Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism
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There are three basic positions concerning man's choices: determinism, indeterminism, and
self determinism. Determinism is the belief that all of man's actions are the result of antecedent
factors or causes. Naturalistic determinists, such as Thomas Hobbes and B F Skinner, argue that
man's behavior can be fully explained in terms of natural causes. Theistic determinists, such as
Martin Luther and Jonathan Edwards, trace man's actions back to God's controlling hand.
The opposite position to determinism is indeterminism. On this view there are no causes for
man's actions, antecedent or otherwise. The final position is self determinism, or free will. This
is the belief that man determines his own behavior freely, and that no causal antecedents can
sufficiently account for his actions.
Determinism
The belief that man's actions are the result of antecedent causes has been formulated
naturalistically and theistically. The naturalistic view sees human beings as part of the machinery
of the universe. In such a world every event is caused by preceding events, which in turn were
caused by still earlier events, ad infinitum. Since man is part of this causal chain, his actions are
also determined by antecedent causes. Some of these causes are the environment and man's
genetic make - up. These are so determinative of what man does that no one could rightly say
that a given human action could have been performed otherwise than it in fact was performed.
Thus, according to determinism, Bob's sitting on the brown chair rather than the blue sofa is not
a free choice but is fully determined by previous factors.
A contemporary example of naturalistic determinism is B F Skinner, the author of Beyond
Freedom and Dignity and About Behaviorism. Skinner believes that all human behavior is
completely controlled by genetic and environmental factors. These factors do not rule out the
fact that human beings make choices; however, they do rule out the possibility that human
choices are free. For Skinner, all human choices are determined by antecedent physical causes.
Hence, man is viewed as an instrumental cause of his behavior. He is like a knife in the hands of
a butcher or a hammer in the grip of a carpenter; he does not originate action but is the
instrument through which some other agent performs the action.
A philosophical argument often given for determinism can be stated as follows. All human
behavior is either completely uncaused, selfcaused, or caused by something external. Now
human behavior cannot be uncaused, for nothing can happen without a cause, nothing cannot
cause something. Human behavior cannot be self - caused either, for each act would have to exist
prior to itself to cause itself, which is impossible. Thus the only alternative is that all human
behavior must be completely caused by something external. Naturalistic determinists maintain
that such things as heredity and environment are the external causes, whereas theistic
determinists believe that God is the external cause of all human behavior.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the argument misinterprets self
determinism as teaching that human acts cause themselves. Self determinists, for example, do not
believe that the plays in a football game cause themselves. Rather they maintain that the players
execute the plays in a football game. Indeed it is the players that choose to play the game. Thus
the cause of a football game being played is to be found within the players of the game. Self
determinists would not deny that outside factors, such as heredity, environment, or God, had any
influence. However, they would maintain that any one of the people involved in the game could
have decided not to play if they had chosen to do so.
Second, the argument for determinisim is self defeating. A determinist must contend that both he
and the nondeterminist are determined to believe what they believe. Yet the determinist attempts
to convince the nondeterminist that determinism is true and thus ought to be believed. However,
on the basis of pure determinism "ought" has no meaning. For "ought" means "could have and
should have done otherwise." But this is impossible according to determinism. A way around
this objection is for the determinist to argue that he was determined to say that one ought to
accept his view. However, his opponent can respond by saying that he was determined to accept
a contrary view. Thus determinism cannot eliminate an opposing position. This allows the
possibility for a free will position.
Third, and finally, if naturalistic determinism were true, it would be self defeating, false, or be no
view at all. For in order to determine whether determinism was true there would need to be a
rational basis for thought, otherwise no one could know what was true or false. But naturalistic
determinists believe that all thought is the product of nonrational causes, such as the
environment, thus making all thought nonrational. On this basis no one could ever know if
determinism were true or not. And if one argued that determinism was true, then the position
would be self defeating, for a truth claim is being made to the effect that no truth claims can be
made. Now if determinism is false, then it can be rationally rejected and other positions
considered. But if it is neither true or false, then it is no view at all, since no claim to truth is
being made. In either case, naturalistic determinism could not reasonably be held to be true.
Another form of determinism is theistic determinism. This is the view that all events, including
man's behavior, are caused (determined) by God. One of the more famous advocates of this view
was the Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards. He maintained that the concept of free will or self
determinism contradicted the sovereignty of God. If God is truly in control of all things, then no
one could act contrary to his will, which is what self determinism must hold. Hence, for God to
be sovereign he must cause every event, be it human or otherwise.
Edwards also argued that self determinism is self contradictory. For if man's will were in
equilibrium or indifferent to any given event or decision, then his will would never act. Just as a
scale cannot tip itself unless an outside force upsets the balance, so man's will could never act
unless God moved it. Thus to speak of human acts as self caused would be like speaking of
nothing causing something. But since every event must have a cause, self determinism, which
denies this, must be self contradictory.
