Lesson 2

advertisement
Lesson 2 -
The USA and Vietnam Conflict
Outcomes (SWBAT)

Evaluate to what extent America’s involvement in Vietnam compromised
their historical notion of national self-determination
Activities
1. Cold War Quiz up to, but not including Vietnam
2. Continue ledger paper outline of Vietnam, now continuing into American
involvement, using attached lecture notes
3. “Dear America” – Letters Home from Vietnam – continue showing this
DVD from Pen-Hi library
Materials




Cold War mimio quiz and paper version
Ledger paper from last day
Lecture notes
“Dear America” DVD from library
THE UNITED STATES AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
Pre-lesson questions and concepts
Key Concepts:
Key Players:
containment
‘Titoist’ communism
nationalism
Cold war
domino theory
Vietnamization
Guerilla warfare
Nixon Doctrine
South Vietnam
North Vietnam
Diem Bien Phu
Ho Chi Minh
ARVN
North Vietnamese Army
United States
Viet Cong NLF
(Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon)
Preamble: WWII demonstrated to the USA that isolationism based on a false
sense of security failed. Containment and intervention were the new policies.
Does this compromise the historical notion of national self-determination?
Is national security compromised by revolutionary independence movements?
South Vietnam under Diem 1954-63
Nepotism and graft
Remember the conditions of the Geneva Accord?
SEATO initiated
VIET CONG define the term and their area of operation
GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT -
(Mapbook 126)
describe
(D 217)
TET OFFENSIVE 1968 - describe event + hist. sign.
(D 218)
NIXON’S VIETNAMIZATION POLICY -
(D219)
(H 226)
PARIS PEACE ACCORD 1973 -
describe/success?
describe terms
(D 220)
(H 227)
1976 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (Communist) created
1979 COMMUNIST VS COMMUNIST!!! (refer to ledger paper)
WHY DID THE USA NOT WIN IN VIETNAM? -list reasons
(D 221)
In class
* read article “The Rules of War”
THE “RULES” OF WAR
Everything rotted and corroded quickly over
there: bodies, boot leather, canvas, metal,
morals. Scorched by the sun, wracked by the
wind and rain of the monsoon, fighting in alien
swamps and jungles, our humanity rubbed off of
us as the protective bluing rubbed off the barrels
of our rifles. We were fighting in the cruelest
kind of conflict, a people’s war. It was no orderly
campaign, as in Europe, but a war for survival,
waged in a wilderness without rules or laws; a
war in which each soldier fought for his own life
and the lives of the men beside him, not caring
who he killed in that personal cause or how many
or in what manner and feeling only contempt for
those who wrought to impose on this savage
struggle the mincing (too polite) distinctions of
civilized warfare – that code of battlefield ethics
that attempted to humanize an essentially
inhuman war. According to those “rules of
engagement”, it was morally right to shoot an
unarmed Vietnamese who was running, but
wrong to shoot one who was standing or
walking; it was wrong to shoot an enemy
prisoner at close range, but right for a sniper at
long range to kill an enemy soldier who was no
more able than a prisoner to defend himself; it
was wrong for those infantry-men to destroy a
village with white-phosphorous grenades, but
right for a fighter pilot to drop napalm on it.
Ethics seemed to be a matter of distance and
technology. You could never go wrong it you
killed people at long range with sophisticated
weapons. And then there was that inspiring
order issued by General Greene: kill VC (Viet
Cong). In the patriotic fervor of the Kennedy
years, we had asked, “What can we do for our
country?” and our country answered, “Kill VC”.
That was the strategy, the best our military
minds could come up with: organized butchery.
But organized or not, butchery was butchery, so
who was to speak of rules and ethics in a war
that had none?
-Philip Caputo: A Rumour of War
VIETNAM- A WAR OVERTAKEN BY HISTORY
In historical perspective, the great unanswered
question over Vietnam will probably be: Which
would have been less costly, an earlier
Communist victory or the agony of this war?
One cannot help but wonder what might have
happened if not one single American soldier had
ever come to Indochina. History does not reveal
its alternatives, and thus one cannot say with
certitude where this road not taken would have
led. Vietnam might indeed have gone communist
much earlier. It would, however, probably have
been a form of Communism of the Titoist variety
– with a strong does of nationalism and a fierce
tradition of independence vis-à-vis both Moscow
and Peking. The US could have lived with that, it
