Development in Urbanized Settings: A Study of Novostroikas in Bishkek
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor
of Arts in International and Comparative Politics at The American University of
Kyrgyzstan.
by
Bermet Zhumakadyr kyzy
Supervisors:
Medet Tiulegenov, Assistant Professor, International and Comparative Politics
Shairbek Juraev, Director, Central Asian Studies Institute
The American University of Central Asia
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
April, 2012
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisors Medet Tiulegenov and Shair Juraev for
their wise help and guidance with this work. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.
I would like to thank Emil Nasritdinov, Joyce Pisarello, and Rene Provis for
their help and support.
Last but not least, I would like to thank interviewees for providing information
and sharing their knowledge.
II
Abstract
DEVELOPMENT IN URBANIZED SETTINGS: A STUDY OF NOVOSTROIKAS
IN BISHKEK
By Bermet Zhumakadyr kyzy, International and Comparative Politics
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor
of Arts in Politics at the American University of Central Asia,
2012
Supervisors:
Medet Tiulegenov, Assistant Professor, International and Comparative Politics
Shairbek Juraev, Director, Central Asian Studies Institute
Government’s engagement is crucial for the development of the new settlements. The
subject of this study is the development of novostroikas in Bishkek. Specifically, this
paper attempts to explore why government decides to engage in one novostroika,
while ignoring the existence of another. Government’s engagement is only possible
when the new settlement has the legal status. Meanwhile, illegal settlement may attain
legal status through pressure in the form of political protests or lobbying by
government officials and/or residents of the new settlement. Once a novostroika gains
legal status, government engages in the development of the new settlement. The study
provides an illustration on the challenges posed by the weakness of the state in
addressing the problems of urbanized poverty.
III
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................I
V
Abstract........................................................................................................................IV
Table of Contents.........................................................................................................IV
Introduction....................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: Novostroikas in Bishkek: Background and Policy Dilemmas Faced by
The Government.................................................................................................7
Chapter 2: Background on Case Studies: Ak Bata, Ak Jar, Altyn Kazyk, and Kalys
Ordo..................................................................................................................12
Chapter 3: Review of Literature and the Conceptual Framework: Two Theoretical
Approaches to Study Development in Novostroikas........................................20
Chapter 4: Vying for Public Goods: The Role of Legal Status, Pressure and
Connections......................................................................................................26
Conclusion....................................................................................................................36
Bibliography.................................................................................................................39
IV
Introduction
Over 200,000 new settlements reportedly exist in the world today.1 These are
favelas in Brazil, barriadas in Peru, barrios in Caracas, vijijis in Kenya, katchi abadis
in Pakistan, gecekondus in Turkey, kampungs in Malaysia and so on. These new
settlements, often labeled as slums, are nothing less than a vivid illustration of the
process commonly referred as the “urbanization of poverty.”2 The UN-Habitat
(United Nations Human Settlements Programme) states that “[s]ince 1950, mankind
has endured its most rapid expansion, from 2.5 billion to 6 billion people. Sixty per
cent of this gain has been in urban areas. […] During the next 30 years, the global
urban populations will increase by more than 2 billion while rural populations will be
almost static.”3
These numbers reveal the magnitude of persisting and continuing trend of
population increase in urban areas. The UN-Habitat further reports that “[a]lmost 1
billion people, or 32 per cent of the world’s urban population, live in slums, the
majority of them in the developing world.”4 UN-Habitat’s astounding numbers
complement World Bank’s warnings that “urban poverty would become the most
significant and politically explosive problem of the next century.”5 The enormity and
speed of global poverty urbanization reveals the importance and urgency of
examining urban poverty closely. One of the ways to contribute to the study of this
salient phenomenon is to explore the product of poverty urbanization, namely, new
1
Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 26.
Gerard Piel, “The Urbanization of Poverty Worldwide,” Challenge 40, no. 1 (1997).
3
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003 (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 5.
4
Ibid, - 1 -.
5
Anquing Shi. “The Impact of Access to Urban Potable Water and Sewerage Connections on Child
Mortality: City-Level Evidence, 1993,” in World Bank Economists’ Forum, ed. Shantayanan
Devarajan, F. Halsey Rogers, and Lyn Squire (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001), 234.
2
-1-
settlements. This paper aims to look at the developmental issues faced by the new
settlements in Kyrgyzstan, a relatively new state with a struggling economy and
persisting legacies of the Soviet rule.
Novostroikas, a local term for new settlements, in Bishkek are coalescence and
a visible evidence of the most salient social problems that Kyrgyzstan has been facing
today: unemployment, poverty, and corruption. These new settlements often have
negative connotations being associated with squalor, criminals, social unrest.
However, the associations are often without merit to them. There are some
novostroikas that are thriving and are well integrated into the city infrastructure.
Nevertheless, striking is the difference in the degree of infrastructure
development among the new settlements; sometimes drastic contrasts can be observed
in novostroikas located just next to each other. An excellent illustration is the example
of Altyn Kazyk and Kalys Ordo, two bordering novostroikas in the outskirts of
Bishkek. In Altyn Kazyk people live in inhumane conditions: there is no clean
drinking water, no electricity, and no paved roads. All it consists of are houses made
out of clay. On the other hand, Kalys Ordo has electricity, water, 5275 meters of
paved roads, and an elementary school. Kalys Ordo feels like suburb of the city,
although only 100 meters away, Altyn Kazyk seems like an impoverished slum.
This paper aims to examine this issue though addressing the following
questions: Why is there such a striking difference in the levels of development in
these two bordering novostroikas in Bishkek? What factors are most important in
determining the quality of life in these settlements? What are the roles of the state
authorities and settlers in this, and in what contexts does their relationship lead to
improvements in the settlements? These questions guided the research project under
the main research question: what are the factors that result in government’s actions to
-2-
improve infrastructure in the novostroika? The hypothesis has been that the
differences among the novostroikas are very much a reflection of the varying
combination of factors, including the governmental engagement, which results from
the legal status of the settlement, initiatives of the residents, the political connections
between particular novostroikas and representatives of decision-making bodies. Given
this, the research task has been to reveal those contexts in which these factors play
with each other and produce quite differing results. The findings, discussed in length
the in the subsequent chapters, suggest the authorities’ engagement is only possible in
the legalized settlements; however, the legal status is necessary but not sufficient
factor. The informal pressure from the residents of settlements and development of
political connections between the settles and the authorities prove to play a very
important role.
Given the limitations in terms of time and scope, the research is focused on
close analysis of four new settlements in the northern outskirts of Bishkek: Altyn
Kazyk, Ak Jar, Ak Bata, and Kalys Ordo. These are relatively recent settlements,
located close to each other, but presenting quite different degrees of infrastructural
development. One of the reasons for limiting the number of discussed settlements is
the methodological feasibility. The paper relies both on secondary sources, but
significant part of the findings come from the first-hand in-depth interviews held with
the relevant representatives of the novostroikas. The interviews had the purpose of
finding primary information about this quite under-researched topic, and overall two
government officials, one NGO director (with over 20 years of experience of work
with new settlements), and 14 residents (mostly anonymous) were interviewed.
There are several caveats in terms of the terminology employed in the paper.
