European Union Foreign Policy:
The EU as a capable international actor
Feel free to give us a call, Mr. Kissinger!
Master thesis by;
Dennis Kjeldsen
Student id: 20001209
Submitted March 15, 2007
Aalborg University
Politics and Public Administration
Counsellor;
Henning Jørgensen
1
Resume
Den Europæiske Unions Udenrigspolitik:
EU som kompetent international aktør
af
Dennis Kjeldsen
EU er verdens største handelsblok og verdens største donor af udviklingsbistand og humanitær støtte.
Med sine 450 millioner indbyggere står medlemslandene tilsammen for en fjerdedel af verdens output.
Unionen er et sui generis fænomen, som vel nok udgør det fremmeste eksempel på regional integration.
Den ofte citerede kliché om EU som økonomisk gigant og politisk dværg konstituerer indgangsvinklen til
nærværende kandidatspeciale. Jeg er nemlig uenig med de, der påstår at EU ikke formår at gøre sin
indflydelse gældende ude i verden.
Ved at stille spørgsmål omkring udviklingen af EU’s udenrigspolitiske dimension ønskes der i dette
speciale at fremsætte belæg for en påstand om at EU er en kompetent international aktør. Samtidig
påstås det, at EU faktisk i højere grad end de traditionelle udenrigspolitiske aktører – stater – er i stand
til at imødegå nutidens globale udfordringer.
Belægget for disse påstande tilvejebringes gennem en teoretisk fremlæggelse samt en empirisk analyse. I
den teoretiske del forsøges det at anlægge et ’nyt’ perspektiv på forståelsen af EU som international
aktør. Indledningsvist tages der således afstand fra mange af de klassiske litterære tilgange til EU, som
er for stats-centrerede, og ved at fremstille EU som et udenrigspolitisk system, der består af tre
forskellige udenrigspolitiske dimensioner; intern, centripetal og ekstern udenrigspolitik. Samtidig
skelnes der i den eksterne udenrigspolitik mellem forenet og fragmenteret politik.
Den empiriske del gør brug af de teoretiske ræsonnementer i et case-studie af EUs aktiviteter i forhold
til Bosnien Hercegovina. Ved at kigge tilbage til 1991 og frem igen til 2006 bliver det muligt at følge
udviklingen af EU’s udenrigspolitiske kapabiliteter, som er udviklet i ’skyggen’ af indsatsen i Bosnien.
Resultatet af mine anstrengelser har ført til en moderat ændring i min opfattelse, idet jeg har måttet
konstatere, at EU til stadighed har vanskeligt ved at håndtere internationale kriser og konflikter af særlig
alvorlig karakter. Derfor er en yderligere analyse udfærdiget til specialet (i forhold til den oprindelige
plan), der undersøger nogle institutionelle forklaringer på, at EU til tider stadig kommer til kort.
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Slutteligt opsummeres mine resultater i konklusionen, der forholder sig til min indledende
problemformulering og den fremførte påstand.
God læsning!
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CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 5
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION ...................................................................................... 7
3. THE WAY FORWARD ................................................................................................. 11
CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................... 14
4. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF STUDY – CENTRAL DEFINITIONS ............... 17
DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................................................ 17
‘Foreign policy’ ............................................................................................................................................................. 17
‘Capability’ ................................................................................................................................................................. 19
5. THEORISING EUROPE ............................................................................................ 22
TO PREVENT ANOTHER WAR ......................................................................................................................................... 22
EXPLAINING CONTINUED INTEGRATION ...................................................................................................................... 22
‘THE NATURE OF THE BEAST’ ........................................................................................................................................ 24
LESS THAN A STATE? ..................................................................................................................................................... 25
AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE? ................................................................................................................................... 26
AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR AND THE QUESTION OF ‘ACTORNESS’ ................................................................................ 28
Actor by virtue of legal competence .................................................................................................................................... 28
Actorness as a polity ..................................................................................................................................................... 29
6. THE EU; A FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM (FPS) ..................................................... 33
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SYSTEM AND THE INTERACTING UNITS ............................................................................ 34
EUROPEANISATION ....................................................................................................................................................... 36
A FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF THREE DIMENSIONS ...................................................................................................... 37
Internal Dimension ....................................................................................................................................................... 38
Centripetal Dimension................................................................................................................................................... 42
External Dimension ..................................................................................................................................................... 45
7. THE ROLE OF THE EU IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM? ....................... 51
CIVILIAN POWER? ......................................................................................................................................................... 52
NORMATIVE POWER? .................................................................................................................................................... 54
8. ANALYSIS – EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION ........................................................... 56
THE WAY FORWARD ...................................................................................................................................................... 56
HISTORICAL BACKDROP – FROM EPC TO CFSP ............................................................................................................ 57
1991 – 1995; FOREIGN POLICY FAILURE AND THE CFSP’S BAPTISM OF FIRE. ................................................................. 60
1996 – 1999; BUILDING CREDIBILITY ON THE BALKANS ................................................................................................ 71
2000 – 2006: COMMON DIRECTION EVOLVING AND BRING BIH CLOSER TO EUROPE .................................................... 80
IN SUM .......................................................................................................................................................................... 94
9. ANALYSIS – INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES OF UNION................................ 96
STUDYING THE INSTITUTIONAL SETUP OF EU FOREIGN POLICY ................................................................................... 96
COORDINATION ............................................................................................................................................................ 97
ACTORS AND JURISDICTION .......................................................................................................................................... 98
IMBALANCE OF POWER AND RESOURCES ..................................................................................................................... 101
IN SUM ........................................................................................................................................................................ 102
10. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................104
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................................107
ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................... 116
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“TO UNDERSTAND EUROPE YOU HAVE TO BE A GENIUS OR FRENCH”1
Madeleine Albright, 1998
1. Introduction
Historically, Europe and the European countries have played a prevalent part in shaping the world
around it. Through uni-, bi- and multilateral foreign policy the Europe has influenced global events and
taken centre stage in international politics - both in positive and in negative terms. The violence and
scars of two world wars and numerous other intra-European conflicts have been replaced by peace and
stability, which in turn has pathed the way for a united Europe in an ever demanding global
environment. The present foreign policy of the European Union plays a pivotal role in those European
endeavours towards “world peace” that originate in 1950 with the declaration by Robert Schuman;
“World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The
contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful
relations.”2
A favoured topic for debate among practitioners, scholars and other students of European politics is
the role of the European Union3 (EU) in international relations and, in this context, the development
of European-level foreign policy capabilities.
Parallel to the literary contributions studying and discussing the progression of European integration,
the notion of a European “actors” presence in the world has received increased attention. Particularly
in recent decades this interest has gathered pace and has been accompanied with a mountain of
research from a myriad of perspectives. From being the subject of study for a select few from within
the paradigm of International Relations Theory, the European Union has become a free-for-all to
study, describe, analyse, scrutinise, understand and explain.
1
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, 1998
Schuman Declaration of 9th May 1952
3
The European Union (EU) was established through the treaty of the EU (TEU), otherwise known as the Maastricht
Treaty. The EU is an entity which acts in policy domains through several components; the European Communities
(EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. Furthermore the EU
also acts through its members states. For the sake of simplicity I shall refer to the entire European Union project since
the ECSC in 1951 as the EU or the Union, only using alternative terms when it is decisive for the understanding of the
text. The term European Community (-ies) (EC) will also be covered by the”EU”, although this may be brought into
play more often due to the nature of the institutional infrastructure where the EC is the supranational pillar 1 of the EU.
2
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European foreign policy coordination has gradually developed out of the earliest stages of European
integration from the preliminary steps taken in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1952, through the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 and
the birth of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. In conjunction with an increased
widening and deepening of policy integration within the European Community (EC), mainly in the
economic sphere, an external dimension has arisen through a series of stops. The greatest strides in
foreign policy coordination have been taken since the “conception” of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) through the Treaty of the European Union (TEU, Maastricht 1993). Common
institutions and instruments have been created, resources allocated and the presence of the EU in
international affairs intensified and broadened.
Hand in hand with the developments in political practice the research fields studying the phenomena
have also moved forward; from trying to determine the EU’s existence as a presence in international
affairs to examining the modus operandi and the effectiveness of EU as an international actor. There is
comprehensive evidence that the European Union, and the European Community before it, has had an
immense impact on the world around it through inter alia acts of trade cooperation, special partnerships,
and diplomatic recognition; through provision of humanitarian and development assistance, coupling
aid with market, democratic and human rights reforms.
The effectiveness of the EU as an international actor though is a widely contested notion, which
includes positions on both ends of a continuum. On one end lies severe scepticism and refusal to
acknowledge the existence of EU “actorness” in foreign policy; on the other positions hailing the
immense impact the EU has in international affairs. Any conclusions on the state of affairs of the EU
as an international actor naturally depend on the perspective from which any achievements and
shortcomings are viewed. As one prominent researcher has elegantly (and wittingly put it); “… what you
see may well depend on where you sit, but what seat gives you the best view in the house?”4.
From a supranational approach one could argue for an EU president; a common military force; more
authority to common institutions or increased European defence spending as the remedies to the EU's
lack of political clout. Conversely, some would make the case that adding further instruments to the
foreign policy toolbox would undermine the current prosperous diplomatic and economic capabilities
of the EU in world affairs, which have been built on consensus. Hereby, advocating the notion that the
4
Hill, 1978 cited in Ginsberg, 1999
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Union should continue to develop its civilian power and refrain from aspiring to become a superpower
based on military means.
The bulk of the debate of late, however, has been concerned with circumstances of crisis response and
subsequent crisis management. In this regards the major split over Iraq (2003) and the earlier failure in
the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania) has been used to exemplify the shortfalls and
underscore the call for a single credible European foreign policy with the necessary and adequate
supporting resources, institutions and instruments. While most observers agree that there have been
positive progress made, some argue that there is still far to go before the EU can shrug off the
frequently used narrative: `economic giant, political dwarf'. The dominating opinion seems to be that the EU
as a unit is unable to conduct coherent foreign policy and that the Union continues to fall short of the
expectations.
Regardless of ones approach to the matter, or valuation of the organisations abilities, the fact remains
that the European Union has developed into something that cannot be ignored, and which influences
global politics in a wide array of areas. The vision of Schuman and his peers sparked a serious of events
which ultimately has entailed continuous debate and research in to the role of the European Union in
the world. In this paper I shall join in both the theoretical and the empirical debate by examining the
achievements of the European Union foreign policy in the last 15 years. Through a glance back in time
I hope to open up for an understanding of the nature of the EU in international affairs and the
capability of EU as an international actor. I intend to reflect theoretically on how to conceptualise and
analyse the European Union in a foreign policy perspective and to a conduct an empirical study based
on my theoretical findings. In doing so, I wish to challenge the common and widespread perception
that the EU is incapable of conducting foreign policy and instead aim to show that the EU is indeed a
important international actor in its own right. Too often, I believe, the European Union is unjustly
branded as coming up short in international relations and that this unfair judgement is based on a failed
ability to understand the entirety of EU foreign policy.
2. Problem formulation
With more than 450 million inhabitants and a quarter of world output, and as the
biggest aid donor and the first trading partner of 100 countries, the Union of 25 – and
soon 27 – members could wield considerable influence over the political and economic
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choices determining prosperity and stability in Europe and the wider world, which in
their turn influence the wellbeing and security of Europeans.
European Commission, 2004
There is no shortage of reasons, why the foreign policy of the European Union, is an appealing field of
research for anyone with an interest in European politics. Both theoretically and empirically the EU as
a field of study, offers to political scientists a range of puzzles regardless of which discipline of research
one represents, the motivation behind ones study, or for which purpose the results are to be used.
Each progressive step towards furthering integration and cooperation among European states,
European institution building and the expansion of policy fields gives rise to new questions (and
revisiting the old). What is the EU? How, why and where does it finds its momentum? What is the
driving force behind it? Which developments can be expected for the future? These are just a few of
the reoccurring questions asked in past and present literature.
I too, have my reasons for engaging in a study of the Unions foreign policy. On a theoretical level,
examining the debate about theorizing and conceptualising the EU and its many policy areas presents
more questions than it delivers answers. For it appears that the multitude of perspectives fail on
numerous levels to come to terms with the ambiguity of the European construction, making consensus
among researcher almost impossible. As in most social science, real-life developments gives cause to
rethinking earlier work, in turn refurbishing the varying paradigms and moving them forward into new
and different directions. This is certainly the case with the numerous treaty-based amendments and the
rapid evolution of the EC/EU, since the first ideas of “politically united Europe” were aired. The
particular uncharted territory that the EU constitutes has caused theorists with constant problems
because the gradual shift from a purely intergovernmental arrangement to a more intricate and
supranational body does not allow the EU to be viewed through either the optic of state nor
intergovernmental organisation – where most theorists until now have departed. Moreover, due to the
sui generis character of the EU the study-results which have been forwarded have not been applicable
beyond EU and European integration. The European theorists have spent decades trying to define the
‘nature of the beast’ – a moving target - while also attempting to explain and predict developments.
This in itself seems paradoxical, but it is for students of the EU the world we live in.
Consensus, then, has not been reached and no single theory or group of theories can claim the right to
explain the evolution and the operation of the European polity. As such the challenge is still there; to
develop and apply a framework capable of studying the EU’s modus operandi in a coherent and valid
manner. The intention in this paper is by no means to underestimate, neglect or criticise the work
8
already produced, nor is my ambition to construct a theory that is all encompassing. However, humbled
by my status as a novice, it is my motivation and ambition to take up the challenge and contribute to
the mountains of published literature, within the field of my interest; EU foreign policy. In doing so I
hope to operate within a duality of theoretical thinking and empirical application, while acknowledging
the fact that the outcome may not be generally applicable to anything other than the EU itself. It
cannot be a testing site for broader generalisation.
Empirically the sheer size (economic, geographically and demographically), the functional scope and the
reach of the European Union and its activities is more than an adequate reason for undertaking
investigations into its effect on the wider world. The realm of my interest is found in the ability of the
Union to act in an international environment scared by conflict, poverty and threats to international
peace and security; the impact of the European Union in its efforts to aid and assist countries/regions
in difficulties, and based on the premise that a strong Union of 25 states with 450 million inhabitants,
producing a quarter of the worlds GDP should share the responsibility for global security and
advancement towards a more prosperous and stabile world5. A brief glance at the state of affairs in the
world underscores the crucial need for efforts from actors with the capacity to make a difference. It is
my assumption that the EU is one such actor.
The global challenges facing the EU cover a variety of dimensions. There are more ongoing conflicts in
the world today than ever before. These conflicts have resulted in the deaths of almost 4 million people
since 1990, with the vast majority of these being civilians. As of 2003, 18 million people are
documented to have fled their homes due to conflicts. Add to this those who have left due to natural
disasters, famine etc. and the numbers of displaced persons rises significantly. Conflicts are not the only
source of concern for global security, stability and prosperity. Poverty and disease affect the developing
countries immensely and causes terrible suffering. Almost half the worlds population live on less than 2
EUR a day, 45 million people annually are believed to die of starvation and malnutrition. The effects of
AIDS and other pandemic is felt all over the third world causing major strain on the societies in which
is has infiltrated. These, and other major problems, are linked to economic failure and political
instability, and are among the most substantial of root causes to violent conflict.6
Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and
makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and
poverty.7
European Commission, 2004 – see above quote
European Security Strategy, Brussels European Council, 12th December 2003
7
Ibid.
5
6
9
The great economic divide that has developed between the first and third world, many would argue
incites an antagonistic relation resulting in threats to the developed world, hence the European
countries. Both direct threats and the ripple effects of instability constitute the scenario that the EU
must take into due consideration, when contemplating foreign policy. At the European Council in
Brussels (2003) the heads of government of the EU member states identified the major threat facing
the EU as; terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts
and state failure. These threats constitute the symptoms of the problems facing particularly the
developing world. In an ever globalised world, the regions which were once ‘distant on the horizon’ now
directly influence the way of life in Europe. Moreover, successive enlargements and geographical
expansion of the EU has brought the conflicts and instability of the world into the European
neighbourhood.8 Southern Caucasus, Northern Africa and the Middle East are essentially Europe’s
next-door neighbours. In the eventual case of Turkey’s accession, the Union would share borders with
Syria, Iran and Iraq.
On this basis I argue, that European (EU) foreign policy has a significant and pressing role to play, and
that the comprehensive problems of the world, require comprehensive approaches. In its pursuit of the
strategic goal of ‘a secure Europe in a better world’9 the EU and its member states face severe and complex
foreign policy challenges. Hence, the focus of this paper will be to examine the foreign policy of the
European Union and evaluate on its ability to act on the aforementioned challenges. The basis for my
study will rest on the following research question:
Q: How has the EU evolved into a capable foreign policy actor in the international community
of states?
My answer to this research questions lays the foundation for the paper, as I intend to forward evidence
to substantiate the basic argument (theses) of this paper. Thus the following argument will be the
controlling idea on which my study rests – or falls;
A: The EU has developed into a more capable foreign policy actor than it receives credit for, through a series of Treaty
based additions of foreign policy capabilities. The EU is in many ways better suited than the traditional state to meet the
challenges in the international environment due to its uniqueness and multifaceted properties. Examining the full scope of
8
In the context of the 2004 enlargement, the EU developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with the
objective of avoiding the emergence of dividing lines between the enlarged EU and neighbours and instead
strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned
9
European Union Security Strategy – See Annex 2
10
EU potential for external action (and not just CFSP) provides for a more positive assessment of the EU as an
international actor than has generally been the case.
3. The way forward
To substantiate (bear evidence for) for the above argument I shall rely on a combination of theoretical
and empirical justification.
Theoretically - without a theoretical starting point any observations made during the study, simply
becomes a mountain of data without a context or meaning. Thus the overall reason for applying theory
to the problem is to make sense of the empirical evidence on the EU’s foreign policy. First and
foremost the framework will be constructed without the specific study of this paper in mind, however
with the added objective of (hopefully) being generally applicable to EU foreign policy.
The major challenge in this paper is to construct a coherent and consistent theoretical approach to
understanding the modus operandi of the EU’s many facets under one umbrella. It must be focused
and structured towards – and accommodate - understanding the specific complexities of the European
Union. Moreover, the construction of the framework shall include a more fundamental discussion on
the nature of the EU, asking the question; what kind of international actor is it and how does it fit in to
the international environment?
As such a natural outset lays in defining ‘the nature of the beast’. There is bound to be severe problems in
analysing and trying to understand EU foreign policy if there is no clear definition of the nature of the
EU as an organisation/entity. Here, this is regarded as a prerequisite for further analysis of EU actions
and processes.
As it has already been noted, the task of understanding and theorising the EU/EC is a difficult one.
Which theories best come to terms with the EU and encompass the complexities? The paper’s
theoretical platform shall rely on explanations and theoretical work from various paradigms, including
from international/European theory and clearer cut political science disciplines regarding “actors” in
foreign policy. Based initially on the work of others I shall attempt to create a synthesis framework by
combining elements from competing and complementary theories in to a single coherent approach,
which will ultimately fulfil the analytical purpose of this paper; to answer the formulated research
problem. In doing so, I hope to contribute to the debate, without just reproducing the theories of
others.
11
The contemporary art of theorising Europe stems from a long line of earlier attempts to understand,
explain and predict European cooperation and integration. So before moving on to look closer at the
EU as a foreign policy actor it is helpful to take a brief glance at the bulk of theoretical work
concerning the European phenomena. Then I will move to the core of the matter – defining the EU in
a foreign policy context. By examining the notions of state, presence and actor, the aim is to develop a
conceptualisation of the EU as an international actor. Having conceptualised what the EU is and how it
functions in foreign policy, the next step is to look at the context within which it operates. Leaning on
the perception that actors are actors only in lieu of their relations to others I attempt to identify the
position of the Union in the international system of states.
There are three distinct, yet intertwined, purposes for the theoretical work which is to be presented and
discussed in this paper. The theoretical examination of the questions; what is the EU and how does it fit into
the international system? becomes almost as important as the research question itself. The theoretical
framework of study will entail three different purposes;
1) It will qualify my understanding of what the EU is and the nature of the EU in a foreign policy
context. As such it provides a prerequisite for the theoretical justification of the argument of
this paper, because it will represent a specific way of perceiving the Union.
2) It will constitute justification for the argument in itself because it opens for a view of the Union
– as a foreign policy system – which provides for more encouraging conclusions on the EU as a
foreign policy actor, than that of traditional state-centric contributions.
3) It will be carried over into the empirical analysis of the paper, where it will represent a key
ingredient in the model of analysis and not least the perspective with which the analysis will be
conducted
Empirically I shall present a case study that intends to identify and present the constant development of
the EU’s foreign policy through the last 15 years (between 1991 – 2006).
I shall do this by examining the EU’s foreign policy activities towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. In parallel I
shall attempt to draw some general conclusions regarding the capabilities of the Union’s foreign policy.
Hence, to lift the empirical explanations and conclusions of a more general nature, the study will be
supplemented with empirical evidence of events, activities and developments, relevant to, by not
directly related to the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem. The study thus aims at uncovering how the EU
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capabilities of foreign policy have been continually developed and improved; based upon the general
perceptions of the thesis concerning the status of the EU as an international actor (perceptions that will
be presented in the theoretical section of the paper). The overall objective of this thesis is to conclude
on the EU evolvement and its ability to conduct foreign policy.
The choice of Bosnia as the object of my case-study rests on four decisive factors; vicinity, timeframe,
scope and comparability. Firstly, the geographical vicinity of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the
EU is relatively close - it is in the EU’s ‘backyard’. Secondly, the case of Bosnia constitutes a recent series
of events that coincide with the creation and developments of the foreign policy dimension to the EU
(early 90’s to present). The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) was signed while Sarajevo was under
siege and the conflict was at its peak (with the TEU came also the creation of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy). So it is fair to say that the developments of CFSP and EU external relations have
developed in the shadow of Bosnia. Thirdly, the conflict and subsequent efforts has presented the
Union with an unprecedented scope of challenges, requiring the whole pallet of complex foreign policy
instruments. The challenges have developed over time to include peace brokering, humanitarian aid,
peacemaking, peacekeeping, development assistance, financial cooperation, trade agreements,
democratisation support, electoral support, inclusive measures etc. Finally, this in turn makes the EU’s
efforts in BiH comparable to other challenges, since any other foreign policy project would include one
or more of these activities. Bosnia has been the ‘testing ground’ where the EU has tried to introduce a
comprehensive approach towards conflict management: including political tools like conflict mediation;
economic ones (like humanitarian aid and long term economic reconstruction assistance); and military
ones (peace-keeping and policing missions).
While these factors have been central to my evaluation of BiH’s value as a case study, the remarkable
progress made here is what initially intrigued me and awoke my curiosity. Hearing the former High
Representative to BiH, Lord Paddy Ashdown address the United Nations Security Council on 15 th
November 2005 did nothing to discourage my interest.
Lord Ashdown stated that BiH was ready to enter a “post-Dayton” era just 10 years after the brutal war
that had left its people traumatized and an infrastructure collapsed, and that it had acquired the
framework, although not the substance, of a modern European State. Bosnia and Herzegovina had
done what many had said was impossible even a year ago, let alone at the date of the Dayton Peace
Agreement.
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On 8th November 2005 the foreign ministers of the Union welcomed the recommendation by the
European Commission to commence drawing up a negotiating mandate for the country’s Stabilization
and Association Agreement with the EU. On the 22st November 2005 the General Affairs and
External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels, precisely 10 years after the Dayton Agreement was
signed, authorised the Commission to commence negotiations at the earliest possible opportunity.
According to Lord Ashdown this was “a fitting anniversary present”. BiH would join the rest of the region
on the journey towards European Union accession. “This is truly a remarkable achievement for a country as
war-torn as Bosnia and Herzegovina was just 10 years ago”
Case study Methodology
As highlighted in the above problem-formulation, the empirical justification for the thesis’ argument is
to be sought through a case-study. I shall briefly reflect on this, to ensure an understanding of how I
see the case study as a method and how I intend to put it to use herein.
The study of the European Union foreign policy - what it is, how it works and how it has evolved presents significant challenges, but in turn assures considerable rewards for those willing to undertake
it. The institutional framework of the Union’s foreign policy capabilities is complex and the likeness to
other fields of study hard to see. This makes studying the Union and its capabilities problematic, since
one cannot necessarily apply all the same methodical tools, which are used in similar fields of study.
Robert Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that; “investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and
in which multiple sources of evidence are used” 10
The case study method has its advantage in letting us come to terms with and understand a complex
issue or object, while also adding value to that which has already been learned. It can be used in a
multitude of ways across a variety of disciplines. Common for the method, is its ability to emphasis the
details of rich and comprehensive information in a given context, focusing on a limited number of
events or phenomena. Thus it is useful when studying a complex case such as the EU’s foreign policy.
Critics of the case study method highlight its inability to derive the basis for establishing reliability or
10
Yin, 1994, p. 13
14
generality of findings.11 This may well be true, however who is to say that reliability and generality is
always an objective. Here, the objective is instead to increase an understanding of the specific subject of
EU foreign policy capabilities – in short, to learn.
“[S]ometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases—not in the hope of proving
anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!”12
Flyvbjerg notes that proof is hard to come by in social science, since there is a lack of “hard” theory.
Social science does not succeed (like the natural sciences) to produce general, context independent
theories. It merely offers concrete and context-dependant knowledge. So, while incapable of producing
general hypotheses or theories, it is able to produce knowledge and as such learning through case
studies is possible.13
Here, the case study method will be applied to derive an in depth understanding of the EU’s foreign
policy capabilities across a broad variety of foreign policy dimensions e.g. the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), trade policy, development policy, external environmental policy, the external
dimension of justice and home affairs etc. The sui generis character of the EU makes it difficult to
generalise its approach in the world, to anything other than itself. Hence the case study method seems
well-equipped for my purpose even though (or maybe because) I can only rely on “… specific cases and
context-dependent knowledge.”14 My purpose; to investigate the formulated problem in such a manner,
which gives the maximum output of knowledge to solve this problem.
“Good social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a
given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand.15
The form of reporting on the results of case studies is an issue which must be considered. Peattie warns
against summarizing sense case studies claiming that “… it is simply that the very value of the case
study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces, is lost when one tries to sum up in large and
mutually exclusive concepts” .16
11
Yin, 1994
Eysenck, 1976 in Flyvbjerg, p. 9
13
Flyvbjerg, p. 223-224
14
Flyvbjerg, p. 224
15
Flyvbjerg, p. 242
16
Peattie in Flyvbjerg, p. 260
12
15
Here I will follow the method of Flyvbjerg, when telling the story of the development of the EU’s
foreign policy. Allowing space for the diversities, letting the story unfold and revealing the complexities
(and contradictions) becomes a part of the answer to my problem.
“Case stories written like this can neither be briefly recounted nor summarized in a few main results. The case story is
itself the result. It is a “virtual reality,” so to speak.”17
As such, the case study of this thesis represents a narrative, which follows the evolution of the Union
and the development of it capabilities. The comprising parts, while elements of the whole study
become smaller independent studies, which are interesting both on their own, but also in the larger
context.
17
Flyvbjerg, p. 238
16
4. Narrowing the scope of study – central definitions
At the centre of this thesis lays the concept of ‘foreign policy capabilities’. For this concept to make any
sense in terms of the problem of the thesis, it needs to be thoroughly defined. What is more, to enable
analysis of the foreign policy capabilities of the Union, these have to be operationalised into something
‘measurable’. The point of this section is not to discuss the EU’s foreign policy as such, since such
discussion represents a vast part of the further process. Instead the section will look to unfold and
establish a basic understanding of both ‘foreign policy’ and the ‘capabilities’ that will be utilised
throughout the thesis – the operational definitions. These conceptual issues are critical to further study
because a) it enables consistency in the overall analytical approach to the problem and b) it allows for
clear illustration (for the reader) of which phenomena are being discussed. If these basic steps are not
undertaken, there is a risk of being misconceived as to the nature of what is actually being studied.
As Carlsnaes notes in a review of the art of European foreign policy analysis;
“Are scholars talking about similar phenomena when discussing European foreign policy and its attendant aspects, or are
they speaking past each other simply because they are discussing essentially different things?”18
Definitions
‘Foreign policy’
Union foreign policy, Community foreign policy, external relations, foreign affairs, European Foreign
policy, EU/EC foreign policy etc; These are just some of the labels used in characterising the actions of
the EU towards the wider world. In reading academic literature, one finds no guide or common
denominator as to which terms to use or when to use the respectively. Off course, this is not surprising
in a much contested field and cannot as such be expected. However, more often than not, there does
not seem to be any justification or explanation for the use of the respective terms. It appears that many
contributors to the study if the EU ‘in international affairs’ (another largely undefined term) simply
‘pick a horse and go with it’. Granted, the induction of the CFSP in the institutional framework has
made this exercise easier since the phenomenon of EU external activities now has an institutionally
defined name. Nonetheless, clarity has not prevailed, but only opened for another side of the
conceptual problem; some argue that the EU’s foreign policy extends to more than that of the ‘CFSP’19.
18
19
Carlsnaes, p. 2,
See Smith, 2003
17
So, the first logical step is to clearly define the notion of foreign policy. First and foremost what does
‘foreign’ mean? This is the easy part. In terms of EC/EU, the objects of foreign policy is all ‘third’
countries/regions and organisations, or stated more bluntly; non-members of the Union. Thus policy
towards those states which have association agreements, application countries and potential future
members is included in the realm of EU foreign policy. Likewise EU policy towards NATO is foreign
policy, although most EU members are also NATO members.
Regarding ‘policy’ the important question is whether foreign policy of the EU is defined by the way that
it is ‘made’ or its consequences/impact on the object in question. White defined foreign policy from a
state perspective as “…that area of governmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the state and
other actors, particularly other states, in the international system”20. The mentioned relationships are not limited
to those of conflict, security and war – what has been referred to as ‘high politics’, but also include
economic and diplomatic relations on areas of ‘low politics’. This definition focuses on the process of
relations and thus on the way by which policy is made, and not so much on the impact. However,
foreign policy is not merely about relations, diplomacy and negotiations – these are best characterised
as means. Foreign policy also concerns definition of interests, objectives and goals – ends - and then
about how to pursue them.21
Hence, the foreign policy of the EU can be summed up in the words of Hill as “…the sum of what the
EU and its member states do in international relations.”22 This definition, while viable, is however a little
vague. Instead a more stringent definition has been forwarded by Hazel Smith23 who states; “The foreign
policy of the EU is the capacity to make and implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and
polices of the EU.”24 This definition highlights that, which is also important in relation to the problem of
this thesis; the question of the practical application of policies, towards that which can be characterised
as foreign. It lacks but one element which is added in Karen Smith’s who adds the “… the activity of
developing and managing relationships with other international actors”25. This is an important addition because it
entails a view of the EU’s foreign policy as to include the day-to-day relations between the Union and
other international actors. These relations are in practice handled on the ‘fringes’ of the CFSP
framework because the continuous management of EU relations to third parties is most often handled
20
White, 1989, p.1
Peterson and Sjursen, p. 44
22
Hill, Christopher, 1998, p. 18
23
Smith, Hazel, 2002
24
Smith, Hazel, 2002, p. 8, 2002
25
Smith, Karen, 2003, p. 2
21
18
by the European Commission (and or Member States). This implies that foreign policy is not merely an
activity which occurs during times of intense crisis or conflict, and therefore that ‘EU foreign policy’ is
not confined to second pillar (CFSP) activities. This view is shared here. To enable a nuanced analysis
of the EU’s foreign policy it is insufficient to regard only those activities covered by the CFSP
framework. Analysis must also encompass the two other pillars in the institutional framework of the
Union, not to mention the activities of the member states. Confining the view to encompassing the
CFSP pillar is the main source of the bleak pictures often drawn of the Union’s foreign policy
capabilities. I believe it is a blatant mistake to judge the EU’s foreign policy on the CFSP alone, since
EU foreign policy by and large is a cross-pillar venture involving the whole panel of actors, institutions
and instruments. Therefore I advocate for the use of a definition of foreign policy, which extends
beyond the narrow scope of the CFSP and broadens the understanding of what a foreign policy action
is.
