Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons

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Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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Reeta Tremblay, Associate Professor
Julian Schofield, Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science D-103
Concordia University
1455 deMaisonneuve W.
Mtl, PQ, H3G 1M8
Canada
(514) 848-2108
[email protected]
[email protected]
Abstract:
As indicated by the continuing strife both over and within Jammu & Kashmir (hereafter
Kashmir), India’s principal security challenge in the coming decade is disentangling its
nuclear relationship with Pakistan from threats to Kashmir. The Dras-Kargil clash in
June-July of 1999 is a serious empirical puzzle: mostly Western concepts of orthodox and
existential deterrence assert that states armed with nuclear weapons are fearful of the
consequences of escalation, and therefore avoid open conflict. Pakistan is not behaving in
accordance with the expectations of either theory. Nor does the stability-instability
paradox capture Indian responses to Pakistani provocation. We argue that without
incorporating the domestic decision-making process within Pakistan, current theories of
nuclear deterrence cannot explain the Dras-Kargil conflict of May-July 1999. The paper
concludes that for India to maintain regional stability, it could seek a flexible response
strategy that requires nuclear conventionalization. Fortunately, India appears to have
opted for a more conservative and we believe, responsible strategy.
1
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict over
Kashmir
As indicated by the continuing strife both over and within Jammu & Kashmir
(hereafter Kashmir), India’s principal security challenge in the coming decade is
disentangling its nuclear relationship with Pakistan from threats to Kashmir. The DrasKargil clash in June-July of 1999 is a serious empirical puzzle: mostly Western concepts
of orthodox and existential deterrence assert that states armed with nuclear weapons are
fearful of the consequences of escalation, and therefore avoid open conflict.1 Pakistan is
not behaving in accordance with the expectations of either theory. Nor does the stabilityinstability paradox explain Pakistani aggressiveness. Pakistan, unlike India’s other
nuclear neighbor China, is faced with domestic political contradictions that give it
enormous incentive to repeatedly confront India under the seemingly protective umbrella
of its nuclear arsenal. We argue that without incorporating the domestic decision-making
process within Pakistan, current theories of nuclear deterrence cannot explain the DrasKargil conflict of May-July 1999. We suggest that military and civilian governments are
at their most dangerous when they are hybridized --neither purely civilian nor purely
military. While the pure military regimes understand the costs of escalation of conflict
into a war and the civilian governments tend to perceive a clear threshold between war
and peace, the hybrid regimes are based on logrolling the interests of the several
components of the coalition where the lesser interests are sacrificed for core interests
aimed at maintaining regime solidarity. In order to realize the dual requirements of such
regimes –maintenance of domestic legitimacy and familiarity with the exercise of force,
the hybrid coalitions are prone to the use of military force to resolve security issues of
domestic symbolic importance and in the process, rapidly escalate these into war. The
Dras-Kargil war is one such instance of escalation by a hybridized coalition of militarycivilian-intelligence in Pakistan, the others being the 1947 and 1965 Indo-Pakistan
conflicts relating to Kashmir. In all these instances, Pakistan was able to exploit India’s
reluctance to escalate disputes and India’s determination to act responsibly within the
region.
Part one of the paper outlines the theoretical puzzle, and part two demonstrates
the shortcoming of existing explanations of nuclear deterrence. The three subsequent
parts provide a civil-military relations theory, outline Pakistani deterrence, and explain
the various Pakistani interventions in Kashmir, including the Dras-Kargil operation. The
paper concludes with a summary of theoretical points and argues that to maintain
regional stability, it could be advantageous for India to seek a flexible response strategy
that requires nuclear conventionalization. If successful, this approach could significantly
contain further conventional conflicts and enhance military stability in the region. This
would entail sending a clear message to Pakistan that the threshold of Indian nuclear
response has been lowered. This, however, would entail a higher risk of nuclearizing any
conflict. Fortunately, India appears to have opted for more conservative and we believe, a
2
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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responsible strategy. India is apparently prepared to incur the cost of higher volatility in
terms of conventional warfare in order to minimize the risk of a nuclear confrontation.