First, for the purposes of this paper novostroika and new settlement will be used
-3-
interchangeably. These terms are just two of many equivalent variations of the terms
(squatter settlement, informal housing, illegal settlement, shanty town), to denote
largely pejorative term “slum”.6 The notion of “slum” could be traced back to 1812,
when James Hardy Vaux was the first to define it and used it synonymously with
“racket” or “criminal trade” in his work Vocabulary of the Flash Language.7 Since
then and until the end of 19th century the word had negative connotations being
associated with crime, drugs, wretchedness, etc.8 The notion of “slum” changed from
stigmatized concept to general operational in 1880s by the Housing Reform
Movement in England.9 Nowadays slum is a contested term: it has a negative
connotation and is considered to be pejorative term by some, yet it is becoming a
neutral and acceptable notion in academia.
Operational definition of slum was proposed by United Nations Expert Group
Meeting in 2002. It defines slums as “an area that combines, to various extents, the
following characteristics (restricted to the physical and legal characteristics of the
settlement, and excluding the more difficult social dimensions):
1. inadequate access to water;
2. inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure;
3. poor structural quality of housing;
4. overcrowding;
5. insecure residential status.”10
6
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003 (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 9.
7
Mike Davis, Plant of Slums (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 21.
8
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003 (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 9.
9
Ibid, 9.
10
Ibid.
-4-
Ninette Fahmy states that new settlements “are those communities which
sprang up as a result of illegal acquisition of publicly owned state land […]. As such,
these areas fall outside official urban planning, suffer lack of provision of basic urban
services, which includes electricity, water, and sewage, and are subject to forceful
eviction at any time.”11
UN-Habitat and Fahmy’s definitions are useful in describing those new
settlements where government has not taken actions to improve the novostroika.
Kalys Ordo and Ak Bata used to fit within these two definitions several years ago but
do not nowadays as the government has actively been involved in upgrading and
integrating these settlements into the city. For the purposes of this study, term
novostroika or new settlement includes both settlements that are not upgraded (and fit
the definitions above) and those new settlements that were upgraded (and used to fit
the definitions above).
The term “government” is used broadly to denote the state authorities in
general, rather than referring to the executive branch or any particular unit within it.
When particular government body is discussed in this study, then it is called by its
name and is not referred to as the “government”. “Development” in this research
means infrastructure development which for the purposes of this study is measured by
the following tangible characteristics: water, electricity, and paved roads. This is
however not to undermine in any way the importance of multidimensional approach
on development. Infrastructure development is important and necessary before
multidimensional approach could be applied. Consequently, “government’s
Ninette S. Fahmy, “A Culture of Poverty or the Poverty of a Culture? Informal Settlements and the
Debate over the State-Society Relationship in Egypt,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (Autumn, 2004),
600.
11
-5-
engagement” in novostroika denotes government’s actions directed to provide and
upgrade these three infrastructural characteristics.
The implications of this study are limited. There are 48 legally recognized and
unknown numbers of unofficial new settlements around Bishkek. This study mostly
looked at the novostroikas that formed around years 2002-2005, however many other
new settlements were formed in 1990s and 2011. Considering these, the findings of
this research could not be extended to all the novostroikas in Kyrgyzstan, even though
the patterns are expected to be similar in other parts of Bishkek’s outskirts.
The paper is organized in the following way. The first chapter provides
general background on the new settlements in Bishkek and dilemmas government
faces in implementing policy towards these new settlements. The next chapter
presents four new settlements that were studied in this research: Altyn Kazyk, Ak Jar,
Ak Bata, and Kalys Ordo. The Chapter 3 provides a brief review of the literature and
puts forward two theoretical approaches employed in this study. Finally, Chapter 4
analyzes government’s engagement in four case-study new settlements utilizing
combination of two main theoretical frameworks. Conclusion summarizes the
findings of the study, stresses its implications within the broader context and gives
suggestions for further research in the area of development in novostroikas in
Bishkek.
-6-
Chapter 1: Novostroikas in Bishkek: Background and Policy Dilemmas Faced by
the Government
First new settlements started to form around Bishkek in 1989, when the Soviet
Union was still in place.12 These first settlements were formed through “land
invasions” (or local term samozahvat).13 This trend of creation of novostroikas
through either “land invasions” or sometimes on legal basis through government’s
allocation of land lots to people around Bishkek has persisted since 1989 till recent
days.14 In 2006, 30 percent of Bishkek’s territory consisted of novostroikas.15
Currently there are 48 officially recognized new settlements in Bishkek (including Ak
Jar, which is in the process of gaining legal status).16 The number is even larger if to
include many novostroikas that still lack legal statuses.
Formation of all these new settlements around Bishkek could be divided into
three waves: (1) during the first years of independence from 1989-1993, (2) during the
2005 riots, and (3) during 2011 riots and ethnic conflict.17 These are only main waves,
some novostroikas formed in times which do not fit the delineation into three waves.18
The main cause for the development of these novostroikas around Bishkek is
high rate of internal rural-urban migration which resulted in the high growth rate of
the city’s population. From 1989 to 1999 Bishkek’s population increased by 151,000
12
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Азамат Касыбеков, “«Пояс шахида» вокруг Бишкека. Новостройки и их обитатели,”
ЦентрАзия, Январь 16, 2006, доступ Апрель 1, 2012.
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1137395340.
16
Официальный сайт Мэрии города Бишкек, “Пресс-конференция по вопросу «Самовольно
выстроенных индивидуальных жилых домов в новостройках города Бишкек, а также об
упорядочении работы общественного транспорта в столице»,” Официальный сайт Мэрии города
Бишкек, Мар. 16, 2012,
http://bishkekgov.in.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2329%3A-lr&catid=40%3Acategorynews&Itemid=74&lang=ru (доступ Апр. 1, 2012).
17
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003 (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 22.
18
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
13
-7-
due to internal migration, although the increase was offset by emigration to other
countries.19 Population growth in Bishkek resulted in high demand for housing and
land. This led to the formation of new settlements around Bishkek.20 This begs a
question: what causes migration from rural areas to Bishkek. Literature on rural-urban
migration explained the phenomena through dividing decision to migrate as being
affected by “push” and “pull” factors. “Push factors” are based on longing to escape
unemployment and lack of opportunities in impoverished rural areas, whereas “pull
factors” are decision to migrate in search of better opportunities and life in the city
and attraction to “the city lights.”21 However, once in Bishkek there is a need for land
and housing.
According to the Land Code of Kyrgyz Republic every citizen is entitled to a land
plot free-of-charge if they do not already possess a land plot anywhere else within the
borders of Kyrgyzstan: (a) for the construction of a residential house; (b) for the
construction of a dacha; and (c) for agricultural use for the entitled citizens.22
However, to qualify for a plot the household must meet demanding criteria and,
afterwards, wait in the queue hampered by corruption for the land lot.23 Therefore,
some decide to illegally squat public land instead of undergoing through rigid and
lengthy procedures to obtain land.
Martin Schuler, “Migration Patterns of the Population in Kyrgyzstan,” Espace Populations Societes,
2007, http://eps.revues.org/index1967.html#tocto1n5 (accessed Apr. 1).
20
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003 (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 22.
21
Johan Frederick Rye, “Leaving the Countryside: An Analysis of Rural-to-Urban Migration and
Long-Term Capital Accumulation,” Acta Sociologica 49, no. 1 (Mar., 2006): 49.