seems. Certainly, its postponement was hardly
worth the sacrifice of more than 56 000 American
lives and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese
lives and $150 billion.
As the war cost more and more in blood
and treasure, it tended to resolve less and less.
Finally, it ended in the stunned exhaustion of
defeat. Ironically, despite Vietnam, the US had
reached a fairly solid détente with the two major
Communist powers. The hopes, rather than the
fears, of five presidents were borne out by longrange international developments. A calmer
world had begun to emerge and the Vietnam
conflict, first initiated to combat the spread of
Communism, had become a deadening
anachronism. This, perhaps, is the bitterest
lesson of this terrible and foolish war. It had
begun in the world of the cold war and ended, a
generation later, in a world of détente. Thus, the
reasons for its outbreak had almost become
irrelevant. History had simply passed it by.
When considered in this perspective, the
awesome logic about Vietnam is apparent: it
was probably in vain that combatants and
civilians had suffered, the land was devastated,
and the dead had died.
-Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War
Execution in the streets of Saigon. A Viet Cong officer is
executed with a single shot in the head by South Vietnam’s
national police chief. February 1 1968
Stoessinger Synopsis on the Vietnam Conflict – on ledger sheet at bottom
“If you look too deeply into the abyss, the abyss
will look into you.”
THEME: 5 US Presidents misperceived reality in
Indochina – they produced a nightmare but they
were not evil men
The Five-Act Tragedy
“What a pity it was this way when it might have
been otherwise” – Auden
-the longest war in US history
-the most divisive conflict domestically since the
Civil War
ACT ONE – TRUMAN
1945-53
-sympathetic to Ho but this changes due to US
China policy and McCarthyism
-transplants containment policy from Europe to
Indochina
-what had worked in Europe would be a disaster
in Asia
ACT TWO – EISENHOWER
1953-1960
-ignores the lesson of France
-certain of Chinese aid to Ho
-reality: an instinctive Vietnamese suspicion of
Chinese domination
-China’s view is only to balance the French
-Geneva Accord and SEATO the beginning of
military presence in Indochina
-Diem vs Ho
-US vs an obscure Asian country?
ACT THREE – KENNEDY
1961-1963
-increased military involvement
-Kennedy advisors perceived Vietnam as a
military rather than a political problem
-US advisors experts on Europe, not Asia
-“the enemy” a total commitment to expelling the
Americans
-Kennedy” a man of reason overcome by
“Americanitis?”
ACT FOUR – JOHNSON
1963-1968
“The Catastrophe”
-massive US escalation
-self-delusion and mis-perception
-divided the US people in a spiritual civil war
-two North Viet strengths:
nationalist unity
communist control
AIR POWER
70% to avoid US defeat
20% to save South Vietnam
10% maintain a free way of
life in South Vietnam
Gulf of Tonking Incident
Operation Rolling Thunder
¾ million US soldiers by 1967
TET OFFENSIVE
Johnson believed that he could not lose to an
inferior (Ho)
Ho: a Vietnamese “everyman”
Johnson confronted the power of the weak
-a President descending
ACT FIVE – NIXON
1968
-extrication and “peace with honour”
VIETNAMIZATION
-Nixon Doctrine – US to provide econ and mil.
aid but not active combat roles
-1972 saw major North Viet offensive against
South Vietnam
-North Vietnam worried about “Ping Pong
Diplomacy” of US and China
-irony of US in conflict with little Vietnam but in
détente with massive China
Paris Peace Accords of 1973
-any different than the Geneva Accords?
“Personally I made 2 mistakes. I
underestimated the tenacity of the North
Lecture Notes – the Vietnam War
Vietnamese and overestimated the
patience of the American people.”
-Dean Rusk, Sec. of State
Gulf of Tonkin – August , 1964
 Vietnamese in North torpedoed American destroyer in the Gulf
 Johnson received “all necessary powers” from Congress and “all necessary
measures” – Tonkin Gulf Resolution
 A growing number of American advisors in Vietnam led to the
commitment of regular ground forces, which in turn led to air support
1965 – 200 000 troops
1968 – 600 000 troops
main factor to increase? The increasing aid that the NLF was receiving from the
North
-much of this aid came from the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail… from North
Vietnam, through Cambodia, through Laos, into South Vietnam
1968 – New President – Johnson totally discredited… didn’t even let his name
stand for the Democratic Party – instead Richard Nixon wins for the Republicans
North Vietnamese Tet Offensive – 1968

