WATER AND ENVIRONMENT
ISSUES IN THE BLACK, CASPIAN
AND ARAL SEAS
Background paper for the G12 environment strategy prepared by the
United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Europe and
Central Asia
January 2003
G12 Regional Seas Programmes (Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Aral Sea): Background paper for the
G12 environment strategy, prepared by UNDP regional Bureau for Europe and Central Asia.
Contents
Page
Executive Summary
1.0. Introduction
2
1.1. Background
2
1.2. Governance
3
1.3. Legal setting and its implementation
3
1.4. Management tools
4
1
2.0. Black Sea
2.1. Water issues in the Black Sea
7
2.1.1. Geographical setting
7
2.1.2. Specific water and environmental issues
7
2.2. Governance challenges specific to the Black Sea
8
2.3. Overview of where specific water and environment needs are being met
by national, bilateral international community
10
2.4. Overview of where specific needs are not being met and
suggestions for possible support measures
12
7
3.0. Caspian Sea
13
3.1 Water Issues in the Caspian Basin
13
3.1.1 Geographical Setting
13
3.1.2. Specific Water and Environmental Issues
14
3.2. Governance challenges specific to the Caspian Sea
15
3.3. Overview of where specific water and environmental needs are being met by national,
bilateral and international community
16
3.4. Overview of where specific needs are not being met and suggestions for possible support
measures
18
4.0. Aral Sea
20
4.1. Water Issues in the Aral basin.
20
4.1.1. Geographical setting
20
4.1.2. Specific Water and Environmental Issues
20
4.2. Governance challenges specific to the Aral.
22
4.3. Overview of where specific water and environmental needs are being met by national,
bilateral and international community.
23
4.4. Overview of where specific needs are not being met and suggestions for possible support
measures. 25
Appendix I: Regional Sea Maps
Appendix II: Listings of regional Sea Projects.
Executive Summary
This background paper has been prepared by the United Nations Development Programme as a
contribution to the G12 environment strategy under consideration by the European Union.
The Aral Sea, Black Sea and Caspian Sea share common bonds geographically, politically and
environmentally. Each has been significantly impacted by the industrialization and agricultural
management practices of the Soviet Union, and, in the post Soviet era, the transitional governments
have dealt with environmental pressures with an array of responses. These water specific
environmental challenges, varying paths of development, and current governance structures are
addressed in this report.
There are several commonalities in regional environmental governance in the Aral Sea, Black Sea
and Caspian Sea basins. Common themes include a basic lack of capacity, a lack of revenues
dedicated to national and regional environmental management and enforcement, a lack of
compliance with existing internationally implemented regional environmental programmes,
dependence on international support to meet basic environmental management needs, and
institutional and sectoral isolation. These factors are endemic throughout the region and create
significant barriers to successful water and environmental management.
The environmental concerns that are in most dire need of attention across the Black Sea, Caspian
Sea and Aral Sea basins are a direct result of industrial and agricultural activities instigated during
the Soviet economic expansion throughout these regions. These massive projects emphasized
immediate domination of nature in order to reap maximum gains, but the result has been economic
dependence on non-sustainable development. These trends were exacerbated following the collapse
of the Soviet Union, as states sought to survive economically at the expense of their natural
resources.
The countries in these regions share common needs for assistance. Current national environmental
action plans need to be amended to more accurately reflect realistic achievable results instead of
unobtainable ideals. National and regional Intersectoral coordination needs to be enhanced in order
to most effectively address common environmental concerns. Implementation of standardized
monitoring of environmental quality, specifically effluents, pollution and nutrient levels and other
anthropogenic impacts should be emphasized throughout all of the basins in order to create reliable
data for compliance and enforcement and to gauge the concrete actions at the local, national and
regional levels.
Despite these commonalities, there are also notable differences in regional environmental
governance in each of these Basins. As a result, these problems cannot be resolved by applying a
single template for regional environmental management.
The Aral Sea basin suffers from a lack of coordinated national, regional and international efforts.
There are multiple water users and usages, and the prevalence of cotton monoculture throughout the
Aral basin strains water resources well beyond sustainable capacity. Further, these strains are
magnified by: competition between states over the water resources of the two major river systems
feeding the Aral; debilitating patronage systems; missed early opportunities for institutional change;
1
and over all regional instability. Only in the Aral Sea basin is competition over fresh water an
immediate threat to economic and political stability of the states in the region. There is a lack of any
legal agreement on the protection of the Aral basin environment and interstate agreements on water
allocation are proving difficult to uphold. Large amounts money, through grants and loans, have
been spent on addressing the Aral basin problems in the past ten years, but with no evident change in
the behaviour of the basin states towards good resource management.
In comparison, the Black Sea basin has the benefit of a coordinated regional sea programme with
significant international funding and technical resources, and, as a result, encouraging progress is
clearly seen in the policies of some Black Sea states. The Black Sea has a ratified Convention, a
functioning Commision and nascent secretariat, and an active umbrella environmental programme.
The somewhat ambitious objectives of the regional coordinating body have resulted in a delayed
implementation phase; however, a recent revision of the Strategic Action Programme has stretched
the time-frame, making implementation more feasible. Eutrophication caused by nutrient loading
from agricultural activities in the major river basins and from inadequate municipal and industrial
wastewater treatment has impacted greatly on the Black Sea ecosystem and, in particular, its socially
and economically important fisheries. This issue is a major focus for the international community,
particularly GEF, and a concerted effort by the UN agencies to tackle and control the problem.
There is attention to broad based environmental management throughout this area, and in the
contributory river basins as well. Unlike the Aral and Caspian basin, in several of The BlackSea
states, there is a clear economic incentive to improve environmental management in order to meet
EU accession requirements. Unfortunately, the G12 Black Sea states are not candidates for EU
accession and as a result there is uneven effort amongst the countries in pursuit of common water
management issues. However, political instability in the Black Sea region does not appear to be
immediately threatened by environmental degradation.
The Caspian basin has several unique environmental, political and geographic features that
distinguish it from the neighboring basins. The regional coordinating body is focused on establishing
a dialogue between the states and producing realistic plans (national and regional) for protection of
the Caspian environment, emphasizing intersectoral coordination and collaboration. Poor economic
conditions, lack of political will, instability, and disputed legal status, diminish the short-term
potential of this programme. Monitoring to ascertain the environmental impacts of human activities
in the region, and human health impacts in the coastal zones has been abandoned by the littoral states
and decisions are being taken in a knowledge vacuum. There are important bioresources, including
sturgeon, which, if managed correctly, could generate significant revenues and provide the financial
means to support a strong environmental management, but at present vested interests and short term
perspectives prevent good stewardship. The Caspian Sea basin contains significant energy resources
and it is these, it is hoped, along with the region’s geopolitical importance, which will be in the longterm be the saviour, rather than some would assert the destroyer, of the seas’ environment.
Despite these differences, this study makes a number of common recommendations to be
summarized here. These include: increased focus of international assistance organizations on
compliance with existing regional international agreements where possible; enhanced intersectoral
coordination at the local, national and regional levels; development of economic instruments to
achieve cooperation and compliance; development of region wide public health atlases to evaluate
impacts of poor water supply and wastewater treatment; and increased public awareness and NGO
participation in international projects.
2
1.0
Introduction
1.1 Background
This paper has been written in response to a request to the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and Central Asia
by the European Union as input into the elaboration of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia
(EECCA) Environmental Strategy. The paper concentrates on the three major regional seas in the G12 region,
Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Aral Sea, and draws upon published reviews and reports, prepared by the Regional
Seas’ coordinating bodies and component projects in the Environment and Water sectors, as well as related
project documents prepared by the littoral states.
The term sea is a misnomer for two of the water bodies in question, since neither the Caspian nor Aral have any
connection with the World’s oceans and are fully enclosed; the Caspian is the World’s largest enclosed water
body. Replenishment of the Black Sea waters through the narrow Bosphorus and it is calculated that it takes
over forty years and under the influence of the large freshwater inflows its salinity is only 18 ppt compared to
22ppt of the Mediterranean. The three seas originate from and are remnants of the ancient Tethys Sea that at one
time spanned from the Atlantic Ocean to Asia and contain unique brackish water flora and fauna.
The environment in these enclosed/ semi enclosed seas is very sensitive to the volume and quality of the waters
from the contributory river basins, many of which support highly industrial and intensive agricultural regions.
None of these seas have the buffering capacity of the open ocean and unable to cope with rapid change. Tidal
currents, if they exist, are minor and gyratory currents, induced by large river inflows, act to distribute rather
than disperse pollution throughout their waters. Throughout modern history these vast inland seas have been
believed to be imperturbable. Recently they have experienced dramatic environment failures due to
anthropogenic influences: the continued existence of the Aral Sea, described as an ecological disaster, is now
under question, and the Black Sea is often said to be a sea in crisis. The Caspian Sea is now also showing
worrying signs of collapse.
The majority of problems for these seas began with the post war industrial and agricultural expansion of the
Soviet Union. The 1950s and 1960s saw tremendous economic growth and execution great engineering projects
to utilize the country’s vast water resources; damming of the rivers Dniper, Don, Kuban, Volga, Kura, Amu
Darya and Syr Darya for hydro-power, navigation and water supply altered hydrological regimes and impeded
migratory fish. Expansion of vast tracks of irrigated lands bmbn the 1970’s in the Soviet “Green
Revolution”.diverted water away, thus changing the seas’ hydro-chemistry, and increasing nutrient input, as
well as insidious agro-chemicals. The Soviet led push for greater production was viewed as mans domination of
nature, and saw contempt for the environment and its protection. This was a clear over estimation of what the
environment could absorb, and has left a legacy of contamination in rivers, groundwaters and land. Industrial
expansion mirrored this with effluent dumping into rivers and tributaries. This pattern of over-utilisation was
not limited to the Soviet Union and the Communist Block but occurred throughout the industrialized countries
during this period. The difference being that recently other industrialized states have developed the capacity and
wealth to be able to begin to rectify their faults. It is common to view the break-up of the Soviet Union as the
point at which everything went wrong, but in fact a steady economic decline had been in progress for ten or
more years. By the early 1990’s the country’s ability to deal with its environment problems was severely
weakened. As evidenced by the condition of infrastructure in the G12 states today, maintenance backlogs have
their beginnings well before the break-up. This (despite the effort) during glasnost to take act in a more
environmentally sound way with regards to economic activities.
3
With the break-up came a period of rapid change, instability, unrest, and in some cases war. Industrial and
agricultural sectors collapsed as Soviet style command and control markets disappeared and new market
economies struggled to form. There was little time to worry about the environment and no money to address the
mistakes of the past. Today, with GDPs still well below those of the late 1980s, tackling the acute environment
problems of the G12 may well take a decade or even two, and there is always the possibility that in some of the
states they never will be addressed without outside assistance. The collapse of region’s economies has delivered
the short-term benefits of reduced pollution loads and in some areas reduced water abstraction levels, but, as
national economies begin to recover without necessary environmental policies and legislation in place, and
strong, adequately funded regulatory authorities to enforce compliance the environmental future could be bleak.
Many existing environmental laws in the region were inherited from the Soviet system, which is reputed for
having the most vigilant environmental laws in the world. However some of these laws and regulations are so
strict that they are impossible to comply and result in a complete disregard for positive environmental
stewardship. The challenge is to set in place a coherent set of environmental structures and tools before this
window of opportunity closes.
Adding to the economic woes is political instability throughout the region, which has the potential for overt
conflict in some places. Although officially all the G12 countries have democratic regimes, in many control is
firmly in the grip of the incumbent President, with a few of these leaders with distinct dictatorial leanings. In
these societies freedom of speech and an independent press is constrained and voiced public opinion – one of
the engines for change in a democratic society – ignored. In the Caspian and the Aral, there is real potential for
future conflict over the natural resources as the relations between littoral and basin states have become more
acrimonious over the divisions of petroleum or water resources. Some of the littoral states have already threaten
the dissolution of diplomatic relations with one another over these disputes. All this makes the concerted effort
to address the shared environmental problems of the regional seas much more difficult. At the same time, this
makes international efforts to bring all the parties together to constructively address these problems all the more
critical and immediate.
1.2 Governance
The regional governance of the three seas varies. The Black Sea Bucharest Convention came into force in 1992
establishing the Istanbul Commission and a nascent permanent secretariat that are now operable. The secretariat
is funded by the countries and is still a relatively weak body. It continues to need considerable support from the
international community to carry out its considerable functions. Tacis will provide direct support to the
secretariat as part of its Environment Programme 2000. The BSEP remains the umbrella programme under
which all major international assistance is coordinated.
There is no Convention of Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian although the final text has been
agreed to and it is hoped the document will be signed in early 2003. The future Convention will only come into
force once all five littoral states have ratified, which is unlikely in the short term until the legal status of the
Caspian is resolved. In place of a Convention and secretariat the Caspian Environment Programme (CEP) acts
as the environment management body. It was formed in 1995 and has a Programme Coordination Unit in Baku,
Azerbaijan and activity centers distributed around the region. Its membership comprises the littoral states with
Tacis, UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank. At present the international partners financially support the CEP, but
in its next phase the countries are committed to fund the management structure.
On the Aral Sea the picture is complex. The basin states signed an agreement in 1992 to form the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) under which two river basin authorities were formed ( Amu
Darya and Syr Darya). In 1994 the Aral Sea Basin Programme (ASBP), a partnership between the basin states
4
and international funding agencies was formed, as a broad umbrella programme. The International Fund of the
Aral Sea (IFAS) was created to undertake overall coordination of ASBP under which the ICWC and a newly
created Sustainable Development Commission (since reformed) was charged with providing advice on technical
and management issues within their areas of competence. IFAS was intended to be supported by both the basin
states and international partners. However, economic difficulties in the Aral states have resulted in a lack of
payments to the organization by all members.
In general, regional governance in the three seas is satisfactory, if shaky, G12 country support for the
management institutions, particularly on the Black and Caspian Seas, is slow in coming. For all these seas the
initial demand for action and its mobilization came from the international community, rather than the littoral
states. The regional programmes were constructed without clear national commitment and support. Therefore
implementation has been slow. The regional programmes have of course themselves engendered national
support, but it is never sufficient to support the demands of ever accelerating regional programmes, driven by
well meaning international partners.
