AY 2006-2007
AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES
STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE:
THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH PAPER
DR. JOHN BOKEL
WILLIAM G. ADAMSON, COL, USA
SEMINAR 7
(DR. GREG FOSTER, PRIMARY FACULTY ADVISOR)
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-5062
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AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE:
THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
Abstract
This study evaluates the effect of an asymmetric threat, the Improvised Explosive
Device (IED), on strategic leader initiative during the “Long War”. The Joint IED
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established by the Department of Defense (DOD) to
“defeat (IED) as weapons of strategic influence”. DOD’s military response, by itself,
lacks sufficiency and JIEDDO’s success remains elusive. The hostile use of IEDs
worldwide persists, and will likely continue, without a national mandate dictating greater
interagency (IA) involvement. This paper suggests a more committed IA constituency
will lead to better collective performance, potentially resulting in success. The
observations of the former operations officer of JIEDDO offers a portfolio of lessons to
enable organizational effectiveness when responding to anomalous conditions.
COL W. G. Adamson, USA
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Dr. John Bokel
2007
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An Asymmetric, Strategic Form of Fires
“Explosives are the safest weapon for the Mujahideen. Using explosives allows us
to escape enemy personnel and to avoid being arrested. In addition, explosives
strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.”
- (Al Qaeda statement quoted from “Encyclopedia Jihad, Version 4”)
The United States (US) currently engages an adversary cloaked in an ancient
ideology in a war it failed to fully envision. The prevalent global threat comes from
autonomously networked, non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, motivated by ideology,
mistrust of the West, and disapproval of international governance. The strategy of hostile
forces presents evolving asymmetries confronting the will of the American public as the
“center of gravity” to democratic ideology. Assassinations, kidnappings, beheadings,
suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent the tactics employed
in a “global insurgency”. (Barno, 2006) This paper relates a chronological account of the
DOD response to one of these tactics, the IED, by recounting the formation of the Joint
IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).
DOD’s military response to the IED threat, by itself, is inadequate, and JIEDDO’s
mission “to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence” remains elusive because of
insufficient interagency (IA) support. National tunnel-vision with the war in Iraq restricts
JIEDDO’s capacity to broaden the national effort on the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue,
absent a national mandate dictating greater IA involvement.
A more committed IA constituency will greatly benefit the IED effort. Greater IA
contributions to a national IED effort, particularly among the intelligence community
(IC) and law enforcement agencies could result in better collective performance,
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO
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potentially achieving success. Current IA participation in the IED effort is a testimony to
the entrepreneurial leadership at JIEDDO. Organizational theory addresses the
difficulties of synchronizing complex organizational endeavors when functions are not
viewed as essential.
Organizational theory suggests that organizations are created in order to
accomplish certain missions….Organizations favor policies that will increase the
importance of their organization, fight for capabilities that they view as essential
to their essence, seek to protect those capabilities viewed as essential, and
demonstrate comparative indifference to functions not viewed as essential. (Nagl,
2002, pp. 4-5)
Because DOD’s preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan centralizes JIEDDO
support properly on the Combatant Commander the IED effort reflects an imbalanced
military-centric approach. As a result of counterinsurgency experience, military
commanders learned and the DOD adapted its institutional response to the hostile use of
the IED. The military’s learning curve outpaces other government agencies in regards to
the IED response. Meanwhile, the hierarchical, ad hoc IA process lacks a comprehensive
strategy for defeating the global IED threat because it is not viewed as essential to their
collective or unilateral missions. Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager’s experience in
Afghanistan led him to state of the IA, “…coordination has been haphazard and ad hoc,
particularly at lower levels. Action is required; the system will not improve by itself.”
(Mansager, p. 80)
A modest prototype effort expanding the scope of IA involvement on the IED
problem could validate integration concepts and processes for a subsequent broader IA
reform effort. Divergent IA authority, tribal-like organizational cultures, and
bureaucratic reluctance inhibits full or comprehensive participation in the IED effort.
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The same could be said of the four military Services during the formative stages of
DOD’s IED response. However, existing law, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, dictating a
Joint Service organizational structure and joint warfare concept enabled the military to
overcome inadvertent friction and Service biases. The release of the Iraq Study Group
report November 2006, recommended a Goldwater-Nichols model for training and
conducting joint operations across IA boundaries. (Iraq Study Group [ISG], 2006) The
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended government reform
of the IA process along the line of Goldwater-Nichols. The notion of building operational
capacity within the IA that approaches the capability of DOD’s joint organizational
concept underpins the recommendations in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study by CSIS.
(Murdock, C & Flournoy, M, 2005, p. 8)
The IED threat required a rapid response, invoking initiative on the part of
strategic leaders and organizational adaptation. An account of the strategic adjustments,
organizational initiatives, and processes enacted during the creation of JIEDDO
illustrates senior leader initiative. Highlighting organizational “best practices” allows
development of a portfolio of lessons observed. A review of the scope of the IED
problem provides operational context for the subsequent development of lessons
observed.
Scope of the IED Problem
The havoc caused by the use of IEDs began in the first few months following the
end of major combat in Iraq. Initially, IEDs did not concern military forces. Following
the end of major combat, loosely coordinated direct fire engagements constituted the
major form of enemy attack in Iraq. The overwhelming firepower and accuracy of US
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and Coalition military forces in direct fire engagements caused rapid adjustment of
enemy tactics. Indirect fire attacks, primarily from mortars and rockets, quickly became
the enemy’s desired form of contact, targeting forward operating bases (FOBs) and Iraqi
government facilities. As US counter-battery fires became more effective, a new tactic
emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED.
The term, IED, entered the popular lexicon of the US military during what was originally
planned as the stabilization and reconstruction phase of the Iraq War.
Numerous definitions exist for the IED. Simply stated, a bomb-maker modifies
the characteristics of munitions, explosives, or substances with explosive properties in a
homemade fashion, creating an IED. (Global Security.Org/military/intro/ied.html) IEDs
can be constructed and delivered to their targets in many different ways. Used for
hundreds of years, recent examples of IED attacks range from the truck bombing of the
Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, to the ship-borne attack against the USS Cole in
1999. The successful aerial IED attacks on September 11, 2001 produced a Presidential
response with an intense focus on homeland security resulting in the reorganization of 22
federal agencies under the Department of Homeland Security. However, as the US opted
to expand the GWOT into Iraq the most pervasive form of IED became the roadside
bomb and car bomb.
Few experiences compare with the helplessness felt by those involved in an IED
attack. The experience is searing. An IED attack has many of the attributes of a sniper
ambush. There’s no emotional build-up prior to an attack, such as: the anxiety prior to an
assault, the sound of preparatory artillery fire, or the rumble of a tank formation en route
to a meeting engagement with enemy armor. IEDs are weapons of surprise. An IED
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO
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victim vaults from relative calm to chaos in the blink of an eye. The IED strikes
unexpectedly like the piercing crack of a sniper rifle. The blast from an IED has
indiscriminate, constituent effect. No attacker is readily apparent. This relative
anonymity offers advantage to hostile forces. The combination of these ingredients:
helplessness, surprise, calm before chaos, indiscriminate effect, collateral damage, and
anonymity of the attacker contribute to tactical anxiety. Personal involvement with IED
attacks begins with the response to a scene of a suspected IED and often moves onto
casualty evacuation. Later, personal involvement extends to discussions with victims,
patients convalescing and coping with daily rehabilitation from wounds. The sense of
urgency felt on the battlefield or in the amputee wards enters living rooms via nightly
news coverage. Images of IED attacks invoke strategic influence over the public, a
public otherwise physically dislocated from combat. The strategic power of the IED
comes from a non-kinetic source, information.
America’s adversaries operate in and exploit the information environment. Blast
effects from IEDs are sensational on film, indiscriminate in the collateral damage they
cause, create a climate of fear in the public, and have a psychological impact on military
forces. IEDs present a new and asymmetric form of fires with a tactical effect much like
artillery; however, the kinetic effect produces psychological anxiety as well as strategic
influence. IEDs become “weapons of strategic influence” because images of IED attacks
impact the psyche of the American public through daily news broadcasts. Hostile forces
count on “sound bite” deep analysis from the media and the American electorate, seeking
to overcome the US technological and military advantage with this asymmetric form of
fires. The resultant draining effect exhausts national will and commitment. Oscar Wilde
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once said, “In America the President reigns for four years, and journalism governs for
ever and ever. (Wilde 1881/Torricelli 2001, p. 177) The adversaries of the US in the
GWOT exploit this reality well. Curtailing the informational power exploited by global
insurgents through images of IED attacks calls for a wider application of all elements of
national power, not exclusively military force.
In operational terms, IEDs presents an asymmetric threat to Coalition Forces for
two reasons: first, they represent a new method of attack that conventional capabilities
were unprepared to address, and second, the IED was something not fully understood.
(Skelton, 2004) Hostile forces do not develop innovative technologies through
conventional research and development (R&D) programs. Attackers employ decades old
insurgent techniques with available Industrial Age weapons. In short, terrorist and
insurgents modify commercially available equipment and adapt tactics at a rate that
bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations cannot keep pace with. Are IEDs, as some
suggest, just a symptom of the general problem of insurgency and or terrorism? One
cannot consider terrorism and insurgency without considering the IED. The following
quote from an Al-Qaeda document highlights this terrorist organization’s reliance on the
IED.
“Al-Qaeda doctrine acknowledges ‘that the production of different types of
bombs and explosives must be mastered,’ but adds this is not difficult because
‘the ways to do this are available and explained in many places … people with
experience …[are] many in number in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere’."
(http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=169)
Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as leaders in the Pentagon,
confronted by the rising insurgency which challenged security and stability in the region
adjusted operational tactics. GEN Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
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recognized “the IED is the poor man’s cruise missile.” (Lovelace & Votel, 2005, p. 34)
IED components are readily available, inexpensive, have relatively simple construction,
and offer easy delivery to a target area. Proliferation in the use of IEDs by hostile forces
continue. Given the widespread, de-centralized nature, and asymmetry of the IED
problem, US forces have had difficulty progressing from a reactive operational mode.
Moreover, the malignancy carried by the IED spans all levels of war.
The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs resulted in a response from the tactical to
strategic level of war. The initial response in theater followed a technically oriented
approach rather than a holistic strategy. Initially, commanders categorized the IEDs as a
problem for either an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team, or Engineers, vice a
new form of fires for ground commanders to address. (Votel, personal communication,
October 7, 2006)
360 Degree Warfare and the IED Phenomenon
Gaining an appreciation of the early tactical and operational impact of the IED
provides greater awareness of the scope of change required by the IED. Terms common
to maneuver warfare such as: meeting engagement, screen, delay, and movement-tocontact, pale in significance to a new lexicon associated with “360 Degree Warfare”. The
concept of a front, or line of battle, vanished.
Currently, the primary offensive component of terrorism and insurgency in Iraq
and Afghanistan manifests itself through the use of the IED. IED attacks target convoys
just as frequently as “front line” units. These logistics convoys become combat
formations known as Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs). A prevalent tactic once known as
the “presence patrol” from the US experience in Bosnia and Kosovo become Combat
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 10
Reconnaissance Patrols (CRP). Reconnaissance missions increasingly focused on route
clearance. Assessing routes for out-of-place garbage bags, animal carcasses, piles of
rocks, and broken concrete curbing indicative of IED camouflage techniques becomes
daily routine. Soldiers and Marines developed skilled vehicle-mounted scanning
techniques as they looked for the tell-tale lone wire crossing a street linked to an IED
initiator. The appearance of new graffiti in a neighborhood becomes an important
indicator of potential IED activity. The dominant form of maneuver for US forces
operating outside of FOBs become CLPs, CRPs, and route clearance patrols.
Primarily for force protection, US forces implemented a policy of living and
operating out of FOBs. Initially viewed as liberators and then occupiers by the Iraqi
people, US forces adopted an “unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practice” by
moving into FOBs. As noted in the final draft of a jointly issued Marine Corps and Army
manual, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, separation and isolation from the population
involved in an insurgency historically leads to poor rapport and ineffective results. (FM
3-24/FMFM 3-24, 2006) US forces looked more like foreign occupiers than liberators.
The shared terrain linking the populace, insurgents, and US forces became the roads and
access points to US facilities. By choosing the time and place for employing IEDs
against troop movements, insurgents seized the initiative on these common routes. The
vast majority of IED attacks occurred within a short distance of the FOBs. Regaining the
initiative became the logical next step for US forces. Regaining the initiative optimally
comes from precise, preemptive targeting of the human activities that enable IED
manufacture. However, identification of an enemy capable of blending into the
environment, one that can hide in plain sight, complicated the problem. Doctrine,
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 11
training, and a lack of counterinsurgency experience set the conditions for a
misconception of how to best approach the IED phenomenon.
Doctrinally in maneuver warfare, ground commanders own battle-space called an
area of operations (AO). Ground commanders initially viewed IEDs as obstacles on
supply routes or as a means of attacking patrols in their AOs. The preferred option for
commanders remains obstacle avoidance, but if that is not possible, they pursue obstacle
reduction or elimination. Decades of training taught commanders that eliminating
obstacles quickly preserves freedom of maneuver and decreases the likelihood of
preplanned attack by the enemy. When the option to avoid the obstacle eluded maneuver
commanders, they typically used their assigned combat engineers. The comfort level and
trust developed through years of doctrinally based training between maneuver forces and
combat engineers expedited decisions to clear routes rather than secure and hold
suspected IED sites for detailed exploitation and neutralization of IEDs. But a route,
once cleared, without constant surveillance and subsequent interdiction becomes easily
reseeded with IEDs. The required surveillance and interdiction rarely occurred rendering
many route clearance missions ineffective. Rapid removal of the IED threat by ballistic
or explosive techniques common to engineers did nothing for forensics or technical
exploitation of the device thereby negating options to capture the emplacer or bombmaker.