‘Capability’
Public and academic debate on the EU’s capabilities is often centred around military means, or to be
precise the inherent lack of a military. This debate is sometimes extended to a comparison of the
significant gap between defence spending in Europe and in the United States. Nevertheless, it is
essential to bear in mind that “a more capable Europe”26 extends beyond the ‘sexy’ topic of military and
defence capabilities. To argue this point, one need merely to look at some of the significant challenges
facing the EU today; can military means overcome the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
Can military forces fight poor governance in failed states? The answers are obvious to most.
To illustrate the elements comprising this thesis’ definition of foreign policy capability the below model has
been designed. Note however that the model is a crude framework, merely created with the purpose of
defining the elements of the EU’s capabilities; and to assist in structuring the later analysis. It does not
signify any deeper theoretical considerations as to the inner workings of the Union as a foreign policy
system, and should not be misconstrued as such. It is a simple tool, which by no mean is exclusive to
the EU and could just as well be applied to any other polity.
26
European Security Strategy, European Council, 2003
19
”Will”
Preferences
Priorities
EU’s capability of
conducting foreign policy
Resources
Capacity
”Ability”
‘Capability’ herein is a broad concept which denotes the internal context of EU action (or inaction) in
foreign policy. It is those aspects of the EU policy process which hinder or facilitate external foreign
policy action and thus determine the EU’s ability to take advantage of its presence and exploit arising
opportunities for asserting its influence. As such the capability of the EU includes the will of the Union
as a whole to conduct foreign policy. Importantly, this naturally includes the preferences and priorities
of the all-important foundation of the Union – the member states. Furthermore the capability of the
Union also comprises all the practical abilities to conduct foreign policy; e.g. the capacities of policy
formulation such as policy instruments, decision-making mechanisms, a legal base and actors; but also
the resources to implement policy (human, financial and material resources).
The extent to which the EU is capable of conducting foreign policy, and the outcome of any policy, is
then a function of the will and ability of the EU (incl. member states) and the interplay between these
elements.
The will to conduct foreign policy
This thesis will generally assume the existence of a will to conduct common foreign policy. This
assumption is based on the previous 15 years of continued integration in the field of foreign policy and
the mere existence of an institutional framework of a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’.
Furthermore the underlying assumption of the CFSP is that we can benefit from acting together. And
while preferences and priorities of the respective states may differ on specific issues, the EU operates
on the foundation of a common set of values and principles. These are set out in the Common
20
Provisions of the TEU27 to which the Union and its member states claim to be committed.28 Suffice to
say, there are times when the preferences and priorities of the member states diverge, thus severely
undermining attempts to common foreign policy. Instances of such will naturally be considered and
included when it seems overly relevant. However, the primary focus herein will be on the dimension,
referred to above as the ‘ability’ of the Union; those capacities and resources which allow for the
practical formation of EU’s foreign policy and implementation of external action.
The ability to conduct foreign policy
When the ‘EU’ conducts foreign policy it does so through the actions of both the Community and the
member states. The available foreign policy instruments are derived from these two sources, even
though it is the European Union which is developing and implementing foreign policy.29 As a
consequence the attainment of foreign policy objectives is sought through the formulation and
implementation of policies by a variety of actors using a variety of instruments. Depending on the
sphere and scope of foreign policy under consideration, the actors of EU foreign policy-making retain
various degrees of competence and responsibilities. Division of competence and responsibilities is
specified in the legal competence (legal-base) of the Union and more specifically in the articles of the
TEU pertaining to foreign policy; predominantly article V concerning the CFSP. The legal-base
furthermore determines the method of decision-making pertinent for the policy sphere, since it
specifies whether the potential foreign policy lies in the domain of either the first, second or third pillar
of the Union framework..
To unfold the elements of the EU’s foreign policy capabilities a run-through of the major actors,
instruments; the legal competence of the Union and its resources has been produced.
(Due to the lack of space, this section has been moved into the Annexes to the thesis and can be found under Annex 1)
27
TEU Title I Art. 6
Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 30
29
Since TEU.
28
21
5. Theorising Europe
To prevent another war
In light of two horrific world wars and a history of inter-European conflicts the earliest schools of
thought dealing with European integration, originates from the essential question on how to prevent
more war.
European federalists advocated their normative goal of designing and establishing a federation of
European states as the alternative to competing national states. Renowned federalist Altiero Spinelli30
claimed that these had “…lost their proper rights since they [could not] guarantee the political and economic safety
of their citizens“31. The political strategy of the federalist approach entailed the setting up of common
institutions as the outset for integration. A rival approach to federalism was (is) functionalism, which in
turn followed the formula of ‘form follows function’, whereby the economic and social needs of the
European people necessitates the formation of international political bodies. Classic functionalism was
in particular personified by David Mitrany, who explains cooperation of state actors by the necessity for
common solutions to comprehensive problems within international relations. “The problem of our time is
not how to keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together”.32 Both federalism and
functionalism as theoretical approaches succeed to a certain extent in explaining the origins of
cooperation between European states, however the limits of both were reached when it came to
explaining developments in continued integration.
Explaining continued integration
The preliminary work in the field of European Integration theory originates from within the field of
International Relations (IR) theory, particularly from American scholars such as Hass (1958/1968),
30
Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986) promoted the foundation of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (European Federalist
Movement) in August 1943. Arrested in 1927 by the fascist Italian regime, he spent ten years in prison and six in
confinement. During his confinement at Ventotene, he studied the texts of Anglo-Saxon federalists, which led him to
abandon communism and embrace federalism. Along with Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni, he drew up the
Ventotene Manifesto in 1941. Spinelli soon realised that the battle for the European federation required the creation of
anew type of political organisation, immune to national fetishes and the limitations of traditional ideologies. Often
referred to as one of the ‘godfathers of the EU’.
31
Spinelli, in Hodges, 1972
32
Mitrany, p. 28
22
Hoffmann (1966) and Lindberg (1970).33 For the first decades the discipline constituted a debate mainly
between the liberal (neo-functionalist) and the realist (intergovernmental) schools of thought.
In short34, the neo-functionalists saw a somewhat automatic and cumulative process whereby
integration was seen as gradually self-developing and self-sustaining phenomena. The basic argument is
that economic integration in one or more sectors creates the conditions and needs for further actions,
and in turn the need for integration in other sectors (spill-over35). Cooperation begets cooperation and
integration begets integration without a clearly defined end. Neo-functionalists foresaw a spill-over
from the economic sphere into the political areas and the potential creation of some kind of political
community.36 Key actors in neo-functionalism count well-known political leaders such as Walther
Hallstein, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, and the approach has been used most often to
understand how the EU has come to continually integrate since its ‘birth’ more than half a decade ago.
Political realism on the other end of the debate tends to consider inter-, extra- or supranational political
arrangements as nothing more than a forum for discussion among rational states forwarding selfinterest. Forwarded by especially Hans J. Morgenthau, the fundamental principle is that of
intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes the significant position still held by the states within the
Union, leaving little room for independent manoeuvre by the supranational entity in international
politics. 37 The intergovernmentalist’s, per definition, therefore also emphasized the importance of the
state in the integration process, arguing that since the process was owned by the member governments,
these controlled the speed and scope of developments. These clear cut realist arguments have come
under increasing scrutiny, being accused of failing to explain some of the developments in European
integration and not painting the full picture of the international environment.
A conceptual relative to realism, Andrew Moravcsik’s ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ (LI) is one of the
most influential contributions to date and is the figurehead of realist integration theory. It is a
framework that lays down a two step model of national preference formation and international
bargaining.38 It still carries the underlying perception of state primacy and therefore attributes the
progressive transfer of sovereignty to the EU as rational acts promoting national interests and adhering
33
Haas, Ernst, 1958, Hoffmann, Stanley, 1966, Lindberg, Leon, 1963,
It is not my intention to present a thorough discussion of all the schools of thought within European integration
theory, but merely to outline the basic arguments, in order to clearly illustrate the continuing debate.
35
The concept of spill-over was developed by Haas and applied by other scholars of the time, not least Lindberg in his
study of the Common Agricultural Policy, 1963.
36
Haas, 1958, p. 311
37
Morgenthau
38
Moravcsik, 1993,
34
23
to domestic pressures.39 For this, Moravcsik has been widely criticised for downplaying the significance
of other actors in the EU, not least the European Commission which plays a central part in policy
making at the EU-level. Marlene Wind is among those critics claiming that “[t]he member states are far from
in control of the process”40, and highlights the agenda setting powers and right of initiative bestowed to the
Commission.
Today, there are still two dominant strains of theories of European integration; neo-functionalism and
liberal intergovernmentalism. The alternate visions within these are: a supranational system of
governance versus an intergovernmental organisation. While, these provide us with two contrasting
normative ideals as to what the EU/EC system of governance ideally could look like, they cannot help
us to entirely understand how the present EU/EC works. The oversimplification of either the
supranational or the intergovernmental approaches are beside the mark, simply because the EU/EC
has always and will always consist of elements of both – Member state legitimacy and power combined
with common (shared) assets, interests and institutions.
Roy Ginsberg writes that;
“[T]heorists struggle with defining and categorizing European foreign policy behaviour. […] If one views European foreign policy
solely through the lenses of a neofunctionalist or realist intergovernmentalist, little will be learned. […] Given how
multidimensional European foreign policy is, it may never lend itself to a general theory.” 41
Off course, this should not halt attempts to develop theory and build frameworks, but doing so in the
knowledge that more comprehensive and encompassing approaches are needed. The existence of the
EU as an international entity has been established by scholars, who now move on to queries on the
effectiveness of EU as an international actor. In doing so more breaking free of the earlier debates
between liberal and realist approaches to produce more nuanced models of analysis.42
‘The nature of the Beast’
So what is the European Union? How are we to understand it in a foreign policy context? And how
does it fit into the international political system? What is its role? The following section attempts, as the
foundation for further study, to discuss the notions of state, presence and actor; to define the EU’s status
39
Moravcsik, 1993,
Wind, Marlene, 1996
41
Ginsberg, 1999
42
Ginsberg, pp. 430
40
24
in the international system; and finally present the yardstick(s) by which the foreign policy actions of
the Union – in my opinion - should be measured.
The much used term sui generis is merely a hollow label and does not adequately define the Union. Nor
is it helpful to rely on the catchphrase ‘more than an intergovernmental organisation, less than a state” which has
also been frequently used. Insofar, contributions to the discussion of the European Union originating
in integration theory have, I argue, had a tendency to either underestimate the role of national interests;
or downplay the significance of the common institutions at the intergovernmental and supranational
levels.43 The ‘boxed’ thinking in the liberal and realist schools of thought, I believe, has hampered the
prospect of appreciating the full picture. It is not my belief that the work is superfluous - quite the
contrary - however it is time to think outside the box. While doing so, one would obviously be foolish
not to profit from (and give credit to) the many achievements made in integration theory and related
disciplines.
Less than a state?
In a much contested field of work, it would be unthinkable to expect agreement on even fundamental
assumptions. However, there appears to be one matter – if not the only – where scholars have
seemingly reached broad consensus. No scholars seem to assume that the EU is a state.44
The international system of states, also referred to as the Westphalian45 order, and the concept of ‘state’
is an entire field of study in its own right and will not be scrutinised here. However, it is necessary to
touch briefly upon the basic understanding of states and the international system, if we are to conclude
anything concerning the EU’s position in it. Carporaso (2000) argues that the Westphalian order is
constructed and defined by four core properties; authority, territoriality, citizenship and sovereignty46.
43
For a similar perspective see Allen and Smith, 1990
The legal criteria for statehood are not obvious. Often, the laws are surpassed by political circumstances. However,
one of the documents often quoted on the matter is the Montevideo Convention from 1933, the first article of which
states: The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
In casual use the terms ‘country’, ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are more often than not used interchangeably as if they were
synonymous, however for a more strict (academic) use they need to b e distinguished. Country refers to a geographical
area confined by boundaries; nation designates a people, however national and international both confusingly refer as
well to matters pertaining to what are strictly states, as in national capital, international law. States refers to set of
governing institutions with sovereignty over a definite territory, most often a country.
45
The basic idea of the Westphalian system is that territorial states operate in an anarchical system as equals. States are
constitutionally independent (sovereign) and have exclusive authority to rule within its own borders. Limits are imposed
on interference with other states. The state is a legitimate party to international treaties. (Carporaso, 2000)
46
Carporaso, p. 8
44
25
Meanwhile Wendt believes that states have certain common properties; any state needs an institutional
and legal foundation, a monopoly on the use of violence, sovereignty, territory and society. 47 By tying
together these two views of the state and the international order, it is possible to draw up the
prerequisites for acting in the international system – until now a preserve of states – and discuss if and
how the EU could operate in such an environment. While common sense tells us, that the EU indeed
does operate, for the purpose of clarifying how and under which circumstances we need to look at
these criteria.
A sovereign state is by most definitions responsible for the conduct of totality of its external relations.
It is not required to have objectives for its foreign and security policy, let alone let these be known.48
Foreign policy is the key instrument in relations between states (inter-nation relations), and as such the
foundation for the operation of the international system. To reinforce the policy of the state are a wide
array of foreign policy instruments and resources to draw upon; the state is an international legal
personality, it can conclude treaties, join international membership organisations, deploy and grant
access to diplomatic and consular missions, defend interests with legislation, defend integrity,
sovereignty and territory with armies and weapons. It has financial means available by exploiting its
human and natural resources.49 These properties of the state constitute recognised legal foundations of
the state and, which in turn legitimises a state as an actor in the international system of states.
Some would argue that the EU has attained state-like attributes, in the sense that it has acquired for
itself the legal and policy-making attributes of a state across a wide range of policy sectors, and that it
already constitutes a polity and a system of governance.50 Nonetheless, the difference between being a
state and possessing state-like attributes – albeit a fine line - is a critical one, which affects the basic
external perception/assumptions of the EU in the international system. The EU is NOT a state
therefore cannot seek recognition as one. In this sense the EU is less than a state.
An international presence?
The expanding importance of the Union in international relations warrants the view that is – although
not a state – more than i.e. an international organisation.
47
Wendt, 1999, p. 202-213
Denza, 2002, p. 85
49
Denza, 2002
50
Jeremy Richardson in White, 1999, p. 48
48
26
Allen and Smith51 have attempted to portray Western Europe as a collective presence in the
international arena, using the concept to define and describe “…the EU as a changing multi-level entity that
affects the expectations and behaviour of participants through various networks of politics, and that is has its own forms
and effects of international behaviour.”52 This terminology makes it less complex to agree with the
significance of the Union in the world, while also evading the drawbacks of defining it as an actor – a
label only befit for states. This view must be seen in the light of the extensive discussions regarding
whether the EU is an intergovernmental organisation or a supranational one. By using the term
presence Allen and Smith provide an approach that steers away from the ‘either-nor’ positions
dominant at the time. Hence they attempt to include the ever growing credibility of the Union in
international relations, though not doing much in the way of defining the international activities of an
entity that is not a state. However, they do carefully point out that, although bearing few of the
credentials of a unified actor, the EU has considerable structure and legitimacy in international
relations. From there they ask questions of how the EU makes its presence felt, and how it can move
from presence to purpose. Similarly Hill voices that the concept of ‘presence’ “gets us of the hook” of
analysing and understanding the foreign policy of the EU in terms of supranationalism and sovereignty,
because such approaches inevitably lead to conclusions stating that there is no such thing, although
experience tells us differently.53 Jørgensen equally applauds the concept which provides for ‘critical and
nuanced analysis’ of the EU, while steering clear of the ‘state-centric approaches and traditional concepts of
power’.54
The mere existence of the EU and the current engagement in world affairs alone justifies describing the
EU as an international presence. The question then, is whether the concept is appropriate and telling
enough? Being present and visible in regional and international fora, does not necessarily qualify the
EU for being anything other than an observer. If this was the criteria, then the same could be said of
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Holy See and the International Seabed Authority, which like
the EU, hold the equal status of permanent observers at the United Nations General Assembly. 55
Exerting influence externally, and shaping perceptions and behaviour of others, while an achievement
in itself, does not denote any purposive external action. It is a question of being rather than a question
of acting.56 Again, common sense and empirical facts tell us that the EU carries more weight and
therefore treating the EU merely as an international ‘presence’ does not suffice. Some – myself included
51
Allen & Smith, 1990
Allen and Smith, p. 20-21
53
Hill, 1993, 309
54
Jørgensen quoted in Ginsberg, 1999, p. 448
55
www.un.org
56
Bretherton and Vogler, p. 27
52
27
- would argue that the concept does not encapsulate the significance of the EU in relations to third
actors and that instead ‘presence’ should be viewed as merely a precondition for ‘actorness’. Along
these lines Bretherton and Vogler suggest two sets of interconnected factors which reflect ‘presence’
and which are related to actorness. Firstly, the character and identity of the Union referring to the
material existence the political system, including common institutions and the member states; and the
shared understandings of what the EU is and does. Secondly presence refers to the internal EU actions
which have unintended or unanticipated consequences for third parties – consequences that in turn
generates a requirement for countermeasures on the part of the Union.57 While these factors may
encourage external expectations, demands and responses from the international system, no substantial
externally directed and purposive action lie within. This underscores the view that presence is merely a
prerequisite for international action.
An international actor and the question of ‘actorness’
Actor by virtue of legal competence
In international public law the concept of actorness is clearly defined, as is always the case in legal
matters, in the notion of possessing ‘legal personality’. For centuries, since the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648, legal personality was exclusively reserved for the states in the international system. Only states
could sign treaties, join international organisations and commit to agreements with other states. Legal
personification is a bestowed right to participate in the international system, but appended to this right
is obligation to adhere to agreements and particularly to be held responsible (accountable) by others.58
It is in this responsibility that international organisations, such as the EU, have found a passage to
international legal status. In 1948 the International Court of Justice established, in the context of a
claim for damages, that the United Nations had international legal status, albeit not equivalent of states.
This was the first instance of such an opinion.59
Today, there is general acknowledgement, that international organisations possess the status of
international personalities under international law, insofar that their legal bases (founding treaties) do
not contradict this. Thus, it is the contracting parties to treaties who delegate competence and legal
personality to IO’s. The three treaties of the European Communities constitute the basis for the legal
personality of the European Community, however no legal provisions exists in the case of the
framework that forms the legal structure of the three communities - the European Union proper.60 The
57
Betherton and Vogler, p. 27 - 29
The history of the European Union, www.historiasiglo20.org
59
In 1948 the UN presented a claim to the ICJ for damages in relation to the assassination of its mediator in Palestine. It
was in this context that the ICJ recognised the legal status of the UN.
60
Tomuschat, 2002
58
28
lingering draft constitution, that failed to be ratified, would have ensured such status, but for now at
least this is not the case.61 The TEU as it stands does though allow for the Council to conclude treaties
on behalf of the member states within certain procedural guidelines, namely the treaty’s article 24.
Furthermore since the actions of the Union in foreign policy can incur obligations, hence also
responsibilities, the Union must enjoy legal personification62. Examples of such instances where the
Union must be regarded with such a status, is the many proclamations / statements on matters outside
of Europe made by the Council or the Presidency. These may evoke events that would entail a claim
for responsibilities, whether the resulting events were intended or not. Although the Union as a whole
does not (yet) enjoy treaty based and delegated competence by member states it would be
underestimating the Union to deny that it is to a certain degree a legal actor in international relations.
Actorness as a polity
Within the discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) scholars have had difficulties coming to terms
with the EU, and there has been extensive discussion about the EU as an external actor.63 The core
problem facing FPA is the realist assumption of state-centricity and the definition of ‘foreign policy’,
according to which the EU does not even qualify as an actor in foreign policy terms, quite simply
because is not a state.64
In 1977 Sjöstedt65 introduced the concept of EU as an external actor, adding considerations regarding
the qualities and prerequisites of international ‘actorness’. Since then the concept has been revisited by
not least Hill66 (1993); Carporaso and Jupille67 (1998); Bretherton and Vogler (1999 & 2002) and
integrated into Ginsberg’s (1999) influential analytical framework of EFP decision making68. The idea
behind the concept is to overcome the ‘problem’ of state-centricity so prevalent in international
relations research, and to further analysis in to the external role of the EC/EU.
Sjøstedt (1977) advocated that the basic prerequisites for being an external actor are autonomy and
actor-capability. Autonomy has two dimensions of equal importance; the actor has to be distinctly
61
Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article 7.
For detailed analysis of the EU as legal persona see Tomuschat, 2002, 177-193
63
White, 1999, White illustrates the problems facing FPA to cope with Europe, and succeeds in producing a revised
FPA framework that has much strength.
64
White, 1999, p. 43
65
Sjøstedt, Gunnar, 1977
66
Hill, 1993
67
Caporaso and Jupille, 1998
68
Ginsberg, 1999
62
29
discernible from its external environment and has to have a certain degree of internal cohesion. In
regards to actor-capability Sjøstedt looks at the institutional and structural aspects of an actor as
indicators of actorness. Firstly, there is a need for common interests, objectives and resources
(including a system for the mobilisation of these) by. Secondly, the actor must have structures of
decision-making and monitoring, so as to enable the preparation and control of external activities.
Finally, Sjøstedt looks to the means of implementing foreign policy, which include diplomacy, trade,
finance, cooperation, sanctions and even military capacity. 69 His study concludes that the EC (in 1977)
enjoyed an extent of autonomy sufficient for it to be regarded as an international actor.
Surely inspired by Sjøstedt, Hill (1993) is very much in tune with this view, claiming also that true
actorness rests on certain prerequisites. He emphasises autonomy and a clear identity; being delimited
from other actors in the environment; a self-contained decision-making system that can produce
independent legislation and decisions; and to possess structural prerequisites for effective policies and
actions. On the latter he mentions legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents, practical capabilities and
the capability of conducting negotiations with third parties.70
Carporaso and Jupille propose four criteria on which to evaluate the capacity of EU as an actor in
international affairs.71 They distinguish themselves from Sjøstedt by focusing more on the context in
which the EU operates, emphasizing the significance of other actors instead of policy instruments.
They argue that actor capacity consist of four components; 1) the recognition as an actor, understood as
the acceptance by and interaction with other actors in the external environment; 2) authority, understood
as the defined legal competence to act derived from the member states; 3) autonomy from other actors
based on a distinct institutional distinctiveness and independence; and finally 4) a minimum level of
cohesion as the critical component. They argue that having a minimal degree of cohesion is the foremost
criteria for actorness and the one that differentiates an actor from merely a presence. 72
Finally, Bretherton and Vogler (1999) forwarded five basic requirements for actorness:
~ shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles,
~ the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies,
~ the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system,
~ the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments,
69
Sjøstedt, 1977, p. 15 - 25
Hill, C. (1993), p. 309, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 31(3), 305-328. & Hill, 1996, The Actors in Europe’s foreign policy, Routledge, p. 1-19
71
Carpraso and Jupille, 1998, focus on the EU as an international environmental actor and present a study of the Rio
Earth Summit. However their criteria are generally applicable to the EU as an international actor.
72
Carporaso and Jupille, 1998, p. 213-218 & summarized in Ginsberg , 1999, p. 447
70
30
~ domestic legitimation of decision process and priorities, relating to external policy.73
To synthesise from these similar approaches the sum of actorness can be divided into three sub-groups
of identified requirements for the EU/EC’s actorness; the structural, behavioural and institutional
requirements.
Recognition as an actor, domestic legitimacy of the EU level, authority and autonomy all fall under the
category of the structural criteria, which refers to the criteria for acting in the international system of
states in a structure-agent perspective. The behavioural requirements are found in internal cohesion,
shared interest, purpose and objectives, and making coherent decisions followed by purposive action.
These are tied to the willingness of the EU and member states for collective action. Last but not least
the institutional requirements which cover the practical capabilities, legal basis, decision-making
structures and the instruments of foreign policy.
These criteria, qualities and prerequisites which determine “actorness” are all ones which are attributed
to the notion of state or those which can be imported from the language of ‘state’, and so it is
questionable whether the problem of state centricity has been overcome. Since the difficulties of
coming to terms with the EU have led to the concept of ‘actorness’, scholars have had to reach back to
the states for guiding principles of this concept. Maybe perceiving the EU through the concept of
actorness is premature in light of the failure to ratify the draft constitution74, which could have
facilitated a more cohesive and independent EU in foreign policy. For now at least, there does not seem
to be many literary contributions, which have succeeded in describing the ‘actor-like’ qualities and
analysing the ‘actorness’ of the EU, without the use of state-centric language.75 Even though, it is worth
arguing that since the EU’s qualities and capacities are those of the state, maybe it is in our best
analytical interest to accept that European foreign policy is built on the premise of the prerequisites of
the member states and that the EU is a foreign policy actor in its own right, although far from
independent of member states (au contraire). This may seem a deceptively simple point to make, but an
important one nonetheless. For, if we are indeed to think outside the box it is useless to preoccupy
ourselves with walking in circles and start moving forward.
In the following I shall present my view of how the EU in a foreign policy context is best considered. It
is a central element of my justification that allows for viewing the achievements and the abilities of the
73
Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (1999) The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge.) p. 37-38
In the future, and in the case of the adoption of a constitution, it may become a central focus.
75
White, 1999, p. 48
74
31
EU in a more nuanced way – especially in comparison with the more state-centric contributions. It will
allow for emphasis to be put, not only on the external dynamics of EU foreign policy and considers the
EU as a foreign policy system.
32
6. The EU; A Foreign Policy System (FPS)
In 1993 (simultaneous with the creation of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty) Hill characterises
European foreign policy as a system of external relations; an enterprise through which national actors
conduct foreign policy both commonly and separately.76 Unfortunately, he later notes, the creation of
the CFSP seemed to lift he expectations for EU action too high for the actual capabilities of the Union
to cope with.77 However as time has passed this systemic view of EU actorness deserves increased
attention and credit as amending treaties of the Union (Amsterdam, Nice) have added to the aqcuis
communitaire and acquis politique within foreign policy and provided for further institutions, instruments
and resources.
Knodt & Princen (2003) test the comparability of the EU with both attributes of the states and that of
international organisations. They make the point that the traditional states have a higher degree of
centralisation; possess a hierarchy between domestic political actors leading to stronger integration of
policies, which subsequently enables formulating and carrying out foreign policy. In contrast
international organisations are highly decentralised and rely ultimately on the delegation of power and
competence from their members, leaving a limited degree of autonomy. This leads them to an
understanding that the EU lies in between, by which they refer to the“… elusive character of the EU”. 78
It is important to keep in mind that the member states still retain vast autonomy when acting
internationally, and the EU structure comprises three different frameworks (‘pillars’), with different
decision-making rules and procedures for dealing with the world. While EU member states still retain
primacy in international relations, the strong institutional framework of the EC/EU and the
development of EU level actors put constrains on this primacy. The EU policies may be less coherent
than those of a state and speaking with one voice is not always a simple task, but the external
dimension of the Union encompasses a wide range of sectors on which the EC/EU holds the exclusive
competence. Thus, gaining a degree of autonomy not enjoyed by any other international organisation.
Furthermore, and importantly, the distinction between the member state and the whole entity is very
fine, meaning that the member states have the ‘luxury’ of choosing the most effective method of
forwarding interest; through the Union or by independent policies.79
76
Hill, 1993
Hill, 1993, 1998 & Ginsberg 1999
78
Knodt and Princen, 2003, p. 203
79
Knodt and Princen, 2003, p. 203-204
77
33
“European governance possesses some distinctive characteristics. It is a polycentric system, which is split into
multiple, overlapping arenas that are characterised by loose coupling. Moreover, the organising principle of
political relations is consensual, relying heavily on interaction and communication between its entities.”80
Because the EU contains attributes of both the international organisation and the state, it has the ability
to play to the strengths of both sets of entities. This opens for a systemic view of the EU as a foreign
policy actor, which departs from state-centric and/or IR focused analyses.
In the following I shall argue, that the European Union can be characterised as a ”Foreign Policy System”
which reaps the rewards of both the common institutions and the comparative advantages of the nation
states. This is done with the goal of producing better and more specific (more encompassing) answers
to questions regarding the extent to which the EU is capable of conducting foreign policy. It views the
EU as mixed actor system that utilises the unitary approach when possible (and where accepted by
‘outside third parties’) and a fragmented approach when this is not possible. I have a presumption, that
using such a perspective it is possible to understand and illustrate the EU’s foreign policy in a more
nuanced way incorporating the three interrelated types of activity; Community foreign policy (the foreign
policy of the European Community, the ‘first pillar’ of the EU, covering primarily trade and
development policy); Union foreign policy (encompassing the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
CFSP, the ‘second pillar’); and the separate foreign policies of the member states – national foreign
policy.81
Distinction between the system and the interacting units
“The EU is an international system consisting of member states and common institutions; created and
regulated by a legally founded institutional framework; tied together by the common ideas and strategic
objectives of its contracting parties. It’s as simple as that…..or is it? ” 82
Essential to understanding the EU as a foreign policy system is being able to distinguish between the
propositions of an actor and a system. A brief glance at the composition and governance structure of
both should suffice to create this necessary basic understanding.
80
Knodt and Prince, 2003, p. 204
White, 1999, p. 37 – 41 & Tonra, 2004, 54-55
82
Lecture at Columbia University by Fernando M. Valenzuela, European Commission Ambassador to the United
Nations on the ‘European Union in World Politics’
81
34
The ‘system’ is comprised of a set of distinct yet interrelated units (actors). The underlying premise of
‘foreign policy’ is the existence of something separating the states – i.e. borders and sovereignty – but
also incentives to cooperate. When the actions of one actor influences or are influenced by the other,
such incentives are present.83 So the units are independent of each other, but in a system create a
structured framework for interaction. Hill and Wallace define it as “…an intensive system of external
relations, in which the cooperating actors which constitute the system intertwine”84 Thus, the most notable
distinction lays in the fact that actors – the member states - are the key elements of the system itself;
stating the obvious: that without actors, no system.
To distinguish between conventional foreign policy actors (at least in the state-centric approaches) and a
foreign policy system it is valuable to examine the structure of governance on which it operates.85
Bearing in mind, that the EU consists of 25 (27) single foreign policy actors it is not difficult to
envisage the structural difference between a foreign policy actor and the foreign policy system.
The policy-making and decision making of a state-actor, is by far and large channelled through one
central foci of power – the national government.86 This ultimately results in decision- and policymaking which is coherent, and an actor representing singular positions in international relations. At the
national level the actors of the system act according to own interest and goals, which they will
ultimately bring to the European level. Here the rational state will attempt to promote and defend these
interest and goals.87
Foreign policy in a system consists of multiple, decentralized policy-making centres at various levels.
The functioning of the system is dependant on – and guided by – the actions of the individual actors in
trying to further own interests. In the system there are myriads of inter-relation between any and all
actors within the system. Here, I stipulate that the EU is a system where foreign policy-making is to be
found along two formal axes; the vertical (national vs. European levels) and the horizontal (among
member states and among the European institutions)88. This multi-level and multi-pillar character
83
Tezcan,
Hill and Wallace, p. 13 in Hill, 1999
85
In the following, the EU shall be presented as something other than an actor: a foreign policy system. For this purpose
it is essential to distinguish between traditional foreign policy actor and the EU as an actor. This may seem peculiar in
lieu of the attempts on previous pages to define the EU as just that; an actor. However it is a necessity in order to
demonstrate how the EU functions as an actor, by being a foreign policy system.
