Chapter 2
Evolution and History of Airfield Seizure Theory
Strategically, time and space are related, and as the history of war has shown
again and again, a handful of men at a certain hour is frequently a far more
powerful instrument of war than ten times the number on the same spot twentyfour hours later.
- J.F.C Fuller
The practice of capturing airfields dates back to World War II and the Luftwaffe’s attacks
in Norway. However, the concept of securing lodgment for friendly troops to ensure the
capability of follow-on attack is centuries old. Evidence is found as far back as the earliest
recorded history, back to 416BC with Thucydides and the Sicilian Campaign. The argument in
favor of the expedition was that by subduing Sicily, which had a large number of Greek colonies,
the Athenians would receive an increase in their forces with which to defeat the Peloponnesians.
In the quote below, Nicias is debating Alcibiades on the merits of the campaign.
18.23 "Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak
naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us,
if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut
out from the country by a numerous cavalry… We must therefore start
from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far
from our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may
undertaken… we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely
strange,”1
In 415 the Athenians sent out a great fleet, and in 414 besieged Syracuse, the main Greek
city in Sicily. The campaign proved to be a disaster for the Athenians and the beginning of the
end for their empire.
Fast forward to an America that up until World War I had fought most all of its wars on
the continent of North America. For two centuries the United States enjoyed near isolation
behind two broad oceans. The country's participation in World War I against the Central Powers
1
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, translated by Richard Crawley, Abridged Edition prepared by Ian Johnston,
(Malaspina University-College, BC), The 6th Book, Chapter XVIII, on-line, Internet, 4 February 2004, available
from http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/thucydides/thucydides_4.htm.
9
was the first major break with these traditional isolationist policies. The United States fought in
World War I as an associate power, not as an ally. Despite President Woodrow Wilson's
leadership, the Senate rejected the Versailles treaty ending that war, and the United States never
became a member of the League of Nations, only to continue its isolationist stance.2 Even after a
world war, America attempted to return to an isolationist country.
The year 1940 marked the first turning point for US isolationists. German military
triumphs in Europe and the Battle of Britain forced widespread American reconsideration of its
relation to the war, now raging in Europe. Many worried that if Germany and Italy triumphed in
Europe and Africa, and Japan triumphed in East Asia, the Western Hemisphere would be the
next target. Even if America withstood assaults, its democracy, freedom, and economy could be
traumatized in the "fortress America" it might have to maintain to guard its security. Given that
frightening worst-case scenario, the majority, by the autumn of 1940, believed it important to
ensure the defeat of the Axis, even at the risk of war. The ultimate turning point, from isolationist
to global power, proved to be the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Hawaii, December 1941.
As America emerged from isolation in World War II, force projection became
increasingly important. In Europe the projection was less of a challenge, as US forces were able
to secure lodgment in North Africa and England. In the Pacific the Allies witnessed the birth of
airfield seizure, an entire campaign based on acquiring new lodgment after new lodgment.
Thousands of miles separated the United States from ultimate victory in the Pacific
during World War II. Lt. Col. James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle led the famous raid on the Japanese
home islands early in the war, but spanning the vast oceans with concentrated air power proved a
daunting task. American naval and ground forces had to secure bases in China and wrest farflung islands from the tenacious grip of the Japanese. From these bases, the US Army Air
Forces (AAF) launched specially-designed, very long range bombers against the home islands.
The strategic bombing campaign, climaxed by the destruction of enemy cities with conventional
and atomic bombs, helped force Japan to surrender and spared the United States a bloody
invasion. The US air offensive against Japan is the central story of the Pacific war, a drama of
2
Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (1983); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power:
American Isolationism and the First World War, 1914-1917 (1969); Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight
against the League of Nations (1970). On-line, Internet, 5 February 2004, Available from:
http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_046200_isolationism.htm.
10
island hopping, airfield seizures and the truest sense of joint operations.3 Much of the WWII
Pacific experience in airfield seizure is very pertinent to today’s expeditionary Air Force.
A RAND corporation study, by Alan Vick notes that there is broad range of objectives to
be gained from attacking an air base. These range on a scale from simple harassment of the
enemy and its operations to the focus of this paper, capturing an airfield for US operations. Vick
further divides the capture of an airfield into two categories, the seizure of an airfield as an
airhead or support base and the capture of an airfield for offensive air operations or a forward
operating location (FOL).4
The capture of an airfield for offensive air operations, where attacking air forces sought
to capture enemy bases to perform their own offensive air operations, was limited to World War
II until recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.5 There were 23 FOL operations found in
WWII, and, in many of these, the attackers were able to mount offensive air operations within
hours or days after ground forces had secured the airfield. These operations were much akin to
today’s conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ground forces captured the airfields so that their own
air force could occupy the base and conduct offensive air operations from the airfield, extending
the reach of the attacker’s air force.6
Fighting in the Pacific theater of WWII was noted for its jointness. In particular, the
campaign plans of both sides were largely determined by the need to capture and defend air
bases.7 As such, joint operations were launched to capture enemy airfields. Subsequent air
operations from these new bases extended the offensive range of airpower, allowing for new
naval and ground operations that, in turn, seized new airfields.
