AntePodium
An Antipodean electronic journal of world affairs published by
the School of Political Science and International Relations at
Victoria University of Wellington [2/01]
THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON AFTER
TAIF:
An Analysis of Four Scenarios on the Emergence of a
New Lebanon
Beatrice Maaloufova, Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies,
University of Malta
Summary
November 5th, 1999 marked the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Taif
Agreement, which marked the end of the 1975 Lebanese Civil War in all its phases.
The year 2000 signified ten years since the end of the conflict. These two significant
dates prompted the need to discuss what lies ahead for one of the most diverse and
volatile countries in the Levant.
The work intends to compel a thinking process. It attempts at taking the
essential aspects of the 1989 Taif Agreement set against the groundwork of the social,
political and economic realities of the 1990s in the country and region and projecting
four outward looking scenarios that could possibly be played out in the Republic of
Lebanon in 2020.
The four scenarios, in order of appearance, are: Parliamentarian Democracy,
Statism, Civil War and finally Federal Entity. All scenarios stem out of the 1989 Taif
Agreement. The fundamental reason for this is because there is no doubt that the
agreement opened a new socio-political chapter in the country that cannot be ignored.
Political Preview:
The 1989 Taif Agreement symbolised a juncture in the Republic of Lebanon’s
political existence. When compared to previous attempts at ending the civil conflict,
the Taif Agreement not only encompassed all facets of the economic and political set
up of the country but was also blessed with favourable international and regional
circumstances. Apart from the unforeseen glasnost policy that was defining a new
East-West relationship, the regional set up saw a rapprochement between Syria and
Egypt and the resurgence of more active roles of countries such as the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia as well as the weakening of Iraq.1
The political stalemate reached its peak in Lebanon in September 1988. The
indecisiveness of President Amin Gemayel in appointing
a presidential candidate
and the rise to power of General Michel Aoun as part of an interim military
government was a strong indicator to the deteriorating position in the country.2 This
was further exasperated with Dr. Salim el-Hoss, until then Prime Minister, contesting
the legitimacy of the newly formed Aoun government. The deteriorating internal
circumstances culminated in the devastating so-called “War of Liberation” declared
by General Aoun, which also targeted Syrian presence in Lebanon.3
It was against this battlefield background that the Arab League called for an
emergency Foreign Ministerial meeting on 26th April 1989 in Tunis. The “SixMember Committee for Friendly Aid and Contact for Lebanon”, better known as the
Six-Member Committee, was created in order to deal with the catapulting problem.
However, the committee’s work was hampered from the beginning namely because of
political differences between Syria and Iraq.
In the following Arab League meeting in May of that year, the Tripartite
Committee consisting of: late King Hassan II of Morocco, King Fahed Bin Abdel
Aziz of Saudi Arabia and the former President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria was set
up.
1
The committee adopted the plan to work out a permanent solution to the
Hamdan, Kamal, Le Conflit Libanais, UNRSID, Dar al Faraby, Beirut, 1998, p.287
Sa’adeh, George, Qisati Ma’ al Taif, Beirut, p.32
3
Pakradouni, Karim, La’nat Watan, Abr al Sharaf lil Manshourat, Beirut, p.199
2
Lebanese conflict. Al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, Assistant to the General Secretary of the
Arab League, was entrusted as main mediator.4
The Tripartite Committee’s main task was thus to bring the Lebanese deputies
to the negotiating table. It also called for a “single united” government to take
decision on the Syrian army presence in Lebanon, and called for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from the occupied territories in accordance with the UN Security
Council Resolution 425 of 1978.5 The reforms that were formulated in the proposed
“National Reconciliation Pact”, Taif Agreement, were an amalgamation of points
found in previous attempts on bringing a peaceful end to the Lebanese conflict.6
On 30th September 1989, 62 Lebanese deputies arrived in Taif, Saudi Arabia.
The number of attending deputies came from the original 73 members elected at the
last legislative elections in 1972. Thus eleven members were absent, eight for nonpolitical reason, and another three boycotted the discussions (Raymond Eddé, Albert
Mukhaiber and Emil Rohana Saqr). Furthermore of those who attended the talks,
seventeen, only two of whom were Christian deputies, attended the later
parliamentarian session.7
After two weeks of intense discussions the deputies agreed largely on internal
and administrative reforms in Lebanon. However they were divided over the issue of
Syrian army presence in Lebanon and the relation between the two countries. There
was no room for manoeuvre on the latter points as the Tripartite Committee had
already discussed them with Syria before the onset of the talks. Without such a
diplomatic move the Taif Agreement would have been ill fated like all its
predecessors. The incontrovertible points have been enshrined in the second section
of the agreement paragraph four and section four “The Lebanese-Syrian Relations” of
the agreement.8
4
Ibid., p.203
‘Qadaya wa Ara’ (19)- A’ashar Sanawat a’ la al Taif’, Assafir, November 16, 1999, p.10
6
Sa’adeh, George, Qisati Ma’ al Taif, Beirut, pp. 38-39
5
7
8
Mansour, Albert, Inqilab A’la al Taif, Dar al Jadid, Beirut, 1993, p.30
Pakradouni, Karim,La’nat Watan, Abr al Sharaf lil Manshourat, Beirut, 1991, p.208
Fifty-five deputies without reservation, and three deputies with reservation
approved the “National Reconciliation Pact”. Another three deputies abstained from
voting and Dr. Hassan al-Rifai declined from participating. 9
The Taif Agreement:
In the words of Hassan Krayem, professor of political science at the American
University of Beirut, the Taif Agreement was a “package deal” which operates on a
two-tier level. On the one echelon the Taif Agreement concerned itself with the
internal administrative reforms. On the second stratum it defined the sovereignty of
Lebanon and its territorial rights and integrity.