86
This is of course a crude generalisation, and maybe even an overstatement if asking a student of multi-level
governance.
87
For more on this view see Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism.
88
Knodt Princen p. 203
84
35
involves the actors at different levels and in different arenas, leaving the state actors to operate at
several levels simultaneously.
The fact that the policymaking attributes of the system differ from that of the actors also has
implications for the foreign policy behaviour and on the policy output. 89 According to Soetendorp the
interactions among the actors in the system create an output, which “…is more than the sum of the foreign
policy of the member states.” Moreover, in the process the common institutions at the European level
facilitate European foreign policy by minimising the complexity present when 25 member states
constitute 300 separate bilateral relations.90 Soetendorp believes that while the creation of a European
level entity does not shape the behaviour and interests of the member states, it has to some extent
constrained the substance and process of these individual states, through the pooling and delegation of
competence to the common institutions.91 This claim can be elaborated by applying a perspective of
Europeanisation.
Europeanisation
Academically, the study of Europeanisation is a field that has been shown increasing interest by many
scholars92, predominantly though focusing on policy sectors regulated by hard law i.e. community
policies. However the concept of Europeanisation is just as valid when examining foreign policy
because it focuses on change to policies both internally in the system and externally facilitated by the
system. The concept is not easily defined since it represents an ‘umbrella-term’ for various
interpretations of related phenomena of change in the European context. Olsen has scoured the field
and produced an overview of conceptualisations of Europeanization in contemporary literature and
lists the following; Europeanisation as93:
1) changes in external territorial boundaries
2) the development of institutions of governance at the European level
3) central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance
4) exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe
beyond the European territory
5) political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.
Europeanisation as changes in external boundaries refers to the process whereby the European (EU)
system of governance is extended to new geographical territories. Through i.e. enlargement the enclosed
89
Ginsberg model
Every member state has bilateral relations with all the other 24 member states, and every relation is only counted
once. (25 x 24) / 2 = 300
91
Sotendorp in Tezcan, p. 3
92
Examples of studies include those by Robert Ladrech, 1994; Michael E. Smith, 1996; Thomas Risse, Maria Green
Cowles and James Caporaso, 2001; Johan P. Olsen; Claudio M. Radaelli, 2003.
93
Olsen, 2002
90
36
single political space (Union) is extended as new members take on the acquis communautaire and conform
to the political practices of the consisting union.
Europeanization through the development of institutions at the European level denotes the building of
central capacities for collective action to provide some degree of political coordination and coherence.
Furthermore is focuses on the building of common norms and a culture of consultation in foreign policy
matters.
Europeanisation as the penetration into the national arena implies adapting national and sub-national
systems of governance to a European political center and European-wide norms. Adaptive pressures and
opportunities are conducive to changes in national foreign policy.
Europeanization in terms of exporting forms of political organization and systems of governance concerns
relations with non-European actors and institutions; and that way in which the EU finds a place in a larger
world. Thus this view of Europeanisation refers to the export of EU ideas, norms and practices, similar to
the view of the EU as a normative power94.
Finally, Europeanisation as a political project, whereby the goal is to create a stronger and more unified
Europe. This fifth dimension relates closely to the other four perspectives of Europeanisation, since the
degree to which Europe is becoming a more important political entity is related both to territorial space,
center building, domestic adaptation, and how European developments impact and are impacted by
systems of governance and events outside the European continent.95
A foreign policy system of three dimensions96
Since it has already been rejected that the collective structure known as the European Union is a unified
political system a la the traditional state (with for example a EU foreign ministry), the EU will be
viewed here as multifaceted by using the terms internal foreign policy (integration, accession, cooperation,
harmonisation, ‘Europeanization’ etc.), external foreign policy (towards third countries/regions, global
problems etc.) and centripetal foreign policy (neighbourhood stabilisation, inclusion, Europeanization of
geographical/political periphery). As such the foreign policy of the Union will obtain a more holistic
94
The EU as a normative power will e dealt with later.
A complication, however, is that there is not necessarily a positive correlation between the four types of Europeanization
mentioned above, and between each of them and a politically stronger Europe. (Olsen, 2002)
96
The concept of the three dimensions of foreign policy is inspired by Kaufholz, 2004. However the content as a whole
does not follow Kaufholz, as this as deemed by author to contain many vague and unsubstantiated points.
95
37
appearance and will not merely include “foreign policy” in the traditional sense (i.e. nation state foreign
policy).97
The foreign policy system
Internal
Centripetal
External
Fragmented / Unified
Internal Dimension
Firstly, the FPS contains an internal foreign policy dimension since the member states still retain state
sovereignty, thus also foreign policy autonomy in terms of acting internationally. The internal
dimension has been dealt with to great extent by European integration theory examining the reasons
and processes of cooperation of independent states. The member states have – by virtue of respective
independent foreign policies - agreed to cooperate on foreign policy and in some case transferred
exclusive competences to the European institutions.
But while certain competences have been transferred to the common institutions and the European
level, states retain the ability to relate to one another as independent actors. Thus, within the foreign
policy system lays a system of international actors with distinct attributes, preferences and priorities. A
97
Although the main point of focus here is the EU foreign policy towards the outside world, I believe that this method
also allows for policy areas, not traditionally referred to in terms of foreign policy, to be understood in a foreign policy
context (economic policies, labour market policies, agricultural policies etc.).
38
simple piece of evidence to support this is the continued existence of assignment of diplomatic
delegations (embassies, consulates, chambers of commerce etc.) in relations to each other. These
bilateral-/multilateral relations within the FPS are equal in status to relations with third
countries/regions.
However with the progression of European integration and interdependence the relation between
states has evolved. Member states no longer present threats each other in terms of security as was the
case fifty years ago. To use security terminology, the intra-EU relations have been demilitarised leaving
no incentives to uphold separate hard security measures98 vis-à-vis other member states. The mere
contemplation of military action towards fellow member states would be absurd, since the damaging
effect of such actions would be just as detrimental to one self. The internal foreign policy dimension
has eliminated the risks of international confrontation within the EU which could otherwise be the
case. Having arrived at such a state of affairs bears witness of the strides taken in integrating and
unifying Europe, and reflects positively on what has been achieved since Europe was at war half a
century ago.
It is well established that in the early post-war period the ‘domestic function’ of European integration
was to eliminate the possibility of further European wars and to preserve peace and stability. 99
Moreover, the foreign policy of the Union can constitute a shock- absorbing effect, ensuring that
conflicts and crises occurring outside of Union are prevented from internal manifestation, causing
internal problems.100 Those, taking for granted that the EU’s foreign policy exist only to face external
challenges do not see this side of the story.
Focusing on identity and legitimacy, Feldman (1998) claims that, the creation of peace and the
sustained efforts of reconciliation, facilitates the external relations of the union. She sees these efforts
as key internal dynamics of the Union that drive integration. So while the Union’s foreign policy cannot
equal the coherence of national foreign policies, it nonetheless “… represents a common effort grounded in the
shared experiences of post-war reconciliation.”101 This is what makes external relations possible. Moreover
reconciliation and shared experiences also provides for the distinct content and focus of the Union. On
the one hand a focus on peace and development, and on the other hand the incentive to obtain this
98
By hard security measures I mean the traditional military and security measures.
See Schuman declaration and other early declarations.
100
Jørgensen, p. 5
101
Feldman, p. 67
99
39
through international cooperative structures (multilateralism).102 With this view one can see the bridge
between the internal and external aspects of the foreign policy system.
It is not only in a security sense that the lines of separation have eroded. Even more so in the economic
sphere where the EU operates under the auspices of the single market, intertwining and harmonising
the economies of the individual states, to such an extent that the economic borders are all but gone. 103
Hence traditional aspects of intra-European foreign policy have eroded with the creation of common
supranational institutions, deep economic integration, and the complete demilitarisation of intraEuropean relations, resulting in blurred lines of foreign and domestic policies.104
A splendid indicator of the integration on foreign policy (and integration in general) is the extent of
existing aqcuis communautaire and acquis politique in the foreign policy context. The body of the acquis with
its rights and obligation renders the member states tied to a repertoire of fixed policy positions. It holds
the lowest denominator for common foreign policy action and represents the platform for further
cooperation, and just as important; the aqcuis is a decisive criterion for integration of new member
states.105 Here lays the substance of the results of the internal dimension, which simultaneously
represent the foundation (and legal base) of EU external action.
It is worthwhile to note, that contrary to common discourse, there are those which believe the role of
states in the European Union has increased over the course of the organization’s institutional
development. According to a Janning (2005), the expansion of intergovernmental activities in key policy
areas; the growth in membership to 25 (27); the subsequent diversity and weakening of the
supranational elements have facilitated the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral networks within
the Union. As a consequence both centripetal and centrifugal dynamics are the order of the day. While
member states are drawn together in continued integration, they are also driven towards building
tactical associations among themselves. 106
So, the member states retain a high degree of foreign policy autonomy even though extensive
integration has taken place, resulting in blurred lines of separation. For as long as autonomy is still the
case the EU is likely to remain a FPS with an internal foreign policy dimension. This is ultimately the
102
Feldman, p. 67
The creation of the Internal Market and not least the final stages of the Euro cooperation has eradicated many of the
former boundaries. (i.e. the free movement of capital, removing tariffs and regulatory barriers)
104
Kaufholz, p.3
105
Ginsberg, p. 436 - 437
106
Janning, 2005 p. 821-832
103
40
foundation of any externally directed EU action and I believe the internal dimension is only
strengthened by integration in areas of common interests. Whether future attempts to secure a
constitutional treaty would entail ‘full integration’ and the creation of a federation is difficult to predict
at this time (although common sense predicts it unlikely). Indeed the failure to ratify the constitutional
treaty has cast fog on where the EU is going, not least in terms of foreign policy.
At the core of the internal foreign policy dimension lays the concept of Europeanisation. When
discussing Europeanisation in the context of the EU’s capability to conduct foreign policy, it is
interesting to determine how and to which extent the development of European (EU) foreign policy
entails the adaptation and changes in national foreign policies.
Rieker argues that national approaches have a tendency to adapt to the norms defined by an
international community or institution, with which they have the closest ties; that it is an adaptation
taken over time, through a process of socialisation; and that it may ultimately entail changes in national
identity. This is a stance, which contradicts the basic assumptions prevalent in international relations
theory, that national interests and identities are distinct and independent of any structural factors such
as international norms and values.107
The development of the EPC108 and subsequently the CFSP has had an impact on national foreign
policies of the EU Member States. It has influenced on the process of formulation and the substance of
national foreign policies of the Member States, a tendency that has been duly noted in much recent
academic literature. Awareness and consideration of the positions and interests of other Member States
is, according to Tonra, one of the main indications of this change.109 Along these lines Sjursen claims
that it is increasingly being accepted by EU members “… that individual interests must be curbed and
occasionally give way to common positions “. As such a norm of consultation has developed.110
With persisting international efforts in the foreign policy domain, the Europeanisation of the national
foreign policies is a constant ongoing process. Change at the national level originates in the adaptation
pressures and the new opportunities generated by the continued process of European integration. This
underscores the importance of the internal foreign policy, and most importantly (when talking foreign
policy) its connection with the external foreign policy of the Union.111 The important point however is
that this tendency towards Brusselsisation suggests that centripetal forces within the EU are quite
107
Rieker, 2006
European Political Cooperation
109
Tonra, 2001, p. 3,
110
Sjursen, p. 8
111
Vaquer I Fanes, p. 3-4
108
41
strong and that the foreign policies of member states undergo important changes as a result of
membership in the EU and participation in the CFSP.
Centripetal Dimension
The EU as a FPS possesses a centripetal foreign policy dimension that defines its relations with its
periphery. Centripetality is a notion found in the natural sciences and represents a dynamic tendency to
move towards a centre. Imagine a ‘ball and chain’ being swung from a centre. The movement by the
ball in a circular motion at the end of the chain creates a magnetic pull along the chain towards the
centre. The force necessary to swing the ball originates from the energy created at the centre. Hence
the term centripetal, stemming from the latin words words centrum ("center") and petere ("tend towards").
Illustration of centripetality
The idea behind this concept is that the energy created at the core creates an inward pull. The energy of
inward pull is found along the line of the ‘chain’. Thus, if we consider the EU to be the interior of circle
in the illustration; the actual circle is the periphery of the Union and thus the centripetal force affects
both a) EU members on the inside and b) the peripheral states.
Starting with the effects of centripetal force within the union, Allen has referred to a process of
‘Brusselisation’ of European foreign policy. While acknowledging that foreign and security remains
formally in the realm of control of the states the foreign ministries of the Member States are having
increasing difficulties in controlling the foreign policy process. Though sovereignty has not been
substantially transferred to Brussels (the Commission) national foreign policy representatives
increasingly formulate foreign policy in Brussels, and through consultations with counterparts also in
42
Brussels.112 This suggests that centripetal forces within the EU are evident and that the foreign policies
of member states undergo important changes as a result of membership in the EU and participation in
the CFSP.113 The process of formulating and conducting national foreign policy has become Brusselised
– or Europeanised.
Understanding ‘centripetality’ in terms of EU external relation, the effects of EU activities of the EU
along its periphery, will promote a movement by non-member states towards the Union. This is when
the action of the EU/EC and its member states influence surrounding states in such a manner that it
compels these states to seek towards cooperation and interaction with the Union. Deepening
integration, the exclusiveness of the ‘club’, economic interdependence, externalisation of EU policy etc.
are all factors worth considering as the cause of the centripetality. Some would argue simply, that the
key source of the pull stems from the peace, political stability and economic prosperity which
characterises the general perception of the EU in world. Not least the internal market of trade and
finance seems to draw others in.114
Centripetal foreign policy, then, is among other things Europeanisation by virtue of exporting ‘models’ for
policy approaches and ultimately by expanding the external territorial boundaries of the Union – through
enlargement. The former refers to the way in which the EU way of doing things becomes a model for
outsiders who desire to join the ‘exclusive club’ that the Union represents. Thus the Union exports its
forms of political organization and systems of governance. Furthermore centripetal foreign policy is
Europeanisation through the extension the territorial reach of the EU system of governance and the
degree to which Europe as a continent becomes a single political space.115 Thus non EU member from
instable regions of Europe (e.g. the Balkans) and those from the immediate neighbourhood of the EU
feel the presence of EU very directly. Strategic instruments are being utilise to deal with fundamental
issues of conflicts, stabilisation, encouraging and supporting steps towards reform of these areas.
It can be argued that the EU’s most effective foreign policy instrument is the attractive goal of
membership: enlargement. In this view the dominant engines of the EU’s centripetal foreign policy are
thus enlargements and the recently created neighbourhood policy116. Association agreements and the
112
Allen, 1998, p. 41 - 58
Sjursen, p. 7
114
Rosencrance, 1997, p. 4
115
Olsen, 2002
116
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); the EU offers neighbouring countries a privileged relationship in exchange
for commitments to political, economic, trade, or human rights reform. In return, the country may be offered tariff-free
access to some or all EU markets (industrial goods, agricultural products, etc), and financial or technical assistance. For
example the Union may offer financial assistance to countries, as long as they meet strict conditions of government
113
43
carrot of accession are methods by which it is possible for the EU to assert influence on third parties.
The prospect of joining the Union motivates regional neighbours to conform and to eventually meet
accession requirements. As such accession has been the engine “…for economic and political reforms in the
countries that joined the EU”117. Liberalisation of economies, changing policies, reforming public
administration and improving relations with neighbours are all measures taken by acceding countries. 118
A very specific example of such is the notion of good governance, by which the lure of EU
membership has provided a major incentive for countries in Central and Eastern Europe to address
corruption in the public domain.119
One of the major dynamics behind enlargement is the special relationships between respective EU
states and (potential) accession states, most often their neighbours. To exemplify; Denmark (and
Finland’s) good relationship with the Baltic states, Germany’s historical connection with Poland,
Austria’s association with Hungary, and Greece’s history on the Balkans. Such bilateral relationships
can be conducive to enlargement processes and bringing neighbours and partners closer to the Union –
politically and geographically. Utilising member states comparative advantages will also be dealt with in
the section on the external dimension of FPS.
With every enlargement the relationship between the EU and the outside environment is altered, as the
Union changes size, geography, composition and scope.120 New members adjust to, but also facilitate
amendments to the aqcuis communautaire and politique and thus contribute in setting new directions for the
EU, including in foreign policy. Through enlargement the Union moves ever closer to the rest of the
world, both in geography but also through new relationships. To exemplify, the enlargement that
included the Baltic States brought the Union geographically closer (and into) to the former Sovjet bloc,
but also closer in terms of cultural and historical understanding.
Ultimately there are geographical and political boundaries of centripetal foreign policy, by way of
enlargement. Where accession is not presently (or potentially) feasible the EU works in the periphery
through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The policy aims at confronting and avoiding
lines of division between the Union and its neighbours in the regions towards the east and south
reform, economic reform and other issues surrounding positive transformation. This process is normally underpinned by
an Action Plan, as agreed by both Brussels and the target country. The European Neighbourhood Policy does not cover
acceding countries, EFTA states or those covered by the Stabilisation and Association process (Sap).
117
Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Brussels European Council on 14-15 December 2006
118
Enlargement puts EU credibility on the line, by Heather Grabbe, 11 October 2002
119
World Bank, 2000
120
Ginsberg, p. 446
44
east.121 These neighbours are invited and encouraged to engage in deeper economic and political,
cultural and security cooperation - strengthening mutual stability and security. The newest aspect of the
ENP is moving beyond mere cooperation to include economic integration.122
Cooperation with, and integration of, neighbours are again subject to the normative demands
forwarded by the Union and make possible economic, legal and constitutional reform. Some argue that
the EU’s capabilities as a foreign policy actor, and it being taken seriously, will depend on its ability to
bring stability and democracy to its immediate periphery.123
In sum the EU as a FPS has the normative power of ensuing reform and progress, but also holds
enormous influence over the fates of nations, by virtue of exclusively making the decision on who joins
and under which conditions.124 Rosencrance observes the EU as a centripetal centre using a ‘balance of
power’ perspective, noting that traditionally any growing locus of uniting power finds opposition
directed towards it. In the case of the EU though, the opposite is the case; peripheral countries have been
centripetally attracted to the European centre, not driven away from it […] [drawing] nations into its web of economic
and political associations.125
As it was emphasised in the case of the internal foreign policy dimension, the expansion of the Unions
activities (incl. enlargement) can be seen as an effort to extend the legacy of post-war reconciliation
eastward to encompass the countries of the former Sovjet bloc.126 Thus promoting the legitimacy of the
EU in the eyes of the former “enemies” and overcoming the antagonistic relation of distrust evident
during the cold war.
External Dimension
The third and final dimension of EU foreign policy is the external dimension, which constitutes the
activities of the Union in relation to the international system and the actors within it. While the
previously described internal and centripetal dimensions of foreign policy are distinct features of the
foreign policy system, the external dimension is that which is often referred to when discussing the EU.
121
Current participation by Algeria, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Armenia, Jordan, Syria, Azerbaijan, Lebanon,
Tunisia,
Belarus, Libya, Ukraine, Egypt, Moldova, Georgia and Morocco
122
European Neighbourhood Policy - http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm
123
See Ralchev, 2004 & Vachudová, 2003
124
Ginsberg, 1997
125
Rosencrance, 1997, p. 2
126
Feldman, p. 67-68
45
It is the aspect of foreign policy that comes closest to the traditional foreign policy of the Westphalian
state and thus the yardstick by which the EU is conventionally measured. Since it constitutes the classic
definition of ‘foreign policy’ associated with nation state it is far from astonishing that the general
approach is to compare it hereto. The Union’s attempts to add strength to its foreign policy – not least
the creation and development of the CFSP - has only reinforced the perception of the Union as a
unitary actor, and in turn raised demands and exterior expectations. However, as earlier noted, this has
lead to what Hill calls a capabilities-expectations gap.127 An example of such is the (continued)
comparisons made between the EU and the United States in which the basic assumption seems to be
that the EU is indeed a single foreign policy actor. Weighing up the EU by these standards will
ultimately lead to the same conclusions almost every time; that the EU comes up short.
The Union’s foreign policy can be dissected in a plethora of ways for analytical purposes. Here the
focus will be on three interrelates, yet distinct, types of foreign policy activities; Community, Union and
National foreign policy. Consequently these represent two approaches of EU intervention in world
politics through either unified or fragmented.
Community foreign policy is in reference to those elements of foreign policy that are a direct
consequence of the establishment of the European Communities through the Treaty of Rome in 1957
and those elements of foreign policy where the EC has later been delegated with exclusive
competencies either through primary law or a set precedence. Institutionally these community foreign
policy activities are placed in the first pillar of the Unions framework and represent the supranational
side of the EU.
The Treaties of Rome specifically codified the external consequences of the Common Commercial
Policy and covered principally trade and development relations with third parties. The community
foreign policy has traditionally covered the economic dimension of European foreign policy most often
handled in practice by the directorates of the European Commission. However, development and
humanitarian aspects of foreign policy have also become an integral part of the portfolio under the
community and in particular the European Commission.128
Union foreign policy denotes the more political dimensions of EU foreign policy, which operates largely
on intergovernmentalism, a saw the light of day in the early 1970’s as European Political Cooperation.
It entails the coordination of the national foreign policies of member states and was until the signing of
127
128
Hill, 1993 & 1996
Tonra, Ben, 2004. p 54-55
46
the Single European Act a domain that lay outside the legal framework of the European Communities.
The CFSP, established under Maastricht, is the flagship of the Union approach, but also the scapegoat
of all EU failures in the world. Any time the EU fails to live up to expectations the verdict usually
includes a reference to the underachieving of the CFSP – and not so much the Union.
National foreign policy obviously refers to the independent foreign policies of the member states. The
foreign policies of the member states have been touched upon in the above section where it was noted
that these are as important as ever. In viewing the EU as a FPS the separate foreign policies are a key
ingredient. In the context of externally directed policy of the Union, it is important to consider to
which extent the respective foreign policies of member states have conformed to the EU institutional
context and common direction. If they do conform it provides the Union with an increased
convergence of 25 (27) policies and may allow for raising the lowest common denominator that has at
times marred the efforts of the EU. Some argue that operating in the EU context has indeed altered
national foreign policy patterns;
‘Habits of cooperation, accepted advantages of shared information, responses to common threats, cost saving
through increased collaboration, have all significantly altered patterns of national policymaking’129
The external foreign policy dimension of the FPS can be divided into two approaches to EU
intervention in the world: a unified external foreign policy dimension represented by the Community and
Union foreign policies – by supranational delegation or intergovernmental consensus respectively; and
a fragmented external foreign policy in lieu of national foreign policy activities. Viewing the EU in such a
manner can be likened to consociationalism. This is a model providing insights into central features of
entities (usually states) which are divided sharply internally and able to function in a relatively smooth
and stable manner130 It is a valuable model in explaining the nature of the balance between
fragmentation and cooperation/integration: costs of fragmentation can be overcome, while power and
authority of both the segments and the collectivity are strengthened. Therefore EU membership does
not fundamentally undermine the sovereignty of member states.
When unified in external activities, through Union or Community foreign policy, the EU as a FPS takes
shape similar to that of the traditional foreign policy actor. The CFSP epitomises the aim for unity and
represents the most high profile of arrangements created for the purpose. It aims at providing the
129
130
Hill and Wallace, 1996, p. 12
Nugent, 1999, p. 498.
47
Union with the ability of speaking with ‘one voice’ carrying the full weight of the 25 (27) member
states, based on the expectation that collective diplomacy enables the EU to carry more weight at
international conferences and negotiations.131 In circumstances where the Union acts through CFSP –
an internal foreign policy project – it is undoubtedly a force to be reckoned with. Ginsberg has referred
to the politics of scale in reference to the rewards of collective rather than unilateral action. The EU
carries the combined weight of 450 (500) million Europeans, the richest and most powerful economic
bloc in the world and the traditional ties to a myriad of nations, whose ties to the states of Europe are
vital.132
The most obvious way to understand the notion of fragmented foreign policy is to refer to the Union in
terms of not being able to produce common policy. However the picture is much more nuanced,
because even though the EU does not act as one, the EU member states are still active in foreign
policy. Hence, member states may, for example, pursue distinct national foreign policies towards a third
country or region. In this case, the FPS still pursues an external foreign policy towards the given third
country though it fails to assume actor characteristics. This is because the EU as a FPS exists on the
actions of all its actors, not just on the entirety acting unitarily. The EU reaps the rewards of
fragmented foreign policy mainly due to the comparative advantages of national policies vis-à-vis specific
third parties and/or political issues; and the non-excludable characteristic of foreign policy outcomes.
The FPS provides for the possibility of tapping in to and utilising the comparative advantages of the
member states that respectively enjoy special bilateral ties with certain third parties, possess good
credentials in certain policy areas or have built up special merit in certain multilateral forums.
For centuries the European states have claimed their stake in the wider world. From the crusades to the
colonial times and since the member states have, by virtue of their foreign presence, shaped
longstanding relations and associations. As such they share history, culture, tradition, religion and
language with actor throughout the world. Spain and Portugal’s have a heritage in South America, just
as France’s does in Africa and the former Indochina. Finland has ties to Russia based on geographical
nearness, while Germany, Poland and Israel have a special sensitive relationship.
In terms of policy-credentials certain member states are at the forefront of international policy areas.
France is the second-largest agricultural producer after the U.S. and as such is a leader on this issue.
Spain is at the forefront of fisheries policy, while Denmark is aspiring to become a significant player in
Environmental policy. Turning to the question of special merit in certain multilateral forums, the most
131
132
CFSP - http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm
Ginsberg, p. 438
48
obvious example is the permanent membership of the UK and France of the United Nations Security
Council.
These significant relationships of the EU members contribute to the comparative advantages of the
EU, which the organisations supranational elements cannot replicate. The EU has the ‘luxury’ of
conducting foreign policy through the channel that adds the most value to a given issue, thereby
maximising the influence of the Union. This a collective strength not enjoyed by any other actors in
international politics. Furthermore it strengthens the respective states, because it allows them to raise
their own international profile by representing the Union as a whole, which in turn reflects upon the
Union. This is tied into the notion of the externalised effects of national foreign policies on the EU.
The Union as a whole becomes a freerider of the comparative advantages of national foreign policies in
both positive and negative terms; for example the outcome of the current relationship between the UK
and the US can be enjoyed by other EU members, while also acting as a protective measure for those
countries that have a more strained relationship with the US (e.g. France). Thus the foreign policy
relationships of member states with third parties are non-excludable.133
The duality of unified and fragmented foreign policy is undoubtedly a great asset and neglecting the
ability of the Union to play to different strengths is ignoring the potential of the EU in foreign policy.
This is a view that would not be possible from a state-centric realist position, which do not
acknowledge nation states’ ability to conduct national foreign policy AND European foreign policy.134
In the FPS view though, national foreign policies, unless divergent contribute to the collective EU
foreign policy.135 So those critics of the EU’s foreign policy ability, who equal the fragmented and
diverse nature of the Union with lack of effectiveness and illegitimacy, obscure it inherent limits,
concrete achievements and growing international recognition.136
To conclude my consideration of the EU as a foreign policy system I believe it fair to say, that such a
perspective warrants the acknowledgement that the EU in theory possesses so many facets, which tied
together allow for the Union to act in any foreign policy issue. Moreover the unique multi-facetted
dimensions of the EU, in a given foreign policy context, allows for the possibility of a more
comprehensive approach to foreign policy problems in the world. It simply has more strings to play
133
Kaufholz, p. 8
White, p. 43
135
White, p. 43 - 44
136
Feldman p. 3
134
49
than the traditional state actor, since it constitutes 25 (27) separate actors, an international organisation
and a system of actors (when possible). Thus it can play to the strengths needed for a given context.
Therefore it is also important to stress that the EU is much more than the CFSP. While the CFSP has
the potential for being a strong element, it is only one facet of the foreign policy of the Union. To
recognise this relatively basic fact one will automatically come to see that the EU is much more capable
in foreign policy than it receives credit for.
Moreover the EU has the advantage of being a world leader in trade, development and humanitarian
arenas - due to the immense wealth of the European countries as a whole – providing it with a natural
position of leadership other will look to. Not necessarily by virtue of its actions, but just as much in lieu
of the benefits third parties can achieve by entering into good relations with the Union. The economic
success of the Union also entails a centripetal pull of those wanting to become a member of or simply
associated with the ‘exclusive’ club of EU Member States.
Having accounted for ‘what the EU is’, the next relevant question, then, is which position the EU holds
in the international system of states?
50
7. The role of the EU in the international system?
Having considered the nature of the EU as an international actor and come to something of a
conclusion on it nature as a foreign policy system, I now turn to the EU’s relations with its others. It is
fine to know how to perceive the EU as an ‘actor’; however it is only due to the context within which it
operates, that it can be regarded as such. It is in the relation with others that it obtains ‘actorness’. As
such it is worthwhile to examine how the EU fits in to the international system of actors and the role
that it plays.
Because the international system of states – by definition - lends primacy to state actors, any secondary
actors (IO’s, NGO’s etc.) must operate in a framework based on, dominated and rule by states. It is the
nation states which grant power and influence to international organisations and international
institutions. I argue, however that the EU need not possess all the properties of the state, in order to
have significance in the international environment. I believe that the EU challenges the international
system and the primacy of state actors, in such a way that the system may in fact change over time to
accommodate international organisations such as the EU (even though it is one of a kind). Besides
challenging the position of the state, the EU still has to operate within the system, and therefore needs
to obtain the recognition of the systems actors. For this, resembling a state is off course a requirement
and in turn a foreign policy is a prerequisite. Since foreign policy is the basis for international relations
among actors, the foreign policy of the EU even is crucial if the Union is ever to be perceived as an
equal international actor.
The EU is only an actor in lieu of a given context, and it is within the relations to other actors and the
system itself that the EU can find its purpose and legitimacy. Therefore it must ‘find its place’ in the
international system. Conversely the system, if it collectively deems there is a need, must accommodate
the Union. Although the EU may appear as a weak actor in ‘high policy’ areas, it is an undoubtedly an
effective negotiator of ‘low policy’ matters, including trade, environment and development aid; areas
that fall under the competence of the community pillar.137
Bretherton and Vogler’s have – in their own words – a preference for constructivist theories whenever
ideas and expectations are accorded significance.138 Based on social constructivist theory they attempt
137
138
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, p. 250-252
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, p. 33
51
to conceptualise the EU and explaining why the EU is an actor in the international system although not
having the conventional state quality of sovereignty.139
They argue that being perceived, by third countries, as an actor is equally important to possessing the
actual credentials of an actor. Traditionally, the attributes of the state were necessities to act in the
international system; however such concepts no longer inhibit what the EU is able of achieving. It is
instead the other members of the international system that define the ‘rules of the game’ with their
decisions on whether or not to interact with an actor.140
According to Bretherton and Vogler the EU is perceived as being an increasing visible presence in the
world141. Thus it is in the best interest of the EU (member states) and third countries to lend the EU
further opportunities to get involved in international decision-making forums, not least in the
multilateral system, in which many of the fields in which the EU is strongest are internationally
regulated. By reacting upon such opportunities to act, the EU has the power to further its potential as
an actor and heighten its importance. In turn, by heightening its importance, visibility increases and a
positive cycle is commenced.
So, as third countries come to acknowledge the importance of EU as an international actor (indeed
even determine a need for EU participation) and by the EU taking advantage of these opportunities
and furthering its presence the structure of the international system is determined by the actions of its
members. System and actor (agency and structure) are in a cyclic motion and continue to redefine each
other respectively. Herein lays the challenge that the EU presents the international system with, but also
the way by which the EU finds it place at the table. The question then is, how should/could the EU as
a FPS take up its position in the international system – what should be its role?
Civilian Power?