During Edwards's own day some thinkers objected to his view on the grounds that it ran contrary
to the biblical evidence which supported human freedom (e.g., Prov. 1:29 - 31; Heb. 11:24 - 26).
Edwards responded in his Freedom of the Will that human freedom is not the power to do what
one decides but rather what one desires. The cause of man's desires is God, and man always acts
in accordance with them. Thus freedom is not uncaused, which is nonsensical, but caused by
God.
Like naturalistic determinism, theistic determinism may be objected to on several grounds. First,
to view freedom as that which one desires is inadequate. People do not always do what they
desire; no one desires to carry out the garbage or clean a dirty oven. Further, people often desire
to do what they do not decide to do, such as taking revenge on someone for wronging them.
Second, according to self determinism, Edwards's position evidences a misunderstanding of free
will. The acts of free human beings are not uncaused but self caused. To say they are self caused
is not to say that they arise out of nothing or exist prior to themselves. Such would be an
uncaused or self caused being, which is nonsensical. However, self determinism maintains that
man's exercise of his freedom is self caused becoming, which is not contradictory. In other
words, persons exist and can freely cause their own actions (not their own being).
Third, Edwards's argument suffers from a faulty view of man. Human beings are not like a
machine (scale) which cannot be moved until some outside force tips it in one direction or
another. Rather, man is a person created in the image of God as a personal living soul (Gen. 1:26
- 27; 2:7), and he retains this image even after the fall (Gen. 9:6; 1 Cor. 11:7). This image
includes the ability to make choices and act upon them. Hence, since man is personal, it is at best
inadequate to illustrate his behavior by impersonal, mechanical models, such as a scale.
And fourth, Edwards is mistaken when he argues that human freedom is contrary to God's
sovereignty. God sovereignly gave man his freedom by creating him a free creature, and God
sovereignly continues to allow man to exercise his freedom by sustaining him moment by
moment in existence (Col. 1:17). Thus the sovereignty of God is not thwarted by human freedom
but glorified through human freedom. For God gave man free will, he sustains man so he can act
freely, and he brings about all his purposes without violating man's free will. As the
Westminister Confession puts it, "Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God,
the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he
ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or
contingently" (V, ii).
Indeterminism
This view contends that human behavior is totally uncaused. There are no antecedent or
simultaneous causes of man's actions. Hence, all of man's acts are uncaused; hence, any given
human act could have been otherwise. Some indeterminists extend their view beyond human
affairs to the entire universe. In support of the indeterminacy of all events Heisenberg's principle
of uncertainty is often invoked. This principle states that it is impossible to predict where a
subatomic particle is and how fast it is moving at any given moment. Thus, it is argued, since
subatomic events are inherently unpredictable, how much more so are complex human acts.
From this they conclude that human and nonhuman events are uncaused. Two noted exponents
of indeterminism are William James and Charles Peirce.
There are at least three problems with this view. First, Heisenberg's principle does not deal with
causality but with predictability. Heisenberg maintained that the movement of subatomic
particles was unpredictable and unmeasurable; he did not maintain that their movement was
uncaused. Thus this principle cannot be used to support indeterminism. Second, indeterminism
unreasonably denies the principle of causality, namely, that every event has a cause. Simply
because one does not know what the cause is, is not proof that an event is not caused. Such lack
of knowledge only reflects our ignorance. Third, indeterminism strips man of any responsible
behavior. If human behavior is uncaused, then no one could be praised or blamed for anything he
did. All human acts would be nonrational and nonmoral, thus no act could ever be a reasonable
or responsible one.
Indeterminism is unacceptable for a Christian. For if indeterminism is true, then either the
existence of God or any causal connection between God and the universe would have to be
denied. But clearly a Christian could not hold this, for the Christian position is that God created
the world and he providentially sustains it and intervenes in its affairs (Matt. 6:25 - 32; Col. 1:15
- 16).
Self determinism
On this view a person's acts are caused by himself. Self determinists accept the fact that such
factors as heredity and environment often influence one's behavior. However, they deny that
such factors are the determining causes of one's behavior. Inanimate objects do not change
without an outside cause, but personal subjects are able to direct their own actions. As previously
noted, self determinists reject the notions that events are uncaused or that they cause themselves.
Rather, they believe that human actions can be caused by human beings. Two prominent
advocates of this view are Thomas Aquinas and C S Lewis.
Many object to self determinism on the grounds that if everything needs a cause, then so do the
acts of the will. Thus it is often asked, What caused the will to act? The self determinist can
respond to this question by pointing out that it is not the will of a person that makes a decision
but the person acting by means of his will. And since the person is the first cause of his acts, it is
meaningless to ask what the cause of the first cause is. Just as no outside force caused God to
create the world, so no outside force causes people to choose certain actions. For man is created
in God's image, which includes the possession of free will.