The agreement was unequivocal in
defining the new identity of the Republic of Lebanon embodied in the Preamble,
which is a complete addition to the 1946 Constitution. It is evident that Lebanon is
clearly defined as Arab (earlier Lebanon was defined as having merely and Arab
facet, zhou wajeh Arabi), and a final homeland for all Lebanese.
Lebanon’s
independence and sovereignty are reiterated by defining the economic system, the
upholding of democracy and the fair distribution of growth and development. And
most importantly the elimination of sectarianism is defined as a national goal and
repatriation (tawteen) is inadmissible.
However, the Taif Agreement was less clear on two separate issues dealing
with the territorial integrity and full sovereignty of the country. To date, Lebanon has
regained most of its territory back through the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces
on 24th May 2000, the issue of the Shab’a farms remains to be resolved. These in turn
are interlinked with UN Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).
Lebanon
participated in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and bilateral negotiations with
Israel; however, it is vital to note that Lebanon is not directly affected with the
security issues as the prevailing status quo between the two countries is the 1949
Armistice since Lebanon never participated in a war against the State of Israel after
1948. Secondly the Taif accord was not concrete on Syrian Army presence in
Lebanon.10
Sa’adeh, George, Qisati Ma’ al Taif, Beirut, pp.48-51
Krayem, Hassan, ‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreemnt’,Almashriq,
http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc//projects/pspa/work/conflictResolution
9
10
The Taif Agreement called upon internal reforms. Through the five
administrations between 1990 and early 2000 brought with it thirty-one amendments.
On the administrative reforms the Taif Agreement can be seen as an amalgamation of
the 1943 National Reconciliation Pact. This essentially implies that the 1989 accord
did not bring fundamental alterations to the political make-up.
This is best
highlighted by the fact that although the abolition of sectarianism was presented as the
national goal no time frame for its implementation has been defined.
The Taif Agreement greatly reduced the power of the President traditionally
reserved for the Maronite sect.
The President of the Republic acquired greater
symbolic powers. This was further achieved by vesting more authority into the Prime
Ministerial post, customarily a Sunni position. The Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies, essentially a Shiite post, had his position enhanced through the extension of
the term in office.11
Scenario No. 1: Parliamentarian Democracy:
In essence of the ‘Administrative Reforms’ of the 1989 Taif Agreement lies
the creation of a Parliamentarian Democracy.
A representative government is what
the Lebanese have always strived for. New realities is what Lebanon is facing at the
dawn of the new millennium and should fundamental adjustments be taken as
stipulated in the Taif Agreement, then Lebanon by 2020 could live up to its
aspirations.
Year 2020 will see a novelty in the Lebanese legislative elections, which for
the first time will take place on a national basis. A clique of free-minded academics
will instigate this avant-garde step.
This independent group come from various
professional backgrounds. Moreover some of them come from prominent Lebanese
families representing the various religious sects.
Basically in 2016, they took
advantage of the electoral law that was largely modelled along previous election laws
as in 1996 and 2000. The electoral law does not prohibit a Greek Orthodox, for
example, to represent a Shiite seat in the Chamber of Deputies as long as there is
equality between Muslim and Christian seats. A novel concept that broke away from
11
Ibid.
the customary law that implicitly
invited the electorate to cast votes for their
corresponding zuama.12
This instigated a cataclysm for change.
On the administrative level this
included the passing of an electoral law devoid of sectarian prejudice. This meant
that Lebanon was turned into a single electorate district. Furthermore the major
parliamentarian debate has been on the measures required to form the National
Council as stipulated in the Taif Agreement and the 1991 Constitution.13 Indeed there
is also much anticipation for the creation of the long awaited Senate after the nonsectarian elections in 2020 in line with the Taif reforms.