In the early seventies Duchene142 labelled the European Community as a ‘civilian power’; an actor in the
international system, that by means of diplomatic and economic instruments exercises its influences,
thus without the use (or threat) of military force. Duchene developed the concept in his attempts to
illustrate the potential future role of the EC in the world. Claiming that, due to increasing
139
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999 & 2006
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, pp. 28-46
141
The foundation of the Bretherton and Vogler argument is empirical analysis on the capacity and character of the EU
as actor across the areas of trade, development, environment, humanitarian assistance and the CFSP.
142
Duchene, 1972 & 1973
140
52
interdependence in international relations, civilian instruments would become more important than
military instruments, he argued that “(western) Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of
power”143. It could be argued that that the prediction of Duchene was conveniently idealistic, and a
reaction to the given fact that EC had no military force on which to base any sort of power. Influence
in the world would have to be sought through other means;
“(t)he European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force
is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its
frontiers”
Allen and Smith intelligently observe that ‘civilian power’ is a notion that seems to focus on the
uncertainty of the EU’s role in the world, that could (and can still) be used to rationalise the Union’s
military impotence.144
Nonetheless, Duchene’s contribution has sparked a wave of research and literary contributions
concerning the EC/EU as a civilian power145, many of which equalled his idealistic and normative
outlook for the Union. In 1976, Twitchett defined civilian power as;
“… an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise influence on states, global and regional
organizations, international corporations, and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and legal factors”146.
This very much became a working definition, when dealing with the Union as ‘civilian power’, just as
the non-existence of military capabilities became an underlying assumption of the concept. It must be
added, that some scholars did open for the possibility for the use of military instruments as a last resort
(ultima ratio), among these Duchene. However, ever since the St. Malo summit147, development of a
military component for the Union’s foreign policy toolbox - the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) – has undermined the EU’s status as a civilian power in the genuine sense. Although ‘civilian
power’ is much more than foreign policy without military means, the EDSP and general evolution in
the foreign policy discourse necessitated the need for a revision of earlier work. The following Solana
quote epitomises the reality that scholars advocating the EU as a ‘civilian power’ now faced;
143
Duchene, 1972, p. 43
Allan and Smith, 1998,
145
Examples of such are Twitchett, 1976; Tsakaloyannis, 1989; Hill, 1990; Maull 1993;
146
Twitchett, 1976
147
Saint Malo was the site of an Anglo-French summit which lead to a significant agreement regarding European
defence policy. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac stated that "the Union must
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises". (Wikipedia insert)
144
53
"The Union has to be prepared to use military assets and resources […]. By developing military capabilities, and enhancing its
existing civilian capabilities, the European Union will be in a unique situation to draw on a comprehensive range of instruments
to support its interest’s world-wide.”148
Normative power?
In 2002, Manners med the case that ‘normative power’ was a more appropriate characterisation of the
Union and based his contribution to the discussions on a new set of assumptions. His definition of the
concept distances itself from the prior focus on military vs. non-military instruments, and instead
advances the idea that Europe (EU) should exercise its power in the world through extending its own
norms into the international system, thereby influencing global opinions and norms. While not
dismissing the qualities of the civilian or military power of the EU, Manners advocates for an increased
attention directed towards the Union’s ability to “shape the conceptions of the ‘normal’ in international
relations.”149 Hence providing the EU with a third dimension in its international aspirations. The seminal
piece by Manners is, in my opinion, a useful concept on which the EU can base its foreign policy
approach in the world. However, it is worth noting that the norms of Europe (EU) must first be agreed
before these can be extended towards the international system. Furthermore the perceptions of
‘normal’ are far from conform throughout the world. On the other hand, this is exactly the point made
by Manners, when he emphasises that through the appropriate economic, diplomatic and legal channels
the EU can make an ideational impact promoting ‘better practices’.
150
As Hill puts it; “where the EU is
weak in leverage, it is strong in values”.151
He identifies the EU’s normative basis through the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set out through the legal base of the Union
(treaties, council conclusions and charters). The norms, he advocates, should then be diffused
(disseminated) through different diplomatic means, including also through procedures of EU
association and membership - i.e. states seeking accession to the EU must commence the abolishment
of the death penalty. 152
Javier Solana, “Reflections on a Year in Office”.
Manners, 239-240.
150
Manners, 235-258
151
Hill, 1996, p. 9
152
Manners, 240
148
149
54
It is my conviction that the characterisation of the EU as a normative power – a norm promoter in the
international environment – is a fitting for the current role it holds. The concept excels with the added
value of combining the means and the ends; civilian means (economic, financial and diplomatic) would
be the key characteristic; military means would be present, but the use of force would be a last resort;
with the objective of promoting the European normative basis. As such the EU has the opportunity to
take the lead in international politics positioning itself as a role model, both in the international system
and for those at which the foreign policy is directed. Given, naturally, that its normative powers are
carefully and properly utilised, both the periphery and the wider world can be influenced by the lead
taken by the EU.
Touching upon the topic Rosencrance writes:
“It is perhaps a paradox that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now
coming to set world standards in normative terms. There is perhaps a new form of European symbolic and institutional
dominance even though the [traditional] political form has entirely vanished.”153
Hence, while the EU does not fit the label of a traditional foreign policy player, the changing state of its
international context may ensure increase its actor credential. That, which has insofar been regarded as
its weakness in international politics – its lack of military and unified political clout - may in fact be one
of its key strengths. In the contemporary international system it may be beneficial to take different
forms depending on the situation, and in particular being able to apply multiple dimensions of foreign
policy approaches.
The theoretical discussion has now:
1. Qualified my understanding of what the EU is and the nature of the EU in a foreign policy
context. As such it has provided theoretical justification of the argument of this paper,
because it represents (I believe) a novel way of perceiving the Union.
2. Justified the argument in itself because it opens for a view of the Union – as a foreign policy
system – which provides for more encouraging conclusions on the EU as a foreign policy
actor, than that of traditional state-centric contributions.
3. Pathed the way empirical analysis of the paper, where it will represent a key ingredient in
the model of analysis and not least the perspective with which the analysis will be
conducted
153
Rosencrance, 1997, p. 10
55
8. ANALYSIS – Empirical Justification
Having spent the prior segment of this thesis coming to terms with the nature of the Union and its role
in the international system it is time to apply these theoretical findings to an empirical study; it is time
to uncover the ability of the European Union in foreign policy. To do this I shall rely on the theoretical
findings just mentioned. As promised in the introduction the empirical matter will be the study of the
EU’s history of relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991 (until 2006). For this purpose I have
chosen to split the 15 year timeframe into three shorter phases, which correspond to a) significant
developments in the history of the Union(s foreign policy) and/or b) significant changes in the scope
of EU intervention in BiH.
In parallel I shall attempt to draw some general conclusions regarding the capabilities of the Union’s
foreign policy. Hence, to lift the empirical explanations and conclusions of a more general nature, the
study will be supplemented with empirical evidence of events, activities and developments/evolution of
the EU’s foreign policy, relevant to, by not directly related to the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem. This
includes both internal EU developments/situations and relevant developments n the wider world. (An
example of such is the Iraq war in 2003). The study thus aims at uncovering how the EU capabilities of
foreign policy have been continually developed and improved; based upon the general perceptions of
the thesis concerning the status of the EU as an international actor (presented in the theoretical section
of the paper). The overall objective of this thesis is to conclude on the EU and its ability to conduct
foreign policy
The way forward
To structure the analysis I shall make use of the following ‘model’ - and the definitions with - which
was presented in the ‘definitions’ section early in the thesis;
56
”Will”
Preferences
Priorities
EU’s capability of
conducting foreign policy
Resources
Capacity
”Ability”
The analysis will represent a narrative combining the elements of the;
a) Theoretical framework; the internal, centripetal and external dimensions of foreign policy; based on the
general conceptual assumptions of the nature and role of the EU;
b) The events and activities in the EU’s relations and interventions in Bosnia and
c) The definition of foreign policy capabilities154 .
A chapter will be forwarded for each of the three time phases. For every time phase (1991-1995; 19961999; 2000-2006). Therefore the analysis will constitute three chapters with three sub-sections
discussing a) internal foreign policy, b) centripetal foreign policy and c) external foreign policy. This
order is decided based upon the formulated problem at hand: to examine the development of the
capability of the Union to conduct foreign policy. Thus the objective is to conclude on the externally
directed foreign policy and such the discussions on internal and centripetal foreign policy – which are
fundamental elements to the foreign policy capability of the Union – need to come before the
discussion on external foreign policy. As mentioned in earlier this thesis puts special emphasis on the
‘ability’ dimension (the practical aspects of foreign policy abilities), however it is impossible to leave out
the ‘will’ dimension altogether. As such this will be incorporated in the text when it is called for.
Historical Backdrop – from EPC to CFSP
154
Including the annexed description of EU foreign policy capabilities.
57
Contrary to popular belief, the EU’s foreign policy intent did not arise solely out of the TEU at
Maastricht. This short section represents a short summary of the development from the early stages of
EC cooperation on political issues until the signing of the TEU. There are many excellent accounts of
this period, which could substantiate and elaborate on these next few pages.155
European diplomacy and political cooperation came into being after France stood down and lifted its
veto of the UK’s accession in the sixties. Many believe that the departure of De Gaulle can be
attributed the first round of deepening and widening. However, even before these events the Six had
discussed Defence and Political Communities (early 50’s) and even a possible Political Union (Fouchet
Plan in Erly 60’s).156
In December 1969, at the summit in The Hague, the leaders of the Six agreed to negotiations on
possible enlargement and mandated their foreign ministers to examine the possibilities for means and
ways of political cooperation. In their report of 27 October 1970 (Davignon Report), the foreign
ministers presented to their governments a prospectus on cooperation in foreign policy which,
although cautiously and modestly formulated, led to the birth of the European Political Cooperation
(EPC). Consultation of the Six started in November 1970, with the prospective EC members (UK,
Ireland, Denmark) joining in early 1972, once they had signed their accession treaties
At the centre of this early aspect of political cooperation was shared information with a view to
harmonising views on foreign policy matters and possibly carry out subsequent ‘joint approaches’.
Through EPC foreign ministers would meet regularly (at least every six months) and a Political
Committee was established, which comprised the Political Directors of the national foreign ministries.
The EPC was an intergovernmental framework, in which the Commission was only marginally involved
in, despite the fact that the Commission was the lead institution on integration. Additionally, the
Secretariat of the EPC followed the respective EC presidency and therefore moved every six months to
the capital of the presidency country.
Further developments to the EPC arose following the October 1972 Paris Summit, in which the
‘European Union’ appeared as a goal for integration, for the first time. Member State foreign ministers
were once again mandated to examine further potentials for political cooperation and extended
integration. The Copenhagen of July 1973 consolidated EPC institutionally. Meetings of foreign
ministers were increased to take place every third month, meaning also an increase in the intensity of
155
156
For example see Smith, 2000
Wallace, William, p. 432
58
work for the Political Committee. Thus this was expanded to include a group of correspondents and a
communication system (COREU) to ease communication between foreign ministries. Moreover
regional and thematic working-groups were created to discuss foreign policy cooperation, and civil
servants of the respective foreign ministries now dealt directly with each other on a daily basis. At the
Stuttgart European Council in June 1983, the heads of state and government declared their intent to
strengthen and expand the scope of the EPC (the Solemn Declaration). This was to include the
coordination of security issues, although only in regards to political and economic security. All issues
pertaining to defence and military were still not included.
Up until 1987 the EPC was managed by a troika led by the country currently holding the EU, and
consisting of previous and next presidencies. This meant a limited scope for continuity, since the
Presidency (hence also the troika) rotated every six months, hindering any attempts at long-term and
strategic planning.157 So despite the aim of cohesion by way of EPC, it was not until the Single
European Act of 1987, that the EPC was given a treaty base. In was in this treaty text that the rules
governing the EPC developed in the prior reports (Luxembourg, Copenhagen and Paris), were
specifically adopted and put into effect. Procedural rules for EPC were adopted and a secretariat was
created and based in Brussels, as a successor to the arrangement of a ‘mobile secretariat. The role of the
Commission and the Parliament was still limited to subservient to the Member States, although the role
of the Commission became more substantial as economic and trade issues (the Commissions raison
d’etre at the time) began to overlap with EPC affairs.158
Although the EPC did generate joint positions on various issues during the eighties which indicated a
European approach to international affairs, it became the object of criticisms claiming it was weak and
lacking in substance. Particularly the loose ad hoc framework is believed to have rendered the EPC illequipped to cope with the challenges of the time, leaving the approach of the EC as reactive and
incoherent in the face of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Sovjet Union.159
The scheduled Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 1990-1991 was initially focused on economic
aspects of the Community and not least the creation on the Monetary Union, and not so much on the
political dimensions of integration. However events in eastern and central Europe, German
reunification and the new international political environment aided in pushing the foreign and security
policy to the forefront of the IGC agenda. It became evident that the limits of the EPC had been
157
Cameron, 1999
Cini, p. 239
159
Cini, p. 239
158
59
reached (and passed) and that further structural steps were needed to enhance the political clout of the
Union.160 As a consequence, and on the basis of the decisions of the European Council in Maastricht in
December 1991, the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (1 November 1993) turned
EPC into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).161
1991 – 1995; Foreign policy failure and the CFSP’s baptism of fire.
’INTERNAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
In the early 1990’s the state of international politics was largely defined by the change in the Cold War
scenario and the new perceptions of the redefined security environment. The USSR had disintegrated
and no longer posed a threat towards Europe; the bipolarity that had governed the world for half a
century had faded; and new independent states were emerging ‘all over the place’. Foremost in the
latter, lay the new security challenges for Europe which would come to dominate the 1990’s. In sum
political and economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic and nationalist conflict,
massive immigration, organized crime, and massive violation of human rights would paint the picture
of these challenges.162
Besides the general situation of uncertainty, several events in the post-Cold War period can be
attributed to convincing the EC member states, that increased foreign policy cooperation was the order
of the day. Although negotiations had been ongoing since the late eighties on how to
strengthen/replace the EPC, particularly the Gulf War and the conflict in Yugoslavia bared the
deficiencies of EC foreign policy. Common positions were few and far between during the run up to
the first Gulf War, and it appeared that national interests and domestic considerations outweighed
common EC action. A key issue, which could divide the Member States, was the taking of European
hostages in Iraq and Kuwait. Despite a unified Community statement strongly condemning the hostage
taking, Member States started to take unilateral steps to secure the release of their own nationals. This
in turn undermined the community effort, especially since the nationals of e.g. Germany and the UK
were not being released due to the support these governments had given to the US at the time. Thus
160
Cameron, p. 21-22
Wallace, p. 435
162
Sjursen, 1999,
161
60
cracks in the unity became evident and unilateralism prevailed as Saddam Hussein succeeded in playing
the EC states out against each other with uneven releases of hostages.163
The Gulf Crisis and the subsequent war significantly altered the outlook common foreign policy and
changed the debate about the development of the CFSP. Prior to the Gulf War the EC’s foreign policy
rested on ideals of peace, including disarmament and the dismantling of military alliances. It was
broadly acknowledged that the EC’s contribution to the new security environment in Europe was
through the application of non-military means - a civilian power.164 However the war necessitated the
EC to rethink its global position and the inherent responsibilities, including new considerations of
defence dimensions to be added to the developing CFSP. But the most important lesson learned from
the Gulf War was the limits of unity and cohesion when dealing in foreign policy. The hostage crisis
and diplomatic initiatives to solve the crisis illustrated very clearly the extent to which domestic
pressures, when strong enough, can shatter the cohesion otherwise evident. Upholding the necessary
cohesion demanded by common foreign policy is very difficult when national interests and domestic
agendas are at stake.165
This lack of a coherent approach again became evident in the situation regarding the breakdown of
Yugoslavia. Particularly the issue of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia split the EC members. At
the centre of this internal unrest was Germany, who many believe pressurised the remaining members
into granting recognition to Slovenia and Croatia prematurely. Mirroring public opinion on the
Yugoslav army siege of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, the German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, demanded that the EC recognise Slovenia and Croatia.166
Germany’s domestic political situation was fragile just one year after reunification, so when domestic
pressures based on sympathy for Croatia and Slovenia were intensified (especially through media
campaigns) the German position – which until that point had been in line with the ‘patient’ Community
position – turned about-face. Now Germany called for immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
In the beginning the cause was supported only by Denmark, but later also by Belgium and Italy. The
foreign ministers of the UK and France were among those who counselled caution, that the Croatia’s
President Tudjman had not given safeguards to the Serb minority, and the situation was still to unclear
to make a enlightened judgement of the matter.167
163
Nuttall, p. 136-139
Nuttall, p. 145-147
165
Nuttall p. 140
166
Grant, p. 10
167
Grant, p. 10
164
61
Other EC members had argued that granting recognition was premature, although they were not
opposed to recognition of independence as such; it was indeed one of the terms of the Brioni
Agreement.168 However, the view was that it removed an important source of potential leverage and
would change the dynamics of the conflict.169 However, at the meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels
in December 1991, Genscher made it clear that Germany would, bar agreement from it partners, carry
on independently in recognising the republics. For the sake of a common front on foreign policy,
merely a week after the affirmation of foreign policy commitments at the Maastricht Summit, the UK
and France fell in line with Germany and agreed to recognise the republics in January. In sum the
German view prevailed after a struggle (and some closed door negotiations) which left the Community
position in a shambles. Slovenia and Croatia were granted recognition despite the fact that an
independent commission had been appointed to consider the case for recognition, and had concluded
that only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the essential democratic criteria.170 What is more during
negotiations, Germany had granted Greece a carte blanche to veto any call for recognition by
Macedonia.171
The recognition issue had grave consequences for Bosnia. Having already recognised Slovenia and
Croatia, the EC could not discount the ambitions of the vast proportion of Bosnians who also wanted
to free themselves from Yugoslavia. Consequently, in January 1992 EC foreign ministers promised to
recognise Bosnia, conditioned on a vote for independence in a referendum. A referendum was
scheduled but boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, who instead took up arms and rejected the result (a
clear ‘yes’ to independence). Those critical of the EC have claimed that this incident that the effects of
European common foreign policy are disastrous and that the EC was in part at fault for the outbreak of
the war.172
Besides the recognition issue the EC/EU members the question of military intervention by the EU was
eagerly debated. While UNPROFOR came in as a peacekeeping force this seems paradoxical since
there was in fact no peace to keep. Therefore it was discussed whether to operate under the auspices of
the WEU173 with military intervention. Again differences in national positions watered down these
efforts with the UK leading the opposition. The UK would not involve itself in military intervention,
168
Brioni Agreement: Cease-fire agreement to end conflict in Slovenia, see Siani-Davies p. 65
Siani-Davies, p. 16
170
Siani-Davies, p 17 & Smith, p. 242 & 252
171
For in depth and detailed accounts of the recognition issue, see: Maull, Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis; and Gow,
Triumh of the Lack of Will.
172
Grant, p. 10, ,
173
Grant p. 9 (!!check page number)
169
62
without an engagement by the US; Germany stated that was constitutionally bound and could not act;
to complicate matters the EC did not have the authority to even discuss military or security issues.
Once the TEU came in to effect the damage was done and the US engaged, thus marginalising any
conceived EU military efforts. The EU was once more criticised for its inability to ‘act in the manner of a
conventional superpower’174 with some claiming that the defence dimension would be key to the
development of the EC/EU’s position in the world.175 Thus the Gulf and Balkan experiences can be
argued to have created the necessary momentum and pressure for the later development of the defence
dimension of the CFSP, the ESDP. The conflicts broke the deadlock on security and defence issues in
Maastricht negotiations, as Member States came to realise the emergence of serious security risks in the
Post-Cold War environment; and the evident deficiencies of the EPC framework, when it came to
influencing the foreign policies of large and powerful Member States such as Germany. Furthermore,
the initial reluctance of Post-Cold war US intervention left a hole which needed filling, with the EU as
the only viable candidate.176
It is fair to say that the internal foreign policy dimension of the EU’s foreign policy in the period
between 1991 – 1993 was characterised by the lack of coherence, due to national agendas taking
priority; and that the EC/EU simply were without the relevant framework of strategies, instruments
and actors to take on a large scale crisis such as the Yugoslav conflict and the Gulf crisis before it.
While the TEU had come in to effect during the period the Member States showed an initial lack of
enthusiasm to implement the provisions of the treaty regarding the common foreign policy. 177
According to Hill, the EU in these early nineties was not an effective international actor, neither in
terms of capacity to produce collective decisions or impact events.178 Hence, it became painfully
obvious that dubbing the period as the ‘hour of Europe’ was indeed a rather premature prediction. In
hindsight it has been argued that the shambolic recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and the disastrous
recognition of Bosnia; and the disagreements over possible military intervention is what “…gave rise to
the perception that the Community had failed over Yugoslavia”179. But this is not the whole truth of the matter.
These events are merely the symptoms of the far worse illness under the surface of the EC/EU at the
time, namely the lack of cohesion; the critical component of actorness according to Sjøstedt, and
Carporaso and Jupille. The lack of cohesion simply undermined the effectiveness of the EC/EU,
because disparate national foreign policy objectives and succumbing to domestic pressures impaired the
174
Buchanen, 1993, in Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 190
Hill, 1993, p. 318
176
Smith, p. 179-180
177
Nuttall, p. 216
178
Hill, 1993 cited in Blitz, 2006
179
Nuttal, p. 216
175
63
EC/EU’s ability to assert its presence in a consistent manner.180 European leaders, in spite of headwind
were confident that the cure was to be found in the creation of the CFSP through the TEU.
The Treaty of the European Union was agreed at Maastricht European Council, signed by on 7 th
February 1992 and took effect on 1st November 1993. The most obvious change lay in the name
change from the European Community to that of the European Union. The new institutional
framework bases itself on the three pillars; the European Community (1); Common Foreign and
Security Policy (2); and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (3). The dedication of an institutional
pillar to a common foreign policy was alone a step forward (from political cooperation) and promised
improved coherence. To replace policy cooperation with common policy is just one indicator that
coherence was a guiding principle throughout the TEU articles on CFSP.181 Gauttier claims that the
principle of coherence indeed “permeates” the Treaty in its entirety and argues that it is one of the
fundamental principles.182 This does indeed appear to be a valid point. Treaty articles A and C, though
they do not specifically concern foreign policy, commits the Union to guarantee the “… the consistency of
its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies.”183
Furthermore, article J.1 states that the Union shall define an implement a common foreign and security
that covers all areas of foreign and security policy, while article J.8 charges the European Council to
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.184 On an institutional level the
replacing of the former Ministerial Meetings under EPC with the General Affairs Council; the merger
of the EPC and Council Secretariat and the consequent centralising of decision-making in a single
institutional framework, bears evidence of the attempts to achieve greater coherence.
The Member States took a greater commitment upon themselves with the TEU, by agreeing to;
“… support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.
They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a
cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.185
Moreover through article J.2 (1)186 the Member States commit to informing and consulting each other
within the Council on those issues of foreign and security policy, which are of general interest. This is
to ensure that the combined exertion of influence as effectively as possible through concerted and
180
Kintis, p. 185
Smith, 2004, 173
182
Gauttier, p. 27-28
183
TEU articles A & C
184
TEU art. J.1 and J.8
185
TEU art. J.1 (4)
186
TEU art. J.2. (1)
181
64
convergent action. To ensure such convergent actions, the TEU introduced two new instruments;
common positions and joint actions. These were the first ‘hard instruments’ of EU foreign policy,
under the intergovernmental framework of the Union. They allowed for foreign policy activities, which
(in theory) goes beyond the traditional common statements following Council meetings. With the TEU
taking effect, there was now legitimacy in discussing matters of security and defence, which had been a
‘no-go’ during the EPC. All matters pertaining to the security of the Union itself, was also placed under
the CFSP framework; and the Western European Union (WEU) was integrated into the development
of the Union with the goal of representing the defence dimension and assigned the task of undertaking
tasks with defence implications.
Improving the coherence of the EU’s external capacities through the TEU represents the groundwork
for a more effective EU in the world. Although it was not apparent from the outset since followthrough was lacking, the motivation for coherence was present. Linking the capabilities of all the three
pillars by a single institutional framework was an important step toward the improvement of the EU as
an international actor.
’EXTERNAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
As covered in the above section on the internal foreign policy dimension, in terms of foreign policy, the
Treaty of the European Union (TEU) was supposed to attribute the Union with greater coherence and
the ability to formulate effective foreign policy means, thus becoming a common and strong voice in
the world. The objectives to support this argument are clearly stated in the treaty text;
“ […] to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and
security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.187
Besides stating this objective the treaty calls for Member States to act on this commitment of Union
foreign policy by supporting the external and security policy in “a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”.
This includes refraining from activities that is contrary to Union interests or that may “…impair its
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations”.188
Nonetheless, the inability to agree in the slightest on the developing situation in the former Yugoslavia
hugely diminished the faith in the developing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and bared
187
188
TEU, Article B
TEU, Article J4
65
the EC/EU’s ultimate limitations in large scale and complex crisis. At the outbreak of political unrest in
the former Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991 the EC took a high profile role, but has since been widely and
publicly criticized for it vague results.
The EC’s leaders, at the time, seemed confident in its own abilities to cope, best personified by
Luxembourg’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jacques Poos. The six-month rotating presidency of the
EC had just passed to Luxembourg in the summer of 1991; and so it was his duty and privilege to
speak for Europe. In doing so he famously announced "this is the hour of Europe". Leading a Troika189
with the Dutch and Italian foreign ministers, he shuttled between Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana,
assuring the local population: "This is a European problem. We shall find a European solution". 190 EC
Commission president, Jacques Santer was equally adamant and confident; "We do not interfere in
American affairs, we hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."191 It goes without saying that Mr.
Santer’s remark came back to haunt him.
An obvious reason for this confidence and will for a European solution can be found in looking at the
status of the EC at this time. The CFSP was close to its birth after the Maastricht Summit in December
1991. Additionally, the EC may have wanted to illustrate that it had learnt from its lessons regarding the
inaction and indecisiveness during the first Gulf War and felt its responsibility for the handling of this
conflict.192 According to Gow, the United States, was trying to define is own role in the post-Cold War
environment, thus keen to pass the baton to the EC leaders, all too aware of the complexity of the
situation and with a belief that the EC was in act the only capable actor to offer a solution to the
Yugoslavian situation.193 By examining the statements of leading European political figureheads at that
time, Soetendorp notes, that the Member States appeared equally confident that the crisis could be
handled by diplomatic intervention/mediation, using economic aid and financial help programmes and
various trade agreements, as leverage194.
However, the EC had continued its use of tradition EC instruments of economic assistance and
diplomatic relations, while the crisis was escalating. The fact that the traditional EC instruments were
incapable of coping with crisis was one of the reasons for the creation of the CFSP, but even though,
On June 26 1991, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) intervened in Slovenia which signalled the actual beginning of
the Yugoslav wars. The European Council meeting in Luxembourg decided to send the so-called ‘Troika’, formed of
the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium, to mediate in Yugoslavia only two days later.
190
Malcolm, Noel, 1993,
191
Rodman, 1995,
192
Gow, p. 48
193
Gow, p. 47
194
Soetendorp, 1999, p. 128-140
189
66
the EC was still negotiating possible economic agreements with Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic in
1991 – all the while the beak-up of the Yugoslav Federation was imminent and well underway.195
However it can be assumed that, although the collapse of Yugoslavia had been obvious for some time,
the Community was taken by surprise at the suddenness of the escalation of the conflict, thus making
the EC’s management of the crisis entirely reactive. The preventive measures – traditionally used –
were thus enforced too late in the process.
Another explanation could be that the EC’s attention was preoccupied with other major events of the
time. The end of the cold war, with the disintegration of the Sovjet Union, the process of German
reunification and the aforementioned summit in September 1991, which would lead to the creation of
the CFSP, were all dominant political agendas at the time.
Despite the obvious problems mentioned above the EU attempted to lead the international effort to
head-off the conflict. The EC was successful in reaching a cease-fire agreement to put an end to the
short-term fighting in Slovenia with the Brioni Agreement in July 1991 and also put in place diplomatic
and economic sanctions to force the parties of former Yugoslavia to a negotiated solution, including an
arms embargo. However, an issue of recognition sidelined the efforts due to severe disagreements
between Member States on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, which Germany had advocated
strongly and publicly ‘promised’. These splits were carried over into later negotiations regarding the war
in Croatia and the breakout of violence in Bosnia and Hercegovina.196 The EC convened a Peace
Conference in September 1991 which resulted in the first major plan to bring peace/avoid Bosnia
sliding into war. The Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan, named for its authors Lord Carrington and
Portugese ambassador Jorge Cutileiro, proposed ethnic power sharing on all administrative levels and
the devolution of central government to local ethnic communities. The proposal never really got of the
ground, before it had to be abandoned, since its rationale was aimed at an intra-Yugoslavian civil war.
Once the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (15th Jan 1992) and Bosnia (6th Apr 1992) were in effect
the dynamic of the conflict changed.197
After events escalated out of control of the EC, the EC and UN jointly convened the International
Conference on the former Yugoslavia headed by David Owen, on behalf of the EC and UN special
envoy Cyrus Vance. The conference, held in August 1992, included the leaders of the three sides within
Bosnia & Hercegovina - the Serbs, Muslims and Croats - as well as the six republics of the former
195
196
197
Gow, 1997, p. 40-50
Siani-Davies, p. 15-16
67
Yugoslavia, the military commanders, the United Nations, and the governments of the European
Community, the United States and Russia in coordination with the United Nations. The result of the
conference was the so-called Vance-Owen plan, which sought to represent midway points between the
demands of the three parties. In short, it proposed the division of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous
regions, much like the Swiss cantons, which could pursue most government functions. However the
plan failed to win consensus, as the Bosnians believed it would reward the aggressing Serbs and Croats
for its actions, while the latter parties were led to believe that they would be in a stronger position to
negotiate for more territory if the continued hostilities198.
As the region was soiled in conflict the fighting intensified the EC was increasingly marginalised by the
progressive intervention by other major international actors, not least the United Nations. The EC
continued to play a central role in the ongoing diplomatic efforts, implementation of sanctions, and
particularly the provision of humanitarian aid, but the UN had become lead agency, hence the EC/EU
activities were carried out within the framework of UN. Moreover the EC seemed determined to obtain
success through the deployment of economic instruments to bring the conflict to an end. But, then
again, at the time it seemed that economic sanctions and infrastructural aid were policies that the EC
governments could come to agreement on. This approach was constantly criticised as being ineffective,
but economic foreign policy was a policy area where the EC was more confident and experienced, and
in particular, where it was already committed by the member states.199 It is fair to say that the EC, in the
vacuum between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ concepts of its foreign policy identity, were learning by doing and
that the inherent lack of a strategic approach was openly evident.200
It can be argued that these early initiatives by the EC (and the UN) failed due to the lack of means to
compel the parties to cooperate, and also the lack of support from other international actors, namely
the US. The US played a much reclined role (if any) in the early stages of the civil war (1992–1994),
which further exposed the EU’s inability to formulate a credible policy towards the conflict. A central
concern was that without being able to issue a plausible threat of military intervention, the agreements
brokered with Milosevic could be breached with impunity by the Serbs. Not until the US took up an
active role in brokering peace between the warring factions did the implied threat of the use of military
force see these agreements honoured.201 The EC’s lack of military force has by many been seen as the
EC’s greatest shortcoming during the conflict. Even though, the Member States were the majority
198
Hall and Danta, p. 30, Hall,
Dover, Robert in Cini, p. 243
200
Wallace, Wallace and Pollack, p. 437-440
201
Dover, Robert in Cini, p. 243
199
68
contributors to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) military mission; Britain and
France alone constitutions almost a third of the force.202 This is an often underestimated fact of the EC
intervention in Bosnia and something that those who criticize often overlook. The fact that the EC was
also an important actor in the provision of humanitarian aid from the beginning of the conflict could
well have played into the ‘non-decision’ for military action. Certain American politicians advocated for
a policy of ‘lift and strike’ – basically lifting the UN arms embargo on former Yugoslavia and striking at
the Serbs.203 The United Kingdom and France opposed this vehemently, believing that if the parties
were free to arm themselves the war would last longer. Furthermore, air strikes would in turn
consequently turn their lightly-armed and neutral soldiers into targets. There seemed to be a common
EC view that military intervention could jeopardise humanitarian relief efforts, including EC
Monitoring Mission personnel and UNPROFOR soldiers (mostly member state personnel).204
A defining moment in the EC/EU’s intervention in Bosnia came in 1994 with the shift towards great
power mediation, through the creation of the Contact Group. While consisting of three EU members
UK, France and Germany along with the US and Russia, it further sidelined the EU as an important
actor. Its role had now been reduced to an observer, relying on the information and goodwill of the
three EU members. Although some may have argued that the Contact Group was a means of providing
a voice to the EU together with other international powers, the fact of the matter was that EU as such
was not recognised as a participating party of the contact group, when reading the historical accounts
of the time. However, it is worth noting that the UK and Germany, at the time, held the presidency’s of
the EU and the OSCE respectively.