There are many relevant national projects (see annex II) that are outside the main regional programmes and
within the jurisdiction of the national programme partners. There are also numerous international partner
projects (Tacis, GEF, UNDP and WB), which are nationally executed, and have a direct bearing on the regional
seas programmes. Often they are not coordinated with the regional seas programmes or with one another,
particularly investment projects. In order to strengthen national inter-sectoral coordination and propagate
country ownership the preparation of national action plans, the creation of inter-sectoral bodies is seen as a vital
step in each littoral state. Such an inter-sectoral body need not necessarily be led by the Ministry of
Environment or Natural Resources, since a weak and marginally effective coordination body could be more
damaging than none at all.
1.3 Legal setting and its implementation
All the G12 countries have participated in the Tacis Common Environmental Policies project and DG
Environment is engaged with those countries that have entered into Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
on beginning approximation work on their environmental legislation. There appears to be recognition in all G12
countries of the need to co-operate in environmental policy and develop harmonized regulations, increasingly
along EU lines. The process is well advanced and should be deepened.
The Bucharest Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution was signed and ratified in 1994
and since protocols on Hazardous Substances, Dumping, Land-based Sources (under revision) have been
adopted. Under preparation are a protocol on Biodiversity and Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Substances, and regional plans on nutrient reduction and co-operation in the event of spillage oil and hazardous
substances. A separate Fisheries Convention is still under negotiation.
On the Caspian, there are no regional agreements of any form and this will remain the case until the legal status
of the sea is resolved. The final text of the Framework Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the Caspian has been agreed and is to be signed by four, if not five countries, in early 2003. A protocol and
co-operation plan in case of oil spills in the Caspian has been drafted and a mechanism is being sought for its
implementation. Protocols on Biodiversity, Hazardous Substances, Land-based Sources, Prevention and Control
of Invasive and Introduced Species and EIA are envisaged. A fisheries agreement is currently being negotiated
with the assistance of CITES, FAO and Tacis; it is unclear whether there will be a separate Fisheries
Convention.
5
On the Aral Sea, agreements between the states on annual water allocation are made through the ICWC and
observe the status quo. An agreement between Kazakhstan and the Kyrgz Republic to supply fossil fuels in
return for summer water releases has been signed, but it is unclear whether the agreement is being honoured. It
has been commented that there is that lack of true commitment at a high political level to solve the problems of
the Aral Sea and enter into comprehensive agreements and co-operation on water use and sharing. There is no
basin wide agreement on protection the Aral Sea basin environment, though one is necessary to protect this
basin.
Commitment to environmental international legislation, at least on paper, is good. UN Conventions such as
Biodiversity, Migratory Species, Basel, CITES, Stockholm, ESPOO and Conventions under the IMO, including
MARPOL, have been either signed or ratified by many of the member countries; however, implementation is
very poor. More work is needed by the international community to encourage compliance. The IMO is very
active on the Black and Caspian seas working in conjunction with the shipping and oil and gas interests to help
the countries implement regional and international agreements. CITES is working with authorities and fisheries
industry in the Caspian to help improve management of the sturgeon fisheries and UNECE is active in the
region encouraging implementation of Aarhus and ESPOO. Following the Johannesburg summit, new efforts
need to be made to forge partnerships with the private sector to assist countries in meeting their regional and
international commitments. These partnerships will not form by themselves and will need to be pursued actively
by the international community.
Failure to implement and comply with existing or new legislation, whether it is at the national, regional or
international level is at the very heart of the regional seas’ problems. There is a common refrain amongst all of
the regional sea programmes for improved compliance and enforcement of existing legislation, and provision of
funding levels for the regulatory authorities commensurate with their obligations. The national institutions
whether they are involved in pollution control and abatement, water resource management, environmental status
monitoring, fisheries or nature conservancy, are drastically under-funded and many have barely sufficient
money to pay salaries. It should be recognized that budgets are in the tens of thousands of dollars, not hundreds
of thousands, and internationally grant-funded projects are a major source of survival income. At the same time,
the regional and international agreements are putting more not less obligations on these weak institutions, which
of course they accept in the hope of further international support. This situation is unlikely to change in the near
future; national budgets are being squeezed as governments look for savings to finance economic development,
infrastructure maintenance and social needs. Policy and legal reform and institutional rationalization will help to
better focus the resources available but this is not the complete solution. The correct use of economic
instruments will prevent pollution and over ultilization of resources. However, they should not be seen, as they
are in many G12 states, as a means of raising operating revenue for the regulatory systems. Environmental
funds work successfully in some states but are at the national level prone to misuse. At the regional level, work
on environment funds on the Black Sea and Caspian Seas received little support from the Ministries of Finance
of the participating countries and could not be advanced, despite eagerness from the Ministries of Environment.
A regional environment fund underpinned by a regional levy on shipping or, in the Caspian, oil and gas
industry, could be viable although expensive to manage, however, at present there are no dominant advocates
for such instruments. Due to poor funding and resulting poor salaries the regulatory authorities often suffer from
low implementation and execution capacity. Capacity building measures undertaken by the international
community are often ineffective due to poor identification of the target audience and lack of follow-up activities
– a certificate and no more. More patient guidance is needed, with step by step training to bring about lasting
changes. Although it goes against policy of most of the international agencies perhaps subsidizing staff salaries
to attract and keep highly educated and motivated young professionals in the Ministries during this critical
period could be considered as an alternative to straight technical assistance. Projects like the recent Tacis
‘Support for the Implementation of Environmental and National Environmental Action Plans’ should be
6
replicated for the regional seas, addressing implementation of the specific National and the Strategic Action
Plans.
1.4 Management tools
Both the Black Sea Environmental Programme (BSEP) and Caspian Environmental Programme (CEP) are
umbrella programmes that address a wide range of water and environmental issues and problems in a holistic
and integrated manner, including, inter alia:
-
Pollution from land-based and marine based sources
Spillage of oil and other hazardous substances from shipping and off and near shore facilities
Fisheries management
Biodiversity and invasive species
Integrated Coastal Area management (based on land use) and sustainable coastal development
Public health, including recreational waters and water supply to coastal communities
In both seas, Transboundary Diagnostic Analyses (TDA) were prepared. Following a review of the perceived
water and environmental issues in the light of existing information and data the root causes were identified and
interventions needed to address them identified in a Strategic Action Programme (SAP). In essence, the Black
and Caspian Seas the SAPs provide a timeline for implementation of commitments made by the countries in
their respective Conventions and associated Protocols, but they are voluntary, non-binding guidance documents,
adopted at the Ministerial level only, often solely by the Ministries of Environment, and contain actions which
lie outside the jurisdictions of the signatories. The Black Sea and Caspian (in draft) SAPs are comprehensive,
ambitious work plans, unprioritized and uncosted. The international partners, typically those who are driving
the SAPs, have unrealistic expectations of the speed with which the SAPs can be realized by the signatory
countries and perhaps, under present economic climate, a more subjective, bottom-up approach to SAP
implementation should be adopted. The G12 countries need to define their own national priorities and prepare
their own national plans for implementation. These should be coordinated through the national endorsement
processes, and receive support from all relevant Ministries – including, critically Ministries of Finance - and key
stakeholders. Importantly, these national plans should be based on available national resources, if wish lists are
to be turned into realistic and implementable plans. Once complete, the prioritization and timelines of these
national plans should be reflected in the SAP – though obviously, not based on the lowest common denominator
– in order modulate the timing of SAP implementation. On the Black Sea it is recognized that the EU accession
process is a driver for three member states and the G12 member constraints cannot be allowed to impede
implementation to any significant degree. The initial national plans produced may not be encouraging, for
example, investment project are unlikely to figure largely into the plans, but they will be realistic and could be
built upon in the future.
On the Aral Sea the focus of concern has been water allocation and demand management in the basin, since
these are root causes of the Aral Sea’s dramatic decline; in comparison these allocation issues are not critical in
either the Black or Caspian Seas. The Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP) deals with the whole basin and was
designed to address both water and environmental issues in an integrated fashion; however, as it developed and
the potential to rehabilitate the Aral Sea faded, water allocation issues took precedent. According to IFAS the
downstream basin states spend around $650 million per annum on the socio-economic and environmental
stabilization under the ASBP. However, these expenditures are excluded from the ASBP Strategic Action
Programme and it would appear none of the countries, are subject to a specific national plan, except the country
NEAPS. This lack of planning integration is of specific concern. Under the GEF project the basin states are
7
being given support to prepare water and salinity management plans.
The regional seas are the final downstream users in the wider basins. The unsustainable use of the water
resources in the upstream countries is finally reflected in the environmental status of the sea. It is impossible to
decouple the regional seas programmes from wider water resource management and land use in the contributing
river basins. The Istanbul Commission for the Black Sea and its umbrella Black Sea Environment Programme
(BSEP) under which the major basin projects are implemented have strong linkages with there river basin
counterparts; these include a major shared project with the International Commission on the Protection of the
Danube River (ICPDR); shared projects, and growing links with national and international activities on the
Dniper and Dinester; and unofficial linkages with the Don and Kuban River Basin Authorities in Russia. On the
Caspian, the geographical coverage of the umbrella Caspian Environment Programme (CEP) is restricted to the
sea’s surface area and a 100km coastal zone. Unofficial contacts through the compnent projects have been made
with the Federal Russian Volga Revival programme, and USAID and Tacis projects in the Kura basin with
some exchange of data between projects. This lack of basin approach is a current weakness of the CEP.
It should be noted that efforts to develop priority investment portfolios in the Black and Caspian Seas have been
less than successful, with few relevant, bankable water and environment projects having been identified and
prepared. Also, to the writer’s best knowledge, no environmental projects, with direct link to either the Black or
the Caspian Sea have been prepared under the EU Tacis Joint Environment Programmes (JEP) project. A major
omission on both the Black (except in the Danube basin) and Caspian Sea is a prioritised list of point and
diffuse source pollution hot spots or, a credible assessment of land-based sources, from which such a list could
arise. Development of such hot spot lists and identification of potential investment projects, in coordinated
conjunction with the regulatory authorities, is believed overdue in the Black and Caspian Seas.
In all three regional seas access to good, reliable data is inadequate and data sharing between littoral/basin
states is uncommon. The G12 region can generally be said to be data rich and information poor. There is a lot of
anecdotal evidence and designer data, which, in the current information vacuum, masquerades as empirical
observations. All historical data and assumptions should be questioned and validated. For the regional seas the
Russian Hydrometeorological Services and the other Russian Institutions that were the depositaries for all
Soviet data hold much of the valuable historical data. Oceanographic, hydrological, hydrographic, hydrochemical, fisheries data stretching back in some cases over hundred years does exist, but is not easily accessible
except in summary form, since much still exist only in paper form and is often well guarded. The G12 countries
usually have access only to data that relates to their own national territory. Data exchange clauses and articles
do exist in the various regional agreements and project documents, as well as international commitments, but in
reality the institutions that hold the data have tremendous vested interests and maintain a tight control. On the
Caspian, the Hydrometeorological Services of the littoral states have still not signed an agreement on data
exchange and obtaining a simple meta-database of Caspian data held by the Russin Hydromet took considerable
effort on the part of CEP. Despite these problems, pressure must continue to be exerted on the countries by the
international agencies to share their information and they themselves must make available all project results in
full and, where possible, in a consistent format.
Little or no information on the environmental status of regional seas is collected by the G12 littoral and basin
states outside specific projects, including fisheries and biodiversity data. Where monitoring is undertaken only
the basic parameters are measured and it is often spasmodic. There constant calls from the states to provide
equipment and training for all aspects of environmental monitoring, but no monitoring needs assessments are
provided and no calculations of running costs made. Initially the international community did respond to these
calls, but stories of equipment lying unpacked in state laboratories for years and valuable instruments being
transferred out of the region have since made donors more cautious. Monitoring programmes, as a first step, be
8
they for contaminants or biodiversity, should be focused, of a limited scope and affordable; designed to answer
the priority questions for the decision makers. They need to be put in place and over a programmed period (4-5
years) capacity building as well as provision of equipment need to be undertaken to ensure a resulting reliable
product. Recipient and donor pride often hinders the acceptance of simple but sustainable monitoring
programmes, preferring the quick technological fix to the long-term step-by-step approach. On the Caspian and
Black Seas work on biological effects and biomarker techniques is seen as one way of filling the need for a cost
effective monitoring contaminant programmes.
Involving the public in environmental decision making as a major engine for change and, with the exception of
the Black Sea, under utilized. It is always, as in this introduction, the final activity considered in any regional or
national plan and it is often the activity whose budget is cut in the final review. As stated clearly in a recent
Black Sea review document, only through embracing the democratic process can we achieve real change with
on-going environmental education of all sectors of society. Transparency of and access to the decision making
process is essential to sustainable development. The public has to be shown that change is possible and it is they
that have power to make the change. Vast numbers of small environmental awareness projects have been
executed in the regions on issues pertaining to the regional seas but still more, better targeted effort is required.
Efforts should include the development of Local Environmental Action Plans involving coastal communities
and local government authorities, mayoral conferences on the regional sea issues, involvement of the Regional
Environmental Centres and the stronger NGOs in execution of key aspects of the regional sea projects. More
accessible information about the programmes objectives, activities, results and failures, through regionally
accessible formats are needed. These cannot be just a web-site, but must also include posters, leaflets, brochures
in the languages of the coastal populations. Outreach programmes are expensive but essential activities. Only
the Black Sea Commission allows NGO observer status to their meeting and, importantly the Black Sea NGO
network is the only such body to grant reciprocal status to the Commission. Transparency on both the Caspian
and Aral Seas needs to be improved.
In the following sections, more detail is provided on the policy and policy tools in the three regional seas
discussed. This will review what is working and what is not working at regional and national levels, and where
there are needs, proposals for and prioritization of support measures. The emphasis is on what needs to be done
at the national level in order to comply with existing national, regional and international commitments.
