Virginia Review of Asian Studies
BOSOZOKU: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF A SUBCULTURE
CYNTHIA KIRKLAND
MARY BALDWIN COLLEGE
Postwar Japan can be defined as a country in the midst of continuous and rapid change
defined by the economic miracle of the 20th century—a phenomena which pinnacled national
pride most evident at the 1970 World Expo in Osaka. Japan was looking to the future, and the
economy was only speeding forward into the 1980s with no observable signs of stopping.
Foreign powers were awed at the fusion of Confucian tradition and Western economic
foundation to create the swiftest economic recovery to date—an economic “rags to riches” story
which seemed to parallel the swift economic development during the previous Meiji (1868-1912)
and Taisho Eras (1912-1926). In less than fifty years, the East Asian business model seemed to
be working with many companies in America and elsewhere pushing their employees to learn
Japanese. Then the Economic Bubble finally burst in 1989 leaving the Japanese psyche badly
shaken. The economy had been a point of unwavering pride, but the surreally infallible economy
tragically collapsed and blanketed the Japanese nation with an overwhelming feeling of despair.
The next generation looked towards their parents for guidance but found no definitive answers to
the problem they would soon inherit. A whole generation of Japanese youth quickly understood
something was wrong but could not seem to voice their despair. Unable to eloquently vocalize
their anxiety, young people began to express themselves visually through fashion and action.
Thus numerous subcultures began proliferated in the 1900s and early 2000s.
The foundations of Japan’s adolescent subcultures were laid when many styles were yet
to be developed. However, the outrageous styles were a result of a morphing frame of mind
about the sense of self within society. As general affluence began to take root in the closing years
of the 1960s, values began to change as people had more time for leisure and Western influences
associated with individualism paved the way for increased self-exploration. Group dynamics
defined by: unyielding work ethic, Confucian-based models of loyalty, and a vast array of
unspoken social obligations were beginning to fade as the power of the purse paved the way for
increased opportunities for self-expression through consumerism pinnacled by the lucrative
fashion business. The increased proliferation of and membership to such deviant groups as punk,
goth, Lolita, gyaru, cosplay and other loud statements found loitering on the streets of
Tokyo’s youth districts seemed to disturb older generations from the time of the economic
collapse and still leaves a bitter taste today (fig. 1).1 Everyone began to worry about the future of
Japan if it were in to be left in the hands of these eccentric groups. Interestingly enough, many of
these groups were not to be feared. Peeling away their appearances, their attitudes and values did
not rebel against middle class standards. Joi Ito, professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, demystifies the phenomena with:
1
Lolita is a style takes inspiration from Rococo fashions and focuses on the extreme fusion of cute and elegant;
gyaru, borrowed from the foreign word “gal,” covers a wide range of trendy fashion for young women from the
cool—kogyaru—to the erotic—bodicon; cosplay, though rarely visible as a street fashion, the donning of clothes
inspired by cartoons, comics, and other media sources is still a revolution in the usage of clothing for self-expression
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You bump into him on the street, he’s going to say, “Excuse me, I’m sorry.” (Harris,
Outsider Japan)
Figure 1: “Untitled,” various, photography
These humble youths were only “buying into” these groups and pursuing them no further than as
consumerist ventures. There was no intention towards some higher anarchy as perhaps feared by
some older generations.
Yet, in some cases, appearance is more than a fashion statement. Unlike their primarily
white-collar affiliated counterparts, groups such as yankii, bosozoku, and the gyaru subsection
yamanba2 were intentionally out to make a statement. Differing from their meek counterparts,
“they would not bow to you if you accidentally bumped them (Harris, Outsider Japan).” Though
people could otherwise easily brush aside the former groups of expressive consumerists,
delinquents such as bosozoku and yamanba were a demographic that was overwhelmingly
comprised of drop-outs and runaways. Focusing on the bosozoku phenomena, this disturbing
statistic sparked greater curiosity towards the existence of these adversarial juvenile groups
within the perceived social homogony of Japan.
Bosozoku (fig. 2, 3)—literally translated as “speed tribe”—have been written off as being
2
Yamamba is a radical subsection of gyaru characterized by blonde or brightly colored hair, darkened skin, and
accented with white make-up around the eyes and lips. This is also coordinated with brightly-colored and loudprinted fabrics.
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Figure 2: Yoshinaga, “Untitled” (2002), photography
a general nuisance to Japanese society. They constitute a subculture that is often left out of the
image of “Cool Japan” exported to foreign countries for the express purpose of cultural
promotion and diplomacy. However, it is not simply because these youths represent a seedier
side of the Japanese social strata; the rise of bosozoku is connected with—though not a direct
product of—a static educational meritocracy, unspoken class discrimination, rigid social
expectations, and a dissolved family structure. These youths instead chose to speed flashy bikes
through postwar modernization and the burst of the Bubble Economy in 1989.
Bosozoku refuse to be the victims of their culture. Only atop their overly modified
vehicles do they become “someone”—the image of the hero. Their penchant for medatsu
cements their “fame.” Their projected koha spirit seems to connect them to the samurai essence;
they feel sympathy towards the masterless warriors portrayed in classic tales such as The FortySeven Ronin. With their unique outlook, they have hijacked mainstream Japanese culture and
created their own distinctive subculture. Their culture is not a revolution against their country as
much as it is a commentary paralleling the underlying problems of postwar Japan.
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Figure 3: Yoshinaga, “Untitled” (2002), photography
The Tradition of the Rebel in Japanese Society
Brushing past many representations constructed in the realm of popular culture, the
image of the rebel has always played a role in Japanese history—from the figures of the FortySeven Ronin to Miyamoto Musashi.34 Bosozoku are only a part of this continuing narrative that
involves a constant struggle between the “norm” and the “other”—whether for good or bad. Yet
unlike various other rebel groups fighting for a concrete cause, bosozoku adolescents cannot
profess to rally under a single slogan. Their identity is so fluid and ever-changing. Their image is
but a clever response to outside forces attempting to represent the meaning behind their being.
Thus the concept of bosozoku can never be a definite representation—never fitting into a solid
mold. The bosozoku may not be able to completely articulate what exactly it is they are, but they
do have strong feelings about who they are not—a social malaise. However, their appearance and
growth has led many to wonder and/or attribute a cause to these youths as well as caused Japan
to become more introspective about itself and its future
.
The Emergence of Zoku
Elevating loyalty before the law, The Forty-Seven Ronin dutifully avenged their lord’s wrongful death. Lord
Asano was sentenced to commit suicide after he drew his sword in the shogun’s palace in retaliation against a
barrage of insults by Lord Kira. The ronin, led by Oishi, avenged their master’s death by slaying Kira but later
became martyrs after immediately and proudly turning themselves in after the incident.
4
Miyamoto Musashi—real name Shinmen Takezo—was a man reputed to be undefeated in his lifetime and author
of The Book of Five Rings. His presence and reputation shocked the dueling community of 16th century Japan with
his unconventional sword style and mantra of: “win my any means.” Musashi’s most bizarre choice of weapon was a
wooden sword carved from a boat oar. Pop cultural representations are often characterized by unkempt hair and a
wild persona. Most notably, Miyamoto Musashi is still highly revered in contemporary Japan and the only person to
have a train station in Japan named after him.
3
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The concept of the zoku, or “tribe,” took hold in the postwar period as many groups
marked by a unique commonality between members took the spotlight in a world parallel to the
general social structure. The first group to be identified by the title of zoku was the Shayozoku, or
“Setting Sun Tribe.” Formed in 1948, members included those of high status left destitute after
the Japanese defeat in World War II. Their focus on group dynamics helped pave the way for
various other zoku such as: Danchizoku (1958; “Public Housing Development Tribe”),
Hippiezoku (1967; “Hippie Tribe”), and Takenokozoku (1979; “Bamboo Shoot Tribe”). The first
biker gang rode into the scene in 1959. The Kaminarizoku (“Thunder Tribe”) (fig. 4) took
fashion notes from their contemporary American counterparts—Greasers of the 1950s. The
bikers often donned leather jackets and put excessive amounts of grease in their hair. As the
predecessors to contemporary bosozoku, they began to remove the mufflers from their bikes and
Figure 4: Toei, Bakuhatsu! Bosozoku (1975), film still
conquer the Japanese streets. It was not until 1972, after a violent altercation at a station located
in Toyama, dubbed the Toyama Incident, turned into a mob scene involving 3,000 spectators of
the joy-riding that the media officially recognized the appearance of a new breed of biker.