The diplomacy of the Contact Group may explain the failure of another two EU-sponsored peace
plans conducted in parallel. The EU Action Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg205 plan like earlier attempts
never really took off. As such the international effort relied on the Contact Group and a UN
framework of peacekeeping. In negotiations of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)
the EU was sidelined once more, even though the EU’s Special Representative, Mr. Bildt was invited to
participate.
All is not doom and gloom, since the EU undertook a significant and innovative operation in regards to
the administration of the city of Mostar (EUAM) in the south-west of Bosnia. The EUAM came to as a
result of the Washington Agreement in March 1994 which created the Bosnian-Croat Federation. The
202
UNPROFOR - http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm
Grant, p. 12
204
Siani-Davies, p. 17
205
Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg had replaced Vance as UN special envoy.
203
69
EU had expressed its willingness to undertake the responsibility of aiding the reconstruction of the city
in consultation and cooperation with local authorities. The objectives pertained to institution and
capacity building, infrastructure projects and a conciliation process, which was to include the
establishment of a multi-ethnic police force. The EUAM lasted two years, between 1994 and 1996 and
can be seen as a testing ground for later EU intervention on a country wide scale in Bosnia. While the
scope of the task was limited the functional approach – utilising civilian instruments and focusing on
institution building – resembles the EU’s later approach. In parallel the EU continued to supply vast
humanitarian support to Bosnia and the region as a whole.206
One of the essentials lessons of the Yugoslavian conflict (and particularly the Bosnian war) was that
even though the Cold War had ended the threat of and actual war in the traditional sense did not
evaporate. What is more war could easily break out just a few hours flight from Brussels. As such the
Union would have to be able to confront the threats in their own neighbourhood and take upon itself
the responsibility of securing stability outside its immediate borders. For this to be achieved there
would be a need for a stronger and more coherent and effective foreign policy identity. Hence the
CFSP would have to become more than treaty text and vague declarations of commitment, and instead
entail the building of practical capacities to act in the face of crisis and conflict. With the CFSP and the
already functioning Community instruments the prerequisites for Union action were now present, but
would have to be elaborated upon. While the role of the Union had been lessened as the conflict
increased in scale, it would be in the time following the Dayton Peace Agreement, that the EU would
become significant. At the European Council in October 1995 the EU expressed its commitment to the
task of reconstruction and long term assistance to the region.
[…] confirm its willingness to contribute to the international effort aimed at reconstruction of the regions devastated by the
war once peace is established. To that end the EU will co-ordinate its actions with other members of the international
community in order to provide long-term assistance with the objectives of supporting economic development, reinforcement of
civil society and reconciliation and regional economic co-operation. In the perspective of peace the EU is developing its longterm policy towards the region, to help build stability and prosperity.207
206
Winn and Lord, p. 74-76
Conclusions of the October 1995 European Council - At the Madrid European Council, subsequent to the signing of
the Dayton Agreement, the EU reiterated its commitment to contribute to the implementation of the civilian aspects of
the peace agreement, playing on its strengths as a civilian power, what proved impossible during the war.
207
70
1996 – 1999; Building credibility on the Balkans
‘INTERNAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
While ‘licking its wounds’ in the post-Dayton era the EU began a review procedure for common
foreign and security – a review which had already been entered into the Maastricht Treaty. 208 By now
the expectations for the CFSP, and the Unions foreign policy efforts as a whole, had been lowered
considerably due to its discouraging baptism of fire. It can be argued in hindsight, that this was fortune
amid misfortune as it provided the Union with time to breathe, collect itself and start moving on.
Such was the unfinished business of the first treaty that a review was inevitable. This should particularly
be seen in lieu of the degree of compromise the TEU was a result of. The review was initiated with the
convening of a ‘Reflection group’ of civil servants in 1996, and culminated in a new IGC, and another
treaty revision which was finally approved at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997.209
At the Amsterdam Council, two fronts disagreed over how policy should develop. Neither argued with
the conclusion that the common foreign and security policy, had achieved remarkably little, or that the
collective presence of the Union had failed in Yugoslavia and Iraq. One front, headed by the UK
deemed that the Yugoslav experience confirmed that the EU was not capable of formulating and
implementing a common foreign policy. Another fraction lead by France counter argued that this
demonstrated exactly why such an institutionalised policy was a necessity.210 Despite disagreements
strengthening the capabilities of the EU’s foreign policy were very much on the agenda. Thus to build
on the efforts and innovations of the Maastricht Treaty and to further improve the capability of the
Union in foreign policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA) was signed by the now fifteen EU Member
States on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. Based on the draft text produced by
the Irish Presidency211 (‘The European Union Today and Tomorrow’) the new and improved Treaty
highlighted the importance of coherent and effective external policy, and introduced several
innovations which had been concocted over the course of the 1996 IGC.
208
TEU art. J.10
Hill and Smith, p. 169
210
Howarth 2000 paraphrased in Cini
211
Irish Presidency Draft Text - Council of the European Union. 1996 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/cig1996/02500en6.pdf
209
71
Of the most high profile additions to the Unions foreign policy capacity in Amsterdam, one finds the
position of High Representative (HR) for the CFSP. The HR (or Mr CFSP) was intended to provide
the answer to the classic question posed earlier by Henry Kissinger; “Who speaks for Europe”. The
incumbent who is also the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union adds a significant
actor to the foreign policy tool-box of the Union.212
The reasoning behind the invention was to reinforce the growing cohesion in the EU’s external
representation and to provide the EU with a distinct and noticeable voice in the international system.
Even though the Presidency is the formal leadership in the EU’s external representation, it had proven
difficult ensure cohesion and continuity with a rotating Presidency at the helm.213 . The High
Representative supports the Presidency in dealings with third parties. By virtue of this position, the HR
becomes a member of the new constitution of the "Troika" along with the foreign minister of the
country holding the EU presidency and a senior responsible representative of the Commission (usually
the competent Commissioner). To ensure full coherence with the EU’s external economic and
development policies, another new creation of the TA - the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit –
was established. The ‘Policy Unit’ has since proved a vital tool of the Council has added a strong core
of competence to the Council Secretariat, and it ‘brusselised’ foreign policy more than ever. Whereas
economic and trade relations with third parties, had long been centralised to Brussels, the foreign and
security policy under the European Council (the intergovernmental sphere) had long been gripped
tightly by the Member States. This is not to say that these (MS) simply rolled over and gave up
sovereignty. The continued use of the intergovernmental working methods and decision-making
mechanism secured that the foreign policy stayed a state prerogative; however the induction of the HRposition and a Policy Unit brought foreign policy much closer to Brussels.
A further indication of the continuing process of integration within the CFSP is the inclusion of
competence of the Council to conclude agreements with third parties on behalf of the Union. With
this, the Council was now able to – independently – authorise the Presidency to open and conduct
negotiations assisted by the Commission.214 On a more financial matter, the Council could lay down
212
Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO was appointed as High Representative for the CFSP for five years
by the European Council on 18 October 1999 and started his new occupation in November 1999. Solana was
reappointed as High Representative for the CFSP for another period of five years starting from 18 October 2004 by the
EU Heads of the State.
213
Cameron, p. 68
214
TA art. J.14
72
cost of CFSP measures as a rule to be covered by the EU budget, instead of by the participating states,
as had previously been the case.215
In order to increase the coherence of the CFSP, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduces a new legal
instrument for the CFSP - the "common strategy"216. A common strategy is a ‘package’ approach to an
issue or geographically defined area in which the EU Member States have considerable interests in
common. The strategies are decided upon unanimously by the European Council on the basis of a
recommendation by the EU Council (of foreign ministers). The implementation of common strategies
is conducted through the instruments of Joint Actions and Common Positions. These became subject
to qualified majority voting, except in the cases where a Member State argues that the measure is
directly contrary to its core national interest – in which case it can exercise a veto.217
Even though "common strategies" are still decided unanimously (the intergovernmental character of
the CFSP undeniably remains), the fact that individual decisions on their implementation can be taken
by qualified majority is a clear advance. Even though the actual event of a majority vote only occurs on
rare occasions, the very notion of majority voting in the extremely intergovernmental area is a
movement towards greater flexibility of the Union in foreign policy. One more flexibility innovation
was introduced, and a notable one at that. The introduction of constructive abstention enabled less
than one-third of member states to opt out of a ‘Joint Action’ without vetoing it for the remaining
Member States, who could the continue the action in question.218 Any steps taken to eradicate the
occurrence of ‘lowest common denominator politics’ – the prevalent symptom of unanimity decisionmaking - can only strengthen the Unions foreign policy capability.
While formally the common strategy was designed as a CFSP policy instrument, it serves all three EU
policy pillars equally well and helps orientate and mobilise these pillars toward a single foreign policy
goal. As such the induction of the common strategy approach completely changes the landscape of
CFSP, and equips as a tangible operational capability.219
As a major prerequisite for the EU's improved capacity for action in the field of civilian and military
crisis management, the Treaty incorporated the so-called "Petersberg tasks"220, from the realm of the
215
TA art. J.18
TA art. J.3 (2)
217
Cini, p. 244
218
TA Art. J.13
219
Smith, p. 227
220
See ANNEX 2 - European Security and Defence Policy
216
73
Western European Union (WEU)221, into the framework of the CFSP and opened up for the possibility
of full WEU integration into the EU.222 A murmur of possible defence and military cooperation had
been heard in the EU corridors since the 1950’s. European security policy had followed various trails
during the 1990’s, gradually developing in parallel within the WEU, NATO and the EU itself. In 1996
the WEU had been appointed with the task of overseeing the developments of common defence
identity with(in) NATO, which would allow for a European pillar inside the structure of NATO. 223
However, a specific EU defence dimension as such, despite different attempts, had never materialised,
due mostly to national constraints.
The decisive move came around in 1998, when France and the UK convened a bilateral summit at St.
Malo. Shorlty prior, Prime Minister Tony Blair, had declared the UK’s support for a more independent
security role for the EU, and thus changed its previous stance of advocating for WEU as the min arena.
The joint ’St. Malo declaration’224 breathed new life into the work of strengthening the EU's security
and defence capacity, and was followed up by systematic discussion amongst the member states on a
viable facilitation of security and defence cooperation.225 The Kosovo conflict of 1999 further spurred
this effort, when most EU members of NATO conceded that they still lacked adequately mobile and
sustainable forces for crisis management.
CENTRIPETAL FOREIGN POLICY
In Bosnia the EU’s actions were changing shape in the latter stages of the nineties. In addition of the
humanitarian assistance supplied by the Community through ECHO226, from 1996 BiH benefited from
two major programmes; PHARE and OBNOVA, and not least trade preferences. The Phare
programme was a pre-accession instrument, through which the EU assists applicant countries in their
preparations for potential membership. OBNOVA (renew) was a regional tool intended to aid with the
post-conflict reconstruction, return of refugees, regional cooperation and reconciliation.227 These are
the first specific instruments, with a long term intent of bringing the countries of the region, hereunder
BiH closer to Europe and ‘into the fold’. Through the programmes the EU established for the first
221
The Western European Union (WEU) is a partially dormant European defence and security organization, established
on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 with the accession of West Germany and Italy in 1954. It represented the
forum for military and defence cooperation in parallel with EU integration. For more including a history of the WEU,
see http://www.weu.int/
222
TA art. 17
223
http://www.weu.int/
224
Hill and Smith, p. 243
225
Sjursen, 2003
226
European Community Humanitarian Office – European Commission
227
Council Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 25th July 1996 relating to aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
74
time in the region terms of political and economic conditionality. Hence the economic assistance
provided under the aforementioned initiatives was tied to the respect of human rights, democracy and
the rule of law. The main focus area of the Union’s economic assistance was predominately towards the
reconstruction of the infrastructure, humanitarian aid and return of the refugees. This is underscored by
the EU Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina of June 1998 which represents a central element in the
in the bilateral relations between the EU and BiH. Herein the Council emphasized that the future of
Bosnia and Herzegovina is in Europe and provides the framework for a closer co-operation.228 The
‘regional’ approach adopted at this time has since been present in all EU initiatives and stresses the
need for bilateral, multilateral and regional co-operation at all levels. The purpose is to find mutual
resolutions to problems that any individual state/entity cannot solve alone. In terms of prospective EU
membership, regional cooperation can be considered as a precondition for future membership:
“Integration with the EU is only possible if future members can demonstrate that they are willing and able to interact
with their neighbours as EU Member States”229
Thus, by encouraging regional cooperation it can be argued that the foundations for a long-term
structural solution to the conflicts in the Balkans, lay in the carrot of accession – with the added
responsibility for the ‘conflicting parties’ to cooperate among themselves. In contrast to the harder and
short term military campaign led by the US, the long-term and softer intervention by the EU provided
a vision for the future. It had an overall goal for all to see – even though it was far away on the horizon.
So while it had not been possible without the military intervention, the EU working mainly through
economic instruments laid down the tracks for reviving BiH and the region as a whole. I believe that
this is an underestimated time in the Union’s Bosnia efforts. The regional was elaborated by the
General Affairs Council in April 1997, resolutely establishing conditionality as the foundation for all
relations of development and reconstruction assistance to the countries in the region, including BiH;
“Political and economic conditions as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy towards the development of bilateral
relations in the field of trade, of financial assistance and economic cooperation as well as of contractual relations. The EU
strategy should serve as an incentive and not as an obstacle to the countries concerned to fulfil these conditions”.230
228
2104th Genral Affairs Council
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/09243EN8.doc.htm
229
European Commission (2003), p. 11
230
2003rd General Affairs Council http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/028a0057.htm
75
Under the umbrella of a general regional approach to the problems the EU has operated mainly under
the auspices of mainly the Royaumont Process (created prior to the adoption of the regional approach) and
later the Stabilisation and Association Process.
‘The Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbuorliness in Southeastern Europe’ which was initiated by the
EU Council of Ministers in December 1995. The process which has gone through several changes was
initially intended to complement the implementation of the Dayton agreement.231 Launched in 1996 it
was slow to get of the ground in the pursuit of the relatively ambitious goals which were set to
“…contribute to reducing the tensions arising from the conflict and preventing a resumption of hostilities, promote a better
understanding that it is in the interest of each party to cooperate rather than to try systematically to put obstacles in the
way of any undertaking by a neighbour, contribute to restoring confidence and dialogue, and overcome ethnic divisions and
hatreds.”232 The European Council adopted the terms of reference in October 1997, a coordinator for
the process appointed in November 1997 and the first meeting held in March 1998. Thus it took time
for the first actual action plan to be established.
In parallel and while the EU’s efforts intensified to becoming the most important actor in Bosnia and
the region the creation of the Stabilisation and Association Process was underway.
The Stabilisation and Association Process; A specific approach for South-Eastern Europe233
Despite major efforts to stabilise individual countries and the region as a whole over a decade, the
progress made had been fragile, as the Kosovo crisis in 1999 belatedly demonstrated. There was a
clear need for a stronger initiative for the region. This led the EU to introduce a substantial
innovation: the Stabilisation and Association Process. This Process offers the possibility for the countries of
the region to sign a new kind of Agreement, namely a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with
the EU, opening up concrete EU accession perspectives for the first time, as the EU did for Central
and Eastern European countries in 1998 with the launch of the Enlargement process and the opening
of accession negotiations.
Compared to the negotiations with Central and Eastern European countries, the criteria for opening
negotiations with South-Eastern European countries had been lowered, taking into account the
specific context of the region. It proved the strong commitment of the EU to the stabilisation and
development of the region. However, the Copenhagen criteria for accession remain entirely valid.
For the first time, the Stabilisation and Association Process offers the five countries of the region, including the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, a prospect of EU integration, based on a progressive approach adapted to the situation of the
specific countries. This prospect is a historic turning point in the relations between the five countries and the European
231
The European Stability Initiative - www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_1.pdf
1903rd General Affairs Council http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/028a0001.htm
233
Reproduced from European Commission - http://www.eudelyug.org/en/eu_in_see/stabilisation.htm
232
76
Union.
The Stabilisation and Association Process offered stronger incentives to these five countries, but also
places more demanding political and economic conditions on them. The need for regional cooperation was stressed particularly strongly.
In order to develop a closer relationship with the EU, these countries would have to gear their
political, economic and institutional development to the values and models underpinning the
European Union: democracy, respect for human rights and a market economy. In turn the Union
would support and assist them in introducing the reforms necessary to progress in these areas.
Since its inception in 1999, the stabilisation and association process is the cornerstone of EU´s policy
towards the western Balkans. It offers the countries in the region a steadily closer association with the
EU. The three main instruments underpinning this process — contractual links, autonomous trade
preferences and financial assistance — are designed to equip the countries with the means to maintain
stable democratic institutions, to ensure the rule of law prevails, to sustain open prosperous
economies and to create strong links between the countries and the EU as well as encourage regional
cooperation.
‘EXTERNAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
In lieu of the major humiliation suffered during the armed conflict, and following the signing of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP – Dayton) the EU assumed, as it had promised, to
undertake the task of assisting the Balkan region in the post-conflict reconstruction. At the outset the
Union adopted an approach mainly resting on diplomatic and economic tools - a civilian approach. It is
in this sphere that the EU has it strengths.
Following Dayton an enormous and rapid assistance effort by the international community was
required to address Bosnia and Herzegovina's most urgent needs and to manifest the fragile ‘peace’.
1996 became known as the year of emergency interventions and quick-fix solutions.
The Commission demonstrated the Community's strong political commitment by approving significant
funding and having staff on the ground in Sarajevo within weeks of the Peace Accord. With a total of
€125 million, the Essential Aid Programme (EAP), focusing primarily on essential imports (equipment
for schools, buses, tractors, agricultural inputs, equipment for utilities, etc), provided assistance crucial
to getting reconstruction underway.234
A transition took place in 1997, as EC assistance moved away from addressing only emergency needs
and towards a more systematic approach to rebuilding key sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina
234
European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Counrty Strategy Paper 2002-2006 at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/bosnia_country_strategy_en.pdf
77
fundamental to the overall revival of the economy. Following the conclusions of the London Peace
Implementation Council of December 1996235, the Commission developed an integrated approach to
bring closer together the reconstruction and refugee return aspects of its assistance. Under the guidance
of the High Representative, it also strictly applied the principles of conditionality in implementing its
assistance. It was the General Affairs Council in April 1997, which established the terms of
conditionality in connection. It is fair to say that this was a significant step in the EU’s activities in BiH
and laid the groundwork for progression. But the success of the conditionality concept subsequently
made it a useful tool in arenas outside of BiH. At the same time, the Union was getting involved in
significant funding of institution created to support the civilian aspects of the GFAP; Office of the
High Representative (OHR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and UNHCR who would
undertake the massive task of dealing with the huge number of refugees. Certain political problems
resulted in the delay or disruption of some of the EU’s programme implementation in 1997. An
example of such was when conditionality requirements led to the repeated postponement of the Donor
Conference-. Furthermore, since certain individuals in the Republika Srpska, did not commit fully to
the conditions of the GFAP programmes were suspended.236
In 1998 - the third year of Bosnia’s reconstruction - there was a shift in assistance emphasis agreed by
the international community, which took into the account both the achievements and problems to that
point. Return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons became overarching focus of the
international effort. The ‘red thread’ of the Commissions strategy was moving away from emergency
interventions and towards sustainable targeted programmes in support of institution building and
economic development. Thus half of the 1998 programme funds were directed into to refugee return
initiatives.
Refugee Returns
The return of refugees and displaced people to their homes remains was a key priority for EU
aid to Bosnia, as laid out in the Dayton Agrement. Bosnia received a total of €103 million in aid
during 2000. Special focus was on returning people to the Republika Srpska in eastern BiH, and
also to encourage cross-border returns from Croatia. Helping refugees and internally displaced
persons to return involves more than repairing houses and homes, however. It meant assisting
in assuring employment, schools for their children, healthcare, social security and other
services. In this type of integrated return project the EU relied heavily on the involvement of
local and international NGOs. Between1996-2000 the EU rebuilt over 21,150 houses
throughout Bosnia.
EU annual report 2000
235
Following the successful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, a Peace Implementation
Conference was held in London on December 8-9, 1995, to mobilise international support for the Agreement. The
meeting resulted in the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). www.or.int
236
Pentland, Charles C., 2003, The EU and Southeastern Europe after Dayton; The Centre for European Studies (CES)
78
Additionally the Commission undertook several large institution-building projects, promoting the
development of customs and taxation systems (CAFAO), a modern central bank, and democratic
media237.
The Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO)
Since 1996, the Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO) has been assisting the State and
Entity authorities of Bosnia to implement the customs and tax-related provisions of the Dayton
Peace Agreement. Assistance and advice are given on all aspects of customs and taxation work:
management, organisation, structure, procedures, legal questions, computer systems, investigation,
and training. CAFAO is generally viewed as one of the more successful reform programmes in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with assistance being provided against a background of an inconsistent
and shifting political will to implement change, the continued existence of ethnically-based parallel
structures and widespread corruption. The number of European customs and taxation officers
working in the programme has varied from 20 to 40 depending on programme needs and activities.
One of the most obvious indicators of its success is the consistent increase in customs revenue,
which in 2001 was three times as much as in 1996.
EU annual report 2001
It becomes pretty evident that the EU began to strengthen the normative facet of its contribution in
the Balkans and succeeded (relatively) in its efforts through thee use, only of economic and diplomatic
instruments. These were off course the only instruments available at the time, but it proved that the
beckoning calls for EU military means were not always fully justified. Applying civilian instruments
without the threat of credible force behind – the carrot method – reflected positively on the Union and
proved the ability of the EU as a capable foreign policy actor. This is not to say, that the foreign policy
toolbox of the Union was not complete – far from it.
The diplomatic and political instruments were particularly vital to the EU in the case of Kosovo. While
the US and NATO led the military and security campaign the EU once again had to make do with the
instruments available to enforce its position as a key regional actor. In settling the conflict the EU’s role
was again of the civilian sort. While the story of Kosovo is a book in itself, one facet is crucial and
relevant to this thesis. The Union’s response to the conflict in Kosovo can seem characteristic of the
overall inadequacy of the international community to propel a firm message followed up by necessary
concrete action. The response time was again too slow (as was the case in BiH) to adopt the measures
and even slower in acting upon them – but this was not just an EU illness.238
However EU had a substantial role in the diplomatic efforts to find a solution from the very break out
of political tensions. The Union applied political and economic pressure on Yugoslavia (now FRY) and
237
238
Pentland, p. 4
For a good account of the EU’s respone to Kosovo see Lykke Friis & Anna Murphy, 2000
79
Serbia during the conflict by way of sanctions on Milosevic’s regime and in parallel commenced the
creation of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europa.239 240
Furthermore several Member States came to play key roles, whereby the EU utilised its comparative
advantages for mutual benefit. Using its neutrality and close ties to Russia, Finland personified by
President Martti Ahtisaari was the EU’s chief negotiator and led final talks with the Milosevic regime
alongside US/NATO-critical Russia’s envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. The talks resulted in obtaining
Milosevic’s agreement to the international community’s demands. Meanwhile the UK was able to
pursue the exertion of military pressure on Serbia. The UK did not have any particular ties to Serbia,
but possessed military capabilities and not least close ties to the US. Lastly, Greece utilised its close
geographical proximity to Serbia and its close cultural and historical heritage to maintain negotiations
throughout the conflict, including sealing a deal for the provision of humanitarian aid by the EU.241 The
Kosovo example illustrates the ability of the Union to navigate foreign policy issues by applying either a
unified or a fragmented method. By applying sanctions as a unified entity and exploiting the
comparative advantages of the respective Member States the EU’s intervention contributed greatly to
the resolution of the conflict. What is more, though EU discussions about common defence and
military capabilities was still in its early days, it is worth noting that The ground forces in Kosovo have
been predominantly European from the outset.242
2000 – 2006: Common direction evolving and bring BiH closer to
Europe
’INTERNAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
The Treaty of Nice (TN) was signed on the 26th February 2001 by the then fifteen Member States and
entered into force on 1st February 2003. In terms of foreign policy the Treaty provided few new
arrangements and instead seemed to address some issues which had been left aside at Amsterdam. 243
Provisions in the Treaty defining the EU-WEU relation were removed, with defence aspects tied more
directly into the EU framework instead.
239
The Stability Pact (SEE) is the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, reactive
crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. For
more see http://www.stabilitypact.org/
240
UK Ministry of Defence - http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/lessons/chapter5.htm
241
Kaufholz, p. 10
242
UK Ministry of Defence: http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/lessons/chapter5.htm
243
Smith, 233
80
One vital innovation of Nice was the extension of the concept of enhanced cooperation to the CFSP,
until then a mechanism reserved for the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. Enhanced cooperation allows
for a number of countries increase the scope and function of their cooperation, on matters covered by
the EU’s treaty base, and in doing so to utilise the common institutions and procedures of the Union.
As such there is room for manoeuvre even though some Members States do not wish to participate,
thereby adding flexibility to the foreign policy of the Union. This, however, does not provide Member
States with a carte blanche to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the Union in any which way it
chooses.244
According to the Treaty Article 27a enhanced cooperation in the CFSP should aim at safeguarding the
values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on
the international scene and should respect; the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency
of the common foreign and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy;
the powers of the European Community; and consistency between all the Union's policies and its
external activities.245 Thus, enhanced cooperation is designed to respect both the consistency of the
common foreign policy and the consistency between foreign policies and all other EU policies.246
There is though one area, in which the TN did not allow enhanced cooperation and an important on at
that. All matters having military or defence implications were excluded from application of enhanced
cooperation. This could potentially have negative consequences for the coherence of the Union since
any it creates a gap between activities under the Common European Security and Defence Policy
(CESDP) and those under the rest of the CFSP. It becomes virtually impossible to apply enhanced
cooperation in any form in areas such as defence industry, but more importantly (in foreign policy
terms) it has grave effects on the operational capacity in crisis management; without adding military
components enhanced cooperation in crisis management becomes de facto impossible.247
Iraq - redux
In late 2002 and early 2003 the build up to the eventual Iraq war saw great divides between the EU
Member States over the EU stance on the matter. Europe was split down the middle on the question.
While the UK (US closest ally) lead a faction of Member States countries broadly supportive of military
action, including Spain, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands and the former Soviet bloc countries of
244
SCADPlus - http://europa.eu/scadplus/nice_treaty/cooperations_en.htm
Treaty of Nice Article 27a - http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice.html
246
Missiroli, 2001, p. 192
247
Missiroli, 2001, p. 192
245
81
Central and Eastern Europe who mostly lined up behind the US. Meanwhile France and Germany
headed the anti-war bloc and leaned towards Russia. The ‘pro-war’ bloc sent a letter of support to the
US, without the consent of the Greek Presidency, which despite all its efforts was sidelined and
subsequently fell in line with the anti-war bloc. The EU’s complete lack of unity resulted in damage to
its identity, credibility and institutional structure and also impaired trust between Member States.248
The Iraqi crisis underscored the constant problem in EU foreign policy; the complexity involved in
reaching unified positions on the largest and most sensitive foreign policy issues. Add to this the
enlargement process and the divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, and the situation and ability to
reach consensus dramatically worsened. Though consensus did exist on the objectives, divergence was
the order of the day regarding the threat assessment and by which means to respond to threats. Carl
Bildt notes;
“Early 2003 was probably the low point in modern times for the ambitions of the European Union as a global actor in
the field of foreign affairs and security. Not only were views among key member countries very divided, but it was also
obvious that practically no one tried to use the mechanism of the EU to try to bridge the divisions”249
European Security Strategy
Late 2003 saw the first overarching strategic document for the EU’s foreign policy, in what by many
seemed a response to the spilt over Iraq. On the request of Member State foreign ministers, Javier
Solana drafted the European Security Strategy (ESS) titled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ and
presented it at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. Following a revisions process,
including inputs by the Member and acceding states (and independent experts), the final text was
adopted in Rome on 12-13th December 2003.
The intent behind the ESS was two-fold; to found a common European concept of security and the
strategy to supplement it; to prevent future divisions on sensitive issues (like Iraq) and ultimately to
make the EU a more coherent and effective actor on foreign and security issues. One of the advocates
of the ESS was Fraser Cameron250. According to Cameron the respective Member States had (have)
their own security concepts by which they act and react. However, as the Iraq Crisis illustrated there
was no security concept at the EU level, by which the Member States were tied together - hence the
248
Cameron, F., 2003b
Bildt, 2004, p. 23
250
Scholar and current Head of the Political and Academic Affairs Section in the Delegation of the European
Commission in Washington DC Head of Delegation at the European Commission in Washington.
249
82
divisions.251 Everts shares the view and asserts the urgent requirement for a security strategy, at the time
pointing to the lack a shared vision, assessment of security threats and sufficient policy responses.252
He believed that EU Member States first and foremost shaped their own national viewpoint and
subsequently only half-heartedly attempted to find a common stance with European partners. For the
development of a successful foreign policy, Europeans needed to agree on a basic common view of the
nature of the international security environment – an environment which changed overnight following
the 11th September – and the EU’s role within it. This would include an understanding and listing of
serious threats and appropriate responses. Furthermore the ESS would aid in reconciling the ‘activists’
(e.g. UK and France) who wanted to pursue and active EU role in the world, with the ‘pacifists’ (e.g.
Germany, Sweden, Finland) who opted for an EU with a more regional outlook.253
The ESS that was adopted emphasises the importance of coherence as a means to becoming an
effective actor. It highlighted the need for increasing convergence of European interests and the
strengthening of mutual solidarity within the EU as a way to make Europe a more credible and
effective actor. 254 In addition to the goals and visions within the ESS, it also examined the policy
implications for the EU if it was to realise the strategy and visions; the EU would need to be more
active, more coherent and more capable and they would have to work with others, if their contributions
were to match their potential. It called for the development of a strategic culture that fostered early,
rapid, and (when necessary), robust intervention, including to develop operations involving both
military and civilian capabilities. Moreover the EU needs to shift from reactive to proactive in foreign
policy and as such support the UN’s strategy for pre-emptive engagement. 255
Bringing the different instrument of the EU into tune was another key focus area of the ESS, noting
that the problems faced by the EU often called for the use of multiple instruments simultaneously.
European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian
capabilities from Member States and other instruments, Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and
environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. “In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of
command”256
251
Cameron, F., 2003b
Everts, 2003
253
Everts, 2003
254
European Security Strategy, p.1.
