Group Identity and Social Trust
in the American Public
J. Matthew Wilson
Southern Methodist University
jmwilson@mail.smu.edu
Abstract: This study considers the impact of strong identification with a social group on
generalized trust in others, and hence on the formation of social capital. Previous work in the field
has tended to ignore intra-group differences in levels of social trust and affect toward out-groups,
which I argue are substantially rooted in orientations toward individuals’ own social groups. Using
three major groups (women, African Americans, and evangelical Christians) as exemplar cases, this
paper outlines the circumstances under which strong group identification is likely to contribute to or
detract from generalized social trust, and demonstrates empirically its importance both for broad
questions of faith in others and for attitudes toward specific out-groups. In all three cases, the
strength of individual members’ identification with the social group shapes powerfully their
profession of trust in their fellow citizens, and their affective responses to a range of other social
groups. The findings have clear implications for our understanding of the sources and origins of
social trust, the most central and crucial building block of social capital.
The last decade has witnessed an explosion of social science research on the topic of “social
capital.” Beginning with Coleman (1990), followed most notably by Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000),
scholars have stressed the importance of civic engagement, collective problem solving, and general
public-spiritedness for the health of a democratic polity. This observation is not new; over a century
and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville (1840) observed these same virtues to be central and vital to
American political culture. What is new, however, is the perception that these qualities are in short
supply in the contemporary United States, and that they have declined at an alarming rate over the
last several decades (Putnam 1995, 2000). This realization has led to serious scholarly inquiry into
the sources of social capital, in an attempt to develop prescriptions for stemming the tide of
American civic indifference.
First and foremost among the factors identified as making important contributions to social
capital has been trust, whether of other people, of the government, or of both (Yamagishi and
Yamagishi 1994; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Berger and Brehm 1997). Only if people believe that
others are basically decent, sharing on some level similar values and not seeking to take advantage of
them, will they be willing to engage actively in the larger society. In game-theoretic formulations,
trust is critical in inducing cooperative behavior and pareto-optimal outcomes (Axelrod 1984;
Wrightsman 1992), and the same logic has been applied to real-world social and governmental
settings (Levi 1997). Clearly, generalized trust is a central bedrock of social capital.
The identification of trust as a prime contributor to social capital has in turn led to inquiry
into the sources of social and political trust (Hardin 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Brehm and Rahn 1997;
Brehm 1999). In Brehm’s (1999) characteristic formulation, trust in other people and trust in
government are mutually reinforcing, and also driven by factors such as education, age, economic
circumstances, and evaluations of governmental performance. Absent from this and all other
1
existing trust models, however, is any consideration of the role of group identification in shaping
individuals’ attitudes toward others in society. While Loury (1977) uses the idea of social capital to
explain economic empowerment in minority populations, other scholars have given remarkably little
attention to the effects of individuals’ affective ties to their various social sub-groups on generalized
trust.1 Clearly, a sense of close attachment to one particular segment of society (one’s own race,
gender, or religious group) has the potential to shape powerfully one’s view of the larger social
whole, and of other people in general.
Related work in social psychology suggests strongly that group attachments shape individual
perceptions of and trust in generalized others. Parenti (1967), for example, argues that ethnic
communities develop powerful social and political norms that shape their members’ interactions
with the larger society. Additionally, social identity theory, initially advanced by Tajfel and Turner
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987), holds that people define themselves socially
primarily with reference to salient groups of which they are members. In this process of selfcategorization, the individual tends to develop a group-centered lens through which to view others
in society (Fiske and Taylor 1991). For subordinate groups particularly, group-based norms for
understanding the behavior and intentions of people both within and outside the group can
significantly influence an individual member’s view of generalized others, especially if that member
strongly identifies with the group in question. Dawson (1994), in his study of contemporary African
American political behavior, makes use of social identity theory to explain precisely this
phenomenon in the black community. Clearly, social psychological models predict widespread and
powerful group-based heuristics that shape individuals’ perceptions of their relationship to the larger
society. Despite these findings, however, the extant literature on social trust has largely ignored
group identification as a major factor.
2
This paper employs a multi-pronged analytical approach in an attempt to remedy the
omission of group identity from the discussion of social trust. After outlining the circumstances
under which strong group identification could either bolster or undermine generalized social trust, I
present models testing the impact of group identity on trust in other people, trust in government,
and affect towards out-groups. Overall, this paper traces in some detail the interaction between
identification with a particular segment of society and attitudes toward generalized others. It should
provide an important enhancement and corrective to the currently prevailing models of social trust
and, in turn, of social capital.
Theory and Hypotheses
If modern political science has largely ignored the potential relationship between
attachments to a segment of society and broader social trust, it has not gone unremarked by the
more philosophically inclined. Two centuries ago, Edmund Burke (1791) observed in his Reflections
on the Revolution in France that "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong
to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the
series by which we proceed toward a love for our country and for mankind." The logic here is clear:
habits of trusting others and recognizing their basic decency, first developed in the context of those
with whom one associates closely and shares obvious characteristics, are likely in the end to color
favorably one’s view of humanity at large. Barring any unique characteristic of the group that might
make its close adherents more wary and suspicious of others in society, this should be the normal
pattern. “To be attached to the subdivision” should contribute to one’s “public affections;” put less
elegantly, in the language of modern social science, strong group identification should normally be a
significant and positive predictor of individuals’ levels of generalized social trust. Thus, racial
3
identification among African Americans and gender identification among women, for example,
should increase affect towards and confidence in other people generally.
