Intervention Summary
Title: Access to Justice through Paralegal Services and Restorative Justice
What support will the UK provide?
This business case is for a UK contribution of £18.5 million over six years from December 2012 to
December 2018. UK funding will enable an existing project, with funding commitments of £8.3
million from Germany (BMZ) and Spain, to extend its coverage of paralegal and other services from
5 Districts to 35, and cover 60% of the prisons in Bangladesh. The project will address one
symptom of problems in the justice system, reducing the number of awaiting trial prisoners and
thereby reducing prison overcrowding. Benefits will include improved justice services for women and
a reduction in corruption opportunities within the justice sector. The project will work in a way that
builds support for reform of case management, rules governing the justice system, and legislation.
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to address?
Bangladesh’s justice system is overwhelmed. There is a combined backlog of more than 2 million
civil and criminal cases. Bangladesh’s prisons currently hold more than twice the number of
prisoners they were built for. Of the people in prisons, 70% (50,000 people) are on remand (“under
trial”), and it is estimated that 90% of these will not be convicted of an offence.
The criminal justice system fails the poor more than the rich. Delays in police investigation and court
process result in opportunities for corruption and unnecessary remand of prisoners awaiting trial,
often for years. The availability of legal aid is limited in Bangladesh, and lack of information and
cumbersome procedures make it hard for poor people to access it.
Overcrowding makes it impossible for prisons to deliver minimum international human rights
standards of adequate light, air, decency and privacy. Women, girls and juveniles in jails are
particularly vulnerable to abuse. Reducing the number of under trial prisoners, who are often
detained unnecessarily, could solve the prison overcrowding problem and many of the human rights
issues associated with it. Human rights abuses also have implications for wider UK-Bangladesh
cooperation on the rule of law in the justice sector.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
We will support the scale-up of a tried and tested approach. Since 2008, GIZ (part of the German
Development Cooperation) has been piloting a project to address prison overcrowding. GIZ
supports paralegals employed by local NGOs in five pilot districts and prisons. Paralegals (the legal
equivalent of primary health care by paramedics) work with poor people caught up in prison, to guide
them through the justice system. They also work with prison officers, courts, police and lawyers to
assist the system to manage cases better. GIZ backs this up through dialogue with local and
national level policy-makers in the justice sector
Early results of this public-private partnership approach have been impressive. In the first two years
of GIZ’s project, paralegal teams in two pilot districts achieved between 12% and 19% reduction in
the number of under-trial prisoners. An evaluation by Bangladesh’s Ministry of Home Affairs in 2011
identified that the project had made senior local officials more aware of who was in prison and why,
and improved court administration and prompt submission of reports on petty crimes by Police. The
evaluation commended the ‘catalyst’ effect the project had had on broader criminal justice reforms.
1
DFID Bangladesh has received a proposal from GIZ to scale up this project. Germany and Spain
have already committed to support a modest expansion. UK support will enable the project to
expand the project’s work from the existing 5 locations to a further 35 Districts, covering 60% of
prisons in Bangladesh.
Paralegals will have access to prisons, courts and police establishments, and will work with local
Case Coordination Committees (CCCs) who receive information on cases of concern and follow
them up. As well as working with these local committees, GIZ will feed evidence from the local level
into a national policy dialogue on reforms to regulations, legislation and budgets in the justice sector.
GIZ’s project will contribute to DFID Bangladesh Operational Plan objectives of increasing access to
justice services, formal and informal, and reinforce work in an existing DFID Bangladesh
programme, the Safety and Justice Programme (S&J), to build an integrated approach to the
problems of the justice sector. The S&J programme works with other government justice sector
agencies and with NGOs, but not with prisons. DFID will set up an Independent Advisory Panel to
look at the progress of all of these projects and share evidence of what works with government and
other donors, both to build up an evidence base in support of reform, and also to encourage other
donors to invest in what works.
At the moment the proposed UK burden share is 78% of the project, but other bilateral donors have
expressed an interest in prisons, and GIZ is discussing possible future collaboration. DFID will take
stock of progress at the mid-point of the programme and decide whether further expansion of the
project, and DFID’s share of it, is still required.
Who will be implementing the support we provide?
GIZ will be the main implementer. GIZ will contract several Bangladeshi NGOs with a proven track
record in this sort of work to provide the paralegal services. It will work closely with the Bangladesh
Ministries of Home Affairs and other relevant Ministries, the Prisons Directorate, Prisons, Police,
courts and lawyers at a local level.
What are the expected results?
With the UK assistance, 2 million people will benefit by expanding the project to 35 district prisons
and engaging 450 paralegals over 6 years. Up to 17,750 awaiting trial prisoners who are yet to be
declared by the courts as convicted or innocent could potentially be released. At least 53,840
women and juveniles in conflict with the law will be supported at police station to find alternatives to
imprisonment.
Better functioning case management in the project areas will reduce overcrowding. Work by the
paralegals and GIZ itself will improve capacity of the prison officials and develop retraining and
rehabilitation programmes for the convicted inmates. Additional benefits will include improved justice
services for women and a reduction in corruption opportunities within the Justice sector.
As well as addressing the immediate problem (prison overcrowding), the project will demonstrate
how the working of the justice system itself can be improved. By building up evidence on what
works at a local level, and demonstrating success to decision-makers at national and local level, the
project is expected to be a catalyst for national legislative and policy reform that can address causes
of prison overcrowding as well as symptoms.
These results will contribute to DFID’s commitment to improve access to justice for women and girls,
and to the objectives in DFID Bangladesh’s Operational Plan.
2
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
A monitoring and evaluation strategy has been developed on the basis of the experience of GIZ’s
pilot project. It will use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate the direct results
attributable to the project, and the contribution of the project to processes of policy and
organisational change within the justice system in Bangladesh, both at a local level and at the
national level.
To make up for the poor quality of existing data in the criminal justice system, GIZ will put in place its
own arrangements for data capture and analysis, and run a detailed information management
system. This will enable monthly quantitative evaluation of impact at each site, which is passed to all
interested parties, and in the pilot project has been shared with local justice sector agencies in the
form of information sheets, which provide recognition of achievements.
A particular challenge will be to measure whether the project is having an impact on policy change
processes. DFID will establish an Independent Advisory Panel that will do a periodic assessment of
policy initiatives in the justice sector, and assess the influence that this programme and other donor
initiatives in the sector have had on moving selected policy processes forward. This assessment will
feed back into project plans for advocacy and support to policy and implementation.
Independent evaluations are scheduled half way through the project and at the end.
3
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
High levels of poverty and inequality exist in Bangladesh, with more than 4 in 10 people living on less
than $1.25 per day and over three quarters of the population on less than $2.00. Population growth is
a continuing challenge, with about 160m people living in an area the size of England and Wales.
Bangladesh suffers as a result of unstable politics (characterised by violence and confrontation),
endemic corruption and weaknesses in state capacity. Political unrest increases as the country
moves closer to the election scheduled for end of 2013/early 2014. Although the economy has grown
by 5-6% a year since the early 1990s and Bangladesh has weathered recent global turmoil well, it will
require sustained annual growth of 8% or more if it is to achieve its aspiration of middle income
status by 2021.
The Rule of Law index1 has been relatively constant over the past 10 years while the trend for Voice
and Accountability by contrast shows a gradual improvement.2 The judicial system is ‘overwhelmed’
(with a combined backlog of two million civil and criminal cases),3 and the prisons are overcrowded.
70% of the prison population (50,000 people) are on remand (‘under-trial’); it is estimated that 90% of
these will not be convicted of an offence.4 The provision of legal aid is limited in Bangladesh. The
National Legal Aid Services Office (NLASO) regularly fails to use its national budget, while the poor
continue to suffer without timely legal aid.
The Village Courts and Arbitration Councils (the lowest tier of the formal justice system and,
theoretically, the most accessible to poor people) operate in only 10% of the country, and traditional
‘Shalish’ (informal community dispute resolution mechanism through meditation), while available, is
often out of line with the laws of the country and biased against women, young persons and the
marginalised. Community Legal Services (for example, mediation services to people who cannot
afford to go to court for “petty” cases, such as legal separation, inheritance disputes within the family,
property issues such as stolen cattle and the like. In cases where the dispute has to go to court,
these NGOs also provide free legal advice and legal representation in cases such as pollution of
rivers, unsafe labour practices and work related accidents, ship collisions in the rivers, etc.) provided
by NGOs are seen to be the most effective mechanisms for poor people to access justice but they
are only available in 35% of the country.5 Crime prevention and deterrence remain weak.
In short, the justice system is weak due to a combination of poor capacity, political interference, elite
bias, lack of awareness of legal rights, corruption and high transaction costs (travel and fees) which
results in the poor and vulnerable having little or no access to the formal justice system. The result of
this situation is that the poor are unable to protect themselves, their assets, or their interests. This
has a direct impact on poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs. It creates an overwhelming
sense of powerlessness.
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp
Bangladesh occupies the lower 40% of countries.
3
Evidence Based Analysis of Court Cases in Bangladesh, Dr. Asif Nazrul, Dr. Barrister Tureen Afroz, Heather
Goldsmith, J.D., January 2011.
4
The US State Department, Bangladesh Human Rights Report 2010
5
The Asia Foundation, 2007, Survey of Community Legal Services
1
2
4
Prison overcrowding
Bangladesh’s prisons now house over two times the prisoners they were built for6. This massive
overcrowding makes it impossible for Bangladesh prisons to deliver United Nations defined minimum
standards of adequate light, air, decency and privacy which particularly affect the women, girls and
the juveniles in the jails in absence of any alternative to protect them from the abusive situations.
The problem is compounded by limited scope for training and rehabilitation for the prisoner. Also,
such overcrowding creates ideal breeding ground for disease like pulmonary tuberculosis and
HIV/AIDS, which are then transmitted back to the general population when prisoners are released.
Leading Bangladeshi legal experts have long been concerned with the violations of human rights that
occur when people, especially poor people who are by far the majority of prisoners, get entangled in
the penal system. The Prison Directorate pointed to two main blockages in Bangladesh's legal
system that have created the current crisis in the prisons: lack of legal advice and legal assistance to
prisoners; and the slow judicial system that has prisoners waiting protracted periods in prison before
their trials.7 Another viewpoint pointed to other factors that lead to prison overcrowding: the poor
quality of police investigations; widespread disregard of legislation protecting vulnerable groups by
the courts and police; and the rigid restrictions for accessing Bangladesh’s prisons.8
Access to justice is particularly difficult for women in Bangladesh, who are frequently victims of
violence, but suffer multiple layers of discrimination. Problems of access may be worsened by
language barriers, low education/literacy, urban/rural divides, distance from the courts and lack of
childcare facilities. Even where cases are investigated, the costs may be too high for poorer women,
rules of evidence may discriminate directly or indirectly against them and there may be bias against
women plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, lawyers and judges. The court trials in many cases revictimise survivors, through aggressive treatment of victims/witnesses, and inadequate protection for
victims and witnesses. When convictions for perpetrators are secured, sentencing may be
disproportionately lenient, court-ordered damages/fines may remain unpaid, or the perpetrator may
be released early taking advantage of existing loopholes in the legal system.
The Bangladesh Jail Commission Report of 1980, under the Chairmanship of Justice Munim, made
farsighted recommendations for prisons reform that are still valid today, and it rightly noted, “building
more prisons cannot be expected to reduce overcrowding inside the prisons.” The Report called for
alternatives such as “adequate use of bail system, a strong, effective and frequently utilised probation
system, community services order, compensation, conditional discharge, suspended sentence.”
Recently, the Prison Directorate has undertaken a number of initiatives to address the urgent
problem of Bangladesh’s prisons, including new training and rehabilitation programmes and legal aid
support for the prisoners. Also, with a small scale support from the German Government through
GIZ, the Prison Directorate has shown the potential to prevent new cases from entering the criminal
justice system through greater reliance on processes based on principles of restorative justice which
focuses on the needs of the victim, offender and the community 9 and providing options to the people,
especially women and girls to settle disputes and minor crimes.
6
1996: 44,000 in prison with capacity for 22,000
2007: 87,000 in prison with capacity for 27,000
2011: 74,000 in prison with capacity for 29,000
Individual prisons can be worse: Narayanganj holds 1700 and has capacity for only 200.
(Source: Bangladesh Prison Department Headquarters)
7
Evaluation of the Paralegal Advisory Service, Ministry of Home Affairs, September 2011
8
Id
9
Restorative Justice (RJ) is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of the victim, offender and the
community. It is based on the theory of justice that considers crime and wrongdoing to be an offence against an
individual or community rather than the state. As the name implies, the principle is to restore the situation to as
5
Evidence of what works
The legal case blockages which cause prison overcrowding originate outside the prisons and must
be addressed there. The GIZ Project, Improvement of the Real Situation of Overcrowding in Prisons
(IRSOP), started in 200810, has been working with the Ministry of Home Affairs, in particular the
Prison Directorate. IRSOP provided appropriate legal aid services to those in conflict with the criminal
law, and linked up the justice agencies to enable them to co-ordinate their activities better. It adopted
a ‘process approach’11, which viewed the problem of prison overcrowding as a ‘symptom of a wider
crisis in the criminal justice system of Bangladesh’.12
IRSOP demonstrated how Paralegals (the legal equivalent of primary health care by paramedics)
could offer primary justice services to poor persons caught up in the criminal justice system,
especially to those in prison and assist the system better to manage these persons. Emphasis was
placed on building relationships and increasing partnerships at all levels. Paralegals worked with
prison officers (regulated by a Code of Conduct agreed with the Prison Department) and courts
through the Case Co-ordination Committees established in each pilot site. In addition, they were
careful to work with the lawyers to avoid perceptions of competition.
Three teams of six paralegals (employed by three different NGOs13) coordinated by a full time lawyer
in GIZ worked in Dhaka Central Prison (as well Kashimpur II and III), Bogra and Madaripur districts.
The eighteen paralegals were trained with the assistance of Paralegal Advisory Services Institute in
Malawi. In addition, they were trained by representatives from local criminal justice agencies, with
whom the paralegals are eventually intended to work. A census of prisoners in the pilot sites in
Dhaka, Bogra and Madaripur provided important snapshot of who is in prison, a common point of
departure both for the project and for all actors in the criminal justice system. It enabled the
authorities to bring to the attention of the courts people who had overstayed, ought to be on bail or
brought to trial. The courts were able to take immediate action on some of these matters. This ‘quick
win’ demonstrated what could be done through a simple yet coordinated action.
There have been two positive evaluations of the IRSOP programme. The first was commissioned by
GIZ as an independent evaluation (January 2011) and the second was undertaken by the Ministry of
Home Affairs.
By the time of the first GIZ evaluation (September 2010), the paralegal teams had achieved a 12%
reduction in under-trial prisoners in Bogra district and 19% in Madaripur. (The scale of the population
in Dhaka Central Jail, with 10,000 prisoners, is of a different order and by September 2010, the team
of six paralegals had only completed a census of just under 4000 prisoners).
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) evaluation highlighted the following evidence of the success of
Paralegal Services:

A baseline Prison Census conducted at the outset of the district pilots had provided the
criminal justice agencies with a profile of the prison population ‘for the first time ever’.

The use of safe custody had ‘all but disappeared’ in two districts; and in both these prisons
there were no more ‘on call’ prisoners: prisoners were regularly produced before the courts on
the next due date (rather than languishing for months or even years without a return date).
it was before the crime. RJ fosters dialogue between the victim and offender towards an outcome that is
acceptable to the victim, and that usually prevents minor offenders from straying into a cycle of crime.
11
GIZ evaluation, January 2011, p4
Id
13
BRAC, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) and Madariput Legal Aid Association (MLAA)
12
6

Jail visits by the District Judges and Deputy Commissioners, accompanied by paralegals
were happening more regularly, which ‘helped the Deputy Commissioners and District Judges
to see the real situation of the prisons and then bring the issues to the CCC to resolve
immediately.’

Police were submitting reports within time in connection with petty crimes, reducing the
amount of time prisoners had to stay in prison awaiting those police reports.’

The courts were becoming more ‘proactive’ in administering the cases.

The interaction of the paralegals with the District Legal Aid Committee (DLAC) had
contributed to making the DLAC ‘more functional’. As a result, NLASO had requested formal
collaboration between IRSOP and DLAC in the pilot sites. Paralegals attend at the monthly
DLAC meetings and share good practice.

The project has developed an information management system. It has introduced a data
tracking system and monthly reporting for the project.

The project has acted ‘as a catalyst for the reform agenda in criminal justice. As a result of
project activities and learning, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Law, Justice
and Parliamentary Affairs as well as the Law Commission are collaborating.
The MoHA evaluation also noted the need for some further improvements in the project:

Closer involvement of police – who should ‘allow the paralegals in their police stations to
ensure legal assistance at the entry point of the criminal justice system’ which in turn would
assist speed up investigations, ensure the presence of witnesses at court and inform the
court’s decision whether or not to grant bail.14

Increasing the numbers of paralegals.

Closer attention to orienting judicial officers in ‘human rights perspectives’ (as concerns bail
and sentencing principles) and promoting alternatives to prison to reduce overcrowding.15
Additional lessons drawn from IRSOP are that:

Numbers of prisoners will not decrease overall without a concerted strategy by all justice
agencies supported by political will. Stating a complex problem simply: the inflow of cases
needs to be reduced and the outflow increased. This requires more concerted action at the
community and police levels to prevent cases coming into the system by embarking on a dual
crime prevention strategy as well as developing effective mechanisms for diverting cases
away from the justice system. Once in the system, courts require a mechanism to divert
appropriate cases out of the case list and prisons need to know-how to assist convicted
prisoners obtaining a useful skill that will serve them to be released.

People need to be informed and encouraged to apply the law. The utility of ‘forum theatre’
techniques applied in the paralegal aid clinics in prisons in Uganda and Malawi have led to
prisoners understanding the cases against them and organizing their defence better or
entering guilty pleas.16 General ignorance of the law and legal aid services offered by
government result in fear and suspicion among ordinary people.
14
MoHA evaluation p15
Id
16
The PLCs started at the end of IRSOP
15
7
IRSOP has already addressed some these evaluation recommendations:

A phased plan has been developed for expansion to a significantly larger number of prisons in
discussion with GoB. The initial sites for migration are being determined based on criteria agreed
between GIZ and GoB.

Carefully targeted high level Study Missions have helped to demonstrate what works in other
countries and built interest in replicating that experience in Bangladesh, among Policy makers,
Police, Prison authorities, Judiciary and Prosecution services and Research organisations. GoB
is also supported to engage in policy discussions and showcase results at conferences and
international forum, whether on legal assistance for prisoners or on prisoner rehabilitation.

IRSOP has supported the development of a strategic plan for the Prison Directorate, and
supported the drafting of a new Prison Act (at the request of the Ministry of Home Affairs) by
engaging GoB in discussion with internationally renowned practitioners and drafters. Strong
linkages between MoHA and Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJPA) have
been established, and in an international conference on penal reform in Dhaka in 2010, these
ministries led the consensus formation that the enactment or amendment of several laws was
required in consonance to make the legal reform process effective. While working with these two
important ministries the new project will create stronger dialogue and linkages between MoHA
and MoLJPA in addressing the shortcomings of the criminal justice system and its delivery.

The number of paralegals is being increased, and training for select paralegals as paralegal
trainers and coordinators for newly recruited paralegals are being planned. Dialogues with the
Law Departments in national universities are on-going to determine support and receptiveness to
instituting a national level diploma course to certify the paralegals.

Joint workshops on effective monitoring for results in Rule of Law interventions and District wide
awareness raising sessions for criminal justice actors etc have been organised together with
partner institutions.
The impact of IRSOP has also been noted by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in
Afghanistan (where it is informing the development of a pilot paralegal scheme in Helmand) and by
DFID in the Border Areas in Pakistan (where a pilot paralegal scheme is being planned to start in
Peshawar).
Need for a DFID intervention
DFID Bangladesh has received a proposal from GIZ to support a project covering the period 20122018, which will scale up the provision of legal services in selected districts of Bangladesh. The
proposal builds on the success of IRSOP. Other donors (Germany and Spain) are committed to
support a modest expansion of GIZ’s project. Support from DFID would enable the project to
consider a more significant scale-up.
A scaled up project would complement and strengthen the impact on an existing DFID programme,
the Safety and Justice Programme (S&J), which has the following three components:
 Police Reform Programme II (PRP II) (£10 million) to improve crime prevention (community
policing), service delivery that addresses the needs of women and girls, and to promote
organisational reform in the Police.
 A Community Legal Services Project (CLS Project) (£17 million) to increase access to
community legal services at the local level through alternative dispute resolutions (mediation,
legal advice, etc), legal aid and legal education/awareness raising. The project will extend the
geographical provision of community legal services to the poor and excluded women,
8

children, minorities and slum dwellers.
Justice Sector Fund (JSF) (£3 million), to support the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) to
strengthen sector wide dialogue, planning and coordination among the key justice institutions
for developing a strategic vision for justice sector reform.
DFIDB’s S&J programme closely works with the key justice institutions and actors e.g. the Ministry of
Law, Supreme Court, Lawyers, Judges, Attorney General Office, Police, Ministry of Home Affairs,
and civil society organisations and NGOs – but not the Prison Directorate. GIZ’s proposal aims to
expand IRSOP’s good practices to provide support for joint action by justice sector actors. This
resonates with DFID’s emphasis in the S&J Programme on building an integrated approach to the
problems in the justice sector.
The project would also address an important human rights issue in Bangladesh.
Prison
overcrowding is symptomatic of a lack of access to justice of one of the most vulnerable groups in the
country who experience huge violation of human rights. As of 1 September 2012, the actual
population in prisons was 67,908, against an official capacity of 30,610. Prison staff are fully
occupied in managing this massive inflow of prisoners and attempting to control the violence and
crime that such overcrowding produces. Therefore, the project seeks to improve the human rights
situation of the prisoners in selected districts through building capacity of the prison officials and
increasing the scopes for retraining and rehabilitation programmes.
The project activities do not duplicate the Community Legal Services (CLS) project in the S&J
programme because the GIZ project is looking only at the working of the criminal justice system. The
majority of the disputes and cases that the CLS programme will work to resolve are civil in nature –
for example family, dowry or land disputes. The community level interventions17 of this project will
add further value to DFID’s existing justice programme by:

filling critical gap with information collected by the paralegals about criminal cases and
prisoners which will help in taking concrete decision on how cases can be coordinated;

directly contributing to improve criminal justice and prison systems through reduction of
prisoners;

