A) Magnitude: Assuming power over nature unleashes the worst forms of violence
Dallmayr, 04 (PhD, Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Notre Dame,
Constellations Volume 11, No 1, 2004 The Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel Fred
Dallmayr).
Themes and insights of this kind are carried forward in Die Geschichte des Seyns, a series of texts dating from the onset of World War II. Politically, the texts are still more
nonconformist and rebellious than preceding writings – an aspect largely attributable to their grim context. Central to the volume is again the critique of Machenschaft defined
as a mode of being that “pushes everything into the mold of ‘makeability’.” As before, Machenschaft is intimately linked with the glorification of power (Macht), and the latter is
To effectuate its rule, power relies on
violence (Gewalt) as its chief instrument. When violence or brutality becomes predominant, matters are
starkly simplified: everything is geared toward the “unconditional annihilation (Vernichtung) of opposing
forces by unconditional means.” The unleashing of brutal violence carries in its train the “devastation”
(Verwüstung) of everything with the result that a “desert” (Wüste) spreads where nothing can grow any
longer – especially not thoughtfulness and care for being. A particularly vivid and harrowing sign of this
devastation is the hankering for warfare – a warfare that, due to the totalizing ambitions of
Machenschaft, now turns into “total war” (totaler Krieg). Given the steadily widening range of
modern technology and weaponry, Heidegger adds somberly, the relentless struggle for power and more
power necessarily leads to “unbounded or limitless wars (grenzenlose Kriege) furthering the
empowerment of power.” Unsurprisingly, such wars ultimately take the form of “world wars” in the
service of a globally unleashed Machenschaft.16
anchored ultimately in “will” to power and in “unconditional subjectivity” (a chief trait of modern metaphysics).
E) No Value to Life
Dillon 99, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 99 (Michael, Political Theory,
April, ingenta select)
The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the
political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation
of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require
calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once
rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also,
of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no
mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of
economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of
value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out,
the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the
invaluable itself.
Before each of these nuclear power plants were constructed there was a surge in belief
about nuclear power and wildly exaggerated dreams of technological miracles. Star this
argument—the 1ac may seem unique but it is simply recycled optimism and willful
forgetting of past trauma. Be highly skeptical of nuclear power dreams of success, they
pave the way for the next nuclear disaster by claiming things will be different this time,
that’s Peat, the impact is total societal collapse
Armitage and Virilio 99. John Armitage, Principal Lecturer in Politics and Media Studies at the
University of Northumbria in the UK, and Paul Virilio, Director of the Ecole Speciale d’Architecutre,
Theory, Culture & Society 1999 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 16(5, 6): 25-55 WM
PV: Let me put it this way:
every time a technology is invented, take shipping for instance, an
accident is invented together with it, in this case, the shipwreck, which is exactly
contemporaneous with the invention of the ship. The invention of the railway meant, perforce,
the invention of the railway disaster. The invention of the aeroplane brought the air crash in its
wake. Now, the three accidents I have just mentioned are specific and localized accidents. The Titanic
sank at a given location. A train de-rails at another location and a plane crashes, again, somewhere else.
This is a fundamental point, because people tend to focus on the vehicle, the invention itself, but
not on the accident, which is its consequence. As an art critic of technology, I always try to
emphasize both the invention and the accident. But the occurrence of the accident is being denied.
This is the result of the hype which always goes together with technical objects, as with Bill
Gates and cyberspace, for instance. The hype in favour of technology dismisses its negative aspects. It
is a positive thing to have electricity, it is a wonderful device, but at the same time it is based on nuclear
energy. Thus what these three types of accidents have in common is that they are localized, and this is
because they are about relative velocities, the trans- port velocities of ships, trains and planes. But from
the moment that the absolute velocity of electromagnetic waves is put to use, the potential of the
accident is no longer local, but general. It is no longer a particular accident, hence the possibility
arises of a generalized accident. Let me stress the point by giving you two examples: the
collapse of the stock exchange and radioactivity as result of a nuclear conflict. These examples
mean that when an event takes place somewhere today, the possibility arises that it might
destroy everything. A virus in an electronic network, an atomic leakage in Chernobyl—and that
was not much, compared to a massive nuclear strike. Today's collapse of the stock exchange is a
nice icon for the integral accident, in the sense that a very small occurrence changes everything,
as the speed of quotations and programmed trading spreads and enhances any trend
instantaneously. What happened a few weeks ago in [South East] Asia is an integral accident, well,
almost an integral accident.