22
Земельный Кодекс Кыргызской Республики, Право на земельный участок как объект
гражданских прав и сделки с ним, глава 3, статьи 25-30.
23
Raymond J. Struyk and Friedemann Roy, “Kyrgyzstan’s “Squatter Communities” and the Potential
of Housing Micro Finance to Support Upgrading,” Housing Finance International (Sep., 2006), 23.
19
-8-
The reports suggest 392,852 people currently live in 48 officially recognized
novostroikas.24 The number may go even bigger if to count new settlements that still
lack legal statuses. Living conditions in these settlements vary greatly: there are new
settlements which are considered to be an “elite zone” with spacious and fancy
housing and there are novostroikas with no electricity, no water, and no paved roads.
The latter in most of the cases are the ones without legal statuses.
The state identifies illegal settlers as “land-grabbers” or “land-invaders”
(samozahvatchiki) who should not be granted right to land.25 These illegal settlers
often do not have a residence permit for Bishkek or propiska. Without this residence
permit these dwellers become second-class citizens: they cannot vote, do not have
access to medical services, their children cannot attend schools (although this can be
solved through informal payment), etc.26 The difference in treatment by state of illegal
and legal settlements is interesting considering the fact that some of the now-legal
settlements once were illegally squatted too.
State policy options towards novostroikas have variety too: negligence, eviction,
resettlement, or upgrading. Most often used policy is negligence, where the new
settlements remain under the threat of eviction, although novostroikas seem to gain
legal status eventually. Kyrgyz government faces a dilemma when deciding whether
to grant legal status. On the one hand granting legal status to illegally squatted
novostroika will set an undesirable precedent, on the other hand the government is
responsible for the well-being of all citizens including the dwellers of novostroikas.27
Диана Эсеналиева, “Около 400 тыс. человек проживает в новостройках Бишкека,” КирТаг,
Апрель 10, 2012, доступ Апрель 11, 2012. http://www.kyrtag.kg/?q=ru/news/18761.
25
Balihar Sanghera and Elmira Satybaldieva, “Ethics of Property, Illegal Settlements and the Right to
Subsistence,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 32, no. 1/2 (2012), 104.
26
Анастасия Ходыкина, “Нет бумаги – нет человека,” Inkg.info, Февраль 20, 2012, доступ Апрель
1, 2012. http://inkg.info/news/deti/1063-net-bumagi-net-cheloveka.
27
Самарбек Болотбеков, Интервью с Еленой Нечаевой, ТВ программа. Майдан. Мар. 6, 2012.
24
-9-
Housing in the illegal settlements should be removed according to law. However,
state chooses to ignore existence of these settlements. Removal of the housing
constructions in these new settlements requires positive active actions from the
government, whereas neglect does not require any actions. Kyrgyz government was
able to remove few housing constructions, which were located at the legally
recognized novostroikas. However, officials admit that there are many more
constructions which need to be removed. Yet, the state is hesitant to forcefully enforce
eviction policy. There is a dilemma: on the one hand government should enforce the
law on the other hand enforcement may lead to protests and violence.
So, there are two main dilemmas faced by the government when deciding which
policy to follow. First dilemma is whether to grant legal status to illegally formed
novostroika and set precedent. On the other hand, government is responsible for
ensuring well-being of the novostroika dwellers as they are still Kyrgyz citizens. If
not to grant legal status, then the government should evict illegal settlements.
However, the dilemma is: eviction may lead to protests and violence, yet government
must enforce the law. As OGUKS’ (Общественно-государственное Управление
капитального строительства мэрии Бишкека) official said: “Russian saying goes as
“Better poor peace than any war.” […] If more people will become aggressive, the
balance in the society will go off. There is a golden rule by which society must be
ruled – balance interests in the society. We should take into account interests of these
people [novostroika dwellers], they are too our citizens.”28 In the face of these
dilemmas most of the time government chooses to ignore illegal settlements and take
no actions towards them.
28
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
- 10 -
To sum up, new settlements have existed ever since Kyrgyzstan’s independent
history and squatting of publicly owned land is not a recent phenomenon in a
relatively short history of a sovereign country. A high rate of rural-urban migration
resulted in the formation of these often illegal new settlements. The government’s
policy towards these new settlements has been somewhat ambivalent due to the
dilemmas it faces when deciding which policy to adopt.
- 11 -
Chapter 2: Background on Case Studies: Ak Bata, Ak Jar, Altyn Kazyk, and
Kalys Ordo
There are four bordering novostroikas in the northern part of Bishkek. They
are located along one of the main roads that is used to drive into and out of Bishkek
(ob’ezdnaya doroga). They are Ak Bata, Ak Jar, Altyn Kazyk, and Kalys Ordo. If to
travel along the ob’ezdnaya doroga from east to west the new settlements will follow
one another in the following order: Ak Jar, Ak Bata, Altyn Kazyk, and Kalys Ordo.
With regard to the level of infrastructure development in these new settlements they
will be positioned as follows (from “less developed” to “more developed”): Altyn
Kazyk, Ak Jar, Ak Bata, and Kalys Ordo (see table 1). This will be the order in which
novostroikas will be presented in this chapter.
Altyn Kazyk
Ak Jar
Ak Bata
Kalys Ordo
84
146
83
135
Electricity
No
Most houses
Most houses
Yes
Water
No
Some houses
Most houses
Yes
Roads
No
No
Some roads
Yes
Area (in
hectares)
Table 1
Altyn Kazyk is an illegal new settlement with an area of 84 hectares. It was
established through squatting of the public land in 2005 following the “Tulip
Revolution”. Ever since its existence the government has ignored this new settlement.
- 12 -
At the same time novostroika residents were not assertive in demanding legal status as
some other illegal new settlements were.
Houses in Altyn Kazyk do not have electricity. However, there are electrical
transformers that were built and are used to support the workers on city’s dump site
located right next to Altyn Kazyk. Some of the residents living close to the dump site
illegally connect their households to these electrical transformers through informal
payments.29 However, this option is available only to households that are located in
the immediate vicinity of the dump site, and hence in the vicinity of the electrical
transformers. There is no drinking water available in Altyn Kazyk. Therefore, the
residents are forced to go neighboring novostroika Kalys Ordo for the water.30
Moreover, there are no paved roads in Altyn Kazyk. The roads turn into watery mud
after the rain. There are no marshrutkas (type of local public transportation, minibus)
that have routes into this new settlement. Therefore to get to school or to go to work
the residents have to walk around one kilometer to the ob’ezdnaya doroga and then
catch marshrutka. Children attend school located either in other novostroikas, in the
city, or do not attend school at all. There are no medical services provided in the new
settlement itself, moreover most of the residents cannot access public healthcare due
to not having propiska. However, informal payment is likely solve this matter too.31
Altyn Kazyk is located in an area which is considered to be hazardous and
prohibited for living. The new settlement is in an unacceptable vicinity to the city’s
dump site, which however provides jobs to the residents who pick and sort trash.32
29
Altyn Kazyk resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 5, 2012.
Ирина Ковшова, “Золотой клад на помойке,” Слово Кыргызстана, Мар. 27, 2012,
окончательное издание.
31
Altyn Kazyk resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 5, 2012.
32
Ibid.