Ascertaining those responsible for IEDs becomes a primary concern and the IED
threat varied greatly from region to region. Sunni and Shii’a conflict, foreign terrorists,
anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), former regime elements (FRE), organized criminal gangs, or the
Taliban in Afghanistan, all these groups employed IEDs for their own purposes, with
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 12
varying degrees of sophistication, and with different tactics. Deciphering this confusing
array of threat groups at times presented a complex and haphazard picture of the IED
threat for Coalition Forces. Technical analysis from EOD forces coupled with a spirit for
law enforcement investigation supportive of Host Nation judiciary and criminal law
became vital components to the IED effort. Few maneuver commanders had experience
operating with EOD forces to engender the critical cohesion and interoperability essential
for success. Due to limited availability of EOD forces in peacetime, maneuver and EOD
forces had not trained together and were forced to learn in combat.
EOD forces train for the unique and dangerous mission of rendering safe
explosive devices permitting detailed exploitation of devices. Across the Joint Service
employment of EOD forces varied. Air Force EOD assets typically operate only on
airfields for UXO removal. Navy EOD forces are employed in more of a SOF role with
specialization in underwater and littoral operations. Marines EOD forces offer habitual
support to Regimental Combat Teams in a direct support mission. Finally, Army EOD
forces, traditionally aligned in a combat service support role, typically perform UXO
neutralization on training and firing ranges.
Practicing highly specialized EOD skills in peacetime normally restricts
maneuver training for EOD forces. In all but rare combined arms training exercises,
Army EOD detachments trained unilaterally on demolition or firing ranges with range
safety controls constraining the participation of other ground forces. However, the IED
use in combat surfaced both a maneuver and doctrinal dilemma for ground forces.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 13
The Counter Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC)
In Iraq, the Corps initially maintained central control of EOD detachments
limiting any habitual association with ground forces. EOD detachments rotated around
the country spending about ten days at a time with maneuver brigades. The EOD
battalion headquarters remained in Baghdad under Corps control. The insurgents
developed an understanding of US tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) by
observing US responses to IEDs. As the IED threat grew, EOD technicians became
principal targets for insurgents and terrorists. Casualties and fatalities among EOD forces
as well as damage to their robotic interrogation equipment became a threatening concern,
particularly with IED first responders. In an attempt to share IED trends and technical
information, EOD forces developed a technical exploitation process unique to themselves.
This new technical exploitation capability, an ad hoc organization became known
as the Counter Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC). The CEXC served as a
consolidation point for discovered or neutralized IEDs where detailed technical analysis
developed trends, technical information, and unique bomb-maker signatures. A
regionally-based IED threat emerged from this analysis. Sophistication of an IED relates
directly to the talent of the bomb-maker. The techniques employed varied in part due to
insurgent and terrorist access to specific munitions, explosives, detonators, and design
expertise. The desire for increased technical and biometric forensics from IEDs raised
command interest. The command emphasis shifted and interdicting the chain of activities
enabling IED use became a primary concern. The value of the skills brought to the
battlefield by EOD forces increased markedly. There were not enough EOD forces in
theater for every maneuver brigade, however. Amending EOD force allocation took time
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 14
but eventually request for forces (RFFs) as well as Army force structure changes creating
more EOD capability and other initiatives discussed later in this paper corrected the
problem. Simultaneously, evacuation of IED components bearing unique characteristics
generated IA and international interest for more detailed exploitation.
Supplemental support became available through agreements with Coalition and
IA partners. The involvement of the IA in the CEXC represented the first IA
participation in what would become DOD’s Joint IED Defeat strategy. The universally
positive recognition of the CEXC eventually required long-term support. Because of the
Navy’s role as joint proponent for EOD forces, Joint Service support for the CEXC fell to
the US Navy for oversight but the early funds came from the IED Task Force. Manning
the CEXC demanded even more from already under-allocated, critically required US
EOD forces.
The preceding depiction represents a doctrinal as well as training challenge, a
novel organizational initiative, and a force allocation shortfall resulting specifically from
the insurgent use of IEDs. The military institution acknowledged this early lesson by
making adjustments in theater. However, overcoming the effect of the IED in this regard
took valuable time and forces suffered more IED casualties in the interim.
Simultaneously, as IED use gradually increased, completion of the first year of the war in
Iraq coincided with major troop rotations.
Commanders adapted, learning new lessons while fighting this insurgency, but
they needed help. Unit commanders spontaneously identified unexpected capability
requirements which compelled development of new approaches and equipment.
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Acknowledging rising casualties from IED use, the Army, with 70% of the combat forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan, responded early with an ad hoc task force.
The Department of the Army Responds
In October 2003, Lieutenant General Richard Cody, then the G3 of the Army,
responded to increasingly dangerous IED attacks against ground forces by creating an
Army IED Task Force. LTG Cody chose, COL(P) Joe Votel, USA, Deputy Director for
Information Operations in the Army G3 to lead the Task Force. The Task Force initially
focused on information sharing and dissemination. Votel primarily deployed contractors,
former, elite Special Operation Force (SOF) personnel coupled with a small hand-picked
cadre of officers to the battlefield to assess the situation and make creative
recommendations on adjustments to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed
by operating forces. (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) The Army,
preoccupied with conventional warfare and tactics in its preparation for the war, needed
to learn and innovate rapidly. Because of SOF specific training and experience, former
SOF personnel proved critical to assessing the problem. (Schoomaker, 2005)
The Army IED Task Force deployed its first field detachment to Iraq in December
2003. In April 2004, an additional team followed to Iraq, and another to Afghanistan. A
desire for a permanent organizational solution for asymmetric threats matured with a new
concept from the Army called the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG).
The Army Asymmetric Warfare Group
Several months after the formation of the JIEDDTF, an Army initiative for
formation of a new permanent organization for asymmetric warfare surfaced. The AWG
is a U.S. Army Special Mission Unit (SMU) with the mission of providing Army and
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 16
Joint commanders decisive advantages to counter existing and future asymmetric threats.
The Army envisioned building this capability from across the Army with the initial
planning done by the Army IED Task Force. The concept transitioned the forward
deployed operational component along with the training functions of the JIEDDTF to the
AWG. The remnant of the JIEDDTF would provide support to the JIPT. However, the
OSD decision establishing the JIEDDTF altered the original plan. Subsequent legal
issues slowed the formation of the AWG, not the least of which was the need to get
Congress to change law allowing its formation. Overcoming these hurdles took time but
the AWG continued close support to the Joint IED Defeat effort. (Lovelace and Votel,
2005) In the meantime, the JIEDDTF continued to provide tactical advice to deployed
forces through its field teams, and assisted commanders in pre-deployment training
through its Training and Advisory Teams (TAT).
In order to provide counter-IED training and advisory support; collect lessons
learned, TTPs, and disseminate best practices the personnel on the field teams embedded
with units at brigade-level and below. The field teams afford a direct tactical to strategic
linkage to all JIEDDTF resources: National assets, priority, and fixes for technical
intelligence and forensics exploitation linkage through the national intelligence
community. After a 90 to120 day rotation, deployed field team personnel rotate back to
CONUS to serve on the TAT. In this way the TAT inform, influence, and support
commanders in their pre-employment training. Some of these functions have since been
transferred to the AWG. (Allyn, personal communication, October 17, 2006) The
JIEDDTF, through the TAT, provided relevant, current lessons learned through advisors
possessing recent regional operational experience. The activation of the AWG finally
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occurred formally in January 2005. The collaboration between the JIEDDTF and the
AWG continued, however, DOD recognized the JIEDDTF as the Department’s single
point of contact for IED matters. The Pentagon-generated Task Force drew initial
skepticism, especially from Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7, resulting in several
challenges.
Coordination challenges between the various levels of command complicated the
effort, such as the lack of a corresponding organization at CENTCOM or in theater.
Multiple counter-IED efforts did exist but no clear leader synchronized the effort.
Throughout the spring of 2004, the first round of major troop rotations took place
changing all the military leadership in country.
Rotation of Forces Heightens the IED Threat
The change-over of leadership and personnel experienced with the rising
insurgency met with a corresponding marked increase in overall enemy activity in the
spring and summer of 2004. Maintaining operational continuity and priority of effort
between changeovers along with problems tracking numerous materiel requirements
generated from theater created difficult challenges. As the first units departed the combat
theater, knowledge about requirements generated months earlier left with them.
Equipment arrived unexpectedly, many times with an ill-defined concept of operation
(CONOP) for employment, and came with little to no support. This multi-faceted
problem went beyond simply tracking requests for equipment. Training newly arrived
units on unfamiliar equipment proved problematic. Stuck fielding new equipment and
capabilities while in contact with the enemy, arriving unit commanders grew frustrated.
The complexity and tactics of IEDs evolved throughout this period as well.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 18
At first, roadside IEDs constructed with hard-wired initiation systems and
rudimentary detonators persisted. The abundant supply of military grade munitions
throughout Iraq afforded insurgents and terrorists a virtually unlimited supply of materiel.
Suicide car bombings became daily events. The enemy raised the stakes in the counterIED fight and collateral damage to civilians did not constrain them.
The indiscriminate attacks against Iraqi infrastructure, security forces, and
civilians increased, demonstrating the relative impotence of the nascent Iraqi government.
The terrorist weapon of choice became the IED. The media relentlessly broadcasted the
effects of IED attacks serving the terrorists’ purpose. The early IED challenge brought
opportunities to overcome institutional obstacles as well.
The early IED response by DOD highlighted a lack of conceptual unity among the
interagency (IA) and the Services. Over time, new agreements and organizational
adaptation enabled consensus for complementary joint approaches and comprehensive
rules while working through the IED problem. Conversely, complaints common from
combat commanders questioned an apparent lack of national involvement in the war.
The sense of commitment shown by the “Greatest Generation” of World War II
(WWII) appeared absent to some commanders. GEN John Abizaid, the commander of
Central Command (CENTCOM), built on the WWII theme and called for a “Manhattanlike Project” for the IED threat. Returnees from the war seemed inclined to think like
Winston Churchill, speaking to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941, “Give us
the tools and we will finish the job.” A call for a nationwide IED effort commenced
when, in June 2004, GEN Abizaid wrote a P4 letter [personal for] to Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, asking for his help in mobilizing the nation.
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Getting a Manhattan-like Project Started
Because he foresaw the IED threat as a potential threat to success in Iraq, GEN
Abizaid wanted a Manhattan-like project, referring to the atomic bomb program in WWII.
Debate over whether he achieved his desired effect continues. Whether GEN Abizaid
spoke metaphorically or not, the IED problem got the Department’s attention.
The strategic response to the IED required DOD to amend internal biases and
institutional rhythms. During July 2004, the Department grappled with organizing itself
to assist CENTCOM. The Army felt the IED effort needed an Executive Agent and they
volunteered. The Army IED Task Force developed a briefing outlining the Army position.
The deliberations by the Service Chiefs and Secretaries during the briefing surfaced
cultural differences among the Services. The discussion exposed divergent Service
values on the IED response. As an example, Air Force Secretary James G. Roche
disagreed with the establishment of a DOD task force under Army leadership. He
thought the Air Force could provide a solution to the IED threat and defeat it in about six
months. (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) Apparently, the belief of
some senior leaders was that DOD could deal with the IED problem with a somewhat
discreet approach, not requiring IA participation.
The outcome of the deliberations on
the Army proposal produced a Joint Integrated Process Team, or JIPT, for IED Defeat on
July 12, 2004.
A one paragraph memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
authorized the establishment of the JIPT. As a result of the Deputy Secretary’s decision,
the Army IED Task Force became a Joint Task Force and formed the nucleus of the DOD
effort. The Army led the JIPT assigning its Director of Operations in the G3, MG Fred
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 20
Robinson, as lead for the JIPT. BG Votel maintained the position as director of the Joint
IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDDTF). The combination of these two organizations, the
JIPT and JIEDDTF, synchronized the department-wide IED effort.
The primary focus of the JIPT became assessing technology and deliberating on
resource decisions for Joint IED Defeat. The JIPT consisted of 13 primary members at
the O7/SES level from each of the Services and select Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) offices. The JIEDDTF performed support functions for the JIPT, coordinated
operational IED Defeat efforts, and produced IED threat intelligence assessments. The
formation of joint task forces (JTFs), like the JIEDDTF, epitomized how Pentagon
bureaucracy responds to irregular challenges.
JTFs can buy time for an institutional assessment of the need for longer-term
DOD change. However, several bureaucratic deficiencies surfaced from building the
JIEDDTF in this fashion. The Services supplied personnel filling the temporary positions
in the JIEDDTF with multi-disciplined expertise. One of the benefits of staffing the
JIEDDTF this way became the linkage people brought to their parent organizations.
Conversely, the ad hoc staff lacked continuity of operations.
Personnel vacancies caused atrophy in parent organizations further retarding
bureaucratic efficiency. In the case of active duty personnel, some managers expected
personnel to function in both their parent organization as well as the JIEDDTF. The
ensuing tug-of-war between management, coupled with split loyalty on the part of the
employee, and increased work demands, affected efficiency in both organizations. Due
to the Title X role, the four Services took different approaches when they filled the
JIEDDTF temporary billets due to Service specific regulations.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 21
In the case of the Air Force, personnel served a 120-day term with the JIEDDTF.
The other services typically used a six-month rotation. Service specific personnel
processes took months before filling these positions. Reservists called to active duty
filled many positions in the JIEDDTF. Disruption in operational continuity resulted from
this form of military manning and caused a recurring learning curve for new personnel. It
left a void of knowledge in how the JIEDDTF operated and resulted in a lack of sustained
experience on the nature of the problem. Over time, tour extensions for a core group of
selected personnel provided limited continuity and an ability to operate at the highest
levels of the institution.
Developing Shared Approaches for Joint IED Defeat
The JIEDDTF routinely answered questions from Congress and other US
government agencies on the IED threat and provided assessments and updates on
counter-measures. The resulting media coverage shed public light on the JIEDDTF. As
the single point of contact for the DOD, many coalition partners viewed the JIEDDTF as
a valuable point of contact with the US government. International partners regularly
contacted the JIEDDTF for assistance in an effort to coordinate actions on counter-IED.