Dubbed the Bosozoku (“Speed Tribe” or “Joyriding Tribe”), they took to the streets. However,
this gang of bikers gradually traded in the previous rockabilly look for the now trademark
tokkofuku and sentofuku—uniforms associated with kamikaze pilots during WWII.5 These young
rebels took to the streets with a greater forceful and reckless abandon than their predecessors.
Though bosozoku are characterized by bikes or cars, for the purpose of this essay, the
focus will be on bikes. Bikes can be more directly connected with the origin of the bosozoku
5
Sentofuku have come to also be associated with the standard uniform of construction workers in contemporary
settings. In parallel, by donning the uniform identified with construction workers, bosozoku youth display their class
affiliation.
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lifestyle; cars were later incorporated into the bosozoku imagery as youths gained more affluence
in postwar Japan. Yet many young people begin engaging in bosozoku activity with no vehicle or
a hand-me-down bike from a senior or retired member. Only later do these youths gain access to
cars as money and/or income becomes more available. The car also lends greater status than a
bike so is usually afforded to members with greater seniority.6
Becoming a Bosozoku
Bosozoku youths consider themselves the “Saturday Night Heroes” of the Japanese
streets (Sato, 72). They are free to embrace the samurai tradition of bushido, often translated as
“the way of the warrior,” in which they not only show skill with a weapon—their vehicle—but
also unwavering loyalty towards their tribe. “To a young bosozoku, loyalty belongs entirely to
his gang. Teachers and cops are all just part of the obstacle course that is life living on the edge
of Japanese society.” (Morris, Gaijinchannel) These youth bikers often begin their careers in
middle school as yankii, or delinquent youth. From early on, yankii express their social
“otherness” and disconnect with the school by donning modified school uniforms with long hems
and high collars and often pair these with inappropriate hairstyles (fig.5). From these tame
displays of rebellion, often these adolescents will later begin to engage in frequent truancy.
Figure 5: “Untitled,” photography
6 The model of car also has a language of its own to express the status and age of its owner. Sometimes bosozoku
are chastised if their vehicle model is not congruent with their age and/or rank within the group hierarchy.
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While these juveniles are squatting and loitering in the streets, they are often treated to glimpses
of bosozoku displaying their colors, revving their engines, and otherwise creating a spectacle of
chaos.
During an interview by Jamie Morris—producer of the documentary Sayonara Speed
Tribes (2011), Hazuki Kazuhiro—former member of the gang Specter—recounts his experience:
I had always hated school, but my value in education was totally destroyed by the sounds
of that revving...it happened when I was in junior high…during the morning assembly
[when] the principal does the morning greeting. One day he said, ‘For years this used to
be the worst school in Funbachi city but now you kids are good…this is an upstanding
school and furthermore…’ But as he said that, with perfect timing, some older bosozoku
bikers came tearing into the school. It all happened in a split second. He just stood there
blinking. [laugh] And when I saw that, I thought it was so hilarious that teachers always
boss the kids around, and they act like they know everything. But the bosozoku kicked
their asses with their revving and taught them a lesson that day…” (Morris, Speed Tribes)
Kazuhiro’s statement can be said for many young yankii who become infatuated with the
antagonistic bosozoku culture.
Pop Culture Representations Fuel Interest in the Rebellious Lifestyle
Though Kazuhiro’s story seems more cinematic, in the book entitled Speed Tribes, one of
Taro Greenfield’s informants describes his initial fascination with bosozoku stemming from the
movie Akira (Toho Studio, 1988) (fig. 6).7 Many youths become infatuated with the biker culture
after exposure to pop cultural representations of the group through such media as the 1988 cult
classic Akira.
7
Akira was originally a Japanese comic book series created by Katsuhiro Otomo and published in Young Magazine
1982-1990.
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Figure 6: Outomo, Akira, movie poster. Toho.
Akira is an animated movie that follows the stories of Kaneda and Tetsuou, two bosozoku
youths on the fringes of society, who attempt to navigate the chaos of Neo-Tokyo8. Crafting an
image of post-Armageddon Tokyo, Neo-Tokyo represents the once modern and affluent city in
shambles as a result of World War III. As a plot device referencing the aforementioned situation,
World War II is also given mention as the movie opens with an atomic bomb explosion—
recalling the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The movie acknowledges other instances of
chaos in postwar Japan such as the widespread student protests in the 1960s and subsequent
police crackdowns.
Representing simultaneously the image of adolescent, bosozoku, and ronin, Kaneda saves
the day while navigating his position on the outskirts of an overall chaotic and undesirable
environment. While this character represents the unconventional hero archetype, Tetsuou
contrasts this archetype by representing the model of the victim. He becomes the unknowing
subjectus of his environment—prey of a military experiment—while his best friend Kaneda
searches for answers within a cyberpunk environment were sinister things are veiled with a thin
curtain and power is held in the hands of a privileged few.
This basic plotline of Akira can be read as embodying the general anxiety amid the
Japanese populace that finds itself caught within an uncertain future. Young people—whether
associated with bosozoku gangs or not—can find a hero in the image of Kaneda. Akira was a
construction that seemed to explicitly pinpoint many feelings harbored by Japanese adolescents.
Bosozoku and similar subcultures continue to rally under the banner set forth first by the general
unrest and series of student protests that took root after the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. As Japan
8
Neo-Tokyo is represented as the chaotic and dilapidating remains of contemporary Tokyo after it was destroyed by
the detonation of an atomic bomb—as shown in the opening scene—during World War III.
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became more affluent, its young people had the luxury of increased free-time which they used to
reevaluate the significance of the established social and political structures.
Foundations of the Japanese Psyche
Even though the above-mentioned notions seem to hover in the deep recesses of the
Japanese psyche, there are basic concepts that govern human relations and interactions within the
Japanese repertoire of manners. Perhaps the most central in understanding basic social constructs
in Japan, the concept of shuudan ishiki can be translated as the Japanese group consciousness.
Sociologists Roger Davies and Osamu Ikeno explain how a feeling of comfort and solidarity can
be maintained by adherence to a collective social order (197). Even though associated with
freedom and daring, the concept of independence harbors many levels of uncertainty. This
unfortunate consequence is often felt by those seeking a separation from the group structure. The
Japanese language has coined these feelings with the words uchi and soto which literally mean
inside and outside. Traditionally, Japanese society has always been wary to things of the soto
category. Due to this anxiety towards the unknown, the Japanese have an overwhelming fear of
being ostracized from their particular collective order.
A second social construct vital to understanding the structure upon which many
subcultures comment on is the idea of giri, or social obligation. The concept of giri is explained
by Davies and Ikeno as: “(1) moral principles or duty, (2) rules one has to obey in social
relationships, and (3) behavior one is obligated to follow or that must be done against one’s will
(95).” Though the exact origin of the concept is unknown, many sociologists have attributed this
concept to the origins of the Japanese community, primarily in connection with rice farming.
Because rice is such a difficult and labor intensive crop, the success of the harvest was
determined by everyone fulfilling their unique role within the activity. The exchange of aid
cultivated within the collective activity helped to cement a general bond within the community.
Neighbors and other community members were often found helping in fields that were not their
own. In consideration of this act of goodwill, the need to reciprocate developed into an
obligation over the years.
Though not yet a term widely utilized in the Japanese language, the concept of giri would
gain more prominence in the later Kamakura (1185-1333) and Muromachi (1336-1573) period
with the rise of the samurai class. Fulfilling their role as feudal lords, daimyo would offer plots
of land to favored subordinates, and in turn those gifted with land were of a social obligation to
grant their generous lords loyalty and respect. Due to practice by the nobility, the concept soon
became engrained in the Japanese psyche through various rules of manner subsequently
developed.
In contemporary times, the practice of gift giving on various occasions is an example of
the still proliferating custom of giri practiced by the Japanese population.9 Gifts are an
expression of gratitude given—though sometimes against one’s will—to those that the gift-giver
is socially obligated to acknowledge as important to their personal uchi. “According to a recent
TV program…the cost of ochugen and oseibo gifts is almost equivalent to the cost of justice in
“New Year’s cards, called nengajyou, are likely to be written with giri (giri de kaku, or “writing in the giri style”)
(Davies and Ikeno, 97).”