The affirmative conceives of the world as a laboratory amenable to human calculation;
climate change thus presents itself as an opportunity for increased ecological surveillance,
but this forgets that policy approaches act to exacerbate climate change not reduce it
de Goede and Randalls 09. Marieke de Goede, professor of European Studies, University of
Amsterdam, and Samuel Randalls, professor of Geography, University College London, “Precaution,
preemption: arts and technologies of the actionable future”, Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 2009, volume 27, pg. 859-878
In climate change, even with societal scenarios in place, the climatic outcomes are divergent
depending on how carbon cycle dynamics and climate sensitivity are understood. Indeed,
this is what makes climate policy so treacherous and it is why a rational climate policy
may break down on its own terms.(6) As Boykoff et al (forth- coming) argue, climate
stabilization as a policy formulation is flawed scientifically by the inherent problems of
inferring back from an idealized temperature target through to emissions profiles,
requiring climate sensitivity and carbon cycle dynamics to be held constant (and hence
knowable). To put this simply, a temperature target of 2VC above preindustrial temperatures, assuming
the IPCC's climate sensitivity range (1.5VC ^ 4.5VC),
requires
stabilizing
atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 anywhere between 330ppm and 700ppm [for a summary of the implications of this
see Boykoff et al (forthcoming)]. In this way, climate change presents an ideal application of
precautionary approaches, an acknowledgment that one should act carefully in arenas of
uncertainty. Ironically, however, this contemporary policy approach on climate change,
which sets a specific temperature and concentration target that are labelled as
precautionary, acts precisely to exacerbate the risks of uncertainty, not to reduce them.
Climate policy also shares with terrorist policy a historical arenaönamely, that of arms control. Prins and
Rayner (2007) argue that climate policy was transferred from arms control via ozone
policies, where the control of stocks of things in the world (arms, CO2) becomes critical,
enforced through constant monitoring and international protocols. Similar to precautionary
principles more broadly, this conceives of ``the world as a laboratory (the only one we have)
requir[ing] more intelligently targeted ecological and biological surveillance'' (Gee and
Stirling, 2003, page 202). It should, therefore, be possible to determine who owns what (of the
CO2 emissions) and who is to blame. This opens up geopolitical opportunities for the
monitoring of rapidly industrializing countries such as China and India through their
carbon emissions. Climate is here imagined to be amenable to human calculation with a
concomitant rise in the attribution of human blame for its failings (Jankovic, 2006). If humans
are the ones to blame, then humans can also attain control through reducing emissions or speculative
geoengineering strategies. Geoengineering approaches are claimed to be necessary as a precaution (eg
Connor and Green, 2009), making available a set of emergency technologies in case the unthinkable starts
to occur (Fleming, 2007). Questions of politics and ethics are frequently swept aside by a
banal, technocratic focus on risks. These `ultimate solutions', whilst not new ideas especially in
military circles (Fleming, 2007), are enlivened by the dramatizations of apocalyptic futures in
which the only way to act seems to be to adopt spectacular techniques of/for control.
The possibility of annihilation is made banal through its institutional preparation and
routinized imagination (Masco, 2006). This technological response is also deeply redemptive in its
potential to recover perfection (Noble, 1997). One of the political questions to be raised in relation to this
new banality of catastro- phe, as we will discuss below, is whether it is able to foster enchantment,
understood as the ``profoundöand empowering attachment to life'' that, according to Bennett (2001, page
160), is required for ethical political engagement. The apocalyptic futures are also stage-managed in
practised responses to the threat of terrorism or climate change: terrorism through, for example, London
scenarios of a terrorist strike and climate change through the search for criteria to measure climate
change preparedness across the world. This is bolstered by, for example, the 1-in-1000- year tidal flood
event exercise (Exercise Triton) held in the UK in 2004 or the ATLANTIS project led by Thomas Downing
at the Stockholm Environment Institute branch in Oxford. These calculations and imaginations produce
citizens sensitive to the concerns of the policy makers, but, at the same time, desensitized to thinking
critically about these issues. Local councils have seized on the opportunities to use dystopic images to
engage citizens in broader agendas of recycling and reductions in energy consumption.(7) Whilst there is
not space in this paper to discuss in much detail the ways in which subjects are constituted through
contemporary terrorist and climate change policies, this is nonetheless a critical point. Isin (2004), for
example, discusses the `neurotic citizen' as one who is constituted as neurotic, insecure,
and anxious by the rational and affective governmental politics within a variety of
domains including security and the environment. We become terrorist-conscious or
climate-change-conscious consumers, encouraged to eschew war diamonds, oil, or airfreighted goods (Campbell, 2005; Le Billon, 2006). The neurotic citizen is promised the
impossible, absolute secur- ity from terrorism and climate change, but despite these active
attempts is unable to address his or her insecurities (indeed, Sutton Council also distributed
leaflets to house- holds showing local landmarks of ponds and trees with the admonishment to ``Protect
Sutton, help Stop Climate Change'', with a list of `things you can do' on the reverse). The implication of
this is that the neurotic citizen is no longer a rational subject amenable to rational pleas,
but, rather, always already an affective subject, where affec- tive politics are implicated
through and in the creation of these subjects (Isin, 2004). For our purposes, the troubling
conclusion is the possibility of an affective subject that is peculiarly susceptible to pleas
to manage future climate and terror insecurities with little consideration of the nature of
political engagement and commitment that policies to manage these insecurities might
engender.