strengthening the state sponsored legal aid services; and

linking up with initiatives which has already been acknowledged within the government.
The project will directly contribute to achieve one of the objectives of the Bangladesh-HMG Country
Business Plan for 2012-2013: enhanced access to justice for poor and vulnerable. The project will
also contribute to achieve broader goals of DFID Bangladesh’s anti-corruption strategy as it will help
poor people to avoid paying bribes to get justice services provided by the state. Through its positive
impact on human rights in the prisons system and the justice sector more widely, it will also
contribute to wider UK-Bangladesh cooperation on justice and the rule of law.
17
Paralegals act as a bridge between prisoners, courts, prisons, the police and the legal profession. At Court,
paralegals provide primary legal information on cases and procedure, either directly to prisoners or to members
of the families or public at go-to points in court and make referrals to ‘District Legal Aid Committees’ (DLAC)
delivered by Bangladesh’s National Legal Aid Service (NLASO), to NGO panel lawyers or to private lawyers,
as appropriate. They service the Case Coordination Committees (CCCS) and bring to their attention prioritised
case lists for action. In Prisons, paralegals are involved in facilitating Legal Aid Clinics in prisons to empower
prisoners to understand the law as it applies to their own case (to increase the prospects of an early plea to the
right charge) and to ensure that they are better able to access legal assistance. At Police, paralegals work to
develop the trust of the police by targeting young persons in conflict with the law and women victims. They
work through and with Community Police Forums in each district to divert appropriate cases from the justice
system.
9
Through DFID’s Strategic Vision for Girls and Women, the UK has committed to put girls and
women at the heart of development assistance. It sets out to encourage greater and more effective
programmes for lives of girls and women to see significant improvement and sustainable
transformation. Safety and Security for women both at home, in the community and in the workplace
is a prerequisite in order for them to seek opportunities and fulfil their potential for transformational
change. The programme will contribute to this strategic objective by making the justice system more
accountable and responsive to the needs of women and girls leading to improved safety and security.
The project will make significant contribution to the target expressed in DFID’s ‘We Wills’ of helping
ten million women and girls with improved access to security and justice services through DFID
support. The approach would be designed to complement the CLS project, which is just getting
under way.
The success of IRSOP, together with the high level dialogue and advocacy of GIZ personnel, has
generated strong interest in this project in the Bangladesh Government. Due to his keen interest the
Law Minister has deployed his representatives in the Advisory Committee of the project, and
instructed the National Legal Services Organisation to observe and learn from the working of the
project and its Advisory Committee. He has also agreed that the government’s District Legal Aid
operation should include some of the methods of case coordination introduced by IRSOP. In 2010,
the Minister offered to jointly host an international conference on reduction prison overcrowding. The
conference resulted in a declaration for prison reform including the necessity of reforming the
antiquity 19th century laws. High level interest in reform was reinforced by an exposure visit to the UK
in September 2012, in which a delegation headed by the Minister of Law and the Home Minister
visited prisons, police facilities and other justice support systems and discussed a proposed
Bangladesh strategic plan for prisons with Ministers and officials dealing with similar issues in the
UK. The legal system of Bangladesh allows for direct comparison of procedures in England and
Wales, as both are based on Common Law.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
Impact: Enable more people in Bangladesh particularly the poor, prisoners, women and children to
get accountable, efficient and effective justice services.
Expected outcome: Improved access to justice for poor through reduced inflow of cases into the
judicial system, reduction in remand population in prisons; and increased diversion of cases out of
the formal criminal justice system.
This outcome would complement the work of DFID’s Safety & Justice programme, but with a
particular focus on improving access to justice of poor people caught up in the criminal justice
system.
Numbers of cases and beneficiaries would depend on the scale of an expanded project, which is a
key decision to be taken in the options appraisal.
10
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
The problems of the justice sector in Bangladesh are well documented and have been apparent for
many years. Prison overcrowding is a symptom of a bigger problem.
We have therefore discounted options that address a single agency or a single piece of legislation.
Several donor projects in Bangladesh have worked to improve the performance of individual parts of the
justice sector, including the Police, courts or the judiciary. The experience in Bangladesh, as in most
countries where DFID has done similar work, is that improving the performance in one part of the justice
sector, or working to change a single piece of legislation, does not solve the problems of the system as a
whole. As one study in Bangladesh concluded: “While justice as a ‘sector’ is relatively new in
development circles, …. the sector has to be seen as a whole, because it is a chain of events and each
links up to another; by addressing one and not all, will create a new blockage and malfunction;…”18
DFID is already funding a Safety and Justice Programme that works with Police, other justice sector
agencies and NGOs, but not with prisons. The starting point for the appraisal is a proposal from GIZ
that seeks to address the justice system as a whole.
There are three feasible options for addressing the needs identified in the strategic case and set out in
the Theory of Change:
Option
Description of benefits
1
Support the GIZ proposal on
‘Increasing Access to Justice through
Paralegal Services, Restorative
Justice, Preventive and Empowerment
mechanisms in up to 35 Districts and
Prisons’
Over 2 million people will benefit by expanding the
project to 35 prisons and districts and engaging 450
paralegals over 6 years.
Up to 17,750 awaiting trial prisoners will be released.19
At least 53,840 women and juveniles will be supported
at police station to divert from prison when in conflict
with the law.20
2
Support a more modest scaling up of
the project to be implemented by GIZ,
in 10 districts and prisons
Around 630,450 people would benefit through
expanding the project to 10 districts and prisons and
engaging 220 paralegals over 3 years.
Up to 3,000 prisoners will be released.
16,800 women and juveniles will be supported at
police station to divert from prison when in conflict with
the law.
3
Do nothing
IRSOP would continue in more limited form with
funding from Germany and Spain, but no formal link or
synergy with DFID’s Safety and Justice Programme.
18
Joint Assessment of Prospects for Harmonisation within the Justice Sector in Bangladesh, Adam Stapleton,
Greg Moran and Sara Hossain, June 2007. The assessment was commissioned by the Justice and Human Rights
Working Group of the Local Consultative Group of the Development Partners in Bangladesh, and funded by
CIDA, DFID (through a World Bank Trust Fund), DANIDA and GTZ.
19
IRSOP secured a reduction of 12 to 19 per cent in the numbers of awaiting trial prisoners in two and half
years. 17,750 prisoners is a reduction of 35% of the total population of awaiting trial prisoners, which will be
achieved over 6 years..
20 53,840 women and juveniles is calculated over a timeframe of 8 years as this work will have a benefit of at
least 2 additional years even if the intervention from DFID closes at year 6. In the log frame the number is cut
off at 30,740. These numbers are calculated very conservatively.
11
Theory of Change
Need
Bangladesh’s prisons overcrowded. 70% of prisoners are under-trial prisoners. Human rights of
prisoners are not being adequately addressed as a result of overcrowding.
Unnecessary case inflow to the criminal justice system due to limited access to legal aid and paralegal
services at the community level, particularly for the prisoners, women and children.
Limited or no training and rehabilitation services for the convicted prisoners and ex-offenders.

Inputs and processes
Training and equipment for additional paralegals to be assigned to each of the sites/prisons where the
project is implemented.
Support the work of Case Co-ordination Committees that enable the criminal justice agencies to work in
a coherent way.
Enhance knowledge, understanding and practice of mediation and diversion at the community level and
criminal justice agencies, so that women and children allegedly involved in petty crimes could avoid the
formal justice system to settle cases quickly and cheaply.
Develop capacity of prison officers and Ansars to help convicted prisoners in project areas to be able to
undertake a productive life on release from prison.
Link with referral agencies to treat the people with chemical/drug addictions and training, and support for
community-based organisations to assist ex-offenders in project areas.
Training and orienting the police and prison authorities on using existing and new alternative dispute
mechanisms to reduce arbitrary detention and violation of human rights of the prisoners.

Outputs
Functioning Paralegal Services and Case Coordination arrangements in the targeted Districts.
Restorative Justice mechanisms to reduce inflow of cases into the justice system.
On-going prevention measures enhanced a) at the community level through media; b) in prison through
vocational training; c) support to referral services.
More people, particularly women, under-trial prisoners and ex-offenders better able to access laws and
services to improve their situation.

Outcome
Improved access to justice for poor through reduced inflow of cases into the judicial system, reduction in
remand population in prisons; and increased diversion of cases out of the formal criminal justice system.

Impact
Enable more people in Bangladesh particularly the poor, prisoners, women and children to get
accountable, efficient and effective justice services.
In addition to the direct benefits in the results chain described above, the aim of DFID’s investment is to
12
be a catalyst for national legislative and policy reform areas addressing the causes of prison
overcrowding. Priorities for legislative reform include:



Enactment of a modern Prison Act to replace the colonial Jail Code
Revision of the National Legal Aid Act to assist decentralisation; and
Institutionalising partnerships between the NLASO and Legal Aid NGOs for formal delivery and
revising the business rules of the District Legal Aid Committees (D-LAC) to encompass regular
and timely case coordination functions.
In addition, these reforms are expected to influence the Evidence Act, Bail Act and Sentencing
Guidelines for the Judiciary for effective and timely disposal of legal cases. Parallel to the work on prison
overcrowding, Germany is working in partnership with MoLJPA, on Legal Reform and Corruption
Prevention, to amend legal frameworks to address the glacial movement of cases through the criminal
justice system and the caseload outstanding in Bangladeshi courts. A number of laws and procedures
are prioritised as identified in the findings of the Case Coordination Committees in the prison project.
These include a) necessary amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) b) review of the
National Legal Aid Act, and c) the possible introduction of a Bail Act.
Amendment of the CrPC will place the responsibility of guaranteeing legal representation of the
prisoners both on police and on magistrates. Amendment of the Legal Aid Act is necessary to ensure
that no person is without the safeguard of legal representation when arrested, charged or at trial. Also,
enactment of a new Bail Act will increase the authority of presiding judges, magistrates to use bail. This
in turn will strongly reduce the numbers sitting in prisons, awaiting trial.
The combined impact of these policy and regulatory changes, if they occur, would benefit a much
broader range of people than are included in the cost-benefit calculations below. The benefits are likely
to include those, which are expected from the investment as a whole, such as reduction of the financial
burden on the judicial and prison system, reduction in the legal costs of access to justice and reduction
in the time spent during incarceration.
Option 1
This option proposes a significant increase in scale, cost, timelines and benefits. It will create
the opportunity to work with wide range of partners including the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA),
Prison Directorate, Ansar and Village Defence Party (work at community level to support the police),
National Legal Aid Organisation (NLASO), a number of Legal Aid NGOs, Partners for referrals related to
drug rehabilitation (including Family Health International), organisations specializing in skills
development/vocational training etc. A Policy Advisory Committee will be chaired by a Supreme Court
Justice and will comprise of additional judges of the High Court Bench, officials from Ministry of Law,
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJPA), Inspector General of Prisons, Additional Inspector General
of Police, Director NLASO among others.
This scale of support will offer a capability to extend implementation incrementally (in phases) to 35
prisons with 450 paralegals and 35 Case Coordination bodies. A key aim in such a large-scale-up would
be to reach a tipping point where improvements at a local level (in sixty per cent of the prisons in the
country) would be a catalyst for national legislative and policy reform. This includes the enactment of a
modern Prison Act to replace the colonial Jail Code, a revision of the National Legal Aid Act to assist
decentralisation, institutionalise partnerships between the NLASO and Legal Aid NGOs for formal
delivery and revise the business rules of the District Legal Aid Committees (D-LAC) to encompass
regular and timely case coordination functions.
With this option, 2 million people are expected to benefit directly from the increased access to legal
services, awareness of laws and the interventions planned for the community level. The table below
13
provides expected outreach and beneficiaries in 35 districts/prisons.
Table 1 – Expected Outreach and Beneficiaries21
Unit
Paralegal Advisory Services in prisons
Community Legal Service interventions
Assistance by paralegals at court
Women and young persons assisted in police stations
Matters mediated in the community
Matters diverted through the CPF
No of Prisoners trained to certified level
No of drugs/alcohol related cases referred
Media Strategy Coverage22
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Total
People
reached
35,000
1,383,600
462,400
53,840
4,800
9,600
33,600
5,280
5,760,000
7,748,120
Projected
Beneficiaries
17,750
1,383,600
462,400
53,840
4,800
9,600
33,600
5,280
57,600
2,028,470
It is expected that at least 17,750 awaiting trial prisoners will get out of jail, and 4,800 people would be
able to avoid unnecessary imprisonment through mediation of 4,800 cases over 6 years. Also, in the
absence of other interventions to divert from a custodial sentence, it is anticipated that option 1 would
contribute in releasing 650 women who have been convicted of offences, but who should be eligible for
parole or early release.
While this approach provides opportunity to work with the key justice institutions, ensuring necessary
coordination and cooperation poses a challenge. DFIDB’s pilot Justice Sector Strategic Fund has shown
that it is a challenge to build an agreed strategic vision, cooperation and coordination among the justice
institutions. The capacity and experience of GIZ and the Prison Directorate to implement such a large
project would need careful appraisal. The capacity of the NGOs who would employ the paralegals to
manage a scale-up on these proportions is also untested, although this could be managed through a
gradual scale-up.
Nevertheless, proposed Case Coordination Committees in 35 districts are expected to provide a
platform for incorporating development partners’ investment and dialogue on Security and Access to
Justice into the Government of Bangladesh mechanisms and concerns. Community based actors, such
as Community Police Forums and the Ansar Village Defence Party will have a strong role in up to 35
districts to reduce the flow of the poor into prisons, through crime prevention and increased dialogues
and interaction. Also, 35 prisons will allow both a network of service providers to work in coherently with
the prison system and for communities to support the social process of re-integration into society.
Evidence
Whilst there is evidence that this project works on a smaller scale, there is LIMITED evidence that such
a large scale up will achieve specific outcomes in Bangladesh. Success of this option will depend on a
harmonised approach where the prisons, MoHA, MoLJPA, NLASO, Supreme Court and lawyers will
need to work closely. The project coordination arrangements in the Management Case have been
designed to ensure that the activities and decisions are endorsed together.
The assumption that nearly sixty per cent coverage of prisons and districts would reach a tipping point
21
Beneficiary numbers have been derived from: (i) experience of the previous work by the German
Government; (ii) projections of the likely coverage of the paralegals deployed in prisons, courts and at the
community level based on experience from other similar programmes, and (iii) evidence collected from a
literature review of the impact of similar projects.
22
The figure for “Coverage” is a best estimate of the total number of people that will see the media materials
designed to inform people about their rights. In calculating a number of beneficiaries, GIZ has assumed that
only 1% of these people will take any action on the basis of that information.
14
for much needed legislative and policy reform is untested (and probably untestable at the outset). It will
therefore require close process monitoring through the life of the programme to identify whether local
pilots across much of the country is really having an influence on national policy processes, and what
form that influence takes. The benefit of legislative and policy reform is potentially large, but has not
been factored into the cost-benefit analysis below.
If consistently adopted, gender-sensitive programming should contribute to addressing violence against
women and girls in the longer term. For example, increasing numbers of female police officers seems to
encourage women to report crime.23 Recruitment of women police officers alone will not address
discrimination and abuse as evidence shows this requires specifically trained women as well as men. 24
This larger programme will look at ways for paralegals to work with female police officers to speed up
cases filed against Domestic Violence Act and other legislation supporting access to justice for women
and girls. Community-based policing (CBP) is particularly relevant to addressing violence against
women and girls systematically. It allows the police and the community to work together to solve
problems of crime, disorder and safety issues and to improve the quality of life for everyone in the
community, including women and girls. Community members could also play an important role in
monitoring progress and providing feedback on whether the justice system is working for the poor.
The element of the programme seeking to reduce re-offending is new for Bangladesh, and the available
evidence is mostly from of similar projects in Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada and the UK,
where the institutional context is very different. These studies25 measured the effectiveness of
restorative justice, including ex-offender assistance, focusing on the needs of both the offender and the
victim. The benefits include greater ability to return to work, to resume normal daily activities, and
reduced anger towards the offender. The study also provides evidence of a reduction in re-offending, for
both violent and property crimes.
Option 2
The option includes expansion of the paralegal advisory services only in 10 of total 64 districts;
enhancing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms based on principles of restorative justice at
community level in five districts; providing vocational skills training to convicted prisoners in five prisons
and referral services to those in need of support. Prevention and empowerment would include a media
strategy and community policing interventions with the participation of Ansars.
It is expected to reach 2.42 million people. Of these, 1.8 million people are expected to be targeted
through the media strategy and 10,000 of the prison population will be targeted. While not all of these
people are expected to benefit directly from the information they receive, even if 1% of these people
make use of the information disseminated through the laws, the number of those directly benefiting from
the media strategy would reach 18,000 people. About 630,450 persons are expected to directly benefit
from the increased access to legal services, awareness of laws and the interventions planned under the
project. Table below provides expected outreach and beneficiaries in 10 districts.
23
Megan Bastick, Karin Grimm and Rahel Kunz Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and
Implications for the security sector Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2007) p.148
24
Section 9: Integrating gender awareness and equality in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting security and justice.
(2009) p.7.
25
Dr. Lawrence W. Sherman and Dr. Heather Strang.
15
Table 2: Expected Outreach and Beneficiaries
Unit
Paralegal Advisory Services in prisons
Community Legal Service interventions
Assistance by paralegals at court
Women and young persons assisted in police stations
Matters mediated in the community
Matters diverted through the CPF
No of Prisoners trained to certified level
No of drugs/alcohol related cases referred
Media Strategy Coverage26
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Persons
Total
People
reached
10,000
432,000
144,000
16,800
1,500
3,000
10,500
1,650
1,800,000
2,424,450
Projected No of
households
Benefitting
3,000
432,000
144,000
16,800
1,500
3,000
10,500
1,650
18,000
630,450
It builds on GIZ’s existing programme to scale up the provision of legal services to poor people in
Bangladesh in line with the recommendation of the Bangladesh Ministry of Home Affairs27 and requests
made to GIZ by both the Inspector-General of the Bangladesh Prison Department and Minister of Law.
The proposal also aims to complement and strengthen DFID’s programme of support to community legal
services.
Also, it draws from lessons learned to focus more legal services at the entry point to the criminal justice
system and preventing new cases from entering the system (through greater reliance on processes
based on principles of restorative justice); as well as empowering people (especially women) to apply
laws, procedures, skills and services that best advance their own situation – some of which will benefit
those emerging at the end of the justice process.
The initial phase of IRSOP has demonstrated a considerable achievement at the local level. Working in
only 10 districts under this option would reduce the prospect of securing systemic changes at the
national level – although might not rule it out altogether. To maximise the impact, appropriate link up
between GIZ and DFIDB supported CLS and JSF projects will be critical. If approved it will be an
additional programme but complementary to the Safety and Justice Programme which will require
additional resources to managing these programmes effectively.
Evidence
The evidence for this option is MEDIUM, because it is closer in scale to the successful pilots that GIZ
has already supported in Bangladeshi. The Paralegal approach is at the heart of this option that
represents a low-cost method of providing effective legal advice and assistance for ordinary people in
conflict with criminal law. The approach has grown very rapidly around the world in many different