9
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the USA, meaning that the cost of keeping harmony in human relations and that of mediating
legal disputes is almost the same (Davies and Ikeno, 99).”
Davies and Ikeno also note that these formalities are directed toward maintaining a basic
harmony, or wa, within various Japanese uchi. Yet perhaps the most important mannerisms that
protect the general feeling of wa is perhaps the concepts of honne and tatemae. Honne versus
tatemae can be severely narrowed by the idea of the “genuine” versus the “constructed.” Honne
is the original and personal intent by the subject; however, tatemae is the result of that intent
altered by the intervention of societal expectations and obligations.10 So, often the personal and
public spheres for many Japanese are often incongruent. Guided by manners, Japanese are often
considered very passive-aggressive by outside observers, because expressing their true feelings
can be considered rude by the standards of maintaining wa. Expressing personal intentions—and
too often—can have the unintended repercussions of hurting the feelings of the other party. “In
Japan, people understand the difference between honne and tatemae because they have grown up
with these dual concepts. People switch easily and skillfully between the two and are rarely
aware that they can cause misunderstandings and confusion among people who are not
accustomed to this way of interacting (Davies and Ikeno, 116).” It can sometimes be difficult to
deal with Japan in the realm of foreign relations, because outside countries cannot often discern
whether agreements by the Japanese government are sincere or influenced by tatemae.
The above three behavioral aspects govern the environment whose critics would become
the subcultures of Japan. Although the overall adolescent population of Japan seems to share
similar anxieties in connection with their environment, the difference between the “upright” and
the “delinquent” seems to be in their ability to cope and assimilate into the above structures
central to contemporary Japan. Many citizens are marked by their smooth assimilation into
society post-graduation, yet bosozoku seem categorized as those who cannot subordinate
themselves to the school system which Michael Zeilenger often metaphorically references as a
conveyor belt that each student rides passively into their future.
The Japanese Educational System
The education system in Japan seems static and outdated in many respects. The
educational system is still based on the traditional idea of the school as the environment for
training well-behaved citizens as opposed to creative learning. Schools are expected to not only
foster strong academic achievement, but also nurture the future citizens of Japan. After school
each day, all students are expected to participate in o-souji. During these cleaning sessions, the
students are expected to take on a responsibility whether taking out the trash, cleaning erasers, or
sweeping the floors. These menial tasks foster a work ethic based on community socialization
and collectiveness—an integral part of the traditional Japanese lifestyle.
The educational meritocracy is based on a system of rote learning where students are
drilled into memorizing a collection of sometimes unrelated facts across a broad spectrum of
subject areas. The hope is in passing standardized examinations that will direct each student
10
The strict boundaries of expression established by the adoption of honne and tatemae can be difficult to adopt for
groups such as bosozoku. Youth subcultures in Japan are marked by their outward and public expression of honne
through their fashion, demeanor, and activity—for example: the tokkofuku and boso drive.
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towards higher education, and then subsequently deposit them smoothly into the workplace.
However, this system is slowly falling apart from the insides as students are rebelling within the
classroom. Beginning in the 1990s and continuing into the late 2000s, the classroom structure is
in shambles. In his book Japan Unbound: A Volatile Nation’s Quest for Pride and Purpose, John
Nathan describes experiences of being on the frontlines of the growing classroom chaos.
Unable to remain at their desks for more than ten minutes at a time, they walked around
the classroom or ran into the halls with their teachers in pursuit, talked loudly with their
friends or pummeled them with book bags, threw milk bottles and tangerines at
lunchtime, and either ignored their teachers sullenly or flew into abusive rages when they
were scolded. …By 1996, anarchy was epidemic in elementary school and spreading to
secondary schools. (Nathan, 29)
Attributed to the excessive disorder, the educational system is being halted. Even many of the
dedicated students are finding the environment too disruptive. Discipline seems entirely absent.
Teachers take an apathetic approach. However, there is not much else they can do but continue
their lessons amid the disruptions. Teachers would not be supported by the school system or
parents if they attempted to take disciplinary action. The simple act of sending disruptive
students out of the classroom is illegal. As defined by law, their liberty and right to learn would
be in effect denied. There is also an underlying fear that penalized students may try to inflict
violence upon their instructors outside the classroom environment.
This disruption is causing many students to simply “refuse school.” Since attendance is
not mandatory in Japanese schools, frequent truancy will incur poor grades but nothing more. In
connection with the general chaos and disruption, students may leave due to continuous bullying.
Black Rose member Masao Kanise recounts his victimization as follows:
In Japan people cannot stand it if you act different. I have always acted different. When I
was 14, several of my classmates beat me up at least once a week because my hair was
not cut properly. (Yates, Japan Perspectives)
Bullying is an overwhelmingly common practice in Japanese schools. Referred to as mushi and
utilizing the kanji for bug (虫), intimidation tactics in Japan do not characteristically employ
physical violence.11 To bully a fellow student, the instigators will often completely ignore the
victim as well as attempt to influence other students to participate thus cementing the target’s
isolation. Being isolated from one’s uchi is overwhelmingly distressing for any Japanese, hence
many adolescents who “refuse school” have usually fallen prey to such harassment.
In parallel, some bosozoku find that because they were not able to conform to the system
of rote learning, they were being coerced down less glorified paths than their more academic
peers. Recorded in Speed Tribes (1991), Taro Greenfield describes one experience by an
informant—dubbed Tats to protect his identity—at Kokushikan High School:
11
Though more subversive measures are more frequently associated with bullying in Japan, physical violence does
also occur.
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He was what his teachers described as learning impaired: he had a short attention span.
He had shown even less aptitude in shop classes than in academic classes, and neither
department wanted him anyway. He dropped out of school.
Kokushikan High School, located in one of the working class neighborhoods of Tokyo, was
presented as a school that had yet to send a student to college, even during the last years of the
1980s (Greenfield, 23-23).
Child Rearing Amidst Dissolving Family Dynamics
The school system is not the only institution to blame in regards to rising juvenile
delinquency. Fingers are now being pointed at the family structure broken by the intense
modernization program of postwar Japan. As the extended family dissolved and nuclear families
are now forced to thrive in cramped apartments on the outskirts of metropolitan areas, the role of
the father and mother have become considerably warped in the modern era. Seeking to rebuild
itself from the wreckage of World War II, Japan averted its attention away from its defeat and
directed a blind focus towards economic recovery. This single-minded pursuit can be also
explained by the close partnership of Japanese business and government. The government’s
close monitoring of the economy left much to be desired in the social sector. Thus the Japanese
economy absorbed huge numbers of salarymen into its ranks who would slave away within the
fortress walls of their companies. The companies are perhaps reluctant to release their staff at the
end of the day in the name of productivity. Leaving for the commuter train before the sun rises
and returning late at night, the Japanese father has been labeled by sociologists as the “absentee”
father. His presence within the nuclear family is only cemented by periodical installments of a
paycheck.
While fathers are being chained to their companies, households are becoming more like
single-parent environments. However, even this is changing as women are seeking more
liberties, and mothers are taking up part-time jobs as both a source of supplementary income and
freedom. Attributed to the changing family structure and lack of adequate and accessible sources
of childcare in Japan, working mothers are shipping children off to cram schools and other
sources of supplementary education as early as pre-kindergarten. However, the use of cram
schools is not exclusively a tool by working mothers. Due to a shrinking job market dually
strained by a system of tenure within most companies as well as the burst of the Bubble
Economy, competition within the job market is drastically increasing. Sometimes mothers tend
to mask their high expectations with justification through their child’s future success. Children
are being swept along by their society.
Not all mothers are becoming so influenced by the heightening standards of the modern
era. Some follow less aggressive means of guiding their children into the future. However, the
passive-aggressive nature of Japanese mothers when raising their children allows many cases of
child rebellion to persist unchecked for much longer periods than in Western environments. Two
examples of the family dynamics that help to shape the bosozoku youth come in the form of the
mothers of Decko (Godspeed You! Black Emperor, Yanagimachi, 1976) and Hazuki Kazuhiro.