Of course, this is not to suggest that under all circumstances strong group identification will
result in greater generalized social trust. Organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nation
obviously push group identity to a dangerous level, and channel it in destructive ways directed
against specific (though often quite varied) out-groups. Even among more main-stream groups,
however, there are circumstances under which group identity can erode social trust and social
capital. This is particularly apparent among African Americans. Dawson (1994) includes in his
discussion of black-white relations at least one possible future scenario in which the liberal
integrationist project fails, and black identity begins to strongly undermine trust in out-groups. Orr’s
(1999) study of school politics in Baltimore points out a specific instance where the fostering of
black social cohesiveness and social capital has resulted in a less trusting overall orientation toward
relevant actors outside the group. Likewise, Harris-Lacewell’s (1999) analysis of black ideology
suggests that only for liberal integrationists in the black community should stronger in-group ties be
associated with generalized social trust. For black nationalists, one of the very foci for group
identity is lack of trust in those outside the group. That liberal integrationism has been the dominant
paradigm for mainstream black leadership since the civil rights movement would suggest that for the
most part racial identity among blacks should augment generalized social trust, but one should be
aware of the separatist undercurrent in black thought as well.
Nonetheless, there remains good reason to believe that, under normal circumstances,
identification with one’s own social group should contribute positively to generalized social trust.
To begin with, “habits of trusting” developed within the group setting should facilitate trust on a
broader level. Additionally, Smith and Tyler (1997) suggest that positive feelings toward one’s own
4
group, and favorable interactions within it, build individuals’ sense of efficacy and self-esteem. As
both of these characteristics have been shown to contribute to social trust and more positive
orientations toward the larger society (Tyler 1997), this provides another important reason to suggest
that group identity ought normally to be associated with increased generalized trust and more
positive affect toward most other members of society.
It is conceivable, however, that strong identification with some social groups could decrease
levels of trust in generalized “others.” If a group’s central identity elements and belief set emphasize
the shortcomings of non-members, one would expect group identity to detract from social trust and
affect toward out-groups. This might particularly be the case with evangelical Christians, for reasons
deeply rooted in the group’s central religious doctrines and worldview. From the very earliest days
of American evangelicalism, evangelical theology has stressed the fundamental sinfulness of man,
emphasizing that most people will make poor moral choices most of the time (Clabaugh 1974; Noll
1992). Evangelical pastors often stress the sharp distinction between “the Elect” and the great mass
of humanity, mired in sin and unbelief (Guth et al 1997).2 Moreover, over the last thirty years a
sense has developed among evangelicals that they are involved in a “culture war,” in which many of
their fellow Americans scorn their religious faith and reject their basic values (Green et al. 1996).
This perception could well serve to create a siege mentality among evangelicals with strong religious
identity, undermining their generalized social trust. Thus, for reasons specific to the particular
group, religious identification among evangelicals is likely to be negatively associated with professions
of faith in the honesty and decency of others. This pattern, however, should be the exception rather
than the rule. Under most circumstances, the previously discussed link between group identification
and trust in others should apply.
It is important to note that neither in the usual pattern (hypothesized to be present among
5
women and blacks) nor in the exceptional case of evangelicals is there any reason to suspect a direct
link between group identification and trust in government. While some have asserted that African
Americans as a group are likely to have more faith in government (at least at the national level) than
are whites (Walton 1985), Brehm and Rahn’s (1997) more recent analysis does not find any such
relationship, despite including race in the model of government trust. More importantly, there is no
reason to suspect that strong adherents of any of these groups (women, blacks, and evangelicals)
would on average differ from their low-identity counterparts in their levels of trust in government.
Strong group identification may create more ambivalent feelings about government (i.e. heightened
awareness of government’s potential utility in achieving group objectives coupled with increased
anger at the group’s under-representation in the corridors of power), but there is good reason to
remain agnostic about the overall direction of strong group identification’s effect on mean levels of
government trust, and to suspect that it should in any case be rather small.
Thus, we have here a relatively straight-forward set of predictions. While the strength of an
individual’s group identification should have no great impact on levels of trust in government, it
should clearly influence his profession of trust in other people, usually positively, occasionally
negatively. What we would like to infer from this if true, of course, is that close identification with a
social group affects the way that individuals think about and evaluate people in the larger society. In
other words, strong identifiers should be more favorably disposed (or more hostile in the case of
evangelicals) toward out-groups. There is, however, another possibility to guard against, particularly
in the case of those groups with whom identity seems positively correlated with social trust. Since
the battery of trust questions (on which more detail later) query about one’s evaluations of the
motives of generalized “other people” or “most people,” it is possible to be deceived by a spurious
relationship here. It may be the case that strongly identifying group members actually feel no more
6
warmly toward members of other groups than do weakly-identified group members. Instead, they
may simply be answering the questions to a greater extent with reference to members of their own
group. In other words, African Americans with high racial identity, for example, when they answer
that “other people” are trustworthy, might really mean that other blacks are trustworthy. It is
certainly plausible that strong group identifiers might disproportionately use their own group as a
referent when answering such general questions. Clearly, if what we are ultimately interested in is
trust beyond the narrow confines of a single social group, we must find some way to distinguish
between a genuine increase in affect toward out-groups and a mere artifact of differing frames of
reference in responding to a survey question.
If strong identification with most groups does indeed enhance an individual’s tolerance,
respect, and even affection for groups of which he is not necessarily a member (the true basis of
social trust and broad-based social capital), then strong identifiers should provide more favorable
responses when queried about a variety of social groups in the context of a survey. According to
Coleman (1990) and Fukuyama (1995), generalized social trust is fundamentally a question of respect
for and sense of commonality with people to whom one does not have direct ties. Thus, one key
indicator of social trust would be an individual’s attitudes toward a variety of groups of which he or
she is not a member. While the claim that strong group identifiers simply use a different reference
group when answering the general social trust questions cannot be directly tested and refuted—one
can hardly ask a respondent “Who were you thinking of when you just answered that question?”—
one can examine differences between high- and low-identifiers in their evaluations of specific outgroups . If, as I maintain, strong group identification among women and African Americans is truly
associated with genuinely higher levels of social trust, then high race and gender identifiers ought to
express warmth towards more groups and animosity toward fewer groups than their low-identity
7
counterparts. Conversely, the pattern among evangelicals ought to be exactly opposite: those with
strong religious identity ought to express affection for fewer groups and hostility towards more
groups than those with low levels of religious identification.3
To recap, then, the hypotheses to be tested here are as follows:

Strong group identification should significantly influence levels of social trust among all groups
examined. The relationship should be positive among women and African Americans, and
negative among evangelical Christians.