environments. This model entails that a force of trained people provide national legal services on the
front line of the criminal justice system in police stations, courts and prisons.28 An evaluation of the
IRSOP by the Ministry of Home Affairs and GIZ in Bangladesh found that the paralegals had been able
to offer around 11,000 legal interventions, demonstrating a clear increase in access to justice. Almost
1300 prisoners have been released on condition or discharged as a result of the information gathered by
paralegals and acted upon through the Case Coordination Committees (CCCs).
26
See note above: in calculating a number of beneficiaries, GIZ has assumed that only 1% of people will take
any action on the basis of the information they receive through media.
27
Ministry of Home Affairs evaluation of IRSOP, Sep 2011 at p15
28
Stapleton, Adam (2010). Legal Empowerment Working Papers. Empowering the Poor to Access Criminal
Justice: A Grass Roots Perspective. International development law Organization.
16
The approach in Malawi (PAS-Paralegal Advisory Services) has been very positively evaluated and
described as “energising the criminal justice system”.29 In many countries the experiment has
significantly helped to decongest the prisons…by speeding up the determination of long-pending cases
in courts…helped remove bottlenecks curtailing access to justice for the poor through facilitation of
meetings between key criminal justice agencies and improve prison conditions.30
The impact of PAS has been to reduce the overall remand population – those awaiting trial – from 40–
45% of the overall population to a current figure of 17.3%.31 There is ample evidence from many
countries in Africa of the impact of PAS on remand population reduction. In Uganda, the prison
population was reduced from 63% to 58% nationally over 5 months32; in Langata prison (Kenya), a
facility for women, the remand population was cut by 80%; and in Bo prison (Sierra Leone) it was cut by
50%.33 PAS programmes in Bangladesh also report very positive results. In Bangladesh, the paralegal
approach reduced the under-trial population in Bogra prison by 12% and in Madaripur prison by 19%.34
Option 3: Do nothing
In this option, the S&J programme will continue to work with other key justice institutions, but not the
Prison Directorate. IRSOP would continue on a smaller scale, with support from Germany and Spain,
but with no institutional link to the S&J programme. This would make it less likely that the projects could
work collectively in support of policy change, and reduce DFID’s ability to manage the risk of duplication
and overlap between IRSOP and DFID’s CLS, PRP and JSF projects, some of which work with the
same NGOs and Government agencies. An opportunity for UK aid to address prison overcrowding,
which denies large numbers of poor Bangladeshis their basic human rights, would be lost.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
In the table below the quality of evidence for each option is rated as either Strong, Medium or Limited.
Reasons for these ratings are summarised in the section above.
Option
1
2
3
Evidence rating
Limited
Medium
Medium
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
Option Climate change and environment risks Climate
change
and
environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
1
C
C
2
C
C
3
Do nothing
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity; C, low / no
risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
29
Hansen, Thomas (2004) Evaluation of Activities 2002-2004; Fergus Kerrigan (2002) Energising the
Legal Justice System in Malawi; Martin Pierce (2007) Changing the Landscape. The reports were prepared
for DFID.
30
Stapleton, Adam (2005) Kenya, under the Kenya Prisons Paralegal Project (KPPP). First evaluation,
Msiska/Nyongesa,
31
International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Remand List 2008. Since 2004 the mean average
remand population has been under 25%.
32
IDLO Paper.
33
Annual Review JSDP (DFID) 2010.
34
.Improvement of the Real Situation of Overcrowding in Prisons in Bangladesh” (IRSOP). Evaluation
conducted by GIZ. January 2011 - p 7.
17
Both options are assessed as having low environment and climate change impact, and low
opportunities. The project will mainly pay for human resources, working in their local area, with relatively
low travel costs and associated emissions. The project will not fund any large scale infrastructure work
that might have negative environmental consequences.
Whilst some aspects of justice sector reform may play an important role in mitigating the effects of
climate change (in particular a growing pressure on land as rising sea levels reduce the amount of
cultivable land in coastal areas), this project does not directly address those reforms.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
OPTION 1: Scaling up to 35 districts
Expected Resource Costs
This project builds on the on-going positive experience of GIZ in Bangladesh and plans to expand its ongoing work with paralegal services, community policing and referral services. The project will extend
paralegal advisory services in 35 districts and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms based on
principles of restorative justice at community levels. The project will also provide vocational skills training
to convicted prisoners in prisons and referral services to those in need of support. Prevention and
empowerment would include a media strategy and community policing interventions with the
participation of Ansars and Community Police Forums. The project will target vulnerable segments of the
population, particularly women and youth and provide them services in prisons, at police stations and in
courts.
Estimated Costs of the Project GBP (million)35
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year 1
2
3
4
5
6
Paralegal Advisory Services
0.18
0.31
0.45
0.71
0.98
0.21
0.21
0.35
0.35
0.17
0.17
0.34
0.34
Research
Study Tour and
Conferences
0.10
0.12
0.15
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.19
Media
0.19
0.19
0.19
Restorative Justice
Training
0.31
0.98
Total
(%)
3.62
19.55%
1.12
6.08%
1.51
8.16%
0.49
2.65%
0.60
3.24%
0.10
0.67
3.62%
0.65
3.51%
0.17
0.10
Procurement
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.10
0.10
Project Personnel
0.55
0.56
0.70
0.75
0.75
0.75
4.06
21.95%
Operating Costs
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
1.05
5.68%
Consultants
0.13
0.19
0.19
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.82
4.41%
Monitoring and Evaluation
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.30
0.30
0.30
1.50
8.11%
1.67
2.34
2.63
3.30
3.54
2.61
16.08
GIZ Overheads
sub-Total
0.25
0.36
0.39
0.50
0.53
0.39
2.41
Total
1.92
2.70
3.02
3.80
4.07
3.00
18.50
35
These figures are notional and illustrate the various cost categories. The accurate cost categories will be
submitted as a budget in GIZ format in separate annex. Subsequent financial reporting will follow this GIZ
format.
18
The budget for study tours and conferences is governed by GIZ global rules. Study missions are
generally headed by a Minister (or two ministers in a recent visit to the UK) and structured to display
alternative or innovative approaches which can be adapted to Bangladesh requirements. In a recent
visit two Bangladesh Ministers had meetings with three UK Ministers.
The budget for consultants includes both the cost of international experts (where the necessary
expertise is not present in Bangladesh), and the funding for local NGOs, who are contracted to deliver
paralegal services defined by the project.
Benefit Cost Analysis
In order to assess the current project from an economic perspective, a benefit cost analysis was
undertaken by GIZ. For this purpose benefits were projected over an 8 year period. While it is normal to
assume that benefits would continue to accrue over a 5 to 10 year period beyond the life of a project, in
this case the post project benefits have not been assumed until there is certainty about whether the
paralegal cadre will be retained beyond the project period. Some of the interventions are expected to
continue to year 7 and 8 due to the working of some of the paralegals on a sustainable basis.
GIZ’s experience in Bangladesh showed that a range of benefits would accrue from the early release of
prisoners. On average, each prisoner’s stay in prison will have been reduced by one year. This will
entail a saving for government of £ 0.40 per day per person on food expenses alone. In addition, the
detainees have an opportunity cost of time and to assess this conservatively, it is assumed that early
release will result in reduction of legal and other transaction costs which are estimated to be a minimum
of £100 for the poor household. These benefits have been included in the benefit cost analysis. It is
assumed that there would be a one year lag in the benefits that would accrue as the project is not
expected to result in immediate release of the prisoners. However, it is assumed that some of the
paralegals will continue to perform their services on a self-sustaining basis even at the end of the project
and as such some benefits are also expected in Year 7.
The analysis was undertaken using the discount rate of 7%. The 7% interest rate was used because it
reflects the real interest rate in Bangladesh. The use of this discount rate will facilitate the decisionmaking on the use of the funds in alternate uses in either Bangladesh or in other investments elsewhere.
The exchange rate used for the analysis was £1 equivalent to BDT122.
The benefit-cost analysis shows that the investment is highly viable and offers opportunities for
significant return. The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the investment is estimated to be 68%. The Net
Present Value at the discount rate of 7% it is assessed to be £28.16 million. The benefits from the main
interventions which could be quantified have been presented in the table below.
Benefit Cost Analysis (£)
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
209,191
836,762
1,882,715
3,137,859
4,393,002
4,393,002
655,200
1,695,400
2,982,000
5,295,360
7,330,400
15,708,000
11,792,000
99,000
162,000
243,000
333,000
315,000
108,000
1.4. Media Strategy
780,000
600,000
750,000
375,000
375,000
1.5. Reduction in
Recidivism
11,400
32,250
57,750
108,750
108,750
90,000
1,545,600
2,698,841
4,869,512
7,994,825
11,267,009
20,299,002
Project Benefits
1.1 Paralegal Advisory
Services in Prisons
1.2. CLS in Courts and
Police Stations
1.3 Restorative Justice
Total Benefits
35,000
35,000
19
16,185,,002
Project Costs
Total Costs
1,917,694
2,637,502
3,128,460
3,691,776
4,122,842
2,996,992
Net Benefits
-1,882,694
-1,091,902
-429,619
1,177,736
3,871,983
8,270,017
Internal Rate of
Return
Net Present Value
at 3.5%
Net Present value
at 7%
20,299,002
16,185,002
68%
£36,034,186
£28,166,904
Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis was undertaken based on the risks with a high probability of occurring and
estimating their impact on the benefit cost analysis and the associated IRR and NPVs. The interventions
are very robust and show high returns and positive net present value under a wide range of negative
circumstances. The programme yields very good returns even if the benefits are reduced by 20% or
costs are increased by 20%. The project is most sensitive to an increase in costs by 50% and delay in
benefits by more than 2 years. The table below gives the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity Analysis
Scenario
IRR
NPV at 7%
Benefits reduced by 20%
52%
£19,652,987
Costs increased by 20%
55%
£25,286,368
Costs Increased by 50%
41%
£20,965,564
Benefits delayed by 1year
43%
£25,381,978
Benefits delayed by 2 years
32%
£22,779,243
Other Benefits and Risks
There are potential benefits in terms of reduced corruption and human rights abuses. GIZ’s approach is
to displace these practices rather than tackling them head on. For example, prisoners often have to
bribe officials to ensure they are produced in court on the day assigned for appearance. With the
increasing responsibility given by jail authorities to paralegals in identifying and tracking prisoners for
court appearances, the need to pay these bribes will be reduced.
A larger-scale option might attract resistance from interest groups who stand to lose from any change to
the status quo. To mitigate this risk, the approach would be to build strong consensus at every stage.
The highest levels of decision makers from executive to judiciary have accompanied the implementation
of the current project because of the win-win approach used by GIZ. So far, stakeholders have not
resisted the design or implementation: on the contrary, more stakeholders have been brought in, at the
reference and suggestion of the core group.
OPTION 2: Scaling up to 10 districts
Expected Resource Costs
The cost of this project is estimated at £8.72 million over a three year period from July 2012 to June
2015. The project includes paralegal advisory services in 10 districts; enhancing alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms based on principles of restorative justice at community level in 5 districts;
providing vocational skills training to convicted prisoners in 5 prisons and referral services to those in
need of support. Table below gives the costs by main budget line item.
20
Estimated Costs of the Project GBP (million)36
Year 1
Paralegal Advisory Services
Year 2
0.25
Year 3
Total
(%)
0.45
0.50
1.20
13.76%
0.25
0.70
0.95
10.89%
0.17
0.17
0.69
7.85%
Research
0.15
0.13
0.28
3.20%
Study Tour and Conferences
0.10
0.24
0.34
3.93%
Media
0.21
0.21
0.43
4.91%
Restorative Justice
Training
0.34
Procurement
0.26
0.10
0.36
4.09%
Project Personnel
0.40
0.50
0.55
1.45
16.62%
Operating Costs
0.14
0.15
0.15
0.44
5.08%
Consultants
0.15
0.20
0.20
0.55
6.31%
0.40
0.50
0.90
10.32%
1.54
2.69
3.35
7.59
GIZ Overheads
0.23
0.40
0.50
1.14