As well, the Indian government is providing both Pakistan and the international
community an unambiguous evidence of its firm commitment to maintain a nuclear
capability for emphatically defensive purposes.
I. The puzzle – what happened at Kargil?
A useful theory that captures the logic of nuclear deterrence in South Asia would
have to be able to explain the events surrounding the Kargil encounter between India and
Pakistan in May-July of 1999. The conflict itself was over an issue of significant
symbolic value, conducted with widespread public support in Pakistan. The infiltrators
included a mixed group of approximately battalion to brigade-sized (500-2,000
personnel) Pakistani military personnel (including elements of nine Northern Light
Battalions and two Frontier Forces), domestic religious fundamentalists, and mujaheddin,
not including regular military support personnel. These include Afghani and international
Muslim militants, including Al Badr backed by Osama bin Laden, in turn supported by
Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).2
The goal of the operation appeared to be to seize a portion of easily defensible
territory in the Dras, Kaksar and Mushkoh valley, and Batalik sectors, whose location
overlooking the strategic Srinagar-Leh 1A Highway would compel the Indian security
forces to counter-attack and thereby bear the costs of exposed assault in unfavorable
terrain. It is less plausible that Kargil was a failed attempt at deeper infiltration into
Kashmir. Its proximity to the Line of Control indicated that either the Pakistani military
was unconcerned with the consequences of escalation, or that the operation was
dependent on logistical support.
If the fear of unintended escalation to nuclear war engenders caution, then why
did Pakistan permit the deployment of infiltrators in the most escalatory fashion possible?
This is a puzzle that cannot be solved by any current theory of nuclear deterrence.
II. The logics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia
Orthodox deterrence
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests, followed
shortly thereafter by Pakistani tests on May 28 and 30. For most observers, this marked a
major transformation of the Indo-Pakistani security competition that had plagued the
region for over fifty years.3 The principal benefit of nuclear tests, according to orthodox
deterrence theory, should have been the strengthening of deterrence and a reduction in
hostilities, with a consequent reduced likelihood of war.4 According to Richard Betts,
“altogether, the greatest consensus would be that capabilities for mutual destruction do
not absolutely preclude war but radically reduce the odds, and that deliberate initiation of
armed conflict against a nuclear power on behalf of lesser interests than core territorial
3
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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security is almost unthinkable…”5 Nuclear weapons have a crystal ball effect that makes
states aware of the cost of confrontation: nuclear weapons can cause tremendous
devastation, the political implications of which tend to be quite clear to decision-makers.
And since a dispute, however small, may escalate to the level of a nuclear war, there is a
pervasive fear that engenders caution between nuclear rivals.6
Nuclear war is nonetheless possible: nuclear weapons may actually invite a
preventive or preemptive war if they are not secured against a first strike. In fact, the
traditional incentive for a preemptive attack is to make use of one’s own nuclear arsenal
either before it becomes vulnerable to an attack from another’s arsenal, or if an enemy
attack is imminent so as to decrease the overall strength of its force. 7 Between two firststrike nuclear forces, the ‘reciprocal fear of nuclear attack’ is an incentive to attack first.8
However, states with a second-strike capability (nuclear arsenals that can survive to
retaliate even if they are struck first) deter attack because they guarantee retaliation so
costly that it would outweigh any conceivable political benefit.