9
2.0 Black Sea
2.1 Water issues in the Black Sea
2.1.1 Geographical setting
The Black Sea is the largest of the three regional seas in this report and is virtually land-locked being
surrounded by the littoral states are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The
surface area of the Black Sea is 423,000 km2 and has a volume of 574,000 km3. The contributory
basin has a surface area of over 2 million km2 and falls within 17 states. The sea is connected to the
Mediterranean in the south via the narrow Turkish straits at the Bosphorus that leads into the Sea of
Marmara and then to the Aegean Sea. In the north, it is connected to Sea of Azov, which is shared
between Russia and Ukraine and is considered an intrinsic part of the Black Sea. In the main basin of
the Black Sea the water depth approaches 2200m with only a narrow coastal shelf. In the northeast
between Romania and Ukraine there is an extensive shallow shelf area, which occupies
approximately 20% of the surface area of the sea, which is an important fish spawning and nursery
ground. The Black Sea receives large quantities of freshwater from its many contributory rivers; the
largest of these rivers are the Danube, Dniester, Dnieper and Don that provide over 70% of the
freshwater inputs. Since the sea receives more freshwater than it loses in evaporation, the salinity is
quite low compared to other regional seas. It is calculated that there is a surface outflow from the
Black Sea to the Aegean of 610km3/year and to compensate an underflow of 313km3/year enters
from the Mediterranean keeping the salinity at approximately 18ppt.
The slow rate of replenishment of the deep waters from the Mediterranean and large input of
freshwaters has led to a very stable hydrographic environment in which wind, solar and wave
energies are insufficient to mix the lighter freshwater surface layer with the deeper denser saline
waters. This has created permanently anoxic basin waters below 150m, due to the oxygen demand of
large quantities of decomposing riverine organic matter as it falls to the bottom.
The River Danube is the single largest contributor of freshwater to the Black Sea and has a profound
influence on the hydrography, chemistry and biology of the sea and, especially on the north-west
shelf. The Danube and the pollutants it carries represent the biggest threat to the stability of the
Black Sea. The Danube riparian states include Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovenia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova and
Ukraine.The activities of the people of these thirteen countries as much as those of the Black Sea
littoral states that have put the Black Sea in crisis, and demonstrating most vividly the need to adopt
a basin wide approach in addressing the environmental problems of regional seas.
The Black Sea coastal zone is densely populated, hosting a permanent population, excluding
Istanbul, of 16 million and another 4 million during the summer season. Tourism is an important
source of revenue for region, especially in the three G12 littoral states, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia
where seaside holidays at home are once again becoming popular. Recreational and commercial
fishing are prevalent in the region. Experts estimate that the Black Sea could support sustainable fish
catches in the region of 2 million tones per year if the principles of responsible fishing were
introduced and the necessary protective measures put in place. Since the 1980’s the value of the
fishing industry on the Black Sea is estimated to have declined by as much as $170 million due to
over-capitalisation and over exploitation with a reduction in overall landings and a loss of valuable
species. In addition, in the 1980’s the invasion of the ctenophore Mnemiopsis Leidyi from the
10
eastern seaboard of the United States, transferred in ship ballast waters, has led to competition with
and loss of the pelagic fish species. Bringing about a near total collapse of Black Sea fisheries as the
invasion reached plague proportions. Mnemiopsis numbers are now declining for a several reasons
and with some enforcement measures in place there is now hope that the Black Sea fisheries may get
recover. Despite this, the Black Sea states have not yet finalized the Fisheries Convention begun in
1996 and illegal fishing is still a major concern for the region.
2.1.2 Specific water and environmental issues
Eutrophication is the priority transboundary issue for the Black Sea and target of a major initiative
by the Global Environmental Facility to reduce nutrient loading from the basin countries.
Eutrophication in the Black Sea was first widely observed in 1960s and 1970s when the linkage to
river discharges were made. It is estimated that historically the Danube alone introduced some
60,000 tons of phosphorus and 340,000 tons of inorganic nitrogen into the sea each year. These huge
nutrient inputs were observed to change the structure of the plankton community, including a shift to
small size plantonkic algae (i.e. dinoflagellates) and an increase in the incidence of ‘blooms’ – the
phenomena whereby a particular aquatic ecosystem becomes dominated by a single species. In
addition, the decomposition of the plankton caused oxygen depletion, sometimes also the production
of Hydrogen Sulphide, which led to mass mortalities of fish and invertebrates. Observations have
shown a worrying rise in the anoxic waters of the basin and reduction of the oxygen rich upper layer
to less than 100m in depth in places and an expansion of the zones of hypoxia. The waters of Danube
have had a particularly troubling impact on the all-important northwest shelf of the Black Sea, whose
historically clear waters support the macrophyte Phyllophora, a red algae which provides the most
important nursery for fish in the Black Sea. The increase in phytoplankton populations and their
consequential density reduced water clarity and the amount of the sunlight getting to the
Phyllophora. In the deeper waters and the area of Phyllophora field have been reduced from
11,000km2 in 1950s to 500km2 in the 1990’s.
A joint Danube-Black Sea working group in 1998 identified the long-term objective for
rehabilitation of the Black Sea in order to achieve an ecological status as close as possible to that of
the Black Sea in the early 1960’s, when the natural conditions were not significantly disturbed. And
an intermediate objective for all countries to introduce urgent control measures to avoid that
discharge of nitrogen and phosphate does not exceed levels observed in 1997. It was also made clear
by the working group that the Danube basin countries were the major source of nutrients, with
fertilizer use in Germany and Austria being of particular concern. In the lower basin Central
European countries fertilizer use has declined over the past ten years due to economic downturns,
although reactivation of intensive agriculture could again, cause problems if not regulated.
Municipal water waste treatment in on the G12 Black Sea coast is either poor, or non-existent. The
treatment works are often overloaded, obsolete and in need of urgent repair. Often sewage treatment
is limited to screening before being discharged directly via long sea outfall of industry into coastal
rivers. Micro-biological pollution of recreational waters is of concern in the G12 Black Sea countries
and lack of access to monitoring data compounds the problem. Without primary, secondary or
tertiary treatment the nutrient loading from municipal waste is naturally high.
Clean water supply in certain places of the coastal zone is a problem with high reported incidence of
water borne diseases. Secondary contamination of drinking water in urban areas and poor separation
of water supply wells and septic tanks in rurac areas is common. It is unclear whether this situation
11
is deteriorating or improving since the epidemiological data is not easily accessible. This certainly
warrants further attention.
The main sources of hydrocarbons are the oil terminal at Odessa, the Port of Sochi and the Danube.
Transport of oil into and out of the Black Sea via the Turkish straits is forecast to increase
considerably with the development of the Caspian oil fields. The new Baku – Poti pipeline will
deliver oil to the Black Sea coast, along with the oil already delivered from Novorossiysk, for
transfer to Ukraine and to the Balkans via Borgas. This additional tanker traffic will increase the risk
of oil spills and the countries under the stewardship of the IMO are about to sign a Cooperation Plan
in the event of an oil spills. All the countries are signatories to MARPOL 1973/78 and strenuous
efforts are being made to provide reception facilities in compliance with the special area status
accorded to the Black Sea.
Assessments have indicated that trace metals do not appear to be a general problem in the Black Sea,
but of course, there are as always regional hot spots. It also must be noted that there are considerable
data gaps, both in contaminants measured and coverage. The highest concentrations of
organochlorine compounds found in the Black Sea sediments are in the vincinity of the Danube
delta; out values are low in comparison with other regional seas and G12 locations. There is
evidence of current use of DDT. It is not clear from current pollution assessment of the Black Sea
what levels of organochlorine compounds are to be found on the eastern shore of the Black Sea and
the Sea of Azov, which are associated with large irrigated areas.
2.2 Governance challenges specific to the Black Sea
The Black Sea countries signed the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution
in 1992, known as the Bucharest Convention, and the Istanbul Commission was established once
ratified. Agreement on the associated documents dealing with, financial issues, privileges and
immunities, and headquarters took time and delayed the establishment of a permanent secretariat
until October 2000. Not all the countries have paid their contributions for upkeep of the secretariat
and at it is limited to an executive director and a senior pollution and monitoring officer, plus
support staff at present. In time, four additional officers responsible for addressing land-based
sources, biodiversity, environmental information and environmental law will be engaged. It is
understood that the Tacis phase III support project is considering supporting the biodiversity expert
in the short term. After ten years there is still a lack of assurance of country commitment to the
Convention, especially within the G12 countries..
Tacis has recently reported that the Commission and current secretariat are subject to severe
functional and operational constraints in ensuring the implementation of the Convention and its
protocols. The Commissioners, drawn from the Ministries of either environment or natural
resources, do not have jurisdiction over many of the issues addressed in the Convention and have no
access to a national mechanism to secure funding. They are not able to guarantee national
implementation of the Convention articles or protocol or even monitor progress towards their
implementation.
In addition, protocols on biodiversity and transboundary movement of hazardous waste are being
finalised
Only one state, Ukraine, has a national Black Sea plan, based on the Convention and Strategic
12
Action Plan, which has been endorsed by the government, and can serve as legal binding instrument
for implementation. In June 2002 the national plans of Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Turkey were
still at the draft stage. As on the Caspian and Aral Seas the inter-sectoral coordination is poor in the
Black Sea. The establishment of national bodies to develop integrated environmental policies and an
action plan incorporating the major stakeholders is an important next step.
The secretariat has an immense work programme, but has neither the finances nor capacity to
execute it. Six advisory boards, coordinated by the activity centers established under the Black Sea
Environmental Programme, are still to be established to assist the secretariat in their work. Only of
the Activity Centers four can be considered operable. Including the three G12 Activity Centres,
which are operating with the assistance from Tacis; however but their claim to be regional centers of
excellence is dubious. The Biodiversity center in Batumi, Georgia is incapable of leading the
biodiversity component of the Tacis programme and has been given more nationally oriented
activities. The future of pollution monitoring Activity Centre is also uncertain following the request
by the Ukrainian beneficiary that it be moved from its long-standing home in Odessa to an institute
in Kiev. The secretariat will remain reliant on both the GEF and EU-Tacis projects, under the Black
Sea Environment Programme, for some time yet to come in order to meet its obligations.
The Black Sea countries are divided into those which are either on the path to EU accession
(Bulgaria and Romania) or are waiting in the wings (Turkey) and those which not. The accession
countries have a very real incentive to meet the accession criteria and align their legislation with that
of the EU and are receiving considerable financial assistance to do so through the ISPAR funds. As a
result, these accession seeking states are more aggressively addressing environmental compliance
within regional water management programmes, including the Black Sea and Danube, as a clear
demonstration of environmental stewardship. However, actual compliance with new legislation, as
opposed to titular enforcement of environmental laws, needs to be demonstrated to the European
Union. Since this is often one of the predominant barriers for EU accession. The strained budgets
and overwhelming need to provide basic public services in the G12 countries has led these countries
to relegate environmental issues to very low priorities. A comparison of the EU accession states to
these G12 countries demonstrates two-tracked environmental policy development in the Black Sea.
There is a real concern that implementation of the Convention, its protocols and Strategic Action
Plan will pushed as much by Brussels as the littoral states. The G12 countries could not implement
the original 1996 Strategic Action Plan (SAP) and it’s doubtful whether they can implement the
recently revised time-frame (2002) but they agreed to both. Perhaps they had no choice and they felt
that by agreeing eventually some real material assistance might be forthcoming. This wishful
thinking is dangerous, since it puts off the day when the countries themselves have to address the
problems and it would be better if they set realistic objectives themselves, within the framework of a
national plan, instead of the looking to the SAP which emphasizes unobtainable goals for them.
Addressing the problems of the Black Sea is very closely linked to the need to address the problems
of the major river basins. In this regard, the Black Sea is a model for all other regional seas. The
Brussels Ministerial Declaration, 2001, and MoU on Cooperation between the Black Sea
Commission and the International Commission on the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR),
2002, formalized the cooperation and collaboration between the two governance bodies. It is under
this that the Danube-Black Sea task force and Joint Black Sea-Danube Technical Working group
were established. In the future a similar close relationship could be forged with the Dnieper countries
(Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) as they begin negotiation on their own regional basin Convention. In
fact it is essential that the Black Sea Commission involve itself in these potential transboundary river
13
programmes and agreements to avoid confusion and conflict in the future.
According Tacis reports and others there are some very serious problems with water related
environmental management in Ukraine, Russia and Georgia at the national level. These include:





A basic lack of commitment to environmental protection, with very little financial support allocated
to national and regional programmes. This is in large part due to economic difficulties, lack of
general revenue and more pressing social and political concerns of the governments of these
countries. There are trained scientists in these countries that have the raw technical skills to
undertake environmental monitoring, assessment and management, but the lack of budget is slowly
eroding what capacity remains.
Despite commitments of governments, capital investment projects to reduce pollution, within
Ukraine, Georgia and Russia’s Black Sea basin, have not been forthcoming.
Any environmental reforms intended to address transboundary issues are not dealt with at local and
municipal levels, due to a lack of regional cooperative experience of these states.
Though major and valiant efforts have been made towards incorporating the public in environmental
management issues, it is believed that the public is generally not aware of Black Sea environmental
issues. As a result of this lack of awareness and lack of education, the public has not been able to
curtail environmentally damaging practices, nor to appeal to their governments to support more
active compliance with regional environmental governance commitments.
Poor compliance of pollution regulations, caused by poorly equipped and trained enforcement
authorities and a debilitating patronage system, is common to the region’s institutions. In its recent
five year review of SAP implementation the Istanbul Commission noted that there were no
comprehensive records of effectiveness of the enforcement procedures.
These combined factors have severely hampered positive water based environmental change in the G12
Black Sea Basin littoral states.
2.3 Overview of where specific water and environmental needs are being met by national, bilateral
and international community
The Black Sea Environmental Programme (BSEP) was initiated in 1993 and as one of the first GEF
Regional Sea Programmes has laid the foundations for other GEF international water programmes
around the world. With the assistance of the EU, through their Tacis and Phare facilities, BSEP
established a regional management structure – including six Activity Centers located on the coast;
undertook a detailed Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis that spawned many national and regional
reports; and developed a comprehensive Strategic Action Programme (SAP), between the years
1994 to 2000. National Black Sea Action Plans were initiated, but, as stated above, failed to be
implemented because they were not endorsed by the littoral states. The SAP is intended to address a
range of environmental issues pertaining to the broad concept of sustainable development, with
emphasis on the human component of environmental management. The SAP was a very well
presented comprehensive document, but perhaps overly ambitious, and as a result, in a recent review
by the Istanbul Commission many of the Programmes time-lines have been extended by five or ten
years. The Tacis phase II project and current phase III project under BSEP were designed to assist
the countries implement the SAP in the areas of biodiversity, pollution monitoring and integrated
coastal zone management and have been in part successful. The current GEF projects under the
Black Sea – Danube River Basin Strategic Partnership are targeted at nutrient load reduction and
habitat restoration, which are seen as the most immediate threats to the Black Sea (see below).