Util is the biggest link—star this argument— A society based on the principle of utility is the
culmination of a technological understanding of Being, human beings become a resource
to be used
Dreyfus, no date (Hubert Dreyfus, Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate School at UC-Berkeley, no
date but last reference in bibliography from 92 so must be more recent than that. Heidegger on the
Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics).
What, then, is the essence of technology -- i.e., the technological understanding of being, or the
technological clearing -- and how does opening ourselves to it give us a free relation to technological
devices? To begin with, when he asks about the essence of technology we must understand that Heidegger
is not seeking a definition. His question cannot be answered by defining our concept of technology.
Technology is as old as civilization. Heidegger notes that it can be correctly defined as "a means and a
human activity." But if we ask about the essence of technology (the technological understanding of being)
we find that modern technology is "something completely different and ... new." (QCT 5, VA 15) It even
goes beyond using styrofoam cups to satisfy our desires. The essence of modern technology Heidegger
tells us, is to seek to order everything so as to achieve more and more flexibility and efficiency:
"[E]xpediting is always itself directed from the beginning ... towards driving on to the maximum yield at
the minimum expense." (QCT 15, VA 23) That is, our only goal is optimal ordering, for its own sake.
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so
that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing.
We call it standing-reserve. (QCT 17, VA 24) No more do we have subjects turning nature into an object of
exploitation: The subject-object relation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure "relational," i.e., ordering,
character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. (QCT 173, VA 61)
Heidegger concludes: "Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against
us as object." (QCT 17, VA 24) He tells us that a modern airliner, understood in its technological essence,
is not a tool we use; it is not an object at all, but rather a flexible and efficient cog in the transportation
system. Likewise, we are not subjects who use the transportation system, but rather we are used by it to
fill the planes. In this technological perspective, ultimate goals like serving God, society, our fellow men,
or even ourselves no longer make sense. Human beings, on this view, become a resource to be used -- but
more importantly, to be enhanced -- like any other. Man, who no longer conceals his character of being
the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process.(EP 104, VA 90) In the film, 2001: A
Space Odyssey, the robot, HAL, when asked if he is happy on the mission, says: "I'm using all my
capacities to the maximum. What more could a rational entity want?" This is a brilliant expression of what
anyone would say who is in touch with our current understanding of being. We pursue the development of
our potential simply for the sake of further growth. We have no specific goals. The human potential
movement perfectly expresses this technological understanding of being, as does the attempt to better
organize the future use of our natural resources. We thus become part of a system which no one directs
but which moves towards the total mobilization and enhancement of all beings, even us. This is why
Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to the welfare of all is
not the solution of our problems but the culmination of the technological
understanding of being.
Nuclear power is the quintessential expression of technological regulation
Kinsella, 6 (Wiiliam, Ph.D Assistant Professor at North Carolina State University, “Heidegger and Being
at the Hanford Reservation: Linking Phenomenology, Environmental Communication, and
Communication Theory”)
In his essay on “the question concerning technology,” Heidegger (1977c) critiqued the reduction of
nature to a “standing reserve” (Bestand), a stockpile of phenomena appropriated for human use
and exploitation. Hanford is an archetypical example, as the place was taken from its former
residents, farmers and ranchers who had taken it in turn from their Native American
predecessors, by the government for use as a plutonium factory. Hanford’s plutonium “product,”
as it is known in the jargon of workers and officials, remains an essential element in the U. S.
nuclear “stockpile.” The example is even more fitting, however, because Heidegger viewed
atomic energy as the quintessential expression of both modern technology and Western
metaphysics, which he linked in an instrumental “enframing” (Ge-stell) of the natural world
(Foltz, 1995; Heidegger, 1966, 1969, 1977c). Enframing involves a stance toward the world that
“challenges,” “regulates,” and “secures” its elements to create a standing reserve of useable
resources (Heidegger, 1977c, p. 16). Human intervention in nuclear processes enframes nature
in a way that is historically unprecedented, but was already implicit in the founding premises of
modernism (Kinsella, 2004, 2005).
They missed the boat - this is not a question of whether ontology focus is good or bad, but
correct or incorrect. Their framework is non-responsive. We are not saying they aren’t
allowed to access the case - but that they can not without first winning their ontology. They
can still advance federal policy, they just have to deal with this prior question
Dillon, 99 (Prof of Politics, University of Lancaster), 99 (Moral Spaces, p. 97-98).
Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially
revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political 4-never tired of pointing out, the
relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say
anything about any-thing that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought,
in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regionalmodes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate
through-out the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal
ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of
any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to
the question of moder-nity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological
questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable
to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it
characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and
what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other
continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable
difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or
unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe
to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some
arcane question of philosophy, but Nietz-sche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking,
but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being
that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most,
to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.