255
European Security Strategy, p. 11-14
256
European Security Strategy, p. 13
252
83
The ESS has brought the EU a new dimension in foreign policy. Much like the acquis communautaire and
acquis poltique it brings to the Union an acquis stratégique by establishing common priorities and setting
clear and shared policy goals. By constructing a security concept the Union – in terms of integration –
has reached new heights. Although it may seem trivial at first glance the Union has in reality taken over
the defining and formulating the policy goals and means of the Member State on the strongest bastion
of State policy. The Strategy is broad enough to include different strategic traditions in Europe, but
focused enough to become a rallying call and an engine for coherent and effective foreign policy action.
Off course one should not get ahead of one-self; it still requires the backing and ultimately the will of
the Member States. Nonetheless it should be regarded as a historic event. In the words of Carl Bildt257;
“This is the first time a more comprehensive attempt has been made to go beyond Henry Kissinger’s - where’s the telephone
number? - to the far more important question of what to say in the event that someone does actually call?”
Using a peculiar analogy to computer systems he claimed that the EU was beginning to fill the
‘hardware’ of the institutions, with the ‘software’ of policies and that the ESS would be the operating
system that would make it possible for the EU’s other programmes and policies to work in a
comprehensive and coherent way.258
Enlargement and the Constitutional Draft
On the 1st May 2004 the EU opened its doors to the ten new Member States. Insofar this has
presented a mouthful for the EU in general as it clearly takes time to accommodate the newest
Members. A plethora of envisaged changes can become reality with the new scope of EU foreign
policy. For example, with the enlargement to the east the EU is traveling geographically closer to
Russia. The Union and Russia are becoming neighbours, and one could expect that this will
fundamentally alter the relationship between Brussels and Moscow - the major foci of power on the
European continent. However, in terms of foreign policy, no major situations have as yet arisen, which
would seriously test the resolve of the Union with 25 Member States. So it remains to be seen how the
EU would cope with a scenario such as Iraq or Kosovo.
2004 also saw the next step in the evolution of the EU’s foreign policy (and the Union as a whole) with
the signing of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe259 (TCE), in October 2004. Based
on the long-running work of the Convention on the Future of Europe, headed by Valery Giscard
257
Bildt, p.23
Bildt, p. 23
259
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/constit.html
258
84
d’Estaing the Treaty text introduced a series of amendments which would further strengthen the EU’s
ability to conduct a more effective and coherent foreign policy.
As we now know, the Draft Constitution failed to be ratified due to the no-votes in referendums in
France and the Netherlands. This has somewhat paralysed the development and initiative of foreign
policy evolution. However it is worthwhile to look at the innovations of the Draft, since these may well
yet become reality and may therefore illustrate the foreign policy of the near future. I would argue that
the provisions on foreign policy are not the main reasons behind the French and Dutch no-vote, and
that we will see these provisions materialise – in some form – in the near future. What is more, the
intent for further and more structured cooperation depicted in the draft, is in itself a step towards
deeper integration.
Most noticeably the TCE introduced a new concept for the Presidency, a solidartity clause, an
extension of the Petersberg Tasks and permanent structures of cooperation.260
Certain problems with the current rotating Presidency led to a rethinking of the concept.
Firstly, a lack of consistency arises when each Member State hold the Presidency for the relatively short
time-frame of six-months. This time is often used impose individual foreign policy preferences and
priorities on the EU, leaving the impression that each change of Presidency becomes a rebirth of EU
policy. Furthermore, international incidents, such as Iraq and September 11th can put a strain on smaller
Member States who do not yield the same political clout in the world as the larger states. As such
timing becomes an issue. Examples of such are the Greek Presidency during the Iraq split (sidelined)
and the Belgian Presidency during September 11th (overshadowed by larger Member States and ignored
by the US).261 To avert problems of continuity and representation, caused by the six-month rotating
presidency the TCE introduced a new format, including a two and a half year term for a President
elected by the European Council.262
A Solidarity Clause was introduced in the TCE depicting that in the event that a Member State the victim
of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the EU shall act jointly to assist. The EU will
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal including the military resources made available by the
Member States; to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; to protect
democratic institutions, the civilian population from any terrorist attack; and to assist a Member State in
260
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/constit.html
Grant, 1996
262
TCE Art. I-22 Articles referenced to; Bonde, Jens-Peter, Traktat om en Forfatning for Europa, 2005, euABC.dk
261
85
its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or manmade disaster.263
The clause undoubtedly arises out of the developments in international terrorism over recent years and
provides an equal to NATO’s ‘musketeer oath’ of one for all and all for one. Although, not providing
the EU with a pro-active externally directed tool, it leaves the impression of a stronger more united
Europe.
With the TCE the Petersberg Tasks expand to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation.264 However,
whether these are actually new tasks is doubtful, since they do not appear to extend beyond the current
Petersberg task, but merely lay within the current scope. An inclusion, though, is the specification of
purposes for which the tasks may be used. The TCE states that both civilian and military means might
be used and that all tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including supporting third
countries in combating terrorism in their territories.265
According to Duke this is of vital psychological importance because;
“…it moves the Union away from the previous division between the Petersberg tasks and the remaining civilian aspects of
crisis management, many of which were not specifically mentioned in the Petersberg tasks but nevertheless took their
legitimacy from CFSP’s general mandate covering ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’.”266
As such the definition of crisis management has evolved to entail a wider array of tasks and the means
by which to resolve problems, structured under the same heading and governed by the same
procedures. Whether or not, it will increase the resolve and response of the Union is hard to predict,
but it should surely lend coherence and improved coordination in times when the EU does engage in
crisis management.
The TCE creates a new post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, with the aim of providing an
institutional bridge between the supranational European Commission and the intergovernmental
Council; and to solve the problem of representation. The move would merge the current functions of
263
TCE Art. I-43 & III-329
TCE Art. III-309
265
TCE Art. III-309
266
Duke, p. 21
264
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HR CFSP and the Commissioner for External relations into an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs
(EUFM), who would also become Vice President of the Commission.267 This would ensure improved
coherence and working relations between the two arms of EU foreign policy. This should also be seen
in the light of the intent to grant the EU with legal personality268 which would only reinforce the
representation and credibility of the prospective EU foreign minister.
Among the best examples of the TCE’s practical benefits for foreign policy is the envisaged European
External Action Service (EEAS), which would be set up to support the EU Foreign Minister in his/her
external representation. The EEAS would be an EU diplomatic service (much like national diplomatic
services) that would provide the EUFM with a readily available and substantial instrument to assist in
developing, maintaining and streamlining the EU’s foreign policy clout. Although it is unclear how it
would be structures it represents a positive step for EU coherence and effectiveness if foreign policy.269
While we can conclude that the TCE has not come into effect, and that it is unclear whether any or all
of the innovations for foreign policy will actually materialise, the draft TCE represents steps in the right
direction. It will generally add to the coherence, representation and continuity of the foreign policy –
granted that the Member States still retain the final word.
‘CENTRIPETAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
Based on its adoption at the Cologne Council in June 1999 the Union launched the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe270. The Pact, which had been initiated by the German Presidency constituted an
attempt to develop and improve the long-term strategy of the Union in the whole Western Balkan
region, including not least potential induction into Euro-Atlantic structures. The Stability Pact, and the
adjacent initiatives (e.g. SAP) provided for an increased purpose and direction, including manifesting
the EU as the lead actor in the region.
Speaking on the role of the EU in Bosnia former External Relations Commissioner, Christopher Patten
he highlighted the normative effect and ability of the Union in furthering improvements. He said that
the Balkan States, hereunder Bosnia
267
TCE Art. I-28
TCE Art. I-7
269
Duke, p. 33
270
The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, adopted on 10 June 1999 in Cologne, is a European Union initiative. Its
aim is to bring peace, stability and economic development to the region. In its construction, the Stability Pact is not a
direct instrument of the EU. It lays down a framework for co-operation between the European Union, the European
Commission, the United States, Russia, Japan, South-Eastern European countries, Turkey and other countries including
regional and international organisations and international financing institutions.
268
87
“…identify the EU with security, with jobs, with a decent and rising standard of living, with the rule of law upheld by
accountable, democratic, clean public institutions, a system in which rights of minorities are protected by law, not by carving
out territory. They recognize the EU as probably the most successful conflict prevention and resolution mechanism in
history. And they desperately want to be part of it.”271
Thus, the carrot of membership was such a strong instrument, that it could facilitate internal changes in
Bosnia, simply because it provided the “…EU with enormous leverage”272. And it appears that there was
plenty of support to be had. In support the Stability Pact and the SAP the European Councils in Feira,
2000 and Thessaloniki, 2003 endorsed the prospect of future membership for the countries, given the
fulfilment of the necessary criteria. In December 2002 the European Council in Copenhagen confirmed
the European perspective on the countries of the Western Balkans as potential candidates. Furthermore
it underlined the determination to support the countries in their efforts to move even closer to the
Union. This was reiterated at the European Council in March 2003 which also pledged the full support
of the EU to undertakings of the countries of the region to strengthen democracy, consolidate stability
and to encourage economic advances.273 In reaffirming its commitment the EU kept the ‘fire burning’
so to speak;
“The European Council, recalling its conclusions in Copenhagen (December 2002) and Brussels (March 2003),
reiterated its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries,
which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria”274
The strategy towards integration in the SAP is based on local ownership and conditionality, meaning
that Bosnia will work towards matching the set criteria at the pace best suited for the country, while
abiding by the conditions set by the EU.
“The speed with which each country moves through the different stages of the SAP, taking ownership of the process,
depends on the increasing ability to take on the obligations flowing from an ever closer association with the EU as well as
compliance with the conditionality policy defined by the Council””275
271
Patten quoted in Pentland, p. 11
Patten quoted in Pentland p. 11
273
2474th & 2495th General Affairs and External Relations Council
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/newsWord/en/gena/75004.doc
274
European Council Conclusion - http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf
275
2425th General Affairs Council 272
88
The economic, institutional and political criteria were established by the Copenhagen European
Council in 1993, with enlargement in mind, and set out in the TEU.276 As such, the same criteria apply
to Bosnia as those of the recently acceded countries. 277 Additionally certain criteria were formulated
specifically for the SAP countries, and depict full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); respect for human and minority rights; the creation of real
opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons to return; and a visible commitment to
regional co-operation.278
The overall objective of the SAP was at the time that BiH in the future would be able to negotiate a
SAA. With the introduction of the SAP in 1999 as the new EU’s strategy for the region, further
preferential EU trade concessions were adopted for BiH, as well as more economic assistance under
the new CARDS programme. In the first four years of the new millennium the SAP was the main
driving force behind the positive changes in BiH and the region as a whole. The carrot of closer ties to
Europe provided the critical progress needed to bring Bosnia out of the chaos following the war and
the early Dayton period and obtain some degree of stability. The aim for Bosnia now shifted from that
of stabilisation and reconstruction to sustainable development, association and integration into
European structures. Although a long-term and complex process it provided for an incentive of
development, with the Union’s policy of Stabilisation and Association constituting the framework for
the European road until eventual future succession.279
An important component of the SAP, for countries that have made adequate improvement in terms of
political and economic reform and administrative capacity, is a formal contractual relationship with EU
in the form of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which is intended to link the political
stabilisation and domestic reform.280 One dimension of the SAA, for example, is the obtainment of
trade preferences incorporated into the commitment. Though Bosnia was not in a position to obtain
SAA status in the early 00’s it became a beacon of light towards which to travel.
The Union provided a large financial assistance package programme under the heading CARDS
launched in 2000 (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) to assist
the development the SAP. CARDS became the main financial instrument in the SAP and provided a
276
TEU Art. 6 & 49
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 26 May 1999 on the
stabilisation and association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r18003.htm
278
Report from the Commission of 26 March 2003 - The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe –
Second Annual Report COM(2003) 139 - http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r18003.htm p. 5-6
279
Ralchev, p. 7
280
CARDS - http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/cards/index_en.htm
277
89
total of € 4.6 billion to the region in the period 2000 to 2006 earmarked for investment, institutionbuilding, and other measures to achieve four main objectives:
1. reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, reconciliation and the return of refugees
2. institutional and legislative development, including harmonisation with European Union norms and approaches,
to underpin democracy and the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free
market economy
3. sustainable economic and social development, including structural reform
4. promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among countries and between them, the EU and the
candidate countries of central Europe.281
Of the total EUR 4.65 billion, some EUR 500 million were allocated to Bosnia in the period. With the
SAP the EU moved the responsibility further into the hands of Bosnia for its movement towards the
Union, since the general performance and the implementation of reforms determines the opening of
negotiations of a SAA. Conditionality became the strongest principle in EU assistance and a demand
for commitment by government of Bosnia the main engine for improvement.282
’EXTERNAL’ FOREIGN POLICY
As the new millennium rolled around the EU seemed adamant that a strong engagement with a clear
offer of membership could facilitate long-term stability to the Balkans, and that the problems in the
Western Balkans also influenced the EU and therefore, that the Union held a responsibility to promote
stability in the region. This general view can be found in the ESS;
“The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including
in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there
to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU” 283
In the early 00’s there was a clear shift in the policy towards BiH, which (as illustrated above) was
targeted at bringing the country closer to Europe through stabilisation and association. As such the use
of traditional foreign policy instruments either slowly faded or was replaced or carried over into the
administration of the SAP. As such it became a pillar 1 activity more than a CFSP activity to drive
Bosnia forward.
281
Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/general/2666_00_en.pdf
282
Ralchev, p. 7
283
European Security Strategy, p. 6
90
However the Eu’s activities in Bosnia have not been limited to economic and/or civilian instruments in
the first years of the new millennium. As earlier noted it became clear after the Bosnian war, that there
was a need at times for military coercion, if the EU was to stand any chance of becoming an effective
promoter of norms and/or creator of peace. This may seem contradictory, which is also the point made
by critics of the EU’s intention to develop military capabilities. Others argue that it is a necessity if the
EU intends to develop into a more credible and effective international actor. The latter argument
appears to have prevailed and since the French/Anglo St. Malo summit, the option of military force in
crisis management has been in the cards and gradually included into the arsenal of EU foreign policy
instruments. So even though the EU’s engagement in BiH characterises an increased commitment to
the promotion civilian means and a regional approach, Bosnia has also become the testing ground for
the continually developing ESDP. It has proved an apt possibility of deploying ESDP capabilities, such
as police, security and military missions.
“The experience of the Balkans has been a sobering one for the European Union. But it has I believe also provided us
with an opportunity. It is a test of our commitment to the region, to a wider Europe, and to a mature common foreign and
security policy. The Balkans has shown that the European Union can no longer remain a force for peace simply through
example. It has also to be forthright in defending the basic values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which
it is founded”284
The first concrete CFSP/ESDP step taken was the appointment of an EU Special Representative
(EUSR) as the eyes and ears of the Union on the ground in March 2002. Serving dually as the High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the UN and representing the figurehead of the EU’s
presence in the country. The mandate given by the EU was to oversee the whole range of activities
conducted by the Union and to ensure coordination of the efforts of the international community as a
whole.285 As set out in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement the High Representative is responsible for
overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement286. As the High
Representative the EUSR has vested powers “to remove from office public officials who violate legal commitments
and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as he sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to
do so”.287
284
Solana Speech, 2000, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy" http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=246&BID=107&DocID=621
17&insite=1
285
http://www.eusrbih.org/ - EU Special Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina.
286
Dayton text: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380
287
Also known as the Bonn Powers : See OHR http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/
91
Shortly after taking office, the first EUSR – Lord Paddy Ashdown – had his portfolio increased to
overseeing a EU police mission, launched in BiH in January 2003. The European Union Police Mission
(EUPM) aids local law enforcement organizations. It is the first such mission undertaken by the EU
within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security and Policy and represents a significant step
in the crisis management history of the Union. Succeeding United Nations' International Police Task
Force in Bosnia, the EUPM aims to aid “…in establishing a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service
operating in accordance with best European and international standards”. Furthermore, it assists local law
enforcement in fighting large-scale organised crime and assisting with the countries ongoing police
reform.288
In December 2004 the EU launched the EUFOR/Althea peacekeeping mission to succeed the long
running NATO SFOR operation in BiH. Deploying a force equivalent to the NATO force of 7000
troops, it represented the biggest military operation for the ESDP to date. Even though 80% of the
troops remained the same, as under the NATO flag, the mission would lend experience to the
CFSP/ESDP infrastructure on the control and command elements of a major military engagement.
The EU took over the mandate of SFOR to ensure continued compliance with Dayton Agreement and
to contribute to a safe and secure environment, which could facilitate the further success of the civilian
aspects of Dayton.289 It is worth noting that the military operation was an integral part of a coherent
EU approach, which intertwined with other EU measures being applied – a so-called integrated
approach. Thus it added value to the EU’s political engagement, assistance programmes, EUPM all in
the context of the Stabilisation and Association. Hence the EU was ‘firing on all cylinders’ by 2005,
using almost all the different elements of the foreign policy toolbox.
It is not without merit that the Balkans, Bosnia in particular, has been dubbed the testing ground for
the ESDP. After all, the Western Balkans has been an area of high priority since the failure of the early
90’s, and it represents a region full of threats; regional conflict, state’s failure, organised crime, human
and drug trafficking, small weapons trafficking and migration.290 Comparing the activities in BiH of the
EU to the threats and responses listed in the European Security Strategy indicate that the EU is indeed
following through on the promises herein.The ESS calls for the EU to tackle all relevant threats in a
coherent and active manner, using a mixture of instruments (including the use of military instruments);
288
EUPM - http://www.eupm.org/MissionOverview.asp
EUFOR - http://www.euforbih.org/
290
ESS, p. 6-9
289
92
build security in its neighbourhood; and foster cooperation and effective multilateralism as a way to
better deal with these problems.291
Looking through the activities of the EU described in the earlier parts of the analysis it would be fair to
deem that the EU is well on its way to fulfilling the strategy, if looking at the history of activities in
Bosnia and the Western Balkan region. On the other hand one could argue that the ESS was produced
at a stage in the intervention, whereby it could be rationalised to fit the circumstances. I choose to
believe that the EU is living up to its own ideals for the EU foreign policy and the EU’s role in
international affairs.
291
ESS, p. 11-16
93
In sum
Having now concluded the analysis of the development of the EU’s foreign policy over the past 15
years, it is time to stop and reflect briefly on the findings.
The EU has without doubt come ‘leaps and bounds’ since the early 90’s where the forst Gulf War and
the Yugoslavian conflict bared the inability of the Union to cope. In parallel with the developments of
the early phases of the Yugoslavian/Bosnian conflicts the EC became the EU and took it upon itself to
start building a common foreign and security policy. It was with the creation of the Union through the
TEU that the CFSP was born. However, events showed that being able to conduct foreign policy
requires much more that a collection of articles in a Treaty text. While expectations for the EU clearly
rose – both within and outside the Union – the capabilities did not follow suit. Nor did the solidarity
which the Member States had committed themselves to and so not all foreign policy in the early 90’s
were conducted in a ‘spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’.
With new Treaty based innovations in the late 90’s the foreign policy started to take shape and
provided promise for the future. What is more the form and scope of the task in Bosnia changed into
something the EU was already good at – providing economic assistance and solving problems needing
diplomatic solutions. Through successive Treaty based innovations the EU more actors, instruments
and resources have been attached to the Unions foreign policy dimension, just as greater coherence
between the Unions three pillars has been achieved through institutional adjustments.
The EU has engaged in what could be described as ‘learning by doing’. Acting in foreign policy is a
complex matter, which even the traditional states can have problems with. Along the way there have
been severe disappointments and failures. However, it seems that each failure lead to a regrouping and
renewed attempts to grow stronger. To exemplify; the failures surrounding the Gulf War and Bosnia
pushed the CFSP to the top of the agenda at the 1991 IGC, resulting in the provisions of Maastricht;
Kosovo fuelled the considerations of the ESDP and a more comprehensive approach to crisis
management; and the split over Iraq (2003) prompted the formulation of the ESS and a more
purposive strategic approach to common foreign and security policy.
On one front especially the EU has excelled. Taking up its role as the regional centre of power and
normative leader, it has pushed forward incredible achievements in countries devastated by war not
more than a decade ago. By applying the principles of conditionality in return for potential preferences,
94
association and membership it has succeeded in assisting the countries of the Western Balkans into
steady development. The ‘carrot method’ has brought about reforms prompting democratic values,
respect for human rights and the rule of law.
By looking at the historical development of the Unions foreign policy it can be concluded that it has
grown into a capable and coherent foreign policy actor. It yields massive influence in international
politics, not least in its geographical proximity.
As I (believe to) have demonstrated in this analysis there are much more positive signs that can be
concluded from the EU’s foreign policy, than it has been credited for. Although starting weakly the EU
has increased its influence and presence in the world, and produced remarkable results in BiH
specifically. This has been achieved using a wide scope of policies and instruments, covering economic,
political, diplomatic and military instruments. Furthermore there has been a progressive pulling of BiH
towards the EU as a prospective future member state. By examining the three dimensions of EU
foreign policy; internal, centripetal and external, instead of merely CFSP or external foreign policy actions I
believe I have illustrated the benefits of the EU as a foreign policy system - and not least the usefulness
of perceiving the EU as such.
It would be great to conclude my examination here and applaud the EU for all its efforts – and myself
for a correct initial assumption. However, one cannot ignore the noticeable problematic of EU foreign
policy when it comes to down to the crunch. In the event of critical and/or sensitive international
incidents and conflicts it continues to fall short in terms of its capacity to produce collective decisions
and impact events. In those instances where a unified and strong EU could ideally make the difference,
the problem of coherence and effectiveness is still clear. So, as not to leave ‘a stone unturned’ the
following section represents an analysis of the institutional elements which still seem to inhibit the EU’s
ability in international politics.
95
9. ANALYSIS – Institutional weaknesses of Union
Studying the institutional setup of EU foreign policy
The combination of intergovernmental and supranational institutions in the same political entity is an
immediate “cause for concern”. How is it possible to conduct coherent and efficient foreign policy,
when the central institutions are guided by different methods of decision-making, resource allocation
and operate under differentiated legal basis? The very diversity that gives the EU an advantage (as
described in the prior analysis) is also the root causes of incoherence and ineffectiveness, when it
comes to the unified approach on matters of high importance and political sensitivity. Three main
characteristics seem to make the difference between a state actor and the EU – a foreign policy system;
1) actors and jurisdiction, 2) multiple institutions and 3) coordination. In a nation state there would
typically be one actor with the jurisdiction to conduct foreign policy, namely national governments.
Based on the government’s direction foreign ministries, other ministries and national institutions
conduct elements of the policy, but all from the lead of the head of government. As such coordination,
while definitely a must, is overseen by the government and therefore directed hereby. On these three
points the EU’s foreign policy encounters severe problems as I shall now attempt to illustrate, while
also the question of representation also will be touched upon.
The EU, counting the Member States, has been unsuccessful in obtaining the international influence
comparable to the immense diplomatic and economic resources that it holds, when it comes to the high
politics of international conflicts and severe threats to international peace and security.
In conjunction the EU and Member States far outweigh any other single actor on the international
arena. To recap; with its member-states it accounts for 55 per cent of all official International
development assistance and some 60 per cent of all grant aid. They finance 50 per cent of world aid to
the Palestinian Territories, over 60 per cent of all aid to Russia and close to 85 per cent to the
Balkans.292 The amount of diplomatic staff and third country representations by far outnumber those of
the second largest actor; the United States. While the EU numbers 40,000 (diplomatic) staff members
within 1500 diplomatic missions, the US number 15000 staff in 300 missions.293 So why the lacking
political clout? In the following I shall argue that weak there still exists problems of weak foreign policy
292
Statement by former Commissioner for External Relations, Mr. Christopher Patten to the Institute of European
Affairs, Dublin, March 2001. - http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech01_111.htm
293
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76748.pdf - Council of the European Union
96
coordination, that the jurisdiction among the many actors is unclear and that an institutional imbalance
between power and resources are among those factors that can be blamed.
Coordination
The conversion of the abovementioned resources into credible action has at times failed in part due to
lack of effective coordination. The existence of strong ‘nation-state preferences’ and the attachment of
Member States to their freedom of manoeuvre have detrimental effects of underperformance on the
international stage.294 A careful estimate is that in 90% of cases the governments of the EU Members
States would be able, in some capacity, to find common ground. Unfortunately it is in the remaining
10% of cases that the disagreements between members become apparent and surface for all to see. The
best and most notable example of this was the pre-Iraq war split. It is difficult to envisage that some of
the persisting divergence of positions could be shelved. This is because they rest on underlying cultural
and historical sentiments that are not easily ignored. This is off course often the case when
disagreement in bi- and multilateral relations occur, but the implications for EU foreign policy are
harmful not just to the substance of the issue, but also to the common European foreign policy ideal.
To illustrate one can emphasize the very relevant case of trans-Atlantic relations. The relationship with
the United States can be split roughly down the middle of the EU. On the one side are the continental
Europeans (old-Europe295) where ‘anti-American’ sentiments are predominantly more noticeable - not
least France and Germany are categorised in this group. On the other side, we find the Anglo-Saxon
countries and many of the new Member States (new-Europe), particularly from the former communist
block of countries, where a greater tendency to align policy with the US is exists.296
The EU may have been capable of acting strongly in more uncontroversial issues such as restrictive
measure against Burma, Liberia and terrorist groups297, but when it comes to policies directed towards
more sensitive policy areas (i.e. Iraq, Russia, China, US) fragmentation has been the order of the day.
However, there are also achievements that should be emphasized to contrast the bleak picture of
failures. The exception that stands out is the remarkable progress made in the EU policy towards the
Balkans. Here, the EU has been effective and cohesive in learning from previous shortcomings. Within
294
Everts, 2002,
The old/new Europe distinction was highlighted by US Secretary of Defence in the UN Security Council in the build
up to the Iraq war.
296
Alesina and Perotti, 2004
297
CFSP Sanctions - http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm
295
97
recent years the EU has taken the lead and been the driving factor behind the current state of affairs.
And although the Balkans has a long way to go, much has been accomplished.298
There is much to suggest that an institutionally constructed foreign policy, particularly the Council-led
CFSP, is inadequate to entail a single coherent and credible Union approach to the world. Unless there
is political will from the primary actors – the Member States – it is at times merely a hollow framework.
Until the Member States believe that their national interests are best served at the supranational level
and/or that national interests can take a backseat to that of common interests, the intergovernmental
approach may continue to come under sharp criticism – and rightly so.299 However, as ever nation-state
preferences in foreign policy are at the core of the national identities and so the projected single voice
of Europe has many languages and dialects. To exemplify imagine this hypothetical scenario. France
and the United Kingdom are undoubtedly key actors in Europe’s present and future. Both have long
standing histories of foreign policies, not least as former colonial powers. They were on the same side
during World War two and the subsequent peace, have both been at the centre of world politics for
decades and hold an equal position of power in way of permanent seats at the UN Security Council. In
regards to foreign policy they share the intergovernmental rather than the federal approach, but few
would argue that a hypothetical Europe would look different with either France or Britain in the
driving seat.
Actors and jurisdiction
The old saying about “too many chefs in the kitchen” is more than applicable to EU foreign policy.
The functions of foreign policy are dealt with by the whole range of institutions and actors making it
difficult to envisage any kind of coherence and/or consistency. While EU foreign policy is functionally
unified it is characterized by institutional fragmentation, which results in disharmony, confusion and
lack of coherence. It is unavoidable when a myriad of bodies from different institutional contexts act
within the same area.
Separated by 200 meters by the Rue de la Loi in Brussels are the offices of the two most powerful
institutional positions in European Union Foreign Policy. Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the
Council of Ministers is also the High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and represents the EU on behalf of the 25 member states. He is the figurehead of the
298
See twenty-eighth report of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and
Herzegovina, at www.un.org
299
Cameron, 1998
98
intergovernmental arrangement set up to give Kissinger his one phone number.300 Benita FerreroWaldner is the Commissioner for External Relations in the current Barroso Commission and
administers all external programmes and day- to-day relations with third countries. In theory the two
positions are complementary. The HR being the much needed high-profile diplomat and the focal
point for common EU policy, who is responsible for the Unions rapid reaction force; and the external
relations commissioner who controls the EU’s staggering external relations budget of approximately
EUR 11.7 billion301 (2006) for humanitarian and development aid, conflict prevention and the effects of
conflict. However there is much to suggest that foundation for intra-institutional turf wars exist and
that the two most powerful positions in EU’s foreign policy are miles apart. At first glance it seems that
there is no clear definition on the scope of responsibilities – or more importantly – the jurisdiction of
each. As such there is overlapping responsibilities in areas where a more than coherent and delicate
approach may be needed.
A current and telling example is the situation in the Middle East. The EU is the single biggest donor of
funds to the Palestinians302, hence the HR has an important role to play as representative of the EU and
a member of the Quartet303. However the HR has to incorporate the views and opinions of the 25
member states into his actions - views that are far from coherent. In many ways the HR’s hands are tied
and his influence limited to the common denominator of the EU25 positions. Furthermore, there is no
external service infrastructure to support his efforts and the HR “… operates with woefully inadequate
resources, in terms of [ ] money”.304 The Commissioner for external relations, on the other hand, controls a
vast infrastructure including offices in third countries and the aforementioned foreign budget. While
the Commission is naturally fully associated with the formulation and implementation of the CFSP and
supports the EU's position in the Middle East Peace Process305, the commissioner for external relations
has the instruments and the economic tools and not least the vested right to dispose of them. Some
would claim that this gives the Commission the possibility to stretch their authority in order to further
own agendas and interests. Some would go a step further and claim this is the case.
Whatever the case, there is just cause to look closely at the institutions and decision making processes
of the European Union vis-à-vis foreign policy. To exemplify this one needs look no further than the
European Commission. Foreign policy issues, in the context of the Commission are coordinated in the
300
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once complained that he didn't know Europe's telephone number. In
doing so he was making the point that Europe did not have one consolidated voice/opinion on matters of international
security.
301
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/index_en.htm - General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2006
302
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/ - European Commission
303
Quartet: USA, the UN, Russia and the EU
304
Cameron, 2003
305
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/ - European Commission
99
Group of Commissioners for External Relations chaired by the President (currently Mr. Barosso) and
constituting also Commissioners for RELEX, Trade, Enlargement and Development.306
While the Commissioner of RELEX is responsible for coordinating external relations as a whole she is
institutionally equal to the other Commissioners there is no lead Commissioner. Moreover, DG
RELEX is not generally responsible for many of the countries and regions that are dealt with. DG
Enlargement deals with current and prospective candidate countries for EU accession, including those
on the Western Balkans, which still are subject to EU peacekeeping/peace-facilitating operations and
several other EU foreign policy instruments, not directly related to pre-accession. DG Development
directly manages the relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in the
framework of the Cotonou Agreement307 while it is RELEX who is the main actor, when it comes to
political issues regarding these. DG Trade, while primarily an instrument for conducting EU
commercial policy, is important in foreign policy with the inclusion of human rights clauses in trade
agreements. Human rights issues in general however are the responsibility of DG RELEX.308
This is just a snippet of the institutional complexities within the context of the Commission. Adding to
this the other major institutions and Member States makes the complexities seem endless. The potential
for turf wars is plain to see, but unfortunately the difficulties do not end here. For among the key actors
are political personalities, that do not necessarily complement each other well. Benita-Ferrero Waldner
(RELEX), the former foreign minister of Austria has replaced Christopher Patten who many believe
was instrumental in raising the profile of the Commission in external relations and a tough act to
follow. As such Ferrero-Waldner is trying to make her mark. President Barrosso though is more visible
than his predecessor (Mr. Romano Prodi). Along with this, comes the task of developing and
maintaining a fruitful working relationship with Louis Michel of Development with whom she has a
strained past. Michel was at the forefront of the campaign objecting to the inclusion of the extremeright party in the Austrian government in which Ferrero-Waldner served.309
The responsibility for relations with the Western Balkans has recently been transferred from RELEX to
Enlargement and Commissioner Oli Rehn, with much of the experience and knowledge still with the
staff at DG RELEX. It can be assumed that Rehn’s task is made no easier, due to the fact that most
EU activities on the Balkans lie within the scope of the CFSP framework and as hence are within the
306
The Commissioner for Development (Louis Michel) is also responsible for Humanitarian Aid.
