The Ethics of Using
Protectzia
By Rabbi Joshua Flug
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I.
II.
Introduction-The word protectzia is a Hebrew word of questionable etymology. It
connotes the use of nepotism, or influence in order to achieve a goal. Protectzia is
commonplace in Jewish culture. In this shiur outline, we will explore a number of
situations that involve use of protectzia and the ethical issues surrounding them:
a. Rina is very frustrated that every time she brings one of her kids to the dentist, she
can wait in the waiting room for over an hour. As she contemplates switching to
another dentist, she finds out that her cousin Aliza was just hired as the receptionist in
that office. Rina kindly asks Aliza if she could fast track her kids the next time she
comes in for a visit. Is Aliza permitted to do so?
b. Jim has a very old car that runs well, but the license plate lamp has an electrical
problem and as such, he must repair it in order to pass his upcoming vehicle
inspection. Jim figures that it is cheaper for him to give the inspector a box of donuts
than to repair the license plate lamp. Is it ethical to do so?
c. The local county commissioner is very interested in receiving the Jewish votes in his
county and he is known as the person to call when someone wants a political favor.
Is it permissible to call a politician to ask for a government service that one would not
be able to attain using the ordinary system? Does it matter whether the service is
something that affects an individual or a group of people (an entire congregation, an
area of town, etc.)?
d. Until recently, physicians used to receive very generous gifts from pharmaceutical
companies in order to entice them to prescribe that company's medications. Recent
regulations set limits on what types of gifts are acceptable. Physicians also receive
gifts from specialists that the physician refers to. Is this ethical?
The Prohibition against Bribery
a. The Torah states in Parshas Mishpatim {1} and in Parshas Shoftim {2} that there is a
prohibition against a judge accepting bribery.
i. R. Meir Simcha of Dvinsk (1843-1926) writes that the parshiyos are not
repetitive. Parshas Mishpatim is dealing with dinei nefashos and Parshas
Shoftim is dealing with dinei mamonos. {3}
b. The Gemara adds that the warning against bribery in order to choose sides is already
included in the prohibition against corrupting justice. The prohibition applies in a
case where one takes a bribe from someone who was going to win anyway. {4}
c. Rambam (1138-1204) states that one who offers a bribe to a judge violates the
prohibition of lifnei iver. {5}
d. The Gemara states that one should not judge a neighbor if the judge borrows tools
from his neighbor and he doesn't have anything to lend the neighbor in return. The
Gemara notes that Rava used to borrow tools even though he had none to lend
because he was only borrowing them so that they would feel important. {6}
i. Rambam implies that it doesn't matter who initiates the relationship. As long
as it is understood that each is going to lend the other and nothing else is
expected in return, there is no issue of bribery. {7}
ii. R. Ya'akov ben Asher (1269-1343) writes that it is only permissible if the
judge initiates the relationship so that when the judge borrows tools, it is only
considered a return of the favor. {8}
e. R. Ya'akov ben Asher (1269-1343) quotes a responsa of the Geonim that if the
plaintiff sends a gift to a judge prior to filing suit, the defendant can't invalidate the
III.
judge. However, if the judge feels that it may affect his judgment, he should remove
himself from the case. {9}
i. This opinion is codified in Shulchan Aruch. {10}
Analysis of the prohibition against bribery
a. Bribery vs. Corruption
i. The Gemara we quoted earlier highlights the difference between bribery and
corruption. Bribery can be used to corrupt a judge and have him rule in a
manner that is not just. However, one can also violate the prohibition against
bribery, even when there is no corruption of justice.