14
With the establishment of the secretariat the status of the Black Sea Environmental Programme has
now formalized as a coordinated programme of interventions designed to implement the SAP and is
coordinated through a Joint Project Management Group, ensuring collaboration amongst donors. Ongoing projects under the BSEP include:
- GEF-UNDP Control of eutrophication, hazardous substances and related measures for rehabilitating
the Black Sea eco system, phase 1, project elements include: Capacity building of the secretariat;
revision of the land-based activity legislation; strategic studies of eutrophication process in the Black
Sea; development of sectoral and national nutrient control plans, including amended proposals for
amended legislation; cost-benefit study of application of recommendations; formulation of proposals
for economic instruments; and small grant programme to support nutrient reduction projects. The
value of the support is $4.3 million over 2 years.
- GEF-WB Investment Fund for Nutrient Reduction in the Danube and Black Sea Basin worth $70
million over the next six years, has been established to catalyze the necessary investment response
from a wide group of stakeholders to reduce nutrient inputs. The investment fund will provide grant
funds for investments in agriculture, municipal and industrial wastewater treatment sectors and will
aim to lever an additional $210 million.
-Tacis Black Sea Environmental Programme support Phase III commenced in June 2003, with a total
budget of Euro 2.8 million it is to be implemented over 24 months. The project will provide technical
assistance to the secretariat and the three Activity Centres in Ukraine, Russia and Georgia to meet their
commitments under the SAP. Specific project activities include:
- Assist the countries to finalise and adopt a water monitoring programme and development of
the Environmental Assessment and Monitoring Strategy and Integrated Monitoring and
Assessment Programme for the Black Sea
- Develop a regional database and QA/QS system for an integrated contaminant monitoring
programme
- Investigation possible economic instruments to support a regional environmental fund
- Finalisation of Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, and a integrated biodiversity
monitoring programme
- Update of Black Sea Pollution assessment and help prepare a cost-effective Pollution
Reduction strategy
- Dissemination of information and public awareness raising
The ICPDR’s Pollution Reduction Programme, a similar but more advanced programme of projects
to the BSEP, which has recently developed a revised Strategic Action Programme. The overall
objectives are to achieve sustainable development in the Danube River Basin and specifically to
reduce pollution loads, in particular nutrients, to the Black Sea. On the sectoral level, the Danube
SAP priorities are (1) Improvement of municipal wastewater and solid waste management; (2)
Introduction of Best Available Technologies – BAT, and Best Environmental Practices – BEP, and
abatement of water pollution in the mining and industrial sectors; and (3) Implementation of good
agricultural practices and mechanisms for sustainable land management in the agricultural sector.
Under the Pollution Reduction Programme the GEF – UNDP project Strengthening the
Implementation Capacities for Nutrient Reduction and Transboundary Cooperation in the Danube
River Basin, phase 1 has a duration of two years and a value of $5.35 million. Project components
include ; Development of river basin and water resource guidelines; formulation of policy for
15
reduction of nutrients and other harmful substances and rehabilitation of wetlands; proposal for
economic instruments; capacity building to improve transboundary contaminant monitoring; a public
awareness campaign and small grants programme and strategic studies of the sediments of the Iron
gate reservoirs.
The Dnieper Basin Environment Programme is a GEF/UNDP sponsored programme to assess the
transboundary river issues in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus that began in 1999. The long term
objectives of the programme are to remedy serious environmental effects of pollution and to ensure
sustainable use of the basin resources. In this first phases the specific objectives are (1) Create a
transboundary management regime and coordinating body; (2) Assist countries in the formulation,
review and endorsement process of a Strategic Action Programme; (3) Improve
financial/legal/operational mechanisms for pollution reduction and sustainable resource use; (4)
Formulation of National Action Plans by inter-ministerial committees; (5) Improve conservation of
biodiversity; (6) Enhance communication among stakeholders and encourage public awareness and
involvement in addressing the problems of the Dnieper Basin; and (7) Build capacity for SAP
implementation. The BSEP and Dnieper programmes coordinate through the UNDP-GEF offices in
New York.
Other regional projects include projects such as:
A $10 million World Bank loan to Georgia with additional GEF funds to support an ICZM project
which includes the preparation of national oil spill contingency plan, a contaminant monitoring
programme, ICZM database and the creation of a national park within the Kolkheti wetlands.
The IMO is working with the Black Sea states and oil and gas industry representatives to implement
the new co-operation plan in the event of oil spills and through a pilot project in Odessa to test
proposals for the new Convention on Ballast waters management.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has been active in the Black Sea since 1993 with
various projects and provided much valuable data to the BSEP Black Sea Pollution Assessment in
through their Science for Stability Black Sea project which ended in 1998.
A full listing of major Black Sea projects is given in appendix II.
2.4 Overview of where specific needs are not being met and suggestions for possible support
measures
There is an urgent need for all the Black Sea states in particular the G12 countries, to develop a
national Black Sea plans that can be endorsed by the governments, undergo full inter-sectoral
consultation and to which a budget can be assigned. The current SAP is still too ambitious and
which, it should be remembered, is not a binding document. In its phase III project Tacis is to
provide some small assistance to the G12 countries develop national plans, but it is unlikely to be
enough. The states countries should be encouraged to strengthen an inter-sectoral coordination.
Coordination at the regional level between countries and donors is good and also between the Black
Sea and the major programmes of the river basins. However, the secretariat is still weak and has not
the funds or capacity to undertake its duties and more financial and political commitment is needed
from the countries.
16
Although much assistance in terms of equipment and training has been given to the region, little
coordinated monitoring of contaminants and biota is being undertaken by the states. This may be
because existing proposed conventional monitoring programmes are too expensive to execute and no
cost-effective alternatives have yet to be agreed. It should be hoped that the Tacis project would be
able to encourage the G12 states to establish new programmes soon.
A land-based source assessment was undertaken as part of the first GEF project, however, the result
was not satisfactory and a new assessment, including that of diffuse sources, is required urgently. A
revised list of hot-spot should be prepared and for priority projects documents prepared for
submission to international donors.
The international community should emphasize compliance with existing agreements and policies at
the national and regional level. These agreements should be followed as closely as possible and
implementation of a graduated process for enforcement would create more effective compliance than
an all or nothing approach; however, Policy makers, and enforcement bodies should be made aware
of these policy process options.
In order to fully understand the range of water specific environmental needs in the region, a
comprehensive stakeholder analysis should be conducted. This should focus on the multiple
stakeholders, including not only those affected by environmental degradation, but those causing it,
and those who are charged with regulating it. Further, such an analysis, if properly conducted would
provide illuminating insights into the perceptions of the most immediate threats to and concerns of
those most directly involved in these issues. This information can be used to steer policy, target
programmes, and to influence government actions. Though this area is probably less prone to
emerging environmental based conflict than the Aral or Caspian basins, the information garnered
from such a comprehensive stakeholder analysis could provide much needed information regarding
the basic water specific needs in the region.
Improved monitoring of health conditions in the G12 countries, specific to water related impacts
should be considered. These conditions warrant attention for public health reasons, as well as for
broader environmental management concerns.
In summary, the suggested project for the Black Sea include:
-
-
Encourage water and environmental policy coordination in the region through development
and implementation of national action plans and the creation of national coordinating unit
and inter-sectoral liaison committees
Assist the countries to implement cost-effective, integrated contaminant and biological
monitoring programmes in the coastal waters.
Undertake a new land-based source assessment for the Black Sea.
Assist the countries improve their compliance record with national and international
legislation, and investigate graduated compliance process.
Undertake a stakeholder analysis
Production of a public health atlas for the Black Sea and development and implementation of
targeted action plans.
17
3.0 Caspian Sea
3.1 Water issues in the Caspian Basin
3.1.1. Geographical Setting
The Caspian Sea is the largest inland water body in the world, occupying a deep depression on the boundary
between Asia and Europe with a water level at present 27 metres below sea level. It is approximately 1200km
long with a maximum breadth of 466km and contains 78,000 cubic km and has a total coastline of 7000km. The
sea is split into three major portions: the northern, middle and southern parts. The northern part, which covers
approximately 80,000 square km, is relatively shallow, averaging about 5 to 6m and has a salinity of 0.1 parts per
thousand (ppt) and 10-11 ppt near the middle Caspian. The Northern Caspian is subject to a continental climate
and ice begins to appear in November and in severe winters will cover the whole of the northern section. The
middle part of the Caspian is a separate depression whose western slope is quite steep leading to depths of 400600m and whose eastern slopes are more gradual. The middle part is separated from the largest southern part by
the Absheron ridge, which is an extension of the Greater Caucasus range. The middle and southern parts of the
Caspian have only small fluctuations in salinity: surface salinity varies from 12.6 to 13.5 ppt increasing from
north to south and west to east, there also a small increase in salinity with depth. Water depths of over 1000m are
found in the southern part of the Caspian. The Caspian is fed by four rivers or river groups: in the north the Volga
(80 percent of total inflow) and the Ural (5 percent); in the west the Terek, Sulak and Samur (5 percent) and the
Kura (8 percent); and, in the south, the short mountain rivers from the Iranian Alborz range (4-5 percent). There is
no appreciable run-off from the eastern side of the Caspian. The Caspian is subject to considerable water level
fluctuations. Between 1835 and 1978 the water level fell by three metres to –28.5m, since then levels have risen
by more than two metres and then fallen back slightly. These water fluctuations are mainly caused by natural
phenomena but are also subject to anthropogenic effects. Depending on which climatic model is selected, global
warming may cause either a dramatic increase or slight decrease in the water level over the next fifty years. The
water level fluctuations have significant impacts on the coastal biodiversity and infrastructure, particularly in the
shallow, northern part where loss of land and flooding are of real concern.
Although the biodiversity of the Caspian is quite low it does exhibit a relatively high endemism due to its
historical isolation. The current estimated number of endemic species is 337, including 34 fish and 1 marine
mammal, the Caspian Seal. The coastal and marine habitats are diverse, including important Ramsar sites,
however, protection of these areas is not always as legislation dictates and the water level fluctuations of the
Caspian constantly re-define the boundaries and extent of the coastal wetlands. With the connection of the
Caspian to the Black Sea and Baltic Sea through the Russian inland waterways of the threat of invasive species
and the potential destruction they bring is a major environmental issue for the Caspian. There are five Caspian
littoral states: Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and Turkmenistan. There are
three additional states whose territory lies within the Caspian basin: Armenia, Georgia and Turkey. The
population of the Caspian coastal region is approximately 12 million; six million reside in the narrow coastal strip
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 3 million in Baku and the coast of Azerbaijan. The remaining population are
distributed on the Russian (Daghestan, Kalmykiya and Astrakhan oblasts) and Kazakhstan (Atyrau and Mangistau
oblasts) coasts. The coastal population of Turkmenistan is very small, and is concentrated around the ports of
Turkmenbashi and Chalakan.
Oil and gas have been a major industry of the Caspian since the end of the 19th century. The Caspian Basin is
believed to contain considerable oil and gas deposits, though the magnitude, value, location and even ownership
is still unclear. Initially oil reserves were estimated to be around 50 billion barrels. This figure was upgraded to
200 billion in the mid-1990s, but has recently been revised downward to 100 billion. All the major international
18
oil companies are currently involved the exploition of Caspian oil and gas and construction of the infrastructure,
including pipelines, to deliver the oil to market. The earliest date for large-scale production from the two major
known fields in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is 2007 and 2010, respectively.
The Caspian Sea is rich in fish resources and home to the largest populations of sturgeons in the world. The
fishing industry creates large numbers of coastal jobs. The wholesale value of caviar alone is estimated to be $80
million dollars annually, although only a small percentage of this money will return to the coastal communities.
The Caspian sturgeon fishery has suffered a dramatic decline since the early eighties due to numerous factors.
Illegal fishing and trading in caviar since the break-up of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the fisheries
management is the main reason for the decline, however, pollution and changes in the hydrological regime in the
main spawning rivers have also contributed. The invasive of the comb jelly Mnemiopsis Leydei of the Caspian
from the Black Sea, via the Volga-Don canal, is of great concern, threatening to decimate the sardine and sprat
fisheries particularly in the southern part of the sea much as it did on the Black Sea, and rather impact the
sturgeon fishery.
3.1.2 Specific water and environmental issues in the Caspian Sea
It is often stated that the Caspian is highly polluted with hydrocarbons from the oil and gas industry and by the
Volga River, which discharges the wastes from Russia’s industrial heart-land into the northern Caspian. It is true,
there are major pollution hot spots, Baku and the Absheron peninsula in particular, but recent international studies
have yet to identify widespread pollution. On the Volga river, below the Volga cascade, studies by Dutch
scientists have indicated the lower portion of the Volga to be a relatively clean river and studies in the Volga delta
by Moscow State University have come to the same tentative conclusion. This is in comparison to other similar
river systems, for instance, to the lower Danube. It is very conceivable that many of the pollutants from the Volga
system are sequestered in the reservoirs of the Volga cascade and further investigation of these potential pollution
sources needs to be undertaken. On the Kura river system, the Azerbaijan authorities talk of gross pollution
emanating from both Georgia and Armenia and threatening the water supply abstraction point for Baku, which
lies on the main river below the junction of the Kura (draining from Georgia and Azerbaijan) and the Aras
(draining from Turkey, Armenia and Iran). A limited study by USAID of the Mingechaur reservoir, a large
irrigation impoundment on the Georgian-Azerbaijan boundary, showed the quality of the downstream water at the
time of sampling (summer) to be relatively good. As part of its Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis of the
Caspian Sea, the Caspian Environment Programme (CEP) reviewed the available historical water and sediment
quality data from the Aras river system, but could not make any conclusive statements about the pollution load of
the river because of the questionable reliability and coverage of the data, indicating further studies are perhaps
required.
