PCNA Review: Phase One
Liberia Needs Assessment
Case Study
Reader’s Guide
This case study was prepared in July 2006 by a joint team from the UN Development Group
Office and the World Bank as part of Phase One of the PCNA Review conducted in 2006. The
Post Conflict Needs Assessment is increasingly used as the platform for post-conflict recovery
and reconstruction planning, and the 2006 PCNA Review is a joint effort by the UN and the Bank
to capture lessons from past experience and introduce innovations and guidance that support
improved and more effective PCNAs. Case studies are available for PCNAs done in Iraq, Haiti,
Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia; in addition, two case studies for countries whose assessments predated the current PCNA “methodology” are also available (East Timor and Afghanistan).
The objective of the case study is to present a “snapshot” of the post-conflict needs assessment
done in Liberia in 2003, documenting what happened and, to the extent available, the lessons
learned during the assessment. This descriptive case study is based primarily on written materials
that documented the preparations for, process of, and products from the Liberia assessment;
additional information was solicited from participants in e-mail and interviews.
This case study is written to serve the needs of many audiences, ranging from those who have no
background in or knowledge of PCNAs to country experts who may even have participated in the
assessment itself:
if you are interested in . . .
refer to –
the national context in which the assessment was situated
Section I
the process of the needs assessment – who participated, how it Section II
was organized and conducted, who paid for it, what documents
were produced, and what resources it mobilized
inclusion of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS,
environment, or security
Section III
attention to issues of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity in Section III
the process and products of the PCNA
the legacy of the PCNA – financing, implementation, Section IV
coordination, and monitoring of subsequent programming
unique circumstances and lessons that PCNA participants Section V
identified
Phase Two of the PCNA Review investigates key questions under five themes to provide refined
guidance and revised PCNA tools: strategic and programmatic aspects; operational mechanisms;
state-building; peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity; security-development nexus. Phase Two
ends in November 2006.
October 2006
1
I. National context
After a military coup in 1980, Liberia experienced a series of conflicts, which not only resulted in
political, social and economic disruption, but widespread violations of human rights. Following a
three-year period of relative calm, hostilities resumed in 2001 and conflict spread throughout the
entire country. President Charles Taylor’s indictment by the Special Court in Sierra Leone for
war crimes and crimes against humanity on 7 March 2003 led to a further escalation of violence.
Despite the signing of a ceasefire on 17 June 2003 in Accra between the Government of Liberia
and two main warring rebel groups (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy , LURD,
and Movement for Democracy in Liberia, MODEL), the conflict continued. At the urging of the
international community, President Charles Taylor resigned and departed Liberia for exile on 11
August 2003. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed one week later on 18
August 2003 in Accra, paving the way for peace and widespread efforts by the international
community to support Liberia’s post-conflict recovery. Regional actors, including ECOWAS, the
AU, Mano River Union, and Women in Peace Network, were also closely involved in mediating
the conflict and in ushering in the peace agreement.
The Security Council responded by approving Resolution 1509 authorizing the establishment of
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 19 September 2003. UNMIL deployment
began on 1 October 2003. The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was
officially established and inaugurated on 14 October 2003.
The newly installed NTGL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of UNMIL
agreed that a donor conference would be the most effective way to mobilize resources,
particularly in the days following the signing of the peace agreement and deployment of UNMIL,
which offered a window of opportunity to capitalize on donor momentum. They agreed a
reconstruction conference should take place in early 2004, and that a composite assessment of the
country’s needs during the official transition period – 14 October 2003 to 31 December 2005 –
was needed to secure both donor engagement and requisite funding. The CPA and Security
Resolution 1509 provided clear political and security plans, but there was little clarity on how to
put the much-needed humanitarian, recovery and development roadmap in place. As a result, a
needs assessment exercise was initiated, with the full engagement of the NTGL.