ii. This idea is highlighted in the discussion regarding the prohibition of bribery
from a Ben No'ach:
1. Ramban (1194-1270) writes that the mitzvah on B'nei No'ach to
establish a justice system includes a prohibition against bribery. {11}
2. R. Yonasan Eibeschitz (1690-1764) writes that we see from the fact
that B'nei Noach are allowed to judge relatives that bribery can't be
prohibited. It's more likely that a judge will show favor to his father
than to someone who gave him $1,000. {12}
3. R. Yosef Shaul Nathanson (1808-1875) writes that there is no
contradiction between the comments of Ramban and the comments of
R. Eibeschitz. Ramban prohibits bribery that is for the purpose of
corrupting justice. When justice is corrupt, it is not considered a
system of justice. However, R. Eibeschitz is referring to bribery that
doesn't affect the justice system. {13}
a. An example of bribery that does not necessarily corrupt justice
is sending gifts to the judge without any reference that it relates
to the case. This is something that both parties have the
opportunity to do.
b. In U.S. law a government official (including judges) may not
accept a gift. However, there are certain gifts that are
permissible that would be considered a form of bribery in
Jewish law. These include:
i. Social hospitality based on personal relationships;
ii. Modest items, such as food and refreshments, offered as
a matter of social hospitality;
iii. Greeting cards and items with little intrinsic value, such
as plaques, certificates, and trophies, which are
intended solely for presentation.
b. Bribery of Non-Judicial Government Officials
i. R. Yom Tov L. Heller (1578-1654) proves that the prohibition of bribery
applies to non-judicial representatives:
1. The Gemara discusses the story of Bar Chama who was accused of
murder and the Reish Galusa order an inquiry to see if he should be
punished. R. Papi, who was on the panel, found a way to exonerate
Bar Chama and at the conclusion of the trial, Bar Chama promised R.
Papi that he would take care of his taxes for the next year. {14}
2. Rabbeinu Asher (c. 1250-1327) asks: Isn't this a form of bribery? He
answers that R. Papi was exempt from that tax and therefore, there was
no bribery. {15}
3. R. Heller notes that R. Papi wasn't acting as a judge, but rather as an
appointee to figure out the appropriate punishment. Yet, Rabbeinu
Asher was concerned about bribery. We see that bribery applies to all
appointed officials. {16}
ii. R. Moshe Sofer (1762-1839) discusses a case where a community was looking
for a rabbi. The first two candidates that came up for a vote were rejected by
the congregation. The third candidate then won a majority of the votes. It
was then discovered that at least some of the members of the congregation
were bribed to reject any candidate except the third candidate. Chasam Sofer
rules that the appointment of the third candidate is invalid (assuming there is
sufficient proof that the allegations are true) for two reasons: {17}
1. Any representative of the congregation must perform all actions for the
benefit of the congregation. If one accepts bribery, it is not for the
benefit of the congregation and the actions are rendered invalid.
2. A representative of the congregation has the same status of a judge for
all matters of qualification. Just as a judge can't accept bribery and if
he does, he is invalid, so too a representative of the congregation may
not accept bribery and doing so invalidates him from his position.
iii. Do the technical rules of bribery apply to a non-judicial official?
1. One could have argued that the rules of bribery are more limited when
it comes to appointed officials and prohibitions such as borrowing
tools and the like are not applicable. Nevertheless, we see from both
R. Heller's and Chasam Sofer's comments that the rules are exactly the
same for appointed officials.
2. When it comes to a non-Jewish appointed official, one can argue that
according to R. Nathanson's analysis, there is no prohibition against
giving a gift to an official as long as it is considered legal by that
system of law.
a. For example, people give money to the Patrolman's Benevolent
Association and receive a sticker or emblem to place on their
car. The unstated purpose of the sticker is so that when a
police officer stops them for a traffic violation, he will be more
lenient knowing that the individual donated money to support
his association. This is not illegal. By comparison, a dayan
who is also a rosh yeshiva (and ultimately responsible for the
finances of the yeshiva), can't judge on a case where one of the
parties is a donor who contributed regularly to his yeshiva.
iv. What matters are subject to the prohibition against bribery?