Turns policymaking—only investigating ontology ensures effective policy solutions.
Grego, 07 (Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities/Culture at Dayton Beach College. Richard, “Global Warming,
Environmental
Philosophy
and
Public
Policy:
John
Dewey
vs.
Martin
Heidegger,”
http://www.philosophos.com/philosophy_article_153.html)
How any of this might translate into an actual environmental policy is anyone's guess (and contemporary interpreters of Heidegger
Heidegger is heir to the legacy of Medieval Christian mysticism,
He encourages a heartfelt
awareness of and appreciation for the natural world as a dwelling-place of the sacred. With this awareness
and appreciation may perhaps come a general shift in the public consciousness (a renewed revelation of 'Being')
that can lead, in turn, to a new way of 'dwelling authentically' or living harmoniously with the natural world.
Such dwelling or living will then lead effortlessly to policies that sustain this harmony. However we cannot make these
policies unless the shift in consciousness occurs first. Dewey's views, in contra-distinction, are quite compatible with the spirit of
are certainly doing a lot of guessing!) but some general possibilities come to mind. Environmentally,
German idealism, and romanticism, and he is the inspiration for much contemporary thinking associated with 'deep ecology'.
instrumental science, technology and commerce and are applicable to environmentally sound policies like low-carbon technologies in industry, international regulations on
greenhouse gas emissions, and environmental standards in the Kyoto Protocol. These are temporary flexible innovations made by interested political and commercial parties
that are based on tentative research-findings which may be revised as circumstances change. Dewey does not share Heidegger's antipathy toward modernity and sees things like
environmental problems as incentives to further research and improvement, rather than as an end to human possibilities. While Dewey endorses a kind of Heideggeriansounding awareness and appreciation of the natural world (lauding the value of 'aesthetic experiences' in the appreciation of nature, for instance), he sees this as only one
capacity among many that may be employed to protect or improve the natural environment, which humanity is an integral part of. The Global Roundtable On Climate Change
based at Columbia Universities' Earth Institute in New York, in which various scientists, corporations, civic organizations, and political action groups from around the world are
while
Heidegger's views may seem too extreme for the practical necessities of our current situation, Dewey's
more practical approach is vulnerable to the Heideggerian criticism that it may be too accommodating to
this situation. Heidegger would probably say that any attempt to preserve, protect, or improve nature by
tinkering with it through science, defeats its own purpose — and it does appear as though every new
'solution' to ecological dangers over the past half-century has only yielded new problems — the latest of which
researching and adopting a comprehensive statement on environmental science and policy, seems like precisely the sort of initiative that Dewey would support. Yet,
is global warming (and some of the proposed scientific solutions to this problem are ominous themselves: From giant space shields,
to spreading aerosol particles in the upper atmosphere, to spraying water-clouds into the air from the oceans). Thus perhaps the
very impractically of Heidegger's ideas make them particularly worthy of consideration. It is fairly obvious that
environmental degradation is largely — if not primarily — a result of the impact of science, technology and commerce on the natural
world, and that the kind of reverent appreciation for nature's sanctity that Heidegger advocates would engender a deeper concern
and respect for nature. What may therefore be needed for environmental protection over the long-term (as
opposed to short-term fixes for temporarily 'fashionable' issues like global warming) is a Heideggeriantype transformation in the public consciousness, rather than more Deweyan technocratic innovations. A
renewed experience of authentic 'freedom' and the revelation of that 'Being' which is the groundless ground that sustains both
nature and humanity, might be just what is needed for the earth's sustainable future.
Roleplaying DA – pretending to be the federal government ignores our personal
responsibility for war and makes the perpetuation of violence inevitable
Kappeler 95 (Susanne is an associate professor at al-akhawayn university, “the will to violence: the politics of personal
behavior”, pg. 10-11, MT)
Which is why many of
those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental
deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign
minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile
and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do
if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as
‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the
range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever
more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this
backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or
participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal
to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring
innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking
advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the
‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and
one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in
the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our
values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
Reflection solves
Best and Nocella, 06 –associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso (Igniting
a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, p. 82-84, google books)
Yet, for both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, there exist possibilities for transformation
despite the destructiveness of Enframing. In the midst of technological peril – indeed, precisely because
the peril strikes at and thus awakens us to the bond between human and nonhuman life – there emerges a
sense of solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. Looking at the well-heeled, bureaucratic discourse of “human resource management”
and “personnel resources,” the challenging forth of human beings into standing reserve is fairly evident. Factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens obviously have it far worse
than people, but in both cases the purpose is to harness resources for maximum efficiency and profit. Ultimately human and nonhuman beings are similarly enframed within
It is precisely the experience of this solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated –
in arts, poetry, ceremony, music, and especially in socioeconomic and political action – in order to
provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the metaphysics of technical control and
capitalist exploitation. Action will only be truly revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in
solidarity with nature, where liberation is always seen both as human liberation from the confines of
Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human
technics. Anything less will always lapse back into the false and oppressive hierarchy of “man” over
“nature” and “man” over animals with attendant effects of technological, disciplinary control over
humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. Using a familiar title from the anarchist Crimethinc collective,
revolutionary environmentalism is truly an instance of “fighting for our lives” where the pronoun refers to
all life not just human life. Heidegger describes the possibility of transformation through a return of
Being as a re-figured humanism. It is the possibility of suspending the will and attaining a lucid sense of the free play of Being within which all of life emerges and is
one giant “gasoline station.”