Another objection often raised against self determinism is that biblical predestination and
foreknowledge seem to be incompatible with human freedom. However, the Bible does clearly
teach that even fallen man has freedom of choice (e.g., Matt. 23:37; John 7:17; Rom. 7:18; 1
Cor. 9:17; 1 Pet. 5:2; Philem. 14). Further, the Bible teaches that God predestines in accordance
with his foreknowledge (1 Pet. 1:2). Predestination is not based on God's foreknowledge (which
would make God dependent upon man's choices) nor is it independent of God's foreknowledge
(since all of God's acts are unified and coordinate). Rather, God knowingly determines and
determinately knows those who will accept his grace as well as those who will reject him.
A further argument for free will is that God's commandments carry a divine "ought" for man,
implying that man can and should respond positively to his commands. The responsibility to
obey God's commands entails the ability to respond to them, by God's enabling grace.
Furthermore, if man is not free, but all his acts are determined by God, then God is directly
responsible for evil, a conclusion that is clearly contradicted by Scripture (Hab. 1:13; James 1:13
- 17).
Therefore, it seems that some form of self determinism is the most compatible with the biblical
view of God's sovereignty and man's responsibility.
N L Geisler
(Elwell Evangelical Dictionary)
Bibliography
Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will and On Grace and Free Will; B Holbach, The System of
Nature; W James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," in Pragmatism; M Luther, The Bondage of
the Will; R Taylor, Metaphysics; A Farrer, The Freedom of the Will.
Determinism
Catholic Information
Determinism is a name employed by writers, especially since J. Stuart Mill, to denote the
philosophical theory which holds -- in opposition to the doctrine of free will -- that all man's
volitions are invariably determined by pre-existing circumstances. It may take diverse forms,
some cruder, some more refined.
Biological and materialistic Determinism maintains that each of our voluntary acts finds its
sufficient and complete cause in the physiological conditions of the organism. Psychological
Determinism ascribes efficiency to the psychical antecedents. In this view each volition or act of
choice is determined by the character of the agent plus the motives acting on him at the time.
Advocates of this theory, since Mill, usually object to the names, Necessarianism and Fatalism,
on the ground that these words seem to imply some form of external compulsion, whilst they
affirm only the fact of invariable sequence or uniform causal connectedness between motives
and volition. Opposed to this view is the doctrine of Indeterminism, or what perhaps may more
accurately be called Anti-determinism, which denies that man is thus invariably determined in all
his acts of choice. This doctrine has been stigmatized by some of its opponents as the theory of
"causeless volition", or "motiveless choice"; and the name Indeterminism, is possibly not the best
selection to meet the imputation. The objection is, however, not justified. The Anti-determinists,
while denying that the act of choice is always merely the resultant of the assemblage of motives
playing on the mind, teach positively that the Ego, or Self, is the cause of our volitions; and they
describe it as a "free" or "self-determining" cause. The presence of some reason or motive, they
ordinarily hold, is a necessary condition for every act of free choice, but they insist that the Ego
can decide between motives. Choice is not, they maintain, uniformly determined by the
pleasantest or the worthiest motive or collection of motives. Nor is it the inevitable consequent of
the strongest motive, except in that tautological sense in which the word strongest simply
signifies that motive which as a matter of fact prevails. Determinism and the denial of free will
seem to be a logical consequence of all monistic hypotheses. They are obviously involved in all
materialistic theories. For Materialism of every type necessarily holds that every incident in the
history of the universe is the inevitable outcome of the mechanical and physical movements and
changes which have gone before. But Determinism seems to be an equally necessary
consequence of monistic Idealism. Indeed the main argument against monistic and pantheistic
systems will always be the fact of free will. Self-determination implies separateness of
individuality and independence in each free agent, and thus entails a pluralistic conception of the
universe. (See DUALISM; MONISM.) In spite of the assertions of Determinists, no true logical
distinction can be made between their view and that of Fatalism. In both systems each of my
volitions is as inexorably fated, or pre-determined, in the past conditions of the universe as the
movements of the planets or the tides. The opponents of Determinism usually insist on two lines
of argument, the one based on the consciousness of freedom in the act of deliberate choice, the
other on the incompatibility of Determinism with our fundamental moral convictions. The
notions of responsibility, moral obligation, merit, and the like, as ordinarily understood, would
be illusory if Determinism were true. The theory is in fact fatal to ethics, as well as to the notion
of sin and the fundamental Christian belief that we can merit both reward and punishment. (See
FREE WILL; ETHICS; FATALISM.)
Publication information Written by Michael Maher. Transcribed by Rick McCarty. The Catholic
Encyclopedia, Volume IV. Published 1908. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Nihil Obstat.
Remy Lafort, Censor. Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York