7 March 2003
17 June 2003
11 August 2003
18 August 2003
19 September 2003
1 October 2003
14 October 2003
18 November 2003
3-7 January 2004
5-6 February 2004
25 March 2004
11 October 2005
October 2006
Brief timeline of events
President Charles Taylor is indicted by the Special Court in Sierra Leone
for war crimes and crimes against humanity, indictment made public by
the Special Court on 4 June 2003, violence erupts
Ceasefire is signed by the three warring parties
President Charles Taylor resigns and depart Liberia for exile
Comprehensive Peace Agreement is signed in Accra
Security Council approves Resolution 1509 authorizing the
establishment of UNMIL
UNMIL deploys
National Transitional Government of Liberia is inaugurated
Humanitarian Appeal is launched
Stakeholders consultations held in Monrovia
Donor conference in NY
Launch of RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee
Presidential elections
2
II. Process
Origins and Substantive Purpose
Shortly after its establishment, UNMIL identified a list of needs and corresponding budget as a
draft document that could be used for resource mobilization efforts, and circulated it to UN
Headquarters. The list and corresponding budget appeared to lack a coordinated strategy and
consultation with the UN Country Team. As a result, DGO suggested a UN/World Bank Joint
Needs Assessment (JNA), modeled after the Iraq exercise, be undertaken. The NTGL supported
the proposal and committed to participating on all levels.
In light of the informal agreement from the UN Country Team to proceed with a technical needs
assessment, the UNDG established a Technical Working Group at Headquarters on 28 October
2003. It was agreed that the UNDG would facilitate the exercise, focusing on the medium term up
to the elections. The needs assessment would also need to be consistent with the Consolidated
Appeal Process (CAP) coordinated by OCHA that was ongoing simultaneously. DGO proposed
that a Senior Technical Coordinator with experience in the Iraq JNA be seconded to support the
UN Country Team to coordinate the technical teams. A candidate was selected from within WHO
and was seconded on a part-time basis beginning early November 2003.
Simultaneously, an Inter-Agency Working Group was formed in Monrovia to guide the needs
assessment exercise under the leadership of the DSRSG, who was also acting as Resident
Coordinator (RC), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Representative (RR),
comprising the UN Country Team, the NTGL and NGO representatives. A series of teleconferences was initiated between the Technical Working Group in New York and the InterAgency Working Group in Monrovia as a means to share information and discuss emerging
issues.
The Inter-Agency Working Group agreed that the Liberia JNA would achieve the following
objectives: formulate a national vision and framework for a transition strategy; develop, as part of
the process, a consolidated and coordinated planning tool for government and the international
community; and present a multi-sectoral, technical overview of the main rehabilitation and
reconstruction needs and funding needs to be presented to the reconstruction conference.1 The
time period of the JNA concluded with national elections, which was a directive of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The vision of the JNA was described as: a secure and enabling environment leading to democratic
elections and recovery through the scrupulous implementation of the Accra Agreement under a
cohesive, accountable and adequately resourced Transition Government at the service of the
Liberian people.2
The Inter-Agency Working Group defined six guiding principles of the needs assessment
exercise:
* National ownership and participation;
* NTGL leadership;
* Broad support from all partners;
* Legitimacy through immediate re-capacitation of key government agencies and
institutions;
* Security through full UNMIL deployment; and
1
2
LRC – A Presentation by the NTGL (NTGL, January 2004)
Ibid
October 2006
3
*
Economic stimulus and restoration of productive capabilities and humanitarian support
and protection of vulnerable and special groups. 3
To meet these objectives, the Inter-Agency Working Group decided on 13 priority sectors and 7
cross-cutting themes. The Inter-Agency Working Group also identified lead agencies for the
priority sectors and cross-cutting themes and agreed on who would participate in the sector
working groups (interested Agencies and main national partners.) The UN Country Team,
mindful of local capacity constraints, requested their Agencies’ Headquarters to bring in technical
experts to lead the sector working groups as Task Managers where there were gaps. (for ex.
UNICEF brought in experts on Education, Water and Sanitation and Child Protection; UNDP on
Governance, Electricity, Livelihoods and Community-Development; FAO on Agriculture;
UNHCR on Refugees.) The World Bank did not have a field presence in Liberia at the time; the
Country Director was based in Ghana.
A high-level consultation meeting was held on 21 November 2003, in which UNMIL, the UN
Country Team, the World Bank, USAID, the EC and the UK reached a common understanding of
the goals of the JNA. The meeting also agreed to organize the existing 13 priority sectors into
nine clusters and five cross-cutting themes, and develop a matrix called the Results-Focused
Transition Framework (RFTF.)