Accordingly, Pakistan should be exercising great restraint in their Kashmir
dispute because of the fear of escalation to a nuclear war.9 They should be equally
concerned about a surprise disarming attack. Two probable paths of escalation to nuclear
war in South Asia are the widening of a conflict over a minor dispute, such as Kashmir,
or if a dispute somehow becomes viewed as a core interest linked to the survival of the
state.10 Under these circumstances the rivals may lose sight of the fact that the value of
any political objective, other than the survival of the state, is outweighed by the
tremendous international costs of using nuclear weapons.11
However, orthodox deterrence theory is unable to explain both the seeming
disregard Pakistan has shown for the fear of escalation in their confrontation and fighting
over Kashmir, and the absence of any disarming attack. Despite the nascence of secondstrike arsenals, it is plausible that preemptive attacks have not occurred in South Asia for
the simple reason that the paucity of nuclear forces relative to possible targets, wide
landscapes, large conventional forces, and the uncertain location of these nuclear
weapons, some of which may soon be attached to mobile tactical forces like the Prithvi
battalions, give little incentive for a first strike.12 While fixed facilities that produce
nuclear weapons are both identified and within reach of each other’s missiles, the
location of the weapons themselves is not.13
Existential deterrence
A second line of argumentation is that even if states do not possess a secure
second-strike capability, the threat that just a few nuclear weapons would survive a
disarming first strike should deter an attacker by consideration of the damage they would
inflict on its cities. An existential deterrence strategy is one in which a state is ambiguous
about the possession, deployment, and doctrine of its nuclear forces. This generates
uncertainty in its rival about the precise threshold of nuclear use, and is intended both to
weaken the intensity of nuclear confrontation, and to instill restraint in an adversary by
increasing the fears of escalation.
4
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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Scholars of South Asian security have affirmed the applicability of existential
nuclear deterrence to the case of Indo-Pakistani security: even after the tests it is unclear
where and how many warheads have been deployed.14 They argue that even without
second-strike capabilities, opaque (ambiguous) and existential (weapons-capable)
deterrents are just as effective at reducing the likelihood of war.15 Kenneth Waltz has
argued that preemption of an opaque deterrent is only conceivable if “…the would-be
attacker knows that the intended victim’s warheads are few in number, knows their exact
number and locations, and knows that they will not be moved or fired before they are
struck. To know all of these things, and to know that you know them for sure, is
exceedingly difficult.”16 Devin Hagerty posits that it is the uncertainty inherent in that
relationship that minimizes the importance of the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.17
Consequently, the small nuclear arsenals in South Asia should be good punitive
deterrents because of the relative vulnerabilities of the cities in India and Pakistan and the
relative ease of hiding the warheads.18 Leaders therefore resist the temptation of
decapitation attacks that typically characterize preemptive damage-limiting nuclear
strategies. The logic of existential deterrence would predict that small doctrinallyunarticulated arsenals deter conflict by threatening unpredictable escalation. However, by
itself, existential deterrence fails to account for the lack of restraint demonstrated by
Pakistan in their confrontation over Kargil.
The stability-instability paradox
Orthodox deterrence theory holds that even the slightest threat of escalation to
nuclear war is a sufficient incentive against the initiation of conflict.19 It was for this
reason that the United States and the Soviet Union were so reluctant to become directly
militarily engaged during the Cold War. Nuclear weapons deter war in part because of
their potential for destruction, but mostly because once a war has begun, the participants
may quickly lose control of the escalation process. One critic, Kenneth Boulding, has
argued that this unmeasured and uncontrollable threat of escalation is vital to the
functioning of effective deterrence: “…if [deterrence] were really stable… it would cease
to deter. If the probability of nuclear weapons going off were zero, they would not deter
anybody.”20 Steve Fetter has argued that the confidence placed in existential deterrence in
South Asia is similarly dysfunctional: a nuclear balance managed so perfectly that it
eliminates the possibility of escalation undermines the restraint to engage in non-nuclear
forms of warfare.21
According to Šumit Ganguly, “in a sense, we are seeing a variant of Glenn
Snyder’s famous ‘stability/instability’ paradox [in South Asia]. Stability at the level of
nuclear weapons prevents the outbreak of full-scale war while permitting both sides to
engage in low-level conflict.”22 The logic behind the stability-instability paradox is that
when both states in a rivalry possess nuclear weapons, they cancel out the deterrent effect
of each other’s arsenals. 23 For Snyder, deterrence (against nuclear war) is stable when
“…neither side can, by executing a counterforce first-strike, reduce the opponent’s
retaliation to ‘acceptable’ proportions.”24 By this definition, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear
stand-off is stable because neither side can reduce the other’s nuclear arsenal sufficiently
5
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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to successfully prevent a retaliatory strike. However, Snyder warns that “…if neither side
has a ‘full first-strike capability,’ and both know it, they will be less inhibited about
initiating conventional war, and about the limited use of nuclear weapons, than if the
strategic balance were unstable.”25 The stability-instability paradox implies that Pakistani
and Indian nuclear weapons are politically irrelevant because neither side can threaten
without being threatened in turn. This is believed to permit a gradual escalation of
conflict short of the threshold where nuclear arms are used for last resort.