The CEP undertook a limited survey of the sediments in the coastal zone of the Caspian during 2000 and 2001.
The International Atomic Energy Authority’s Marine Environmental Laboratory in Monaco tested approximately
120 sediment samples for thirty contaminants, including pesticides and PCBs. This was the first basin wide
survey undertaken since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The full findings are available on the CEP web-site
(www.caspianenvironment.org) and are summarized below:
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The levels of many heavy metals (Aluminium, Cadmium, Chromium, Copper, Lead, Nickel, Silver and Zinc)
are high in the Caucasus region and the south Caspian; this heavy metal signature is probably geographical in
origin rather than industrial;
Mercury is a contaminant of concern, especially around Baku, where a source of Mercury from industrial
facilities in Sumgait has been identified.
Two hots spots of Chromiun were identified, one near the mouth the Ural river in Kazakhstan and a second in
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the Kura delta, which could represent industrial or mining discharges.
Lead levels are high near Sumgait and show a slight elevation in the mouth in the Ural.
In general, the sediments in the Kazak and Russian sectors are remarkably unpolluted with heavy metals
Baku Bay has high levels of HCH, Aldrin, PAHs, PCBs, Chlorane, total hydrocarbons, DDT, Lindane Endrin
and Dieldrin in the sediments.
The Kura River mouth has high levels of HCH, Aldrin, PAH, Chlorane, total hydrocarbons, DDT and HCB.
The Kazak waters were the cleanest of organics, including total hydrocarbons
The most worrying finding was the high levels of pesticides in the Caspian and the evidence of continued use of
DDT, a compound that has been banned in the region for over twenty years. Ecotoxicology results undertaken by a
Japanese consultant in a recent World Bank study confirmed these findings showing high pesticides levels present
in the tissues of fish and the Caspian seal.
High levels of total hydrocarbons were not, as had been predicted, recorded in the sediments throughout the
coastal zone and nutrient loading was found to be an issue only in local areas, noticeably along the Iranian coast
were there is a high population, little waste water treatment and intensive agriculture, especially rice.
Baku Bay and the Absheron Peninsula and the city of Sumgait in Azerbaijan are some the most polluted parts of
the Caspian coast. A study of Baku Bay funded by the Government of the Netherlands and executed by the
consulting firm IWACO in 2000, following up on an early World Bank study, reported the water and and
sediments of the Bay to be grossly polluted. It was estimated that the Bay receives up to 8,000 tonnes of
petroleum hydrocarbons per year from a coastal oil field (Bibi-Heybat), two out-dated refineries and the
municipal wastewaters. In addition, 40,000 cubic metres of untreated muncipal wastewaters are discharged into
the Bay daily, representing a considerable health hazard. There have been numerous efforts by the international
funding agencies and CEP to generate sufficient Government and state oil company interest to tackle some of
these problems before and since the study, but as yet these efforts have been to no avail.
Sumgait is an industrial city, close to Baku, which in Soviet times was a major producer Chlorine-Alkaline and
which led to gross contamination of the environment by Mercury. It is estimated that mercury losses to the
environment were at times as high as 1kg per ton of chlorine produced and the total loss during the production life
was between 1.5-3 thousand tones. A World Bank mercury clean-up project, worth $8.3 million, has targeted one
high priority site, out of 44 identified, for mercury clean-up; approximately 100-150 tonnes of mercury is
estimated to have accumulated in the soil of the old factory site. This is the first step in a massive environmental
clean-up, which needs to be undertaken by the Government of Azerbaijan.
3.2 Governance challenges specific to the Caspian
The Caspian Sea has potentially immense oil and gas resources that could be either its saviour or its destroyer. In
the late 19th early 20th century the Caspian and in particular Baku was an important center for the production of oil
and its bi-products. Baku was the target of German armies during World War II but they failed to cut off one of
Russia’s major oil supplies. Throughout the first half of the 20th century tremendous environmental damage was
done by the industry to the Absheron peninsula and the coastal waters of Azerbaijan, but luckily development was
limited on shore and the near shore, and as new more easily accessible oil fields were discovered Baku and the
Caspian lost their importance. The Caspian resources were reappraised at the end of the 20th century, with the
break up of the Soviet Union, and driven by technological advances in oil exploration and the increasing demand
for and therefore price of oil. . Current estimates of the oil reserves of the Caspian are between 100-200 billion
barrels, principally in the Kazakh and Azeri sectors. This represents tremendous wealth if it can be transported to
the global market and if the countries can decide who owns it. In conjunction with the national oil companies all
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of the major international oil companies are actively exploring the Caspian and busy constructing the
infrastructure-the pipelines-necessary to export it to market. Caspian oil is never going to be cheap and constraints
placed by politicians on the export routes are making it even more expensive. The oil companies see the Caspian
as strategic rather than a mainstream development and therefore the revenues from the much heralded bounty may
be some way off, or it may never come.
The littoral states, probably aware of the past short falls of their own national oil companies, but, also possibly
seeing potential revenue sources, have set environmental operating standards for the international oil companies
at very high standards in the production sharing agreements; sometimes higher than those in national legislation
and certainly higher than the national companies could meet at present. The Russian Federation is calling for zero
discharge from all oil off-shore installations on a regional basis. However, no investment in the regulatory system
required to make this enforce this measure is being made by the littoral states. The states also are voicing just
concern about the potential impact of oil spills on the enclosed Caspian, but, similarly, barely, any effort is being
made by the states to address the issue, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are wholly reliant on the
international oil companies to respond to an emergency event. On the other hand, the states are extremely keen to
prosecute the international oil companies when it is claimed they are violating any regulations. It is reported that
in Kazakhstan the coastal oblasts have levied fines worth $40 million on the international oil companies. Based
these very mixed signals it does not appear that the states are taking their stewardship of the environment
seriously and an atmosphere of short-termism, of plunder, still pervades.
All the governments of the Caspian states are marked by strong executive powers and although they all now have
democratically elected Presidents, they are at varying stages of democratization. Government accountability is for
the most part weak in the region, with paternalistic central governments that do not feel a need to consult with or
listen to their citizens. Lack transparency and abuse of power are common in the regional at national and local
level, and are a consequence of the weak democratic process. The governments in the region are tightly focused
on economic growth and revitalization and much less attention is being given to the environment protection, or
even public health. Integration of environmental protection objectives into the overall development planning
process is still a distant objective, although there are encouraging signs notably in Kazakhstan and Iran. Tensions
exist between the states, notably between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and Iran and Azerbaijan over the sea-bed
resources. Succession is a looming issue for Azerbaijan and perhaps Turkmenistan and the slow separation of
church and secular state in Iran brings with it great instability.
In the background of all this activity the main outstanding governance issue for the Caspian, impacting on oil
development, pipelines, fisheries, shipping and the environment alike, is the lack of agreement on the legal status.
Prior to its break-up the Soviet Union had agreements with Persia and later Iran on the commerce, shipping and
fisheries, which allowed free navigation and free fishing except in the costal waters. In 1954 a line of frontier was
established and fishing rights were reaffirmed. However, crucially there was no agreement on sea-bed resources.
Until the legal status of the Caspian Sea is resolved by the five littoral states no regional agreements, even for
those issues (environment and fisheries) that are completely de-linked from the legal status question can be
signed. There are three main options for division of the sea-bed:
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Closed Basin: A twenty mile coastal zone in which the country has full sovereign rights, a further 20 mile
exceptional economic zone with lesser sovereign rights, but including exploitation of all natural resources,
and a middle zone of the Sea which belongs to the Commonwealth of Caspian States and is under their control
and management.
Open Sea, based on UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): A twelve miles of territorial waters in
which the coastal states has full sovereignty and 200 miles of exceptional economic zone were the states have
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lesser sovereign rights, but including exploitation of all natural resources.
Transboundary Lake: The Caspian is divided into national sectors, formed by the median line and extension of
the boundaries between states at the point they meet the Sea, in which the states have full sovereignty.
Negotiations between the countries are on-going, but the present their stated positions are:
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Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan support the transboundary lake option and bilateral agreements have been
signed between Russia and Kazakhstan and Russia and Azerbaijan to that effect.
Iran favours the closed basin option with a proposed a condominium approach, where all resources in the
central zone are shared equally.
Turkmenistan has requested the UN to adjudicate, but it is understood they favor the open sea option and with
the position of the middle line being negotiated.
It is still unclear how and when these negotiations will be resolved. A recent summit of the Caspian State Presidents
in April 2002 failed to break the deadlock; however, political changes in one or more of the Caspian countries in
the nearest future could help speed up the final decision.
The governance of the Caspian is not helped by the continued isolation of Iran by the western powers, although in
recent years relations with the EU and its member states have improved greatly along with the democratization of
the country, the United States policy towards Iran is still one of isolation.
In general, the environmental legislation of the Caspian states is well developed and has undergone and continues to
undergo considerable transformation, however, there are still weaknesses including: legislation gaps,
inconsistencies, misguided economic instruments and, above all, poor compliance. There is recognition amongst the
G12 members of the advantage of harmonization of regulations, standards and increasingly along EU lines.
Compliance with multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) such as Aarhus, Espoo, CITES is often poor and
more assistance needs to be given once the country has signed and ratified a specific agreement to insure
compliance. Countries received GEF assistance in order to implement the Biodiversity and Climate Change
Conventions and now also the Agreement on Persistent Organic Pollutants, but some other lesser agreements are
not so well supported.
The Ministries or Departments of Environment, with perhaps the exception of Iran, are catastrophically
underfunded and their capacity to implement national legislation, ensuring compliance, is severely compromised,
if it exists at all. Working with the authorities on the ground to ensure fair application of existing legislation is
surely the next greatest challenge for the international community. However, the countries must demonstrate a
true commitment to change the situation in return not just through new policy and legislation but also budgetary
allocations.
As in the Black Sea and the Aral Sea lack of clear jurisdiction is a major obstacle in the successful governance of
water and environmental issues and a barrier to integration at the sectoral level. In all states responsibilities are
distributed over a relatively large number Ministries and Institutions, for instance, in Turkmenistan environmental
protection is the shared responsibility of:
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Ministry of Nature Protection
The State Fish Industry Committee
Turkmen Geology
National Hydrometeorology Committee, attached to the cabinet of Ministers
Turkmenistan information standards center
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Ministry of Water Industry
Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Department
Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspection
There are no national coordinating bodies for Caspian issues, although efforts are being made to establish them
through the Caspian Environment Programme, and even within the larger Ministries inter-departmental rivalry
can prevent smooth coordination.
3.3 Overview of where specific water and environment needs are being met by national, bilateral and
international community
In the Caspian’s governance vacuum, the Caspian Environmental Programme (CEP) is the only existing intergovernmental body that operates, although it has no legal entity and participation is voluntary. The CEP is a
regional umbrella Programme agreed in 1995 and launched in 1998 by the littoral states and aided by the
international agencies (approximately $16 million) in a desire to protect the Caspian Sea marine environment, as
expressed in the Tehran (1991) and Astrakhan (1993) communiqués and the Almaty Declaration on
Environmental Cooperation, signed in May 1994. The geographically coverage of the CEP is limited to the
surface area of the sea itself and an inland 100km coastal zone. Its steering committee encompasses all Caspian
states and the main supporting international agencies (WB, UNDP, UNEP and the EU) but excludes the other
countries in the broader Caspian Sea basin, even as observers. The CEP Steering committee meets once a year
and comprises high-level representatives from the countries, often the Minister of Environment or Natural
Resources. The main CEP operational body, the Programme Coordinating Unit (PCU), managed by the
Programme Coordinator, is currently located in Baku, Azerbaijan but is scheduled to transfer to Tehran, Islamic
Republic of Iran in early 2003. The CEP has established ten regional thematic centers (Biodiversity; Water level
Fluctuations; Fisheries; Legal, Economic and Regulatory instruments; Pollution Abatement and Control;
Emergency Response; Pollution Monitoring; Integrated Coastal Area Management; Desertification; and
Sustainable Human Development and Health) whose primary function was to assist in the development of the
Transboundary Diagnostic Analyses (TDA). Following completion of the TD in 2002 the centres’ future is under
review with the likely result will be that the centers will be replaced by Advisory Boards their number reduced.
The International Partners have provided the financial support for the CEP’s management structure, including the
salaries of the Programme Coordinator and key PCU staff, during its first four period. However, a prerequisite for
further support will be that these management costs are met by the Caspian states.
The Strategic Action programme (SAP), compiled by experts drawn from the region supported by international
experts, outlines a ten year plan of action dived into two five year periods. Upon signing the countries will
commit themselves to implement the activities in the first five years and endeavour to implement those in the
second five years – this second group contains the wish list projects. The SAP will be revised every four years
creating a rolling programme of activities. In developing the SAP the experts drew upon the TDA, the text of the
Framework Convention and importantly in the first five years of activity, the draft National Caspian Action Plans
(NCAPs). All five Caspian states are developing, independently or within existing planning frameworks, National
Caspian Action Plans. These NCAPs are currently going through the endorsement processes of their respective
governments and will be adopted within the next six months. The NCAPs reflect the national and regional (as
given in the SAP) environmental priorities and have been subjected to consultation process at the national and
regional levels involving all major stakeholders including the public. The countries are now considering proposals
put forward by the CEP to establish permanent National Caspian Coordinating Units, analogous to Programme
Coordinating Unit (PCU) at the regional level, to monitor and coordinate implementation of the NCAP. In
addition, it has been suggested an inter-sectoral liaison committee be established comprising representative from
the major stakeholders.
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As part of its activities the CEP through the offices of UNEP has been supporting the development process of the
Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea and initiating
discussions on some of the key protocols to the Convention (Biodiversity and Emergency Response). Intergovernmental discussions on the Framework Convention began in 1994, and at the seventh session in Tehran in
July 2002 a final text, between Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan and Russia, was agreed and a
date for signing was set for late January 2003. It is anticipated that at least four of the countries will sign and then
perhaps go on to ratify the Convention. Turkmenistan is still considering whether to sign the document. Only until
all five countries, including Turkmenistan, have signed and ratified the Convention will it enter in to force and a
Commission and Secretariat be established. Until that time the CEP will remain as the regional management
structure.