sustained. A human being, like any entity, is – s/he stands forth as present. But “his distinctive feature lies in [the fact] that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being….Man
is essentially this relationship of responding to Being. Such experience is the clearing of a space (symbolically represented, for example, in the building of an arbor for a
ceremony or in the awesome silence created by the space within a cathedral or a grove of old-growth Redwoods), and the patient readiness for Being to be brought to
language. Given the appropriate bearing and evocation through language, human beings can become aware of dwelling, along with all other existent beings, within Being – the
What comes to the fore in suspension of
willed manipulation is an embrace of other beings and the enduring process of evolution within
which all beings emerge and develop. By reflecting on or experiencing oneself within the
dimension of freedom that is the domain through which all beings pass, human beings can
repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient
equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that
revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant
open realm within which entities are “released” into presence (Gelassenhait – or “releasement”).
and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as
part of a dynamic and necessary historical evolution and transformation process, not merely a gesture of opposition and negation, because of their profound solidarity with
animals and the Earth. Such guidance solidarity thus serves as a general basis for a post-Enframing, post-capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. What will
change is, first, the pre-eminence of Enframing as that which animates the epoch and, correspondingly, our relationship to technology. No longer will technical solutions be
No
longer will nature be looked upon as a homogenous field of resources to be extracted and exploited. No
sought after in realms of activity where technique is not applicable. No longer will everyday activities be pervaded by the standardization and frenzied pace of technology.
longer will resource-intensive and polluting technologies be utilized simply because they serve the blind
interests of corporations over the needs of the Earth . No longer will human beings take from the Earth without thought of the far-reaching
consequences of such actions on all present and future forms of life. Critics would wrongly denounce this position as atavistic, primitivist, or anti-science/technology. But as
the turning toward the re-emergence of Being unfolds, both through revolutionary action rooted in
solidarity with nature and through new, non-exploitative modes of acting in the world, technics will not
disappear; instead, the limits of technology as a mode of revealing will begin to be discerned so that new
forms and uses of technology can emerge.
prolif
don’t solve
Nuclear power can’t solve warming -- electricity sector emissions are too small,
and inevitable demand increases mean the impact is negligible at best.
Green, ‘6
[Jim, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, has an honours degree in public health and a
PhD in science and technology studies for his doctoral thesis on the Lucas Heights research reactor
debates,
energyscience.org.au,
“Nuclear
power
and
climate
change,”
November,
http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf]
It is widely accepted that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions must be sharply reduced to avert climate change. However,
nuclear power is at best a very partial, problematic and unnecessary response to climate change: • A
doubling of nuclear power would reduce global greenhouse emissions by about 5%. A much larger nuclear
expansion program would pose enormous proliferation and security risks, and it would run up against the problem of limited known
conventional uranium reserves. • The serious hazards of civil nuclear programs - the repeatedly demonstrated contribution of civil
nuclear programs to weapons proliferation, intractable waste management problems, and the risk of serious accidents. • The
availability of a plethora of clean energy options - renewable energy sources plus energy efficiency - which, combined,
can meet energy demand and sharply reduce greenhouse emissions . (See for example the reports produced by the
Clean Energy Future Group).1 This information paper addresses the first of those arguments - the limitations of nuclear power as a
climate change abatement strategy. A limited response Nuclear power is used almost exclusively for electricity
generation. (A very small number of reactors are used for heat co-generation and desalination.) Electricity is responsible
for less than one third of global greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Uranium Institute, the figure is “about
30%”.2 That fact alone puts pay to the simplistic view that nuclear power alone can ‘solve’ climate change.
According to a senior energy analyst with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alan McDonald: “Saying that
nuclear power can solve global warming by itself is way over the top”. 3 Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium
Information Centre (UIC) claims that a doubling of nuclear power would reduce greenhouse emissions in
the power sector by 25%.4 That figure is reduced to a 7.5% reduction if considering the impact on overall
emissions rather than just the power sector. The figure needs to be further reduced because the UIC
makes no allowance for the considerable time that would be required to double nuclear output. Electricity
generation is projected to increase over the coming decades so the contribution of a fixed additional input
of nuclear power has a relatively smaller impact. Overall, it is highly unlikely that a doubling of global nuclear
power would reduce emissions by more than 5%.