1. R. Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz (Chazon Ish 1878-1953) notes that the
prohibition against bribery can be viewed as a chok in that it doesn't
apply to all cases where money may affect someone's judgment. A
rabbi is allowed to render a p'sak on whether his own animal if treif or
IV.
not, even though the animal can be very expensive. Shochad is
relegated to the specific area of mishpat. {18}
2. R. Yitzchak Zilberstein writes that based on Chazon Ish's comments,
one may take gifts if there is no judgment involved. For example, a
vehicle inspector does not violate the prohibition against accepting
bribes if he takes gifts from a tire store so that he refers people who
need new tires to that tire store. This is because he is not judging the
owner of the tire store, only the owner of the car. However, it is not
appropriate to do so. He further states that the inspector may not
accept gifts from a repair shop because he must judge the work of the
repair shop when a repair is necessary. R. Zilberstein then notes that a
physician is also not a judge and therefore may accept gifts in order to
refer medications or patients. However, he must be confident that his
decisions are in the best interest of the patient. Nevertheless, al derech
hamussar, it is preferable not to accept gifts. {19}
a. There is a famous saying of R. Yisrael Salanter that there is no
prohibition of lifnei iver regarding middos. It is permissible to
honor someone even though it may lead that individual to
become haughty. {20} As such, even if one considers a
physician accepting gifts from pharmaceutical companies or
specialists as bad middos, there is no prohibition to offer him a
gift.
i. Nevertheless, R. Moshe Berzam suggests that this only
applies when there is a mitzvah involved that may lead
to someone else acquiring bad middos. If there is no
reason to entice someone to acquire bad middos, it is
prohibited. {21}
ii. One can argue that if the physician is accepting gifts
from other companies or specialists, one has no choice
but to do the same in order to remain competitive. It
must be the physician's decision to reject gifts
categorically.
The Ethics of Cutting the Line
a. The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that gives an example of peshara: Two boats are going
through a canal and only one can go at a time, or two people on camels that are
passing though a narrow area, the one with the bigger load or the farther distance
takes precedence. If they have equal claims, they should come up with a compromise
where one goes first and reimburses the other. {22}
i. R. Menachem Meiri (1249-1306) states that the general rule is that the person
who has the greatest merit going first gets to go first. One example he gives is
that an ill person takes precedence over someone who is healthy. {23}
ii. Meiri also implies that if one came before the other, the one who came first
has first rights if they have equal claims. However, if one has a reason to go
first, he would take precedence over someone who came before him.
iii. R. Naftali Z.Y. Berlin (The Netziv 1816-1893) notes that the Beraisa presents
this as an example of compromise based on the verse ‫צדק צדק תרדף‬. Netziv
asks: do we really need a pasuk to teach us that there is a concept of
compromise? He answers that this is a case where compromise is demanded.
If not for the mandate of compromise, each sailor or camel rider can argue
that he has first rights and the strongest will win. The Torah is mandating that
we act with "mishpat shalom" and force the parties to compromise. {24}
b. The order of cases in dinei Torah
i. Talmudic discussions
1. The Gemara states that when a dayan is choosing which case to judge
first, he can't give precedence to the case that has more money at stake.
The implication is that he must handle the cases on a first come first
serve basis. {25}
2. The Gemara records a case of Rav Anan who was asked to judge a
case but he couldn't because of a concern for bribery. He then passed
the case to R. Nachman. R. Nachman assumed that R. Anan couldn't
judge the case because he was related to the litigant so R. Nachman
bumped the case to the front of the line ahead of a case involving an
orphan. His rationale was that positive commandment of kavod
HaTorah takes precedence over the positive commandment to judge
based on a specific order. When the other litigant saw that R.