Well over two dozen countries engaged the JIEDDTF in meaningful dialogue on the IED
threat. Most of these exchanges came with requests for training, intelligence sharing, or
equipment solutions. Many nations explored the possibility of shared R&D of
technologies to defeat or counter the IED. The Department of State and several federal
law enforcement agencies seemingly possessed a vested interest in international requests
for IED response coordination. Viewed by a growing international constituency as a
valued point of contact for the United States government, DOD should have acquired a
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 22
broad mandate for coordinating international agreements. The coordination with
coalition members reminds one of Churchill’s comments, “There is only one thing worse
than fighting with allies – and that is fighting without them.” (Skelton, 2004, p. 102)
The JIEDDTF entered into bi-lateral agreements with several coalition partners.
Ultimately, the closest US partners embedded officers on the JIEDDTF as organic
members of the task force. In this way, the JIEDDTF provided mutual national benefit in
the realm of intelligence sharing, technology and training. The United Kingdom
followed by Australia and Canada provided the early international members to the task
force, enabling near transparent collaboration of national efforts. The international
influence of embedded officers contributed to the development of a more refined Joint
IED Defeat strategy.
The Joint IED Defeat Approach
The JIEDDTF developed a holistic approach for IED Defeat, organizing sub-IPTs
around the five tenets of assured mobility espoused by the Army Engineer School:
predict, prevent, detect, neutralize, and mitigate. These tenets formed the paradigm of a
multi-faceted approach which also encompassed: threat specific intelligence, integrated
technology, focused training, TTPs, doctrine development, and information sharing. The
US Army, through its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), worked closely with
the JIEDDTF developing a new doctrinal manual for IED Defeat, FMI 3-34.114. The
Engineer School led a team from the Army schools along with the TRADOC Futures
Center. The doctrine writers from TRADOC completed the new interim field manual in
an unprecedented six months. Even with this significant doctrinal effort from the
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 23
institutional schools, the main effort shifted noticeably toward technology in the hope of
a quick answer to the IED problem.
A belief at the highest levels in the Department, echoed by commanders within
CENTCOM, pressed for a technological solution to the IED threat. The predisposition
for a technological solution hindered DOD’s early strategy toward a more comprehensive
IA approach centered on intelligence driven operations. The JIEDDTF posture was not
risk averse. The initial direction received from GEN Abizaid in August 2004: identified
the most promising solutions, even if they had only a “51% chance” of being effective,
and test them forward in theater. To be fair, the early effort became a quest for
immediate solutions which could save lives. Combat developers from across the Services
got the message. GEN Abizaid wanted the bleeding stopped quickly.
GEN Abizaid aggressively sought to test potential solutions in the combat theater
but by doing so, he inadvertently surfaced some friction and bias which at times
complicated the effort. (Votel, personal communication, September 27, 2006) Stated
simply, most deployed commanders were not enamored with the concept of testing
unknown capabilities while engaged in a daily life and death struggle with the enemy.
Identifying the right level of command for coordinating IED issues concerned GEN
Abizaid but he did not slow the effort while waiting for a perfect solution. Concurrently,
the Services pursued various initiatives as IED casualties increased.
The early Service efforts concentrated on techniques and materiel solutions for
mitigation of blast effects from IEDs. Budget obligations of literally billions of dollars,
primarily from the Army, fielded up-armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs), paid for developments of add-on armor solutions for lightly
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 24
armored vehicles, and adequate personal body armor for Soldiers and Marines. Avoiding
duplication of Service efforts remained a critical policy for the JIEDDTF. The JIEDDTF
looked for promising solutions that required additional funding to reach higher readiness
levels for field tests and operational assessment. (Boston Globe, 2006)
In August 2004, Secretary Wolfowitz directed a National Laboratory Challenge,
an effort soliciting new ideas and more promising technology. Secretary Wolfowitz
called for the development of innovative solutions from the best minds in the nation. He
emphasized rapid fielding of solutions to the IED problem, but he did not ignore longer
term science and technology (S&T) and R&D efforts. Over 300 attendees from all the
Nation’s laboratories and leading defense firms embarked on multiple paths to find
solutions to this threat. Representatives from several IA technical offices participated.
These representatives showed interest in DOD’s call for assistance but no coordination
resulted from the IA at the conference. Two months later a similar conference held for
industry garnered 500 attendees.
The Joint Baseline Assessment
Simultaneous to this outreach to the labs and industry, the JIEDDTF scoured the
DOD-wide inventory of programs for technologies that might apply to the IED Defeat
effort. This effort did not represent completely unplowed ground however. After the
attacks on September 11, 2001 the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (OSD-ATL) formed its own task force, the Combating
Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF). Led by Mr. Ben Riley, the CTTTF looked
into technology approaches to disrupt and defeat terrorism. Much of the early work in
IED Defeat resulted because of the partnership with the CTTTF. COL Lamont Woody,
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 25
USA, of the JIEDDTF led a review team that assessed nearly 300 programs. Known as
the joint baseline assessment, this review and assessment effort categorized and
prioritized initiatives. The team led by Woody split the initiatives among the five tenets
for further evaluation by the sub-IPTs. The effort consumed a large portion of the
JIEDDTF and succeeded in identifying the ideas and equipment most ready for field
deployment.
The initiatives deemed the most ready, termed the “low-hanging fruit”, received
priority. Quickly assessing these initiatives gained immediate importance in the JIPT
process. As an example, the first solutions approved involve detection and neutralization
efforts. A well trained dog proved the best solution for quick explosive detection, and
one that could rapidly deploy to theater. The first effort led to the fielding of 12
additional dog teams to Iraq. Robotics for explosive exploitation and neutralization
surfaced as another promising capability. High demand EOD units identified the
requirement for additional robots for unmanned stand-off for device interrogation. The
JIPT provided funding for additional robots in sufficient quantity to double the number
deployed with EOD forces as well as expanding availability of depot replacements in
theater. However, the purpose of this study is not to focus on the merits of individual
solutions approved by the JIPT, but to review the emerging processes.
Rapid Approval Process
What developed in the JIPT approval process for IED Defeat solutions indicated
an atypical culture shift from the Pentagon norm. The JIEDDTF broke established
procedure. The default setting for any bureaucracy sustains processes developed to
normalize the organization. The JIEDDTF, charged to innovate and move fast, operated
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 26
on the fringes of the existing bureaucratic system. Since the JIEDDTF operated at the
direction of the Deputy Secretary it attracted great attention and scrutiny. This kind of
entrepreneurial discretion proved critical to rapid decisions.
The initial process gave the JIPT authority to approve single initiatives up to a
threshold of $10 million with the Deputy Secretary reserving approval for solutions
exceeding $10 million [later adjusted to $25 million, See Figure 1]. To advise him, the
Deputy established a Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG) which closely paralleled
the Joint Readiness Oversight Council (JROC) structure, however the SRSG exclusively
approved Joint IED Defeat proposals. In most cases, there were no contentious issues, so
initiatives received approval electronically without physically forming the SRSG. Even
this high level approval process met with inadvertent institutional friction.
The new process for rapid funding of IED Defeat initiatives met with some
reluctance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Comptroller (OSD-C). (Votel,
personal communication, October 7, 2006) The capabilities and materiel solutions for the
IED effort did not fit neatly within standard Planning, Programming, Budget, and
Execution (PPBE) cycles. Because Congressional supplemental funding known as the
Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) paid for the war effort, the OSD-C prepared all DOD
submissions for Congressional review for this supplemental funding (See Figure 1). The
JIEDDTF operated without an organizational budget, relying on the Army for operating
funds while the IFF provided money for the IED Defeat effort. The JIPT decisions
passed through the Services for their concurrence and the OSD-Comptroller for action en
route to Congress.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 27
Joint IED Defeat Resource Process
DEPSECDEF
Standard: Approval to Funding w/ Svc - 13 days
SRSG
> $25M Project
DIRECTOR
Joint IED Defeat TF
> $25M Project
< $25M Project
OSD(C)
OSD(C) IFF
IFF
Congressional
Congressional
Committee
Committee
Chairs*
Chairs*
Execution
Execution
OSD(C)
OSD(C) and
and
Services
Services
OMB
OMB
* 5 Days
Notification
Joint IED Defeat
IPT
Joint Systems
Integration Board
(O6 / GS15)
Joint
Joint Sub-IPT
Sub-IPT
Resource
Resource
Board
Board
Appropriations
Funding Coordination
Predict (NRL)
Prevent (OSD SOLIC)
Detect (OSD AT&L)
Neutralize (Navy)
Mitigate (Army)
New
New Idea
Idea
Field Forces
Services
Agencies
Academia
International
Industry
CTTTF
Figure 1, Joint IED Defeat Resource Process (JIEDDTF 101 Brief)
Even with the Deputy Secretary’s emphasis, the approval process proved painful,
extremely deliberate, lacking the sense of urgency intended, although faster than the
typical DOD approval process. The JIEDDTF advertised a process that could take as few
as 13 days for funding approval from Congress. Occasionally it actually met the 13 day
target, but in reality a 30-day norm typified the processing time required for distributing
funds to the Service designated as lead for a specific IED Defeat solution. The manner in
which ideas and requirements came to the JIEDDTF complicated the JIPT process.
The four military Services filled requirements for fighting forces based on
requests from field commanders. Commander requests come in the form of Operational
Needs Statements (ONS) for the Army, Critical Mission Needs Statements (CMNS) for
the Air Force, and Urgent Universal Needs for the Marine Corps and Navy. For some
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 28
reason agreement for one “requirement” term proved too elusive for the Services. The
requirement process did not lend itself well to the Combatant Command (COCOM)
commander’s priorities. Instead, requirements moved through the disparate Service
approval and programming processes based on Title X funding requirements.
Attempting to overcome this war-fighting deficiency, in mid-2005 the Joint Staff
instituted another process called the Joint Universal Operational Need Statement, or
JUONS as depicted in Figure 2. CENTCOM insisted that all IED Defeat requirements
come to them as JUONS for validation and prioritization by the COCOM prior to the
individual Services.
The Army process illustrates the initial validation sequence. Validation of
requirements occurs at various levels of field command until they get to the Pentagon.
The Department of the Army (DA) staff, typically from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3,
reviewed and revalidated all requirements. DA validated requirements pass to the
programmers in the G8, and they assessed the need for reprogramming to pay for a
requirement. So, even though a field commander may have a valid war-fighting
requirement, there’s a chance funds are not available. When the Army, or any Service,
rejected a request, it would come to the JIPT for consideration. There was a general
verbal understanding that the JIPT would only consider requirements with joint counterIED applicability, meaning no single service initiatives.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 29
5
4
3
2
1
Service rejects IED
Initiative for funding
Validated/Approved
Requirements passed
To programming channel
Service
Requirements
Validated by operations
channels in Pentagon
JUONS for IED
Requirement
Prioritized
By CENTCOM
Service-specific
ONS, UNS or MNS
Requirements or new
Capability validated
by field commands
JIPT takes action to assess,
refine CONOP and fund
IED initiatives
1.
Requirements are validated at various levels of
command until they get to the Pentagon where
they are validated again by the Services,
typically by in the Deputy Chief of Staff, 3.
2.
JUONS for IED requirements would flow thru
CENTCOM for approval and priority
3.
These validated requirements are passed to
the programmers, the Service N8, G8, etc…for
reprogramming actions.
4.
Field commander may a validated requirement,
but there’s a chance it won’t make the funding
cut line.
5.
When rejected by a Service request would
come to the JIPT for consideration.
Figure 2, Requirements Approval Process
All the Services had a stake in this process since the IFF paid for the war effort.
Congress sent the action to the Office of Management and Budget and then it made its
way back to OSD. Since the Deputy Secretary gave priority to Joint IED Defeat
initiatives, he allocated the funds before Service requests received their “cut” by OSD.
When these appropriated funds got to the JIEDDTF, it generally worked through the
Army Budget Office facilitating fund distribution to pre-designated Services for
subsequent fund obligation.
Over time BG Votel recognized the JIEDDTF had become a cash cow with the
secondary effect of stifling Service initiative to fund their solutions. (Votel, personal
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 30
communication, October 7, 2006) The JIEDDTF issued a Broad Agency Announcement
(BAA) through the program management of the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG) soliciting industry solutions for 17 identified capability gaps. Industry
responded with 851 submissions. The Joint Rapid Acquisition Council (JRAC) provided
needed assistance in prioritizing resource decisions from across the Department. Led by
Dr. Bob Buhrkuhl from OSD ATL, the JRAC took special interest in the Joint IED
Defeat effort and assisted with the funding process. The JIEDDTF sub-IPTs vetted these
851 submissions down to some 30 initiatives for follow-on development and funding
through the JIPT. Over the course of the first year, $1.2 billion worth of obligations paid
for over 70 initiatives. In the second year, budget obligations eclipsed $3.5 billion. With
money comes the expectation that equipment could rapidly materialize in theater. The
Army’s Rapid Equipping Force assisted the JIEDDTF to quickly field needed capabilities
and equipment.
The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF)
During the first year, at the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, now
GEN Richard Cody, the REF provided direct support (DS) to the JIEDDTF. The REF’s
novel acquisition and contracting capability greatly enhanced JIEDDTF operations. The
JIEDDTF was more than simply a supply warehouse filling requests from the field,
though that was a priority in the first year. It also found innovative ways to address
capability gaps and then deploy the capability to theater. In layman’s terms, these
capabilities were needed to offset perceived or real mismatches against the threat. At
times, commanders need capability that may not exist. The REF searched commercial
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 31
off the shelf (COTS) and government off the shelf (GOTS) inventories for equipment that
provided immediate impact for units in combat. This effort involved S&T, R&D, and
adjustment to the conduct of operations. Integrating new solutions into existing
platforms many times fell to the JIEDDTF Technology Integration Team collocated with
the REF. While much of the equipment the REF purchased offered enhancements over
existing equipment, some unique capabilities also materialized. An illustration of the
working relationship between the JIEDDTF and the REF clarifies the process of fielding
capabilities in theater. One such example, the Dazzler, procured by the REF in a COTS
purchase provided an unusual and much sought capability.