Warming tipping points inevitable – too late
NPR 9 (1/26, Global Warming Is Irreversible, Study Says,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)
All
Things
Considered,
Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study.
As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term
environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under
control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists.
"We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just
cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly."
That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous
oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide. Turning off
the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming.
"People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to
normal in 100 years or 200 years. What we're showing here is that's not right. It's essentially an
irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says.
This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the
carbon dioxide put into the air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean.
And that will take place for many hundreds of years.
Solomon is a scientist with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Her new study looked
at the consequences of this long-term effect in terms of sea level rise and drought.
bombs
Dirty bombs aren’t a threat to civilization
Coates 2009 – former adjunct professor at George Washington University, President of the Kanawha
Institute for the Study of the Future and was President of the International Association for Impact
Assessment and was President of the Association for Science, Technology and Innovation, M.S., Hon D.,
FWAAS, FAAAS, (Joseph F., Futures 41, 694-705, "Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the
earth”, ScienceDirect, WEA)
The opportunity for setting off a nuclear device, a dirty bomb, in a city is real. It appears to be a practical
matter to acquire, illegally, nuclear material or a device, particularly some of those that may have been
smuggled out of Russia during the breakup of the USSR. Again, suppose the device went off in one of our
largest cities—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles—it could kill as many as several million
people, an event of 6 or 7 on my scale. It would probably injure more and create chronic disorders and
shortening of life for millions of others. But that would be it. There would be no substantial effects leading
to loss of civilization in the nation or the world from that kind of event. The political responses are
difficult to anticipate and a distraction to conjecture about here.
cafe
solves warming
Noam Mohr and Joseph Shapiro, U.S. Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, “PUMPING UP
THE PRICE: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF OUTDATED FUEL EFFICIENCY STANDARDS,” US Public
Interest
Group
Research
Education
Fund,
October
5,
2000,
http://static.uspirg.org/reports/pumpinguptheprice2000.pdf
Outdated standards take a heavy environmental toll as well. Low
miles-per-gallon standards increase oil use,
causing more air pollution and millions of gallons in oil spills. With transportation responsible for
a third of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions, outdated standards also mean the
average new car will emit many tons of excess global warming pollution. Scientists have
reached a virtual consensus that these emissions have already caused significant changes to the
global climate, and warn of increases in extreme weather events, the spread of
infectious disease, widespread ecological damage, and coastal flooding. Since global warming
pollution remains in the atmosphere for up to centuries, the costs of today’s emissions will be felt for generations to come. New car buyers
therefore pay a far greater price for inefficient vehicles than can be calculated in spending at the pump. Improving
miles-pergallon standards would save consumers thousands of dollars, effect large cuts in air
and global warming pollution, while reducing our nation’s dependence on foreign oil.
Congress should put the interest of the American public before the interest of the oil and auto industries, and allow the Department of
Transportation to update fuel efficiency standards.
Nuclear power can’t solve warming -- electricity sector emissions are too small,
and inevitable demand increases mean the impact is negligible at best.
Green, ‘6
[Jim, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, has an honours degree in public health and a
PhD in science and technology studies for his doctoral thesis on the Lucas Heights research reactor
debates,
energyscience.org.au,
“Nuclear
power
and
climate
change,”
November,
http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf]
It is widely accepted that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions must be sharply reduced to avert climate change. However,
nuclear power is at best a very partial, problematic and unnecessary response to climate change: • A
doubling of nuclear power would reduce global greenhouse emissions by about 5%. A much larger nuclear
expansion program would pose enormous proliferation and security risks, and it would run up against the problem of limited known
conventional uranium reserves. • The serious hazards of civil nuclear programs - the repeatedly demonstrated contribution of civil
nuclear programs to weapons proliferation, intractable waste management problems, and the risk of serious accidents. • The
availability of a plethora of clean energy options - renewable energy sources plus energy efficiency - which, combined,
can meet energy demand and sharply reduce greenhouse emissions . (See for example the reports produced by the
Clean Energy Future Group).1 This information paper addresses the first of those arguments - the limitations of nuclear power as a
climate change abatement strategy. A limited response Nuclear power is used almost exclusively for electricity
generation. (A very small number of reactors are used for heat co-generation and desalination.) Electricity is responsible
for less than one third of global greenhouse gas emissions . According to the Uranium Institute, the figure is “about
30%”.2 That fact alone puts pay to the simplistic view that nuclear power alone can ‘solve’ climate change.