30
- 13 -
Moreover, the novostroika is located nearby a cemetery and cattle cemetery.33 Finally,
gas pipes pass underneath some parts of Altyn Kazyk and pose a risk of explosion.34
The houses cannot be built on the ground underneath which gas pipes pass as the gas
pipes cannot hold the additional pressure and might break and explode.35
Altyn Kazyk’s history of interactions with the government starts with its
formation in 2005 during the riots in March commonly known as the “Tulip
Revolution.” That same year Kurmanbek Bakiev signed the decree no. 247, which
transferred public land to individuals for housing constructions.36 Later he revoked the
decree and the same territory was appropriated for cemetery.37 However, some people
have already paid and bought the land from alleged officials and started to build
houses.38 These people refused to move out and the new settlement continued to
grow.39
Another new settlement, Ak Jar is comparatively better off than Altyn Kazyk.
It was promised to be granted legal status by the Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev
himself; however its legal status is ambivalent. It occupies an area of 146 hectares.40 It
was finally established in 2005 through squatting, although there have been earlier
attempts to form a new settlement in that area.41
Ak Jar has a main road which goes all the way through the novostroika. There
are 40 roads crossing it perpendicularly. The Mayor’s Office ordered to put electrical
33
Altyn Kazyk resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 5, 2012.
Ibid.
35
Bolot Abdiev, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 20, 2012.
36
Ирина Ковшова, “Золотой клад на помойке,” Слово Кыргызстана, Мар. 27, 2012,
окончательное издание.
37
Ibid.
38
Altyn Kazyk resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 5, 2012.
39
Ibid.
40
Официальный сайт Мэрии города Бишкек, “Глава столичного муниципалитета посетил
жилмассив «Ак-Жар»,” Официальный сайт Мэрии города Бишкек, Мар. 16, 2012,
http://bishkekgov.in.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1657%3A-lr&catid=40%3Acategorynews&Itemid=74&lang=ru (доступ Апр. 1, 2012).
41
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
34
- 14 -
lines till the road 22 inclusively in 2011. Therefore, only half of the new settlement
has electricity, the rest of the new settlement either still does not have electricity or
have illegally extended electrical lines from the street 22.42 There is no running water
in the households. Instead there are water pumps on the central road from where
residents bring water to their houses. There are no paved roads in Ak Jar. The ground
largely consists of clay in that area, therefore the roads become extremely muddy after
rain.43 Despite bad roads there are two marshrutka lines into this novostroika. There is
no school in the new settlement, but most of the children attend schools that are
located either in the neighboring new settlements or in the city.44 And there are no
medical services provided in the novostroika.
Ak Jar is located in an area which does not meet the criteria for building
houses. The ground largely consists of clay, which cannot hold housing constructions
well. This is the reason why there is no running water in every household, as clay is
not able to hold water pipes and starts raveling out if the humidity rises.45 Moreover,
underneath some of the housing constructions in Ak Jar pass gas pipes, which are
dangerous as they have the potential to explode under the additional pressure of
housing constructions.46
Ak Jar initially was squatted in 1989 and people already had then started
building houses.47 However, it was discovered that the area is not suitable for
housings due to the fact that ground largely consisted of clay.48 Therefore, national
42
Ak Jar resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
44
Ak Jar resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
45
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
46
Ibid.
47
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
48
Ibid.
43
- 15 -
government resettled these people in 1992 and paid compensation.49 Yet, the housing
constructions and unpaved roads made by people remained.50 Therefore, people could
see that these places could be populated and used this opportunity during 2005 riots to
re-establish the new settlement.51 For the six years since then Ak Jar residents lived
without electricity, water, etc. In August 2011 residents of Ak Jar blocked the
ob’ezdnaya doroga demanding provision of water and electricity, construction of a
school, a medical center, and a road to the new settlement.52 Later in August the
Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev visited Ak Jar and promised to provide water
and electricity to the new settlement.53 Water was provided in October and electricity
was provided in December of 2011 to the novostroika Ak Jar.54
Ak Bata is located between Altyn Kazyk and Ak Jar and is comparatively
better off than both of them. Ak Bata was formed through squatting in June 2002.55 It
has been granted legal status shortly in August 2002 after the protests by the
squatters.56 It legally occupies an area of 83 hectares.57
There are six electrical transformers that provide electricity for the entire
novostroika. However, there are no electrical poles in the new settlement and some
residents extended the electrical lines by building and establishing self-made electrical
poles.58 There are water pumps in most of the households, however substantial
amount of households still do not have access to water directly from their own
49
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
K-News, “Расследование K-News: Кому принадлежит новостройка «Ак-Жар»,” K-News,
Август 9, 2012, доступ Апрель 11, 2012, http://www.knews.kg/ru/action/1572/.
53
СДПК, “А. Атамбаев: «Жители новостроек – граждане нашей страны, мы обязаны решать их
острые социальные проблемы,” СДПК, Авг. 13, 2012, http://www.sdpk.kg/party-line/meetings-withvoters/584--ll------------r (доступ Апр. 11, 2012).
54
Ak Jar resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
55
Ibid.
56
Зинаида Сорокина, “Снести или переселить?” Вечерний Бишкек, Февраль 22, 2012, доступ
Апрель 11, 2012, http://members.vb.kg/2012/02/22/gorod/1.html.
57
Ibid.
58
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
50
- 16 -
house.59 There are no paved roads in Ak Bata, however some roads have gravel.60
There are 3 marshrutka lines ending in this new settlement. Moreover, there are
school and medical center in Ak Bata.61
Unlike Altyn Kazyk or Ak Jar, territory of Ak Bata is not considered to be
hazard zone. However, it is still in the vicinity of the city’s dump site as it borders
with Altyn Kazyk. Therefore, residents complain that the smell from the dump site
reaches Ak Bata especially during summertime.62 Moreover, some housing
constructions in Ak Bata are not legally registered as they are built in the area
underneath which gas pipes pass.63
Ak Bata was squatted in June 2002 few months after the Aksy events in Osh.64
In August residents protested by occupying the public land (current Ak Bata) and at
the end of August the new settlement was granted legal status through government’s
decree no. 596.65 After it acquired legal status, government was committed to and did
provide the new settlement with water, electricity, and built school in the
novostroika.66
Kalys Ordo is a new settlement located to the West from Altyn Kazyk. Kalys
Ordo is a new settlement which is the most developed out of the four settlements
studied in this research. It has legal status and occupies an area of 135 hectares.67
Every household in Kalys Ordo has running water and electricity.68 Most of
the roads, 5272 meters, in Kalys Ordo are cemented.69 There are 3 marshrutka lines
59
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
64
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
65
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
66
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
67
МСН “Бишкек «обрастает» новостройками,” МСН, Ноябрь 28, 2006, доступ Апрель 11, 2012,
http://www.msn.kg/ru/news/16366/.
