
Cuba (Allison and Zelikow 380). White and Thompson do not arrive at the same
conclusion. But the arguments put forth in Essence of Decision make Allison and
Zelikow’s hypotheses very plausible indeed.
Real differences between the three books can be traced when we look at the other
levels Allison and Zelikow examine. Puzzles – often not even mentioned by White and
Thompson – can only be explained with an evaluation of the other models. The
organizational behaviour model focuses on how organizational output explains the
outcome of an action and the formulation of a policy. According to Allison and Zelikow,
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this model explains a great deal about the crisis: For example, that the United States
reacted with a blockade was partly determined by the organizations involved: “An Air
Force that cannot deliver the strike Kennedy wants and a Navy that can organize a
blockade that achieves Kennedy’s goals” (Allison and Zelikow, 381). Allison and
Zelikow show in great detail how the officials in the ExComm discussed the possibility
of an air strike, and which targets would have to be attacked. The more they discussed
and the more they learned about the situation in Cuba, the less probable it seemed that an
air strike would be successful. The fact that the US reacted with a blockade is thus
interpreted from a new angle, and this new angle adds to our understanding of the
policies conducted during the crisis.
The Soviet deployment of missiles can also be seen in a different light through a
model two analysis: It was largely due to organizational routines and decisions that such
a large number of missiles was sent to Cuba (Allison and Zelikow 381). A more
interesting insight, though, is the fact that organizational behaviour can account for the
puzzling fact that the missiles were so easy to detect: Not much was done to cover the
weapons and to provide camouflage. This is indeed a crucial puzzle in the history of the
Cuban Missile Crisis: Once the missiles were on the island, it was easy for American
reconnaissance planes to detect the construction sites (Allison and Zelikow 206-207).
White and Thompson do not even mention this puzzle, but it obviously exists and needs
explanation. Allison and Zelikow provide this explanation in terms of organizational
behaviour: Never before had the Soviet army deployed missiles outside the Soviet Union,
where there was no need to cover missile sites. Units in Cuba therefore simply “had no
routine for camouflage” (Allison and Zelikow 213). When they were faced with a new
situation, Soviet officials thus did what they were used to do – they followed routines.
These organizational routines can well explain an obvious puzzle like the lack of
camouflage. This puzzle can satisfactory be solved only with a broadening of the point of
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analysis that goes beyond a simple rational actor model, and Essence of Decision engages
in this kind of broadening of the analysis.
Essence of Decision has one more level of analysis to offer: The level of
governmental politics. This model focuses on how the decision-making process of a
government is not only influenced by organizational behaviour, but especially by
bargaining games between players in this government. “The leaders who sit atop
organizations are no monolith. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his or her own
right, a player in a central, competitive game” (Allison and Zelikow, 255). Decisions are
thus never just the rational decision of a rational actor, but the result of pulling and
hauling within a group (Allison and Zelikow, 255).
For the Cuban Missile Crisis, the theory of governmental behaviour offers some
interesting insights, especially with regard to the Soviet side: Khrushchev’s “appreciation
of the situation (was) cloudy at best, his judgments bereft of any attribute of high-quality
deliberations” (Allison and Zelikow, 382). The Soviet leader also had to rely on false
information due to the lack of experts on American affairs in his team. Equally, the
absence of a competitive game on the Soviet side and the lack of expertise led to the
withdrawals of the missiles from Cuba. On the American side, the decision to impose a
blockade was reached after intense discussions among different members of the
administration, as predicted by the governmental behaviour model (Allison and Zelikow
338-347).
The essence we can draw from Essence of Decision thus is, that there were many
different forces at work during the crisis, rooted in the behaviour of rational actors, in the
behaviour of organizations, as well as in the fact that governments are a competitive
arena. That these forces were at work can be shown by the fact that some outcomes – like
the fact that the US reacted with a blockade – can be explained by different models. The
outcome was partly reached because, after a cost-benefit analysis of a rational president it
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seemed to offer the greatest benefits. But what is more, the organizations involved as well
as the political fights between different members of the administration also influenced the
decision. Many factors were at work, and in order to trace them different levels of
analysis must be followed. This is what Essence of Decision does, and this is the great
merit of the book.
III.
Conclusion
Each of the three books reviewed in this paper has its merits and contributes to the
understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The merit of White’s book is that the crisis is
placed in the Cold War context. Moreover, White gives a detailed account of the
American deliberations in the ExComm. The book is, however, also the least complex of
the three books reviewed here. Thompson adds insightful new aspects to the analysis, for
example the regional context of the crisis. He also describes how different forces were at
work during the crisis, like pressure from various sides on the President. The most
complex and insightful book is Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of Decision. This book
arrives at all the conclusions the other two books come up with. But beyond this it offers
a wide range of new insights. Established observations – like the fact that the US reacted
with a blockade – are interpreted from new angles. Moreover, the book solves puzzles
and explains inconsistencies the others do not account for.
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IV.
Works Cited
Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis. 2nd ed. New York et al.: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999.
Thompson, Robert Smith. The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F.
Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York et al.: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
White, Mark J. Missiles in Cuba. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro and the 1962 Crisis.
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997.