Suicide car bombers using vehicle borne IEDs (VBIED) routinely patrolled
commonly used routes for passing US formations. The terrorist employed a tactic
targeting US formations by driving into the vehicle column and then detonated the
VBIED. The initial counter-action by US forces became firing warning shots in front of
suspect vehicles. The technique of firing warning shots at vehicles eventually became a
command issue in Iraq, and subsequent policy prohibited the practice. The hand-held
Dazzler offered a non-lethal means of mitigating the VBIED threat by essentially
crystallizing the windshield turning it white, rendering no visibility for the vehicle
operator. Typically, the driver was so stunned they veered off course thwarting the attack.
In most cases the Servicemen that employed new systems, like the Dazzler, hadn’t
trained with the equipment so they refined CONOPs for employing newly fielded
equipment in combat.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 32
Lack of training complicated the JIEDDTF’s and the REF’s task. The IED effort
generated public interest and scrutiny from industry. Congressional constituents,
particularly from industry, were not shy about letting their Congressman know that, if
given a little money for development, they had “the solution” to the IED problem. The
national lab and industry challenges directed by Secretary Wolfowitz generated even
more Congressional interest and inquiries. A change of leadership occurred during this
surge of public interest in the IED effort with Secretary Wolfowitz’s departure from
DOD.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 33
The Joint IED Defeat Directive
Gordon England replaced Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in June 2005. Mr.
England closely followed the IED effort while in his previous position as the Secretary of
the Navy. Prior to assuming his position in OSD, he directed the Office of Naval
Research to initiate an R&D effort for IED Defeat. With Secretary England’s arrival
came a renewed commitment to the JIEDDTF.
The JIEDDTF presented an overview briefing to Secretary England and he
immediately asked how he could help. In the demanding first year, the JIEDDTF and
JIPT experienced instances where established institutional processes inhibited operational
need. JIEDDTF members felt the one paragraph memorandum establishing the JIPT and
the JIEDDTF left too much to the imagination. The single paragraph did not provide the
clarity of scope and responsibility the Pentagon bureaucracy needed.
The Joint IED Defeat effort required an authoritative directive for developing
conceptual unity across the Services and within OSD. Previously, the JIEDDTF
developed a charter for the JIPT and approached Secretary England with the idea of
authorizing a DOD directive for Joint IED Defeat. The JIPT charter became the blueprint
for the development of DOD Directive 2000.19. The OSD staff toiled with a select group
from the JIEDDTF for four days before the wording met Secretary England’s intent. In
the accompanying cover letter to the directive, Secretary England stated, “We will not
have a business-as-usual approach … defeating IEDs is one of the highest priorities for
the Department of Defense.” (DODD 2000.19, June 2005)
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 34
Senior Leaders Underwrite Risk
Senior DOD leadership underwrote risk during the development of the Joint IED
effort. Numerous business processes ranging from acquisition, budgeting, R&D, testing,
and training underwent modification enabling the Joint IED Defeat process. Of course,
some of the processes developed by the JIEDDTF made people uncomfortable. The
bureaucracy typical of Pentagon actions recoiled. Much like Secretary Rumsfeld decried
early in his tenure with his “Anchor Chain” memos, the Department’s biggest
impediment seemed to be its own bureaucracy. (Rumsfeld, May 1, 2001, “a six-page
SECRET memo entitled, ‘Illustrative New 21st Century Institutions and Approaches’.”)
Secretary England’s personal involvement underscores one of the vital elements of
JIEDDTF success. In one early memo from Secretary England authorizing the funding of
a sensitive IED initiative he wrote across the top, “No staffing – No hierarchy [italics
added].” BG Votel believed the Deputy Secretary wanted to reinforce with the Services
and OSD staff the personal emphasis he placed on IED specific actions and he didn’t
appreciate Service hierarchy slowing the approval process.
Senior leader involvement and risk tolerance proved an important ingredient to
enabling organizational innovation and the capacity to work around standard process and
procedures. The notion that, “Only organizational self-awareness can change
organizational culture,” prompted the type of response DOD leaders enacted responding
to the IED threat. (Nagl, 2002, p. 221) Faced with Pentagon bureaucratic friction and
cumbersome DOD policy, Secretary England demanded improved processing speed for
IED actions instilling a sense of urgency normally found on the battlefield. The directive
fostered institutional continuity for Joint IED Defeat.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 35
DOD Directive 2000.19 provided authorization for several important
improvements to JIPT and JIEDDTF operational procedures. First, the JIEDDTF
Director now reported directly to Secretary England. Previously, all actions went through
the Army, Vice Chief of Staff, GEN Cody. The Director’s role as single point of contact
for DOD allowed growth of an intimate relationship for Joint IED Defeat at the highest
levels in the Department. The Director’s recurring updates to the Deputy Secretary also
forged a strong tie with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice
Chairman added Joint IED Defeat to his personal portfolio of interest. Acknowledging
the stature of the Director at this level allowed development of a peer relationship with
the Service Chiefs. Secondly, the approval authority for initiatives moved to the
JIEDDTF Director, vice the JIPT, improving independence and decision speed. The JIPT
now served as an advisory board to the Director and a forum for the Services and
principal OSD offices to voice their opinions. The approval threshold for the JIEDDTF
IED Defeat initiatives increased to $25 million vice the previous $10 million. Finally,
and most significantly to the JIEDDTF, it instructed the Services to fully staff the
JIEDDTF with the “best and brightest” personnel. A Joint Manning Document (JMD)
provided authorization of the permanent positions. For administrative purposes the Army
continued as Executive Agent, but in a somewhat unprecedented decision, the JIEDDTF
became an OSD, Joint Task Force under the Deputy Secretary. (DODD 2000.19, June
2005) The DOD directive itself galvanized the effort. The institution readily accepted
the authority inherent in a directive signed by the Deputy Secretary lending credence to
the position of the JIEDDTF director as well as the entire Joint IED Defeat effort.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 36
OSD institutionalized Joint IED Defeat with the new directive but it did so
without following established procedure. Correcting this shortfall became the job of the
Joint Staff, J8. The J8 coordinated with the JIEDDTF on an Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD) for Joint IED Defeat for over a year. Choosing the term Joint IED
Defeat vice counter-IED for describing the DOD effort signaled a need for an offensive
component to the strategy.
Time to Modify the Strategic Approach
The term “counter” connotes a defensive, reactionary mode of operation. The
term did not convey the holistic strategy required to defeat the terrorist use of IEDs. The
initial IED approach designed by the JIEDDTF used the five tenets of assured mobility
for the purpose of organizing the initial baseline assessment of IED Defeat solutions.
The sub-IPTs categorized, assessed, and refined initiatives by using the five tenets. But
by now the JIPT had harvested all readily available technological solutions, the lowhanging fruit. Taking a device-centric approach to neutralize or mitigate the effects of
the IED does not stem the use of the IED. Improving intelligence and preemptive
targeting of the human chain-of-activities enabling the use of IEDs took greater
importance.
Many acknowledged the need for an offensive, human-centric component but no
mention of greater involvement with the intelligence community (IC) or IA surfaced at
this time. Although seemingly intuitive that technology alone could not deliver a “silver
bullet” solution, the JIPT efforts delivered predominately technological solutions.
Another lesson emerged with the recognition that technology alone may not offer a
panacea, a more comprehensive approach developed. Evolving the Joint IED Defeat
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 37
strategy became a priority ultimately codified in the updated directive as well as a new
CENTCOM Counter-IED Campaign Plan.
Defeat the IED System
“…prevent the emplacement of
the IED by attacking enemy
vulnerabilities at multiple
points in the IED system.”
“…defeat the device
once it is
emplaced...”
Defeat the IED Device
Common
Operating Picture
“…facilitate the
establishment and
growth of Coalition and
partner nation counterIED capability.”
Train the Force
Figure 3, The Strategic Approach (JIEDDTF 101 Brief)
Some members of the JIEDDTF worked with CENTCOM on a Counter-IED
Campaign Plan. CENTCOM choose three lines of operations to describe the effort. The
JIEDDTF adopted a modified version of these lines of operation. The JIEDDTF
restructured its strategic approach along three lines of operation: Defeat the IED System,
[later rephrased as Attack the Network to emphasize an offensive component] (Allyn,
personal communication, October 17, 2006) Defeat the Device, and Train the Force. A
Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP) and Joint Common Intelligence Picture (JCIP)
informed all three of these lines of operation. [See Figure 3] The new approach
recognized an integrated application of synchronized techniques delivered comprehensive
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 38
success. As the JIEDDTF adopted this strategy, it began treading on the turf of many
organizations involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
Other organizations and task forces for terrorism and insurgency existed prior to
the JIEDDTF. The OSD-ATL task force, the CTTTF, mentioned earlier took a
technology-centric approach to counterterrorism. The collaboration between the CTTTF
and JIEDDTF mitigated any duplication of effort and the close partnership overseen at
OSD level alleviated any issues with authority. However, other efforts were not as
closely associated with the JIEDDTF.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) similarly delved into terrorism. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)
responded to the Army as a center of excellence for irregular warfare. The previously
mentioned Army AWG treaded on very similar ground but in close collaboration with the
JIEDDTF. The intelligence community (IC) also actively pursued initiatives closely
aligned with some aspects of the Joint IED Defeat effort but not collaboratively with
DOD. This partially listing offers a brief perspective of the perception that developed as
the JIEDDTF expanded its three lines of operation to defeat the IED enabling activities
offensively.
Adopting these three lines of operation necessitated a predictive and offensive
approach in order to Defeat the IED System. The JIEDDTF recognized that being
reactive gave the advantage to the enemy. BG Votel initiated development of a
preemptive, human-centric component to his strategic approach.
The desire for preemption required red teaming. The design of a red teaming
capability for the IED Defeat effort assembled cultural experts, scientists, seasoned
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 39
operators, intelligence professionals, and explosives experts designed to provide insights
into enemy innovation and reaction to coalition IED Defeat initiatives. In order to get
ahead of the enemy, the JIEDDTF had to develop the next generation of capability before
the enemy demonstrated his counter-measure to current capability.
Strategic to Tactical Unity of Effort
In May 2005, CENTCOM created a Counter-IED Task Force from a portion of its
staff. Previously, GEN Abizaid employed the JIEDDTF as one of his own JTFs. The
JIEDDTF delivered regular updates to the CENTCOM commander but had no
corresponding organization for staff coordination within CENTCOM. GEN Abizaid’s
sponsorship with the national, strategic-level organization was vital to the early success
of the JIEDDTF. Managing the tactical to strategic effort was difficult from the Pentagon,
and this counterpart organization improved coordination with CENTCOM and units in
theater. As the CENTCOM Counter-IED Task Force formed they pursued contacts with
the IA representatives in the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) resident at
CENTCOM. Action officers at CENTCOM attempted facilitation of greater IA support
by arranging a meeting between a high-level ATF director and BG Votel in Washington
D.C. but at the last minute, the ATF pulled out of the meeting. Due to resource
constraints, the ATF could not support greater involvement with DOD’s IED effort.
Completion of both the Joint IED Defeat ICD and the CENTCOM Counter-IED
Campaign Plan occurred well into the DOD effort. Much like the challenges the
Coalition experienced with preparing to win and then sustain the peace in Iraq, the
asymmetry presented by the IED was not considered before the war. Clearly, the effort
took more time and resources than envisioned by the Service Chiefs and Secretaries the
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 40
previous summer. With a broader strategic approach for the IED effort underway, this
became an opportune time for soliciting greater IA participation but the AO-level attempt
back-fired. Preparations for a longer, more comprehensive DOD commitment to the IED
effort commenced just as the name of the “the ideological struggle of the 21st Century,”
changed from the Global War on Terror to the Long War. (Bush, 8/31/06) Renaming the
GWOT as the Long War, recognized terrorism as a tactic used in war, not war itself. The
Long War, or “ideological war”, implies a global insurgency as suggested by LTG David
Barno in an article quoted earlier in this paper. (Barno, 2006) Waging a global
counterinsurgency implies greater synchronization of all elements of national power,
inclusive of the IA, necessitating a long-term, unifying strategy for Joint IED Defeat.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 41
Preparing for the Long War
Up until this time, BG Votel operated with a small staff. Innovating rapid
solutions and adjusting TTPs prioritized the JIEDDTF effort. He felt he could not grow
the organization rapidly enough to deal with the demands that evolving challenges
dictated. In hindsight, the JIEDDTF looked at too many things, according to BG Votel,
and a reduced scope of following a technology road map would have been preferable.
(Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) But by this time, senior leaders in the
Department acknowledged the IED menace would become part of the Long War.
Instilling a sense of urgency into an S&T culture accustomed to operating on
much longer time constants challenged the JIEDDTF. (Keesee, personnel communication,
November 17, 2006) The Office of Naval Research (ONR) began a R&D effort for IED
Defeat following instructions from Secretary England. Coordinating the Join Laboratory
Board (JLB) effort also concerned the JIEDDTF. Dr. Starnes Walker of ONR
collaborated with the JIEDDTF during the establishment of the JLB. JIEDDTF gave the
JLB primary focus of prioritizing, funding, and planning a long-term S&T effort for
promising emergent technological approaches discovered by academics and laboratories.
The time horizon for this effort was five to ten years. Walker, the chief scientist for ONR,
felt the Joint IED Defeat focus should be the entire human chain-of-activities, or “kill
chain.” (Boston Globe, June 25, 2006) The many disparate DOD programs, laboratory
efforts, and industry initiatives needed an expedited process for test and evaluation.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 42
Synchronizing the Test Effort
Each of the Services approached testing in their own way, and JIEDDO needed
systems developed where everyone worked together. The JIEDDTF needed a test
coordinator. BG Votel called on the assistance of the Army once again. MG Jim Myles
the commander of the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) led a new Joint Test
Board for IED Defeat. A fairly loose confederation of the various test entities across the
Department, one of the tasks for this board was scheduling and prioritizing IED Defeat
initiatives for testing primarily at the Yuma Proving Ground facility.