There should be little or no direct relationship between group identity and government trust
among any of the groups.

Strong identifiers among women and blacks should express feelings of closeness toward more
social groups than do weak identifiers. Strongly identifying evangelicals should express
closeness toward fewer groups than weak identifiers. These patterns should hold even after
controlling for ideology.

Strong identifiers among women and blacks should express animosity toward fewer social
groups than do weak identifiers. Strongly identifying evangelicals should express hostility
toward more groups than weak identifiers. These patterns should also hold even after
controlling for ideology.
Data and Method
In examining the question of group identification and social and political trust, there is a
necessary trade-off between breadth and depth. One could do a highly detailed and contextual
study of a single social group, or a much less detailed examination across the entire spectrum of
8
possible groups. The analysis here is based on a middle-ground approach, selecting three groups for
analysis: blacks, women, and evangelical Christians. This number should allow individual discussion
and analysis of each group, while at the same time providing some assurance that the findings are
generalizable across different group contexts. Significantly, the selected groups vary in size (from
about 12% to over half of the U.S. population), partisan disposition (from strong Democrat to
strong Republican), and social integration with other groups (from generally segregated in residence,
work, and worship to largely integrated in most social contexts). Thus, these groups are amenable to
analysis within the theoretical framework outlined here, and an examination of them should provide
a good general discussion of the relationship between group identity and social trust. Patterns found
in these three groups may reasonably be considered general social and political phenomena, because
of the clear diversity of the groups across a host of dimensions.
The analyses here employ data from the 1992 American National Election Study.4 This
survey is based on a national sample of about 2500 respondents, and contains measures of both
objective group membership and group identification for all three groups of interest (discussed in
greater detail below). The 1992 NES data set contains over 1300 women, over 600 evangelicals, and
over 300 blacks. Thus, while the sample of African Americans is smaller than ideal, there are
enough respondents in each of the three groups to permit useful within-group analysis.5
Before proceeding with a discussion of specific models, a few notes on how respondents
were classified into these three groups are in order. To begin with, only people who are objectively
members of the groups in question are considered in the analyses. While other people may in some
sense “identify” with blacks, women, or evangelicals, this is a much different psychological
phenomenon than the one examined here. This exclusion of non-members is consistent with
previous work in the field, as Gurin et al. (1980) and Conover (1984) among others maintain that
9
objective membership is a prerequisite for group identification or consciousness. By this criterion,
blacks and women are easily classified based simply on the race and gender questions in the NES,
but evangelicals pose a bit more of a problem. While there are several possible methods for
identifying evangelicals using survey data, the strategy outlined in Green et al. (1996), classifying
respondents primarily according to their religious denomination, is employed here.6 This method
identifies those respondents who attend evangelical churches, allowing additional sub-division,
comparison, and analysis based on professed identification with the evangelical movement.
Another important methodological issue is the question of how to operationalize group
identification. The most common practice when using NES data is to rely on the “closeness”
measures in the study (see, for example, Conover 1984). In these items, respondents are presented
with a list of groups, and asked which of the groups are “most like you in their ideas and interests
and feelings about things.” Blacks and women who identify these respective groups as being close
to them are classified as high identifiers; those who do not select the group are considered low
identifiers.7 For evangelicals, the process is somewhat more complicated, because no religious
groups are on the list presented to respondents in the “closeness” battery. There is, however, a
question asking Christian respondents to classify their type of Christianity as either “moderate to
liberal” (the option selected by the majority of respondents) or “evangelical,” “fundamentalist,” or
“charismatic or Spirit-filled.” Those respondents identified (by the process described above) as
objectively members of evangelical churches are classified as high identifiers if they self-select one of
the labels associated with the broader evangelical movement (that is, a description other than
“moderate to liberal”). Those who do not select one of these labels are classified as low identifiers.
This method of division yields approximately the same two-to-one ratio of high- to low-identifiers as
the closeness battery does for blacks and women, lending some support to the contention that the
10
two methods are at least roughly comparable.
There are admittedly some drawbacks to using the closeness items as a measure of the
strength of group identification. To begin with, they are dichotomous, forcing a simple high-low
division of identifiers instead of the more realistic continuum along which group identification
almost certainly ranges. One possible remedy for this defect would be to use group feeling
thermometer ratings instead, but feeling thermometers capture a slightly different theoretical
concept—affect as opposed to identification. As Turner (1982) argues, “The first question
determining group-belongingness is not ‘Do I like these individuals?’ but ‘Who am I?’.”8 A more
important potential problem is that not all respondents necessarily understand “closeness” in the
same way, making these items somewhat “noisy” measures of the underlying concept of group
identification. However, the closeness measures do seem to be the best approximation available for
group identification, and using them provides the clearest basis for comparison with previous work.
Ultimately, if strong results emerge using this fairly blunt instrument, we may have considerable
confidence that a more finely honed one would produce even sharper findings.