Ten clusters (Cluster 10 was included in the synthesis report yet was developed post-donor
conference):
1. Security
2. Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation & Reintegration (DDRR)
3. Refugees, Returnees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
4. Governance, Democratic Development & Rule of Law: Public Sector Capacity,
Local Government, The Judiciary, Police, Correction System, Development of Civil
Society, Human Rights & Media
5. Elections
6. Basic Services: Health & Nutrition, Education & Community Water & Sanitation
7. Restoration of Productive Capacities & Livelihoods: Agriculture, Fishery,
Community Development & Social Safety Nets
8. Infrastructure: Power, Tele-Communications, Urban Water Supply & Sanitation
9. Economic Policy & Development Strategy: Financial Management/Audit,
Development Strategy/Budget, Public Sector Procurement, Financial Sector, Public
Enterprises & Forestry
10. Coordinated Implementation of the Transition Framework
Five cross-cutting themes:
1. HIV/AIDS
2. Human Rights, Protection & Gender
3. Environment
4. Forestry
5. Shelter & Urban Management
The Senior Technical Coordinator and a Coordination Advisor, who was seconded by UNDP,
drafted a Guidance Note (from their respective Headquarters) to guide the assessment teams in
the methodology and prepared a financial reporting template to guide the teams in the costing.
The primary objective of the financial template was to provide a birds-eye overview of the
resource requirements for the different priorities, planned activities, outcomes and their timing
within the two year transition period. The costing focused on (1) investments required to
3
Ibid
October 2006
4
rehabilitate and repair systems to pre-2003 crisis performance levels, and (2) further investment
that would be needed for rebuilding systems, institutions, capacities and services to levels
reasonably achievable in the transition period. Therefore, when it came to preparing the costings,
the assessment teams sought to do justice to the most urgent priorities while also conscious of
existing donor expectations and given limits on pledges likely to be made at the reconstruction
conference.4
Following the decision to cluster the priority sectors, the Inter-Agency Working Group appointed
Cluster Managers from among the various Task Managers and began to consolidate the sector
analyses. The Senior Technical Coordinator and Coordination Advisor arrived in Liberia in early
December to coordinate the teams, compile the analyses and draft the results-matrix. The World
Bank and IMF teams arrived shortly after to undertake their assessments. (The IMF assessment
was not part of the JNA; their findings were released in March 2004.)
The sector reports were completed between 22 and 31 December 2003. The Senior Technical
Coordinator and a team of report writers returned to Monrovia in early January to draft the
synthesis report and finalize the Results-Focused Transition Framework. The synthesis report was
presented to a multitude of national stakeholders, including the highest levels of the NTGL, for its
endorsement. The synthesis report was then presented to the Donor Core Group and International
Liaison Groups in mid-January 2004 in advance of the reconstruction conference.
Linkage to other processes and strategies
Humanitarian: A Humanitarian Appeal was launched on 19 November 2003. An effort was made
to incorporate the Common Humanitarian Action Plan, the strategy underpinning the CAP, within
the synthesis report. The assessment teams also attempted to address coordination with the CAP
and tried to avoid duplication in needs. The CAP was ultimately presented at the reconstruction
conference as representing requirements over and above the RFTF costing while also mindful of
the need to maintain donor commitment to meeting ongoing humanitarian needs.
Peacekeeping: The integrated mission planning task force for UNMIL held consultations and
missions in August-September, prior to the decision to carry out a needs assessment. Individual
Agencies were invited to send representatives on the planning mission. During the needs
assessment, very little information was provided by UNMIL, yet certain sectors and clusters were
clearly identified as their priorities (for ex: security, DDRR, Rule of Law, Civil Affairs, Police,
Human Rights, etc.) Nonetheless, UNMIL was in its initial stages of military and civilian
deployment, which may have contributed to their limited engagement.
Long-term development strategy: A Common Country Assessment (CCA) was undertaken in
1998 and revised in 2001, followed by a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in
March 2003. (The UNDAF itself had never been validated.) Technical experts did draw on some
of the data within the UN CCA and UNDAF during the needs assessment, though both were
considered obsolete. The NTGL’s national recovery plan and strategy were being prepared
simultaneously, but there was no explicit linkage to the JNA. The World Bank was not operating
in Liberia when the needs assessment exercise began. However the World Bank prepared a
country re-engagement note in 2004. There was no clear plan for the preparation of an I-PRSP at
the time of the needs assessment, though it was understood that an I-PRSP would eventually be
prepared under the leadership of an elected government.
Participants
The needs assessment exercise successfully engaged the NTGL as well as members of civil
society at various intervals. Due to capacity constraints the NTGL did not lead the sector working
4
Note to the draft RFTF and Financial Reporting Templates
October 2006
5
groups; the UN and the World Bank did. However NTGL participated in the JNA consultations
and technical meetings.