The Joint Test Board proved an extremely important effort, especially during the
testing, and fielding of electronic countermeasures (ECM) coined (CREW) in IED Defeat
terminology for, Counter-IED Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare. Enemy employment
of radio controlled initiation systems increased markedly especially in Iraq. At times as
many as 70% of the IEDs consisted of RC initiators in specific regions of Iraq. The
enemy need for increased stand-off distance, coupled with the commercial availability of
RC components explained this surge. CREW emerged as more than a billion dollar
business by itself.
The fielding of CREW marked a paradigm shift for conventional ground forces.
Formerly only personal security detachments for high value individuals, Special
Operating Forces (SOF), and EOD response teams operated with ground-based ECM. Of
course, the Air Force and the Navy employed ECM for years, principally in airborne and
maritime operations.
Now, in an effort to prevent IED detonations, hundreds of ground combat units
were equipped with highly sensitive CREW systems. Literally thousands of CREW
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 43
systems were fielded, programmed, and then upgraded or reprogrammed during combat
operations due to the transitory nature of the IED threat. Accomplishing CREW fielding
without an established management structure and with very minimal pre-deployment
training proved another challenge. The US Navy stepped forward offering experienced
electronic warfare personnel which offered time for maturing the Army’s capability with
CREW. Those closest to the CREW effort claimed CREW fielding proved the largest
technological challenge for DOD in the war, on a scale last experienced in WWII.
In the minds of commanders and units preparing for deployment, the technology
and fielding challenge associated with CREW paled in importance to an even bigger
concern for them, ensuring tactical lessons and new TTPs were validated and provided to
the Services for pre-deployment training. Were these observations, lessons learned, and
best practices finding their way into doctrinal manuals, training standards, and
commanders’ pre-deployment training plans early enough to make a difference in saving
the lives of Soldiers and Marines? The answer surfaced through collaboration between
the JIEDDTF and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
Improving the Joint Training-base
The JIEDDTF needed a way to standardize emerging TTPs across the joint force.
Coaching units with tactical advice and providing training suggestions appeared the best
thing the early Army IED TF did for tactical units. The understaffed joint task force
regularly sought assistance from others. BG Votel thought soliciting support from
JFCOM could benefit the IED training effort.
The first foray to Norfolk, Virginia, happened in December 2004. The JIEDDTF
spoke about its approach and requirements to about 70 individuals, including three flag
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 44
officers led by the J3. It took several months before JFCOM fully engaged in the effort
but when they did there was an immediate impact. In August 2005, a large contingent
from JFCOM led by BG Tony Cucolo the Director of the Joint Center for Operational
Analysis (JCOA), attended a CENTCOM C-IED Conference and volunteered JFCOM for
some critical actions.
The JFCOM staff formed an IED Cell of their own under BG Don Broome, the J5,
and BG Cucolo’s staff at JCOA developed a framework for an operational analysis effort
on Joint IED Defeat. Up until the work of JFCOM, no joint doctrine, no joint training
regulations, really nothing of a formal, doctrinal nature on Joint IED Defeat
existed. JFCOM rectified this shortfall and assisted in capturing joint tactical lessons
learned, something outside of their charter but something desperately needed. The
JIEDDTF provided funding for a JFCOM prototype effort known as, Knowledge and
Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE). The concept included building a responsive staff
of analysts and doctrine writers for inquiries on IED related questions. This staff drafted
joint lessons learned and posted them on a new website allowing 24/7 access and
collaboration. JFCOM’s collaboration also prompted the Chairman’s, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) interest in the training needs of the Services for Joint IED Defeat.
During late summer of 2005, GEN Richard Myers, the CJCS, instructed LTG Ray
Odierno, Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a joint training needs
assessment for the IED threat. Over the course of several weeks, he received briefings,
traveled to training sites, and talked to commanders, Soldiers and Marines. Following
LTG Odierno’s assessment a joint working group developed a proposal for a Joint Center
of Excellence (JCOE) for Joint IED Defeat. LTG Odierno championed the need for the
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 45
JCOE before the Service Chiefs at a JCS Tank briefing outlining its critical roles,
functions, and essential manning requirements. (Allyn, personal communication,
October 17, 2006) The goal of the JCOE became training preparation of joint forces for
fighting with well developed TTPs, excellent, current situational awareness, and the right
equipment solutions. Selection of a facility location proved a key Service issue
deliberated at the JCS Tank briefing.
The final choice of a training location was the Army National Training Center
(NTC) at Fort Irwin, now concurrently designated as the Joint Center of Excellence for
IED Defeat. The Army already modified its training regimen at the NTC and the Joint
Readiness Training Center for units bound for Iraq (OIF) or Afghanistan (OEF). Predeployment exercises, called MREs, or Mission Rehearsal Exercises, for OIF and OEF
required currency for training to the threats in these two theaters. The Commanding
General of the NTC serves concurrently as the Director of the JCOE for the JIEDDTF
and receives additional staff and funding support for this new effort. He oversees the
efforts of all four Services at locations determined by the Services.
The Marines use 29 Palms Marine Base, the Air Force Lackland Air Force Base,
and the Navy its Indianhead facility in Maryland. Each Service was assigned functional
specialties based on Service core competencies to develop concepts of operation
(CONOPs) and TTPs. The JCOE would lead efforts to integrate CONOPs and TTPs for
full spectrum operations in collective, combined arms scenarios. Once trainers validated
new CONOPs, leaders required training to recognize threat warning signs and modify
their training approaches to this new environment. (Meigs, 2003)
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 46
Approval of the JCOE concept occurred in November 2005 and simultaneously
the Service Chiefs recommended elevating the Director of the JIEDDTF to a three or
four-star flag officer. The deliberations at the JCS Tank briefing acknowledged complete
Joint Service acceptance for Joint IED Defeat. Service posturing experienced the
previous summer over budget impacts from the IED effort become immaterial. Service
values for Joint IED Defeat coalesced with this decision. The senior leaders of the
military, the Joint Chiefs, submitted a consensus recommendation to Secretary Rumsfeld
for final approval.
Approval of a Permanent JIEDDTF
In November 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld approved the upgrade of the director
position and gave the Services two weeks to recommend a new flag officer as the
JIEDDTF director. Rumsfeld and the Service Chiefs wanted a “more senior
commander’s operational perspective” for the Joint IED Defeat effort. Secretary
Rumsfeld expected the effort, “to encompass the manner in which our forces operate,
their tactics, and their procedures.” (DOD News Release, December 5, 2005)
Additionally, Rumsfeld instructed OSD and the Joint Staff to assess the need for a
permanent organization.
In essence, the JIEDDTF bought time for an institutional determination if a
permanent capability for the IED threat proved necessary. (Keesee, personal
communication, 17 November 2006) With permanent recognition of the Joint IED
Defeat Organization, DOD Directive 2000.19 required updating. Significant
organizational and procedural lessons emerged during the update of the directive.
Consensus by the senior military leaders in each Service and the Chairman allowed
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 47
organizational innovation because they all viewed it in the best interest of their Services
and the long-term interests of the institution. (Nagl, 2002) By creating a permanent
organization, DOD shifted primacy for synchronizing and funding the IED effort to the
Director. Secretary Rumsfeld agreed with the Service Chiefs expanding the IED joint
training effort with the JCOE. He also approved a more senior leader, one with a broader
operational perspective on a par with the Service Chiefs for the JIEDDO Director.
On 12 December 2005, General Montgomery C. Meigs (USA, Ret.), assumed his
new role as the Director for the JIEDDTF. GEN Meigs is the former Commander of US
Army Europe and 7th Army, and the Louis A. Bantle Professor at the Maxwell School of
Syracuse University. GEN Meigs drew regularly on his experience as commander of the
NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia, a constant reference point for him. By mid-January
2006, the Joint Staff and OSD recommendation for a permanent organization received
approval from Secretary Rumsfeld, completing the history of the JIEDDTF as depicted in
Figure 4.
GEN Meigs brought with him two individuals that served previously with him
while on active duty. They proved critical to implementing Meigs’ concepts for his new
organization. Mr. Maxie McFarland, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence at the Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) served as special advisor to GEN Meigs,
his immediate task, increasing the intelligence capability of the JIEDDO. Mr. Steve
Kirin, MITRE Corporation, reviewed and refined the operational assessment approach for
the organization. Concurrent with the update to the directive, GEN Meigs conducted a
mission analysis from December 2005 to about March 2006.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 48
Army IED TF
formed
Oct ‘03
Iraq Field Team
deploys
Dec ‘03
P4 letter for
Manhattan
Project
June ‘04
Afghan Field Team
deploys
April ‘04
Joint IPT
formed
July ‘04
BAA issued
thru TSWG
Feb ‘05
DODD
2000.19
June ‘05
SECDEF
Approves mission
Permanent
JIEDDO
est. Jan ‘06
JCS Tank
Approves JCOE
Nov ‘05
DODD
2000.19E
Jan ‘06
GEN Meigs
appointed Director
Dec ‘05
Figure 4, JIEDDTF transition to JIEDDO Timeline
JIEDDO Mission Statement
“Focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support
of Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to
defeat Improvised Explosive Devices as weapons of strategic influence.”
JIEDDO’s mission requires coordination and collaboration between the COCOMs.
Terrorist organizations constitute global enterprises with recruiting, financing, supplying,
and training of the IED network spanning the geographic COCOMs. JIEDDO must
foster permanent linkages into a broad, consistent IA constituency in order to synchronize
support for the COCOMs. Given the magnitude of JIEDDO’s mission, assessing
common measures of effectiveness became a priority for the organization as well as the
commanders it supports.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 49
Growing Pains for JIEDDO
Getting an Operational Assessment Effort off the Ground
Prior to GEN Meigs’ arrival, the JIEDDTF designed an operational assessment
architecture for measuring the effectiveness of fielded Joint IED Defeat initiatives. BG
Votel recognized that, “We didn’t develop metrics and an OA effort to gauge progress
and drive the effort.” (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) At the urging
of the Vice Chairman, ADM Ed Giambastiani, BG Votel directed a small group to come
up with a plan.
The early Operational Assessment (OA) approach involved Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) and several Federally Funded Research and Development
Companies (FFRDCs) that each contributed to the effort. According to the professionals
from the FFRDCs, unprecedented as it was for them to work together like this, they also
recognized none of them could do this alone. It was also clear that the JIEDDTF staff
needed outside help for something of this magnitude. The JIEDDTF needed to determine
if it was making a difference. It needed a feedback loop into institutional subject matter
experts.
BG Votel and ADM (R) Dennis Blair of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
conducted a decision brief on the OA strategy to ADM Giambastiani who endorsed it and
told them to get GEN Abizaid’s approval. A week later ADM Blair and BG Votel
briefed GEN Abizaid. The result of that briefing: CENTCOM wanted OA started almost
immediately. Before commencing, however, GEN Abizaid wanted concurrence from
GEN George Casey, the commanding general of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I). On
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 50
December 27, 2005, a small team met with GEN Casey in the Pentagon. GEN Casey
neither approved nor disapproved the OA plan. Instead he asked GEN Meigs to “come to
the theater for two weeks and feel my pain and then make recommendations” in theater
before beginning an effort of this magnitude. GEN Casey didn’t want any more outside
help from a lot of “50-pound brains”. Meigs observed from his research on WWII
subsurface warfare, there needed to be an intimate relationship linking scientists with
military operators to uncover potential technological solutions. (Meigs, 1990) GEN
Meigs left for theater the next week with a small team.
Meigs traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan and met with commanders and their staffs.
He took Mr. McFarland and Mr. Kirin with him to assist in his theater assessment. GEN
Meigs also imparted his initial guidance to the JIEDDO field team leaders.
At the same time GEN Meigs traveled around CENTCOM’s theater, at the
direction of the senior intelligence officials in DOD, a five-man joint team of Marines
and Army traveled to Iraq. The team conducted an assessment of the tactical-to-strategic
intelligence linkages for the Joint IED Defeat effort. The week prior to this trip, GEN
Meigs and Mr. McFarland discussed their ideas for expanding the intelligence effort for
IED Defeat. Their concept included building capability at the brigade and regiment level
in the following areas: a law enforcement intelligence capability, adding investigative
skills forward for site exploitation, expanding technical IED exploitation and adding
cryptologic support teams at the tactical level.
GEN Meigs’ concept met resistance from both the Army and USMC intelligence
chiefs. The team’s purpose was providing DOD decision-makers with an accurate
depiction of actions at the brigade combat team or regimental combat team (BCT/RCT)
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 51
level to defeat insurgent and terrorist use of IEDs and recommending task-organization of
teams of individuals and or capabilities for deployment to an Army brigade or Marine
regiment. Meigs argued that the experience of senior law enforcement professionals,
working closely with brigade and division staffs, would greatly improve units ability to
target the nexus of criminal, corrupt former intelligence service operatives, and
paramilitary forces that provided the foundation of the IED networks. They also would
be able to provide special training in areas in which conventional forces were weak, like
sensitive site exploitation and development of the evidentiary materials needed to convict
terrorists in Iraqi courts.
The Army G2, LTG Jeffrey Kimmons, suggested the Army lead the survey team.
The JIEDDO provided a seasoned operator with IED experience and the USMC provided
both intelligence and IED expertise to the team. (McFarland, personal communication,
October 24, 2006) All five members were carefully chosen because of previous combat
experience in Iraq. General consensus from OIF returnees revealed that the intelligence
community could do much more for tactical war-fighters confronted by the IED.