The World Bank has been executing a $2 million project to identify and prepare environmental investment
projects on the Caspian and through grant support small-scale investments projects up to $50,000. The number
and type projects put forward as candidates for preparation by the Caspian states has been disappointing. No
major pollution rehabilitation projects were put forward, although many exist, and there were a large number of
projects targeted at supporting the sturgeon fisheries.
Assistance is to be provided in the new GEF support project to the CEP to undertake a rapid land-based source
assessment of the near basin and develop and priority hot-spot list in the hope to trigger more interest from the
countries in tackling these problems. The GEF project worth $5-6 million is to be implemented by UNDP. It will
also address the priority regional concerns biodiversity, invasive species (in conjunction with the IMO Global
ballast management project) and persistent toxic substances identified in the SAP.
There are numerous public participation and awareness projects and programmes in the Caspian region
implemented by Tacis, UNDP, bilateral donors and international NGOs. One of the most targeted programmes is
that of the NGO support group ISAR. Funded by USAID, ISAR has offices in three of the Caspian states,
coordinates the Caspian NGO forum and holds workshops and seminars on key Caspian environmental issues.
This is the only Caspian region project funded by USAID, although they do provide sporadic technical assistance
to oil spill contingency planning.
On the national level, the World Bank money is being accessed by Kazakhstan to prepare a Master Plan for the
city of Atyrau in Kazakhstan; in Azerbaijan, as part of the Urgent Environmental Investment Portfolio, a new
sturgeon hatchery is being constructed on the river Kura and a Mercury clean-up pilot project is being
implemented in Sumgiat. Negotiations are also underway with the Ministry of Power in Iran for a loan to
implement a basin plan for the river Pashakola in the south-east of the Caspian. Through their trust funds the
World Bank provided regional support for the development of a mutual aid plan for oil spill preparedness
(Norway) and an ecotoxicological study (Japan) of the Caspian seal, sturgeons and bony fish.
Assistance to the countries in preparation of their National and Regional Oil spill contingency plans has come
from numerous quarters including the IMO, UNDP, EBRD and the international oil companies; this assistance
will continue beyond the planning stage and into implementation.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) provided training to three Caspian states (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and
Iran) on microbiological monitoring techniques for coastal recreational waters and associated quality assurance
and quality control measures. Follow-on pilot projects were organized based in the three states over a fifteen
month period on important recreational beaches. The WHO in collaboration with CEP endeavored to collect data
on the public health of the coastal population in the Caspian, in particular incidence of water borne diseases, but
unfortunately the local health authorities either had no information or were unwilling to release it.
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In addition to CEP there are two inter-agency bodies functioning on the Caspian; the Bioresources Commission
which sets quotas for fish and the Caspian seal and CASPCOM which is a loose affiliation of the countries
Hydrometeorlogical and Meteorological Services. The Bioresources Commission is currently working with
CITES FAO and EU- Tacis to agree a fisheries management plan for the Caspian Sea, in particular for the
sturgeons, and in discussions towards establishment of a separate Fisheries Convention. Both Tacis and FAO are
preparing new technical assistance support projects for the fisheries worth in total approximately $4 million.
CASPCOM has been working with the World Meteorological Organisation for a number of years in the design of
a programme of activities, known as CASPAS, to rehabilitate the hydrometeorological monitoring infrastructure
of the Caspian states to improve short-term flooding and longer-term water level forecasts, and in some states also
improve contaminant monitoring. The money required is considerable, first estimates of were $120 million, and
the lack of suitable monitoring vessels is a major obstacle. Collaboration with oil and gas industry may be one of
the only ways forward.
As noted above, the geographical coverage of CEP is limited to the surface area of the sea and a narrow coastal
strip; however, the programme does collaborate with a number of major projects in the contributory river basins
of the Caspian, especially the Volga, Ural and Kura. On the Volga the Russian Federal Volga Revival
programme, based in Nizhny Novgorod, has a comprehensive pollution discharge and hydrological database and
has developed an ambitious action plan. However, funding of the programme, even though guaranteed by the
central government, is limited. In the past it received support from Tacis, the German government and from
UNESCO, through the UNESCO chair at Nizhny Novgorod Technical University. UNESCO is currently assisting
the programme prepare a new vision for Volga-Caspian basin. A UNEP Volga-Caspian basin project that began
in 1998 is still on-going and overlaps with the proposed UNESCO project. In the Volga and Ural deltas major
GEF biodiversity projects focused on wetlands are due to begin implementation in 2003.
On the Kura, a number of transboundary projects are being implemented or are in the planning process. Although
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not yet been resolved, the two countries are willing to cooperate
at the technical level in certain sectors and in particular in regards to the environment. USAID funded Water
Management in the South Caucasus has had considerable success working with the hydrometeorlogical services
of the three main Kura basin countries to improve transboundary water quantity measurements and developing
sub-basin IRBM plans. The Tacis Joint River Management Project, which ends in 2003, has a pilot project on the
river Kura to demonstrate implementation of UNECE guidelines on monitoring and assessment of transboundary
waters.
A list of known major projects in the Caspian basin is given in appendix II.
3.3 Overview of where specific water and environmental needs are not being met and suggestions for possible
support measures
The lack of a ratified regional agreement of the Caspian environment is likely to remain a hindrance to good
governance of the sea for a considerable time, unless the political map of the region changes rapidly in the near
future. Good work is being done and will continue to be done by UNEP to support the Convention process and if
the if final text is signed in January we will have, if not a legal binding document, then a clear statement of intent
which can be built upon. Development work on the protocols to the Convention must also continue and assistance
will need to be sought from a host of different institutions including the EU, FAO, WHO, UNDP and IMO. The
future of the CEP is relatively secure, although funding of the management structure has been given as a
prerequisite for future funding by GEF and Tacis.
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At the national level, there is an urgent need to form national coordination units (NCU) and through that body
improve the inter-sectoral collaboration. The development of the National Caspian Action Plans (NCAP) and
their endorsement will hopefully act as a spur the countries to create and support such bodies and a
complimentary inter-sectoral liaison committee. The countries will need assistance in creating the NCUs and
building the necessary capacity to enable them to function as execution bodies in their own right. Countries will
also need support to implement their NCAPs, especially in capacity building, technical assistance and public
participation areas.
A major shortfall is the lack of knowledge regarding the impact of pollution loads on the Caspian. The land-based
source assessment for the near basin planned will hopefully lead to development of a prioritized hot-spot list and
the accelerated investment by the governments in reducing pollution of the Caspian. It has been assumed that
many contaminants in the basin are sequestered in the major river impoundments before reaching the sea, but
there is no data to support this view and some basic research is required. Closer collaboration with the major
projects in the Volga and Kura basins is also required.
The G12 Caspian states require assistance at the regional committee level to help ensure pollution control and
abatement compliance. This is probably the most critical need. The authorities need to be shown ways and means
of working with enterprises to reduce pollution loads and meet environmental objectives in a phased manner. A
real commitment from the states to tackle the pollution problems and within the regulatory authorities a
transparency in their dealings are required.
Little is known about the public health of the Caspian coastal community and its linkage, if any, with water and
environmental problems. A health atlas of the Caspian would be the first step in developing a public health
programme for the Caspian peoples, identifying priority areas of concern and localities which could be addressed
with a combination of concrete actions and public education campaigns.
National public awareness campaigns to support the limited regional activities are sorely needed, starting with the
regional government and the municipalities at the coast. Information needs to be provided in the native language
in an accessible format. Possible activities include: Mayoral conferences, creation of coastal concern groups,
development of school curriculum.
In summary, the suggested projects for the Caspian include:
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Encourage water and environment policy coordination in the region through the implementation of the
National Caspian Action Plans and creation of national coordinating units and inter-sectoral liaison
committees.
Undertake a comprehensive assessment of the pollution loads on the Caspian in particular from the major
river basins of the Volga and Kura, and from these studies work develop a list of priority hot-spots.
Improve the collaboration between CEP and management authorities and projects in the major river basins.
Assist the states improve their compliance record with national and international legislation, in particular
legislation relating to pollution control and abatement.
Production of a public health atlas of the Caspian coastal zone and development and implementation of
targeted action plans.
Development and implementation of national public awareness campaigns targeted on Caspian issues.
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4.0 Aral Sea
4.1 Water issues in Aral Basin
4.1.1 Geographical setting
Located in the heart of Central Asia, the Aral Sea Basin (see map in appendix 1) covers an area of
2.2 million km2 and is home to 38 million people. The basin comprises the drainage area of two
large rivers (the Amu Darya and Syr Darya), the Aral Sea and the Aral Sea’s natural surrounding
region. The source of the Amu Darya is on the northern flank of the Pamir mountain range and the
Syr Darya rises in the Tien Shan Mountains about 500km to the north. The rivers flow
approximately 2500 km through the high mountain countries of Tajikistan and Kygyzstan down to
the plains of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The southern, larger river Amu Darya
carries a flow of approximately 70-80 km3/year while in the Syr Darya the flow is about half this
volume. The two rivers discharge into the Aral Sea in two separate deltas located in Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. The Aral Sea was the fourth largest inland body of water, with a surface water area of
67,000km2,until the 1960s and the expansion of irrigation in the region.
These two rivers are the life blood of Central Asia, providing much needed water for irrigation in the
downstream countries where annual rainfall is as little as 100mm/yr. Currently 90% of the waters of
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers are used for irrigation. The Aral Sea used to receive up to 60
km3/year, it now only receives between 0 to 20 km3/year. The most heavily impacted region on the
Aral Sea is Karakalpakstan in western Uzbekistan, which was the Amu Darya river delta. Currently,
the Amu Darya does not reach the Aral due to excessive water withdrawals upstream. In 1990 the
decline in water was so drastic that the northern section of the Aral Sea, Maloye More fed by the Syr
Darya, split from the Bol’shoye More fed by the Amu Darya in the south.
4.1.2 Specific water and environmental issues
The most pressing water issue is water management and allocation in this basin as a result of rapid
agricultural development in the basin during the Soviet era. The increase in area of irrigated lands
and development of cotton have resulted in dramatic reductions in the volume of water reaching the
Aral Sea, whereby the size of the Aral Sea has shrunk to approximately 25 percent of it’s 1960
volume. The result has been: an increase in land and water salinization, poisoning what remains of
the Aral Sea waters, collapse of economic viability for coastal fishing towns, decreases in human
health in the near Aral zone from sedimentary dust laden with agro-chemicals, decline in human
health conditions in the basin from contamination of the drinking water supplies by nutrients and
agro-chemicals, a significant decrease in access to potable water, and loss of regional and global
biodiversity. The deterioration of irrigation systems and water management infrastructure
compounds the problem, with the loss of precious water resources due to inefficiency. The Central
Asian states are in the depth of a socio-economic transition, which does not allow for large scale
reduction of agricultural activity nor the massive investment required to modernize the irrigation
practices. Additionally, the threat by upstream states to hold back water for hydro-electric power
generation will impact upon the volumes of summer water available for irrigation and is a potential
source of conflict between the up and down stream states.
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During the Soviet era cotton became the main commodity for the Central Asian states. The
expansion of cotton base agriculture in the 1950s involved massive irrigation projects schemes,
drawing on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, and almost doubling the area of irrigated lands to 7.9
million hectares. By the 1950s the Soviet Union was independent of cotton imports and the fate of
the Aral Sea was sealed. The land itself is high salt and not suited for water intensive agriculture and
salinization and high water tables are constant and critical problem. Almost 30% of all irrigated
lands have medium to high salt levels with yields reduced 20 to 30%. The agro-chemicals have been
used in great quantities, including DDT, BHC, methyl mercaptophos, octamethyl, butifos, milbex,
hexachlorane (BHO), phosphamide (dimethoate), phosalone, lenacil, ronit (Ro-Neet), yalal
(molinate), sodium TCA, chlorazone, and aldrin. These persistent organic substances find their way
into rivers via the drainage canals polluting downstream waters and contaminating groundwaters.
When the surface waters evaporate, either in fields or down stream in the Aral basin these chemicals
are deposited in loose soils that contribute to toxic dust storms that sweep across the region. The
environmental ramifications are significant with high human health and development costs in the
region. Anemia, cancers and infectious diseases are prevalent among the indigenous population in
the Aral region.
The pressure from Moscow and from regional elites during the Soviet era to increase cotton
production led to the massive expansion of cultivated lands which appears to be an intractable
situation at present. In the post-Soviet era, cotton remains a major export commodity. The lack of
centralized planning, and the need for states to pursue economic development has led each state to
independently increase cotton production and thus water. Water use has continued to rise, as states
seek to maintain economies based on the export of a non-sustainable product.
In order to support to the irrigation in the region the Soviets constructed massive water management
infrastructure projects. Dams were built upstream to conserve the water in the winter months that
was needed in the cotton fields through the summer months. Canal systems were constructed to
distribute and channel water from the rivers, and irrigation systems designed provide the crops with
water when needed. The Kara Kum Canal stemming from the Amu Darya is the longest canal in the
world. It extends more that 1300 km into Turkmenistan where it provides irrigation for over 850,000
hectares of croplands. These regionally integrated, massive infrastructure projects were maintained
during the Soviet era through state subsidies. There were Soviet institutions in place to direct
coordinated management of transboundary regional infrastructure projects, and water sharing
practices. However, after this period, each state became responsible for its own portion of this
integrated infrastructure. State autonomy led to a significant decrease in the resources devoted to
maintaining the infrastructure, and the result has been a substantial deterioration of the water
management capacity. Water seepages, leaks and diversions are commonplace, putting further
stresses the on already diminished water resources of the Aral Sea basin.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, water from upstream states is often horded by governments
in need of hydropower energy, while crops in the down stream states wilt in the summer months.