Americans at home now see that in spite of accelerated bombing and
greater commitment – the Vietcong and NViet able to mount a major
offensive – the US was suffering much more from the war of attrition than
did the enemy
Johnson was ignorant of the Asian reality – even of the South Viets who
outnumbered the North Viets ten to one – the one Viet was willing to die which
made him more valuable than the ten who weren’t
HO CHI MINH
 Because he believed he could not lose, Johnson sent more men to their
death – for Johnson the war in Vietnam finally became a lost crusade
Ho was very different from Johnson’s vision of a Maoist puppet – he was more a
Vietnamese nationalist than a communist
Part Gandhi, part Lenin, part Vietnamese
Remember – China wouldn’t let the USSR be dominant in the area and China less
imperialist
Johnson mocked his black pajamas – which was a source of strength – the secret
of Ho’s success was his ability to walk humbly
Johnson believed he could bend the enemy to his will – the power of the strong
over the weak – the Vietnamese were able to defy this by their struggling
qualities
Ho’s strategy of weakness prevailed over Johnson’s strategy of strength – he
could destroy Vietnam – would he then look like a Hitler? Or could he withdraw
– was he going paranoid and how about such a person in power? - an provable
thesis, but one for thought.
NIXON
Extrication and “peace with honour”
 Policy of “Vietnamization” – the war gradually turned over to the
Vietnamese as the US troops gradually withdraw
Dilemma of Nixon’s Vietnamization – as US withdraw, the North becomes
stronger… Nixon’s response:
1. destruction of Communist sanctuaries in Laos & Cambodia
2. increased air bombing
-so, Nixon increases the air war to reduce ground casualties
1969 – Nixon Doctrine
 in the future, US would avoid entanglements like Vietnam by providing
economic aid and military aid and not direct participation
1970 – Nixon repeals Tonkin Gulf resolution, which had given Johnson
wide military powers in Indochina
“New Nixon Peace Offensive:
good example of doublespeak used in this war!
-remove American ground forces and step up the air war
B-52 bomber’s power was unleashed… USA bombed N. Vietnam in an attempt to
get Vietnamese to make some concessions at the Paris table.
Paris Peace Talks in progress, but in 1972 North Vietnam begins a major
offensive – want to do it while momentum on their side and détente doesn’t set
in
Détente proceeds and North Viets start to lose their allies
Irony – US has reached a peaceable level with 1 billion Communists, but not with
a small peasant country
1973 – Paris Accords
Henry Kissinger - Nixon’s American Secretary of State
2-track formula
1. military solution: strengthen the S. Vietnam military
2. political solution: strengthen the S. Vietnam gov’t
Henry Cabot Lodge - Nixon’s American negotiator at the on-going Paris Peace
talks
-provides for withdrawal of US troops and advisors
-consultations between North and South Viets on new elections
-looks like a state of regress… like it was in 1954
1975 – South Vietnamese fighting force collapsed
US policy had failed]Dean Rusk – “Personally I made 2 mistakes. I
underestimated the tenacity of the North Vietnamese and
overestimated the patience of the American people.”
CONCLUSION
Each US president left the problem to his successor in worse shape than he had
found it
America too was in anguish over the war – her leadership lost the respect of an
entire generation, universities disrupted and the economy bloated by inflation –
55 000 Americans dead
The great unanswered question remains – Could the US have lived with a Titoist
brand of communism?
However, the Khmer Rouge Regime of Pol Pot came into power in 1975 in
Cambodia and committed genocide
Irony – 1978
Vietnam backed by the USSR invaded and dismembered Cambodia, which was
receiving the support of China – the genocide of the Khmer Rouge was ended
not by moral pressures brought to bear by an outraged humanity but through
the power interests of the Sino-Soviet conflict – after the withdrawal by US from
Vietnam, the only wars in Asia were fought by Communists against other
Communists
1979 – China invaded North Vietnam because Soviets were helping the North
Viets in Cambodia
the US was blind to see that not every Communist loves each other
Summary:
A.
EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
 war cost the USA gov’t $150 billion
 over 2 million men saw action
 57 939 lost
 USA dropped more tonnage of bombs on North Vietnam than the sum
total of bombs used by all the belligerents during the Second World War
 USA left with less influence throughout Southeast Asia
 Turmoil, sometimes violent, resulted at home because of opposition to the
war
 No longer could America claim innocence and moral superiority
B.