There are two problems with the stability-instability paradox, the first theoretical
and the second empirical. First, attempts to contain escalation demonstrate a fundamental
misunderstanding of its uncontrollable aspects. Robert Jervis, a proponent of orthodox
deterrence thought, criticizes both Snyder and Boulding for proposing that the mutual
influence of nuclear weapons can be cancelled. First, Jervis argues that their hypotheses
rest on the assumption of perfect information, which is unrealistic. Pakistan simply does
not have the level of certainty necessary to make fear of escalation irrelevant. Derived
from this is his second criticism, which is that escalation can therefore not be controlled.
It seems intuitively obvious that if there is crisis stability, neither side can
credibly threaten to start an all-out nuclear war in response to a limited
provocation. But this misstates the situation. It would be an accurate
formulation if levels of violence were hermetically sealed off from each
other, if undesired escalation were impossible. In fact, most statesmen
realize that whenever violence is set in motion, no one can be sure where
it will end up. Because events can readily escape control, limited
responses carry with them some probability that the final, although
unintended, result will be all out war. A state that begins a confrontation
or responds to one invokes what Schelling called ‘the threat that leaves
something to chance.’ What then brings pressure to bear on the adversary
– and on the state as well – is less the immediate product of the action than
the fear of where both states could end up.26
According to Jervis, “because escalation can occur although no one wants it to,
mutual second-strike capability does not make the world safe for major provocations and
limited wars.”27 In effect, Jervis agrees with Boulding’s observation that the ‘threat that
leaves something to chance’ in the process of escalation is what produces deterrence, but
disagrees that this element of ‘chance’ can be sufficiently estimated as to be
manageable.28 The stability-instability paradox, by its own logic, does not produce a
stable conflict. The second, empirical, objection is that were the stability-instability
paradox operative in the Kashmir dispute, permitting combat without fear of escalation,
Pakistan would still be deterred by India’s conventional superiority. All the evidence
indicates that Pakistan demonstrated less concern for escalation than India, which belies
the predicted outcomes of all three of the aforementioned nuclear deterrence theories.
A hint to solution of this puzzle lies in a similar clash between Chinese and Soviet
forces on March 2, 1969. Staring shortly after China’s detonation of its nuclear device on
October 16, 1964, there was a sharp increase in the number of border incidents with the
6
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
-7-
Soviet Union, totaling some 4,189 by 1969. Amidst the domestic disorder of the Cultural
Revolution, on March 2, 1969, units of the People’s Liberation Army ambushed and
destroyed a platoon to company sized formation of the Soviet army on Hei Hsia Tzu
Island near the city of Khabarovsk. Clashes continued until March 15 by which time
regimental sized Soviet units were engaged in heavy bombardment of Chinese positions
and Beijing decided to step down the escalation.29 The prerequisite for the border clashes
was an existential Chinese nuclear deterrent, but it was the onset of domestic discord and
its resulting ambiguity in civil-military relations that was sufficient for the dispute to
escalate to a dangerous border war.
Similarly, the prevailing evidence indicates that the Kargil Operation, much like
the Sino-Soviet case of 1969, as well as the October 1947 (Op Gulmarg) and August
1965 (Op Gibraltar) Pakistani assaults, was conducted neither by an independent civilian
authority nor exclusively through the official military chain of command. Rather, it was
planned and implemented by a hybrid logrolled coalition of civilian and military officers,
with all of its attendant decision-making dysfunctions. Furthermore, Pakistan’s most
recent involvement in Kashmir coincides with the development of its nuclear weapons
capability in the late-1980s. To this we turn to next.
III. Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Deterrence
Military professionals, whether in or out of government, are more likely to
correctly perceive the dangers of escalation to nuclear war than are civilian decisionmakers. This is entirely the result of the professional bias of the armed forces grounded
within their institutional structures and their methods of planning. For the purposes of this
study, a militarized government is one in which the armed forces rule a state directly,
exclusively, and provide policy guidelines for constitutional, external, and war-making
affairs.30 Within this definition, there may be an intervening organization, such as a
subordinate civil bureaucracy, or a military bureau responsible for civil affairs, that
isolates the military planning from the martial law functions of the armed forces.
However, if the intervening organization is an autonomous ideological party, a nonmilitary political elite, or if the influence of the armed forces is limited to veto powers
only, then the government is of a hybrid variety that manifests a very different type of
foreign policy.31
Traditional militarization theory argues that, as the armed forces increase their
influence in government, because of an increase in their capabilities, the state becomes
more likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy that can lead to war. 32 “…[T]he
presence of military capabilities means participation in decision making by officials
responsible for those capabilities, who are likely to urge or endorse the use of force and
who regard it as a proper and feasible step.”33 The conventional wisdom, at least, is that
military leaders are more likely to endorse war mainly because they are more familiar
with that policy instrument.34 This would, however, wrongly predict times of greater
peace under civilian governments and an increasingly provocative foreign policy under a
military government, which does not fit the case of Pakistan’s involvement in Kargil.
However, while there is evidence of covariance between states with high per
7
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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capita defense spending and conflict35, the current social science literature does not
indicate that non-democratic regimes, in all their variants, including military regimes, are
more conflict prone than democratic regimes as a whole (there are no statistically
significant findings that indicate as much).36 Although there are as yet no direct large-n
inferential studies on military versus non-military regime types per se, we believe that
non-democracies are a legitimate surrogate for military regime behavior given their
shared reliance on narrow decision-making processes and state-directed coercion.
Furthermore, the conventional wisdom that democracies are restrained by a population
that must bear the burden of war, is offset by the recurring rally-around-the-flag effect
that occurs within democracies during crises.37
Betts and Samuel Huntington have found that in constitutional governments,
particularly in the United States, military decision-makers tend to advise caution rather
than adventurism. Huntington argues that the soldier “…will always argue that the danger
of war requires increased armaments; he will seldom argue that increased armaments
make war practical or desirable.”38 The principal reason for this, he contends, is that war
increases rather than decreases the threats to a state’s security, and this is an outlook
common to the militaries of states as dissimilar as Imperial Germany, Communist Russia,
and the United States. The military also has an institutional motive for self-preservation
that tends to emphasize the accumulation of power rather than the execution of its
function, even where the two are linked. Consequently, militaries tend to oppose
adventurist foreign polices except where they are linked to averting future threats to core
strategic interests, such as densely-populated territory.39 In the normal policy process, the
military’s reluctance to recommend war is a function of the awareness of the political
constraints within which military leaders have to operate.40 Under these circumstances,
military leaders within a civilian decision-making structure are actually less likely to
recommend war as an option than the civilians themselves.41 In fact, the US Army Chiefs
of Staff have historically been more reluctant to recommend force than their civilian
counterparts, particularly over US intervention in Laos in 1961, Jordan in 1970, and the
Taiwan Straits in 1954.42
Military regimes have two pertinent distinctions from their civilian counterparts.
Betts has noted, first, that although military leaders are no more hawkish than their
civilian counterparts in recommending intervention, and sometimes less so, they are far
more likely to recommend a rapid escalation once they perceive hostilities are underway.
“Generals prefer using force quickly, massively, and decisively to destroy enemy
capabilities rather than rationing it gradually to coax the enemy to change his
intentions.”43 This bias has its origins in the military-type of organizational decisionmaking whose hierarchical design ensures quick responses under chronic environmental
uncertainty, but within parameters familiar to the military.44 Once an outbreak of war
occurs, not to deploy the totality of forces violates the advantages inherent in the use of a
concentration of force, thereby decreasing the chances for victory, and increasing both
the duration and the costs of conflict. Rapid escalation is therefore the natural bias of
military institutions.45
Consequently, military planners are less prone to see a conceptual break between
peace and war, and instead view periods of peace as the preparation for war. The
8
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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predisposition to view a seamless path from preparation for war to a conflict in which all
resources are deployed within war, also makes military planners more sensitive to the
implications of escalation, including its high costs.46 Not perceiving the threshold
between peace and war as clearly as civilians, military leaders are less likely to be
deceived by the imaginary thresholds against escalation inherent in the stabilityinstability paradox.