The most important methodological issues for this analysis involve the creation of the
various scales measuring social trust, government trust, and civic engagement. In all of these, I have
intentionally followed other scholars’ formulations (particularly Brehm and Rahn 1997 and Brehm
1999) closely, both because their scale components seem quite plausible and because this will allow
for the most direct possible comparison of my findings with theirs. The scale measuring civic
engagement (a predictive variable in the social trust equation) is built from six individual items
measuring individuals’ involvement or willingness to become involved in community service and
activities. These activities include talking with their neighbors, performing community service,
serving on a jury, and attending church, among others.9 Likewise, the government trust scale is
11
constructed from a basket of five items, measuring perceptions of the extent to which government
and politicians are honest, efficient, responsive, and representative. Finally, the social trust index is
built from two questions (as in Brehm 1999), measuring willingness to trust other people and
perceptions that others are seeking to take advantage. Means, distributions, and standard deviations
on all of these scale measures are comparable to those found in previous work. More specific details
on the construction of these scales, including the wording of all of the component questions and the
exact equation used to compute individual values, can be found in the Appendix.
A second methodological issue involves the operationalization of affect toward various
social groups. Fortunately, the NES includes a battery of questions asking individuals to provide
feeling thermometer evaluations of over twenty different major groups in society, ranging from
immigrants to conservatives to homosexuals to the military. Additionally, the NES closeness
measures (the same ones that I use to separate high- and low- group identifiers) ask respondents
whether or not they feel close to sixteen different groups, ranging from Asian Americans to
Southerners to Working-class people. There are eleven groups that appear in both of these
batteries, and they form the basis for my analyses in this paper. From evaluations, it is possible to
derive measures (both positive and negative) of respondents’ general affect towards others in
society. In this analysis, I employ two measures. One is “positively” valenced, tallying the number
of groups to which individuals profess feelings of closeness.10 The other measure is “negatively”
valenced, tallying the number of groups toward which respondents express clear hostility.11 A list of
the groups presented in both the closeness and feeling thermometer measures can be found in the
Appendix. By examining respondents’ feelings of both affection and distaste for other groups in
society, I hope to provide a clear and conclusive demonstration of the effects of group identification
on social trust.
12
Analysis
The first stage in my analysis seeks to establish a direct connection between identification
with a social group and trust in generalized others. Of course, to test fully and accurately the link
between group identity and social trust requires a properly specified multivariate model. Following
Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Brehm (1999), I assume the two trust functions to be reciprocally
dependent processes; in other words, social and governmental trust should be mutually reinforcing.
Thus, the model estimated is a two-stage least squares regression model, with separate estimations
for women, evangelicals, and blacks.
The independent variables are the same across all three groups.12 The social trust equation,
in addition to the government trust term to specify the reciprocal relationship, contains a variety of
other predictive variables. To begin with, it includes the civic engagement scale described above,
based on previous scholars’ assertion that civic engagement is critical in building trust in other
people (Putnam 1995; Brehm and Rahn 1997). In addition, the equation (where appropriate)
includes terms for race, gender, and religion, based on the well-documented fact that blacks are less
trusting of others than are whites (Walton 1985; Mullen 1991; Kramer 1994) and the suggestion
from the bivariate results above that evangelicals and women might be somewhat less trusting than
others. The model also includes dummy variables for several age groups (people born in the 1950’s,
1960’s and 1970’s), based on work indicating that younger cohorts in America have grown
progressively less trusting and more cynical (Easterlin and Crimmins 1991; Putnam 1995; Brehm and
Rahn 1997). Education, also included in the model, is thought to be correlated with greater
knowledge and understanding of diverse groups of people, and hence with higher levels of social
trust (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Personal experience of divorce is assumed to depress
trust in others, while exposure to media is assumed to make a positive contribution (Brehm and
13
Rahn 1997). Finally, and most importantly, a strength of group identification term is included in the
model, with directional hypotheses specific to each group as outlined above.
The government trust model also follows as closely as possible the specifications employed
in previous work (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Brehm 1999), with the addition of the group identity term.
In addition to the social trust scale specifying the presumed reciprocal relationship, the model
contains items measuring both positive and negative affect toward the two major political parties.13
Age cohort measures are also included, to capture any possible effects of coming of political age
during the low-trust Vietnam and, especially, Watergate era (Berger and Brehm 1999), or during the
more trusting Reagan era (Citrin and Green 1986; Miller and Borelli 1991). Ideology is included, on
the assumption that conservatives, with their generally anti-statist orientation, might be more
skeptical of government than liberals. Finally, a variety of government performance measures are in
the model, including economic prosperity, foreign prestige, and responsiveness to public opinion, as
all of these have been demonstrated to contribute significantly to individuals’ levels of trust in
government (Feldman 1983; Lipset and Schneider 1987; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).
Results of the two-stage least squares models of social and government trust are presented in
Table 1. Looking first at the model for social trust among women, we find that, as expected, trust in
government makes a powerful contribution to trust in other people. Additionally, civic engagement
also performs as expected, increasing the likelihood that respondents will profess trust in their fellow
citizens. Black women have sharply lower levels of social trust than do white women (confirming a
pattern suggested in the bivariate analysis), and young women are significantly less trusting than are
older women. Education and the experience of divorce both operate as expected, augmenting and
detracting from social trust, respectively. Despite some suggestions to the contrary, evangelical
Christianity and exposure to news media appear to have no discernible effect on levels of social
14
trust, at least among women. Finally, and most importantly, strength of gender identification among
women has a clear effect in increasing trust in other people. In this case, attachment to the genderbased group clearly translates into more positive generalized feelings toward one’s fellow citizens at
large.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
In the government trust portion of the model, we encounter an unexpected result. Contrary
to Brehm and Rahn’s (1997) argument that social trust and government trust are mutually
reinforcing, the results here suggest that social trust among women actually exerts a significantly
negative influence on trust in government. In other words, the more women trust their fellow
citizens, the less faith they place in government.14 Other than this puzzling finding, however, the
other coefficients are basically as expected. Both of the partisan affect measures exert a significant
influence in the anticipated direction. Also, the youngest respondents (those born in the 1970’s,
who would have become politically cognizant during the Reagan era) have slightly more confidence
in government than do other women in the sample. Not surprisingly, coefficients for the
government performance evaluation measures are all significantly positive. Finally, as hypothesized,
there is no direct link between strong gender identification and trust in government. Group
identification’s contributions to trust appear to be entirely on the social trust side of the ledger.