According to a senior energy analyst with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alan McDonald: “Saying that
nuclear power can solve global warming by itself is way over the top”. 3 Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium
Information Centre (UIC) claims that a doubling of nuclear power would reduce greenhouse emissions in
the power sector by 25%.4 That figure is reduced to a 7.5% reduction if considering the impact on overall
emissions rather than just the power sector. The figure needs to be further reduced because the UIC
makes no allowance for the considerable time that would be required to double nuclear output. Electricity
generation is projected to increase over the coming decades so the contribution of a fixed additional input
of nuclear power has a relatively smaller impact. Overall, it is highly unlikely that a doubling of global nuclear
power would reduce emissions by more than 5%.
Tripling current global capacity by 2050 is necessary for nuclear power to solve
warming -- multiple constraints prevent that.
Squassoni, ‘8
[Sharon, Senior Associate, Nonproliferation Program -- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 312, “The Realities of Nuclear Expansion” Congressional Testimony: House Select Committee for Energy
Independence and Global Warming, Washington, DC]
Princeton scientists Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow published a “wedge analysis”
for stabilizing global climate change.3 Since fossil fuels currently emit seven billion tons
of carbon/year and are projected to double that level through 2050 in the business-asusual scenario, Pacala and Socolow considered what technologies and/or approaches
might help stabilize those emissions at current levels (about 375 ppm). Seven wedges of
reduced emissions (a cumulative effect of 25 billion tons through 2050, or one billion tons of carbon/year reduction at the
end of that period) were postulated. One “wedge” would ultimately achieve a reduction of one
billion tons per year (or 25 billion cumulative tons) by 2050. For nuclear energy to “solve” just
one-seventh of the problem – lowering emissions by one billion tons per year – an
additional 700 GWe of capacity would have to be built, assuming the reactors replaced 700 GWe of
modern coal-electric plants.4 Because virtually all operating reactors will have to be retired in that
time, this means building approximately 1070 reactors in 42 years, or about
25 reactors per year. Current global reactor capacity is 373 GWe or 439 reactors
worldwide. In short, one “nuclear wedge” would require almost tripling current
capacity. Mapping A “Realistic Growth” Scenario Nuclear Expansion5 The attached maps (see slide 1) depict estimates of
In 2004,
reactor capacity growth for 2030 and 2050, according to three scenarios. The first is a “realistic growth” scenario, based on the U.S.
Energy Information Administration figures for 2030.6 The second is what states have planned for 2030, or a “wildly optimistic”
scenario. The third is roughly based on the high-end projections for 2050 done by MIT in their 2003 study entitled “The Future of
Nuclear Power.” This 1500 GWe scenario lies between the Pacala-Socolow wedge and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change estimates that nuclear energy could reduce carbon emissions between two billion and six billion tons/year (or 1800 GWe –
Nuclear energy is
undoubtedly safer and more efficient now than when it began fifty years ago, but it still faces four
fundamental challenges: waste, cost, proliferation, and safety. It is an inherently risky business.
Most industry executives will admit that it will only take one significant accident to
plunge the “renaissance” back into the nuclear Dark Ages. Because of this, estimates are highly
uncertain. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not use its computer model to
estimate nuclear energy growth because, among other things, key variables such as public
attitudes and government policy are difficult to quantify and project. That said, estimates tend to
4500 GWe).7 A few caveats with respect to projecting nuclear energy expansion are necessary.
extrapolate electricity consumption and demand from gross domestic product (GDP) growth, make assumptions about nuclear
energy’s share of electricity production, and then estimate nuclear reactor capacity. The United States, France, and Japan constitute
more than half of total world nuclear reactor capacity (see slide 1). Yet half of the 34 reactors now under construction are in Asia.8
Under any scenario, nuclear power is expected to grow most in Asia, because of high Chinese and Indian growth and electricity
demand. Under the realistic growth scenario, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates 2030 reactor capacity at 481
GWe. The International Energy Agency (IEA) envisions greater potential for expansion, projecting a range from 414 to 679 GWe in
2030, but the higher number would require significant policy support. With electricity consumption expected to double by 2030,
nuclear energy will have a difficult time just keeping its market share – currently 16 percent of global production.9 According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with no change in energy policies, “the energy mix supplied to run the global economy
in the 2025-2030 time-frame will essentially remain unchanged with about 80% of the energy supply based on fossil fuels.”10 Coal
now provides 59% of electricity production, followed by hydroelectric power at 39% and oil and gas together provide 25%.
regions that have coal tend to use it,
particularly for electricity generation, which increases greenhouse gas emissions.
The IPCC has noted that “in recent years, intensified coal use has been observed for a
variety of reasons in developing Asian countries, the USA and some European countries.