The lack of an enforced bartering trade agreement employed during the Soviet era is a main cause of
this hording behavior. Originally upstream states held water in reservoirs during winter months in
exchange for transfer of energy resources from the down stream states. The allowed water to be
released to the cotton fields during key growing season, and energy for heating to be transferred to
upstream states in the winter months. This exchange is no longer instituted following the collapse of
the USSR, as the down stream states of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan seek external markets for their
energy resources. In response, Kyrgyz dams at the Toktogul reservoir on the Syr Darya are used for
28
hydro-electricity generation during frigid winter months to provide heat to Kyrgyz residents. Kyrgyz
officials maintain that Uzbeks should either pay for water held in the reservoir, or exchange water
for natural gas. While a similar situation is possible between on the Amu Darya between upstream
Tajikistan and downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it has not yet occurred because of civil
war in Tajikistan. The major concern regarding dams on the Amu Darya is the disrepair threatening
unregulated flow of spring water into the river basin.
Poor pollution control in Tajikstan and Kyrgyzstan puts further pressure on the water management in
downstream states. Contamination of downstream waters from municipal waste waters, food
industry, agriculture and, most telling, mining activities are of concern for the water supplies and the
general environment of the Aral Sea Basin. In Turkmenistan, the Kara Kum canal distributes the
waters of the Aral Sea basin almost to the shores of the Caspian Sea, literally carrying the country’s
lifeblood. When built the Kara Kum brought about huge socio-economic changes to a desert,
nomadic society. This crucial artery is subject to pollution from agrochemicals, municipal wastes
and industrial enterprises, and suffers high levels of leakage, whereby reducing efficiency and
causing water logging of adjacent land and polluting groundwaters. Uzbekistan suffers from flow
restrictions and pollution of its waters from the upstream states. It is the largest consumer of water in
the basin as its economy and society the most reliant on agriculture. Agriculture is between 23% and
35% of GDP, and accounts for between 24% employment in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan with
Kazakhstan share the shoreline of the Aral Sea and therefore have suffered huge social-economic
costs with the destruction of the Aral Sea and the decline in human health in the Aral surrounding
area.
These factors, combined with low GDPs and regional ethnic tensions have led to high levels of
concern regarding the stability of the Central Asian region as a whole and the Aral Sea Basin in
particular. International organizations have begun to address these complex problems, however, a
workable solution remains elusive. The water management of the Aral Sea basin was strictly
dictated by Moscow in the Soviet era, but, subsequently, the independent states are struggling to
work collectively to address the problem while also addressing other immediate demands.
4.2 Governance challenges specific to the Aral
The basic management capacities for water management at the national and regional level are
remnants of the Soviet era. Though there were movements made during glasnost towards
incorporating ecological sensitivity into water management schemes they were not in place long
enough to come to fruition. Control over water in Central Asia is directly linked to political control
and after the break-up the new Central Asian states maintained the institutional inertia that had
dominated water management in the region for decades. As a result, the interests that are served by
current water management practices hold a distorted political power throughout the region, as was
the case under Soviet rule. Though some initial attempts have been made to reverse this, it is viewed
that the political stability of the region is better served by allowing such systems to remain intact for
now. Additionally, it is commonly accepted that the window of opportunity to shift this pattern of
control was missed early in the transition period and hence the international community may have
sacrificed the capacity for sustainable water management in exchange for short term regional
stability. It should also be noted that Ministries with jurisdiction over water management issues are
often staffed by persons with a scientific background and hold a belief that technological solutions
can resolve all environmental problems. Thus they are not inclined towards innovative practices or
29
policies that would reduce regional strains on environmental resources.
Though water problems may initially appear to be solvable to the outside observer, the internal
politics of the states make this much more complicated. There is a basic lack of capacity endemic
throughout the region with regards to implementation of coordinated, and sustainable water
management practices, particularly in a transboundary context. Policies that are devised to improve
conditions domestically often have negative regional impacts. In addition, the budgets of
organizations charged with formulating and implementing policies are limited, as national
governments struggle to provide basic services to populations. With the loss of support from the
Soviet Union, the Aral Sea states have been accumulating debt, as exports of domestic products have
fallen. The major export commodities are cotton and energy resources. Thus prioritization is given to
sectors that have potential to earn income in the short term, even if it is at the expense of country,
and region as a whole in the longer term.
Despite these barriers, the governments of the Central Asian republics recognized that they were in
need of international assistance and perhaps used the ecological catastrophe of the Aral Sea as a
means for attracting international aid. Therefore, there have been movements by the states to develop
institutions that focus on regional cooperation. The most notable of these is the Aral Sea Basin
Programme (ASBP). The objectives of this organization were defined as (a) stabilizing the
environment of the Aral Sea, (b) rehabilitating the disaster zone around the Sea, (c) improving the
management of the international waters of the Basin and (d) building capacity of the regional
institutions. The purpose was also to collectively adopt accepted principals of international water
law, including the principal to use ones own water resources in such a manner as to not injure others
also dependent upon these resources. However, excessive focus on water management as a singular
issue, instead of an integrated social, political and economic challenge to the states in the region has
hampered the effectiveness of these institutions.
Recently, there has been a concerted effort on behalf of the international community to coordinate
efforts more effectively, linking management with agricultural reforms, and energy efficiency.
Despite these changes, the countries are still plagued with barriers to compliance. Managerial
capacity declines as well educated, highly literate specialists receive training from international
donors and move away from the region, leaving those in charge to continue the practices that were
set during the Soviet era.
Unfortunately, the Basin countries have failed to meet their obligations under the ASBP agreement
and time frames have been stretched. This delay on the part of the countries have led many in the
international community to question the commitment of the states to true cooperation. Nonetheless,
the challenge of the Aral is one that international organizations are hesitant to surrender.
The compliance problems related to successful cooperative water management in the region at the
state level stem from a lack of overall sectoral and inter-sectoral coordination. Though one ministry
may be charged with management of water for agriculture, another may be charged with water
management for energy purposes and yet another ministry charged with water oversight for
environmental purposes. Water quantity and quality issues are dealt with separately and the
environment is separate again; problems are dealt with in isolation instead of an integrated, holistic
manner. The institutionalized patronage system, which has its roots in the Tsarist and Soviet eras,
remains systemic and is reinforced by low government salaries, and thus acts against sectoral
cooperation at the state or regional level. However, because this corrupt system is so endemic, the
30
international community is hesitant to force its dismantling without a credible replacement. The
seemingly fixed nature of these relationships limits the ability to bring about positive change at the
sub national level.
The dead of a transitional system with enhanced civil participation and civil society in natural
resource management remains elusive. And democratization is limited in the region. There is little
institutionalized transparency in the governments, elections rarely meet acceptable norms set by the
international community, and the regional governments lack mechanisms for true civic participation.
The absence of free and independent press, prosecution of journalists and strict control of
information in the region limits democratization efforts. Without these basic elements of democracy,
civil participation in water and environmental remains a fallacy. The government maintains control
of NGOs with very strict monitoring and registration requirements and severe limits on political
participation of these groups.
The institutions and mechanisms for collective management need to be established to ensure that all
consumers, including the Aral Sea and the environment of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, are able to
enjoy benefits. Though this ideal appeals to many in the international community, the domestic
policy makers have not yet realized the benefits in cooperation.
4.3 Overview of where the water and environmental specific needs are being met by national,
bilateral and international community
In the Aral Basin, there was international attention from UNEP to the crisis prior to the collapse of
the USSR, however, once the Soviet Union imploded and Moscow no longer controlled the region,
UNEP withdrew their programme. But soon after other international organizations come to the
region’s aid. The international community was eager to offer assistance under the condition that a
regional cooperative agreement was initiated. The regional leaders, acutely aware of the need to
attract aid, worked quickly to develop such an agreement, based largely on the existing Soviet era
agreements of water management ministries.
This agreement established the Interstate Water Management Commission, later referred to as the
International Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) made up of relevant water ministry
officials. Though this applied Soviet era regional institutional structures to international cooperation,
it was initially acceptable to the international aid community. This agreement and the subsequent
international support to the Aral Basin states, led to a continuation of reliance of the region on
external support for internal water management problems. This agreement did not significantly
address sustainable use of the waters of the Aral basin and it lacked institutional mechanisms to
allow for enforcement, monitoring or incentives for states to actively cooperate.
Despite these institutional weaknesses, international aid organizations flocked to the region offering
assistance and support. These included: The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, the EU, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, UNDP and NATO. Bilateral aid organizations
from the US, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Japan and Switzerland engaged the
individual states and the region as a whole. NGOs including Mercy Corps International, Crosslinks
International, Farmer-to-Farmer International, Medecins San Frontieres and Greenpeace became
active in the region as well.
In order to more effectively support the mission of the ICWC, with guidance from the World Bank,
31
the states created the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFACs) and the Interstate Council for Aral
Sea (ICAS) under the broader umbrella of the Aral Sea Basin Programme. This organization had
multiple branches, including Interstate Commission for Socio-Economic Development and
Scientific, Technical and Ecological Cooperation (ICSDSTEC), and the broader scoped International
Council for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis. The World Bank, UNEP, UNDP and European Union
broadly supported this organization. The seven main themes of the programme were to:







Develop a regional strategy for managing water resources and improvements in
efficiency and sustainability of dams
Rehabilitate hydrometeorological services and regional environmental information
systems
Manage water quality
Restore wetlands and conduct environmental studies
Improve clean water, sanitation and health
Integrate land and water management in upper wetlands
Automate controls of the two basin-wide agencies for water allocation
The countries, under the advisement of the international community, later streamlined this largescale internationally funded organization. This streamlining was due to a lack of clear authority,
duplication of efforts and overall difficulty in obtaining credible commitments from the states. IFAS
and ICAS were consolidated into one organization, IFAS, which is accountable to the five heads of
state of the region. In turn IFAS has a board made up of five Deputy Prime Ministers who oversee
the ICWC, and it’s Scientific Information Center, the Executive Committee over the Deputy
Chairman and GEF project manager, and the Sustainable Development Commission with it’s own
Scientific Information Center. The World Bank, and European Union largely support this
organization.
The GEF support to regional activities, implemented by the World Bank, began in 1994 with a
$500,000 preparatory assistance grant, with which initial work on the regional water strategy was
undertaken. Out of this preparatory phase the Water and Environmental Management Project was
borne. The project is worth $21million, including $4.1million contribution by the five basin states,
and is supported by the governments of Netherlands and Sweden, and the European Union and GEF.
It commenced in 1998 with duration of 4 to 5 years. The major components are: Water and Salt
Management plans at the national and regional levels; water conservation pilot projects for
agricultural users; Public Awareness Campaign to sensitize the public to the objectives of ASBP and
induce behavioral changes; Dam and Reservoir management; Transboundary Water Monitoring;
Wetlands Restoration of Lake Sudoche; and Project Management Support to IFAS. At the outset of
this project it was assumed that a large-scale reduction of irrigated areas was neither politically or
economically feasible, at least until other less costly alternatives have been exhausted. It is
calculated that near full restoration of the Aral in a 100 year time- frame would require flow to the
Aral to be restored to 45km3/year and demand for irrigation cut by 50%. This is deemed unrealistic
and a target of 20% reduction to restore flows back to 20km3/year is being sought to restore the Aral
to about a third of its original size and a salinity of 60g/l.
The EU TACIS established in 1995 a programme to assist in water policy development issues, Water
Resources Management and Agricultural Production in the Central Asian Republics (WARMAP)
phases I and II. The project focused it’s attention on capacity building, legal assistance, development
strategies for managing water resources, the creation of a management information systems and
32
improvement of water efficiency in agricultural sectors. The official terms of reference are “drafting
of international (interstate) agreements on policies and strategies on water and land resources, their
use, management, protection and apportionment; the drafting of national and intergovernmental legal
and normative acts based on interstate agreements.”(Volume VI: Legal and Institutional Aspects, p.
2. TACIS). TACIS WARMAP assisted with reforming the water codes of the Aral Basin states to
conform to international water law, and harmonizing domestic laws across borders. Finally, TACIS
WARMAP seeks to address issues of overlapping jurisdiction among institutions and organizations
regulating water management in the Aral Basin.
In order to encourage regional cooperation among the states, the UNDP organized a conference on
Sustainable Development in the region in 1995. The result was the “Nukus Declaration” in which the
five regional presidents renewed their overall commitment to the Aral Sea Basin Programme. While
the cooperation was largely symbolic in nature, it was viewed as a precursor to further international
commitments in the region. However, it is suggested that this overt emphasis on regional
cooperation has led states in the region to replace Moscow with the international organizations when
it comes to direction in water management strategies. While this is problematic in terms of true
autonomy for the states, it does allow involvement of the international community in one of the
world’s most visible environmental catastrophes.
In an attempt to join in this effort, many bilateral aid organizations have come forward to assist these
efforts. Generally, this assistance is done in coordination with pre-existing programmes. The US
government has made independent steps in the region through a US-AID programme. This
programme focuses on water management as tied to energy. Independently of other international
efforts, US-AID has held a series of workshops for regional leaders, with eventual agreements
resulting from these. These agreements address payment for water through pricing policies and
incentives. As a result, Kyrgyzstan has been continuing to horde water in order to exact a price for
its release or a barter agreement for energy resource exchange. This project involves the very real
concerns for energy and resource sharing for the region. However, it also counters the progress made
by the Aral Sea Basin Programme.
In addition to the above technical assistance projects, major investment projects in irrigation and
drainage, worth at least $200 million are being advanced by the World Bank and other donors in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz republic and Uzbekistan. A full listing of project of Aral Sea Basin projects is
given in appendix II.
In general these international and bilateral assistance programmes are well intended and attempt to
address the plethora of problems facing water management in the region. However, there is obvious
duplication of efforts, with state leaders bidding one organization off another in some cases and in
others turning a blind eye to intersectoral competition for foreign assistance funds. The lack of
coordination at the international level also wastes the support offered by the broader global
community. As this occurs, agreements become less enforceable, especially when they are
challenged by other agreements. This results in much lower levels of actual compliance than
anticipated, since it is often not clear which agreement takes precedence and a lack of concrete
action. Throwing money at the situation cannot solve the problems of water management. It is
critical that compliance with coordinated agreements is emphasized in order to achieve the concrete
results that are desperately needed.