Pure military regimes operating under a nuclear umbrella are the least escalatory
in the context of a nuclear stand-off. Military regimes have an inculcated appreciation of
the effects of escalation, and are therefore unlikely to permit the pursuit of strategies
predicated upon the stability-instability paradox. The stability-instability paradox
therefore holds less substance for military governments because by eliminating the
effects of nuclear weapons, the Pakistani armed forces would thereby face the prospects
of a superior Indian military.
In contrast, civilians are more likely to perceive a clear threshold between peace
and war for the principal reason that war is beyond their professional competence and, in
the event of war, its conduct is largely surrendered to the military establishment.
Civilians are therefore more likely to escalate a dispute below the war threshold than
military decision-makers, although they tend to defer escalation within war to the
competencies of military leaders. A threshold between a mutually desirable and
undesirable outcome, such as war, may also act as a point of salience around which state
decision-makers adopt strategies designed to undermine the commitments of their
adversaries. This is precisely the behavior predicted by the stability-instability paradox.
A second distinction is over the types of disputes in which regimes participate.
Military governments, because of an increased sensitivity to the balance of capabilities
with an adversary, are less likely to concede losses over strategic matters (those that have
long-term implications for the survival of the state, as opposed to disputes over symbolic
issues) than civilian governments.47 The concern for streamlined decision-making
inadvertently imposes a military interpretation upon all events, insulates military regimes
from their populations and impedes the upward flow of information.48 Military
governments are therefore less sensitive to domestic issues that have symbolic
importance because the nature of their governance renders them relatively isolated from
popular politics.49 In contrast, civilian governments are more likely to take action on an
inter-state dispute that has symbolic importance because they have a greater short-term
dependence than military leaders on popular support. Whereas a military government
may stave off unpopularity using coercive means, the same alternatives are less available
to civilian governments.
The residual outcome is the hybridized venture, a product of either civilian or
military regimes, in which the preferences of both are represented. 50 Hybrids are policy
coalitions of select civilian and military members who logroll their interests in order to
aggregate their influence to obtain a common goal. These are neither purely civilian nor
military regimes. In a logrolled coalition, lesser preferences tend to be sacrificed for core
interests in order to maintain solidarity. Hybrid ventures are likely under civilian regimes
when core military strategic interests are either satisfied or remain unthreatened, and
civilian interests, typically symbolic political issues, are under pressure for resolution.
9
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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Hybrid ventures are especially likely under military regimes when the legitimacy of the
regime comes under pressure, typically after it has been in power for sometime and its
initial favor with the public has worn out. Hybrid ventures are dangerous because they
desensitize military decision-makers to the threats of escalation by their close association
with civilian symbolic issues.
This theory predicts that a nuclear-armed and deterred military government would
therefore show greater restraint in comparison with a similarly-armed and deterred
civilian government. This prediction is consistent with the apparent behavior of
Pakistan’s military government following the coup of 12th October 1999, and in its
failure to exploit the availability of a nuclear shield from 1987 to 1990, especially during
the 1987 Brasstacks Exercise. However, it also indicates that military and civilian
governments are at their most dangerous when they are hybridized for the purposes of
maintaining legitimacy. In these circumstances, there result regimes that are prone to the
use of military force to resolve issues of domestic symbolic importance, and then to
rapidly escalate these disputes to war.
This precisely describes Pakistan. Its chronic economic underdevelopment and
unresolved legitimacy issues has led to an oscillation of civilian and military
governments each desperately in search of legitimacy. Periods of absolute military rule in
Pakistan have been few: 1958 until the early 1960s; 1970 to 1971; 1977 to the early
1980s; and since 1999. At all times, therefore, the military are prone to escalate rapidly
disputes perceived as protecting core interests, such as the threat to the Pir Panjal in April
of 1948, the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, or the loss of the Haji Pir Pass in August 1965.