Total
1.77
3.09
3.86
8.72
Monitoring and Evaluation
sub-Total
Under the current project, the Paralegal intervention will expand to cover an additional 10 prisons. It is
assumed that a range of benefits would accrue from the early release of prisoners. The estimation of
benefits is based on experience from similar projects in the past. It is assumed that, on average, each
prisoner’s stay in prison will have been reduced by one year. This will entail a saving for government of £
0.40 per day per person on food expenses alone.
Benefit Cost Analysis
A benefit cost analysis was undertaken where benefits were projected over a 4 to 5 year period to
incorporate benefits that were expected to accrue with a lag. While it is normal to assume that benefits
would continue to accrue over a 5 to 10 year period beyond the life of a project, in this case the post
project benefits have not been assumed until there is certainty about whether the paralegal cadre will be
retained beyond the project period.
The analysis was undertaken using the discount rate 7%. The benefit -cost analysis shows that the
investment is highly viable and offers opportunities for significant return. The Internal Rate of Return
(IRR) of the investment is estimated to be 61%. The Net Present Value at the discount rate of 7% is
assessed to be £10.44 million. In view of the very conservative projections made about benefits and the
fact that not all benefits can be monetised, these estimates are likely to be an under-estimate of the
benefits that will actually accrue. The benefits from the main interventions which could be quantified
have been presented in Table below.
Benefit Cost Analysis (£)
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Project Benefits
1.1 Paralegal Advisory Services in Prisons
1.2. CLS in Courts and Police
Stations
1.3 Restorative Justice
1.4. Media Strategy
1.5. Reduction in Recidivism
88,525
30,000
36
627,572
836,762
1,255,143
2,016,393
4,032,787
6,098,361
221,311
442,623
442,623
3,600,000
4,237,500
These figures are notional and illustrate the various cost categories. The accurate cost categories will be submitted as a
budget in GIZ format in separate annex. Subsequent financial reporting will follow this GIZ format.
21
119,250
Total Benefits
118,525
2,984,527
9,549,672
11,396,127
9,549,672
11,396,127
Project Costs
Total Costs
1,774,450
3,091,200
3,857,100
Net Benefits
(1,774,450)
(2,972,675)
(872,573)
Internal Rate of Return
Net Present Value at 3.5%
Net Present value at 7%
61%
£12,640,741
£10,443,586
Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis was undertaken based on the risks with a high probability of occurring and
estimating their impact on the benefit cost analysis and the associated IRR and NPVs. The interventions
are very robust and show high returns and positive net present value under a wide range of negative
outcomes. While the project is most sensitive to an increase in costs by 50% and delay in benefits by
two years, it yields good returns even if the benefits are reduced by 20% or costs are increased by 20%.
Table 4 below gives the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity Analysis
Scenario
IRR
NPV at 7%
Benefits reduced by 20%
45%
£6,853,493
Costs increased by 20%
48%
£8,942,210
Costs Increased by 50%
35%
£7,379,456
Benefits delayed by I year
28%
£8,171,752
Benefits delayed by 2 years
28%
£8,171,752
OPTION 3 : Do nothing
IRSOP would continue on a smaller scale, with support from Germany and Spain, but with no
institutional link to DFID’s Safety and Justice programme which run the risk of duplication of activities
e.g., community legal services. Also, in absence of this institutional link IRSOP will face unhealthy
competition with other projects in justice sector and the gains achieved by IRSOP may be wiped out,
and it may lead to isolated initiatives for legal reform which often results in very limited success.
Moreover, there is no other donor ready to step in with considerable funding to support the Prison
Directorate to work with other justice institutions that could lead to reduce backlog of cases which is a
significant challenge to access to justice for the poor in Bangladesh.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
There are several ways in which value for money is being assured in this intervention. These measures
include a careful analysis of the benefits and costs of the intervention, a sensitivity analysis which
computes the change in the value for money indicators, design based on a strong evidence base,
improving procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation and lesson learning. These
measures are very much in keeping with the latest guidance from DFID regarding its approach to Value
for Money (VfM).37
37
DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM). July 2011. DFID. Quest reference: 3116186
22
Not all the benefits associated with the project are amenable to quantification and as such, only some of
the benefits have been included in the analysis. Despite this exclusion, a high internal rate of return and
very positive net present values were obtained, illustrating that this intervention represents high value for
money for DFID.
The unit cost of assisting one household is estimated to be £9 per household. This figure will be
monitored over the course of the project and compared over time, and with similar programmes in other
countries. The expansion of the project is expected to demonstrate some economies of scale as
average cost per prison and average project personnel in relation to number of prisons goes down as
the number of prisons covered by the project increases.
DFID investment is also likely to help in reducing the costs of the justice system in Bangladesh.
Evidence from research shows that there are at least three ways in which Restorative Justice (RJ), to be
applied in this programme, could reduce costs to the Government of Bangladesh. One is to reduce the
use of courts for processes that fail to bring offenders to justice. A second is to reduce the use of
prisons for offenders whose incarceration does not prevent crime. The third is to reduce the health costs
incurred by failure to treat crime-related post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS).
The monitoring system will be designed to ensure on-going programme management to keep
interventions on track to achieve the intended results. Annual reviews will be undertaken to place
emphasis on scoring based on a comparison of the results actually achieved against those expected at
project design stage; regularly assess whether intervention still represents good VfM.
Value for money will be used as an operational principle in guiding the partners’ choice between different
approaches and activities during implementation of the programme. This is in line with DFID's
recommendation for measuring value for money where a project’s outcomes are both quantitative and
qualitative. The partners will be required to use an improved results-based management approach in
which performance will be assessed based on outcomes and not just activities and encouraged to
compare the potential impact with costs and also undertake a trends analysis, in which a comparison of
progress against indicators will be used to measure effectiveness.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
Option 1 is the preferred option.
This option represents significant value for money for DFID as it will build on the ongoing project funded
by the Governments of Germany, Spain and Bangladesh that is currently working in 5 prisons. This ongoing implementation capacity will enable quicker start-up, it will entail considerable savings and
efficiency gains as the investment of the previous project and lessons learnt will be built upon.
The benefit-cost analysis shows that the investment in Option 1 is highly viable and offers opportunities
for significant return. Compared to Option 2, the cost-benefit analysis for Option 1 assumes that benefits
would be generated faster because a large part of the systems would need to be set up earlier to go for
scaling up. However, even without this assumption, using the same time lag for both options, the IRR
for option 1 remains higher.
The programme will deliver additional benefits to DFID’s existing Safety and Justice programme through
its potential to reinforce momentum for legislative and procedural reform in the justice sector. The UK
contribution will be attached to a larger BMZ-supported Programme on Justice and Prison Reform for
Promoting Human Rights and Preventing Corruption, which also includes a partnership with the Ministry
of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and the Anti- Corruption Commission. Inspired by the progress
made by IRSOP the Law Minister has requested GIZ for support for legal and policy change around the
laws such as the Evidence Act, Bail Act, the Legal Aid Act etc.
23
This scale of support (60% of prisons) will offer a capability to extend implementation incrementally (in
phases) to 35 of total 68 prisons in Bangladesh. Such a step will effectively amount to the beginning of a
‘roll out’ to national scale, and a potential tipping point for legislative and policy reform. Evidence from
actions from 35 districts will provide a push for the enactment of new and much required legislation such
as National Legal Aid Act, Evidence Act, Bail Act, Prison Act and Sentencing Guidelines for the Judiciary
for effective and timely disposal of legal cases.
A National Legal Aid Act would enable proactive legal assistance by the State and position legal aid at
first points of conflict with the law. Currently State legal aid is reactive and delivered through a district
committee, which meets once a month and has little support. A new legal framework will assist
decentralisation, institutionalise partnerships between the National Legal Aid Service Organisation and
Legal Aid NGOs. Community based actors, such as Community Police Forums and the Ansar Village
Defence Party will have a strong role in up to 35 districts to reduce the flow of the poor into prisons,
through crime prevention and restorative justice. Ansars will be trained to provide skills/vocation training
to vulnerable prisoners to accompany the sentence planning and rehabilitation process in up to 35
Prisons.
This option will provide a framework to move prisons from a purely security agenda to a crime
“prevention” and rehabilitation mission. This will also contribute to reduction in crime and savings for
society and the government over the long-term. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
documents several programs around the world that appear to have achieved significant reductions in the
rates of crime. Evidence shows that investments in projects of this nature represent a high value for
money.
24
Commercial Case
Direct procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
DFID funding would involve scaling up an existing project, which is currently supported by the
German Government (principally BMZ) and has secured funding from the Spanish Government.
As an existing multi-donor project implemented by GIZ, GIZ would be treated as a bilateral partner,
and the project would be managed by GIZ under a Memorandum of Understanding with DFID. There
would therefore be no direct procurement involved.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for
DFID?
N/A
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
N/A
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how will
we measure and improve this?
N/A
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
N/A
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the intervention?
N/A
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
DFID funding will be channelled through GIZ which is a Development Agency that is funded and
works on behalf of the German Government, principally BMZ. We will use a joint MoU in this case
because it is an on-going multi-donor project that has secured funding from the German and Spanish
Governments. It is appropriate to use a joint MoU because GIZ, in this case representing BMZ as the
Development Wing of the German Government, is acting as a bilateral partner.
This funding instrument offers value for money because it will allow for immediate start-up of the
project and delivery of results. GIZ has been supporting the prison authorities for the past three
years and built up a strong institutional relationship and arrangements required to implement this
programme. This makes GIZ a natural partner for a coordinated approach both at the community
and policy levels.
25
Also, this is the single largest programme working with the prison authorities in Bangladesh. With the
GIZ and Spanish funded programme already underway, DFID has opted to use its resources to
expand the programme and take advantage of the existing management structure established by GIZ
with the Ministry of Home Affairs and Bangladesh Prison Directorate, rather than setting up a new
programme with a separate management structure. GIZ also has competitive advantage in the area
of restorative and criminal justice sector based on the scale of their work, duration of investment, and
capacity. Any new organisations would require significant resources and time to build the necessary
capacity.
B. Value for money through procurement
Procurement of supplies and services will be done in accordance with GIZ's rules and regulations for
procurement and contracts, including international competitive bidding, if required. GIZ undertakes
direct procurement for up to EUR 500 or £410 following informal competitions, if appropriate. Up to
EUR 20,000 or £16,39338 tenders are invited (at least 3 written tenders). For procurement involving
above EUR 20,000, Head Office of GIZ manages the process of both the technical and financial
evaluations of tenders. It takes in account of the following provisions for large procurements:





If appropriate request security (bid-bond, performance, bond)
Terms of payment should be made or should only be made against a bank guarantee.
For public tender process: Request proof of qualification of company.
Clarification of conditions tenders must be sent to all companies in writing.
No changes can be made to the specification of materials and equipment or conditions of
requests for tenders after the submission of tenders.
The Ministry of Home Affairs conducted an evaluation of the Improvement of the Real Situation of
Overcrowding in Prisons in Bangladesh (IRSOP) project in 2011. The evaluation concluded that the
project offered value for money,
Supporting this existing intervention offers value for money to DFID because:

The project is already operating and delivering results, so set-up costs and delays will be minimal.
Partnerships are established with GoB and Non-state, structures and permissions are provided
through German-Bangladesh government negotiations, and the management structure is in
place. Fiduciary Risks are underwritten and due diligence processes are in place. Also, nonquantifiable benefits from the whole DFID investment are likely to include the reduction of the
financial burden on the judicial and prison system, the reduction in the legal costs of access to
justice, the reduction in opportunities for corruption and reduction in the time spent in
incarceration.

Appropriate interventions to move unnecessarily held under trial prisoners out of prison, will bring
about greater parity between prison capacity and prisoner numbers. This will reduce the need to
invest in continuously building new prisons.

The GIZ intervention has established partnerships with police and corrections officers on active
duty in the UK. They serve as advisers or consultants during implementation, at reduced costs.
Either their parent institutions release them for limited periods at full pay, or GIZ bears 50% of the
salary costs for their period of assignment. This is in recognition that the GIZ assignments
contribute to officers’ career development in the UK. It also reduces costs for the project.
38
As per the conversion rate at GBP1=EURO1.22
26
DFID plans to carry out a mid-term review in year 3 to assess the extent to which the theory of
change on which the project is premised is yielding anticipated results. This would help evaluate
which components of the project are working well and which need to be modified to yield better value
for money in terms of outputs and outcomes. There would be a break point after year 3, which will
provide an opportunity to re-assess whether further scale-up in years 4, 5 and 6 is still justified by the
results of the first three years and the momentum towards reform of laws, policies and procedures.
GIZ will charge an overhead fee of around 15% to 17% that includes project administration, staff
recruitment, costs for contracts and services, etc. While this project will not make profit for GIZ, the
overheads are linked to what GIZ charges the German Ministries for every project, in accordance
with the German Price Law. This does not allow GIZ to charge DFID a lower amount than they
charge the German government. The same principle is being used for every co-funding arrangement
that DFID has with GIZ, and the German and Spanish Governments will pay the same overhead
charge.39 This global policy of GIZ is also standardised and audited by the Comptroller General's
Office in Germany. German rules are also applied to the payment of travel costs, subsistence and
meeting and workshop costs, and compliance with these rules is audited along with the rest of project
expenditure.
As part of the funding arrangement, the fiduciary risk of the DFID contribution will be borne by GIZ. A
1% statutory reserve is charged to the budget for all co-funding arrangements to cover potential
liabilities, including any case of funds misused or misappropriated. GIZ Bangladesh will take all
possible actions to get the money back from the individual or organisation responsible, but should
that not be possible, it will be written off after approval from BMZ and will be reimbursed to the project
from the reserve fund. No costs will be booked to a project for anything that cannot be documented
properly as per GIZ rules and regulations.
Although the headline overhead charge is relatively high, it offers value for money in this case
because DFID is buying into an existing project that can start to deliver benefits immediately. Direct
procurement of an alternative managing agency through competition would imply a lengthy start up
time, plus further time and consultant inputs to build up the working relationships that GIZ has built up
in its pilot project. It would also increase the risk of funding of inappropriate and politically connected
NGOs.
39
All applicable overheads do vary depending on the time of signing the agreement with GIZ, the duration of a
project, the structure of a project and with that the spread within the different cost categories. Overheads for the
Spanish contribution were calculated with 16.6% and for the German funded part of the programme with
16.1%. Both funders recognized that small variations are possible and that actual percentages are only known
after completion of the project, as such a spread of 15-17%.
27
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate forecasting?
The cost of this project is estimated at £18.5 million from December 2012 to December 2018
including £1.5 million for monitoring and external evaluations. The breakdown over seven financial
years is as follows:
Proposed
disbursement schedule
10 Dec 2012
15 April 2013
15 April 2014
15 April 2015
15 April 2016
15 April 2017
15 April 2018
Financial Year
Allocation (million)
2012 / 2013
2013 / 2014
2014 / 2015
2015 / 2016
2016 / 2017
2017 / 2018
2018 / 2019
£0.90
£2.10
£3.25
£3.50
£3.75
£3.75
£1.25
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
The programme will be funded from DFID Bangladesh Programme Resources. Budgets for the first
three financial years are included in the approved Operational Plan for Bangladesh. The final three
years fall outside the current spending round, so we will obtain the necessary Treasury approval for
the forward commitment.
The German (BMZ) and Spanish Governments will also contribute to the programme in addition to
the UK funding. UK aid will provide 78.5% of the prison component and 69.07% of the total budget,
with the rest contributed by German and Spanish Governments. The Government of Bangladesh will
contribute to the project in kind by waiving customs duty and value addition tax for the vehicles and
equipment to be imported for the project.
C. How will funds be paid out?
The disbursements (resource spend) will be scheduled in annual tranches as per forecast mentioned
above, subject to confirmation from FCPD that this is acceptable under this form of funding
agreement.
UK Aid funding will be in advance as BMZ will not advance money for activities being explicitly
supported by DFID. GIZ will send a formal request to DFID, according to that schedule, for funds to
be released to the relevant account. Funding in advance of need will be avoided as all payment will
be governed by the terms of Memorandum of Understanding with GIZ. Also, payments will depend
on agreed work plan and satisfactory reporting on financial and programme performance.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
Fiduciary Risk in Bangladesh has been assessed as High. However for this programme, all UK aid
will be managed by GIZ in accordance with BMZ and GIZ financial rules and policies. While the
programme will work with a number agencies and departments of Bangladesh Government, no funds
will be transferred to the Government.
28
DFID has not previously worked through GIZ in Bangladesh, so in the course of developing the
programme we have obtained details of GIZ’s systems for managing donor funds, and assessed
whether they provide a sound internal control mechanism to address financial risk and fraud.
Contributions from other bilateral partners i.e. Netherlands and Spain for two other GIZ implemented
projects on community based policing, and legal and social empowerment of women, were audited
separately were found entirely satisfactory by these co-funders.
GIZ is a large and financially strong organisation with an annual turnover of just above 2 billion
Euros. Its disposal of funds is regularly audited and monitored by several bodies including the highest
auditing authority of the German Government. Decisions on spending are made on management
level in accordance with agreement of the commissioning party and in line with the rules and
regulations of GIZ on contracts, procurement and due diligence.
Avoiding misuse of funds and preventing internal corruption are priorities for GIZ and a zero
tolerance policy is maintained throughout the organisation. GIZ Bangladesh has its own anticorruption working group that looks into how to prevent corruption internally. At the end of 2010, an
independent study was commissioned to conduct a confidential survey of national staff to assess
their perceptions of corruption within GIZ Bangladesh. The results were reported to the Senior
Management Team. No action was necessary following that work and it will be replicated at the end
of 2012 to assess the current situation and examine variance from the previous encouraging findings.
GIZ Head Office Audit Unit is responsible for the quality of the internal controls/audits and normally
works with its own internal controllers/auditors, but external auditors are commissioned as well. GIZ
Bangladesh Country Office carries out the internal controls/audits of projects. On (at least) an annual
basis the following is checked for adherence to GIZ rules and regulations:



the procurement of materials and equipment
personnel matters relating to national personnel, and
the proper keeping of the project accounts
One area of potential risk for this programme is the funds that GIZ provides to its contractual
partners, including local Bangladeshi NGOs. All contractual partners including the NGOs are directly
accountable to GIZ and thus follow the rules and regulations of the organisation. GIZ will maintain
financial checks to ensure the partner organisation’s financial controls are working and that financial
administration and procedures are sound. Regular financial monitoring by GIZ will ensure that
project/grant partners are familiarised with GIZ financial regulations, including:







Properly maintaining books of accounts;
Having appropriate and transparent procurement policies;
Spending funds on the purpose for which they were given;
Duly authorising expenditure at the level of the competent authority and according to
instructions and contractual requirements;
Reconciling balances in the organisation’s bank accounts;
Maintaining appropriate and transparent audit trails; and
Maintaining and recording original documentation including receipts and invoices as required.
External auditors commissioned by GIZ will audit finance and procurement of its partners. GIZ is
regulated by German law that requires it to keep all original vouchers for audit scrutiny for 10 years,
which will be available for inspection or auditing by DFID on request.
We see GIZ’s oversight of its NGO “contractors” as a key safeguard to manage fraud and corruption
risk, and we will review the effectiveness of this before the first annual review.
29
GIZ has its own transparency policy that contains directives on transparency and information. It sets
out how GIZ supports the implementation of the international agreements on transparency, and what
information it makes publicly available. Further extensive project-related materials are made
available by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Information on
GIZ’s work is also provided to the general public by the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC).40
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
GIZ will be accountable to DFID for all funds disbursed by the programme. Before receiving a
tranche, GIZ will be required to submit yearly progress and financial reports. Each report will also
include activity work plan for next reporting period as well as budget. DFID Bangladesh will scrutinise
all activity and financial reports and DFID will only approve next round of disbursements upon being
satisfied with progress and how funds have been managed (including value for money
determinations). No funds will be disbursed until reports have been submitted.
GIZ will administer and account for DFID’s contribution in accordance with its financial regulations
and other applicable rules and procedures and practices and keep separate records and accounts for
this programme.
GIZ will submit to DFID a certified annual statement showing funds received in pounds sterling and
expended for the project in Euro. This statement will consist of an extract from the accounts after
they have been audited by the external auditors whose certificates will appear in the Financial
Report. Where DFID have any concerns about the certified statements, these will be discussed with
GIZ, and if they cannot be resolved DFID may appoint an independent auditor.
Monitoring and Evaluation Costs
A budget of £1.5 million has been included for independent evaluations at the midpoint and end of
the programme. It will also cover cost for placing necessary monitoring arrangements and routine
monitoring. Due to the unusually rigorous nature of data generation, tracking etc in this project, the
usual evaluation costs are high. Currently, the project relies on a range of instruments to capture
qualitative information and quantitative data, to set baselines and measure progress.
This includes an electronic information management system, which has been tried and tested in
other countries for information tracking. As first users, Paralegals are trained in the gathering of data
in prisons through a census. This provides a snapshot of who is in prison and what case blockages
are keeping them there. This forms the first common case information set for courts, prisons,
lawyers, prosecutors, police etc. from which to start the work of Case Coordination. The paralegals
regularly input and update data on each legal intervention as case movement picks up. This updated
data is accessed and analysed by project staff and presented as individual case movement or as
case “types”, at the request of the Case Coordination Committee each month. In addition, often
courts request data on individual cases, which can then be promptly and accurately provided from
the same tracking system. Changes in numbers are circulated by the project to all partners every
month.
Paralegals are also trained in providing monthly reports to the project, where a qualitative analysis of
some of the most pressing cases is included, plus any human rights violations that the project might
want to discuss at policy level or with senior prison officials. They also include “case studies” which
illustrate project impact.
40
http://www.giz.de/en/aboutgiz/transparency.html
30
The above is currently restricted to data from 3 sites and services or is serviced by people involved in
the work. DFID funding will contribute to spread this to beneficiaries/clients through an independent
ethnographic evaluation which will be undertaken to assess the qualitative impact through a series of
baseline, mid-term and end-term surveys. These will be designed in consultation with
academic/research organizations prior to implementation to ensure compliance with internationally
accepted standards. Mid-term surveys will also assist in re-aligning directions where required.
The expansion of the project with DFID support will require an agreement on targets with state and
non-state partners. During a series of meetings gaps in baseline data will be identified and the
development of further monitoring mechanisms agreed. These meetings will end with an agreed work
plan.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
GIZ will implement the programme through already established networks and management
arrangements including three committees at different tiers which are as follow:



Project Steering Committee,
Advisory Committee, and
Case Coordination Committees.
The project will work through the Prison Directorate, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), in
discussion with the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJPA), and will continue to
manage the project through a Project Steering Committee (made up of key stakeholders) which will
meet twice a year with the Senior Secretary in Chair, Advisory Committee (AC) and the Case
Coordination Committees (CCC) at the district level ensuring the high buy-into the project achieved in
the first phase (2008-2011) is maintained. DFID Bangladesh will play an active role in the
governance of the project through its participation at the PSC and AC.
A National Project Director and the Programme Coordinator (GIZ) will be responsible for the work
and achievement of the results of the project. The National Project Director and the Programme
Coordinator will make annual work plans, which will be approved by the Project Steering Committee.
GIZ and the MoHA will arrange the details in an implementation agreement. The project will involve
input both at the national and local levels by both partners.
Paralegals working under the project would be employed by local NGOs with a track record in this
sort of work, including some who are already involved in the pilot project.
The MoHA will take the lead with issues relating to inter-ministerial dialogue. GIZ will provide input to
such dialogue as required. GIZ will bring to the project their experience, expertise and assistance in
co-ordinating technical input of project partners in addition their experience in the sector of access to
justice and the development of training and building material in this field. Sustainability and an exit
strategy will be a constant consideration during the life of the project.
The Project Steering Committee (PSC) will continue to provide overall policy guidance. The AC
formed in IRSOP will continue to provide high level legal advice to the PSC and to provide guidance
to GIZ in the implementation of the project in this phase. The AC will meet on a quarterly basis with
additional meetings as required. The composition of the AC shall be expanded from three senior
judges, Senior police officer, Inspector-General Prisons, Representatives of the MOLJPA and
National Legal Aid Organisation , and GIZ Principal Advisers, to include the Director-General of the
31
Ansars.
Each District covered by the project will have a Case Coordination Committee, under the joint
chairmanship of the District Judge and Deputy Commissioner. The CCC is an innovative mechanism,
particularly the joint chairmanship, but an evaluation of IRSOP concluded that they were ‘operating
effectively’, and GIZ’s judgement is that they are a good model to roll out to new districts. They will
continue in their main purpose of identifying what steps can be taken to ameliorate the congestion in
their local prison, to monitor the progress locally and share their reports of progress (and challenges)
with the PSC and AC. The CCC membership will comprise representatives from the judiciary,
administration, prison, police, social services, community leaders and civil society.
The new locations/districts for the project will be selected in discussions with the partner ministries
and agencies. Criteria for selection of sites will include existing partnerships with prisons and Case
Coordination Committees, accessibility of courts and availability of strong legal aid NGO partners.
The scale up will be phased over the six years of the programme. There will be an opportunity to
revisit the geographical coverage and ultimately the scale of the programme after 2 years, prior to the
mid-point of the programme.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Past intervention has showed that the programme is feasible and can manage key risks to delivery.
For all justice sector programmes, DFID’s policy is to assess the risk of contributing to human rights
abuses. The risk is lower in this programme than in programmes where the UK provides more direct
support to law enforcement agencies that have been associated with human rights abuses.
We also need to consider the possible positive impact of the programme on human rights. The
programme will address a number of human rights issues including 1) unlawful detention/arrest, 2)
malicious prosecution, 3) lack of prisoners’ legal representation, 4) some selected cases of cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners which are in conflict with international standards, and
5) prisoners' right to rehabilitation.
The issues the project will not address are those related to improving prison conditions which will
involve huge infrastructural improvements and building more prisons. However, building more
prisons is not a viable option as recognised by international practices while there are available ways
and means for reducing prison inflow.
Risk
Probability
H/M/L
Impact
H/M/L
Change in political
leadership, or
increased
politicisation in
justice institutions
and police and
prison authorities
undermine political
will for prison
reform
M
L
Risk mitigating actions