The month long survey traveled throughout Iraq visiting 13 Forward Operating
Bases encompassing 35 different units from the Corps staff down to squad level. The incountry portion of the survey culminated with a report to GEN Meigs while he was still
in theater. LTG Pete Chiarelli, the commanding general of Multi-National Corps Iraq
(MNC-I), and GEN Meigs discussed the findings of the report with GEN Casey. The
survey team’s principle finding was that Soldiers and Marines wanted better
understanding of the IED threat in their specific employment region. Soldiers were
hungry for better intelligence and at times felt unsure of what they would encounter.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 52
Another recurring theme emerged relating to enemy agility with IEDs which led one
commander to say, “What works today will not work tomorrow simply because it worked
today.” (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)
Many observations of the IED survey team coincided with what GEN Meigs and
his team of McFarland and Kirin discovered. GEN Casey approved four areas for
operational assessment including: assessment of pre-deployment training, identification
of best practices, CREW effectiveness, and he directed study on what he termed, “leapfrog the threat”, implying a red team effort to predict what the enemy would try next.
(Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006) While the survey team
observations remain classified, the report confirmed many of GEN Meigs’ previous
thoughts; he used this report to get his point across with leaders in the Pentagon and the
intelligence community. With the report finalized, the survey team briefed the
intelligence and operations leadership in the Pentagon. These leaders generally accepted
the findings and agreed adjustments were necessary.
However, the nature of Pentagon bureaucracy often stifles innovation by agreeing
with a proposal and then not acting on it. (McFarland, personal communication, October
24, 2006) The default setting for the institution is to sustain its norm. The institution,
designed for the Cold War, performs remarkably for what it was designed to do. But,
institutional biases inherent in DOD culture restrict agility and responsiveness when
confronted with unexpected challenges.
This impression of Pentagon bureaucracy isn’t prophetic. For the past several
years, DOD leaders led by Secretary Rumsfeld recognized transformation as necessary to
overcome cultural biases and preclude bureaucratic incoherence. It took a leader with the
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 53
seniority of a four-star general to push ideas through the Pentagon. GEN Meigs had the
vision, leadership, and importantly, the trusted relationships with senior leaders in the
Pentagon to accomplish the work. The IED effort required entrepreneurial freedom and a
degree of independence from bureaucratic norms. Since the institution accepted GEN
Meigs, he could work on the fringes of Service hierarchies. While the DOD leadership
embraced GEN Meigs, an internal Pentagon report written for CENTCOM critical of the
Joint IED Defeat campaign, stated the JIEDDO effort was “poorly focused” and overly
reliant on large defense contractors providing Cold War technical solutions. The report
claimed the JIEDDO approach neglected the human terrain. (The Project on Government
Oversight, 2006)
“The Americans may have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time.” – Taliban
leader (Barno, 2006)
GEN Meigs and GEN Abizaid both felt the long-term answer to the IED problem
required the Iraqi people to deal with the insurgency. (Meigs, September 8, 2006). GEN
Abizaid stated that technical solutions and devices coming out of the Pentagon would not
stop the bombings, only people could stop the bombings, indicating only the Iraqi people
would eventually solve the IED problem. (The Boston Globe, June 25, 2006) Comments
written by LTG Chiarelli’s in his article published in Military Review demonstrate the
subtleties of fighting an insurgency.
“[A] task force could win engagements by killing or capturing an insurgent
emplacing an improvised explosive device, and it could win battles by targeting,
disrupting, and killing off insurgent cells. But it could only win the campaign if
the local populace revealed insurgent and terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied
sanctuary.” (Chiarelli & Michaelis, Jul/Aug 2005)
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 54
The codependent relationship between hostile IED use in the broader context of
combating insurgency and terrorism resulted in JIEDDO supporting a wide range of
training and education initiatives for the military institution. Although not as widely
known, possibly because the initiatives did not involve big defense contractors and large
funding commitments, both JIEDDTF and JIEDDO supported initiatives in
counterinsurgency. Returning commanders and JIEDDTF field team personnel learned
the importance of cultural understanding and language training. Taught the advantages
of high-technology, commanders witnessed its limitations as well. A recurring theme
emerged from Soldiers and Marines, they needed more detailed information on
community leaders, individuals, tribes, political parties, past attack areas, social gathering
places, etc. for the areas where they lived and fought. GEN Casey could only effect rapid
capability formation in Iraq and the leaders deploying to his command desperately
needed counterinsurgency training. To prepare newly deployed commanders for the
intellectual rigors of their duties in counterinsurgency, GEN Casey created a
Counterinsurgency Academy in Taji, Iraq. JIEDDO contributed a portion of the
instruction and funding for the academy. Providing targeting support for identification of
bomb-makers and the enabling activities that support IED use: financing, recruiting,
supply, targeting, etc… required improved intelligence on bomb-makers’ customers as
well as their innocent victims. (McFate, 2005)
Familiarity with the Iraqi judicial process provides a valuable example of how
cultural understanding impacted the early IED effort. Investigative skills proved vital
when prosecuting cases against alleged IED attackers. Investigation skills such as:
preserving a crime scene, evidence collection and processing, witness questioning, and
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 55
developing community crime trends, common among law enforcement professionals,
support the Iraqi government’s enforcement of the rule of law. The Iraqi judicial system,
historically a confession-based process, was at times uncomfortable with scientifically
obtained evidence. Both the JIEDDTF and JIEDDO, invested in biometric technology,
metal detection scanners, surveillance equipment, and explosive residue detectors for the
purpose of obtaining evidence against suspected IED attackers. Convincing Iraqi courts
using American evidentiary standards becomes difficult when prosecuting IED cases,
especially involving individuals accused of enabling IED attacks, such as: financiers,
suppliers, recruiters, and bomb-makers. In all but cases involving individuals that
actually handled explosives where physical explosive residue implicated an attacker, the
cases proved difficult to close, absent the required evidence. Demonstrating the science
behind the equipment eased the concerns of judges and improved acceptance of some
technologies. Judges preferred certain evidence gathering techniques over others. Based
on feedback from deployed commanders, JIEDDO adjusted equipment purchases to
judicial preferences. Understanding the nuances of Iraqi society with this sort of cultural
awareness required institutional reform.
The Services adjusted education and training across the force as a prerequisite
for success in the Long War. (McFarland, 2005) In 2004, JIEDDTF contracted cultural
anthropologists and social scientists developing a pilot effort called the Cultural
Preparation of the Environment (CPE). Military training and education on cultural issues
provided knowledge in only the broadest terms, so this initiative closed a significant
institutional gap potentially providing information to current commanders and their
successors. It provided clear recognition of the linkage between counterinsurgency
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 56
success and success against the IED. Units needed new organizational approaches to
enhance investigative skills.
Weapons Intelligence Teams
The JIEDDO provided funding and training oversight to the development of
Weapons Intelligence Teams (WITs) for brigade-level incident investigation and site
exploitation. WITs followed an example used by the United Kingdom. Implementation
of the WIT concept offset the constrained availability of EOD forces. JIEDDTF hoped
WITs could help span this void and initiated a modest prototype effort. The Army
mobilized a reserve component military intelligence battalion, assigned it a completely
new mission, and retrained the battalion’s personnel while forming the WITs.
The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) developed and sponsored the
initiative and received JIEDDTF funding for the first phase of the effort, when six of
these WITs deployed to Iraq. The concept provided a crime scene investigation (CSI)
capability at IED post-blast sites or uncovered weapons and ammunition caches. Pairing
the skills of intelligence analysts and law enforcement professionals with EOD
technicians afforded intensive investigative capacity.
The JIEDDO expanded the program based on the success of the pilot effort
approved previously by the JIEDDTF. All maneuver brigades eventually received a WIT
team in Iraq. After JIEDDO efforts soliciting support from federal law enforcement
agencies failed, JIEDDO provided funding for private contractors to supplement brigade
investigation capability with former law enforcement professionals. Additionally, with
WITs habitually aligned with specific maneuver brigades, ground commanders now
turned to an organic resource for detailed analysis. JIEDDO also provided law
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 57
enforcement criminologists to its field teams bolstering on-site investigation skills and
providing feedback to brigade commanders. The WITs, universally accepted by
maneuver commanders, proved a valuable organizational initiative which the military
institution evaluated for permanent inclusion into the force structure.
The combined capability of the CEXC and the WITs improved technical
exploitation and the forensics analysis capacity of Coalition Forces. Trends in the
construction of IEDs, identification of employment patterns and emergent technologies
were now possible at forward locations. Additionally, the JIEDDTF and JIEDDO
provided oversight and funding for enhanced forensics exploitation in the US by
partnering with the FBI. Gathering the IED components and transporting them to the
TEDAC followed after initial exploitation by the WITs and CEXCs. High priority IED
components were sent to the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis Center (TEDAC).
The influx of IEDs from Iraq quickly exceeded the capacity of TEDAC. JIEDDO
provided additional funds for increasing the staff of the TEDAC and JIEDDO oversight
insured proper scheduling for priority exploitation and analysis. At the TEDAC,
components underwent detailed analysis to enable gathering of biometric evidence.
Existing international criminal databases occasionally confirmed suspected terrorists.
This evidence proved useful for decisions on detainee releases and criminal cases in Iraqi
courts. Although designed with a common vision, the two theaters employed this
technical exploitation capability in different ways.
Organizational Approaches CJTF-76 and MNC-I
While there are significant differences in the nature of the IED threat between
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is natural as well as valuable to compare the situation,
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 58
approaches, and solutions in both countries. In terms of magnitude, a typical day of IED
activity in Iraq represented a month of IED attacks in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan the command embraced the JIEDDTF field team. The JIEDDTF
field team formed the nucleus of a counter-IED task force for CJTF-76 called Task Force
Paladin. The Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), MG Ben
Freakley, selected the JIEDDO field team leader, COL Chuck Waggoner, who served
concurrently as the TF Paladin commander. Waggoner’s purview included all forces and
capabilities related to countering the IED. Source documents for TF Paladin complicated
the staffing of the organization because the requests and authorizations came in a
piecemeal fashion. The harsh terrain and remote widely dispersed locations of forces
necessitated forward positioning of counter IED assets, collocated with maneuver units.
TF Paladin focused its support on the brigade combat teams at their forward locations in
a dynamic, tailored fashion. (Allyn, personal communication, October 17, 2006)
Waggoner distributed his CEXC personnel as members of the regional counter IED teams
for responsive IED exploitation. While CJTF-76 created a task force offering a dual
mission for the JIEDDO Afghanistan field team, the magnitude of the IED threat in Iraq
required a different approach. GEN Meigs left Afghanistan having witnessed a
significantly different threat environment than what he would see in Iraq.
In Iraq, XVIII Airborne Corps turned over authority to LTG Pete Chiarelli and his
V Corps forming the new MNC in Iraq during January 2006. The Corps leadership
formed a counter-IED task force of its own, called Task Force Troy. Approval of the task
force concept and source documents occurred with XVIII Corps, but TF Troy was just
forming at the time of GEN Meigs’ visit.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 59
TF Troy, more typical of a hierarchical organization, followed a support brigade
model and centralized its CEXC in Baghdad. (Allyn, personal communication, October
17, 2006) The British had a corresponding CEXC cell in Basra. The approach in Iraq
used the JIEDDO field team in an advisory role to MNC-I and not at all in the same
fashion as GEN Meigs saw in Afghanistan. He naturally questioned why and offered his
views and assistance to both LTG Chiarelli and GEN Casey.
Challenges with theater integration of emergent requirements resulted in
institutional friction over the previous months, not the least of which was CREW fielding.
GEN Meigs thought now that DOD created a permanent organization for IED Defeat the
JIEDDO should take a larger but behind the scenes role, especially with the fielding of
CREW. The new organization, as well as deployed operational commanders, had yet to
define and understand the role, authorities, and scope of mission of the JIEDDO.
The rapid growth of the Joint IED Defeat effort coupled with the increased
authority entrusted to GEN Meigs and the JIEDDO through the DOD directive required
interpretation among forward deployed commanders. Explaining roles and
responsibilities for JIEDDO seemed prudent. The JIEDDO provides support to the
combatant commanders by performing the following key tasks:

Manage, resource, and focus the strategic to tactical IED Defeat effort for
Department of Defense by supporting the Combatant Commanders in their
operational and tactical efforts,

Provide the appropriate influence across the Services and coordinated with the
COMCENT,
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 60

Provide oversight for the Joint CREW Fielding Office (JCFO) and CREW
fielding in support of Navy effort to man electronic warfare officer (EWO)
positions and all other EW efforts,

Provide the strategic linkage and reach-back capability for forward elements
for technical and forensics exploitation for the long war,

Serve as the "gatekeeper and sponsor" for all IED Defeat technology entering
theater,

Coordinate CREW strategy and resources that support MNC-I and CJTF-76.
Mission Analysis Complete
GEN Meigs previous writings about asymmetric threats, Slide Rules and
Submarines and Unorthodox Thoughts on Asymmetric Warfare prepared him for his new
role. “The ability to deploy a new weapon without the enemy’s knowledge offers an
opportunity to attack him from a dimension he does not perceive…Asymmetries in
capability accelerate the killing.” (Meigs, 1990, p. 214) He also commented, “The
combination of asymmetry and the terrorists’ ability continually to devise idiosyncratic
approaches presents our real challenge.” (Meigs, 2003, p. 4) These writings form the
blueprint for his approach to the IED problem. GEN Meigs concluded that there is a
need to combine the ingenuity of scientists and rigorous operational analysis with savvy
military leaders to develop innovative but pragmatic solutions to unique problems of
operational art. (Meigs, 1990)
Where the JIEDDTF focused on innovation and speed to get solutions in theater
rapidly, GEN Meigs recalibrated the JIEDDO effort to develop turnkey solutions, still
rapidly but with a more complete package at something better than the previous 51%
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 61
solution. (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) GEN Meigs heard the
complaints of commanders about the challenges they experienced with equipment
fielding, training soldiers to use it, and developing CONOPs on the fly. GEN Meigs
pushed for improved integration and interoperability of IED Defeat initiatives. He guided
JIEDDO using an investment banking strategy providing venture capital for promising
technologies. He thought investment money for R&D was “the bread and butter of our
effort”. (Meigs, personnel communication, December 11, 2006) The first 90 days of
GEN Meigs tenure at the helm of JIEDDO concluded with a presentation to the President
explaining DOD’s Joint IED Defeat strategy.