68
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
60
- 17 -
that end in this new settlement. There is a medical center and an elementary school in
the novostroika.70
Unlike all of the previous three novostroikas Kalys Ordo is the only one that
does not have housing constructions built above the gas pipe lines.71 The area does not
pose hazardous threats to the residents. However, during summertime, similar to Ak
Bata, smell from the city’s dump site reaches Kalys Ordo.72
Kalys Ordo has had relatively peaceful history: if there were protests, they
were peaceful, such as meeting in front of the Mayor’s Office.73 800 people, who
squatted this area in 2003, were people who were not able to get land in Ak Bata in
2002.74 Sabyr Omuraliev, one of the residents, was actively involved in projecting and
planning the new settlement.75 Under his supervision residents themselves built roads
and left special areas for school construction, parks, medical center, etc. in the
future.76 In 2003 water started running in the new settlement through the efforts of the
residents.77 As at that time the novostroika still did not have legal status, government
could not provide electricity to Kalys Ordo. However, Sabyr Omuraliev made a deal
with an organization located nearby to extend electrical lines and make a monthly
payment for it.78 One electrical transformer was put through the efforts of the
residents themselves, moreover residents themselves made wooden electrical poles.79
Kabar Mobile, “При содействии АРИС в ряде новостроек Бишкека завершается строительство
дорог,” Kabar Mobile, Июль 20, 2011, доступ Апрель 11, 2012,
http://pda.kabar.kg/society/full/8372.
70
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
71
Ibid.
72
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
73
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
69
- 18 -
In 2004 government granted legal status to this new settlement.80 After that residents
in cooperation with government provided electricity and water to the entire new
settlement.81
To sum up, four new settlements (Altyn Kazyk, Ak Jar, Ak Bata, and Kalys
Ordo) were examined in this research. These four settlements geographically border
with each other, yet exhibit a variety which characterizes 48 novostroikas in Bishkek.
These settlements were established in different years from 2002 to 2005. Current
levels of infrastructure development in these novostroikas differ. History of how
infrastructure developed in these new settlements differs too. Yet, if to compare only
two new settlements instead of all four, there are similarities either in the year of
establishment, legal status, hazard danger, etc. The variety of novostroikas exhibited
through these four new settlements with some differences and similarities provide an
opportunity to compare whether differences influenced the way government was
engaged in these novostroikas.
80
81
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
Ibid.
- 19 -
Chapter 3: Review of Literature and the Conceptual Framework: Two
Theoretical Approaches to Study Development in Novostroikas
Development literature on new settlements suggest there are two ways of
seeing and assessing the developmental challenges in the new settlements. One group
of scholars puts much importance to the government’s involvement in the
development of the new settlement – process known as slum upgrading, which usually
follows with further integration into the city. Doug Sanders suggests that the future of
the slums largely depends on what course of actions (eviction, demolition, relocation,
legalization/integration, ignoring) towards the settlements government decides to
take.82 He advocates for the government that engages with the new settlement, rather
than ignoring or repressing them.83 Another scholar Ninette Fahmy makes a strong
case against state’s repressive policies towards the new settlements.84 She argues that
repressive policies create culture characterized by poverty, which in combination with
weak society and corruption impedes government’s objectives.85
Another group of scholars goes further arguing that government’s engagement
in the new settlement must be complemented by vision and/or participation of the new
settlement in its development. Akbar Zaidi argues for national and state institutions to
engage in alleviating poverty in new settlements must incorporate local context of the
new settlement and take into account “desires, expectation, or choices of the
prospective beneficiaries.”86 R. Sharma and K. Sita argue that participation of the
82
Doug Sanders, Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping Our World (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2010).
83
Ibid.
84
Ninette S. Fahmy, “A Culture of Poverty or the Poverty of a Culture? Informal Settlements and the
Debate over the State-Society Relationship in Egypt,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (Autumn, 2004).
85
Ibid.
S. Akbar Zaidi, “Institutions, Poverty: The Case of Karachi,” Economic and Political Weekly 32, no.
51 (Dec. 20-26, 1997), 3293.
86
- 20 -
residents of new settlements in the government’s development efforts must be
included.87 They go as far as stating that attitudinal training and attitudinal change of
the residents of the new settlements is needed.88 Finally, Raymond Stuyk and
Friedemann Roy join international group scholars arguing for the pro-active
government policies in the novostroikas, specifically
Novostroikas in Kyrgyzstan started gaining scholarly attention relatively
recently due to the fact that the phenomenon itself is comparatively recent in this
country. Thus, novostroikas in Kyrgyzstan first developed in late 1980s-early 1990s,
whereas Rio de Janeiro’s first favela was established in 1880s.89 Scholars on
novostroikas in Kyrgyzstan rarely studied the phenomenon within the framework of
development field. Balihar Sanghera and Elmira Satybaldieva approach study of
novostroikas in Kyrgyzstan from the human rights perspective.90 Somewhat similarly,
Craig Hatcher explores the novostroika themes in the context of the propiska system
in Kyrgyzstan.91 Aida Alymbaeva studies ethnicity and regional divides through her
fieldwork in novostroikas.92 Yet, there is no literature devoting specific focus to
government’s policy and development in new settlements in Kyrgyzstan.
International scholars largely agree that government’s intervention is needed
for the development and successful integration of the new settlement into the city.
Therefore, this research assumes that government’s engagement in the development of
a novostroika is necessary. Building on this assumption and seeing different levels of
development in Altyn Kazyk (where government clearly invested money to build
R. N. Sharma and K. Sita, “Cities, Slums and Government,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no.
42 (Oct. 14-20, 2000).
88
Ibid.
89
Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 27.
90
Balihar Sanghera and Elmira Satybaldieva, “Ethics of Property, Illegal Settlements and the Right to
Subsistence,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 32, no. 1/2 (2012).
91
Craig Hatcher, “Making Citizens Legible: Legacies of Population Registration Systems in PostSocialist Cities,” (working paper, American University of Central Asia, 2011).
92
Aida A. Alymbaeva, “Kyrgyz Ethnicity Issues: North and South (In the Case of the Bishkek PeriUrbans of Qelecheq and Qoq-Jar).
87
- 21 -
roads and provide water and electricity) and Kalys Ordo it is of scholarly interest to
explore why government engages in one new settlement and not another.
For the purposes of this paper, two bodies of theories are suggested to be taken
as a basis for the case of novostroikas in Bishkek. One set of theories focuses on the
public policy decision-making, and specifically on how the government comes to a
decision to engage and upgrade conditions in the new settlements. The second body of
theories deals with the new settlements themselves – their conditions, characteristics,
etc. Combination of both of these approaches with arbitrary modifications will be
employed in this work as a theoretical framework.
With regard to the first group of theories focusing on the government-side,
Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis became
the classic study of government decision making after initial publication in 1971. As
more documents were declassified and evidence about Cuban Missile Crisis grew,
Graham Allison rewrote the book with Philip Zelikow in 1999. In their book authors
propose three separate models of decision-making at international level and employ
these models for the analysis of the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Actor
Model, Organizational Behavior Model, and Governmental Politics Model.
The Rational Actor Model, the one that is most commonly used in analyzing
foreign affairs, sees the state or national government as a unitary actor. This model
emphasizes rationality and of the national government. Moreover, this model focuses
on the government’s objective or goal, based on which the government chooses
certain policy to achieve that objective or goal. As the authors point out: “recounting
the aims and calculations of nations or governments is the trademark of Rational
- 22 -
Actor Model.”93 To sum up, national government being rational actor purposely
chooses highest value-maximizing action among the available alternatives.94
Another model developed by the authors is the Organization Behavior Model.
This approach, contrarily to previous, “opens up” the “black box” government. It sees
government as a “conglomerate of loosely allied organizations.”95 These
organizations within the national government developed standard operating
procedures and organizational culture.96 Therefore, standard patterns of behavior
developed by constellation of organizations within the government result in an output
– policy. To sum up, policy is not a rational choice of a unitary actor, but an output
of operations of the organizations within the government.