National NGOs and members of civil society were invited based on their expertise to participate
in meetings with sector working groups during the assessments. Some sector working groups also
organized validation workshops exclusively for national actors (for ex. Water and Sanitation.)
The synthesis report and RFTF matrix were presented to and endorsed at multi-stakeholder
meetings in Monrovia, which convened members of the legislative assembly, the business
community and the media, and culminated with a high-level summit of the NTGL, ECOWAS,
donors, civil society and INGOs.
A number of regional bodies were also active in the Joint Needs Assessment and its
implementation. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in particular was
closely involved in the preparation of the reconstruction conference through the Donor Core
Group. The African Union did not have a physical presence in Liberia at the time of the
assessment exercise, but fully endorsed the RFTF later on at the conference. Both ECOWAS and
the African Union were represented on the implementation and monitoring committee of the
RFTF.
Coordination and Institutional Support
Monrovia coordination: The Inter-Agency Working Group, based in Monrovia and under the
leadership of the DSRSG who was also appointed the RC, HC and RR, coordinated the technical
assessments. The Inter-Agency Working Group was comprised of UNMIL, the UN Country
Team, the NTGL (the three former factions were represented through the various Ministries),
donors (USAID, EU, UK - consultative not technical participation) and INGOs (Merlin, SCF UK,
Oxfam, who were nominated by the UN.) The World Bank participated from its office in Ghana.
The Working Group drafted an Action Plan to guide the process.
The Inter-Agency Working Group, along with the NTGL’s internal structures, namely the InterMinisterial Coordinating Committee and the Inter-Ministerial Technical Coordination
Committee, provided a mechanism to ensure the government’s participation at both consultative
and technical levels. The Inter-Agency Working Group provided policy guidance and oversaw
the sector working groups, who were responsible for collecting data, drafting sector reports and
organizing stakeholders’ participation. The Inter-Agency Working Group regularly liaised with
the Technical Working Group in New York, as well as with donors who were based in Monrovia.
HQ coordination: The Technical Working Group based in New York was chaired by DGO on
behalf of the UNDG, with representation from: UNDP, UNOPS, DPKO, IOM, UNHCR, WHO,
UNICEF, OCHA, UNEP, OHCHR, UNSECOORD, UNIFEM, HABITAT, FAO, UNFPA, WFP,
ILO, UNSECOORD and UNESCO. The Technical Working Group provided guidance to its
partner Working Group in Monrovia, including sharing lessons learned from other PCNAs. It also
facilitated the secondment of technical experts to Liberia and liaised with the Donor Core Group
(see below) and with the International Liaison Group. DGO created a web site to facilitate
information sharing among donors and other interested stakeholders. DGO also printed the
synthesis reports and was tasked with its distribution leading up to the conference.
International community – JNA coordination: A Donor Core Group was established in
Washington DC comprising USA, the EC, Sweden, Ghana (on behalf of ECOWAS), Japan,
France and the UK. The UN, World Bank and IMF acted as observers. The Donor Core Group
acted as a steering committee and followed the ongoing developments of the needs assessment
exercise and played a key role in the preparation of the reconstruction conference. The Donor
Core Group met with less frequency following the conference, yet stayed actively engaged to
support the establishment of the RFTF implementation and monitoring mechanism.
October 2006
6
In addition, an International Liaison Group was established in New York in the lead up to the
donor conference consisting of interested Member States (whose engagement would be limited to
making a pledge), NGOs, including the Humanitarian Working Group and IASC, ECOWAS, the
AU and troop-contributing countries. DGO acted as the Secretariat of the Liaison Group and
organized a plenary session on 15 January 2004 to share information among a wider group of
donors.
Financing of the PCNA
No formal budget was prepared at any point for the JNA exercise. Nonetheless, resources were
made available from various agencies as the need arose. In addition to the secondment of the
Senior Technical Coordinator (from WHO) and of the Coordination Advisor (from UNDP),
initial start-up funds came from the RC Budget and were utilized to support stakeholders’
consultations and the recruitment of consultants where there was no lead agency (for. ex.
Electricity.) DGO funded expenses and travel of the Senior Technical Coordinator and the
Coordination Advisor and subsidized the printing of reports and their distribution. The World
Bank and UN Agencies brought in staff and consultants on their own budgets. UNDP also
seconded a Senior Economist to help coordinate the exercise and provided some additional funds
for consultations and technical coordination.