The Cotonou Agreement (into force 1. April 2003), deals with development issues pertaining to drug trafficking,
organised crime, discrimination and more in 71 African, Carribean and Pacific countries.
308
International Crisis Group, 2005
309
Financial Times, 7th February 2005 www.ft.com/world/europe
307
100
reigns of the High Representative, Mr. Solana. With the Balkans insofar being the one major success of
CFSP and the EU’s foreign policy in general, the issue is still a favourite of Solana’s.310 Solana, in turn,
being the representative of the Member States has to juggle between the differentiating positions and
the policy shifts that may occur as the function of Presidency is rotated every six months. It is not
difficult to imagine the variance between different Member States holding the Presidency. I.e. France,
one of Europe’s largest countries has a long history of substantial foreign policy; longstanding relations
with key countries and regions; are traditional Europeanists; among founding members of the EC; and
permanent UN Security Council membership would be expected to promote different foreign policy
than some of the newer, smaller Member States like Malta, Cyprus and Lithuania.
In sum, the many actors constitute an intricate web of formal and informal relations without a clear
picture of the lines of authority. Furthermore, it raises questions about the formal and informal
allocation of power and resources among institutions and whether there is an imbalance of power in
the European institutions.
Imbalance of power and resources
It is fair to say that the CFSP framework is the flagship of EU foreign policy in a rhetorical sense, but
in substance the Commissions policies and programmes constitute the bulk of the external effort.
It is a common misconception that the EU started conducting foreign policy with the establishment of
the CFSP through the Maastricht Treaty. The EU has been in the business of foreign policy for many
years in the shape of activities under the authority of the Commission, including but not limited
development cooperation, trade, environmental and technical assistance. An important, but overlooked,
dimension of the external relations conducted by the EU is that of enlargement. Without years of
external activities directed towards candidate countries the EU may still have had only 15 member
states (or less).
These policy areas though do not possess the same outward appearance as the CFSP and the high
politics of conflict prevention and conflict management that it has been set up to deal with. However
the result of the decades of Commission external relations activities has resulted in the majority of
foreign policy resources being within the jurisdiction of the Commission. In plain numbers the
310
Ibid.
101
Commission numbers app. 3000 staff devoted to external relations, whereas the Council Secretariat has
a staff of app. 200. In terms of financial resources, as earlier mentioned, the Commission far outweighs
the Council.
There is an obvious imbalance between these two main institutions. While the Council decides policy it
is literally unequipped to follow through without the Commission. This undoubtedly bestows the
Commission with a great deal of power. The roles of the HR and the Commissioners of external
relations personify the imbalance since the Commissioners have legal competences that exceed those of
the HR and the European Council. This underscores the problem of the conflicting roles of the
intergovernmental and the supranational approach in EU foreign policy, making tensions almost
inevitable. The proposal of merging the two posts has periodically occurred, not least in relation to the
drafting of the constitutional treaty. There are plenty of arguments to support this; single voice,
balancing institutions, clear lines of authority and coherence in policy. On the other hand some could
argue that this could undermine the role of the Member States. It is highly unlikely that the Member
States would agree to this. Annexed to this thesis are two case studies, which reflect some of the
institutional problems facing the EU and its institutions in acting coherently in foreign policy.311
In sum
It cannot be denied that the European Union is a significant global actor. However the complexities of
its foreign policy make it difficult to envisage the Union taking the last step up to become the kind of
global leadership, one could expect from the worlds biggest economic power. Until the institutional
arrangements are altered, an active, coherent and capable foreign policy approach is left wanting.
Imbalances in the institutional setup, the division of power and resources along with overlapping
jurisdictions can and has led to intra-EU turf wars.
One of the key problem areas is the conflicting interests and lacking working relationship between the
Council and the Commission. I argue that the general problem is that the Commission and the Council
are too detached from one another. Instead of working together for the common good, to often the
contrary is the case. The lack of co-ordination among the institutions makes it difficult for the EU to
produce coherent policies, not least in external relations. The shared responsibility for executive and
legislative action leads to power struggles and turf wars, and so too many resources are used on the
intra-institutional disputes, rather than being aimed at the matters at hand. Adding into the equation the
311
See ANNEX 5 – Case studies of the institutional weaknesses of the Union
102
Member States, with their conflicting national and prerogatives and it becomes ever clearer that a single
European foreign policy is hard to obtain.
At the core of the issue one finds the construction of the Unions institutional structure. The constant
and underlying tension between the intergovernmental and the supranational approach will always
reduce the Union to a segmented organisation which breeds ideological power struggles. It can be
argued that the EU has come far despite being built on this foundation. However the two approaches
are just too incompatible for the EU to take the final step into a unitary actor on key issues.
The recently rejected constitutional draft possessed elements that could facilitate the institutions to
cooperate closer in a result-oriented manner. But when all is said and done the intra-institutional turf
wars probably will not be eradicated that easily.
103
10. Conclusion
This thesis commences by asking the question; how has the EU evolved into a capable foreign policy
actor in the international community of states? The rest of the thesis that you have just read, has
focused upon substantiating the answer to this research question, by bearing theoretical and empirical
justification for the adjacent argument;
The EU has developed into a more capable foreign policy actor than it receives credit for, through a series of Treaty based
additions of foreign policy capabilities. The EU is in many ways better suited than the traditional state to meet the
challenges in the international environment due to its uniqueness and multifaceted properties. Examining the full scope of
EU potential for external action (and not just CFSP) provides for a more positive assessment of the EU as an
international actor than has generally been the case.
First, came the task of coming to terms with ‘the nature of the beast’. What is the European Union?
And how are we to understand it in a foreign policy context?
Through theoretical discussion of the notions of state, presence and actorness I arrived at something of
a conclusion. It was determined that the EU is less than a state, in the sense that, while possessing
certain state-like attributes it could not be recognised as a state, due to the lack of legal personality – a
crucial prerequisite for statehood in the international system of states (Westphalian order). Through
further theoretical consideration it was deemed that EU does however possess all the prerequisites of
actorness and is a recognised international actor. Eventually it was concluded that the EU is a foreign
policy actor in its own right, built on the premise and prerequisites of the Member States and as such
far from independent of member states.
By applying a view of the EU as a foreign policy system it became evident that Union possesses so
many qualities which tied together allow for the Union to act on any given foreign policy issue.
Furthermore, the EU’s ability to apply a more comprehensive approach to the problems in the world
was attributed to its unique multi-facetted dimensions.
Next, the role of the EU in the international community was considered. By exploring the concepts of
‘civilian’ and ‘normative’ power the EU was characterised as a norm promoter in the international
environment, with the opportunity of positioning itself as a role model in various policy areas.
104
This section concluded the theoretical justification for the thesis’ argument and equipped me for the
empirical analysis which would follow.
In the analysis of the EU’s foreign policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1996 it was
possible using the theoretical perspectives, arrived at in the prior part of the thesis, to display a nuanced
picture of the EU’s evolvement into a capable foreign policy actor. By viewing its foreign policy
development and activities through the three dimensions of the foreign policy system (internal,
centripetal and external) it was possible to conclude that the EU is a coherent and effective foreign
policy actor, with a wide array of tools at its disposal. It has evolved as a consequence of ‘learning by
doing’ and has used failures and mistakes as catalysts for improvement.
However it also became clear, that the EU continued to come up short in international crisis and
conflict. Thus an additional analysis examined the institutional infrastructure of the Union and found
disturbing symptoms of intra-EU turf wars, problems of coordination, jurisdiction and imbalances of
power and resources. And so, the final thoughts of this: what if the draft constitutional treaty had been
ratified? I believe that many of the innovations of the Constitution would have provided for a better
coordinated, more coherent and more capable EU in foreign policy.
I will leave this question for the future to show, or for others to answer.
105
106
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No.21 (April 2001)
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UP, 2005
Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Pollack, Mark A., Policy Making in the European Union, Oxford
UP, 2005
Wendt, Alexander, 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press
Winn, Neil and Lord, Christopher, 2001, EU foreign policy beyond the nation state, Palgrave
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World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition, 2000,
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/D74DB51B2D46615D8525695B00678C93?Open
Document
Yin, Robert K., 1994, Case Study Research, Design and Methods, 2nd ed. Newbury Park, Sage
Publications
Young, Richard. (2002) The European Security and Defence Policy: What Impact on EU’s Approach
to Security Challenges?, European Security,11(2), 101-124.
Internet Sources
EU Treaty Base
The basic treaties of the European integration (ECSC, EURATOM, EEC, SEA, TEU, TA, TN):
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties
ECSC:
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc29.htm
EURATOM:
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc38.htm
EEC:
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm
Treaty on European Union, Maastricht:
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc01.htm
Single European Act:
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc113.htm
Treaty of Amsterdam:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/amsterdam.html
Treaty of Nice:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice.html
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/constit.html
EU legislation
SCADPLUS
http://europa.eu/scadplus/scad_en.htm
Eur-Lex, European Union Law
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0626en01.pdf
General EU information:
EU portal
http://www.europa.eu.int/index_da.htm
General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2006
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/index_en.htm
Decision Making in the EU
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/decision-making/index_en.htm
EU Institutions
Council of the European Union
113
http://ue.eu.int/
European Parliament:
http://www.europarl.eu.int
European Commission:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp
European Commission:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm
European Court of Justice
www.curia.eu.int
Other Institutions
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http://www.fco.gov.uk
UK Ministry of Defence
http://mod.co.uk
United Kingdom EU Presidency, 2005
http://www.eu2005.gov.uk
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History site:
www.historiasiglo20.org
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European Neighbourhood Policy
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm
The European Stability Initiative
www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_1.pdf
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http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm
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http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#5
Other Links
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www.ft.com/world/europe
Speeches
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European Affairs, Dublin, March 2001.
Speech by Commissioner Benita (Ferrero-Waldner, at the Conference organised by the European
Commission in Cooperation with the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) - Brussels, 14 November
2005 “Needs to Solutions: Enhancing Civilian Crisis Response Capacity of the European Union”
Javier Solana, “Reflections on a Year in Office”. Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Central
Defence and Society Federation, 27 October 2000, Stockholm.
114
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=424&BID
=107&DocID=63735&insite=1
115
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1 - Capacities of the Union
ANNEX 2 - The European Security and Defence Policy
ANNEX 3 - The Stabilisation and Association process in short
ANNEX 4 - CFSP introduction
ANNEX 5 – Case Studies on the institutional weaknesses of the Union
116
ANNEX 1 - Capacities of the Union312
When the ‘EU’ conducts foreign policy it does so through the actions of both the Community and
the member states. The available foreign policy instruments are derived from these two sources,
even though it is the European Union which is developing and implementing foreign policy. 313 As a
consequence the attainment of foreign policy objectives is sought through the formulation and
implementation of policies by a variety of actors using a variety of instruments. Depending on the
sphere and scope of foreign policy under consideration, the actors of EU foreign policy-making
retain various degrees of competence and responsibilities. Division of competence and
responsibilities is specified in the legal competence (legal-base) of the Union and more specifically
in the articles of the TEU pertaining to foreign policy; predominantly article V concerning the
CFSP. The legal-base furthermore determines the method of decision-making pertinent for the
policy sphere, since it specifies whether the potential foreign policy lies in the domain of either the
first, second or third pillar of the Union framework.
Actors
Member States
The Member States are undoubtedly the key actors in the foreign policy of the Union. Although
developments have gone towards centralisation of the foreign policy efforts with the strengthening
of the EU institutions, the intergovernmental approach still defines the EU. The CFSP which is still
largely an intergovernmental arrangement is the forum for Member States where their
predominance is most noticeable, and where they are particularly important in terms of
implementation. The Union has a wide array of instruments in its toolbox, but it is ultimately the
Member States who add value and strength to foreign policy.314
The Presidency315
312
Most factual descriptions derived from George & Bache, 2001, Otherwise from http://ue.eu.int/ - Council of the
European Union and http://www.europa.eu.int/index_da.htm - EU portal, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ - Presidency
http://europa.eu/european_council/index_en.htm -European Council
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#5 - Commission on Foreign Policy,
http://www.fco.gov.uk – UK Foreign Office
313
Since TEU.
314
Smith, hazel, p. 112
315
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ - Presidency
117
The Presidency is held by EU member states on a rotational six-month basis and bears much weight
in CFSP, as it has the luxury setting the agenda for the political decision-making process in its time.
The incumbent member state provides the preparatory administration for meetings /negotiations,
and is responsible for attempting to settle disagreements and blockages to policy issues. This
represents a particularly important task in relation to foreign policy, since decisions in the
intergovernmental pillars (CFSP and JHA) are made unanimously and disagreements may
consequently result in vetoes. To assist the Presidency in its duties, is the Council Secretariat and,
since the Amsterdam Treaty, by its Secretary-General, also known as the High Representative for
CFSP.
The European council316
The supreme body of the EU, although it has no formal decision-making power is the European
Council. This is an exclusively intergovernmental forum wherein the European heads of state along
with the President of the European Commission meet to discuss general issues. Each Member State,
in a predetermined order, holds the presidency. The European Council convenes at least once every
six months, under the chairmanship of the rotating presidency, and makes decisions based on
unanimity. It is the most influential institution where the general direction of the EU is discussed,
most major policy guidelines are set and decisions on the biggest issues facing the EU are made. The
decision made usually published as Council Conclusions or as joint statements.
The Council of the European Union317
The Council of the European Union, not to be confused with the abovementioned European Council
has both the executive authority, which by far and large is entrusted to the Commission, and the
legislative authority. All regulations and directives (the two most important and binding legislative
acts) must be approved by the Council, either jointly or after consultation with the Parliament.
While the Council is an intergovernmental body it has supranational traits, owed to the fact, that it
is the executive body that adopts legislation. The configuration of the Council depends on the issue
under discussion (foreign policy, finance, social affairs, transport, agriculture, etc.), but is always
composed of one representative per country at the ministerial level, with the empowerment to
commit national governments. Consequently, even though it is a distinct institution, the Council has
numerous embodiments (app. 23) of which the most important, in terms of foreign policy is the
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The GAERC convenes on a monthly
316
317
http://europa.eu/european_council/index_en.htm -European Council
http://ue.eu.int/ - Council of the European Union
118
basis and includes, the member state foreign ministers, the Commission and the High
Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It makes decisions on external
relations issues, including CFSP, possibly leading to Joint Actions and Common Positions. The
Council is supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). COREPER
meets at least once a week to prepare Council meetings and decisions, including those related to the
General Affairs Council and CFSP. COREPER has a crucial role to play organising the work of
CFSP and smoothing over policy disagreements.
Foreign policy support actors
The Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS) is central to CFSP. It is the hub in organizing
the EU’s response to any crisis, and is composed of national representatives. The PSC prepares
recommendations on how CFSP (and ESDP) should develop and also deals with the routine
elements of these policies. In the event of a crisis,the PSC is the body that analyses the options open
to members and manages the EU’s approach to the crisis. Other support functions to the Council
include the External Relations counsellors of the Secretariat who analyse the institutional, legal, and
financial aspects of proposals made under the CFSP umbrella. These ultimately prepare the work of
COREPER, including the drafting of Joint Actions (see instruments below) by ensuring consistency
across the three pillars. A number of CFSP Working Groups, which are staffed by experts from the
member states and the Commission, examine policy documents and consider options for the
deliberation of the various institutional bodies of foreign policy. To keep the Council updated on
relevant situations and events is the task of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. This is
embedded within the Council Secretariat and has the responsibility for monitoring and assessing
international developments, as well as analysing prevailing threats and crises. The unit’s analytical
role is decisive insofar as it provides the member states with the information essential to the
formulation of common policy. A group of European Correspondents in all EU member states and
within the Commission coordinate the day-to-day business of the CFSP and prepare the PSC
meetings. The correspondents are also responsible for ensuring that CFSP business is included on
the agendas of the General Affairs Council and European Councils. They liaise via the encrypted
telex network known as Coreu (Correspondance européenne) which connects member states and the
Commission.
119
The European Commission 318
The Commission, or the ‘Octopus’ as it is affectionately known by some staff members, is the
institution in the EU with the widest array of tasks. It has the right of initiative in proposing
legislation; it monitors the implementation of the adopted legislation; it regulates in certain areas
(mostly public service); it monitors infringements to the Treaties and refers matters to the European
Court of Justice; and it monitors the compliance of Union economic policies. The Commission, an
unelected authority, is comprised of 25 appointed Commissioners (one from each member state)
whom have been approved by the Parliament; and the EU’s largest administrative and functional
staff. (app. 21000). It has 120 delegations worldwide and as such is the most visible of the EU
institutions abroad. The Commission has exclusive competence for a number of EU external
policies, including trade. It is also responsible for Community actions when it comes to
humanitarian and development assistance, reconstruction efforts and sanctions regulations. Even
though it is a supranational institution of the Community it is a vital element in and fully associated
with the work carried out in the field of CFSP. The Commission may, just as the Member States,
refer questions relating to CFSP to the Council; and may submit proposals to the Council - although
it does not have the sole right to do so as in Community matters. Furthermore the Commission may
request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting and make suggestions to the
Policy Unit for work to be undertaken. The Commission also implements the CFSP budget (under
the EC budget) including through appropriate financial proposals. The external relations function is
implemented through five Directorate Generals (external relations, development, trade, enlargement
and humanitarian aid) who through their functional responsibilities and a total budget of app. EUR
11 billion is bestowed with the potential to contribute substantially. The Commissioner for DG
External Relations (RELEX) – currently Benita Ferrero-Waldner – is responsible for the
coordination of the Commission external relations as a whole, whereas the other DG’s have more
specific tasks pertaining to their portfolio’s.319
The European Parliament320
The European Parliament has 732 seats divided proportionally among Member States. It is a key
player in the decision-making procedure, however largely under pillar 1 activities. It has (as yet) no
formal CFSP role, but is regularly kept informed and is consulted on issues within these areas. So
318
http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm - European Commission
Eu Crisis Response Capability Revisited, Europe Report No. 160, 2005, International Crisis Group
320
http://www.europarl.eu.int – European Parliament
319
120
albeit constituting the EU’s singular democratically elected representative institution the influence
of the Parliament in foreign policy has been somewhat limited. It possess essentially a consultative
role in that is has right to be consulted with regards to the key aspects and key choices in foreign
policy decisions. The Council is obliged to take the position into account, but it is not obliged to
materialize the positions. The Parliament has succeeded in gradually increasing its influence, by
using its democratic mandate to establish itself as the principal forum for public debate of foreign
policy issues with its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and CFSP.321 In this forum the
European constituencies, national political interest groups and leading non-governmental
organisations, possess the opportunity to forward the views and opinions of the broad masses on
foreign policy matters. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been very active
arranging debates, tabling questions, and putting pressure on national governments. Not
surprisingly, perhaps, the Parliament is keen to overly have more foreign and security policy
competencies
Instruments
Economic incl. trade
The economic instruments of the Union, remain within the Community pillar. The Union operates
with both positive and negative economic instruments to further the objectives of foreign and
security policy. In casual terms these can be understood as either the ‘stick or the carrot’ methods.
The negative instruments, on the other hand, are more often used to facilitate changes in behaviour
of countries that are not in line with international agreements or violate international
law/international humanitarian law (e.g. arms embargo). Examples of such instruments are
sanctions and other restrictive measures (e.g. travel bans). The positive instruments refer to
financial assistance, trade concessions, trade preferences, and aid grants and loans. These are often
aimed at facilitating an improvement in a given country/region on the basis of reconstruction or
rehabilitation (e.g. Bosnia/Balkans). Increasingly, the Union is basing the use of economic
instruments on the principles of conditionality, applying numerous conditions to e.g. assistance
programme and trade agreements. These include human rights clauses, democratic and good
governance provisions; and recently incentives to combat international terrorism and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.322
321
322
Eu Crisis Response Capability Revisited, Europe Report No. 160, 2005, International Crisis Group
Bretherton and Vogler, p. 180-181 & Smith, Hazel, p. 116-117
121
Some instruments, such as economic are explicitly recognised as CFSP instruments sine the TEU.
While the economic instruments are not always utilised to implement or supplement foreign policy,
they are almost all designed to have an external impact. As such Community policies such as the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be used as a foreign policy instruments, when tariffs and
quotas are directed externally.323
Political and Diplomatic
EU foreign policy operates on a number of non-binding political instruments such as common
statements, declarations and demarches, and through legally binding Common Positions, Joint
Actions and Common Strategies.
Contacts with third countries take place mainly through "political dialogue" meetings, diplomatic
procedures or "démarches". The EU holds a political dialogue with a very large number of
countriesor groups of countries on questions of international policy. Such meetings take place at all
levels: Heads of State, Ministers, Political Directors, senior officials and experts. The EU can be
represented at them by the Presidency, or by the Troika, or by all Member States forming part of
the Council. The Commission is always present.
Demarche is an ongoing diplomacy undertaken (either confidentially or publicly) with certain
States to resolve matters relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law or humanitarian
action (diplomacy).
Declarations give public expression to a position, request or expectation of the European Union visà-vis a third country or an international issue. This flexible instrument makes it possible to react
very quickly to sudden incidents in a particular part of the world and to state the Union's point of
view. They are entitled "Declaration by the European Union" where the Council meets and adopts a
position on an international issue and "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European
Union" where the Council does not meet.
Common Strategies, adopted by unanimity, are designed to focus on areas where EU member states
have important interests in common, and set out the objectives, duration and means needed to
pursue the EU's policy towards those areas. Three common strategies have so far been agreed on
Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean.
323
Smith, Hazel, p. 116
122
Common Positions define the approach of the EU to a particular issue, and require the Member
States to implement national policies that comply with the position defined by the Union on that
issue. The common position in the context of the common foreign and security policy is designed to
make cooperation more systematic and improve its coordination. The Member States are required to
comply with and uphold such positions which have been adopted unanimously at Council meetings.
Joint Actions address specific situations where operational action by the EU is deemed to be
required. They define the objectives, scope, means, duration and conditions for their
implementation.
The Council adopts joint actions in certain situations requiring operational intervention by the
European Union rather than simply the adoption of a political stance. Each action specifies its
objectives, scope, the means made available to the Union, the conditions for its execution and,
where applicable, its duration.
International Agreements
The power to conclude international agreements has been part of the European Community’s
competence since the beginning and International agreements are one of the principal foreign policy
instruments of the European Union (EU). The scope for concluding international agreements has
been considerably expanded over the last decades alongside the development of other EU foreign
policy instruments.
When it is necessary to conclude international agreements with one or more States or international
agreements in order to "put the CFSP into practice", the Council may unanimously authorise the
Presidency to open negotiations to that end. The Presidency may be assisted by the Commission in
the course of such negotiations. Agreements are subsequently concluded unanimously by the
Council on the recommendation of the Presidency. The exception to this rule is enlargement
negotiations, which are conducted by the Commission.
Military & Security
The EU’s military component was introduced by the Helsinki and Nice European Councils. Firstly,
by establishing a headline goal for the Unions capacity to deploy, within 60 days, a total of 60.000
persons, and sustain this engagement for at least one year. This is all very well, but it must be noted
123
that these are Member State personnel, since the EU proper does not ‘own’ any military assets or
personnel. Along with the headline goal military (or security) structures were introduced, including
the Political and Security Committee (PSC) – a prepatory organ at the ambassador’s level. The PSC
keeps abreast with the development of issues of international peace and security, works on the
definition of policies and monitors their implementation. To ensure its operation, the PSC is
assisted by a political military working group and a committee for civilian aspects of crisis
management, as well as the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS).
On 20 November 2000 the Member States convened at a Capabilities Commitment Conference to
discuss the commitment of military capabilities for the use of future EU operations. In May 2003
the Council confirmed that the EU now has operational capability across the full range of
Petersberg tasks.324 The EU cooperates with NATO on elements of military matters, so as not to
duplicate unnecessarily military capacities, operational planning, etc. In practice the EU relies
heavily on NATO capacities.
Legal competence and decision-making
The legal base of the Union refers to the Article or Articles of the Treaties giving the Union – and it
institutions - power to act. The relevant Article describes the voting requirements and type of
legislative procedure (e.g. co-decision) that should be used for a proposal to be made into an EU
law. Any EU laws or actions must clearly define the legal base on which the Union is acting. 325
There are two main sources of legislation in the EU – primary and secondary legislation. The
Treaties of the EU are the primary legislation and sets out rules and procedures for EU decisionmaking. Every piece of EU-legislation has the Treaty as its primary legislation and must specify
the Treaty-article from where it gets it legal basis. The three major types of “secondary” legislation
are regulations, directives, and decisions. There are basically two procedures to pass major
legislation (regulations and directives) regarding the first pillar: consultation and co-decision; a
third procedure, cooperation, is intermediate between the two and was intended to be abolished
through the Constitutional Treaty. In all cases, the Commission has the right of initiative.
Consultation applies to the most sensitive first pillar issues: Common Agricultural Policy,
competition, taxation, guidelines for employment policies, industrial policy. The power of the EP is
324
325
For explanation of the Petersberg Tasks see ANNEX 2
http://www.fco.gov.uk
124
limited to a consultative role, and unanimity is required in all issues except agriculture and
competition policy. Co-decision applies to the remaining first pillar issues; it covers about 80
percent of the main legislative decisions, in particular all the issues decided by QMV, except
agriculture and competition policy. The general rule in foreign policy, under the CFSP framework is
that decisions are adopted unanimously. However, Member States can abstain in a vote.
Furthermore the principle of Qualified Majority Voting can be applied when adopting Joint Actions,
Common Positions or any other decision that is taken on the basis of a Common Strategy, and when
adopting any decision that implements a Joint Action or Common Position.
Constructive abstention is a principle which allows a Member State to abstain on a vote in Council
under the common foreign and security policy, without blocking an otherwise unanimous decision.
If constructive abstention is accompanied by a formal declaration, the Member State in question is
not obliged to apply the decision but must accept that it commits the Union. The Member State
must then refrain from any action that might conflict with Union action based on that decision.
Resources
Economic resources
The combined budget of the EU funds EU policies and the expenditure of all the EU institutions. It
is decided upon by agreement of all the Member States, and the spending is voted by the Parliament
and Council, on the basis of e proposal forwarded by the Commission. The revenue comes from
import duties, VAT and from the Member States. The annual budget for 2006 amounted to 112
billions (1.01% of the Gross National Income (GNI) of the enlarged EU). Of this the CFSP budget
amounts to € 102.6 million, which is not a great deal. All expenditures related to CFSP are charged
to the Community budget, with the exception of expenditures arising from operations having
military or defence implications, or in the case that the Council unanimously decides otherwise.
While, €102 million is just a drop in the water compared with the total Community budget, and a
limited resource in terms of foreign policy it is hard to foresee this resulting in foreign policy
strength. However, the Commission has a budget for external action in the range of €7 billion,
which more than makes up for the lack of funds in the CFSP. This budget includes covering the
costs of humanitarian aid, development assistance and enlargement. In addition to the regular EU
budget there are funds dedicated to the European Development Fund (EDF) for ACP (African,
Caribbean, Pacific) countries managed by the Commission. This amounts to approximately €3.5
125
billion. Thus the Union has substantial financial assets to draw upon, and this is not counting the
bilateral assistance and unitary foreign policy expenditures of the Member States.
126
ANNEX 2 - The European Security and Defence Policy
The European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP is a major element of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy pillar of the European Union (EU). The ESDP is the successor of the ESDI
under NATO, but differs in that it falls under the jurisdiction of the European Union itself,
including countries with no ties to NATO.
Formally, the European Security and Defence Policy is the domain of the Council of the European
Union, which is an intergovernmental body in which the member states are represented.
Nonetheless, the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in the person of
Javier Solana also plays a significant role. In his position as Secretary General of the Council, he
prepares and examines decisions to be made before they are brought to the Council.
European security policy has followed several different paths during the 1990s, developing
simultaneously within the Western European Union, NATO and the European Union itself.
At the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin, it was agreed that the WEU would oversee the creation of a
European Security and Defence Identity within NATO structures. The ESDI was to create a
European 'pillar' within NATO, partly to allow European countries to act militarily where NATO
wished not to, and partly to alleviate the United States' financial burden of maintaining the military
bases which it had had in Europe since the Cold War. The Berlin agreement allowed European
countries (through the Western European Union) to use NATO assets if it so wished (this agreement
was later amended to allow the European Union to conduct such missions, the so-called Berlin-plus
arrangement).
The European Union incorporated the same Petersberg tasks within its domain with the Amsterdam
Treaty. The treaty signalled the progressive framing of a common security and defence policy based
on the Petersberg tasks. Traditional British reluctance to such a plan changed into endorsement after
a bilateral declaration of French President Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair
in St. Malo, where they stated that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action,
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in
order to respond to international crises".
In June 1999, the Cologne European Council decided to incorporate the role of the Western
European Union within the EU, effectively shutting down the WEU. The Cologne Council also
appointed Javier Solana as the High Representative of the CFSP to help progress both the CFSP and
the ESDP.
European Security Strategy
The European Security Strategy is the policy document that guides the European Union's
international security strategy. Its headline reads: "A Secure Europe In A Better World". The
document was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and
drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy CFSP Javier Solana. With the emergence of the ESDP, it is the first time that Europe has
formulated a joint security strategy. It can be considered a counterpart to the National Security
Strategy of the United States.
The document starts out with the declaration that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure
nor so free". Its conclusion is that "The world is full of new dangers and opportunities". Along these
lines, it argues that in order to ensure security for Europe in a globalising world multilateral
cooperation within Europe and abroad is to be the imperative, because "no single nation is able to
127
tackle today's complex challenges". As such the ESS identifies a string of key threats Europe needs
to deal with: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states,
and organised crime.
The Petersberg Tasks
The Petersberg tasks are a list of military and security priorities incorporated within the European
Security and Defence Policy of the European Union.
The Petersberg tasks were first fomulated by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 during a
summit in at the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam,
the tasks were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union. Both the WEU and the EU are
empowered to enforce the Petersberg tasks, but with the transfer of the most important WEU assets
to the EU in 1999, this distinction is mostly artificial.
The Petersberg tasks cover great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most simple
to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as:
•
Humanitarian and rescue tasks
•
Peacekeeping tasks
•
Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
Officially, the range of tasks the EU commits itself "includes" these tasks, but is not limited by
them. In practice, the task of territorial defence is considered the domain of NATO. As many
European countries are fervent supporters of NATO, there are many provisions to prevent
competition with NATO.
128
ANNEX 3 - The Stabilisation and Association process in short326
Europeans have the most direct and obvious interests in preventing further Balkan chaos: an
economic interest in developing markets and trade routes with the region, and a security interest in
protecting the frontier of the European Union against criminal activity, instability, and refugee
flows. The EU is taking the lead in providing economic and technical assistance and encouraging
political reform and stability in the Balkans, with the aim of elevating the Balkan states’ standards
of economic and political governance to EU norms. As the single largest assistance donor to the
countries of the former Yugoslavia, with $4.65 billion committed
from the European Commission budget for 2000–2006 (in addition to bilateral aid and the provision
of peacekeeping troops from member states), the EU and its agencies—including the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)—will be at the core of
reform and modernization efforts.The EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) lays out
actions required to join the union, with incentives for reform and disincentives for backsliding. This
process is the fundamental road map for progress toward a closer association with Europe.