IRSOP is an on-going programme. It has
survived several changes in political leadership
and in personnel in the bureaucracy and in
criminal justice agencies.
The proposed scale up of IRSOP to 35
additional prisons is based on a request from
the Prison Directorate. The project design has
taken careful consideration of GoB priorities set
out under different political regimes. These
include the Sixth Five Year Plan, the last two
National Strategies for Accelerating Poverty
Reduction, and the recommendations of the
GoB authorised Justice Munim Commission
Report on Prison Reform (1980).
32
Police, prison, key
justice institutions,
community, NGO
partners fail to coordinate and
support programme
activities designed
to contribute to
wider impact of the
programme.
L/M
L

The successful approach of the project involves
alliances and partnerships, which are widely
spread to ensure ownership and involvement at
all levels. These include collaborations ranging
from senior public administration officials in
Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), senior prison
directorate officers, prison superintendents and
jailers. In each district, the head of the Judiciary
and the head of the Executive provide joint
leadership for case disposal and coordination
among actors in the courts, police and prisons.

Based on past experience, the programme will
to work with each agency individually, to
demonstrate the benefit of the results on the
ground for each agency individually. Benefits
and recognition are designed to be spread
widely, e.g. the Home Ministry reduces its
expenditure on prisoners, prison authorities
benefit from reduced overcrowding, courts are
able to reduce backlog of criminal cases, police
receive assistance with tracing witnesses and
families to expedite investigation. All sides,
irrespective of political affiliation, can claim
results, and see some benefit in a better
functioning justice system. Experience shows
that this mitigates the risk of active resistance
from potential spoilers who might have a stake
in maintaining the status quo.

The project approach is based on collective
problem solving. The partnerships envisaged in
the project are tried and tested since the
inception of IRSOP. In the Case Coordination
Committee, decisions will be endorsed together
by the Executive Magistracy and Judiciary/
Judicial Magistracy. They will also be agreed
between state actors, Communities and NGO
Partners. Access to case information/prisons
will be the result of a partnership between the
Prison Directorate and NGO partners, which
grants paralegals full access in prisons. All
these partnerships are guided by Codes of
Conduct, which lay down the duties and rights
of both sides and regulate disputes when they
arise. Key to the success of joint action is the
gathering and presentation of a common case
information set, which forms the point of
departure for all actors.

Follow up support for implementation of joint
decisions made by the Case Coordination
Committee is also provided by paralegals, be it
to the lawyers, prosecutors, judges, magistrates
33
or prisons. This is a valuable service, as this
kind of manpower does not exist within these
agencies.
This
again
strengthens the
continuation of coordinated decisions and
actions by the agencies and keeps the
momentum going.

Risk
Probability
H/M/L
Outdated legislative L
frameworks hinder
justice sector reform
Impact
H/M/L
L/M
Communities will play a strong role in crime
“prevention”, restorative justice and in social
support to released prisoners for effective
rehabilitation. In these capacities they will work
with paralegals, NGOs and specialised drug
rehabilitation agencies to reduce inflow and
inhibit re-offending. With the exception of cases
where an “offender” is formally diverted by the
court, the spheres of operation of these
communities based groups and the formal
criminal justice institutions will be separate,
though contributing to the same overall result.
Risk mitigating actions

The Ministry of Law Justice and Parliamentary
Affairs (MoLJPA) has been and will continue to
be an active partner with MoHA on the need to
update and improve the Jail Code. Interministerial discussions, including involvement of
members of the MoHA Parliamentary Standing
Committee, are to be actively pursued. Also,
MoLJPA has specifically requested that its
efforts to update laws and procedures should
be closely linked to recommendations emerging
from the Case Coordination Committees. The
programme will pursue the revisions to the
Criminal Procedure Code, with special
emphasis on the Justice System’s responsibility
in ensuring adequate legal representation to
those in custody. Besides these, review of the
National Legal Aid mechanism and Act as well
as the possible introduction of a much-needed
Bail Act will be actively pursued.

During the project, a national conference is
proposed to review achievements of the
programme and other reform programmes
(including DFID support to community legal
services and to an integrated justice sector
approach), lessons learned and to build further
consensus towards policy and legislative
reform.

The Advisory Committee for policy guidance
and advocacy in the project will provide a high-
34
level platform for exchanging views on
challenges and a common understanding for
future directions in policy change among senior
judges of the Supreme Court, high-level officers
of MoLJPA, MoHA, Prison Directorate and
Police.
Reoffending exoffenders especially
problem drug users
lead to limited
results delivery
Violation of human
rights due to
arbitrary arrests by
mobile courts41
avoiding due
process and
assumption of
innocence
especially by
targeting drug users
and other first
offenders on petty
offences leads to
increased prison
overcrowding.
M
M
M
M

Rates of reoffending are difficult to track but
most people offend because they have no
gainful employment, or because they have an
addiction that needs treatment. By equipping
ex-offenders with treatment/support for their
addiction and skills that would be useful in the
community, it is assumed that for a proportion
this will be adequate to prevent them from
committing further crime.

The project is designed to work with
community-based groups who will provide
social support to facilitate acceptance and
counter stigma towards released prisoners.
This includes drug-related offenders.

A network of NGOs specializing in drugrehabilitation and drop-in facilities and in
employment generating activities will partner
with community groups to ensure that treatment
of addiction, identification of job opportunities
accompany social acceptance and support.

IRSOP has contributed to increase recognition
among project partners that arrest, prosecution,
conviction and incarceration of short-term petty
offenders is counter-productive, laying the
ground for re-offending more than for crime
prevention.

Discussions with policy makers and MoHA
officials will be systematically intensified on the
high costs that accrue to the prison system with
the rapid and repeated entry of such offenders.
These persons are notoriously difficult to
rehabilitate from within the system, due to the
lack of adequate treatment programmes in
prison and because no sensible rehabilitation
programme can be effective due to the very
41
The 2007 Mobile Court Ordinance created two kinds of magistrates in Bangladesh, judicial and executive.
Judicial magistrates will operate the Magistrate Courts and decide cases full time. They are appointed and
supervised by the Supreme Court. The executive magistrates, on the other hand, will no longer preside over
trials in any specific jurisdiction. They are appointed through the Public Service Commission and will deal with
on-the-spot, proceedings anywhere in the country, and establish punishments. Punishments by the executive
magistrates, however, may be meted out only against accused persons who confess, and are limited to financial
penalties. The executive magistrates may later frame charges under section 242 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. A confessed violator may be freed on payment of a penalty or may be imprisoned up to three
months.
35
short nature of their stay. Officials in the MoHA
have therefore begun informal discussions on
the low probability of crime prevention through
the mobile court, whereas measures such as
timely diversion, fines and community based
support could be much more effective.
Fiduciary Risks of
the project

Awareness will also be generated in the Case
Coordination Committees, that while the
Judicial Magistrates are working to reduce
overcrowding (e.g. through Bail), the actions of
the Executive Magistrates (mobile courts) are
serving to increase inflow into prisons. This
contradiction will be increasingly placed for
discussion in all district committees of the
project
to
encourage
problem-solving
approaches. Also, it will be regularly discussed
in the sessions of the Advisory Committee for
policy direction and guidance.

Management of the fiduciary risks has been
addressed at the financial risks and fraud
section under the Financial Case.
Overall, the programme is considered to be a
Medium risk
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
N/A
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
The programme design is based on the experience of an existing programme that adopted a
‘process approach’42, which viewed the problem of prison overcrowding as a symptom of a wider
crisis in the criminal justice system, and on an analysis and consultations on the current position and
priorities of the stakeholders.
The Output, Outcome and Impact level changes identified in the programme log frame are a mix of
qualitative and quantitative changes. The M&E framework will build instruments for gathering
quantitative and qualitative data for log frame monitoring. A particular challenge will be to measure
whether the project is having an impact on policy change processes. DFID will establish an
Independent Advisory Panel that will do a periodic assessment of policy initiatives in the justice
sector, and assess the influence that this programme and other donor initiatives in the sector have
had on moving selected policy processes forward. This assessment will feed back into project plans
for advocacy and support to policy and implementation.
At implementing level a series of planning meetings will be held with the expanded programme
partners (state and non-state) and gaps in baseline data will be filled. This will end with the tabling of,
and agreement on, a work-plan. An interim, independent, evaluation is scheduled half way through
the project cycle and at the end.
42
GIZ evaluation, January 2011, p4
36
Evaluation of impact requires both qualitative and quantitative approaches in an area where data
capture is usually unreliable, inconsistent and haphazard. The only benefit of data obtained in this
way is to provide imprecise information about trends, on the assumption that inaccuracies are
consistent. From a quantitative perspective IRSOP has employed full time data analysts who will
develop data capture mechanisms to ensure as accurate data as possible is obtained. As the scale
of the project increases so the cost of this work will rise exponentially. Sustainable quantitative data
capture does not currently exist within the Prison Directorate. It is currently based on a ledger entry in
each prison to capture information required for internal use and only maintained by prisoners. There
is no quality control or audit. Until computer based data is available it is necessary for an outside,
stand alone, system to exist which is maintained by NGO staff and consolidated at GIZ project level.
External evaluation of this kind of work is difficult to design and implement and requires a higher level
of quality assurance than usual.
The project runs a detailed information management system (IMS). The initial data from a census in
individual prisons, showing who is being held, is always gender disaggregated. Subsequently each
stage of legal intervention per case is tracked meticulously by paralegals and collated and analysed
by the IMS specialist. This data is also gender disaggregated. All stakeholders can be provided this
data on request, and this is frequently done. All data in the future intervention years will be similarly
disaggregated by gender.
This work also overlaps the monthly quantitative evaluation of impact at each site, which is passed to
all interested parties. Experience has shown that the information sheets for each site are becoming
an incentive for both achievement and recognition. As the number of sites increase so does the cost.
Ethnographic research will also be undertaken in order to evaluate the impact of the changes on the
intended outcomes of the project. As different pilot approaches are adopted it will be necessary to
undertake local surveys before up-scaling these approaches across the geographic spread of the
work. This will apply to each of the different project areas such as rehabilitation, vocational training,
reintegration, community sentence, mediation and restorative justice.
The monthly meetings and reports will be supplied by teams of paralegals and a regional coordination unit will be introduced once new sites have been identified. A key element of the
programme is the Case Coordination Committee at the district level which systematises the
monitoring of all activities and will provide on-site monitoring capability and feed the information up
the chain to the Project Steering Committee and the Advisory Committee. Modalities of the
independent evaluations (interim and final) will be agreed between GIZ and DFID in the course of
implementation of the programme.
Logframe
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: 3745070
37