Nachman was treating his opponent with respect, he froze and wasn't
able to make his claim. {26}
3. The Gemara states that a talmid chacham can claim that he should be
first on line (many Rishonim assume that we are dealing with a din
Torah). {27}
4. The Gemara records an incident where R. Yosef asked that a colleague
be moved to the head of the line. {28}
ii. Analysis
1. There seem to be two reasons why a talmid chacham should be moved
to the front of the line:
a. Rashi writes that it is a form of kavod haTorah. {29}
b. Rabbeinu Asher writes that it is because we don't want him to
waste time from his learning. {30}
2. This seems to be reflected in Ritva's two interpretations of the incident
involving R. Anan and R. Nachman: {31}
a. The first interpretation is that one can only move someone to
the front of the line if it is clear why he is being moved. If he
is a talmid chacham, it is clear. However, if he is a relative of a
talmid chacham, it is not clear and one may not move him
ahead. While this interpretation seems to be focused on kavod
haTorah, Rabbeinu Asher will come to the same conclusion for
a different reason. He will say that a relative can't be moved
ahead because the relative is not learning Torah and there is no
concern for wasted time.
b. The second interpretation is that one is allowed to move the
relative of a talmid chacham ahead because that is also
considered kavod HaTorah.
3. Rambam rules that an orphan comes before a widow. He also rules
that a widow comes before a talmid chacham. {32}
a. The simple interpretation is that an orphan certainly comes
before a talmid chacham. This is how R. Yosef Karo (14881575) understands Rambam. He explains that from the fact
that there was a problem when R. Nachman moved a supposed
relative of R. Anan to the front ahead of an orphan, one should
deduce that a talmid chacham can't come before an orphan or
widow. {33}
b. R. Pinchas Horowitz (1731-1805) presents a different
understanding of Rambam's opinion. An orphan comes before
a widow and a widow comes before a talmid chacham.
However, a talmid chacham comes before an orphan. The
reason is that the obligation to give an orphan precedence
stems from the fact that the beis din is the father of orphans.
This obligation is overridden by the obligation to honor a
talmid chacham. The obligation to give precedence to a widow
is based on her status as someone who will suffer from waiting.
For this value, we forgo on the talmid chacham's honor.
Therefore, an orphan comes before a widow because the
orphan is like a relative of the beis din and they have the right
to move him to the front, even over an almanah. However, the
mitzvah to honor a talmid chacham overrides the beis din's
right to give precedence to the orphan. R. Horowitz highlights
the fact that there are two components to a line at beis din:
{34}
i. There is an obligation on the dayan to follow a specific
procedure in determining who comes first. This is why
an orphan comes before a widow.
ii. There is an obligation on those waiting on line to follow
certain criteria. The orphan must give kavod to the
talmid chacham and the talmid chacham must be
mochel on his kavod for the widow.
4. Tosafos present two opinions regarding giving precedence to the
talmid chachcam: {35}
a. The first opinion is that this only applies if they come at the
same time. If the talmid chacham comes second, he can't move
ahead of the first.
b. The second opinion is that the talmid chacham moves ahead of
those who preceded him.
c. Shulchan Aruch follows the second opinion. {36}
c. Whether one accepts R. Horowitz's interpretation or not, his analysis that one must
look at the dayan and the people on line separately is compelling:
i. The case of the boats and the camels is one where there is no owner of the
passageway to decide who gets to go first. In that case, the Beraisa states that
one must use peshara to figure out a system that works. The first come first
V.
serve system is usually the best system. However, there are times where it
makes sense to move someone who came afterwards to the front of the line. It
is incumbent on the people to respect a talmid chacham and they are the ones
who should move him to the front of the line. It is equally incumbent on the
people on the line to move people with needs to the front of the line. If there
is someone who is sick and has difficulty waiting on line, the people should
all agree to move him to the front.
1. R. Moshe Shternbuch notes that a talmid chacham can't cut the line.
He must wait for the people on the line to give him that honor. {37}
ii. The dayan, as the authority, should be entitled to choose who comes first.
However, since he doesn't work for himself, but rather on behalf of the Jewish
people, he must follow certain criteria. If we are not dealing with a dayan, but
a private individual, he is entitled to move his friends or relatives to the front.