The EU’s Stabilization and Association Process
The European Union’s Stabilization and Association process was initiated in 1999 and formally
launched at the Zagreb summit on November 24, 2000. It represents a long-term commitment by
the European Union of political, financial, and human resources for the development of the Balkan
region.The SAP combines the development of privileged political and economic relations between
the European Union and the Balkans with a substantial financial assistance program called CARDS
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization). The cornerstone of
the SAP is the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which establishes a contractual
relationship between the signatory country and the European Union. The conclusion of an SAA
represents the signatory’s commitment to complete, over a transition period, a formal association
with the European Union. This association is based on the implementation over time of core
obligations, including the establishment of a free trade area; the enactment of political, economic,
and other reforms necessary to achieve EU standards; and the harmonization of domestic legislation
with that of the European Commission, SAA, the European Union can use the mechanisms entailed
by the agreement to help them prioritize reforms, shape those reforms according to EU standards,
solve problems, and monitor implementation. Signing an SAA confers the status of “potential
candidate
for accession to the European Union” on the signatory. Thus far only Croatia and Macedonia have
signed SAAs, while the remaining areas of the western Balkans—Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo—are still in the preparatory phase for entering
into negotiations.Non-signatory countries are nonetheless eligible for technical and financial
assistance under the CARDS program, which provides financial support for the political, legal, and
economic reforms and institutionbuilding necessary to implement SAP obligations. In addition to
fostering bilateral relations between individual countries and the European Union, the SAP also
emphasizes regional cooperation among the Balkan countries. As such, the SAP encourages the
establishment of close informal and contractual relationships between the signatories of SAAs, akin
to those between EU member states; aims to create a network of compatible bilateral free trade
agreements; includes the gradual reintegration of the western Balkans into the infrastructure
network of wider Europe; and urges the countries to cooperate on addressing security threats—to
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http://www.delalb.cec.eu.int/en/eu_in_see/stabilisation.htm
129
the Balkans and the European Union—that come from organized crime, illegal immigration, and
other forms of trafficking.
Approximately 10 percent of the CARDS budget will be directed toward this regional cooperation
component, totalling €197 million ($193 million) in the period 2002–2004.327
WHAT IS IT?




The European Union's (EU's) main contribution to the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
Enhancement of the Regional Approach, which has until now provided the framework for
the development of relations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania.
Stronger incentives for the region, but also more demanding conditions regarding political
and economic development and regional co-operation.
A tailor-made, progressive approach that takes into account the individual situation of each
country. Some countries can progress faster than others.
WHAT IS IN IT?
The
Stabilisation
and
Association
process
will
include,
as
appropriate:
Stabilisation and Association Agreements: a new kind of contractual relationship offered by the EU
in return for compliance with the relevant conditions to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
This represents a new dimension in the relations with these five countries, offering for the first time
a clear prospect of integration into the EU's structures;






assymetric trade liberalisation;
economic and financial assistance, budgetary assistance and balance of payment support;
assistance for democratisation and civil society;
humanitarian aid for refugees, returnees and other persons of concern;
co-operation in justice and home affairs;
development of a political dialogue.
WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL?
Bring peace, stability and economic development to the region and open the perspective of longterm membership of the EU.
EU initiatives for South-Eastern Europe to date

327
1996: The Royaumont Process
The EU's first initiative aimed at stabilising South-Eastern Europe was the Royaumont
Process, launched in December 1996 under the French EU Presidency with the aim to
support the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements. It focused on promoting
regional projects in the field of civil society, culture and human rights. The Royaumont
Process is now responsible for inter-parliamentary relations under the Stability Pact.
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/index.htm.
130



1997: Regional Approach
In April 1997, the EU General Affairs Council adopted the Regional Approach, establishing
political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the five
countries in the region - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Conditions include respect for
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, protection of minorities, market
economy reforms and regional co-operation.
1999: Stabilisation and Association Process
The European Commission proposed, on May 26, 1999, the creation of a Stabilisation and
Association Process (SAP) for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM). The SAP provides a new framework for the development of relations between
these countries and the European Union.
1999: The Stability Pact
The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, adopted on 10 June 1999 in Cologne, is a
European Union initiative. Its aim is to bring peace, stability and economic development to
the region. In its construction, the Stability Pact is not a direct instrument of the EU. It lays
down a framework for co-operation between the European Union, the European
Commission, the United States, Russia, Japan, South-Eastern European countries, Turkey
and other countries including regional and international organisations and international
financing institutions.
The EU's main contribution to the Stability Pact is the new Stabilisation and Association Process it
offers to five countries of the region.
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ANNEX 4 – CFSP introduction
The common foreign and security policy: introduction
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is one of the external relations instruments of the
European Union (EU). The CFSP's legal basis at European level came relatively late, with the
Treaty on European Union . This delay is closely linked to the sensitive nature of this policy, which
is at the heart of a State's powers.
BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP
Throughout the various stages of European integration, the concepts of a political union, a common
foreign policy and even a common defence policy have regularly been put on the table through a
series of policy proposals. The first attempts at a substantial transfer of competences for these
sensitive policies were blocked by a minority of Member States because of the intergovernmental
aspect involved. As a result, the gradual transfer of powers has been given priority since the 1970s.
Since then, two acts have imparted strong impetus to the development of the CFSP: the Treaty on
European Union (1992), with the introduction of Title V (the second pillar of the EU), and the
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), with the strengthening of decision-making procedures and
instruments. The Treaty of Nice (2001) introduced further changes.
From the Pleven plan (1950) to the Single European Act (1987)
In 1950 the Pleven plan aimed to create an integrated European army under joint command. This
plan was the subject of negotiation between the six Member States of the European Coal and Steel
Community from 1950 to 1952 and led to the signing of the Treaty establishing the European
Defence Community (EDC). The corollary of the EDC was a political project presented in 1953 and
aimed at establishing a federal or confederal structure. The "European Political Community" would
have created a two-chamber parliamentary assembly, a European Executive Council, a Council of
Ministers and a Court of Justice. The Political Community was to have had very wide powers and
was, in the long run, to have absorbed the ECSC and the EDC. However, this project never came to
fruition as it was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954.
At the beginning of the 1960s, tough negotiations were conducted on the basis of the two Fouchet
plans, which envisaged closer political cooperation, a union of states, and common foreign and
defence policies. A committee established to draft specific proposals produced difficult, yet
nevertheless ambitious compromises, such as the establishment of an independent secretariat or the
future prospect of qualified-majority voting in certain areas. Unfortunately, agreement could not be
reached on the proposals of the Fouchet committee and negotiations between the Member States
floundered in 1962.
In response to calls by the Heads of State or Government for a study of possible ways of moving
forward on the political level, a report known as the "Davignon report" was presented in 1970 at the
Luxembourg Summit. This was the starting point for EPC, launched informally in 1970 before
being formally enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The main feature of EPC was
consultation among the Member States on foreign policy issues, and establishment of its joint
actions was the responsibility of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE )
132
The agreement on EPC was facilitated by the fact that it was a much less coercive method and
entailed less coordination than its predecessors.
The establishment of the European Council in 1974 contributed to better coordination of EPC
because of the role it gave to the Heads of State or Government in defining the general orientation
of Community policy. From that point, the role of the presidency and the publicity given to the
work of the EPC reinforced each other through official statements of position by the European
Community (EC).
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 brought home to the
Member States the growing impotence of the EC on the international scene. Determined to
strengthen EPC, they adopted in 1981 the London Report, which required prior consultation by
Member States of each other and the European Commission on all foreign policy matters affecting
all Member States.
In 1985 the Dooge Committee Report, drawn up in preparation for the Intergovernmental
Conference which was to lead to the Single European Act, contained a number of proposals
concerning foreign policy. The provisions introduced by the Single European Act established an
institutional basis for EPC, the group of European correspondents and a secretariat working under
the direct authority of the presidency. The objectives of EPC were also extended to all foreign
policy issues of general interest, and with the entry into force of the Single Act in 1987, 17 years
after its launch, EPC obtained its own legal basis.
The Treaty on European Union - Maastricht 1992
It was against the geopolitical backdrop of the early 1990s - which saw the end of the Cold War, the
reunification of Germany and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia - that the Member States finally
decided to equip themselves with a new instrument: the CFSP.
Under the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU), the CFSP constitutes the "second pillar" of the European
Union, involving intergovernmental cooperation between Member States. The CFSP constitutes a
separate pillar of the European Union because of the way it operates, its intergovernmental nature
and the need for Member State consensus in the decision-making procedures.
The Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty), which came into force on 1 November 1993,
introduced the common foreign and security policy (Title V). Article 11 sets out the five main
objectives:





to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the Union;
to strengthen the security of the Union;
to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
to promote international cooperation;
to develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.
The EU pursues its objectives by means of systematic cooperation between Member States and the
implementation of joint actions in areas where the Member States have important interests in
common. The Member States retain sovereignty in the conduct of their respective foreign and
security policy, as the CFSP is not an exclusive competence of the European Union. Nonetheless,
the Council ensures that the Member States refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests
of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
133
The Maastricht Treaty provides the CFSP with the following key instruments:


common positions, which require the Member States to implement national policies that comply
with the position defined by the Union on a particular issue. One example of coordination can be
found in the fight against the illicit traffic in diamonds, which contributes to prevention and settlement
of conflicts (2001/758/CFSP) ( pdf ) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola;
joint actions, which are operational actions by the Member States under the auspices of the CFSP.
One example is the support for the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities
emanating from its territories (2000/298/CFSP) ( pdf ).
The Member States must coordinate their action in international organisations and at international
conferences, where they uphold the common positions. The Union may express itself through
decisions, the conclusion of international agreements, declarations and contacts with third countries.
According to the Treaty, the common foreign and security policy "shall include all questions
relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence
policy" (Article J.4).
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
The reform of the CFSP in the Treaty of Amsterdam assumed particular urgency following the
break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the tragic conditions there highlighting how vital it was for the
Union to be capable of acting and preventing, rather than simply reacting.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May
1999, added a new foreign policy instrument to the existing ones (joint actions and common
positions), namely common strategies. The European Council defines, by consensus, common
strategies in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. A common
strategy specifies the objectives, duration and means to be made available by the Union and
Member States. It forms the general framework for actions under the Union's three pillars, which
ensures consistency in its external relations and enables the Council to implement common
strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority. The Council
is also responsible for recommending common strategies to the European Council.
The general rule remains that CFSP decisions always require a unanimous vote in their favour.
However, Member States can exercise constructive abstention, i.e. an abstention which does not
block the adoption of the decision. This mechanism does not apply if the Member States abstaining
in this way account for more than one third of the weighted Council votes. If they qualify their
abstention by a formal declaration, they are not obliged to apply the decision; but they must accept,
in a spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain
from any action that might conflict with the Union's action under that decision.
The amended Title V of the EU Treaty does, however, allow for adoption by a qualified majority
when it is a matter of:


adopting decisions applying a common strategy defined by the European Council;
implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council.
With regard to decisions taken by a qualified majority, there is nonetheless a safeguard clause
enabling Member States to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy. In such
cases, when the Member State concerned has stated its reasons, the Council may decide by a
134
qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision by the
Heads of State or Government.
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the role of the High Representative for the CFSP , who
fulfils the tasks of the Secretary-General of the Council. He is responsible for assisting the Council
in CFSP-related matters by contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of
decisions. At the request of the presidency, he acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political
dialogue with third parties and endeavours to improve the visibility and consistency of the CFSP.
External representation and implementation of the CFSP are further strengthened by the work of the
troika, which incorporates the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country holding the EU
presidency, the High Representative of the CFSP and the Commissioner responsible for External
Relations; if necessary, a representative of the country that will hold the next EU presidency
participates.
The policy planning and early warning unit comes under the authority of the High Representative
of the CFSP. Its purpose is to help the Union produce effective and more united reactions. This is an
important new element in the Treaty of Amsterdam and aims to enable the Member States to work
together on a logistic level and, thus, to have a more prominent role on the international stage.
The Treaty of Nice (2001)
With the Treaty of Nice, which came into force on 1 February 2003, enhanced cooperation
became possible for the implementation of a joint action or common position if it relates to issues
that do not have any military or defence implications. If no Member States object or call for a
unanimous decision in the European Council (the "emergency brake"), enhanced cooperation is
adopted in the Council by a qualified majority, with a threshold of eight Member States.
At institutional level, the Treaty of Nice reinforces the role of the Political and Security
Committee (PSC - the new name given to the political committee by the Treaty), which is a
standing political and military committee responsible for the Union's autonomous and operational
defence policy. Under Article 25 of the EU Treaty, this Committee is authorised by the Council to
take appropriate decisions to exercise political control and strategic direction of a crisis
management operation. This gives it an even more prominent role in the ESDP.
The Treaty of Nice established:


the Military Committee of the European Union, which is responsible for providing the PSC with
military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC is the highest
military body established within the Council.
the Military Staff of the EU, which implements the Military Committee's decisions and policies,
becomes the EU's source of military expertise.
A Constitution for Europe (2004)
Signed by the Heads of State or Government on 29 October 2004 in Rome, the Constitution for
Europe ("the European Constitution ") should enter into force following ratification by the
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. It provides for the
creation of:

the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article I-28 of the Constitutional treaty) so that the EU
speaks with one political voice to ensure the effectiveness and coherence of the CFSP. The
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
Minister's role consists of conducting the CFSP and the European security and defence policy
(ESDP), using all the instruments currently at the disposal of the High Representative for the CFSP
and the Commissioner for External Relations.
the European External Action Service, with the role of assisting the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
This Service will be composed of officials from the General Secretariat of the Council, from the
Commission and from the diplomatic services of the Member States.
As regards the decision-making process, the Commission will not have the power to submit
proposals in CFSP matters. The Council of Ministers continues to decide by unanimous vote in
most cases and the Member States will have the right of veto. Compared with the EU Treaty, the
Constitution limits the CFSP instruments, restricting them to European decisions and international
agreements. The use of legislative instruments such as European laws and framework laws is
excluded.
BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESDP
The "Treaty of Brussels" of 17 March 1948 marked the beginning of economic, social and cultural
collaboration and collective self-defence in Europe among the signatory countries (Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The Treaty of Brussels was
amended in 1954 by the Paris Agreements establishing the Western European Union (WEU), a
European organisation set up for the purposes of cooperation on defence and security. In the same
year the French National Assembly rejected the European Defence Community (EDC), and the
WEU for a long time became the forum for defence and security cooperation in Europe.
Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a transfer of competences from the WEU to the
EU. It states that the CFSP covers all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the
progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should
the European Council so decide.
On 3 and 4 December 1998, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, the French Head of State and the
British Head of Government respectively, met in Saint-Malo to sign a joint declaration. This
declaration is seen as the starting point of a European defence.
The European Council meeting in Cologne on 3 and 4 June 1999, continued the discussion on a
common policy on security and defence and in particular adopted a statement on strengthening the
common European security and defence policy (ESDP).. The Heads of State or Government
confirmed their intention that the EU "shall play its full role on the international stage… give the
European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a
common European policy on security and defence".
The Council adopted the German Presidency report on strengthening the European security and
defence policy. The report underlines the need:



to strengthen the CFSP by the development of a common European security and defence policy
(ESDP);
to create the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces and decisionmaking bodies and procedures;
to take decisions to act within the framework of the CFSP. This allows the EU Council to take
decisions on the whole range of political, economic and military instruments at its disposal when
responding to crisis situations.
136
The German Presidency report also stated that the EU would need a capacity for situation analysis,
sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning. According to the report, this
could require structures such as a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee),
an EU Military Committee, an EU Military Staff, etc.
At the Helsinki summit on 10 and 11 December 1999, the European Council decided that:



the Member States must be able to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year, military
forces of up to 50 000 to 60 000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of "Petersberg" tasks;
new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the
Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction for such operations;
a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more
effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal
of the Union and the Member States.
The Santa Maria da Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000 reaffirmed its commitment
to building a common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing the Union's
external action, in full compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. It welcomed
the progress made in fulfilment of the Helsinki mandate on both the military and the civilian aspects
of crisis management and of specific targets for civilian police capabilities. In this respect, Member
States, cooperating voluntarily, undertook that by 2003 they would be able to provide up to 5 000
police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis
management operations. Member States also undertook to be able to identify and deploy up to 1
000 police officers within 30 days.
The Nice European Council of 7, 8 and 9 December 2000 led to the political conclusion of the
Treaty of Nice, which was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003.
This Treaty introduces a few changes with regard to security and defence.
The European Council approved the French Presidency report on the ESDP. The development of
the EU's autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO is not engaged, to launch and
conduct EU-led military operations to fulfil the Petersberg tasks in response to international crises
does not imply the creation of a European army. NATO remains the foundation of the collective
defence of the Member States concerned. The ESDP contributes to the vitality of a renewed
transatlantic link. The EU acknowledges the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for
international peace and security.
The Treaty of Nice repeals Article 17 of the EU Treaty on the relationship between the Union and
the WEU, thereby incorporating the WEU's crisis management tasks into the Union.
After the signing of the Nice Treaty on 26 February 2001, the Brussels European Councils of 12
and 13 December 2003 and 16 and 17 December 2004 adopted two important instruments: the
European security strategy and the document entitled "European Defence: NATO/EU
consultation, planning and operations", allowing for the civilian/military cell to begin work and the
establishment of an operations centre.
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The capacities and structure of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) are divided into
three components, namely military crisis management, civilian crisis management and conflict
prevention.
137
Military crisis management: "headline goal" and permanent structures
The military component was introduced by the Helsinki and Nice European Councils. Firstly,
Helsinki established the "headline goal", that is, the Union's capacity to deploy within 60 days, and
sustain for at least one year, up to 60 000 persons (even some of the candidate countries participate
with military forces). This was accompanied by new military structures introduced at Nice, the most
important being the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Replacing the Political Committee, the
PSC keeps track of international developments, helps define policies and monitors implementation
of agreed policies. It is the lynchpin of crisis management activities. To ensure its smooth operation,
the PSC is assisted by a political military working group and a committee for civilian aspects of
crisis management, as well as the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS).
At international level, the European Union collaborates with various international actors, namely:



NATO: The European Union and NATO cooperate to avoid unnecessary duplication of military
capacities, operational planning, etc. A strategic partnership was set up to this end. The Brussels
European Council of 24 and 25 October 2002 agreed the procedures for implementing the Nice
provisions on the involvement of the non-EU European members of NATO. The EU and NATO
concluded agreements such as the Berlin plus Agreement in 2003.
OSCE: The EC and, later, the EU represented the Member States at meetings of the OSCE on
conflict prevention, crisis management, democratisation and rehabilitation. Examples of the EU's
support for the OSCE include the monitoring of free elections and the development of human rights
institutions in new democracies, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 and 1998.
UN: The UN plays a leading role on the international stage through the United Nations Charter ,
which defines the management of civilian crises. The EU Member States, which are members of the
UN, agreed at the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001 to carry out crisis management
operations within the UN framework.
Civilian crisis management: ensuring peace and stability
The civilian component, developed at the Feira European Council (1999) and the Gothenburg
European Council (2001) with extensive contributions from the Commission, aims to improve a
field where the international community has shown itself to have weaknesses. In order to provide
added value, the EU intends to establish before 2003 four main instruments that are mutually
dependent.
These instruments are designed:




to establish public order: possibility of providing up to 5 000 policemen, including 1 000 within 30
days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with a military force to the training of local
police;
to strengthen the rule of law: possibility of providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts
in the field;
to set up civilian administration: possibility of providing a team to establish or guarantee elections,
taxation, education, water supplies, etc.;
to provide civil protection: possibility of assisting humanitarian actors through emergency operations,
etc. The EU will have to be capable, within three to seven hours, of providing two to three
assessment teams consisting of ten experts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2 000
people.
Furthermore, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been created in order to
improve relations between the military and civilian components. Incorporating instruments from the
first pillar, this committee ensures cooperation with the Commission whilst highlighting that the
success of an operation is closely linked to the reciprocal nature of the military and civilian actions.
138
Preventing conflicts before they happen
Conflict prevention is an important component of the ESDP. The Commission plays an important
role by concentrating on improving the consistency and effectiveness of all of the Union's actions.
The Commission aims:




to make more systematic and coordinated use of the Community's instruments;
to identify and combat causes of conflict;
to improve the capacity to react to nascent conflicts;
to promote international cooperation in this area.
A rapid reaction mechanism , developed by the Commission, was created in February 2001. Used
to provide rapid financing for crisis management, the mechanism may be implemented where there
is a threat to public order or public safety, or in other similar circumstances that might destabilise a
country. This aid is provided in the short term, takes the form of grants and encompasses all of the
activities not covered by the Humanitarian Aid Office ( ECHO ).
The EU makes increasing use of sanctions or restrictive measures to react to violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights or to policies that are in breach of the law or
democratic principles. The EU applies these sanctions in line with the EU Treaty or as the
transposal of UN Security Council resolutions. Restrictive measures concern third countries, nonstate entities and third-country nationals such as terrorists or terrorist groups. Restrictive measures
include: arms embargos, general or specific trade restrictions and restrictions on entry into the EU.
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ANNEX 5 – CASE STUDIES on the institutional weaknesses
of the Union
Through the use of two short case-studies I shall illustrate some of the problems facing the EU and
its institutions in acting coherently in foreign policy. In the first case-study I shall illustrate the
problems facing the EU with regards to setting up the instruments and methods for conducting
foreign policy, by examining the Commissions proposal for rationalising its foreign policy
instruments – specifically the instrument for stability. The second case-study is a presentation of
observations made the Delegation of the European Commission at the United Nations (UN). The
purpose of this is to illustrate the problem facing the Union when actors representing the various
institutions implement EU foreign policy “on the ground”.
The instrument for stability
In a communication to the Council and the Parliament concerning the Unions financial perspectives 2007-2013, the
Commission proposed to rationalise the instruments for external assistance. The proposal contained a streamlining of the
numerous existing geographical and thematic instruments into a total of six instruments. Of these three would be
designed to implement particular policies and the remaining three would constitute necessary responses to particular
needs.328
On of the new instruments was intended to make available adequate responses to situations of crises and instability.
Furthermore it was aimed at long term challenges with a stability or security aspect. This is the instrument for stability
(IS) which would allow the European Community to;
~
deliver an effective, immediate and integrated response to situations of crisis and instability in third countries,
within a single legal instrument, until normal cooperation under one of the general instruments for cooperation
and assistance can resume.
~
address global and regional trans-border challenges with a security or stability dimension arising in third
countries, including issues such as nuclear safety and non-proliferation, as well as the fight against trafficking,
organised crime and terrorism and unforeseen major threats to public health;
~
enable the Community to deliver a timely response to future urgent policy challenges faced by the Union, by
piloting measures unforeseen under the three policy-driven instruments, until such time as they can adequately
be integrated within the policy framework of those instruments.
328
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0626en01.pdf - Eur-Lex, European Union Law.
140
The Commissions proposal may be seen as a response to the call of Javier Solana in the European Security Strategy
(2003), where he advocates for the EU to be ‘more active, more coherent and more capable’ in terms of foreign policy. 329
According to the Commissioner for External Relations the IS will allow the EU “…to anticipate and prevent a crisis
turning into violent conflict; support mediation and reconciliation efforts; and utilise the full range of post-crisis
reconstruction and peace building measures.”330
Furthermore one important justification for the establishment of the instrument is “…to strengthen the collaboration
between the Council, the Commission and Member States.”331 The EU crisis response capability, it was believed, would
be strengthened by combining approaches based on long-term development principles and practices (community actions)
and the foreign policy and security operations of the CFSP. 332
The Parliament, although generally in favour for the attempts to streamline foreign policy instruments had some key
objections to the proposal. In the Working Document 333 regarding the IS the Parliament concludes that the legal base of
the instrument is of concern, because it does not account for Parliament involvement in the decision-making process,
which is the case in many of the current instruments. Furthermore the Parliament objected to the incorporation of the
European Development Funds into the scope of the IS. This would entail the incorporation of an extra EUR 21 billion
into the community budget..
The Parliament also questioned the lack of lack of visibility of financial allocations per region, country or type of action
foreseen.334 Summing up, the Parliaments objections reflect dissatisfaction for those elements of the Commission
proposal, which would undermine or decrease the influence on the decision-making process or the democratic oversight
of the instrument The Council too had objections to the proposal. The main concern was the granting of competence to
the Commission to pursue objectives such as peace building and political stabilization through the instrument. It would
specifically allow the Commission decision-making powers in areas where the Member States through CFSP pursue their
foreign policy interests. This overlap of jurisdiction made the Council dispute the scope of the proposal. 335
The result so far is ongoing negotiations of the decision-making procedures and the scope of the IS. The proposal had the
aim of expanding the role of the Commission in crisis-response and thereby strengthening the overall achievements of the
EU in the future. However, the scope of the projected IS has already been reduced from the original proposal, with the
consequence that the certain areas have been removed. Instead of listing a wide array of political objectives, the IS will
now become a specific limitative list of measures that the Commission can undertake.336
329
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf - European Security Strategy
Ferrero-Waldner, Speech, 2005
331
Ferrero-Waldner, Speech, 2005
332
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0626en01.pdf - Eur-Lex, European Union Law.
333
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dt/556/556529/556529en.pdf - European Parliament,
Working Document No. 15 on the Stability Instrument and the CFSP.
334
Ibid.
335
ISIS Europe, 2005
336
Ibid.
330
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From being a holistic approach the negotiations on the framework of the IS has developed into an inter-institutional
negotiations about competence. Focus has thus shifted from the effectiveness of EU foreign policy through the utilisation
of strengths to a long running turf war between institutions.
The European Union at the United Nations
On the whole the EU is represented by the EU Presidency in UN bodies, but the Commission speaks for and acts as
negotiator for the EU and its Member States in Community issues where powers have been transferred to it (i.e. trade,
fisheries, agriculture and aspects of development and environmental policy). Furthermore it is an essential role of the
Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations to provide timely, accurate and useful information on
local developments, for the headquarters in Brussels. I shall highlight some of the inter-institutional working relationships
and the organisation of work and focus on some of the perceived weaknesses. The main actors are the Council
Secretariat, The Presidency (in this case UK), the Commission and the Member States.
Commission and Council – “evil cousins”
Upon arrival at the Commission Delegation a senior official jokingly made reference to the Delegation of the Council
Secretariat as “our evil cousins”. Upon later reflection, these words carried more weight than initially had seemed the
case.
The two Delegations are physically based in the same office building on two adjacent floors. Despite this closeness the
level of daily interaction between staff of the two institutions is absolutely minimal. This contradicts the efforts made in
2004, when it was centrally (Brussels) decided that the two institutions, which the occupied offices in different locations,
should “move in together”. There are no coordination meetings between the two on a regular basis even though the
portfolios of work are almost identical. There are naturally variations in the scope of tasks, but in general the issues dealt
with pertained to the various councils, committees, bodies and issues at the United Nations (UN). In both delegations
counsellors worked in parallel on the same issues. Furthermore, covering the same sessions of the UN bodies’ meant that
both delegations prepared almost identical reports, which were then sent to Brussels along parallel lines. The
Commission delegation reports to RELEX, while the Council delegation reports to the Council Secretariat – offices
which are, as earlier mentioned, separated by 200 meters. In some instances reports were expedited hastily as it became
known that the “other” delegation had already submitted theirs.
In some rare instances – usually in times of severe workloads – coordination was made possible, by informal contacts
between counsellors of the two delegations. However, this seemed more like a question of “disposing” of the issues
which had no interest or which were known to be very resource-consuming. Certainly the conclusion of this is that the
professional relationship, coordination and interaction between two institutions, with the same overarching goals, may be
defined as inadequate. Rather than cooperating fully to achieve common goals quite the opposite appeared, at times, to be
the case.
Presidency, Member States and the Commission337
The Commission has the role in the multilateral sphere of the UN of coordinating common positions and keeping the
337
When referring to the Presidency the country implied is the United Kingdom.
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Member States I line with EU policy. On major issues these positions are negotiated at the central level in Brussels, but
by far and large negotiations on specific UN topics are handled under mandate in New York. 338
In certain forums where delicate political issues were discussed (i.e. Middle East) the role of the Commissions is at times
coerced. There are several reasons that can be highlighted as the cause of this. Firstly, due to the lack of legal personality
the Commission (and Council) only has observer status in the different UN bodies. Although a substantial contributor and
a key actor in many of the issues discussed in these bodies the EU does not have voting power as a single entity. This is
privileged to UN Member States and as such the 25 EU countries. Secondly, the Presidency which is the primary
negotiator with UN partners uses its status to “take over” EU coordination meetings. When coordinating positions the
Presidency uses drafted discussion papers portraying its own position as the basis for negotiations. Thus, to some extent it
controls the direction of the final outcome - the common EU negotiating position towards third countries. In doing so the
Presidency avoids putting itself in a position, where it will have to negotiate against its own position. According to most
sources this is in fact common practice regardless of who holds the Presidency. Finally, there is a quite open and apparent
discontent with the presence of the Commission in certain EU coordination forums. None more so than in the ‘article
19’339 meeting, where European members of the UN Security Council (SC) brief and discuss with non-members on
matters relating to peace and security. Here there is a open disregard for any information requested by the Commission
and rarely is the proposal of Commission officials incorporated forward planning.
It is not just between the Presidency and the Commission that antagonism exists. The members of the Security Council,
and in particular the permanent members (P5) France and UK, hold a powerbase which is (unsurprisingly perhaps)
utilised strategically. An essential concern of any diplomatic mission especially vis-à-vis matters of peace and security is
the timely access to vital information. None more so than in matters deemed to be addressed in Security Council
consultations. In November 2005 the whole diplomatic community where anxiously awaiting the release of the report of
the Independent International Investigation Committees (Mehlis Report) findings in regards to the assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. On the eve of the release an ‘Article 19’ meeting was convened to discuss matters
of the previous week. In this session several representatives of Member States appealed for the distribution of the report
immediately upon release to the SC-members340, who would obviously receive it first. The delegate of Romania, who had
always previously been forthcoming, noted that SC-members had been advised that it would be distributed to SCmembers at six o’clock the same day and that it could be shared hereafter. The UK and French delegate then ‘corrected’
the Romanian and made it known that they would not receive it until ten o’clock the following morning. Among most
participants there was a sense that the two P5 had been less than truthful. The report was distributed at ten o’clock the
following morning, but it was learned shortly after that the SC-members had in fact, as the Romanian delegate had
informed, received it the day before. Although the Mehlis report was an important factor with regards to peace and
security, I do not believe it had no direct bearing on the national security of neither France nor the UK. When EU
Member States openly deceive partners in this manner it is hard to perceive that common ground can be expected, when
national interests are essentially at the core of the issue. In and around SC matters EU Members are reduced to humble
takers of the information that the SC-members are willing to distribute. The fact that delegates of most EU
representations sit outside SC chambers waiting for information underscores that not nearly enough coordination and
338
Member States expectedly advised from respective capitals.
Named after the ‘loyalty’ article in the Treaty of the European Union.
340
At this time Denmark, Greece, France, UK and candidate country Romania
339
143
cooperation takes place.
Finally,
A peculiar, but telling exercise of turf struggles is the never-ending rotation of name-plates at the EU observer seat of the
various UN conference rooms. Depending on the person sitting in the seat, the staff of the UN conference services must
change it. This is because there are three (!) different plates in use; the ‘European Commission’, ‘European Union’ and
‘European Community’ plates. The Commission and Council Delegation staff usually uses the ‘Community’ plate, but
when officials from the Commission HQ in Brussels attend it is changed accordingly to ‘Commission’. When Member
States represent the EU the ‘European Union’ plate is brought out, because the ‘Community’ plate is associated with the
supranational pillar 1. At certain sessions, the plate has been changed upwards of ten times.
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