Turning to the model of social and government trust among African Americans, we find,
generally speaking, the same patterns as among women. Trust in government is a significant
predictor of trust in other people, as is education. African Americans born in the 1960’s are less
trusting of their fellow citizens than are other blacks in the sample, though the effects of age cohort
on trust among blacks are less pronounced than they are among other groups. For African
Americans, increased exposure to the news media does indeed promote social trust, albeit only to a
15
modest extent. In the government trust model, we find once again a surprisingly strong negative
relationship between trust in others and trust in government (see endnote 14). Aside from that, the
only significant predictors of trust in government are the positive partisan affect measure (though
not the negative one), and the various governmental performance evaluations. Most importantly,
the terms measuring strength of racial identification perform exactly as hypothesized in both
portions of the model: exerting a positive influence on trust in other people, and playing no direct
role in individuals’ trust in government. Thus, on the variables of theoretical interest, the patterns
observed among African Americans are completely in line with those found among women.
In the trust models for evangelicals, we again find confirmation of the central hypotheses.
Trust in government, civic engagement, and education all promote social trust among evangelicals,
just as they do among women and African Americans. Evangelicals born in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s are all significantly less trusting of others than are older evangelicals. Results of the
government trust model also look very much like those among women and blacks (though here the
effect of social trust, while again negative, is not statistically significant). Both positive and negative
affect toward the political parties are significant, and in the expected directions. Likewise,
government performance evaluations again make important contributions to government trust,
though curiously only two of the four (economic performance and responsiveness to public
opinion). Clearly, though, the coefficients of greatest theoretical interest are those for the terms
measuring strength of religious identification. Here, the unique, group-specific hypothesis regarding
evangelicalism and social trust is strongly supported. Evangelicals with high levels of religious
identification are significantly less likely to profess trust in generalized “others” than are evangelicals
with weaker religious identifications. Once again, the effect is only present in the social trust portion
of the equation; the impact of religious identification on trust in government is nil.
16
There is strong evidence in all three of these models that identification with a social group
shapes individuals’ attitudes toward others in important ways, usually building social trust,
sometimes undermining it. To be sure that we have captured a true component of social capital,
however, it is important to confirm that this result does indeed reflect an altered disposition toward
others (particularly out-groups), rather than simply a different frame of reference in answering the
trust questions. To explore this question in greater depth, I turn to the previously discussed analysis
of individuals’ professed closeness and distaste for various groups of people in society. The results
here, it is hoped, should mirror and confirm those in the social trust models above, with group
identification promoting greater overall positivity toward other groups among women and blacks,
and greater negativity among evangelicals.
Table 2 presents OLS models of both the number of close groups and the number of
disliked groups for women, blacks, and evangelicals.15 Because, as I argue, these affect measures are
closely related to generalized social trust, they should stem from common sources. Thus, these
models contain the same independent variables as the social trust models presented in Table 1, plus
a control for ideology. This ideological variable is important, because one could argue that the list
of groups presented is “biased,” in the sense that it contains more groups likely to be objectionable
to conservatives (and hence evangelicals) than groups likely to offend liberals. My objective here is
not to comment on the relative “tolerance” of blacks and whites, men and women, liberals and
conservatives, or evangelicals and others—I am, for purposes of my argument in this paper, agnostic
on these points. If, however, there truly is a relationship between group identification and social
trust, strong identity should clearly influence affect toward other groups, either in positivity
(closeness), negativity (dislikes), or both, even after controlling for any ideological skew in the list of
groups to be evaluated.
17
Turning first to the models among women, we find strong evidence of this pattern. In the
close groups model, civic engagement is an important predictor—those respondents who are
involved in their communities profess closeness to significantly more groups of people than do
those who are more disengaged. Additionally, black women, evangelical women, and younger
women score higher on this measure than do other women in the sample.16 Most importantly,
strength of gender identification plays a strong role in shaping women’s feelings of closeness toward
other groups. Those who feel close to other women are likely to feel close to more other groups as
well. This same general pattern of results is reflected in the model of disliked groups, though of
course in the opposite direction. Here, government trust is highly significant; those women with
high levels of confidence in government express negativity toward significantly fewer groups than
do those who do not trust government. As expected, the ideology term is significant, as
conservative women dislike more groups on average than do liberal women (probably a product of
the slight ideological skew of the groups presented for evaluation). Younger and more educated
women, not surprisingly, dislike fewer groups than older and less well educated women. Finally, the
group identity term is significant here as well, with strong gender identification resulting in
significantly less hostile evaluations of other groups. Thus, among women, gender identification
powerfully shapes feelings toward out-groups, both increasing feelings of closeness and decreasing
expressions of hostility.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Generally speaking, the results among African Americans are similar. Civic engagement is
once again a predictor of the number of groups to which a respondent professes closeness, just as it
is among women. Most important, however, is the impact of the group identity term. Strong racial
identity among African Americans has a dramatic impact on professions of closeness to other
18
groups. Black respondents with high levels of racial identification express closeness to 2.3 more
groups, on average, than those blacks with low levels of racial identification, controlling for all of the
other factors in the model. Turning to the model of disliked groups, however, we find a somewhat
different situation. Here, just as in the model among women, government trust and youth are
negatively correlated with professions of hostility towards other groups in society. The coefficient
for the group identification term, however, while in the right direction, is not significant. It
therefore appears that, for African Americans, group identity’s contribution to social trust comes
primarily from its very powerful effect on feelings of closeness toward other groups (positive affect).