C.







WHY THE UNITED STATES LOST THE WAR
Difficulty in winning a war against nationalist guerillas
Unpopularity of the war at home as represented by:
-the anti-war movement
-the cost of war in casualties
-the cost of war to the economy (inflation)
International disgrace – stature of USA suffered greatly
American military was half-hearted and disillusioned
LESSONS OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR
Limitations of power – even nuclear superpowers had their limitations… an
“unwinnable war”
Home support – a war without popular support is difficult to wage in a
democracy
Military intervention in a popular nationalist uprising can be futile
Conscript armies fighting for a questionable cause are not a reliable
military force… USA soon cancelled the draft
Powers of the President to wage war were constitutionally restricted after
Vietnam
Domino theory soon proved to be political rhetoric
The questioning of many fundamental beliefs in American society
LAOS







Former French colony
Granted independence by Geneva Agreements of 1954
Pathet Lao – Communist organization within Laos, worked easily with
the Viet Cong
Famous supply line for the Viet Cong
Fortunately, neither superpower wanted war over Laos… both Kennedy
and Khrushchev agreed to the neutrality of Laos and to limit supplies
Chinese and Vietnamese continued to aid the Commies
Now a western style constitution
CAMBODIA
 Royal rule from 1954-70, trying to stay out of the Indochina war
 Cambodian communists = Khmer Rouge… began to challenge royal rule in
1964
 North Vietnamese irregulars, operating against South Vietnam, as well as
US and South Vietnamese troops on their “search and kill” operations, all
violated Cambodia’s neutrality
 1975 – military coup established the Khmer Rouge as regime, with Pol
Pot as its dictator
 Pol Pot massacred about 1 million people in “the killing fields”
 1979 – Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge removed forcibly by the Khmer people
with the help from the Vietnamese army
 Cambodia was renamed Kampuchea for one decade until 1989 when the
Vietnamese army went home
 1990’s – Cambodia has become democratic
SUMMARY OF INDOCHINA
 end of Vietnamese War did not see an end to violence in Indochina
 a much stronger Vietnam tried to force a federation of Indochinese
nations on the other countries
 the Vietnamese Army attacked Cambodia in 1979 and in turn China
attacked Vietnam to teach her a lesson
 after this affair, the Vietnamese gov’t decided to drive out approximately 1
million Chinese from Vietnam
 as these people fled to neighbouring countries, they created an enormous
refugee problem = boat people

Download