Brief to the POTUS
By March 2006, JIEDDO hit the radar screen of President George W. Bush. On
Saturday, 11 March, GEN Meigs accompanied Secretary Rumsfeld to the White House
for a classified briefing to President Bush. BG Votel and a small team, a few months
earlier, presented a classified intelligence update to Vice President Cheney, but the
meeting with the President led to something significantly different.
The President included the work JIEDDO was doing on the IED threat as part of a
speech citing it as a vital part of his focus on the Global War on Terror. The brief
outlined what Bush called the nation’s plan to defeat the threat of IEDs. The plan had
three components: Targeting, Training, and Technology.
The President also addressed a factor needing more attention. Iraqis were the
principle victims of IED attacks and this form of terror attack could erode their
confidence in the future of a free Iraq. Tips from Iraqis provided critical intelligence to
target terrorists and bomb-makers. What the President failed to do, undoubtedly because
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 62
of his preoccupation with IED casualties in Iraq, was order comprehensive, long-term
interagency support. Expanding DOD’s mandate as lead agency for the Joint IED Defeat
mission and authorizing formal IA agreements never occurred. Pursuing the global
aspect of the JIEDDO mission seems futile without a comprehensive IA strategy.
DOD Directive 2000.19 promoted institutional continuity and unity of effort for
DOD’s Joint IED Defeat campaign. A Presidential Directive could similarly enable
greater IA acceptance and involvement with the JIEDDO effort. The ad hoc, hierarchical
nature of the IA process created unnecessary impediments to the effort. GEN Meigs’
subsequent pursuit of increased intelligence support for JIEDDO relied on more support
from the IC. Following the President’s speech emphasizing the IED threat, JIEDDO
assembled a small group of outside senior thinkers for charting a new course for the
organization.
JIEDDO Brainstorming: It’s not just the speed you travel but the route you take to your
objective that leads to success.
At an offsite conference in April 2006, GEN Meigs’ advised his team to, “Use
ambiguity in the IED Defeat Directive as an opportunity to apply organizational strengths.
We are not here to solve today’s problem. We are here to decide how to preempt
tomorrow’s problem.” (Meigs, personal communication, April 7, 2006)
One of the out-of-the-box thinkers that frequently works with DOD organizations,
Bran Ferren said, “We, [meaning DOD], tend to spend more time looking for answers
than asking the right questions.” (Ferren, personal communication, April 7, 2006) The
group outlined six challenges: complexity management, educating the audience on the
nature of the problem, acquisition, technology transfer and system engineering, drive
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 63
necessary R&D effort by coordinating what’s being done, and outreach interface
(branding, image, salesmanship). Three temporal regimes framed the challenges: current,
emerging and future. GEN Meigs settled on three operating principles for his strategy:

Take a long, broad view

Develop a good organization with trust and talent

Shape the battle
GEN Meigs’ idea of preemption nested well with the Bush doctrine of preemption
outlined in the National Security Strategy issued in March 2006, but necessitated an
expansion in the JIEDDO staff. With preemption comes a corresponding requirement for
greater intelligence capability in the JIEDDO. The JIEDDO built new capability to
predict threats so commanders were not forced to be reactive. JIEDDO proactively
shaped its future capacity rather than changing reactively. Meigs recognized that while
JIEDDO strove to become the preeminent organization for addressing the IED threat but
the organization’s intelligence staff appeared inadequate. The organization required
access to a network of intelligence organizations and needed greater depth of experience
as well as physically greater capacity for analysis. (McFarland, personal communication,
October 24, 2006) JIEDDO felt a larger IA convergence could bridge the gap and focus
on the global strategic problem of IEDs.
Eliminating the IED threat required collaboration and orchestration of the IA
process and international effort. (Mendelsohn, 2005) The envisioned JIEDDO
organizational structure enhanced the capacity for synchronizing a more comprehensive
approach than previously possible. How and why did the JIEDDO grow the way it did?
The internally generated growth from GEN Meigs’ desired expansion of the intelligence
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 64
and OA capacity represented only part of the reason behind the organization’s growth. A
retrospective examination of organizational stressors and past successes and failures of
the JIEDDTF answers many of these questions.
Self-awareness of previous external demands beckoned the need for
organizational growth. As a small, manageable sized JTF for BG Votel, the JIEDDTF
experienced recurring requirements from Congress, the media, and senior DOD
leadership. This shifted BG Votel’s primary effort, and an inordinate amount of his time,
to strategic communication. Preparing him for these sessions consumed the small staff
detracting from the amount of support it provided deployed commanders. Industry
inquiries and follow-up on research or test developments on initiatives under JIPT
consideration consumed a significant portion of the JIEDDTF technical and support staff.
The internal environment within Pentagon bureaucracy necessitated greater depth of
experience and knowledge of business processes. Institutional, Pentagon-centric
expertise was significantly different than the SOF-based, tactically-focused training
advice originally envisioned when the Army initiated the task force. Cold War founded
R&D, acquisition, procurement, and contracting policies and processes formed
cumbersome barriers to rapid fielding of IED solutions. Finding work-around
alternatives required greater expertise in DOD institutional processes. Demands on the
nimble JIEDDTF outpaced its ability to sustain the effort. The decision for a permanent
DOD IED effort resulted in significant organizational growth.
The organization grew from a temporary, ad hoc task force of less than 20
personnel working in the basement of the Pentagon to a 365-person jointly-manned,
permanent organization with senior professionals at the helm. JIEDDO grew in more
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 65
ways than just size. A significant increase in talent and experience accompanied the
growth of the JIEDDO. The Army IED Task Force began with a lone general officer and
a single mobilized National Guard colonel guiding it. The JIEDDO transformation
included four Senior Executive Service (SES) civilian positions, one a former four-star
general, and two brigadiers, one the Deputy Director for Operations and one with a dual
mission at the JCOE and the NTC. Also, the staff expanded with a dozen or so colonels
and very experienced civilian contractors, most of them recently retired colonels. It took
nearly ten months however for completion of all the requirements for manning through
the DOD personnel system. Anticipating an influx of new personnel over the next
several months, GEN Meigs wanted an internally focused organizational strategy written
based on the results of the brainstorming discussion.
GEN Meigs wanted a short, to the point, strategy document, akin to the
commander’s intent. This document shaped the organizational culture for JIEDDO.
Much of the writing took inspiration from Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, emphasizing
the new emphasis on intelligence and operational assessment following the notion, “If
ignorant of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” (Sun
Tzu, 450BC/1963, p. 84) There was extensive editing by JIEDDO’s leadership along the
way. GEN Meigs previous writing best capture his thoughts as noted below.
“Defeating these new threats requires us to restructure our decision systems for
operations and to reorganize our structures for intelligence requirements,
collection, and fusion. It requires hybrid teams of out-of-the-box thinkers,
scientists, and military professionals working under pressure together. It relies on
matching agency expertise and access to the operational setting as a matter of
national mandate.” (Meigs, 2003, p. 18)
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 66
The quote above represents both the driving challenge and the opportunity
JIEDDO balances daily in regards to the IED effort. Although he did not know it at the
time he wrote it, GEN Meigs’ comments about relying on “matching agency expertise
and access” applies particularly well to the needs of the Joint IED Defeat strategy. The
typical hierarchical, ad hoc IA process does not provide operational continuity or
consistent IA staff representation. How does one grow an organization of the type
described by Meigs and keep a fresh, agile mind-set while engaging in the IA processes
and systems inherent in big government bureaucracy? The answer seemed to grow the
capability of JIEDDO, specifically its capacity for robust intelligence and operational
assessment while enabling IA connectivity with IA liaisons. More capacity in these two
areas proved vital to GEN Meigs for accomplishing JIEDDO’s basic concept vision as an
organization. JIEDDO now strove for integrated application of many techniques in its
drive toward success. It was this organizational self-awareness, conceptualized during
the brainstorming session that permitted a cultural transition for JIEDDO. (Builder, 1989)
JIEDDO’s threat specific intelligence focus enabled development of integrated
operational capabilities in support of the COCOM commanders. JIEDDO refined the
methodology for measuring operational effect of IED solutions and the organization.
The OA strategy previously conceived required modification. The initial OA
concept relied heavily on FFRDCs. Kirin realized keeping the FFRDCs current with IED
specific data had become problematic. The FFRDC’s could not provide full-time, inhouse personnel to JIEDDO, limiting the effectiveness of the original approach. Kirin
assessed a demand of one man-year of effort to monitor and synchronize four man-years
of support from JIEDDO’s external partners. While contracts for outside support from
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 67
the FFRDCs and others occurred, JIEDDO planned for significant increases in the
organic OA staff as well. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)
Initially, until the assignment of full permanent staff, JIEDDO hired contractors
for critical skill positions, broadening the effort and bringing in more expertise. JIEDDO
reached out for key individuals with whom GEN Meigs had worked with in past
assignments. McFarland had a good understanding of what the general wanted.
Developing enhanced threat specific intelligence support was McFarland’s initial task.
However, threat specific intelligence accounted for much more than the IED as simply a
device. The threat constituted the network of activities that enabled IED use. In essence
the IED network accounts for the global insurgency, but JIEDDO concentrated primarily
on CENTCOM’s region. McFarland created recurring senior level forums throughout the
IC for IED specific intelligence issues. He also developed a network of IA liaisons
working at JIEDDO. “The enemy innovates on a global scale so we have to deal with
them globally.” (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) McFarland’s
personal effort and the work of JIEDDO required the IA and international community to
address the threat comprehensively.
“The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple
agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.” (Joint Publication [JP] 3-08
volume 1, 2006, p. I-7) The JIEDDO’s encouraging strides with IA liaisons remained
somewhat personality driven, dependent on agency politics, coercive diplomacy, and
goodwill. Rather, the IED effort calls for a formal IA agreement that defines agency
responsibilities, assigns milestones, and establishes agency accountability for specific
objectives. Formal agreements permit a structured, collaborative IA enterprise capable of
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 68
producing desired strategic effects in support of the geographic COCOMs. JIEDDO also
improved its support to the COCOMs offering assistance in tracking high value
individuals (HVIs), trend and pattern analysis, informing materiel development, and
strategic attack. JIEDDO built a new capability within its organization addressing the
concerns and desires uncovered by commanders over the previous two years. The
Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) enhanced JIEDDO’s ability for
direct support (DS) to forward deployed commanders.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 69
Moving Forward
Counter-IED Operational Integration Center
The COIC represents JIEDDO’s attempt at synchronizing a team of relevant IA
players working on problems identified by combat commanders. “Due to the diverse
interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed for
lack of national-level perspective, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation of the
need for an institutionalized coordination process.” (JP 3-08 volume 1, p. II-2) The
COIC facility offers a networked work environment capable of fusing operational,
intelligence, and embedded IA teams for improved support to combat maneuver
commanders. This operations and intelligence fusion center, interconnected to the
combat theater, provides access to real-time data and analysis. The digitized network
permits horizontal linkages allowing action officers (AOs) to collaboratively swarm on
problems and develop cross-agency solutions in direct response to field commanders’
support requests.
The design of the COIC, as depicted in Figure 5, involved developing a systems
integration lab (Sims lab) to test-drive new materiel and CONOP initiatives using real
data from theater for modeling and simulation (M&S), and to develop new analytical
tools. An operations lab monitored real-time events in theater using state of the art
technology and provided a venue for predeployment battle staff training. An IA
intelligence collection and analysis cell informed the simulation process and materiel
developers as well as reach back DS to commanders in theater. (McFarland, personal
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 70
communication, October 24, 2006) Personnel in the operations lab refined CONOPs,
developed ideas for employment with
JIEDDTF
Innovation
Speed
JIEDDO
Improve direct support
(DS)
to Warfighters
Integration
Interoperability
Training
System
Integration
Lab
Real Time Data
Modeling & Simulation
CONOPs
OPS Lab
JCOE
ID
Gaps & Seams
Red Team
Directed Studies
ORSA
KPPs
MOE
MOP
Figure 5, Capability transition from temporary JIEDDTF to permanent JIEDDO
(Discussion Mr. Maxie McFarland & COL Bill Adamson, 24 OCT 2006)
units in theater and in pre-deployment training at the JCOE. A dedicated Red Team
portrayed the enemy perspective on likely action or reaction to new initiatives and
informed developers of potential gaps and seams in the initiative for future modifications
or spiral development. Once an integrated and interoperable system was tested and
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 71
refined in the Sims Lab, key performance parameters (KPP), measures of effectiveness
(MOE), and measures of performance (MOP) could be written. The initiative could be
deployed and then assessed under operational conditions. Assessments by personnel in
theater would be analyzed by Operations, Research and Systems, Analysis (ORSA)
personnel to provide a coherent way to assess progress.
Staying Ahead of Emerging Threats
JIEDDO’s strategic relevance will increase if it can predict emergent threats and
exploit solutions which permit preemption. As the COIC Red Team matures, it may
serve the purpose of preemption. However, the scope of JIEDDO’s current charter
restricts its mission to improvised explosive threats. Broadening JIEDDO’s effort may
prove prudent in the near future. “Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics
and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we be able to counter them through
continuous adaptation. If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past.” (Skelton, 2004,
p.128) However, the rate of technological change makes prediction even harder in the
future.
Had predictive intelligence analysis forecast the prevalent use of IEDs as a tactic
in the GWOT, military forces would not be in the predicament experienced in Iraq and
Afghanistan. If the IED effort had started as a truly preemptive response, the lead agency
would properly belong within the intelligence community (IC). Internal reform and
mission overload in the IC cripples its capacity for additional effort. Michelle Flournoy,
an analyst at the CSIS, claimed that, “The US operational capacity rests almost entirely in
the Department of Defense.” (Flournoy and Murdock, p.8) Evolution of the IED threat
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 72
compels DOD to seek greater support from the IA. Unfortunately, military forces
engaged in combat do not have the luxury of waiting for a perfect approach.