The final set of models presented here are those for group affect among evangelicals. Here,
of course, we expect group identity to work in exactly the opposite way from its effects among
women and blacks, decreasing expressions of closeness to other groups and/or increasing
expressions of hostility. In the close groups model, there is no evidence of an effect from religious
identity. Just as among women and blacks, the extent of an individual evangelical’s civic
engagement is strongly correlated with closeness to other groups in society. In addition, level of
exposure to media contributes to expressions of closeness. There is, however, no discernible effect
of religious identification in this model. Turning, on the other hand, to the analysis of disliked
groups, we find a much different pattern. As with women, the ideology term is significant,
indicating that liberal evangelicals dislike fewer groups than conservative ones. Additionally, it
appears that, among evangelicals, being female is correlated with greater affect for out-groups, as is
being divorced.17 Of greatest importance, however, is the effect of strong religious identification.
Evangelicals with high levels of religious identity express hostility, on average, toward .2 more
groups than do their low-identity counterparts. When the average respondent expresses hostility
toward less than 1 group, an increase of this magnitude is quite a jump. Thus, once again, the link
19
between group identification and social trust established in the earlier models is borne out in the
analysis of affect toward out-groups. The claim that evangelical identity has negative effects on
social trust is bolstered by this evidence of its contribution to increased hostility toward other social
groups.
Discussion
The analysis presented here suggests an important link between close identification with a
major social group of which one is a member and more universal feelings of trust and affection
toward other individuals in society at large. In all three of the groups examined, strength of group
identity plays a central role in shaping members’ attitudes toward generalized “others” and, relatedly,
toward members of specific out-groups. The effects of group identity do not always run in the same
direction; while the “normal” pattern, observed among women and blacks, is consistent with
Burke’s assertion that attachment to the subdivision should serve as the “germ of public affections,”
there is also the important case of evangelicalism in which religious identity serves to undermine
faith in the general goodness of the larger society. What is clear, however, is that across the board,
measuring and understanding individuals’ attachments to social groups is indispensable if we are to
explain completely the sources of their social trust (or lack thereof).
These results have implications for the larger question of social capital as well. If the pattern
observed among women and African Americans, where strong group identification seems to
promote more positive feelings about others in society, is indeed the norm, then there is reason to
believe that strengthening the salience of such categories to their members could result in increased
social capital. One must, however, be cautious about pushing this conclusion too far. There is a
fine line between a positive, desirable group identification that enhances the social fabric, and a
20
socially destructive one that regards non-members as irrelevant at best and as adversaries at worst.
The evidence presented here, however, suggests that currently, group identification (at least among
women and African Americans) is not a zero-sum game; increasing commitment to a segment of
society does not come at the expense of faith in the larger social whole, but rather serves to augment
it.18
In the final analysis, it is clear that group identification can no longer be ignored in the
discussion of individuals’ attitudes toward the larger society. As in so many areas of political science
research, scholars examining social trust have tended to focus on the individual in relation to the
social whole, ignoring the vital role played by an intermediate level of aggregation, the social group.
As I have demonstrated here, groups through their orientation toward the larger society have the
capacity to influence powerfully the social attitudes of those members that strongly identify with
them. Their importance for social trust and affect toward out-groups rivals that of such well-known
factors as education, age, and personal life experiences. Clearly, attachment to the social group is an
important road by which individuals can be led toward (or away from) “a love for [their] country
and for mankind.”
21
TABLE 1
2SLS Models of Social and Government Trust
Social Trust Models
Variable
Women
Blacks
Evangelicals
Constant
Government Trust
Civic Engagement
Female
Black
Evangelical
Born 1950s
Born 1960s
Born 1970s
Education
Divorced
Media Exposure
High Group ID
0.126 (0.074) **
0.690 (0.189) ***
0.206 (0.062) ***
-----0.301 (0.040) ***
0.007 (0.032)
-0.025 (0.035)
-0.153 (0.039) ***
-0.304 (0.064) ***
0.058 (0.009) ***
-0.108 (0.040) ***
0.003 (0.003)
0.055 (0.028) ***
-0.140 (0.131)
0.379 (0.255) *
-0.041 (0.104)
-0.017 (0.048)
---------0.016 (0.060)
-0.098 (0.063) *
0.099 (0.108)
0.071 (0.018) ***
0.080 (0.070)
0.009 (0.006) *
0.087 (0.067) *
0.121 (0.100)
0.735 (0.253) ***
0.266 (0.092) ***
0.040 (0.041)
---------0.100 (0.053) **
-0.126 (0.055) **
-0.179 (0.010) **
0.067 (0.015) ***
-0.064 (0.059)
0.003 (0.005)