Third model – the Governmental Politics Model – emphasizes the roles
individuals (or as the authors label them “players”) in decision-making. These players
bargain based on their perception of national, organizational, and personal goals,
which may lead to “confusion of officials with diverse interests”.97 Moreover, the
power is shared between the players unequally, meaning that the players have to
bargain with another player with more or less power.98 Thus, political bargaining
between diverse individuals results in certain policy. So, contrarily to Rational Actor
Model, this model sees government as consisting of individual who may be irrational
and confused about their goal. Contrarily to Organization Behavior Model, this model
does not see the output – or policy – as merely and organizational output but an output
shaped by individual players.
93
Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,
2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 13.
94
Ibid, 18-19.
95
Ibid, 143.
96
Ibid, 166.
97
Ibid. 294.
98
Ibid, 300.
- 23 -
The second approach to study development in the new settlements is to focus
on the new settlements themselves. These theories describe and attach certain
attributes to the new settlements. Therefore, development in new settlement depends
on the characteristics of the new settlement itself. Until 1960s-1970s new settlements
were largely perceived as an anomaly or a problem to be solved. Charles Stokes was
among the first to distinguish different types of new settlements and suggest that they
could be seen as something positive.
Charles Stokes’ work is the most widely known and quoted attempt to
conceptualize and theorize the new settlements. In his work Stokes differentiates two
types of new settlements: “slums of hope” and “slums of despair”. The former are
places of upward-mobility for the dwellers, who come to the city “seeking
improvement.”99 Therefore, these new settlements are most likely to either naturally
disappear or reclaim a neighborhood due to the efforts of the dwellers.100 “Slums of
despair” are mostly a home to dwellers who did not possess abilities to survive the
city life. These types of new settlements according to Stokes will persist because the
dwellers in these new settlements lack the capabilities to move up through the “social
class structure.”101 So, Stokes looks at the attitudes of the dwellers themselves to
distinguish between “slums of hope” and “slums of despair” and development in the
new settlement will depend on which group it falls under.
To sum up, two broad approaches could be used for the study of development
in novostroikas. One is theory on decision-making in government, while another
theorizes and categorizes new settlements themselves. These two theories
complement the study of new settlements as it looks at both main actors: government
and the novostroika itself.
Charles J. Stokes, “A Theory of Slums,” Land Economics 38, no. 3 (Aug. 1962): 190.
Ibid: 193.
101
Ibid: 190.
99
100
- 24 -
Development in novostroikas in this paper is explored and analyzed within the
framework of both of these theoretical approaches, thus making novostroika not
merely an object of government’s policies but also an active actor itself. However
arbitrary modifications will be made to theories to fit this study and both models are
taken as a broad framework rather than a strict theory to follow. Allison’s and
Zelikow’s models were tested on international level by the authors themselves.
However in this research the models are employed for the municipal level. Authors of
the theory themselves suggest applying the core arguments of the book beyond the
sphere of international affairs.102 Moreover, various combinations of three models are
used in this work which significantly strengthens the explanatory power of the
models.103 Stokes’ model is used to intuitively and broadly distinguish between the
“slums of hope” and “slums of despair” as the author himself suggests doing.
102
Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 7.
103
Ibid, 392.
- 25 -
Chapter 4: Vying for Public Goods: The Role of Legal Status, Pressure and
Connections
What are the factors that result in government’s actions to improve
infrastructure in the novostroika? The hypothesis is that novostroika needs to have
legal status for the government to take positive actions to develop and improve its
infrastructure. The hypothesis clearly holds true in the four cases covered in this
research. Two other factors are important in explaining government’s engagement in
novostroika’s infrastructure development: a) political pressure from the new
settlements and b) the role of political and personal connections between the
settlements and the decision-making institutions. Each of these factors has
explanatory power regarding government’s engagement in new settlements and these
factors can explain government’s engagement within theoretical frameworks
discussed earlier.
The legal status is the most important factor resulting in government’s
engagement in novostroika. A new settlement acquires legal status after the Mayor’s
Office issues a decree.104 Juridical status as an independent variable fits well within
the combination of Allison and Zelikow’s Rational Actor Model and Organizational
Behavior Model. The combination of these two models shows how juridical status
affects whether government will or will not take positive steps to improve
infrastructure in the novostroika. Combination of these two models classifies new
settlements based on juridical status into legal novostroikas and illegal novostroikas.
104
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
- 26 -
Government is a rational actor (Rational Actor Model). One of its main goals
is to maintain legitimacy.105 One way to do so is to fulfill its obligation to provide for
the needs of the state’s citizens. Therefore, government engages in developing
infrastructure in the new settlement to fulfill its obligation. However, government is
not actively involved in improving infrastructure in all settlements. It only engages in
new settlements that have legal statuses. Furthermore, government is constrained by
existing laws (Organizational Behavior Model) to engage in illegal new settlements,
precisely because the latter lack legal documents. Bodies within the government
cannot take actions towards novostroika which does not exist de jure. Hence, legal
status is the necessary factor for the government’s engagement in novostroika.
The above described combined model mechanism applies to four cases in this
study, although Ak Jar is the only case that does not accurately fit the model. Out of
four cases in this work legal novostroikas are Ak Bata and Kalys Ordo, whereas Altyn
Kazyk and Ak Jar does not have legal status and has ambiguous legal status
accordingly. It must be mentioned, that Ak Jar has an oral promise of the Prime
Minister, now President of Kyrgyzstan Atambaev, to be granted legal status in the
future, yet Mayor’s Office has not issued a decree to legalized Ak Jar. Taking
juridical statuses within the framework of the combined model described above
explains the government’s treatment of the four case-study new settlements.
Government was and still is actively engaged in improving and developing
infrastructure in Ak Bata. Ak Bata acquired legal status in August 30, 2002 through
Mayor’s Office’s decree no. 596.106 Once granted legal status organizations within the
government started to fulfill its obligation to provide for the needs of its citizens by
taking positive actions to develop infrastructure in the new settlement. Thus by 2004
105
106
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
- 27 -
Bishkekglavarhitektura finalized a general plan of construction (genplan) for Ak
Bata.107 In 2004 OGUKS installed water pipes and water pumps.108 In 2005 OGUKS
installed electrical transformers and provided electricity for some parts of Ak Bata.109
Kalys Ordo acquired legal status in September 19, 2004 by Mayor’s Office’s
decree no. 706.110 Before 2004 residents provided the new settlement with electricity
and water themselves. However, starting in 2004, the government began to fulfill its
obligation to meet the needs of novostroika residents. Thus that same year through
efforts of Sabyr Omuraliev (resident of Ak Bata) the general plan of the new
settlement was finalized by Bishkekglavarhitektura.111 That same year OGUKS
continued to further install electricity and water pipes in the new settlement.112 In
2011 ARIS (Agency for Community Development and Investment) in partnership
with Mayor’s Office built cemented roads in Kalys Ordo.113
With regard to Ak Jar, the government was not actively engaged in improving
infrastructure in this novostroika until 2011. Ak Jar is still an illegal settlement with
oral promise to be legalized. In 2011 the Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev under
the pressure promised to grant legal status to Ak Jar.114 Atambaev also stated that Ak
Jar is now under the jurisdiction of Bishkek, which would entail it already was
granted legal status.115 However, there was no decree issued by the Mayor’s Office,
therefore the legal status of Ak Jar remains ambiguous. Later that year OGUKS
107
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
113
С. Султанкулова, “В семи жилмассивах завершена реконструкция центральных дорог,”
Коомдук Телерадио Беруу Корпорациясы, Сентябрь 21, 2011, доступ Апрель 11, 2012,
http://ktrk.kg/rus/index.php?newsid=268.