1. R. Yisrael M. Kagan (1838-1933) presents a similar idea regarding a
gabai in charge of distributing loans. He does not work for himself
and therefore can't move his relatives who need loans to the front of
the line. {38} This is in contrast to a private individual who is
specifically supposed to give a loan to his relatives before giving
anyone else, even a talmid chacham. {39}
How this relates to our original cases:
a. Rina is very frustrated that every time she brings one of her kids to the dentist, she
can wait in the waiting room for over an hour. As she contemplates switching to
another dentist, she finds out that her cousin Aliza was just hired as the receptionist in
that office. Rina kindly asks Aliza if she could fast track her kids the next time she
comes in for a visit. Is Aliza permitted to do so?
i. If we are dealing with a waiting room full of health people waiting for checkups and cleanings, the dentist himself is entitled to fast track anyone he wants
because he owns the practice and it a private matter. [If he wants, he can send
everyone home except the person he wants to treat.]
ii. The receptionist is the authority on the line, so in theory, she should also be
able to fast track patients. However, if she does so without consulting with
her boss, she may be violating her duties.
iii. If there are people in the office who are considered "ill" due to a dental
condition, the dentist is now obligated to heal them and it is no longer a
private matter. He can't simply choose whomever he chooses to go first,
similar to a dayan. This is especially true if the patient is suffering.
b. Jim has a very old car that runs well, but the license plate lamp has an electrical
problem and as such, he must repair it order to pass his upcoming vehicle inspection.
Jim figures that it is cheaper for him to give the inspector a box of donuts than to
repair the license plate lamp. Is it ethical to do so?
i. Even in dinei yisrael, it is permissible to give a gift before the case is opened.
It is up to the judge to determine whether it will lead to his bias. Therefore, if
he brings the donuts and then states that he wants the car inspected, it is not a
form of bribery.
ii. As we noted previously, it would also depend on whether the state allows the
inspector to receive refreshments. [When a building inspector comes to
inspect a house, it is common courtesy to offer a drink. One should not be
concerned that one is enticing the inspector to violate the prohibition against
bribery.] One certainly cannot explicitly state that the donuts are in exchange
for ignoring the license plate lamp.
1. In some states, the mechanics themselves perform the inspection. This
type of system has bribery/corruption built into it because the
mechanic will make money from the repairs if the inspection fails, so
he has the motive tell the customer that certain parts need to be
replaced, etc. On the other hand, the mechanic is motivated to keep a
long term customer happy, so he might ignore a problem in order to
keep his customers.
c. The local county commissioner is very interested in receiving the Jewish votes in his
county and he is known as the person to call when someone wants a political favor.
Is it permissible to call a politician to ask for a government service that one would not
be able to attain using the ordinary system? Does it matter whether the service is
something that affects an individual or a group of people (an entire congregation, an
area of town, etc.)?
i. According to Chasam Sofer, an appointed official can only perform activities
that are in the best interest of his constituents. If the politician does favors for
everyone equally, it is appropriate. If he only takes care of those who
contributed to his campaign or those who voted for him, it is not appropriate.
ii. If we are dealing with a group of people, it is reasonable for a politician to do
favors for the group because that is the way the system is set up. One group
may need a street closed for a parade and a different group may need a speed
bump installed to calm traffic in the area. The job of the politician is to
balance the different interests of the various groups.
d. Until recently, physicians used to receive very generous gifts from pharmaceutical
companies in order to entice them to prescribe that company's medications. Recent
regulations set limits on what types of gifts are acceptable. Physicians also receive
gifts from specialists that the physician refers to. Is this ethical?
i. As we noted earlier, the physician is not a judge and therefore not subject to
the rules of bribery.