There are several noteworthy FOL operations, both Allied and Axis, from World War II.
Among them are the Japanese attack on Wake Island and Japanese landings at Singora and
Patani, Thailand, and Kota Bharu, Malaya. Japan secured two Thai airbases and three RAF
fields and subsequently defeated the British in Malaya, on February 15, 1941. The Japanese also
3
Daniel L. Haulman, The US Army Air Forces in World War II, Hitting Home, The Air Offensive Against Japan, Air
Force History and Museums Program, 1999 on-line, Internet, 5 February 2004, Available from:
www.usaaf.net/ww2/hittinghome/ 5 Feb 04
4
Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases, Project Air Force, (Santa
Monica, Calif. RAND Publishing, 1995), 11-12.
5
Vick, 13.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
11
captured the RAF airfield at Palembang, Sumatra, in Feb 1942.8 The Japanese attack on Midway
Island in 1942 was a failed attempt at airfield seizure—a battle that could have and did change
the tide of the war.9 Notable allied efforts include the British assault on the Vichy French
airfield at Souk-el-Arba, Algeria, in Nov 194210 and the US landings on Tinian, Iwo Jima,
Okinawa, and Ie Shima in 1944 and 1945.11 The above are a few operations in an entire
campaign bent on the seizure of airfields in order to attack and counter-attack the enemy.
The Soviet and American Cold War, following World War II, stifled such operations on a
grand scale. Although airfield seizures did occur in several conflicts, such operations were
limited. The Korean War witnessed the United States rapidly opening air bases as land was
seized from the North. Operation Chromite or Inchon is an excellent historical example of the
strategic importance of airfield seizure. The objectives of Operation Chromite were
multifaceted: neutralize the fortified Wolmi Island, which controlled access to Inchon Harbor;
land and capture Inchon, 25 miles west of Seoul; seize Kimpo Airfield just south of Seoul; and,
finally, capture the city of Seoul.12 On September 24, just days after the invasion, Kimpo airfield
opened for 24-hour operations. Cargo aircraft brought much needed supplies in and air
evacuated the wounded and sick back to hospitals in Japan. Nine C-119 transports emergency
airdropped ammunition and rations to the front line troops as they pushed north out of the Inchon
area. Eight C-54s landed at the newly captured airfield at Suwon on September 24, to bring in
some 65 tons of ammunition and rations. The Combat Cargo Command lifted the 187th Airborne
Regiment into Kimpo on the 25th to guard the offensive’s flank as the troops moved forward.13
As previously mentioned, from the end of Korea until the 1980s, the two superpowers
had somewhat stabilized the global environment, and the United States faced the USSR along
stagnated lines. The static “Iron Curtain” over Europe allowed for the building of forward bases
and the deployment of permanently stationed troops in the theater of conflict. The ability and
8
Nick Tucker, Air Warfare and Air Base Defense, (Washington DC; Office of Air Force History, 1988), 101.
US aircraft discovered the Japanese fleet and sank four carriers, turning back the invasion force before it could
land. RAND analyst David Shlapak has observed that this may be the most significant airfield attack in history.
The resulting battle, and the destruction of the Japanese attack force, was a turning point in the war. Noted in Vick,
13.
10
Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol II, (Chicago IL, University
of Chicago Press, 1949), 81.
11
Vick, 13.
12
50th Anniversary of the Korean War, Fact Sheet: Official Public Access Web Site for Department of Defense, online, Internet, 6 February 2004, available from: http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/chromite.shtml.
13
Larry Davis, “Combat Cargo Command” from Air War Over Korea: A Pictorial Record, (Houston Tex:
Squadron/Signal Pub, 1982), 161.
9
12
requirement to seize bases significantly decreased in strategic importance. The operations were
relegated to a small force of special operations experts.