-0.092 (0.043) **
Government Trust Models
Variable
Women
Blacks
Evangelicals
Constant
Social Trust
Pos Affect for Parties
Neg Affect for Parties
Female
Black
Evangelical
Born 1950s
Born 1960s
Born 1970s
Ideology
Personal Finances
Govt Econ Perf
US Position in World
Govt Responsiveness
High Group ID
0.216 (0.045) **
-0.119 (0.068) **
0.001 (0.000) ***
-0.002 (0.000) ***
-----0.024 (0.028)
-0.015 (0.015)
0.010 (0.016)
0.001 (0.021)
0.044 (0.034) *
-0.002 (0.004)
0.005 (0.006)
0.027 (0.008) ***
0.025 (0.009) ***
0.042 (0.006) ***
0.014 (0.014)
0.034 (0.078)
-0.252 (0.165) **
0.002 (0.001) **
0.000 (0.001)
-0.003 (0.030)
--------0.003 (0.038)
0.005 (0.040)
0.040 (0.067)
0.011 (0.010)
0.019 (0.014) *
0.078 (0.018) ***
0.039 (0.021) **
0.031 (0.014) **
0.025 (0.048)
0.112 (0.044) ***
-0.030 (0.080)
0.001 (0.000) ***
-0.001 (0.000) **
-0.006 (0.018)
--------0.026 (0.022)
0.010 (0.025)
0.033 (0.045)
0.005 (0.006)
0.003 (0.009)
0.033 (0.011) ***
0.011 (0.013)
0.044 (0.008) ***
0.009 (0.019)
N = 816 (women), 192 (blacks), 398 (evangelicals)
R2 (Social Trust) = .19 (women), .15 (blacks), .18 (evangelicals)
R2 (Government Trust) = .18 (women), .27 (blacks), .28 (evangelicals)
22
*** p < .01, one-tailed test
** p < .05, one-tailed test
* p < .10, one-tailed test
TABLE 2
OLS Models of Affect for Other Groups
Close Groups Models
Variable
Women
Blacks
Constant
Government Trust
Civic Engagement
Ideology
Female
Black
Evangelical
Born 1950s
Born 1960s
Born 1970s
Education
Divorced
Media Exposure
High Group ID
0.730 (0.271) ***
-0.182 (0.288)
0.759 (0.236) ***
-0.073 (0.041) **
----1.142 (0.162) ***
0.339 (0.130) ***
0.291 (0.134) **
0.347 (0.147) ***
0.376 (0.243) *
0.015 (0.036)
0.006 (0.154)
0.046 (0.220)
0.974 (0.109) ***
1.493 (0.737) **
-0.829 (0.712)
0.947 (0.597) *
-0.045 (0.100)
-0.155 (0.280)
--------0.325 (0.350)
0.116 (0.369)
0.184 (0.605)
-0.211 (0.095) **
-0.090 (0.390)
0.036 (0.068)
2.347 (0.409) ***
Evangelicals
0.705 (0.473) *
0.036 (0.508)
1.036 (0.411) ***
0.019 (0.078)
-0.280 (0.184) *
--------0.182 (0.234)
0.223 (0.250)
0.154 (0.459)
0.066 (0.064)
0.144 (0.264)
0.093 (0.037) ***
0.301 (0.238)
Disliked Groups Models
Variable
Women
Blacks
Evangelicals
Constant
Government Trust
Civic Engagement
Ideology
Female
Black
Evangelical
Born 1950s
Born 1960s
Born 1970s
Education
Divorced
Media Exposure
High Group ID
0.771 (0.192) ***
-0.829 (0.204) ***
0.140 (0.167)
0.073 (0.029) ***
-----0.005 (0.114)
-0.071 (0.092)
-0.046 (0.095)
-0.096 (0.104) **
-0.151 (0.172) *
-0.038 (0.026) *
-0.149 (0.109) *
-0.002 (0.016)
-0.170 (0.077) **
1.248 (0.376) ***
-0.927 (0.363) ***
-0.255 (0.304)
-0.020 (0.051)
0.172 (0.143)
---------0.058 (0.178)
-0.313 (0.188) **
-0.135 (0.308)
-0.044 (0.048)
-0.155 (0.199)
-0.025 (0.034)
-0.104 (0.208)
0.120 (0.266)
-0.655 (0.285) **
-0.086 (0.230)
0.126 (0.044) ***
-0.170 (0.103) **
--------0.083 (0.131)
0.053 (0.140)
-0.383 (0.258) *
-0.085 (0.036) ***
-0.349 (0.148) ***
0.028 (0.027)
0.171 (0.106) **
N = 864 (women), 191 (blacks), 365 (evangelicals)
R2 (Close Groups) = .18 (women), .19 (blacks), .07 (evangelicals)
R2 (Disliked Groups) = .05 (women), .08 (blacks), .11 (evangelicals)
23
*** p < .01, one-tailed test
** p < .05, one-tailed test
* p < .10, one-tailed test
Appendix:
Scale Components for Trust and Group Affect Measures
Civic Engagement Scale Components
1). Many people say they have less time these days to do volunteer work. What about you, were you
able to devote any time to volunteer work in the last twelve months?
2). Do you have any neighbors that you know and talk to regularly? About how many?
3). If you were selected to serve on a jury, would you be happy to do it, or would you rather not
serve?
4). In the last twelve months, have you worked with others or joined an organization in your
community to do something about some community problem?
5). Do you belong to any organizations or take part in any activities that represent the interests and
viewpoints of (Group X)?
6). Do you go to religious services more than once a week, once a week, almost every week, once or
twice a month, a few times a year, or never?
Social Trust Scale Components
1). Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?
2). Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking
out for themselves?
Government Trust Scale Components
1). How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is
right—just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or none of the time?
2). Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of
it, or don’t waste very much of it?
3). Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
4). Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many
are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?
5). How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the
people think—a good deal, some, or not much?
Groups Included in “Close Groups” and “Disliked Groups” Measures
Poor People
Blacks
Southerners
Hispanic-Americans
Asian-Americans
Labor Unions
Business People
Whites
Liberals
Feminists
Conservatives
24
Notes
A partial exception would be Dawson’s (1994) brief discussion of various possible scenarios for
future black-white relations and black social trust. Also, most scholars do include a race variable in
their social trust models, to account for the fact that blacks overall are less trusting than whites.
However, any consideration of intra-racial differences in trust (based on levels of racial
identification), or of variations in trust according to religious and gender identity, is absent in
existing scholarship.