‫‪ .1‬שמות כג‪:‬ו‪-‬ח‬
‫‪ .7‬רמב"ם הל' סנהדרין כג‪:‬ד‬
‫כל דיין ששאל שאלה פסול לדין לזה שהשאילו במה‬
‫דברים אמורים בשלא היה לו לדיין להשאיל אבל היה‬
‫לו להשאיל כשר שהרי גם זה שואל ממנו‪.‬‬
‫‪ .8‬טור חו"מ ס' ט‬
‫‪ .2‬דברים טז‪:‬יט‬
‫‪ .9‬טור חו"מ ס' ט‬
‫‪ .3‬משך חכמה שמות כג‪:‬ח‬
‫‪ .11‬שלחן ערוך חו"מ ט‪:‬ב‬
‫‪ .11‬רמב"ן בראשית לד‪:‬ז‬
‫‪ .4‬כתובות קה‪.‬‬
‫‪ .5‬רמב"ם הל' סנהדרין כג‪:‬ב‬
‫‪ .12‬אורים ותומים ט‪:‬א (תומים)‬
‫‪ .6‬כתובות קה‪:‬‬
‫‪ .13‬שואל ומשיב מהדו"ק א‪:‬רל‬
‫‪ .18‬חזון איש אמונה ובטחון ג‪:‬ל‬
‫‪ .19‬מאמר הרב זילברשטיין בזכור לאברהם חלק ב'‬
‫‪ .14‬סנהדרין כז‪-.‬כז‪:‬‬
‫‪ .21‬כוכבי אור (תולדות המחבר) עמ' טו‬
‫‪ .15‬רא"ש סנהדרין ג‪:‬יז‬
‫‪ .16‬פלפולא חריפתא שם‬
‫‪ .17‬חתם סופר חו"מ ס' קס‬
‫‪ .21‬אמרות משה ס' נח‬
‫‪ .23‬בית הבחירה סנהדרין לב‪:‬‬
‫‪ .24‬משיב דבר ג‪:‬י‬
‫‪ .25‬סנהדרין ח‪.‬‬
‫‪ .22‬סנהדרין לב‪:‬‬
‫‪ .26‬כתובות קה‪-:‬קו‪.‬‬
‫רב ענן אייתי ליה ההוא גברא כנתא דגילדני דבי גילי א"ל‬
‫מאי עבידתיך א"ל דינא אית לי לא קביל מיניה א"ל‬
‫פסילנא לך לדינא אמר ליה דינא דמר לא בעינא קבולי‬
‫לקביל מר דלא למנען מר מאקרובי בכורים דתניא ואיש‬
‫בא מבעל שלישה ויבא לאיש האלהים לחם בכורים‬
‫עשרים לחם שעורים וכרמל בצקלונו וכי אלישע אוכל‬
‫בכורים הוה אלא לומר לך כל המביא דורון לתלמיד חכם‬
‫כאילו מקריב בכורים אמר ליה קבולי לא בעינן דאיקביל‬
‫השתא דאמרת לי טעמא מקבילנא שדריה לקמיה דרב‬
‫נחמן שלח ליה נידייניה מר להאי גברא דאנא ענן פסילנא‬
‫ליה לדינא אמר מדשלח לי הכי שמע מינה קריביה הוא‬
‫הוה קאים דינא דיתמי קמיה אמר האי עשה והאי עשה‬
‫עשה דכבוד תורה עדיף סלקיה לדינא דיתמי ואחתיה‬
‫לדיניה כיון דחזא בעל דיניה יקרא דקא עביד ליה איסתתם‬
‫טענתיה‪.‬‬
‫‪ .27‬נדרים סב‪.‬‬
‫‪ .33‬כסף משנה הל' סנהדרין כא‪:‬ו‬
‫‪ .28‬שבועות ל‪.‬‬
‫‪ .29‬רש"י נדרים סב‪.‬‬
‫‪ .31‬פירוש הרא"ש לנדרים סב‪.‬‬
‫‪ .31‬ריטב"א כתובות קו‪.‬‬
‫‪ .34‬חדושי הפלאה לחו"מ טו‪:‬ב‬
‫‪ .35‬תוס' שבועות ל‪.‬‬
‫‪ .32‬רמב"ם הל' סנהדרין כא‪:‬ו‬
‫‪ .36‬שלחן ערוך חו"מ טו‪:‬א‬
‫‪ .37‬תשובות והנהגות ד‪:‬שיח‬
‫‪ .38‬אהבת חסד מצות הלואה ו‪:‬יג‬
‫‪ .39‬אהבת חסד מצות הלואה ו‪:‬ז‬
1. Shemot 23: 6-8 (JPS Translation)
6 Thou shalt not wrest the
judgment of thy poor in his cause.