First looking at the 16mm black-and-white film entitled Godspeed You! Black Emperor, the
mother of the main character Decko—an alias—seems rather accommodative and silent about
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her son’s run-ins with the police. She does not express any outward fury towards the court
summons received by her son; in fact, the mother professes her support in the courtroom for her
wayward child. During the entire exchange between mother and son, the father sits apathetically
in the background. He barely seems present in the lives of the other two as his attention is
focused on the television.
Various reasons can be sighted for long-term periods of delinquency in children. Two
reasons are: the Japanese group mentality and the role of amae during interactions between
mother and child. Due to the notion of groupism engrained within Japanese social practices,
mothers will often refrain from discipline for fear of ostracizing their child from the family
group. Amae is a fluid exchange of dependency between mother and child. The needs of the child
give validation to the mother, while the child accepts—sometimes expecting—support from the
mother. These levels of interaction can be more clearly defined by Mrs. Kazuhiro during an
interview with Morris:
Hazuki Kazuhiro: [he asks with a joking smile] Is your son a good person?
Mrs. Kazuhiro: [she returns in jest] He means nothing to me. [she continues with a smile]
What kind of question is that?...What a strange thing to ask. (Morris, 2011)
The above, though said jokingly, would be the expected response after enduring years of
constant grief. Her latter inquiries reveal the fact that her initial words—the expected response—
are not congruent with her true feelings. Japanese mothers are much more accommodative to
their wayward children. The example is continued in the following:
Mrs. Kazuhiro: I went through some hard times. I cried and cried. I said, “I’ll kill
myself.”...But I knew he would come around when he was thirty or forty. (Morris, 2011)
Hazuki’s mother reveals the inner turmoil expressed by many mothers of delinquent youths.
Instead of taking action against her son, she would rather direct the shame upon herself in hopes
that the child would mature into something more socially acceptable. “…Japanese commonly
maintain self-critical attitudes. Since they are constantly taught hansei, or self-reflection, in order
to focus on their faults and flaws, they always seem aware of when they have transgressed some
consensual standard, often an unspoken one.” (Zenielenziger, 57-58)
Japanese childrearing practices, also known as ikuji, have been observed to differ
drastically from the American perspective. Hiroshi Azuma has observed that Japanese mothers
tend to instill knowledge and values in their children through a system of “lead by example.”
When teaching a new skill, Japanese mothers will not overtly correct mistakes made by their
child, instead they will repeatedly and quietly show their child the correct path until the skill is
obtained. Through their passive guidance, Japanese mothers often exemplify then foster the
importance of nonverbal communication and submissive observance of authority, or sanao,
associated with using little words. While American mothers are more authoritative in their
guidance—verbally admonishing undesirable behavior—Japanese mothers seem of a more
flaccid perspective so as to avoid creating a distancing between themselves and their offspring.
Hence, Japanese mothers often abstain from forms of punishment that may be perceived as
proper by their American counterparts. Many observations have noted the apparent passivism in
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Japanese mothers who are more readily willing to concede to their child’s tantrum. Although the
general notion of the Western perspective is that passive techniques would regrettably foster
unruly children, Japanese children slowly assimilate to the groupist mentality. Through a more
passive experience, Japanese children are more capable of assimilating into an environment that
abstains from individualism (Davies and Ikeno, 135-139).
As families are becoming more socially detached and isolated, communities are also
straying from their once active role. Former bosozoku member Yasuhiro Ogawa explains:
When I was growing up, if you were fooling around in the street, it wasn’t unusual for
old women you didn’t know to slap you. Today, there’s nobody to set kids straight.
Parents, teachers, siblings, neighbors, everybody’s just too busy (Jingai.com).
Professor John Nathan also provides a similar example. His interviewee Kikutaro Kawatani
expands upon Ogawa’s experience with: “If my mom found out about it, she’d thank the
neighbor for teaching us to mind out manners.” (Nathan, 55)
Ever since the steady migration of families from more communal countryside
environments to the more isolated apartments of metropolitan cities, the traditional role of
community is slowly losing its grip as people become more concerned in balancing their lives
and daily commute. Outside countries truly took note of the Japanese economic miracle after
Hayato Ikeda accepted the post of prime minister on July 18, 1960 under the mantra of doubling
the national income within a span of ten years. With remarkable work ethic, Japan fulfilled this
goal in only six. With this foundation, the Japanese economy only shot higher—until the collapse
of the unsustainable Bubble Economy. It was Japan’s collective mentality which enabled its
dedicated workforce to forgo personal obligations in favor of a more affluent nation.
Burakumin and Discrimination
The third factor that places a strain on the bosozoku juvenile’s ability to conform to
society is the unspoken discrimination that is still present within Japanese society. One
anonymous interviewee in Jamie Morris’ documentary A Quiet Revolution: Japan and the Uyoku
stated her convictions as follows:
There are several problems with the current imperial system. On the surface, Japan seems like an
equal society, but because of the imperial family we know there is this hierarchy. We are made
to believe in a noble class of people, and the imperial system creates that framework. If there is
nobility then there is a peasantry (Morris, 2008).
Consciousness of the traditional, hierarchical structure is displayed through practices like
bowing, or o-jigi, The hierarchy can be seen everywhere in Japanese society, but nowhere more
prominent than through the use of keigo, an honorific language that is used when distinguishing
levels of importance between those addressed through conversation.
Since Japan can boast the largest proportional middle class in the world, discrimination is
not validated by differences in income. Discrimination is instead based on occupational status.
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White collar workers have more status than their blue collar counterparts alternatively
categorized as working class. Paralleling the merit associated with education and the welcoming
of the Information Age, jobs associated with the white collar community harbor a greater amount
of respect than those involving manual labor. Many bosozoku youths are reported to come from
communities in the latter category. Though these adolescent bikers cannot express direct feelings
of dejection and/or anger arising from their class association, they are but one product of an
unspoken and general discontent accompanying this social stratification.
A more direct example of discrimination arises in regards with the burakumin underclass.
The burakumin class is comprised of those of ethnic Korean or Chinese descent, or native
Japanese who held occupations deemed undesirable in accordance with Shinto and Buddhist
beliefs.12 It was not until the 1960s that the Japanese government began to openly show
sympathy towards the class through the funding of projects to aid burakumin communities. Even
today employers have professed on anonymous online forums, such as 2channel, that they will
hesitate to hire someone labeled a burakumin. Thus many of those classified as burakumin would
join the ranks of the yakuza where they would have more opportunity for advancement.
Female Delinquents
Though bosozoku is a male dominated society, gangs of purely female bikers also cruise
the streets independently or as subsections of predominantly male gangs. However, the female
presence may heighten the discomfort within the general population. “Often bad girls are doing
the same thing men do, which certainly does not sit well with everybody (Miller and Bradsley,
8).” The traditional role of woman can be summed up in the term ryosai kenbo, which can be
explained as “good wife, wise mother.” Through their role as mother, women are expected to
protect the values of Japan and then instill them within their children; the formation of the ideal
Japanese citizen begins in the home. When females break from this mold, the public’s reaction is
one of fear. The ranks of delinquent females represent a general disregard for and rebellion
against traditional standards of what it means to be Japanese.
The Transition from Yankii to Bosozoku: Participation in Boso Drives
A yankii becomes a bosozoku by participation in boso drives. Yankii youths are often
identified by their most notable activity of loitering on street corners. Though, both groups have
access to vehicles, bosozoku are usually more associated with the image of the vehicle. It is the
way in which the vehicle is used that divides the two demographics. When compared with the
very hierarchical and role driven society of bosozoku, yankii activity appears rather unorganized.
The yankii gatherings are simply casual gatherings between like-minded and similarly fashioned
individuals. Those that seek heightened excitement in their experience often engage in shibaku,
or “fighting,” with rival yankii members. The other popular activity involves using their status,
if they are fortunate enough to own a vehicle, to hikkakeru, or “pick-up” girls flaunting the
characteristic yankii style.13 By comparison, bosozoku activity is much more organized than the
general loitering of yankii juveniles.