These infrequent operations included Operation Eagle Claw, the failed rescue attempt of
American hostages held in Iran. Eagle Claw planned on the seizure of Manzariyeh Air Base in
Iran. This putative lodgment would have allowed for C-141 Starlifter transports to fly the
hostages and rescue teams out of the country.14
Operation Urgent Fury, the rescue of American students in Grenada, required the seizure
of Salinas and Pearls airports.15 During Operation Just Cause, US Rangers captured Rio Hato and
Tocuman airfields in Panama, for insertion of forces to remove dictator Manuel Noriega.16 All
of the above operations differ from those of WWII, in that the objective of these seizures was
never to sustain forces. The operations were a “bolt out of the blue,” a surprise special operation
effort for temporary effects.17
In essence, the Cold War was the driving factor in diminishing the US military’s need for
airfield seizure and the requirement to open bases. Europe and the Pacific were fertile ground,
littered with bases to support troops in combat with the USSR. If World War III were to occur, a
nuclear exchange would end the war quickly. If nuclear weapons were not used, the
conventional battle between the United States and USSR was a battle of forces already deployed
in Europe fought from fixed bases with follow on forces deploying to forward NATO airfields
and ports. These forces and forward bases were a requirement of the Cold War and very much
part of deterrence.
Jim Greeley, “Desert One: A mission of hope turned tragic. A case of what could've been,” Airman Magazine,
on-line, Internet, 10 February 2004, available from http://www.af.mil/news/airman/0401/hostage.html.
15
Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury; The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington Mass, Lexington Books, 1989), 200-214.
15
Malcom McConnell, Just Cause; The Real Story of America’s High-Tech Invasion of Panama, (New York, St
Martins Press, 199)1, 73,99.
16
Ibid.
14
13
Figure 3 The Anti-Access Dilemma18
Following the Cold War, America and its allies faced what President George H.W. Bush
called a “New World Order.” Ironically, the President presented the speech on 11 September
1990, and eleven years later his son, President George W. Bush, would face a completely
different world.
A new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger
in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the
nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in
harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a
thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is
struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world
where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong
respect the rights of the weak.19
Instead, the “New World Order” ushered in a new realm of conflict. America was
forced to change from a Cold War force that was deployed forward to a force that was in
garrison and home, based in the United States with the ability to deploy rapidly. The US
18
Sourced from Colonel Ehrhard, PhD, USAF, briefing to SAASS, 17 May 2004
President George Herbert Walker Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and the nation, on-line, Internet, 10
February 2004, available from, http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr.htm .
19
14
approach to combat in Desert Storm was based on Cold War thought. The United States led
Coalition built up forces in the Persian Gulf at allied bases and was afforded the time to meet the
Iraqis with overwhelming force.
Conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda stimulated discussion amongst US strategists regarding
the notion of airbase opening. There was a need for more, open airfields in austere places
located in areas at the very limit of the United States’ logistical reach. US military strategy
increasingly stressed force projection and the important role of air mobility forces. The pre-9/11
airbase opening sequence proved a good start in thought, but a leaner military structure required
the USAF to develop doctrine for the optimum use of forces. The United States no longer
enjoyed a large number of airlifters and tankers flying to fixed bases. In order to strengthen and
grow this budding expeditionary culture, new strategies would have to emerge.
A regional combatant commander requires his forces to flow into the theater in a timely
manner to where they are needed, so that they can quickly prepare for employment. The linear
battlefield made this a challenge; today’s non-linear battlefield makes it even more difficult.
New units in theater make vulnerable targets for the enemy. The airfield, be it an FOL or
support base, can be vulnerable and a bottleneck. Because of its critical importance for force
insertion and sustainment, it is a likely center of gravity. A competent enemy would likely attack
this lucrative target. No longer can air mobility alone open bases as we saw in the pre 9-11
world. Today, forces must be integrated.
CONOPS Theory
Today the US Department of Defense is transforming itself as directed by the Secretary
of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld: “We need rapidly deployable, fully integrated forces, capable
of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries
swiftly, successfully and devastating effect.”20 Although all branches are attempting this
transformation, the Army and Marine Corps long ago developed forcible entry capability. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-18: Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, states Army airborne and
air assault forces are primary forces in such operations. Such forces cannot project themselves
on a global scale and require the USAF in order to seize airfields. RAND’s 2000 study,
Lightning Over Water, notes that airborne and air assault assets lack “survivability and killing
power for future . . . contingencies . . . they need to have much greater survivability and lethality
20
Donald Rumsfield, US Secretary of Defense, Speech at National Defense University, 2002
15
to operate effectively.”21 This survivability and lethality is enhanced by the USAF in the form of
airlift, counter air, CAS, tactical air reconnaissance, air interdiction, special air warfare
operations, electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).22 The Global
Strike CONOPS23 is one tool to offer responsive airpower options, but the integration with Air
Mobility is an absolute must.