Because of the regional stability that is prevailing in the second decade of the
new century in the region, the Lebanese economy is slowly reaping the benefits of its
“Singapore” strategy it has taken up since the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership and the establishment of the free trade zone. The creation of the regional
Arab market has also aided in this economic approach.14
The Lebanese society in 2020 is liberal in its outlook. The driving forces are
the active middle class of intellectuals and students. The main undertaking is the
separation of religion from politics. Unlike previous decades, this society is seeking
to capitalize on its rich diversity. Supported by the administrative reforms, the new
community sees a mushrooming of NGO’s many of which are Lebanese and crossing
confessional lines. These in turn are playing an important role in the reconstruction
process as well as providing aid to neighbouring Arab countries.
When it comes to casting their votes, the new generation of Lebanese are
apolitical preferring the ‘Green’ parties. In fact it is those political parties such as the
Lebanese Democratic Movement who all the way back in the 1990s propagated a
“futurist” outlook, which are gaining ground. Adhering to the notions embodied in the
Preamble of the new Constitution such as Lebanon’s Arab identity, parliamentarian
12
Personal meeting with Dr. Ghazi Maalouf, April 2000
Article 95, al Dustour al Lubanani, Chapter VI
14
Diwan, Ishac, 'How Can Lebanon Benefit from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, in Shahin,
Wassim and Shehadi, Kamal (eds.), Pathway to Integration: Lebanon and the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership, The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 1997,p.65
13
democracy and the safeguarding of personal initiatives, such political parties are
gaining favour among the post war generation (Lebanese Democratic Movement).
The above changes have been instigated with the phased plan for the
eradication of confessional divides as embodied in Article 95 of the 1991 Lebanese
Constitution. The Article calls for a gradual plan for the abolition of confessionalism
through a phased plan.
Unlike their compatriots that sought refuge in other countries such as Jordan,
the Palestinians in Lebanon , which amounted to 10% of the population in the late
1990s, have always been denied their basic civil rights.
On the political level the
Lebanese government systematically maintained a policy of indifference to their
plight15. Because of the sensitive confessional set up of the Lebanese society, the
Lebanese nationals supported the ‘Bouways Formula’ taken up by the government in
order to solve the Palestinian issue in the country.
Proposed back in 1996, by the then Foreign Minister Fares Bouways, the
Palestinian issue by 2020 has been systematically resolved. Namely, Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon were resettled at various stages in territories held by the
Palestinian Authorities; others were joined with their families already living in the
Arab world such as in the Gulf and Jordan.
Furthermore as was indicative by
respective state visits in 2000 to Lebanon, immigration doors were opened in Canada,
Australia, Norway and Germany.16 Equally the American proposition of repatriating a
portion of the Palestinians to southern Iraq, a stronghold of Shiites as opposed to the
predominantly Sunni Palestinians, in exchange of reducing sanctions imposed on the
Baghdad regime was executed.17 Lebanon in turn selectively naturalised 10% of the
Palestinian refugees and absorbed a certain percentage of Christian Iraqis.
Despite Syria’s less hegemonic role, propagated by Bashar al-Assad, in
Lebanon’s affairs, the Lebanese negotiating teams still see themselves entangled
15
http:www.annaharonline.com/htd/TAHKIK/HTM, April 10,2000
el-Khazen, Farid, ‘Permanent Settlement in Lebanon: A recipe for Conflict’, Journal of Refugee
Studies, Oxford University Press 1997,Vol.10, No.3, p.280
17
Sid-Ahmda,Mohammad, ‘Opening the Refugee File’,al-Ahram Weekly,
http://www.sis.gov.eg/public/letter/html/text393htm, April 27,2000
16
between the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. Thus at present Syria and Lebanon are
involved in simultaneous talks over the Golan. This is due to the fact that the Shab’a
farms form part of the territories invaded in 1967 war, a war Lebanon never
participated in, and incorporated in UN Resolutions 242.
In consequence, the Lebanese negotiators are bargaining on playing the
“trade-off” role in an Israeli-Syrian agreement. Lebanese mediators are trying to link
an Israeli withdrawal from the remaining Lebanese territories with Syrian withdrawal
from the Beqa.18
In 2020, Lebanon is the first Arab country in the Middle East to formally
apply at joining the European Union. The main motive for this is economic; however,
the covert reason for this move is for Lebanon, which in light of the Taif Agreement
has been thrown into the Arab sphere, to discreetly regain a preferential standing with
its pre-Taif “Western” dimension.
Last and by no means least, Lebanon in 2020 is the only Arab country where
Christians and Muslims enjoy democratic rule. This representation is a role model
mainly for the Palestinian Authorities as well as Syria who is eyeing the events
closely anticipating its own internal political and economic reform.
Scenario No. 2: Statism:
Although the ban on his return had expired back in 1996, it was not until the
early years of the first decade of the 21st century that General Michel Aoun decided to
come back to his homeland. Unlike the General of the 1980s, Michel Aoun entered
the Lebanese political scene as the head of his own political party, the Free Patriotic
Movement.
In the parliamentarian elections of 2016, candidates from the Free Patriotic
Movement won a substantial number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The fact
that General Michel Aoun was the President is already indicative of the decreased
18
Muslih, Mohammad, ‘Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready’, Foreign Policy, Fall 1994,No.96,p.161
influence Syria under Bashar al-Assad had in the running of the internal affairs of
Lebanon.