12
There are between 1.2 million and 3 million burakumin living in Japan today. (Priestley, Japan Times)
Yankii males will only pick up girls donning yankii-inspired fashions or utilizing yankii modes of expression for
fear of gombo (rape) accusations against them. (Sato, 126)
13
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Bosozoku are characterized by the boso drive. The boso drive is the organized activity of
joyriding. Ikuya Sato notes that the use of organization in regards to such activities affords the
group members an attainment of a sort of nobility. Through the hierarchy and role responsibility
of the bosozoku gang members, the youths are able to attain status advancement which is
otherwise denied them in the larger society (Sato, 57). Each member assumes a role within the
group, and the attention to each role assures the successful execution of the boso drive. A
member of the Yokohama Rengo explains his unique role within the hierarchy:
Our main role in the club is not riding but fighting. Our name Kiwami is famous for
fighting. Either our team stay in the front or in the back. The others join in the middle.
Our job is protection. That’s what we are here to master. (Morris, Kanto Zoku, 2006)
The protection referred to in the previous statement is protection from the police or others
attempting to disrupt the activity.
Each biker within the bosozoku structure is designated a specific responsibility within the
boso drive. Those assigned to the rear of the team are meant to protect the gang from police
intervention. During the drive, if police display their flashing lights and attempt to halt the boso
drive, then those assigned to the rear will drive slowly and sporadically to act as a buffer between
the police. While these members flout police interference, other members can take the
opportunity to flee the scene. Another use of this blocking technique of driving well below the
speed limit is that the regular traffic pattern can be considerably altered forcefully volunteering
unwitting drivers onto the bosozoku stage where the fun is being acted out. The purpose of the
buffer zone is that within its parameters, the other group members are allotted the freedom to
race and joyride at will. The shields are able to physically protect their comrades as well as the
boso drive experience.
Other associated roles include those expected to block intersections from regular traffic flow
to ensure the ride continues smoothly. Nothing can put a damper on a good run more than a
continuing trail of stoplights. Another important role is the flag bearer of the group. The flag
bearer plays a dual role in displaying the gang’s colors to potential rivals as well as reinforcing
the bosozoku need for medatsu. The bold display associated with the boso drive helps to
strengthen the masculine archetype of bosozoku members. These very important roles performed
in sync also display the bosozoku parallel to the group consciousness and role responsibility of
ordinary Japanese.
All of the previously stated steps are necessary to preserving the asobi and “flow” aspects of
the boso drive. Ikuya Sato explains the bosozoku use of “flow” as a state of mind in which the
participant’s entire being is engaged and tuned into the activity being performed. The entire drive
is characterized as a complete sensory emersion. The blinding headlights, the deafening revving,
the textured grip of the steering wheel or handlebars, and the smell of gasoline are the
penetration of the senses by the boso drive. This heightened and focused experience is the noted
precursor to the “flow” state. Within “flow,” a heightened sense of self is gained. The boso drive
allows its members to feel above the society which they often site as a cause of their feelings of
frustration. (Sato, 13-36)
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The boso drive is an integral part of the bosozoku lifestyle as it is a stage for the gang to
display their identity and the members are allowed to display their skill and aptness within the
group setting. The drive is a freer creative stage than the educational and social systems that
many members withdraw from in order to engage fully in the bosozoku lifestyle. Through the
bosozoku drive, these adolescents appear, “…explicitly antagonistic towards the middle-class
culture and branded themselves as anti-social villains…they consciously play the role of the folk
devil (Narumi, 428).”
Postmodernism and Bosozoku: The Perversion of Imagery
The use of shocking imagery such as the Chrysanthemum Seal—symbol of the imperial
family—does not mean these youths are part of a larger agenda connected with radical, rightwing movements such at the Uyoku, ultra-nationalistic groups in Japan. Bosozoku choose the
symbols to include in their unique visual language based on their ability to shock. These symbols
are chosen only for their anti-social associations. “Subcultural style involves the appropriation of
items produced for particular markets and their transformation for the use of the subculture’s
members. Because the original meaning is already ‘written into’ these items, transformation and
re-signification can be interpreted as an opposition to the context of their conventional use, and
therefore subversion of the order of society (Narumi, 429).”
Body language is an integral part of the bosozoku vocabulary when communicating their
adversarial stance to the audience. Young delinquents have become characterized by their unique
repertoire of body language such as the “yankii squat.” (fig. 7) The characteristic sitting position
is not traditionally characteristic of delinquent culture; this pose has been generally utilized
across a wide spectrum due to the traditional Japanese use of low furniture. However, the young
delinquents have noted the advantageous prospects in utilizing body language and morphed a
simple, utilitarian gesture into something to be feared. They have adopted this position and
converted it into something adversarial through a combination of aggressive, direct eye contact
under closely knit eyebrows. Utilizing this combination of aggressive messages, “yankii squat” is
not a full sit and connotes a readiness for aggressive action.
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Figure 7: Untitled, television still
Tattoos are another symbol associated with gang culture. In Japan, tattoos are often cited
as being extremely elaborate artworks that often engulf the entire torso and beyond. These
extravagant forms of body art are referred to as irezumi (fig. 8), a word that literally means to put
ink under the skin. Though tattoos are more readily accepted in American culture as a unique
form of self-expression, body art has traditionally had much more negative stigma in Japan.
While elaborate irezumi are not traditionally associated with bosozoku, they are overwhelmingly
linked to with organized crime, especially the yakuza. Upon joining a yakuza gang, or in
preparation therein, a bosozoku member will often begin to mark himself or his association.
When asked about his own yakuza-style tattoos, Makoto, a retired member of the Yokohama
Rengo, explains his reasons for inking regardless of connection with high organized crime:
“Since only [the yakuza] are allowed to wear them, and I’m not one of them, it’s like a big ‘fuck
you (Morris, Metropolic)!’” Thus bosozoku are not afraid to assimilate and appropriate imagery
into their vocabulary heedless of the original meaning.
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Figure 8: “Untitled,” photography
Bosozoku tend to use kanji, or Chinese characters, in unconventional ways in order to
form a unique identity. The bosozoku have created a unique language system. They often
embroider various kanji onto their tokkofuku as not only a creative expression but as an
expression of their exclusivity as a group (fig. 9). However, their choice and arrangement of
characters may seem nonsensical to the ordinary Japanese. Because kanji is a pictorial writing
system—each kanji loosely represents its chosen meaning—the basic reading associated with
image of the kanji remains. However, the phonetic readings are often drastically altered by the
subculture as they try to manipulate the writing system to accommodate their needs.
Disregarding proper usage, intricacy and visual appeal are usually the most important criteria for
choosing which kanji to employ. Phonetics associated with meaning is usually altered to fit the
context. As a display of the gang’s “otherness,” unless one is connected with bosozoku culture
and its creative subtleties, then the meaning may be undecipherable. Sato makes an example
from the group name Don Quixote. Originating in Spain, the name has no parallel in Japanese;
however, the gang has used the combination of kanji: 怒 (do), 鬼(ki), 砲 (hou), and 帝(tei) to
spell this unconventional name. (Sato, 53-54)
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Figure 9: Mihoko Toriumi, “Chosokabe Motochika” (2007), manga
This avant-garde use of imagery displays the creativity of bosozoku youths. Within the
postmodern structuralist tradition, these youths have questioned the relevance of society’s
standards. The very notion of structuralism is that everything exists in context; once removed
from the original context, meaning can be subjective and easily changed. “Meanings are
produced not in the heads of the viewers so much as through a process of negotiation among
individuals within a particular culture (Sturken and Kartwright, 4).” Bosozoku recognize this
fluid exchange of meaning. They adopt easily identifiable imagery from the broader Japanese
society in an effort to simultaneously identify themselves as Japanese yet set themselves apart
from the current Japanese structure. Bosozoku maintain a certain level of power in the fact that
the viewer is never in control of the imagery’s meaning.
The Role of the Media
The perversion of imagery is the passive way of utilizing their ability to turn heads. The
young bikers will often resort to more aggressive avenues in their quest for acknowledgement.