7 Keep thee far from a false
matter; and the innocent and
righteous slay thou not; for I will
not justify the wicked. 8 And thou
shalt take no gift; for a gift blindeth them that have sight, and perverteth the words of the
righteous.
2. Devarim 16:19 (JPS Translation)
Thou shalt not wrest judgment;
thou shalt not respect persons;
neither shalt thou take a gift; for a
gift doth blind the eyes of the
wise, and pervert the words of the
righteous.
3. Ketubot 105a (Soncino Translation)
What was the purpose of
the statement And thou
shalt take no gift? If to
teach that one must not acquit the guilty or that one must not condemn the
innocent [the objection Surely could be raised]. It was already specifically stated elsewhere in
Scripture, Thou shalt not wrest judgement. Consequently it must be concluded that even
[where the intention is] to acquit the innocent or to condemn the guilty the Torah laid down,
And thou shalt take no gift.
4. Rambam, Hilchot Sanhedrin 23:2
Just as the receiver (of a bribe)
violates
a
negative
commandment, the giver does
as well as it states "One may not place a stumbling block in front of a blind person."
5. Pilpula Charifta to Rosh, Sanhedrin 3:17
Come and see an
important idea that
our
teacher
(Rabbeinu Asher) has taught us
that bribery is prohibited, even when it is not in the context of a rabbinical court, rather in the
context of penalty … I wrote this to teach those who are appointed by the community that even
though their judgments are not judicial by nature and they were not appointed for that
purpose, they should nevertheless refrain from accepting gifts for their judgments.
6. Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat no. 160
It seems that regarding the
actual law, if there are two
valid witnesses that are not
part of the congregation
and are not related to a
member
of
the
congregation or the rabbi, and they testify that member of the congregation accepted bribery,
it is certain as egg in sour cream that the appointment is retroactively invalid because the
(members of the congregation) must exclaim that their decision is for altruistic reasons as Rama
states in Choshen Mishpat chapter 263, and their decision was based on bribery.
7. Sanhedrin 32a (Soncino Translation)
Justice, justice shalt thou follow; the first
[mention of justice] refers to a decision based on
strict law; the second, to a compromise. How so?
— E.g., where two boats sailing on a river meet; If
both attempt to pass simultaneously, both will
sink, whereas, if one makes way for the other,
both can pass [without mishap]. Likewise, if two
camels met each other while on the ascent to
Beth-Horon; if they both ascend [at the same
time] both may tumble down [into the valley];
but if [they ascend] after each other, both can go
up [safely]. How then should they act? If one is laden and
the other unladen, the latter should give way to the former. If one is nearer [to its destination]
than the other, the former should give way to the latter. If both are [equally] near or far [from
their destination,] make a compromise between them, the one [which is to go forward]
compensating the other [which has to give way].
8. Meiri Sanhedrin 32a
The same applies in similar
situations
regarding
anyone who cannot handle
additional wait time that
they should precede the
others. Similarly, a healthy person should be placed behind a sick person.
They said the same regarding judgments that if a judge has many litigants to judge, he should
judge the orphan and the widow first, the widow before the Torah scholar, the Torah scholar
before the layman. A woman precedes a man because her embarrassment is greater. If they
are all equal, the first person who came gets first priority.