The political tendencies followed in the late 1990s with Syria questioned the
fundamental principles accorded in Taif: that is Lebanon’s Arab identity and also
proclaimed it as “Patrie definitive pour tous ses fils” that is a final homeland to all
Lebanese nationals.
This was observed with the continuous consultations with
Damascus with regard to internal issues, and the rapprochement of certain
parliamentarians with the Syrian government. The lack of an independent decisions
making process within Lebanon created a potential threat to Lebanese-Syrian relations
and produced antagonism among the Christian community who lost most of its power
base in the civil turmoil.19 The Free Patriotic Movement banked on the revival of the
prestige of Christian’s role in Lebanese politics.
Four years in power, President Michel Aoun has from the onset of his election
attempted to fulfil his long time ambitions. The concept of his self-styled “Lebanese
Nationalism” is the founding denominator for all the government policies, whether
embarking on administrative, economic and social reforms.
Probably the prolonged desolate state of the Lebanese economy is the major
driving force for the rise to power of General Michel Aoun. Back in 1999 the
government deficit stood at 44.8% of GDP. Although the government had attempted
at cutting its spending and limit tax increases in order to reduce public debt, the
reforms were slow. Furthermore tax evasion became increasingly the norm and tax
collection became more complex with the progressively globalised economy. As a
result the markets, which continued to finance the debt, reached a proportional level
that caused havoc in the Lebanese economy.20
One economic triumph of the new government has been the writing off
Lebanon’s international debts with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Mansour, Albert, Inqilab A’la al Taif, Dar al Jadid, Beirut, 1993, pp.225-226
‘Lebanese Economy Headed for Crisis’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, November
1999,http;//www.meib.org/issues/9911.htm
19
20
This however required a political compromise. Proposed back in the 1990s, the
question of the debts was linked with the settling of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.21
The economic reforms of the Aoun administration undertaken since 2016
uphold the free market structure of the Lebanese economy, whilst taking into
consideration the of the deteriorating social costs. The reforms are formulated along
the General’s 1989 economic reconstruction plan which is includes social reforms
including the nationalisation of certain property including that of the Church.22
Interrelated with the political calls for a self determined, sovereign Lebanon
and the deteriorating economic situation, is the increasingly disillusionment of the
Lebanese society. This is leading to two antagonistic polarizations in the society.
At one end of the spectrum, there is a concentration of Christian tendencies
towards a state of xenophobia. This is the outcome of the government’s stress of
“Lebanese Nationalism” and the staunch defiance to the Syrian presence in the
country. Political parties such as the "Guardians of the Cedars-National Lebanese
Movement” that in the 1990s were relatively marginalized have gained ground. Their
main agendas
proliferate a “struggle” against Syrian and Arab ideologies whereby
Lebanon is considered to be “Lebanese without any other quality whether it is Arabic
or non-Arabic”. The most extreme of these parties call for the imposition of the
“Lebanese” language with the introduction of the alphabet designed by the poet and
philosopher, Said Akl, which is based on Phoenician sounds. The drive for the
national self-interest is also against the remaining Palestinians in Lebanon.23
The opposite end of the continuum are the proponents of Hizbullah.
They
see themselves increasingly marginalized because of the political tendencies of the
Aounist position. Although they adhere to the socialist economic approach they do
not find appeal in the interpretation of nationalism, which they see as a reversal of the
Taif Agreement.
21
Damascus continues to utilise Hizbullah as leverage to advance its
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the Lebanese Prime Minister Salim el-Hoss Joint Press
Conference, Beirut, September 4, 1999, as released by the Office of the Spokesman of the US
Department of State, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990904d.html
22
Sa’adeh, George, ‘Proposal by the Working Group of General Michel Aoun’, Document 17, Qisati
Ma’ al Taif, Beirut, 1998, p.411
23
‘The Guardians of the Cedars-National Lebanese Movement’, http://www.idrel.com.lb
interests in the country.
This forms a substantial obstacle for Michel Aoun’s
government.
The rest of the gamut of society is in a state of flux between the above two
ranges. Those who have seen their properties confiscated, including the church as
well as those who are facing exorbitant taxes are voicing their discontent. They are
challenged by those who see the economic reforms as a means out of the cycle of
economic depression.
Lebanese-Syrian relations are precarious. The Lebanese government under
Michel Aoun is demanding a purely Lebanese solution to domestic and foreign issues,
whilst the Syrian leadership is reluctant to relinquish its power.
The major dispute between the two parties is over the fourth article of the Taif
Agreement “The Lebanese-Syrian Relations”. Michel Aoun believes in the special
friendly relations that exist between the two countries; however, unlike his Syrian
counterpart he believes that this should be achieved through the establishment of
formal diplomatic relations between Beirut and Damascus24. On the other hand the
Syrian maintain the supremacy of the Taif Agreement as well as the binding treaties:
“Treaty of brotherhood. Co-operation and Co-ordination” and “Defence and Security
Agreement”.