Air Mobility
This forcible entry option, of either airborne or air assault, requires a delivery method.
The preferred method for delivery of these forces is via the USAF’s air mobility forces. Without
the robust capability of the USAF, the airborne unit is a rider without a horse, but with an
effective and timely USAF response, the employment of seizure forces can be carried out with
the maximum probability of success.24 JP 3-18 states “Air mobility forces are a national
resource and air mobility operations represent a rapid means to project and sustain power across
the globe in support of vital, important and humanitarian US national interests.”25 Rapid global
mobility is “the backbone for sustained combat operations.”26
Air mobility is a system of systems that combines airlift, air refueling, and air mobility
support assets, processes and procedures into an integrated whole. Airlift and air refueling can
operate independently of one another, but neither can operate without air mobility support.27
Current forcible entry forces, airborne and air assault, lack survivability and lethality,
especially in a high threat environment.28 The Air Force’s Global Strike CONOPS package of
aircraft can establish air dominance, but troops on the ground are usually required to occupy
terrain and secure lodgment. The solution is an integrated force using airborne forces, the Air
Forces Global Strike CONOPS and the Global Mobility CONOPS (GM CONOPS).
Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America’s Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions, RAND, on-line,
Internet, 2 February 2004, available from: http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3022/ 2 Feb 04.
22
US Army Field Manual 90-26, (Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC1990), on-line, Internet, 4
February 2004, Available at: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-26/Ch1.htm#p6.
23
The Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) will be the US Air Force’s contribution to the nation’s kick-down-the-door
force. GSTF will rapidly establish air dominance and subsequently guarantee that joint aerospace, land, and sea
forces will enjoy freedom from attack and freedom to attack. GSTF will be a rapid-reaction force employed within
the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct and timeline while maintaining interoperability with joint, coalition,
and allied assets. -- Jumper, John, USAF Chief of Staff, 2001
24
Randolph C.White, Jr., The Airborne Forces of the United States; Cornerstone of Force Projection, US (master’s
thesis, Naval War College, Newport RI), 5 February 1999, 7.
25
JCS Pub 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations (D). April 1994, vii.
26
Air Force Doctrine Document, 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 25 June 1999, 1, on-line, Internet, 2 February 2004,
available at: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afdd2-6/afdd2-6.pdf.
27
Ibid.
28
RAND, Lightning Over Water
21
16
Lodgment and the GM CONOPS
A contingency mission requires a secure base of operations at which combat power can
be introduced, projected from, and sustained in order to conduct joint operations. Seizure of an
airfield is one means of securing such a base. Such operations can be conducted over ground,
via air or by sea. Once the field is attacked, it must be secured, defended and subsequent air
and/or ground operations must ensue.
The projection and employment of United States forces has almost inevitably required the
establishment of bases near the area of operations.29 The Global Mobility CONOPS is the
designated element, designed to facilitate the projection and employment of US forces. The
Global Mobility CONOPS consists of five force modules (FMs) that comprise the whole. One is
the “Open the Airbase FM” that first employs the Base Assessment Team. The second is the
“Command and Control FM.” Next is the “Establish the Airbase FM.” The latter brings
sufficient forces to the base to achieve initial operating capability. The fourth is the “Generate
the Mission FM.” Finally, the Global Mobility Task Force includes the “Operate the Airbase
FM,” which contains forces needed to achieve a base’s full operating capability.30
Figure 4: Building Blocks of Air Base Opening. Sourced from AMC/A35 Airbase Opening Operational
Concept, Version 8.2, 18 Dec 2003
The concept of engaging in GM CONOPS operations in a hostile environment requires
direct and detailed coordination and integration between the GM CONOPS planners and airfield
seizure forces. Airfield seizure forces usually consist of special operations forces (SOF) or
conventional Army (USA) or Marine Corps (USMC), and Air Force forces. Of these, the USAF
“open the airbase” FM is imperative.
29
30
Airbase Opening Operational Concept, Headquarters Air Mobility Command,A35, Version 8.2, 18 Dec 2003, 1
Ibid, 2-3
17
Conclusion
History shows the strategic importance of airfield seizure. The following three chapters
will examine such operations in context. Case studies start with German operations in Norway,
continue with the Soviet concept of airfield seizure and its effects in Afghanistan, and conclude
with the US operation in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These case studies are
offered as reflection prior to further addressing the USAF’s concept for airbase openings in the
wake of OIF and OEF. Finally, future organization, training requirements and doctrine are
amplified as recommendations for future operations.
18