Stonehill vs diokno
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for
which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the
petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation
proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those
seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with
respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
a.
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants.
There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
c.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations
for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.
PP Vs malmstedt
F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was
tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search
warrant.
I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.
R: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited
drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport.
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Villavicencio vs lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women
whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women
were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account
of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal
damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called
upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that
he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power
to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if
the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
Ebralinag vs division superintendent of schools of cebu
Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for raising
same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan,
Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem and recite the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s
Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and
religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of
Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is
devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag
and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic
consciousness and duties of citizenship.
Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious worship
is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief
regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of
the petitioners from the school is not justified.The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing
students and teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious
profession and worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right
does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only
standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so evil
and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not
exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation
of a citizen’s right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute
ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious
beliefs is unjustified.Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND
PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end,
the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and
equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to
the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall
be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of
this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers
and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of
the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or
persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in
the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period
as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of
such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended
activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal
building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the
date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be
posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial
or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing.
Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to
the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable
length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the
participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue
interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a
public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be
conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the
following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful
activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly
may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the
rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with
the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent
under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred
(100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their
assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom
of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform
with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their
uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped
with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public
assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the
attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at
the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of
the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public
assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate,
the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the
public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith
disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he
violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed
by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a
group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit
where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first
secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for
such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the
mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the
public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public
assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor
vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately
preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years
without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to
thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this
Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
Padilla vs court of appeals
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help of a civilian
witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:
1.
.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2.
M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3.
.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal
Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under
PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4
months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals
confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor
General made a complete turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran
siguro).
Issues:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued
for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests
are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed
firearm and ammo, petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the
presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and
the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
?
Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest
in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the
right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to
seizure even without a warrant)
?
Search of moving vehicle
?
Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched
must be within arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him
were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled
jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry
the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized
from petitioner’s possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous
review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and
issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court’s incisive observation. Furthermore,
the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the
Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees
of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms
higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a
non-subversive context” and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal
possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the
penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal,
respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The
penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel
and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification
of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the
Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the
Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress
which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is
to interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the
crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty
is MODIFIED to “10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.
People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the
rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied.
Mercado Vs. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
 Dual allegiance. vs. Dual citizenship
 Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: repudiation of other citizenship
FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest
number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is
a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States
(San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding
his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground
that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any
position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and
was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when
respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
 Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office
HELD:DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in
a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by
filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in
effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any
one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION
FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating
marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant
who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During
the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be
marijuana plants.
Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of
accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the
accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the
accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the
suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was
suffering from migraine The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants.
Accused-appellant’s version of what transpired is that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995
while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a
flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises
then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only
by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the
others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the accused was valid.
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accusedappellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the
exceptions. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure
conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either
expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of
the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the
unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily
armed.
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be
present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified
were seizure of evidence without further search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises without the
latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant
on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view"
of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence
against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The
NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted surveillance and
barged into accused-appellant's residence.