4.4 Overview of specific needs not being met and suggestions for possible support activities
33
The limitations on effective water governance in the Aral Basin are not insurmountable, though they
do present significant logistical and political challenges. At the regional level, there are also
numerous challenges to effective water management compliance measures. These include:




Centralized regional policy development, lacking intersectoral coordination and
largely focused on short term needs. There is a clear need for adoption of an
integrated approach at the regional level. Unclear, overlapping, and contradictory
policies – though steps are being taken to address this, inconsistencies in policies
makes compliance far more difficult.
Sacrifice of environment for short term stability - despite initial intentions to improve
environmental quality, many international and bilateral programmes in the region
favor short term solutions in order to minimize potential for conflict, while long term
sustainable management practices are not applied. By giving up the ideal of a fully
restored Aral Sea, the question becomes: Is a much reduced, degraded Aral Sea worth
saving?
Lack of coordinated efforts of international community- failure of international
community to work as a cohesive unit in the region has led to a redundancy of efforts
of international community, with multiple mixed messages given to government
officials and policy makers.
Lack of incentives for compliance with effective environmental water managementunclear incentives for government officials and policy makers results in decreased
likelihood of compliance.
A review of the current body of agreements on water and environmental issues in the basin is
required as well as a broadening of the regional management structure. The broadening of the
mandate of the Interstate Committee for Sustainable Development from the Aral Sea to the whole of
Central Asia in June 2000 in an effort to revitalize the body, demonstrated the low priority the Aral
states give to this core principal.
At the national level the problems include:





Excessive dependence on a cotton monoculture for export, which leads to a decrease
in political will to invest in alternate agricultural and income producing practices.
Competition for government income, a declining or near static GNP and lack of
alternate income sources and increasing demands for basic services leads to the
pursuit and precedence of immediate term interests over long term sustainability.
A steady decline in infrastructure and loss of maintenance budgets lower water use
efficiency and lower crop yields, adding to every quickening downward spiral. Is this
decline terminal and, if so, are the international community merely postponing the
inevitable, thereby hindering, rather than assisting, the rehabilitation of the Aral?
Estimates of the collective maintenance backlog to rehabilitate the irrigation and
drainage infrastructure lie in the range of $10-20 billion, which can be only
realistically mobilized, if at all, by the private sector.
Patronage systems operating in government institutions decrease the willingness to
cooperate sectorally and inter-sectorally to solve problems.
Moribund institutions at the state and regional levels acceptance of status quo
regarding environmental and water management - they lack adequate budgets, staff
34


and capacity, which, combined with the patronage system, result in entrenched
practices and policies.
Energy dependence on hydro-electricity and lack of reliable alternative sources of
energy in upstream states, leads to hording of water in summer months and discharges
in winter months, counter to agricultural needs.
Abuse of power leads to a decline of institutional capacity of states to meet
compliance and implementation demands of national and regional environmental
problems.
There is a real need to review the efforts made to date to meet the ASBP objectives in particular
those aimed at rehabilitation of the Aral Sea itself. In setting the new reduced targets, is the
international community ignoring one of the central environmental tenet of the last decade, that of
sustainability, and accepting current short-term political and social realities at face? We know that
the situation is environmentally unsustainable, but is it also, given the huge maintenance backlog,
probably financially unsustainable. As stated earlier, the international community may have made
the conscious decision that keeping existing systems in place was crucial in order to preserve
regional stability and avoid conflict.
Emphasis needs to be placed on coordination of water management and environmental policy
coordination throughout the region. Consideration should also be given to a regional Convention for
the Protection of the Aral Sea Basin under which the development of long term goals for water
management and environmental protection can be agreed and a Strategic Action Programmes be
initiated based. Assistance should be given to the countries to strengthen coordination of intersectoral policies and establish a national authority for basin issues and mechanisms for the inclusion
of large numbers of stakeholders in the decision making process.
Enhanced coordination of international programmes throughout the region is needed, with the
international agencies and bilateral organizations taking more responsibility for coordination at
headquarters level, rather than reliance on project staff and country offices. This will require an
increased level of communication between organizations, with the establishment of regular face-toface meetings and a clearing-house for project material.
Obviously further assistance should be given to reform the agricultural sector. In addition to the ongoing efforts in water efficiency, work should begin at looking and ways and means of reducing
regions dependence on cotton and bringing about the large-scale reduction of water-use that would
be so desirable. For example, investigating the diversification of crops and manufacture of value
added products, and extended debt re-payments or possible debt for nature (or water) swaps to
decrease amount of cultivated land in individual states.
Assist the institutions comply with existing legislation, standards and regulations in water use and
pollution discharges. Institutional capacity has to be built and the destructive patronage system
broken and more innovative ways to assist the regulatory authorities need to be sought. The correct
application of environmental instruments is one way of achieving compliance without reliance on
the weak regulatory bodies.
Conduct national and regional stakeholder analyses in order to properly identify gaps in knowledge
and understanding, local, national and regional priorities, and identify specific sources of potential
conflict in order to preemptively address this.
35
Further work needs to be done on sensitizing the public to the plight of the Aral and water usage.
The efforts of GEF project need to be continued, especially in countries such as Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan where civil society is weakest.
In summary, potential support activities include:
-
Review of the long-term strategy for the Aral Sea and within a legal context develop longterm environmental objectives
Develop an integrated water and environment Strategic Action Programme for the Aral
Basin, based on agreed long-term objectives and national Aral action plans
Improved coordination between the international and bilateral agencies
Develop proposals for the significant reduction of irrigated lands and water use.
Assistance to countries to improve their records of compliance with water use and discharge
licensing.
Conduct national and regional stakeholder analyses to improve capacity focus.
Develop country targeted public awareness campaigns.
36
Appendix I, Maps
CASPIAN SEA
37
Map II
38
ARAL SEA
39
Appendix II
LISTINGS OF MAJOR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS IN
THE BLACK, CASPIAN AND ARAL BASINS
40
Regional Projects related to the Caspian Sea
Title
Conservation of
Wetland Biodiversity in
the Lower Volga
Region Project
Contact
GEF/UNDP
Russia
Project life
In PDF B.
2002
Budget
$ 430,220
for PDF B.
No figure
for full
project
Kazakhstan Wetlands
Conservation with the
Ural River Component
Project
Conservation of
Iranian Wetlands
Project
Tacis Phase III CEP
Project
TACIS Joint River
Management
Programme--TACIS
GEF/UNDP
Kazakhstan
In PDF B
2002
No figure
available
GEF/UNDP
Iran
In PDFB.
2002
Tacis/Brussels
Mid-2003 to
2005
Early
spring 2001
(2 years)
Full project
around $
6/7 m
4 million
EUR
1 mln EUR
(4 m EUR
for all four
basins)
Regional Environment
Center (EU-TACIS,
USEPA)
Nato
Kirvalidze,
tel/fax 966-956,
877-418-171;
rec@caucasus.n
et
GEF/UNDP
Iran
Chartered
1999
In PDF A.
2002
Full project
$ 650,000
GEF Small Grant
Programme/UN
DP Iran
Under
implementa
tion
$90,000
Yakhkesh Mountain
Conservation
Community based
Conservation of
Traditional Waterfowl
Trapping practices
Description
Just starting PDF-B phase; to conserve region's wetland and provide for
their sustainable use through strengthened planning and management
capacity; improved adaptive local and regional water management
practices; strengthened legal and regulatory base and enforcement
capacity; development of alternative livelihood demonstration projects ;
improved awareness and establishment of a sustainable financing
mechanism.
To conserve selected wetlands including Ural river component . PDF-B
complete; Project Brief under consideration
PDF-B nearing completion, Project Brief expected by end 2002. Aims at
conservation and wise use of selected wetlands including Caspian
connected Miankale.
Overall objective is to support the prevention, control and reduction of
adverse transboundary pollution impact caused by the quality of the four
rivers selected for the project. The results will be used to recommend
modifications to the UN/ECE Guidelines for monitoring and assessment of
transboundary waters.
Emphasis on capacity building and the development of regional
environmental cooperation. Objectives include increasing information
exchange between NGOs, governments, the scientific community and the
private sector, developing compatible environmental policy and strategies
among countries, and raising awareness about the environment. Includes a
grants program.
PDF A near completion. Project Brief expected by end 2002. Aims at
safeguarding Yakhkesh Mountain ecosystem In the Caspian Province of
Mazandaran
NGO executed project in Mazandaran to protect Siberian Crane
41
including Siberian
Crane
Prevention of
Transboundary
Degradation in KuraAraz River Basin
Integrated
Environmental
Management in the
Volga -Caspian Region
TEAP—TACIS
Environmental
Awareness Project
GEF supported
Enabling Projects in all
five countries to
develop Biodiversity
Protection Strategies
Caspian Environmental
NGO Network
USAID
Water Management in
the South Caucasus
.Phase II
Cooperative River
Monitoring among
Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia and the US—
NATO Science for Peace
Programme
IMP and IS
GEF/UNDP
Azerbaijan
PDF B in
pipeline
UNEP/CIP
Russia
2002
$ 696,000
for PDF B.
No figure
available
for the full
project
No figure
available
Full project will aim at improvement in the quality of water and in water
managements mechanism to meet the short and long terms needs of the
ecosystem and to improve quality of water inflow to the Caspian .
Close to &
1.5 million
for all five
Projects assist the littoral countries to prepared National Biodiversity
Reports and the National Biodiversity Protection Strategies.
Project aims at development of a legal instrument s for protection of the
Caspian Sea and for improvement in the aquatic ecosystem management
completed
GEF/CBD
Convention
Secretariat
Various
stages
USAID
1998ongoing
USAID/DAI
2003
National
Academy of
Sciences
(Armenia),
Tbilisi State
University
(Georgia), and
Azerecolab
(Azerbaijan)
WMO
3 year
project;
June 2001
No figure
available
$ 6 million
Promotion of the regional environmental collaboration in the Caspian area
by information exchange (monthly bulletin “Caspian Environmental
News”) and regional workshops on environmental topics.
Phase I concluded in April 2001. Present phase aims at implementing
activities pertaining to the management of transboundary water resources
in the Kura- Araz River Basin
Pre-proposal has been submitted to NATO. Purpose of demonstration
project will establish approximately 90 monitoring stations for collection of
limited data above and below major cities and farming, mining and
industrial areas on the Kura and Araks Rivers and their major tributaries.
This system will be developed cooperatively with scientists from Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the US, and with additional funding from the US
DOE.
Improved hydrological data collection monitoring in the Caspian littoral
countries
42
Azerbaijan Urgent
Environmental
Investment Portfolio
World Bank
$ 20 million
Strengthening environmental management ; soil clean up in selected areas
and hatchery construction
Regional Projects Related to Black Sea
Title
GEF Regional Control
of eutrophication,
hazardous substances
and related measures
for rehabilitating the
Black Sea ecosystem
GEF Investment Fund
for Nutrient
Reduction
Contact
UNDP Sema
Acar, Black Sea
secretariat,
Istanbul
Project life
2002 -2004
Budget
$4.3
million
Description
Project component include: Support to secretariat; strategic studies of
eutrophication process in the Black Sea; Sectoral and national nutrient
reduction strategies; cost-benefit of application of nutrient reduction
recommendations; small grants programme; economic instruments;
fisheries support.
World Bank,
Piotr
Krzyzanowski,
Washington
2002 - 2008
$70 million
Tacis BSEP support
EU-Tacis, Black
Sea secretariat,
Istanbul
2002-2006
EURO 2.8
million
NATO Scierntists for
Peace Black Sea
project
Middle East
Technical
University
Erdemli, Turkey
GEF-WB, Tacis,
WWF, UK,
Denmark,
Netherlands
UNDP-GEF,
Canada
UNDP-GEF.
ICPDR
secretariat,
Vienna
1998 - 2002
Investment fund to provide grant funding to nutrient reduction projects.
Currently in the pipeline are the following: Ukraine integrated Coastal Zone
Management, Hungary wastewater nutrient reduction; Turkey agricultural
pollution control; Moldova Agricultural control; Russia Krasnodar
Agricultural Pollution Reduction
Project components include: Development of integrated monitoring and
assessment programme; investigation of economic instruments for a
regional environmental fund; updated pollution assessment report; public
awareness campaign; and management assistance to the secretariat.
Co-operation project between six major marine institutes in the Black Sea to
explore and quantify the variability of the Black Sea ecosystem
Black Sea/Asov
ecological corridor
projectt
Dniper River basin
project
UNDP-GEF
Strengthening the
implementation
capacities for nutrient
$16.5
million
Changes to agricultural practices; coastal protection, biodiversity protection
1999-2003
$7.3million
2002-2004
$5.35millio
n
Including a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis, SAP, National plans and
negotiations on a regional Convention
Project components include: policy development for river basin and water
resource management, reduction of nutrients and rehabilitation of wetlands;
formulate proposals for economic instruments; public awareness campaign;
and limited strategic studies
43
reduction and
transboundary
cooperation in the
Danube
Regional Projects Related to Aral Sea
Title
WARMAP, phase I
and II
Contact
EU-Tacis
Project life
1995-2000
Budget
$7million
Aral Sea Basin
Programme; water
and Environmental
Management Project
Transboundary River
Basin Initiative
Central Asia
Environment and
Energy Programme
Regional
Environmental Action
Plan
Syr Darya Control
and Northern Aral Sea
project
Various irrigation and
drainage projects
World Bank,
IFAS
1998-2003
$21million
USAID, UNDP,
US State Dept.
USAID
2000 present
2000-2003
0.35million
UNDP
2000-2001
0.35
Assessment of five priority environmental issues and development of
strategic Action Programme
World Bank and
JICA
Status
unknown
100
World Bank
On-going
1118
Rehabilitation of Syr Darya’s majopr hydraulic structures; strengthening of
water resource management institutions; establishment of a sustainable
fishery in the northern Aral.
Rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage systems; promotion of farm
privatization; and institutional strengthening
20million
Description
Project components include: WARMIS database; Hydrometeorological
survey; cost/benefit analysis; interal water sharing agreements; itegrated
land and water management in upper basin
Project components: Water and salt management strategy; public
awareness campaign on water conservation; dam safety and assessment and
improvement; Transboundary water monitoring; wetlands restoration;
Project management support to IFAS
Satellite monitoring of snowmelt in upper catchment for improved long-tern
forecasting of water resources.
Framework for assistance to improvement of management of critical
environmental resources
44