Another problematic issue is that of the Syrian military presence. The new
Lebanese government maintains that the presence has never been legitimate. This is
set on tow bases. First the National Reconciliation Pact stipulated that the withdrawal
of the troops within two years.
However, the Syrian government disputes the
formation of the “Government of National Reconciliation”. The second foundation is
the Lebanese government’s claim is enshrined in the UN Security Council Resolution
520, which demands the respect of Lebanon’s sovereignty “…under the sole and
exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon.”
24
Interview with General Michel Aoun on Abu Dhabi TV, June 6, 2000, http://www.lebanonworld.org
Scenario No. 3: Civil War:
The Lebanon of the 1990s provides evidence on the critical digressions from
the Taif Accord, which provides reasons to believe that another internal war is
looming on the horizon in 2020.
Starting at the top of the pyramid, the Presidential rights have been abused
since the signing of the agreement in 1989. The recalcitrant position of General
Michel Aoun undermined the Presidential post. The consequent two Presidents have
overridden their limited powers, through their continuous residing over the executive
bodies although this runs contrary to the Constitution25.
Furthermore, the Taif Agreement intended to shift the role of Ministers from
“helpers” of the President to “partners” in the government. This rearrangement was
manifested by the fact that the executive powers were delegated to the Chamber of
Deputies. However, the fact that from the onset of the formation of the new
governments’ Ministers were largely from the old ruling elite hampered the essence of
the reform.26
Moreover the functions of the Chamber of Deputies were marred by the vested
interest of the “Troika”, an acronym synonymous with the decision making process of
the President, Prime Minister and Head of the Chamber of Deputies.
Another
shortcoming suffered by the Chamber dealt with the role of the Deputy Head of the
Chamber. At
the Taif talks the attending deputies did not specify the functions of
this position. Afterwards never since signing the agreement had the Deputy presided
over any session.27 Similarly the duties of the Deputy Prime Minister in the Council
of Ministers remained unresolved until early 2000.28
Related with the above state situation was the inability of the post-Taif
governments to undertake comprehensive administrative reforms.
Examples of this
relate to the re-appointment, after a dismissal of hundred of civil servants by a
Mansour, Albert,Inqilab A’la al Taif, Dar al Jadid, Beirut, 1993,pp.204-207
Ibid., p.208
27
Sa’adeh, George, Qisati Ma’ al Taif, Beirut, 1998, pp.236-237
28
‘Baydoun: al Jadal Hawla I’lam Byzanty wa La Ahad Ya’ouk Tanfeeth al Adala’, Annahar,
http://wwwannaharonline.com/htd/BAYDOUN.HTM, February 23, 2000
25
26
decision of the “State Consultative Council”29; and the appointment of judges and the
independence of the judiciary was an unresolved dilemma up into 2000.
A significant infringement of the Taif Agreement was the legislative elections
of 1992, 1996 and 2000.
For instance the Constitutional Court in fact declared the
1996 elections as “unconstitutional”30.
The Christian community felt the most
marginalized in these elections as they believed that all the electoral laws divided the
Mouhafazah districts, in a manner that reduced the chances of Christian candidates.
Furthermore the elections in August 2000, which saw the re-emergence of Rafic
Hariri, once again infringed upon the traditional Sunni families in Beirut as none of
the prominent Sunni figures of the capital city had any representation.
In the four years between 1991 and 1994, Lebanon experienced a series of
unprecedented economic and structural programmes. These included tax and rent
reforms, urban planning schemes and financial sector reorganisation. However after
1995, the negative aspects of these improvements took their toll on the economy. The
most devastating of these was the rise in overall poverty level reaching up to a third of
the population in the late 1990s. In figures this meant that in the last decade of the
20th century, 28% of Lebanese families lived below the “absolute poverty line”, that is
one million Lebanese, and a further 7% lived in “extreme poverty”, that is 250, 000
people.31
The civil war of the 1970s and 1980s reshuffled the Lebanese confessional
configuration. The system of check and balances that controlled the sectarian divide
degenerated with the war largely through the “religious cleansing” that took place.
Hence the Lebanese national identity became akin to religion rather than civilian
symbolism.32
After 16 years of war this form of identification could not be
realistically eradicated immediately; nevertheless, the lack of initiatives to tackle this
stimulated in diminished a form of national unification.