In a number of countries, the changing relative prices of coal to natural gas have changed the
dispatch order in power generation in favor of coal.” Many fear that states such as China and
India – both of which are not subject to Kyoto Protocol targets because they are developing states – will meet their
increased demand with cheap coal. Without further policy changes, according to the International Energy Agency,
Renewables are just 1-2% of total electricity production. Moreover,
the share of nuclear energy could drop to 10% of global electricity production. “Wildly
Optimistic” Growth Scenario Although some states, such as Germany and Sweden, plan to phase out nuclear power, the trend line is
moving in the opposite direction. This growth scenario does not contain projections based on electricity demand, but instead takes at
face value what states have projected for themselves. The result is a total of 700 GWe global capacity (see slide 2) – two-thirds of
what one nuclear wedge to affect global climate change would require. The reason these estimates are wildly optimistic is that over
20 nations have announced intentions to install nuclear reactors. Several of these – Turkey, Egypt, and Philippines – had planned
for nuclear power in the past, but abandoned such plans for various reasons. Some of these new nuclear plans are more credible than
others and can be differentiated into those that have approved or funded construction, those that have clear proposals but without
formal commitments, and those that are exploring nuclear energy (see slide 3). In the Middle East, these include Iran, Israel, Jordan
and Yemen, with potential interest expressed by Syria, Kuwait, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states of Saudi Arabia, Oman,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. In Europe, Belarus, Turkey and Azerbaijan have announced plans, as well as Kazakhstan.
In Asia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia have announced plans, and the Philippines has also expressed
interest. Venezuela has also declared it will develop nuclear power. In Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Nigeria have
announced plans to develop nuclear power, and Algeria and Ghana have expressed interest.11 More than half of all those states are
in the Middle East. Although this could result in reduced carbon emissions, because Middle Eastern states use more oil for electricity
production (34%) than elsewhere, this is not where the real electricity demand is coming from. “Climate Change” Growth Scenario A
rough approximation of where reactor capacity would expand in a climate change scenario is based on the high scenario of the 2003
MIT Study, “The Future of Nuclear Power.” For 1500 GW capacity, MIT estimated that 54 countries (an additional 23) would have
commercial nuclear power programs. This essentially means a five-fold increase in the numbers of reactors worldwide and an
annual build rate of 35 per year. In the event that smaller-sized reactors are deployed in developing countries – which makes
eminent sense – the numbers could be much higher.12 If nuclear energy were assumed to be able to contribute a reduction of
between two and six billion tons of carbon per year as outlined in the Stern Report, the resulting reactor capacity would range
between 1800 GWe and 4500 GWe – increases ranging from six to ten times the current capacity.13 This would require building
between 42 and 107 reactors per year through 2050. Impact on Uranium Enrichment Such increases in reactor capacity would
certainly have repercussions for the front and back ends of the fuel cycle. Almost 90 percent of current operating reactors use
lowenriched uranium (LEU). Presently, eleven countries have commercial uranium enrichment capacity and produce between 40
and 50 million SWU. A capacity of 1070 GWe – the one “wedge” scenario – could mean tripling enrichment capacity, requiring
anywhere from 11 to 22 additional enrichment plants.14 A capacity of 1500 GWe would require quadrupling enrichment capacity
(see slide 4).15 Further, if Stern Report nuclear expansion levels are achieved, enrichment capacity would have to increase ten-fold.
In assessing where new uranium enrichment capacity might develop, the MIT study assumed that 18 states would have 10 GWe
reactor capacity – the point at which domestic uranium enrichment becomes competitive with LEU sold on the international market
– and thus might enrich uranium. (See slide 4 for a more modest approach, with nine additional countries enriching uranium).16
Impact on Spent Fuel Reprocessing A key question is whether an expansion of nuclear reactors would result in an expansion of spent
fuel reprocessing. This is not necessarily the case, because decisions about whether to store fuel or reprocess it depend on several
factors: existing storage capacities; fuel cycle approaches (once-through, one recycle, fast reactors) and new technologies; and cost. A
shift to fast reactors that can burn or breed plutonium implies an increase in recycling, whether this is traditional reprocessing that
separates out plutonium, or options under consideration now that would not separate out the plutonium. France and Japan now
commercially reprocess their spent fuel and recycle the plutonium once in mixed oxide-fuelled reactors. Russia also reprocesses a
small percentage of its spent fuel. A troubling development in the last two years from a nonproliferation perspective has been the
U.S. embrace of recycling spent fuel under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, after a policy of 30 years of not encouraging the
use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Whether or not the United States ultimately reprocesses or recycles fuel, other states
There
are significant questions about whether nuclear expansion that could affect
global climate change is even possible. In the United States, as the chief operating officer of
Exelon recently told an industry conference, constraints include: the lack of any recent U.S. nuclear
construction experience; the atrophy of U.S. nuclear manufacturing infrastructure;
production bottlenecks created by an increase in worldwide demand; and an aging labor
force.
are now more likely to view reprocessing as necessary for an advanced fuel cycle. Constraints on Nuclear Expansion17