Often bosozoku youths will constantly contact reporters in hopes of securing coverage of their
next boso drive—sometimes to the point of hounding reporters through such tactics as arriving
personally at newspaper publishing offices atop their bikes. However, there have been instances
where the bosozoku’s penchant for medatsu is taken advantage of by the media. Though, the
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bosozoku are known instigators of media encounters, journalists are not always passive within
the exchange and will often egg on the antagonistic youth. The Japan Times recounted that a
reporter representing TV Asahi had asked two bosozoku leaders in the Kyoto area, a 23 year-old
woman and 21 year-old man, to drive recklessly and ignore traffic laws for the purpose of
filming. The footage was used to fuel the bosozoku stance as a nuisance. “Footage of the biker
gang was aired Nov. 4 on the “Super Morning” show, with the gang being introduced as having
caused trouble in the ancient capital [of Kyoto] (Japan Times, 2003).”
The above situation seems coupled with the bias amid Japanese society concerning the
bosozoku “problem.” There is a symbiotic relationship as the media proliferates an image of
bosozoku, and then the adolescents in turn attempt to exemplify this image. Bosozoku standards
concerning their self-image are a fluid fabrication; there is no clear-cut image of who or what a
bosozoku is as their self-perception is constantly morphing. Though the bikers cannot profess to
rally behind a singular, concrete cause, they have strong convictions towards identities they do
not embody—such as a great social problem. Bosozoku are not direct manifestations of Japan’s
need for social introspection, they rather aid in uncovering faults within the current system.
Though they are part of a demographic who have unfortunately fallen through the cracks in the
established structure. These young toughs do not acknowledge personal inadequacies leading to
their choice of lifestyle. Outside observers more often project higher meaning and unspoken
feelings of inadequacies onto this enigmatic subculture.
The Shift in Attitude: Increased Crime in the 1990s and Early 2000s
The bosozoku demographics are changing. When comparing the image of the stars of
Godspeed You! Black Emperors (1976) (fig. 10), their jeans and khaki pants coordinated with
polo shirts and sweater vests covered by leather or athletic jackets are an extreme contrast to the
tokkofuku donned by those seen in the contemporary documentary Sayonara Speed Tribes
(2011). Bosozoku have changed with the times. Their arrival was a heralded via noise pollution
and eluding police arrest. “When bosozoku first took to the streets, in the mid-1960s, they were
dominated not by knife-wielding thugs but by rebellious teenage car and bike enthusiast.
Dedicated to pushing their machines to the limit and flouting authority...(Kattoulas, 2001).”
Later they began donning more radical attire and became more entangled with yakuza—a system
of desperate enrollment. This compiled with the financial stressors caused by the burst of the
Bubble Economy, bosozoku became more adversarial and violent. However, those factors did not
alone account for the alarming rise in violence. Newer bosozoku recruits were generally
becoming more aggressive. Perhaps this was connected with the gangs’ value of proving
masculinity on the bosozoku stage for the enjoyment of their peers. Yet, with increased traffic
and gang laws of the 1990s and 2000s compiled with police crackdowns contributing to the
decline in group membership, new recruits seem more apathetic to the standards handed down by
their predecessors as commented by Hazuki Kazuhiro in the 2011 documentary by Jamie Morris.
Kazuhiro explains the changing spirit of the newer generations of bosozoku members:
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Figure 10: Yanagimachi, Godspeed you! Black Emperor (1976), film
The way I see it, bosozoku nowadays are fake. I hate seeing them in tokkofuku uniform
like we wore. When rival gangs came at us trying to snatch our uniforms…We had to
kick ass. We risked our lives to get our stolen uniforms back. Bosozoku now won’t even
fight. Their uniforms don’t mean anything to them. They’ll just buy a new one if it’s
taken. I can’t stand them wearing our uniforms. I’ll be damned if I let them. (Morris,
2011)
The changing demographics are not only seen from within but outsiders have taken note
as well. Referencing the height of bosozoku membership and activity in the 1980s, a record of
violence began to proliferate. Stemming from a simple system of pay-offs to ensure general
freedom on the streets, bosozoku youths would often pay yakuza organizations and even rightwing organizations such as Uyoku for protection. This casual involvement would lead to yakuza
utilization of a growing recruitment pool. After civil rights acts beginning in the 1960s and 1970s
helped to liberate burakumin compiled with general police crackdowns on yakuza activity, the
wounded yakuza organizations began to tap into a resource which they had previously
considered a nuisance. Through this affiliation, bosozoku became increasingly associated with
drug crimes and cases of larceny. The yakuza wooed the potential recruits of adolescent bikers
with promises of advancement then expressly took advantage of the young toughs. While upper
level yakuza members busied themselves with larger ventures in business and government, they
used their pool of chinpira, or “little pricks”, to peddle drugs such as shabu, a cheap crystal
methamphetamine often distributed to kamikaze pilots of World War II prior to their missions.
Bosozoku are often forced to engage in larceny in order to avoid violent threats from yakuza in
association with money and/or debts forcibly incurred. If yakuza cannot find buyers for the
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goods they intend to vend, they will often turn to bosozoku to relieve their financial losses.
However, it is rare that the young bikers have enough spare change to buy the overpriced wares.
They then turn to stealing.
As the members become more adversarial, the reputation is becoming more fierce and
feared. In 1988, a man and his girlfriend from Nagoya refused money to a group of bosozoku.
The man was killed and his girlfriend was gang raped in an act of retaliation by the hostile gang
members (Yates, Chicago Tribune). In a separate incident on November 25, 2001, Eiju Cho was
viciously attacked with baseball bats, knives, and short swords by 30 members of the biker gang
Dragon after he exited his car in an attempt to confront the members about their mischief
(Velisarious, Jingai). Later in 2003, a Buddhist priest by the name of Okamoto was brutally
beaten to death by bosozoku (Burns, Teach English).14 These are but three examples of severe
and shocking crimes committed by bosozoku. Violence is no longer directed at rival gangs, but
reports of serious crimes committed by these adolescents have frighteningly begun to involve the
public beginning in the late 1990s. The alarming statistics were parallel to the general rise in
juvenile violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Reports of violence connected with bosozoku
gang members such as these have made headlines not solely in connection to the growing trend
in violence by minors. Unfortunately it is these acts of violence that are one factor causing the
downfall of this group. Criminal psychologist Masayuki Tamura explains the alarming path—or
lack thereof—that many contemporary bosozoku ascribe to:
The big groups have disappeared and so have the strong identities bosozoku used to have
for one group or the other. Today they are more like ronin (masterless samurai). Today's
bosozoku lack all sympathy for the pain and discomfort they inflict on others. I think that
comes from the fact that in Japan children never get a chance to play with other children,
to develop important human relationships at an early age, and they reach adulthood never
having learned how to empathize with other human beings. (Yates, Chicago Tribune)
One popular explanation for the rise in violent crime is that as bosozoku gangs are
declining, bosozoku are becoming increasingly violent in reaction to their weakened status and
decreasing numbers. Traditionally, bosozoku gangs were associated with territorial boundaries
generally understood by rival gangs. Within these boundaries, various groups could ride freely
without the encroachment by gangs flying differing colors. As freedom is important to this selfproclaimed stifled adolescent culture, any encroachment by a rival gang will undoubtedly incur
retaliation. In the past, numbers were sufficient to guarantee security. Yet, as numbers are
declining, many gangs are defaulting to the power of violence.
However, the rise in violent juvenile crime in Japan during the late 1990s and early 2000s
is not solely the cause of bosozoku. Alarmingly, violent crime was committed by a wide variety
of adolescents ranging in background whether due to stressors connected with schooling, family,
and/or bullying. “The number of violent crimes involving children 14 and under increased 47
percent in 2003 from [29,300 incidents in 2002] (Hays, Fact and Details).” Regardless, the police
cite these alarming statistics as one reason to concentrate effort on reducing bosozoku activity.
14
Interestingly enough, Okamoto was a former bosozoku.
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These young toughs are not the direct cause for the rise in juvenile crime. Unfortunately, they are
an easy target upon which to help alleviate public anxiety towards these social rebels.
The police do not simply want these gangs to settle down, they want them gone.