29
Hamdan, Kamal, Le Conflit Libanais, UNRISD, Dar al Faraby, Beirut, 1998, pp.321-322
el-Khazen, Farid, ‘Permanent Settlement in Lebanon: A recipe for Conflict’, Journal of Refugee
Studies, Oxford University Press, 1997, Vol.10, NO. 3, p.285
31
Ibid., p.281
32
Skovgaard-Peterson, Jakob, ‘Religious Heads or Civil Servants? Druze and Sunni Leadership in
Post-War Lebanon’, Mediterranean Politics, Special Issue on Western Approaches to the
Mediterranean, Autumn 1996, Vol. 1, No. 2, Frank Cass, London, p.343
30
The consequences of the government policies and economic situation had
major impacts on both the Christian and Muslim communities. The Christians felt
increasingly victimized as not only did they loose their power base but also their
leadership lacked manoeuvring power it exercised prior to 1975. Their boycott of the
1992 elections underlined this feeling of isolations. Equally the schism within the alKataeb political party after the return of Amine Gemayal in 2000 highlighted the
antagonism brewing within the Christian factions. On the other hand the Muslims,
especially the Sunni’s, found themselves deprived of a sense of an identity that could
translate itself in the government.33 This presented a perpetuation of the societal
trends in the Civil Wars and were not alleviated in the aftermath of Taif.
Equally on the social level, until the beginning of 2000, Article 7 and Article 9
of the Constitution were never put into full force. Article 7 stipulates the equality of
all the Lebanese and the latter maintained the freedom of religion.
This was
manifested by the fact that civil marriages were not legalised, laws on marriage and
divorce were functions of the religion of the persons involved and inheritance laws
were subject to religious particularities. In practical terms this implied that those
Lebanese wishing to opt for a civil marriage would resort to Cyprus for that purpose;
some Sunnis for the purpose of allowing their daughters to inherit would convert to
Shiism; polygamy was legal to Muslims; and divorce was prohibited to Maronites.
The naturalization of the Palestinians that took place in 1994 was done in line
with the Naturalization Decree. However the decree was implemented prior to the
ratification of the law. Thus both the Taif Agreement and the Constitution were
violated. By 2020, with the Israeli-Lebanese track culminated; the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations reaching their final status; and a substantial progress on the Israeli-Syrian
front, the issue of the Palestinians in Lebanon has been resolved. This has been in
relation to negotiation over the issue of the Golan Heights. Basically, through the
barter, Golan for the Palestinian right of return, Lebanon was obliged to accept de
facto the settlement of refugees.
33
Mansour, Albert, Inqilab A’la al Taif, Dar al Jadid, Beirut, p.193
The Maronites and the Shiites are the two sects, which most oppose the
absorption of Palestinian refugees.
The Maronites, supported by most other
Christians, feel demographically threatened with the increased number of Muslims.
On the other hand, the Shiites resentment lies in the fact that most of the Palestinian's
are concentrated in the South, which has a Shiite majority. Equally it should not be
forgotten that it is the Shiite population, which bore the heaviest burden of the PLO
insurgencies in the Civil War.
The settlement also carries with it “sectarian
overtones” especially in the context of the Sunni-Shiite divide.34
The spark of the 2020 Civil War emanates from the Christian segment of the
community. The 2020 war is analogous to that of 1958 in terms of the catalyst and
duration.
In the post Taif years, sectarianism was blatantly driven underground. The
cancellation of ‘sect’ in the Lebanese identity cards in the late 1990s did not erase it
from the minds of the people. As mentioned above, the failed administrative reforms,
the faltered elections and the marginalized political representation fuelled by
economic stagnation were the factors that culminated in the short war.
In addition, the Christians remaining in Lebanon and with the support of those
in the diaspora namely the al-Kataeb, Lebanese Forces banned since the mid 1990s
and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement continued to see the Taif Agreement as
running contrary to the ‘natural’ set up of Lebanon. Perceived as an imposed accord
these parties harboured much animosity to what they saw as a conspiracy against
Christianity in the Middle East. 35
There are several reasons to the short duration.
The war is an internal war;
hence it lacks the support of outside players. Iran, Syria and Israel have no vested
interest in this conflict. In turn none of the feuding parties have the financial and
political patronage they benefited from in the last Civil War.
el-Khazen, Farid, ‘Permanent Settlement in Lebanon: A recipe for Conflict’, Journal of Refugee
Studies, Oxford University Press, 1997, Vol.10, No.3, p.287
35
Andari, Paul, Hathihi Shahadati: Lubanan 1975-1992, Beirut, 1993, p.336
34
Interlinked with the above is the regional configuration in the
new
millennium. Neither Syria nor Israel want a disturbing situation along their borders
with Lebanon. Moreover, Israel who has by 2020 embarked full in the economic
basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does
not desire to see a potential
economic market dissipating. Similarly Syria, as an influential Arab political broker,
and with its own socio-economic reforms underway prefers a stable Lebanon than a
turbulent one.
Scenario No. 4: Federal Entity:
The historical and geographical ties between Lebanon and Syria stem back to
the “Greater Syria of the Ottoman Empire. These bonds found an expression as early
as the 1940s with open borders, family ties and the lack of diplomatic relations. 36
However it is with the rise to power of the late President Hafez al-Assad that Syrian
hegemony gained the upper hand.