114
Калича Джаманкулова, “Жилмассив «Ак-Жар» передадут на баланс Свердловского района
столицы,” K-News, Август 12, 2011, доступ Апрель 11, 2012,
http://www.knews.kg/ru/society/1698/.
115
ОКМОТПРЕСС, “А. Атамбаев: Необходимо улучшать инфраструктуру жилмассивов,”
Правительство Кыргызской Республики , Авг. 12, 2012, http://www.gov.kg/?p=1975 (доступ Апр.
11, 2012).
108
- 28 -
installed water pipes and electricity in the new settlement.116 With regard to Altyn
Kazyk the government did not take positive steps to improve infrastructure in the new
settlement – it could not due to legal constraints.
To sum up, government as a rational actor engages in infrastructure
development in novostroikas to fulfill its obligation to provide for the needs of state’s
citizens (Rational Actor Model). At the same time government is not engaged in
development of illegal settlements, such as Altyn Kazyk, as it is constrained by law
(Organizational Behavior Model). It only engages in new settlements once they are
granted legal statuses, shown in the cases of Ak Bata, Kalys Ordo, and Ak Jar
(although ambiguous). Therefore, legal status is a deciding factor that results in
government’s actions to improve infrastructure in new settlement.
Juridical status explains why government engages in some new settlements’
infrastructure development and not others. However juridical status as a variable does
not explain how an illegal new settlement acquires legal status in the first place.
Pressure from illegal new settlements is needed for the government to legalize
novostroika. Pressure can come in various in forms of protests, such as road-blocking
or picketing in front of government bodies.
Pressure as an independent variable fits well within a modified Stokes’ theory
combined with Allison and Zelikow’s Rational Actor Model and Organizational
Behavior Model. Modified use of a combination of these two theoretical approaches
shows how pressure results in legalization of the new settlement. Stokes’ “slums of
hope” concept will be modified to indicate novostroika with politically active
residents, who are able to mobilize effectively, whereas the “slums of despair”
116
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
- 29 -
concept will mean the opposite – politically inactive residents without ability to
mobilize effectively.
Following is the description of the mechanism that explains how pressure in
the form of protests can result in legalization of a new settlement. Government as a
rational actor constrained by its own jurisdiction does not take actions to improve
infrastructure in illegal novostroika (Rational Actor Model and Organizational
Behavior Model). Therefore, it does not take any actions towards an illegal new
settlement. Illegal new settlement (“slum of hope”) could start demanding either legal
status from the government or improvement in its living conditions. These pressures
in forms of protests are most effective during the periods when government is
vulnerable (after riots or during pre-election period). Government as a rational actor
has two choices: ignore or fulfill the demands of protesters (Rational Actor Model).
Since government is weak during the protests and, thus, perceives threats from the
protests, it chooses to fulfill the demands of the protesters. “Sometimes government
needs to think about its interests too. […] Sometimes the issue of legitimacy
arises.”117 Or, as another government official Aida Duishenbiyeva said: “Five years
ago, the government’s decision to legalize plots was forced, and more of a political
measure – it was necessary to relieve the tension associated with escalation of the
housing crisis”.118
The above-described mechanism explains why novostroika has or does not
have legal status in all cases studied in this research, with the exception of Kalys
Ordo. Ak Bata residents protested just few months after they squatted the area.119 In
August 2002 would-be residents of Ak Bata occupied then public land (current area of
117
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
Aigul Temirova, “Kyrgyzstan’s Land Crisis Comes to a Head Again: Experts Blame Corruption,
Lack of Economic Development in Regions,” Central Asia Online, April 21, 2012, accessed April 11,
2012, http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/04/21/feature-03.
119
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
118
- 30 -
Ak Bata).120 Protesters did not leave the area during the day and the night.121 What is
more, many protesters started to build houses.122 Officials from Mayor’s Office came
to dissolve the crowd of protesters giving oral promise to legalize land later and give
land to protesters in other places.123 The efforts to appease the crowd did not work as
protesters refused to leave until government granted legal status.124 Government was
vulnerable at that moment within the context of then recent Aksy events. Therefore,
government as a rational actor, vulnerable and with the perceived threat from
protesters will chose to fulfill the demands of the protesters.
Ak Jar residents mobilized and started protesting during pre-election time on
August 8 2011, six years later after it was squatted. Residents demanded from
government better living conditions by blocking ob’ezdnaya doroga and burning
tires.125 The protesters continued road blocking until then Prime Minister Almazbek
Atambaev’s and City Mayor Isa Omurkulov’s visit in August 12, 2012.126 At that
point A. Atambaev personally promised that Ak Jar would be legalized.127
Protests are clearly the defining factor in the case of Ak Jar’s promise to be
legalized and subsequent positive actions to improve infrastructure there. Ak Jar is
located in a hazardous area. Yet, A. Atambaev still promised legalization. This shows
that government placed more value on legitimacy and stability rather than following
120
Ibid.
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
124
Ibid.
125
Егор Ермаков, “Жители новостройки «Ак-Жар» требуют встречи с премьером и жгут
покрышки на объездной трассе,” Vesti.kg, Август 8, 2011, доступ Апрель 11, 2012,
http://www.vesti.kg/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=6454:zhiteli-novostroyki-ak-zharetrebuyut-vstrechi-s-premerom-i-zhgut-pokryishki-na-obezdnoy-trasse&Itemid=80.
126
Официальный сайт Мэрии города Бишкек, “Новостройка «Ак-Жар» фактически относится к
столице Кыргызстана (фото репортаж),” Официальный сайт Мэрии города Бишкек, Авг. 12,
2011, http://bishkekgov.in.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1380%3A-l-r&catid=40%3Acategorynews&Itemid=74&lang=kg (доступ Апр. 11, 2012).
127
ОКМОТПРЕСС, “А. Атамбаев: Необходимо улучшать инфраструктуру жилмассивов,”
Правительство Кыргызской Республики , Авг. 12, 2012, http://www.gov.kg/?p=1975 (доступ Апр.
11, 2012).
121
- 31 -
rules/laws on what area could be given legal status. It must be mentioned, that Ak Jar
residents signed documents that removes responsibility from the government in the
case of hazardous situations occurring due to pipelines or clay ground.128
In contrast to Ak Bata and Ak Jar, Altyn Kazyk could be looked at as a “slum
of despair” where residents are politically inactive. One of the Altyn Kazyk residents
tried to organize road blocking in August 2011 after Ak Jar residents’ protests.129
However, only a few people showed up for road blocking, and those who did come to
protest stayed only for three hours.130 When asked why this is the case, the resident
replied: “They [Altyn Kazyk residents] became like animals. They do not want to
have business with government and are used to living like they do. […] They even
like it.”131
To sum up, residents of novostroikas could be divided into residents of “slums
of despair” (or those who are politically inactive and are able to mobilize) and into
residents of “slums of hope” (or those who are politically active and are unable to
mobilize). The former lack capabilities to pressure government and therefore are not
legalized. The latter mobilize and pressure the government when it is vulnerable
through protests. A vulnerable government within the context of being in vulnerable
situation perceives threat and chooses to abide by the demands of the protesters
(Rational Actor Model) and grant legal status to new settlement. Once granted legal
status a new settlement will receive government’s engagement in the new settlement
for infrastructure development.