DGO approximates that known costs associated with the needs assessment exercise total
$113,7765, though this excludes quantitative data regarding UN Country Team and World Bank
staff and consultants. [The Office of the RC was asked to help calculate these costs.]
Donor Conference
The Liberia Reconstruction Conference, held on 5 and 6 February 2004 at the UN Headquarters
in New York, was co-hosted by the UN, World Bank and USA. Representatives from 96
countries and 45 organizations attended to demonstrate their support for Liberia’s reconstruction.
The conference was organized and funded by DGO on behalf of the UNDG. The Inter-Agency
Working Group, on the other hand, coordinated the participation of Liberia’s delegation to the
International Liaison Group meeting and the reconstruction conference. The UNDP Liberia
country office subsidized the travel and living expenses for nine NTGL representatives; USAID
funded Liberian NGO participation; the UN Country Team and the World Bank supported their
own staff travel, and DGO provided funds for the travel of the coordination team to New York.
The conference was considered a success for several reasons. First, donors and other members of
the international community recognized that the NTGL was demonstrating good leadership,
collaborating with international partners and taking measures to promote transparency. Second,
technical discussions were held on the specific needs outlined in the RFTF, including the need to
address humanitarian needs in tandem with recovery and reconstruction needs. Third, the
international community demonstrated its commitment to continuing donor engagement, and
finally, the RFTF was overwhelmingly endorsed and $520m was pledged towards Liberia’s
reconstruction against the identified needs of $487.7m for the RFTF and $179.1m appealed for in
the CAP.6 As of 31 March 2006 (the final year of the extended RFTF), $500m in contributions
had been received, of which, according to the government, $411m had been disbursed, which
includes $180m against the CAP for humanitarian needs.7
III. Substance and Key Issues
Cross-cutting issues
5
Final Budget Liberia Needs Assessment (DGO, April 2004)
Communiqué International Reconstruction Conference for Liberia (UN/WB/USA, 6 February 2004)
7
Informal Tracking Sheet (UNDP Liberia, 31 March 2006)
6
October 2006
7
Cross-cutting issues were identified as gender, environment, human rights and child protection,
HIV/AIDS, shelter, forestry, and media.
The Liberia JNA Report (Feb 2004) includes short 1-2 page summaries of key issues for crosscutting themes, including list of priority outcomes, at end of narrative document (pages 71-81)
before the RFTF Matrix begins. Individual actions related to specific cross-cutting themes appear
in some cluster matrices.
During the PCNA, achieving cross-sectoral integration as well as the mainstreaming cross-cutting
issues into sector assessments became a major challenge. Most experts who worked as focal
points for crosscutting themes produced checklists for the clusters; these were extensive and
sometimes exceeded the capacity of the cluster managers, or were not totally relevant for their
work. Some focal points provided comments on draft cluster team reports.
Environment as a cross-cutting issue: The Liberian government was very involved in the
management of the PCNA process, however, the environmental management capacity of the
government was very low and UNEP could not establish a working relationship with a
government counterpart. Although an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Act existed, the
EPA was not yet functional at the time of the PCNA, while the Forestry Development Authority
had been looted and left with no implementation or enforcement capacity. More should have been
done to draw on the limited national expertise that was available outside of government; this
would have been especially valuable in the absence of a government counterpart.
UNEP interacted with the various clusters via audio- and video-conference meetings, which took
place on a weekly basis. Interaction with the clusters was also facilitated by a UNEP mission to
Liberia. It was, however, difficult to obtain information on the working methods and timelines of
clusters, as there was very little communication across clusters. Checklists of environmental
issues were distributed to the clusters, but only one response was received, and in retrospect the
checklists provided were not sufficiently focused on the goals of the PCNA.
Two review processes were initially scheduled, however, due to the imminent donors’
conference, UNEP received the cluster reports for review only once. UNEP’s comments were
included in the JNA synthesis report, however, due to the short time frame for comments, the
quality of the input was not of a sufficiently high standard and could not meaningfully influence
the process. UNEP was instructed not to do costing of environmental interventions, on the basis
that environmental costs should (as part of a cross-cutting issue) already have been included in
the clusters’ costing tables. Although a line for “environment” did appear in the costing of the
Productive Sectors cluster, the figure was not broken down and hence it was not possible to
monitor the allocation and spending of money on environmental issues.