In retrospect, the conditions which led to the formation of the JIEDDO reveal a
strategic flaw in pursuing a military-centric approach. Much of the international
constituency the US must rely on in future conflicts has grown weary of US dominated
military responses. Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006
concedes that the US military does not conceive of future military operations without
assistance from international and IA partners. The consequences of the IA resisting a
broader role against emerging IED threats reflects a continuation of unsatisfactory
performance and an incomplete strategy capable of delivering only military-centric
solutions.
The hostile use of IEDs by global insurgents necessitates a response properly
cultivated by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These agencies require strong
linkages into international partners aligned under DOD for specific operations like, OIF
and OEF. The following line of reasoning develops a proposal for enhancing the IED
effort, improving operational performance against the IED threat.
As previously described, DOD responded to the IED threat initially in a reactive,
defensive mode relying primarily on technology to decrease casualties in Iraq. By
establishing JIEDDO, DOD entrusted the organization as a “change agent” for the IED
effort. The necessity for greater intelligence support for offensive operations resulted in a
recalibration of the JIEDDO main effort. Intelligence driven operations attacking IED
support networks in CENTCOM became the main effort. Concurrently, the internal
realignment of the IC under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 73
consolidation of 22 federal agencies under DHS resulted in significant agency turbulence
preventing optimal support. Understandably, agency reform and organizational
turbulence curbed willingness by the IA to provide support combating IEDs. By default,
the predominant response to the IED threat comes from the military institution. Other
government agencies participated cautiously in the IED effort launched by DOD.
Because the IFF paid for the IED effort and CENTCOM casualties rose because of IEDs,
JIEDDO pursued a CENTCOM-centric strategy. The US government must underwrite
entrepreneurial risk and institute a coherent IA process that supports the operational need
resulting from the hostile use of IEDs.
The dynamic Joint IED Defeat strategy requires even greater IC involvement.
However, decision by committee or taking a team vote rarely optimizes organizational
performance. Teams build franchises around key players. The US government needs an
IA team of players with long-term focus and commitment, not sporadic involvement.
The team needs 100% commitment from everyone for optimal performance. Preferably,
an Executive Branch decision selecting a lead agency fosters agency-wide, laser-like
concentration on the hostile use of IEDs. This lead agency must do more than
coordinate meetings and forums for information exchange. The lead agency requires
regulatory authority over a consolidated IA team.
JIEDDO’s mission for DOD affords a unique position as coordinator of the
strategic IED effort. DOD invested the resources, developed business processes,
identified key leadership, and allocated the personnel in JIEDDO for a broad mission.
JIEDDO established linkages into the IA and across the COCOMs. The geographic
COCOMs execute the global IED strategy for DOD with JIEDDO in support. Regional
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 74
COCOM areas of responsibility (AOR) preclude a global focus for the geographic
COCOMs. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) becomes the global partner for all
geographic COCOM’s. DOD’s planned expansion of SOF affords an opportunity for
greater collaboration on the IED threat. SOCOM’s current counterterrorist mission as
part of the GWOT compels stronger links between the JIEDDO and SOCOM. SOCOM’s
worldwide mission fosters global operational continuity and offers adequate military
force for preemptive offensive missions against insurgent sanctuaries. SOF missions of
this type require approval in consultation with the geographic COCOMs.
In combat operations like OIF and OEF, DOD through its COCOMs, leads the
operational response. The COCOMs, along with the Department of State (DOS), should
persuade like-minded global partners for support, using an international element of power
to deny global insurgents sanctuary in the relatively ungoverned areas of sovereign
territory. Taking preventive and preemptive offensive measures developed in concert
with international partners supports the global main effort.
Much of the work on counterterrorism accomplished by other agencies and
countries complements JIEDDO’s existing effort, easing concerns about greater
collaboration. Developing intelligence on terrorist networks proved difficult because of
a lack of human intelligence assets. Technical and biometric forensics from IEDs proved
a force multiplier that enabled precise targeting of insurgent networks and provided
valuable evidence, increasing the probability of convictions in criminal courts. Threat
specific IED intelligence developed by IA teams in the COIC represents a preliminary
step in what should become an on-going, robust collaborative effort. The DNI, linked to
DOD through JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs, properly continues the
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 75
intelligence focus against IED networks abroad. Domestically, DHS and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) assume the main effort in an enforcement role detaining suspects based
on intelligence from overseas sources fostered by DNI as well as their own domestically
obtained intelligence. Collectively, an interconnected IA team engages in a more
enduring offensive approach against the global IED threat in the Long War than
accomplished solely by JIEDDO. In the Long War, the IED threat constantly evolves,
and JIEDDO must first finish the task at hand in CENTCOM.
JIEDDO’s wartime support to CENTCOM remains unwavering, but as discussed,
realizing success against hostile IED use depends on the IA and SOCOM accepting
greater roles. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 concedes that the US
military does not conceive of future military operations without assistance from
international and IA partners. (Flournoy, 2006, pp.77-79) DOD’s strategy must permit
iterative recalibrations as JIEDDO welcomes focused IA involvement into a more
extensive Joint IED Defeat enterprise. Assigning focused responsibilities, milestones,
and objectives to every collaborating agency enables concurrent multi-agency discovery
of global terrorists and insurgents reliant on IEDs.
The JIEDDO is well structured eventually to assume an even broader role in the
Long War. The tunnel-vision the military has with Iraq and Afghanistan restricts the
current focus of JIEDDO’s effort. Hostile elements in those theaters of war remain
elusive, adaptive, and committed to the use of IEDs. Achieving success against the
global IED threat depends on greater assistance from SOCOM and the IA.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 76
What Have We Learned?
“It is through change that we find purpose.” - Heraclitus
The IED persists as a weapon of indiscriminate destruction with constituent effect.
The enemy proved to be quick learning and innovative, changing TTPs in response to the
success of DOD efforts to counter and defeat the hostile use of IEDs. The enemy
campaign evolved from employment of individual, simply constructed IEDs to multiple
IEDs in combined-arms ambushes. Hostile elements use increasingly more sophisticated
devices, killing first-responders, and indiscriminately targeting civilians using suicide
VBIEDs. The JIEDDO priority remains CENTCOM-centric, focused predominately on
the nation’s malaise on Iraq.
In CENTCOM, the combined efforts of JIEDDO and the COCOM are not
producing the effects desired. The definition of success in the CENTCOM Counter-IED
Campaign remains as elusive as victory in Iraq. Violence in all of its dimensions
increased during the formation of JIEDDO evidenced by the rising sectarian-based
insurgency in Iraq. The early technology-centric IED effort produced limited benefits for
war-fighting commanders but did force the enemy to double the number of attacks to
produce the same amount of casualties. (Allyn, personnel communication, January 25,
2007) Even with all the investments in detection technology, an observant human eye
detects the vast majority of IEDs. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)
IED casualties remain about the same in spite of a four-fold increase in IED use in Iraq.
Casualty rates per IED attack are down indicating that the cumulative effort of training,
better protective equipment, and improved intelligence had a positive effect.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 77
Initially viewed as a tactical challenge for combat units, the terrorist and insurgent
use of the IED demanded institutional change. Commanders in the combat zone
reconsidered the nature of 360 Degree Warfare and the impact of the IED to their
operations. The early focus of the Army IED Task Force, formed in 2003, reduced
combat casualties through the dissemination of effective tactics and promising technical
solutions. The TAT, along with the partnership JIEDDO nurtured with the AWG,
provided relevant, current lessons learned through advisors possessing recent regional
operational experience. The initial OSD response, dominated by the quest for a
technological solution to save lives, evolved into a more comprehensive approach. The
military institution repeatedly demonstrated its resilience, learning and adapting to the
IED threat. Some suggest that updates to doctrine or writing new doctrine serves as an
organizational metric of learning and adaptation. (Nagl, 2002) One must conclude that
the work of JIEDDO with JFCOM, the JCOE, and TRADOC captured the doctrinal
essence of the IED threat explaining concepts and training approaches to prevail.
Important modifications to standard bureaucratic decision systems in the Pentagon,
CENTCOM, and at war-fighting headquarters enhanced the DOD’s institutional response
to the asymmetric challenge brought by the IED. DOD established the JIEDDO to
“defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence”. During the establishment of JIEDDO,
institutional decisions resulted in adjustments to DOD business processes ranging from:
acquisition, test, R&D, training, intelligence, and operations.
While evidence of both, institutional friction and some Service prejudice surfaced
during the establishment of JIEDDO, there was also cooperation due to operational need.
The Joint Service consensus approving the expansion and permanency of JIEDDO along
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 78
with the creation of its subordinate joint training center, the JCOE, signaled long-term
institutional adjustments were expected. Allocating JIEDDO an organizational budget
coupled with Joint Service manning mitigated inter-service rivalries, biases, and
prejudice. This paper gathered emerging lessons from the evolution of the Joint IED
Defeat effort as it expanded during the Long War.
Table 1, JIEDDO Lessons Observed
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Strengths
Strategic-level leader initiative &
commitment
Senior leaders underwrite risk
High threshhold funding authority
Investment Banking strategy
providing venture capital for
technology development
Coalition embeds and collaboration
Adaptive joint testing process
Technology review & assessment
Joint Service and IA LNOs
representation
Entrepreneurial acquisition &
fielding process
CREW development and fielding
US Navy assistance with EWOs
JFCOM collaboration and doctrinal
updates
Contractor manning for JIEDDO
growth
Targeting support to combat units
Weapons Intel Teams at brigade
level
Rapid “best practice” dissemination
and TRADOC doctrinal FM
Formation of JCOE for IED Defeat
Strategic-to-tactical linkages
TAT and ATAT program with
multi-service reach into both the
active and reserve component
Field Teams that embed with
tactical units as advisors
Challenges
• Personnel regulations for manning a
JTF
• Maintaining continuity and
expertise midst personnel rotations
• Building a technology path or
roadmap
• Institutional biases
• Innovation and speed affected by
bureaucratic time constants
• Joint Service consensus building
• IA autonomy degraded unity of
effort
• Responsive CONOP development
and new equipment training for
forward deployed units
• Creating counterpart organizations
at various levels of command
• Institutionalizing change in
structure, equipment, and the
training base
• Synchronizing DOTLMPF midst
rapid change
• Sustaining organizational agility
midst a large bureaucracy
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 79
Military leaders often must translate lessons learned from past conflicts into applications
for innovative training, tactics, and technology. (Meigs, 1990) [See Table 1]
Prudence compels institutions to learn from the past in order to better prepare for
the future. The Services created new organizations, mobilized and realigned units, and
developed a joint training center specifically for the IED threat. Updates to the curricula
of military schools and training institutions occurred, an indication of organizational
learning and adaptation. (Nagl, 2002) JIEDDO support to the MNF-I Counterinsurgency
Academy helped prepare newly deployed commanders for the intellectual rigors of
counterinsurgency. Incorporating embedded international members and IA liaisons laid
the foundation for closer collaboration with these vital partners. A holistic strategy
reliant on intelligence driven targeting support was offered to maneuver units. This
strategy enabled attacks against the entire IED network through a new facility, the COIC,
serving in Direct Support of deployed commanders. The JIEDDO marshaled limited IA
support through its entrepreneurial leadership and personal relationships built with
counterpart leaders in the IC. While integration of IA liaisons occurred at the COIC, the
IED response developed by DOD lacked comprehensive IA commitment. The inclusion
of contracted, experienced law enforcement professionals on brigade and division staffs
improved the ability of units to target the nexus criminal, corrupt former regime
intelligence services, and paramilitary forces that constitute the operational capacity of
IED networks. Even with changes to the military, the time horizons of the DOD
procurement and acquisition cycle were not agile or responsive enough to stay ahead of
asymmetric threats with materiel or technical solutions alone. Venture capital provided
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 80
by JIEDDO for R&D investments on promising materiel solutions became the “bread and
butter” of the JIEDDO technological effort.
By their nature, asymmetric challenges require entrepreneurial freedom and a
degree of independence from cyclic DOD programming and budget norms. By
underwriting entrepreneurial risk, senior DOD leaders, such as: the Deputy Secretary, the
Vice Chairman JCS, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the CENTCOM commander,
and the commanding generals of MNF-I, MNC-I, and CJTF-76, all instilled the JIEDDO
leadership with the drive needed for implementing change while JIEDDO built trusted
relationships among senior leaders in government. Personal involvement of strategiclevel leaders enabled JIEDDO’s rapid impact on the use of IEDs. A stronger partnership
between JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs advances the effort against the
IED threat. However, the IED problem, like the insurgency in Iraq, requires more than
simply a military solution.
Because of the military’s deep involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan with
counterinsurgency, DOD quickly adapted institutionally, outpacing the rest of the IA. A
permanent IA constituency would greatly benefit the Joint IED Defeat effort. Differing
priorities and mission focus among the various IA partners reconfirms that agencies’
divergent core missions contribute to lack of cohesion against a complex threat. DOD’s
ability to learn quickly and create solutions to the IED threat will assist IA partners when
participating in “nation building” or stability and reconstruction operations with DOD.
During these kinds of operations, IED use will likely proliferate.
Effective attack of IED networks requires coordinated IA approaches with clear,
common objectives adopted in collaboration with IA partners. Victory over the prolific
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 81
threat posed by the hostile use of IEDs will take the combined synergy of international
and interagency partnering. It is paramount for agencies to inculcate DOD’s lessons and
develop a joint IA doctrine, modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enforces
consensus approaches and subordinates IA autonomy to operational need. (Meigs, 2003,
p. 18) Greater agency participation working collaboratively with DOD as the lead
agency constitutes the IA team needed for accomplishing the global aspect of the
JIEDDO mission. Congressional legislation mandating IA reform may be uncomfortable
for some agencies, but there couldn’t be anything more central for success against the
global IED threat.
Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 82
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