“Membership of the bosozoku has fallen from an all-time high of 42,510 in 1982 to an all-time
low of 9,064 in 2011 (Hashi, Tofugu).” And the numbers have continued to decline with most
gangs recording a membership of 25—down significantly from the 100 strong member gangs
during the bikers’ heyday. By ridding Japan of biking gangs, the police and general public
believe that many problems will inevitably be fixed. But the reality is: bosozoku’s position as a
general nuisance has made them easy scapegoats by the media. They are accused of being a
direct connection to the growing trend of youth violence within the population at large in the
1990s and early 2000s. Through consciously chosen and sensationalized wording for headlines,
bosozoku have become villains to the general public that absorbs these dramatized reports. Yet
the reality is that juvenile delinquents are still a small portion of many statistical reports. Lack of
academic achievement is not the initiator in bosozoku activity. It is merely a cover-up for the
general lack of conformity within the community. They refuse to immerse themselves wholly
into a system they understand to be inherently flawed. “It is against this backdrop of society’s
preoccupation with the upsurge in delinquency, marking ‘the worst record in history,’ that the
bosozoku played a role in the drama of scapegoating and redemption (Sato, 201).”
Communities and Police Fight Back
According to a 1989 report by the National Police Agency, 114, 936 calls were received
by citizens either being harassed or attacked by bosozoku (Yates, Japan Perspectives). In 2002,
the report was that the approximate volume of calls concerning biker and car gangs was 50 a day
(Japan Times). After the rise of violent crime, communities are taking action. Communities have
been angered to action by the continuously brazen displays by juvenile biker gangs bent on
destroying the peace. The culmination of such delinquent activity was piqued by the disturbance
of local festivals to which bosozoku sometimes attend en masse in full attire. Their attendance is
often a rowdy display which in turn disrupts the festival atmosphere and activities.
Laws are being passed which intend to profile bosozoku. “A municipal ordinance in
Hiroshima that bans assemblies by those who ‘wear unusual clothes, mask their faces and gather
in a huddle’ in public without approval from authorities was declared constitutional by the
Supreme Court...” (Japan Times, 2007) In a previous law passed by Aichi Prefecture in 2002,
recruitment of minors to bosozoku gangs was illegal. The legislation also attempted to rally auto
businesses and gas stations against these adolescent biker gangs by refusing them service (Japan
Times). Such laws forego the concern for personal liberty under constitutional freedoms of
expression in order to preserve the general peace within the Japanese public—utmost concern to
Japanese lawmakers. The bikers themselves are not the only one’s targeted by the police
crackdowns. The media outlets that cover such bosozoku activity are being stopped by police
intervention. “Bosozoku laws” are proliferating. As documented in Sayonara Speed Tribes,
young bikers are even finding it increasingly difficult to continue the tradition. Now police will
begin to write tickets even before a crime has been committed and break-up gatherings before
they begin via tip-offs or by monitoring online forums where bosozoku gather.
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If arrested, gang youths are sent to a Juvenile Correction Home. These youth prisons in
Japan focus on readying each young delinquent for assimilation back into society. More so than
the juvenile prisons in America, Juvenile Correction Homes in Japan focus and utilize the idea of
hansei, or “self-effacement.” Greenfield’s informant Dai recounts part of his personal experience
while incarcerated at Niigata Shonenin:
…I began feeling there was something really wrong with me…You’re in there for two
weeks, in pretrial observation where they can do whatever they want and they get you to
sign piles of papers and these papers turn out to be what the judge reads when he decides
whether to sentence you, release you, or authorize more detention. The papers they gave
me were not just about stealing the scooters but also about being lazy, dishonorable,
disrespectful, everything. They figured out everything that was wrong with me—from
being a bad student to dropping out of high school to not helping my parents enough to
sniffing glue—and made up these papers and gave them to me to sign…but the funny
thing about all the papers they made you sign is that some of them are for your own
advantage, they make you seem like you’re really trying to change yourself and become a
better person…And it’s true that by the time I got to family court, after fourteen days, I
was ready to admit anything and I really wanted to become a better person. I wanted to
improve myself, maybe that’s the point of the whole system, to make you look back on
the past and think about how bad you were and then make you want to become a better
person…that’s what the observation system encourages…the longer you’re in there, the
more you want to become a good person, a regular person…people who didn’t fit in,
were making problems for all the good people, the regular people…. (Greenfield, 74-75)
The system of juvenile incarceration in Japan comprises of three stages: observation (pretrial detainment), trial and possible prosecution, then followed by either a release or sentence.
However, it is only a small number of adolescents who become convicted. Greenfield sites the
statistics at 900 convictions out of 169, 714 juveniles in observation in 1990 (Greenfield, 77).15
Yet, Dai recalls vividly the process of rehabilitation back into society. Rigorous exercise
regiments, inspirational film screenings, textbooks available for recreational reading, and bland
meals.16 The goal of the correctional officers—donning track suits—is not to explicitly punish
their inmates as much as indoctrinate them with the ideals of model citizens. The system is
believed to be successful most of the time, hence convictions are uncommon. Dai’s friend and
accomplice Naoya did not end up at Niigata. Instead he was sent to a juvenile center in the
Ibaraki countryside where more serious offenders are housed. Overlooking Ibaraki Juvenile is a
large statue of Buddha that passively watches the adolescents as they toil in the outlying fields
while sporting shaved heads and black uniforms as part of their observation. As described by
Greefield: “Ibaraki Juvenile exists to break wild kids and remake them as worker drones in
Japanese society. An inmate is drilled to quietly—silently—accept his lot in life (Greenfield,
81).”
The Fight to Continue the Culture
15
Though this statistic seems outdated, the strong tradition associated with hatachi keeps adolescents from more
harsh adult sentences even today.
16
Meals often included brown instead of white rice, because brown rice is not considered fit for the table by
traditional Japanese standards. The conscious choice sends a negative message to the detainees in connection to their
inferior status.
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Police pressure has caused the emergence of kyokushai groups as well as the uniting of
many once rival gangs. Kyokushai groups are law-abiding bosozoku who drive less recklessly
and follow laws requiring the proper muffling of vehicle engines. Some bosozoku have traded in
their modified bikes in favor of scooters and helmets—simultaneously less threatening and less
conspicuous. Flashy tokkofuku are being left hanging in the closet in favor of less obvious
stylistic choices. Other stress relieving outlets are also being explored. Juveniles are much less
likely to be arrested for playing a racing-type video game than blazing through the midnight
streets. “It’s different now but 20 years ago, bosozoku were constantly fighting. bosozoku are
dying out. We don’t want to disappear so we try to get along.” [young Specter interviewee]
(Morris, 2011) And because of this general attitude, integrated boso drives have become the
norm where tokkofuku from various groups can be seen.
Graduation from Bosozoku: The Process of Assimilation
Bosozoku graduate from the lifestyle and leave their peers at 20 when laws become
stricter. However, the graduation age for females during the bosozoku peak was considerably
sooner. Graduation of female bosozoku was often seventeen. It was earlier because of the more
negative stereotype and the looming prospect of marriage.
When you get right down to it, a woman plays the passive role in getting married. A
woman is given away [to her husband’s family]. If a girl gets detained in a training
school or Juvenile Classification Home because of boso driving…it’d be a serious
disadvantage for her marriage prospects (Sato, 172-173).
Against the backdrop of expectations for women, many female bosozoku are bullied even within
gangs by their male counterparts. Even in the world of bosozoku, female participants are looked
down up. The harassment does not stem directly from some inherent inadequacy the females
harbor. The presence of female delinquents seems to undercut the masculinity of the male
demographic. Masculinity may be defined by many roles, one of which is protector whether of
family, household, and/or income. Expected to display their masculine adeptness as long as they
carry the mantle of bosozoku, the presence of female members renders the male role as protector
fallible. Many male bosozoku would often utilize hansei when referring to their alternative
lifestyle. Thus they feel an aversion towards their inability to protect inherently weaker females
who may otherwise have not joined. Their ability as guardian is inadvertently challenged as
women become less passive and more active in this alternative lifestyle.
Bosozoku activity is professed to be a juvenile activity, so those who continue to engage
in the lifestyle past the normative age are referred to as childish. Those who retire at 20, or
hatachi, are considered role models and must serve as examples to younger generations. The life
of ex-bosozoku soon becomes overwhelmingly concerned with their job, marriage, and family—
in that sequence. With maturation, the bosozoku sphere of influence becomes more personal as
opposed to peer oriented. However, age norm are being overlooked and bosozoku demographics
are getting older surpassing the normative graduation age of twenty in order to keep the culture
alive. Traditionally twenty is the coming of age for Japanese, and when a citizen becomes an
adult in the eyes of the law.