The 1990s may be seen as a culmination of the
long-term vision of Hafez al-Assad to buttress Syrian command.
Syrian army presence in all its stages in Lebanon was reinforced with
diplomatic manoeuvring. Under President Elias Sarkis, Syria attempted to formalise
the special relations between the two countries. This failed because of the militia
power politics that prevailed at that time.
The second equally ill-fated move was
through the Trio-Party Agreement that aimed to bring Amal, the Socialist Progressive
Party and the Lebanese Forces together.37 The last measure was the 1989 Taif
Agreement, which for the first time guaranteed the security and the sovereignty of
both countries. However, it also gave Syria a “free-hand” in Lebanon as is evidenced
in the Second and Fourth Principles of the Agreement.
The Second Principle deals
with “Reinstating the Sovereignty
Lebanese State over the Entire Lebanese Land”.
of the
The agreement stipulates the
withdrawal of the Syrian troops within two years of the ratifying the National
Reconciliation Pact.
Faksh, Mahmud, ‘Syria’s Role and Objectives in Lebanon’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1992,
Vol. 2, No. 2, p.84
37
Mansour, Albert, Inqilab A’la al Taif, Dar al Jadid, Beirut, 1993, pp.160-161
36
However until 2000 the above was subject to discussion. A close reading of
the clause provides ample evidence of the ulterior motives of the Syrian leadership. It
is “ … with due thanks” that the Syrian army would assist the Lebanese army in
spreading their sovereignty.
Hence, it is through an official request from the
Lebanese government that Syria would re-deploy its forces.
Furthermore it is
important to note that the agreement to be reached should be between the “ Syrian
government “ and the “Lebanese Government of the National Reconciliation Pact”.
This intrinsically entails, as indicated in the “Administrative Reforms” of the accord,
that along with other reforms, non-confessional elections should have taken place. Up
until 2000 this was not the case in Lebanon.
The Fourth Principle concentrates on the relations between the two countries.
Although as mentioned above, the principle reinforced the sovereignty of both
countries, the paragraph calls upon Lebanon not to “…(shall under no circumstances)
be made a source of threat to the security of Syria”. Equally, it demands from
Lebanon not to maintain any groupings that would undermine the safety of Syria.
This is reciprocated by Syria; however, the statement presumes that it is Syria, which
decides on what is a potential threat to its national interest.
Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination” and
The
“Treaty of
“Defence and Security
Agreement” made this Taif principle binding.
The transfer of power to Damascus did not originate solely from Syria; it was
reciprocated from the Lebanese political scene too.
The 1975 Civil War brought
about a transformation in the traditional political elites. In the 1990s this exemplified
itself in a widening gap between the masses and the elite. The vacuum was filled with
politicians following the orders of what Farid el-Khazen, professor of political science
at the American University of Beirut, labelled as the “super-state”.38
Three important factors that reshaped the internal politics in the post Taif
years served to bring Lebanon closer into Syria’s orbit.
The first concerns the
weakening of Lebanon’s democracy; the second deals with the infringements on the
el-Khazen, Farid, ‘The Making and the Unmaking of Lebanon’s Political Elites from Independence
to Taif’, The Beirut Review, Fall 1993, p.61
38
independence of the Lebanese government and finally the elimination of the makers
of the Taif Agreement.
Lebanon was the only Arab country where the political forces were propelled
by the dynamics of
the opposition versus the government.
However, with the
political parties substantially weakened after the war, the flawed electoral laws in
1992, 1996 and 2000 and restrictions on the freedom of speech further hampered their
proactive participation
Next, following the signing of Taif, none of the Lebanese
governments were able to take a decision independent from that of Syria. This was
most typified when government officials were absent on both the military and
political level during the seven-day bombardment of the South in 1993 by Israeli
forces. Finally and most importantly was the elimination of the majority of politicians
who were the primary ‘movers’ of the Taif Agreement whether through assassination,
such as the case of René Mouawwad, or by ‘orchestrated’ elections.39
The closest model in the Arab world for the Lebanese-Syrian Federation of
2020 is that of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although the Swiss and Belgian
models have been advanced; however, the main prerequisite for this is a mature
communal transformation. This means that conflicts do not emanate from “communal
consciousness” and are resolved through the democratic channels that have evolved
through the centuries.40
In fact through this Federation with Syria, Lebanon is experiencing a stability
it has never experienced since 1943.
The Federation has endorsed a new constitution
that transcended the Taif Agreement. This allowed for political flexibility that was
lacking in the previous national pacts, which in many instances lead to “zero-sum
games” and civil upheavals.