The GTZ case study on Liberia notes that the “role of the cross cutting issues should be reviewed.
Instead of trying to fit cross cutting focal points into a sectoral analytical approach and have them
“chase behind” cluster leaders, at least some of those cross cutting issues (gender, environment)
should be incorporated as specific tasks in each relevant cluster analysis.” UNEP similarly
recommends that more structured methods should be designed and implemented for clusters’
dealing with cross-cutting issues. Procedures should exist to ensure cross-cutting issues are
absorbed by default even if a cluster manager, for whatever reason, fails to take these into
account.
Linkages between the cross-cutting issues were uneven; the GTZ lessons learned case study on
Liberia says future “guidelines should clearly define the mechanisms for integration of crosscutting sectors in the cluster analysis and reports. One lesson could be that there should be regular
meetings of cluster manager(s) with the different and relevant cross cutting sector managers.”
Conflict sensitivity and peace-building
October 2006
8
Conflict analysis was not a specific part of the PCNA; the cluster selection was not based on a
conflict analysis and it was not included in the analytical framework or the assessment
methodology, although according to the GTZ lessons learned case study, the Annotated
Guidelines apparently “called for conflict considerations to be integrated within each cluster”.
No processes appear to have been used to this end, except to the extent that pre-needs assessment
period was very focused on bringing in critical national actors many of whom had been parties to
the conflict and whose acceptance of and involvement in the JNA was important. The GTZ case
study on Liberia concludes with a strong recommendation to “focus on key conflict-relevant
sectors/clusters, to promote stability and peace in the country…instead of taking all development
relevant sectors into consideration the focus should be in the immediate conflict-relevant ones.
Since there will also be a pressure to include more sectors (especially from the government side)
to think about a two-stage process for such a PCNA. In the first stage those immediate conflictrelevant sectors could be analyzed while in the second stage a more long term development
strategy could be developed.”
The Liberia JNA Report includes no discussion of conflict dynamics or drivers; focuses on a
historical narrative but does not present a “root cause” analysis. Participants note that the
assessment in Liberia had a very strict deadline and having not identified and incorporated
previous work on conflict in Liberia during the preparatory stage and launch workshop, there
were no tools to draw upon once the process had begun.
The absence of consideration of conflict drivers led to gaps in the JNA Report. Although it was
foreseen that reconstruction efforts would require the exploitation of natural resources to kickstart economic regeneration, the JNA did not address the institutional weaknesses and lack of
national capacity necessary to ensure sustainable natural resources exploitation. This was a
serious failure, given the critical importance of these resources for future political stability and
economic growth.
The Liberia JNA Report presents security and elections as the primary determinants of a
sustained peace. The report also recommends prioritizing community-driven recovery and social
safety nets. There is not much explicit discussion of reconciliation except as part of the DDRR
and return of refugees. However, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
was included under Governance and the sub-sector Human Rights.
State-building
No explicit definition of state-building of the core state functions to be performed is given in the
JNA. However, the JNA clusters cover a broad range of issues further elaborated on in the RFTF.
Capacity building is highlighted as a key priority throughout all clusters and the cluster sections
on economic management and governance include a detailed list of priorities. The JNA report
does, however, only address some of the difficult state-building-related issues in a brief manner,
such as the wide-spread problems with corruption in Liberia.
In addition, some of the analyses made prior to and during the JNA are at a more generalized
level compared for example with the Sudan JAM and more findings are presented in headlines
than at a detailed level. According to GTZ, the prioritization of sectors was not based on prior
conflict analysis.
The focus in Cluster 10 on coordination and implementation of the RFTF is innovative seen from
a capacity building perspective as an instrument to ensure a higher degree of national/local
involvement, to be gradually phased in over time. A link is made between the strengthening of
national capacity and the use of the national budgetary framework as a transfer mechanism and
key policy instrument. Although the NTGL would have preferred to have resources channeled
October 2006
9
through the budget from the outset, it was recognized that the confidence of the international
community would need to be gained prior to this.