The above described mechanism did not hold true in the case of Kalys Ordo.
How did Kalys Ordo receive legal status if it did not protest? Interviews with Kalys
128
Ak Jar resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
129
- 32 -
Ordo residents revealed that people both from government and the new settlement
were crucial in contributing to the legalization of the novostroika.
Personal connections as a concept explaining legalization of Kalys Ordo fits
within again modified Stokes’ theory and Allison and Zelikow’s Governmental
Politics Model. Kalys Ordo could be looked at as a “slum of hope” where some
residents are particularly knowledgeable and are politically active. These active
residents are able to use personal connections to effectively lobby government to gain
legal status. Moreover, there are people in government who support the cause of the
new settlement either to achieve personal objectives or due to personal beliefs that are
part of an official’s background (Governmental Politics Model).
Sabyr Omuraliev was mentioned by every single interviewed resident in Kalys
Ordo as a knowledgeable person with a university degree in History and as the person
who contributed to the novostroika’s development. He was an informal leader in
organizing squatting in Kalys Ordo.132 Before Kalys Ordo was legalized, Sabyr
Omuraliev drew a plan of future novostroika with space for roads, houses, and public
buildings such as school, hospital, etc.133 Moreover he made informal deals with
people outside of the novostroika to bring water and electricity to Kalys Ordo when
the novostroika was still illegal. Moreover,
For the novostroika to develop there is a need for a “bridge”. There should be
“bridge” between government and people. Sabyr was our “bridge”, he has taken us to
so many government agencies. He would take us all and we would go to Mayor’s
Office with letters. Then we would go to deputies. Sabyr knew where to go and whom
to ask.”134
132
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
Ibid.
134
Ibid.
133
- 33 -
Sabyr Omuraliev established good relations with then Mayor of Bishkek Arstanbek
Nogoev, OGUKS official Beishen Abdrazakov, and deputy Jyrgalbek Surabaldiev.135
These government officials were supportive in legalizing and active in developing
infrastructure in Kalys Ordo.136
Beishen Abdrazakov was particularly active in many novostroikas, however
only in ones with legal statuses.137 He himself grew up in a new settlement and had
first-hand knowledge of the problems in novostroikas.138 His background of growing
up a in new settlement shaped his values and impacted his actions of helping
novostroikas (Governmental Politics Model). He actively lobbied for the
infrastructure development in both Kalys Ordo and Ak Bata.139
To sum up, effective utilization of personal connections both in new
settlements and government were important in contributing to the development of the
novostroika. This could be seen within the framework of Stokes’ theory and within
Allison and Zelikow’s Governmental Politics Model.
Therefore, three main factors were found important in resulting in
government’s actions to improve infrastructure in the novostroika. They are: legal
status, political pressure, and personal connections. Legal status is a necessary factor
for the government to take positive steps in improving infrastructure in the new
settlement. However, this begs a question of how illegal settlement acquires legal
status. Pressure in the form of protests needs to arise from the illegal settlement during
times when the government is vulnerable for the government to grant legal status to
the settlement. Once that status was given, government engages in the development of
135
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
Ibid.
137
Jumagazy Sadyr uulu, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 22, 2012.
138
Kalys Ordo resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012.
139
Ak Bata resident, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 4, 2012.
136
- 34 -
the new settlement. Leadership and personal connections were important factor both
for legalizing the novostroika and lobbying for the new settlement’s interests (which
are mainly infrastructure development) once it was granted legal status.
- 35 -
Conclusion
This paper aimed to examine differences in development levels in different
new settlements though addressing the following questions: Why is there such a
striking difference in the levels of development in these two bordering novostroikas in
Bishkek? What factors are most important in determining the quality of life in these
settlements? What are the roles of the state authorities and settlers in development,
and in what contexts does their relationship lead to improvements in the settlements?
The findings suggest the authorities’ engagement is only possible in legalized
settlements; however, legal status is a necessary but not sufficient factor for
development. The informal pressure from the residents of settlements and
development of political connections between the settlers and the authorities prove to
play an important role.
Two broad theoretical approaches were employed to study these cases and test
the hypothesis. One approach is theory surrounding decision-making in government,
while another theorizes and categorizes new settlements themselves. Modifications to
the original theories and combinations of different models from the first approach, the
combination of both approaches provided mechanisms for understanding why and
how government chose to engage in certain novostroika.
To sum up, the main finding of this research is that in most cases pressure in
the form of the protests during times when government is vulnerable leads to
legalization of the novostroika. In lesser extent, people both from the new settlement
were found to be crucial in facilitating legalization process. Once legalized,
government engages in the novostroika. Again, people both from the new settlement
- 36 -
and in government were found to have big impact on government’s engagement in the
novostroika through lobbying on behalf of the new settlement.
These three factors were found to be most important in legalization and
furthering government’s engagement in the new settlement for infrastructure
development, leading to various outcomes in the level of development in various new
settlements. However, these factors are not the only factors that impact the
government’s actions towards the novostroika. Other variables such as actual number
of people living in the novostroika, hazard zone status, or internal power structure in
the novostroika also affect government’s engagement in the new settlement. These
factors should studied further in this area.
Current research limited the study to two main actors: government and
novostroika. However, NGOs and international organizations are often important in
contributing the development (both infrastructure development and broader
development) in both legal and illegal new settlements in Bishkek. This could be a
potential direction for further research on the development of the new settlements in
Bishkek.
What is more, this research assumed a novostroika to be unitary actor.
However, a closer look at the new settlements in Bishkek reveals that there are
various political structures and actors within the new settlement itself. Residents in
new settlements do not always agree with each other and act cohesively in pressuring
government through protests or lobbying for infrastructure development. For instance,
during protests residents sometimes could not reach an agreement on who should be
the representative of the new settlement and delegate messages from the residents to
government officials. Studying internal politics and structures of the novostroika will
further extend understanding of the development of the new settlement.
- 37 -
In addition, Chapter 4 of this study states that residents of Ak Bata were able
to mobilize politically to pressure the government, whereas the residents of Altyn
Kazyk were not. It will be interesting to explore why residents of one new settlement
are politically active and are able to mobilize effectively to pressure the government,
whereas residents of another novostroika are politically inactive and are not able to
mobilize effectively.
Beyond that, Ak Jar presents an interesting case to study the politicized and
ambiguous process of legalization. Ak Jar is included in the list of 48 officially
recognized novostroikas in Bishkek and OGUKS has been actively engaged in its
development since September 2011.140 To add, resident had to sign papers that free
the government from responsibility in the case of hazard occurring due to clay
ground. Only after that infrastructure development works began. However, the
Mayor’s Office is yet to issue decree which will legalize Ak Jar de jure.
140
Rakadbek Suiumkulov, interview by author, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, March 22, 2012.
- 38 -
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