1
This reference to “the Elect” is not meant to imply a specifically Calvinist coloration to the
argument. While this particular language comes from the Calvinist tradition, the general emphasis
on the pervasiveness of sin and depravity is common in evangelical churches of all lineages.
2
Of course, one must be careful that an ideological bias in the selection of social groups presented
does not create a spurious effect. Thus, it is important to control for respondent ideology in a
multivariate context when analyzing the effects of group identity on the number of close and
disliked groups. This precaution is taken here, and is described more fully later in the paper.
3
While more recent NES presidential election-year data (from 1996) are available, the 1992 data are
preferable for two important reasons. First, the sample is considerably larger, including 2500
respondents (vs. 1700 in 1996). This is particularly valuable in increasing the size of the African
American sub-sample. Additionally, the 1992 study has much better items on gender issues,
including various measures of feminist identification that are absent in the 1996 study. Running the
same basic models using the 1996 data confirms all of the major findings presented here, and results
are available from the author.
4
The relatively small sample size of African Americans, while common to nearly all major national
surveys, is nonetheless troublesome. One solution to this problem is to use the 1996 National Black
Election Study, with a sample of over 1000 African Americans, for analyses of black racial identity.
However, because the questions, interview contexts, and sample frames in the NES and NBES are
not directly comparable, only NES data analysis is presented here. Thus, results presented for blacks
must be seen as somewhat tentative, with large standard errors possibly attenuating significant
results.
5
It should be noted that this classification method essentially excludes blacks from being classified
as evangelicals. This is consistent with the general practice among scholars of religion and politics,
who maintain that the black church, despite some similarities in worship style with white
evangelicals, is really sui generis, deserving its own classification.
6
In both cases, the proportion of high to low identifiers is around two to one, a bit lower for
women and a bit higher for blacks.
7
In reality, however, the two concepts are closely linked. In practice, when both closeness measures
and feeling thermometer ratings are available, they can generally be used interchangeably without
substantially altering the empirical results.
8
25
For this and the other scales discussed here, all of the components used to construct the scale load
on a single factor, with all loadings at least .3, and most in the .5-.7 range.
9
With both this measure and with the “negative” tally, feelings toward the definitional membership
group itself, as well as clearly related groups, are excluded. Thus, evaluations of “blacks” are not
tallied for African Americans, and evaluations of “feminists” are omitted for female respondents.
These omissions allow for a much clearer assessment of the attitudes of strong identifiers in the
three groups in question toward genuinely “other” groups.
10
The threshold for “clear hostility” on the feeling thermometer has been (somewhat arbitrarily) set
at scores of less than 25. Choosing a different threshold (20, 35, or 50), however, does not
significantly alter the results presented in these analyses.
11
The model specification employed here borrows liberally from Brehm (1999), largely because he
models the same processes using essentially the same data. The critical difference, of course, is my
inclusion of the group identification terms in the models, and my division of the sample into three
sub-populations (women, evangelicals, and blacks).
12
The positive affect measure is equal to the the respondent’s feeling thermometer rating of the
Democratic party minus 50 (with a minimum of 0) plus the feeling thermometer rating of the
Republican party minus 50 (with a minimum of 0). The negative affect measure is equal to 50 minus
the respondent’s feeling thermometer rating of the Democratic party (with a minimum of 0) plus 50
minus the rating of the Republican party (with a minimum of 0). Thus, both scales run from 0 to
100, with 100 representing maximum affective positivity (or negativity) toward the existing political
system. This approach is very much analogous to Brehm’s (1999) measure of positivity or negativity
toward the major presidential candidates, but I believe that feelings toward parties are a somewhat
broader indicator of general affect towards the system.
13
The reason for this difference from Brehm and Rahn’s work (and the similar race-based
discrepancy to be discussed later) is not immediately apparent. It is possible that the mutually
reinforcing relationship that they find between social and government trust is driven by the white
male portion of the sample. Indeed, in my own analysis I find, like Brehm and Rahn, that there is a
positive reciprocal relationship when one examines the entire sample, and a much stronger positive
reciprocal relationship when one looks at white males only. There are many possible explanations
for this race- and gender-based discrepancy, but a thorough examination of it is beyond the scope of
this study. In any event, it is an interesting avenue for future analysis.
14
It is important to remember that these numbers represent tallies of the groups toward which the
respondent professes closeness excluding the group in question itself and clearly related groups (e.g.
women and feminists). Thus, the real differences in mean number of close groups between highand low-identifiers (at least for women and blacks) are actually greater than what is reflected in the
table, since professed closeness to women or to blacks is itself the factor used to separate strong
from weak identifiers.
15
26
This result, particularly for black women, is a bit surprising, given the fact that in general blacks
are much lower in social trust than are whites. While the other major predictive variables (civic
engagement, education, and group identity) work similarly in the social trust and group affect
models, this racial variable clearly does not. This discrepancy, however, should not distract from the
fact that the relationship between group identity and the various social trust indicators among
African Americans is consistent and strong across the two types of models.
16
The reason for this effect, and for divorce’s correspondingly negative effect on expressions of
hostility toward other groups among evangelicals, is not clear. Perhaps evangelical churches that are
more accepting of divorce also differ doctrinally and culturally in other ways, resulting in more
generally positive attitudes toward out-groups. This answer, however, is only speculative.
17
Of course, one can certainly question the implicit assumption here that social trust should be
regarded in all cases as an unalloyed good. Evangelicals, for example, might argue that cheerful
acquiescence in a morally deficient social order, or naïve confidence in people who are
fundamentally self-serving, are not goals to strive for. Likewise, black nationalists would argue that
racial identity among African Americans should result in more wariness toward the white power
structures that work to the detriment of black interests.
18
27
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