Given that the nurturing of national ownership during the JNA process and its follow-up is an
important factor in a state-building approach, the short time frame for the assessment put limits
on the JNA as a comprehensive state-building tool or document. The GTZ study concludes that a
high degree of participation was achieved during the field and consolidation phase and that the
JNA process in general clearly produced a commitment by the NTGL. However, the three month
duration of the entire exercise did constrain the depth and frequency of possible interactions with
national stakeholders, which limited the development of a post-conflict vision and the building of
national participants’ capacities. On the other hand, the transitional nature of the government
meant that a substantial part of the national politicians would not continue in office.
The issue of building national institutional capacity is often referred to as an overarching goal and
as part of the sector specific strategies, but it is seldom made more explicit in the JNA report. It is
included as part of the UNMIL’s mandate that Civil Affairs Officers will be able to help jumpstart civilian administration throughout the country.
Security sector considerations
Security was a specific and separate cluster team (led by UNMIL), as was DDRR (led by UNMIL
and UNDP jointly.) The fact that UNMIL led the security cluster did provide a link to the DPKO
mission; however it was essentially a parallel process that allowed for the synthesis matrix to
include security. The Liberia JNA Report presents security and respect for rule of law and human
rights as a paramount priority in “the new Liberia”.
IV. Post-PCNA / Implementation & financing of the TRM
Cluster 10 of the RFTF called for a Monrovia-based, government-led coordination committee that
would implement and monitor the RFTF and financial flows, as well as act as a forum for regular
donor consultations. As a result, the NTGL, the UN system and the World Bank created a policy
level, apex coordinating body – the RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO)
as well as accompanying technical level organs, the RFTF Working Committees (RWCs).
RIMCO was established by the Interim Chairman on 25 March 2004.
RIMCO, on behalf of the NTGL, had policy and strategic oversight of the resources pledged at
the Liberia Reconstruction Conference and assumed overall responsibility for RFTF delivery and
accountability within the two-year time period: 2004-2005. RIMCO included broad participation
at both policy and technical working committee level with representation from the NTGL,
UNMIL, the UN Country Team, the World Bank, donors (USA, EC, UK, China, later Sweden
and Germany), ECOWAS, 1 INGO and 1 Liberian NGO, plus visiting missions of donors,
regional bodies, and UN Agencies.8
It was agreed that the RFTF should be the basis for all coordination and management activities
during the transition period. RIMCO, like the JNA, was based on the guiding principles of
national ownership, accountability to all stakeholders, a focus on results, flexibility in
disbursements and a one-team approach.
The NTGL recognized that donors would not channel funds through the transitional government
but would insist upon disbursing funds through already established systems and procedures. No
further single trust fund was created as donors were mostly interested in making bilateral
donations. However, UNDP managed both the DDRR and Liberian Emergency Governance Trust
Funds, which multiple donors contributed to.
8
Draft Note on Establishment of RIMCO (NTGL, March 2004)
October 2006
10
To ensure that pledges arrived in a timely manner, letters were sent by both the NTGL and the
SRSG to all delegations who participated in the conference, and a series of briefings was held
with donors based in Monrovia and in the region. The UN Office of the Resident Coordinator
created an informal tracking sheet for humanitarian and reconstruction pledges and regularly
reached out to collect information from donors, UN Agencies and NGOs. This information was
regularly circulated to all stakeholders, and later taken over by the UNDP Liberia country office
and eventually by the RIMCO Support Office (RSO.)
A variety of mechanisms were put forth to monitor the progress of the RFTF: regular RIMCO and
RWCs meetings, annual Review Meetings in Washington DC in September 2004 (hosted by the
World Bank) and in Copenhagen in May 2005 (hosted by UNDP), and RFTF Activity Tracking
Sheets as compiled by UNDP. The RSO produced a report in July 2006 which provided an
evaluation of the RFTF itself as a planning tool, the mechanisms established to monitor it as well
as progress and results achieved towards the states outcomes.9
Despite good momentum achieved following the conference, the RIMCO Working Committees
were slow to set up, and largely ineffective at collecting information and coordinating activities.
Equally, it took several months for the RSO to be established, and a year for it to be in a position
to coordinate.
Support/guidance to post-PCNA follow-up
UNDP and the World Bank jointly developed RIMCO as a concept and as a mechanism. The
design was loosely based on a donor coordination mechanism in Sierra Leone. Both agencies
provided funds and technical support to the establishment of the RSO and RIMCO activities.
UNICEF seconded a Senior Policy Advisor upon request from the UN Country Team to assist
RIMCO. DGO also provided an increase in funds to support coordination of the UN Country
Team’s activities undertaken in the context of the RFTF.