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The period of seinen, or “springtime of youth,” is when deviance is thought to be natural
retaliation as adolescents begin to discover their identity in relation to society.17 Japanese society
seems to embrace this period of youth through their system of laws in which one is tried as an
adult beginning at the age of twenty. Though, for more serious crimes, the standards have been
accommodative to try those offenders more harshly even when still adolescents. Contrary to
assumption, bosozoku are very aware of their future, and while they are rebellious now, they
hope to keep their future prospects open regardless of the path they hope to pursue.
The same media bosozoku use as a tool can become feared once the same juveniles
become legal adults. Although youths are rarely convicted and their sentences are easily scoffed
at, the media is one reason for the avoidance of criminal activity by those considered
constitutionally “of age.” While the media protects juvenile offenders with pseudonyms; reports
of adult criminal infraction are much more detailed in that they use the real name and other
details in association with the perpetrator. Bosozoku soon begin to realize that their actions are
not only reflexive of themselves but may harbor repercussion for their family as well. In the case
study of Saburo:
During his adolescence, Saburo did not pay much attention to his neighbors’ complaints
about the loud noise from his and his peers’ motorcycles. He was also sent to the Juvenile
Classification Home for one period. In 1983, however, he turned twenty years old. He
was expected to inherit his father’s shipping and transport business sometime in the
future and live with his parents in Kyoto. (Sato, 160)
Bosozoku learn to mature apart from conventional societal standards, yet the focus upon
hierarchy within the gang structure makes them suited to the company environment of
occupational Japan. An alternative employment prospect is yakuza. Many bosozoku are forcibly
recruited into the ranks of this crime syndicate upon graduation from adolescent biker. But
yakuza is not a favorable occupation in the eyes of peers. Employment in yakuza is seen as a
cop-out to stable employment within the general society. This practice of securing respectable
employment has direct connection to the image of senior bosozoku members as role models for
younger generations.
The Legacy of a Subculture
Japanese subcultures have been marketed to and expressly absorbed by foreign audiences
as the country seeks to spread its “soft power” influence via a program of pop cultural diplomacy
conveniently entitled “Cool Japan” (fig. 11). While global youth are looking to Japan’s wide
array of subcultures for fashions to emulate, not all subcultures are easily commercialized.
17
This also references the national angst associated with puberty and adolescence.
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Figure 11: “Untitled,” photography
Bosozoku are included in the class of cultures that have arisen out of a true form of
expression against traditional and stringent Japanese standards. Their simultaneously playful and
serious demeanor is more three dimensional than the flatness of many other subcultures who
exist only through material expression. The presence of these young rebels is seen as a political
statement regarding the shortfalls of contemporary Japan and deemed difficult to brand by profitmakers. Plus, the government would like to refrain from marketing their problems to the world.
Contrary to what outsiders attempt to infer, bosozoku stand for nothing. Their image is
rather fluid in effect. Unfortunately, as the gangs became more violent, their potential message
began to lose influence—overshadowed by needless acts of larceny and murder. Such acts by
radical individuals navigating within the free bosozoku ideology have sparked fear in the general
populace of Japan. The media saw opportunity in the bosozoku yearning for an attention outlet
from which to feed. Concordantly, the public desired something upon which to pass blame.
Bosozoku became the scapegoats of Japanese society. These young nonconformists became easy
targets for melodramatic media headlines which fueled established public bias against deviant
cultures—regardless of true threat. By becoming too involved in their rogue image and engaging
in increasing displays of criminal force, the bosozoku seemed to spell their own demise. They
soon gave police and local communities legitimate excuses in intervene.
Past the violence committed, such displays should not overshadow the underlying
message connected with the need for changes within conservative Japanese institutions. The
message is one which can spark interest and intervention by those of the international
community. Japan’s subcultures have created an international audience, and the subsequent
curiosity and attention can be a dual-edged sword. Interest in rebellious juvenile circles can lead
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to uncovering a meaning much greater than initial, outward appearance. Masahisa Okuyama, a
counselor focused on hikkikomori18, states: “The more outsiders can expose and explain Japan’s
social ills…the more likely Japan’s government will be shamed into becoming more
responsive…(Zielenziger, 47).” Even now the Japanese government is still attempting to save
face while the subversive influence of youth subcultures is slowly arriving on foreign soil.
The emergence of subcultures has caused the introspection and revaluation of many
Japanese institutions such as education and family. The educational institution has gone through
some casual reform in response to the classroom chaos and discontent of the student body which
festered in the 1990s and early 2000s. Some reform-minded individuals attempted to change the
traditional techniques of rote learning to a more “Americanized” model which allowed greater,
though still minimal, freedom of choice in class selection. However, a full-scale reform has yet
to be seen and the schools that did reform were only a minority.
Japan needs to find avenues for the demographics they once ignored—those not yet ready
to assimilate into the strict conservatism and board the “conveyor belt” that will carry them into a
sometimes unfulfilling future. The once glorified occupation of salaryman is being feigned by
the contemporary generations unwilling to passively assimilate into society and sell their soul to
the last vestiges of national pride in the economy. As long as these demographics are ignored,
subcultures such as bosozoku will continue to band together in an effort to escape. Their goal: to
create a society based on their own terms—dually apart and parallel to the establishment.
Glossary of Terms
2channel: a popular and anonymous online forum in Japan providing a community for a wide
range of subjects and interests
amae: a complex relationship based on interchangeable levels of interdependency
asobi: the act of play
boso: speeding; joyriding
bosozoku: speed tribe; joyriding tribe
burakumin: a Japanese underclass comprised of those positioned in undesirable occupations as
well as ethnic Korean and Chinese
bushido: a samurai code of conduct literally translated as “the way of the warrior”
chinpira: derogatory, slang term translating to “little prick”
“Cool Japan”: a term coined to describe the promotion of Japan’s popular culture by the
18
Hikkikomori are the newest subculture to be uncovered. Due to social pressures, these young men and women
cope by becoming extreme recluses. Many do not leave their houses, or even rooms, for years.
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domestic government in an effort to create outside interest in Japan and promote
foreign relations
daimyo: feudal lord
“flow”: a hyper-focused state of mind achieved when immersed fully in an activity
giri: social obligation
gyaru: a translation of the English word “gal;” this demographic is an umbrella term describing a
variety of subsections catering to a variety of fashions catering to young women
gombo: rape
hansei: self-reflection; self-effacement
hikkakeru: the act of picking up girls
honne: personal intentions; genuine feelings
ikuji: childrearing practices
irezumi: the traditional art of tattooing in Japan; intricate tattoos that cover the entire body
kanji: Chinese characters that proliferate within the Japanese language
keigo: acting as a specialized section of the Japanese language, this form of speaking is utilized
when speaking to someone who one seeks to display respect towards
koha: hard-type attitude; a hero character describing to this archetype is often defined his
silent and rough attitude; “he may seem mean, but he’s just a big teddy bear.”
kyokushai: law-abiding bosozoku groups
medatsu: the art of “being seen”
mushi: utilizing the kanji for bug (虫), refers to the act of bullying
o-jigi: the practice of bowing
o-souji: the act of cleaning
ronin: a masterless warrior
ryosai kenbo: “good wife and wise mother”
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sanao: submissive observance of authority
sentofuku: combat uniforms, although more associated in the contemporary setting with uniforms
donned by construction workers
shibaku: to fight; to beat up
shudan ishiki: the Japanese group consciousness
soto: literally translates to “outside;” refers to less intimate associations/those associations not
considered uchi
tatemae: based on societal expectations, the self-image one projects based on societal
expectations and regardless of true feelings
tokkofuku: long jacket-like uniforms associated with the kamikaze bombers of World
War II
uchi: literally translates as “home” or “inner;” refers to one’s close associations
Uyoku: an ultra-conservative, right-wing organization whose engage in extreme displays of
nationalism
wa: harmony
yamanba: a radical subsection of gyaru whose appearance is most notably defined by heavily
tanned skin contrasted with brightly dyed hair and white make-up accenting the lips
and eyes
yankii: general term for delinquents or those usually found gathering and loitering on
the street corners of Japan while donning fashions that promote their antisocial stance
zoku: a group of people associating based on a shared characteristics and interests; the literal
translation is “tribe”
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