The constitution is open to amendments and
accommodates for the different.41
39
Ibid., pp. 62-63
el-Khazen, Farid, ‘Permanent Settlement in Lebanon: A recipe for Conflict’, Journal of Refugee
Studies, Oxford University Press, 1997, Vol. 10, No. 3, p.287
41
Jureidini, Paul, A., ‘Lebanon and the Peace process: The Case of Greater Realism’, Perceptions,
December-February 1996/7, Vol. I, No. 4, p.28
40
The Federation does not imply a quasi-police state in Lebanon. This would
run contrary to the newly emerged political structure in the region but also it would
undermine the economic transformation-taking place. In fact within the Federation,
Beirut yielded, de facto and de jure, its foreign policy making to Damascus. In turn
Syria has redeployed all its army in Lebanon including the intelligence network.
For once in the history of its existence, Lebanon of 2020 is undergoing
stability it never experienced before. The Federation with Syria has legalised the
relations between the two countries thus ending the “floating state” that Lebanon
faced in the years after Taif. The Federation is a practical outcome forma relationship
that has always prevailed, whether it was through the military presence or in the
dictating of the Second and Fourth Principles of the Taif Accord.
It was the
relinquishing of its external powers through the Federal arrangement with Syria that
proved the most beneficial.
What Future is Lebanon Heading Towards? :
Lebanon is a ripe experimental ground for the region because it encapsulates a
prodigal number of socio-political factors. In fact these elements form a microcosm of
the Middle East. Lebanon is a mosaic of ethnic and religious groups.
The future of Lebanon is embodied in the Taif Agreement. Ignoring the
confessional divided, has proven to be costly. Economically, Lebanon has missed the
shift from economies of scale to economies of scope. This development has been
further hampered by the obliteration of the infrastructure, communications, industry
and agriculture. Socially the communities remain unconsolidated
The four scenarios analysed in further detail in the dissertation are not and
were not proposed to be mutually exclusive.
Furthermore the work was not meant to
paint a rosy picture of a ‘happy’ Lebanon within a parliamentarian setting nor smear
the image with a ‘doomsday’ outcome of a civil war. The spectrum of the scenarios
was intended to highlight the plethora of possibilities that may be the outcome of the
Taif Agreement, its implementation and the regional environment.
Lebanon, like all other countries, does not exist within a vacuum.
As
mentioned above, Lebanon has been a reflection of the regional setting. However, in
the increasingly global world, it is time that Lebanon sums up the courage to exports
its political aspirations to its neighbours.
The Arab world needs a stable Lebanon. Moreover, the Arab world requires a
democratic Lebanon.
In fact the Arab world, supported by the international
community, put down the foundations to build this democracy. The Taif Agreement
may not be the most perfect of these building blocs, but it does provide a framework
through which the Lebanese can themselves build their future. As, the Lebanese
political analyst, Paul Salamé said, “ (there is a need) for a creative interpretation of
the basic document making the formula flexible enough to permit its own
transformation”.42
There are reasons to believe that the winds of change in the Middle East are on
the horizon. In his inaugural speech as the new President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad,
stated that although his policies will continue to adhere to the general framework of
his father, he does believe in the need for social, political and economic reforms
which are much required in Syria.
The most promising change for not only the Lebanon but also the region as a
whole is the European Union’s initiatives. Tacit and long term as it may be, the EuroMediterranean Partnership appears to be an assured measure transforming the region
into an area of democratic states.
Because of its political, social and economic
history, which has been elaborated upon throughout the work, Lebanon is the most
promising country to benefit politically from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
This partnership reflects the European “re-discovery” of its Mediterranean
dimension. There are two main reasons for this. First the European Union aims at
countering the American influence in the region and secondly there is the desire from
the Union to expand its economic market.
If Lebanon eventually signs the agreement with the European Union, it will
bring with it a series of changes. On the structural level there will be a need for a
“mise à niveau” of the Lebanese industry. In order to move beyond the free trade
criteria, Lebanon will have to initiate a form of investment triggered growth process.
This will co-currently require legal reform conducive to transparency and open
economy.43
A democratic Lebanon, with parliamentarian representation, based on total
number of votes and not divided according to sects could serve as a role model for the
Arab countries in the region. This will require internal elements as well as external
initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to attain this long-term goal.
The international actors and most notably the European Union, envisage Lebanon as
the springboard into the Middle East.
With the new millennium, the post Cold War world is searching for answers to
the impacts of globalisation, democracy and peace. Borders are becoming obsolete,
and maybe the Levant would see the erasing of its borders reminiscent of a
geographic configuration of the pre-colonial era. However, it will be the same forces
that drew the borders in the Levant early in the 20th century that will eradicate them in
the next century.
Lebanon is no exception to these discussions. However, Lebanon
should not perpetuate the illusions of the 1926 legacies and face up in finding
solutions to the dilemmas that lead to sixteen years of devastation.
Shehadi, Kamal, ‘The Lebanese-European Partnership Agreement as a Pathway to Economic
Integration’, in Shahin, Wassim & Shehadi, Kamal (eds.), Pathways to Integration: Lebanon and the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, The Lebanese Center for policy Studies 1997, p.2
43
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Newspapers:
al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)
Annahar (Beirut)
Assafir (Beirut)
Interviews:
Maalouf, Ghazi Khalil