The Annual RFTF Review Meeting in Copenhagen agreed on the extension of the RFTF until
March 2006. In follow up, the elected Government of Liberia established the Liberia
Reconstruction and Development Committee to build on the work of RIMCO and to pave the
way for an I-PRSP (expected completion date October 2006.)10
V. Unique Circumstances and Participants’ Reflections on Lessons Learned
Strengths
The Liberia JNA was carried out within the framework of a UN integrated mission. The UN
Country Team came together to support the exercise and committed staff time and agency
resources to ensure its timely completion. By the same token, there was good communication
between the UN Country Team, Inter-Agency Working Group in Monrovia and the Technical
Working Group in New York. Nonetheless, there was some friction between the Agencies,
particularly the humanitarians, and UNMIL during the JNA due to concern over humanitarian
coordination being housed within the peacekeeping mission.
The JNA successfully engaged with both the government and civil society, despite no national
resources (financial) and extremely limited national capacity.
It was recognized that there were enormous residual humanitarian needs, which needed to be
separate from the medium-term recovery and development needs. A conscious effort was
therefore made to avoid duplication and overlap between the CAP and the RFTF, though there
9
RFTF Final Report (NTGL, 8 July 2006)
(UNDP Liberia, 9 June 2006)
10
October 2006
11
was difficulty identifying whether funds were committed for humanitarian or reconstruction
purposes.
The RFTF matrix was developed and used as a tool for prioritizing needs and negotiating among
national actors.
Opportunities for improvement
The JNA took place under tight security (prior to full UNMIL deployment) and was restricted to
working in Monrovia, and under tight time constraints. Security restrictions also restricted the
validation of new data.
There was difficulty with prioritization of the RFTF, and ultimately donors felt the matrix was
over-ambitious and not realistic. While Liberia has made considerable strides in achieving
stability and providing support to displaced populations, the challenges of rehabilitating
community services and infrastructure and restoring productive livelihoods have largely not been
addressed and are crucial for maintaining peace and long-term development.
The JNA exercise could have been more structured. The Senior Technical Coordinator and Task
Managers arrived at different stages in the exercise and worked fairly independently. The World
Bank and IMF missions also arrived a few weeks into the process.
Some of the Cluster Reports were weak, and there was no clear linkage between many of them.
There was also little linkage between the clusters and cross-cutting issues.
Post-JNA
Despite significant efforts by the UNCT and World Bank to develop a coordination and
monitoring mechanism, RIMCO was a top-heavy structure that placed too much responsibility on
a low-capacity transition government. Inadequate skills in key administrative and management
areas and widespread problems of government accountability, coupled with limited capacity
building initiatives, further contributed to poor coordination of the RFTF. There was also no
participation from donors and NGOs in the technical working committees and little decisionmaking from the apex coordinating body.
Pledged funds were often delayed and received in an unpredictable manner. In addition, there was
no formal mechanism for tracking funds. The Office of the UN Resident Coordinator, then UNDP
and finally the RIMCO Support Office, collected pledging and disbursement information in an ad
hoc manner, and as a result, it was difficult to determine what kind of impact the funds made
against the immense needs.
VI. Resources used and key informants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
PCNA Roundtable Summary for the UNDG TWG (DGO, 1 December 2005)
UN/the World Bank Roundtable Report on PCNAs (DGO, 2 December 2005)
Reconstruction in Liberia: Needs Assessment Presentation to the Core Group (UNDP
Liberia, 3 December 2003)
Communiqué International Reconstruction Conference for Liberia (UN/WB/USA, 6
February 2004)
JNA Synthesis Report (UN/WB February 2004)
Working Paper No. 9 Needs Assessment in Post-Conflict Situations, Case Study Liberia
(GTZ, January 2004)
Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations
(UNDG/WB/UNDP, August 2004)
LRC – A Presentation by the NTGL (NTGL, January 2004)
Final Budget Liberia Needs Assessment (DGO, April 2004)
October 2006
12
*
*
*
*
*
Technical Working group and Donor Core Group Meeting Minutes (DGO, insert dates)
Draft Note on Establishment of RIMCO (NTGL, March 2004)
Informal Tracking Sheet on Donor Contributions (UNDP Liberia, 31 March 2006)
RFTF Final Report (NTGL, 8 July 2006)
Key informant interviews with staff from the JNA Coordination Team, UNDP Liberia &
DGO New York
October 2006
13