Since 1953, civilian governments have had to grant considerable autonomy to the
military, and the resulting hybrid governments have predominated throughout the 1960s
and from the late-1980s to the military coup.
Pakistan’s military is typically most secure immediately after its seizure of power,
when it has made the fewest concessions to civilian and domestic concerns in order to
shore up its eroding public legitimacy. Pakistan is generally most secure and least
militarily violent under a strong civilian government, a condition that has only held true
before 1953, less so until 1958, and between 1971 and 1977. Pakistan is least secure in
periods of hybridized governments where civilian and military governments lean on each
other for legitimacy. It is during these periods that the military leadership may believe it
is expedient to commit their forces to ventures associated with symbolic domestic issues,
such as Kashmir, to the detriment of core security issues, such as restraint opposite a
preponderant India. This indicates two danger zones for any state: during periods of
civilian rule in which the military has considerable praetorian influence, and in periods
after the initial honeymoon period is over following a military seizure of political power.
IV. Pakistan and Nuclear Deterrence
Cosmetically, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is identical to China’s. According to
Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, “Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding
principle of our nuclear strategy...”51 In practice, however, nuclear weapons are viewed
very differently. In Pakistan, the utility of nuclear arms cannot be separated from its
10
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
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historic dispute over the status of Kashmir. From its foundation in 1947, Pakistan’s
foreign policy has been preoccupied with securing allies and obtaining arms. The army in
Pakistan has always had a dual role: to ensure the security of Pakistan from Indian
encroachment, and to provide the shield behind which Pakistan can pursue nonconventional strategies to secure Kashmir. This latter role was played by the Pakistan
Army in October 1947 during the First Kashmir War, during 1963-65 in the period
preceding the 1965 War, and from the late-1980s into the 1990s. While Pakistan’s arsenal
has changed dramatically in fifty years – from propeller interceptors to nuclear arms, the
underlying strategy has remained constant, and its nuclear manifestation is demonstrated
in the assumptions of the stability-instability paradox.52
The history of the Indo-Pakistani conflict indicates a Pakistani propensity to select
strategies that circumvent India’s superior military capability, thus under-the-wire
operations intended to weaken India’s levels of commitment and to exploit its reluctance
to escalate disputes. Attempts by Pakistan to isolate its conflicts below the level of an
inter-state war are evident in its proxy intervention in Kashmir in October 1947, and
again in April 1948, in covert operations in Kashmir throughout the late-1950s to early1960s, to Operation Gibraltar, which ultimately triggered the 1965 War, and again in
May of 1999. Pakistan has most often relied on third-party or allied threats of
intervention, particularly US and China, to restrain Indian escalation.
A surprisingly similar case to the Dras-Kargil encounter, and conventional
equivalent of the stability-instability paradox, was Pakistan’s medium-intensity
insurgency in Kashmir in August of 1965. The attack was made possible in part because,
with US military hardware including the M48 Patton tank and F-104 Starfighter
interceptor, and friendship with China, Pakistan believed itself strong enough to deter any
conventional Indian attack through the Punjab.53 More specifically, it was believed that
the respective Indian and Pakistani armored divisions would cancel each other out,
thereby permitting sub-conventional warfare to take place in Kashmir. The preceding
Rann of Kutch dispute in March-April 1965, which had little strategic or symbolic
political value except as a demonstration of Pakistani commitment to resisting
encroachment, permitted a demonstration of this superiority (interpreted as an Indian
reluctance to escalate because of conventional military inferiority to Pakistan) and
increased confidence within Pakistan of the incredulity of Indian warnings of
retaliation.54 It thereafter felt sufficiently secure to permit a hybrid venture of military and
civilian interests to capitalize on the symbolic issue of Kashmir. On August 5th, 7,000
Pakistani insurgents were infiltrated into Indian-occupied Kashmir. But, by the third
week of August, the operation had failed disastrously, and after a number of limited
moves and countermoves, open warfare erupted by September 6th. The 1965 defeat had
indicated to Pakistani decision-makers its inferior conventional strength to India, and it
was this altered perception that drove subsequent escalatory restraint during its 1971
conflict. Not until an Indian attack was actually underway in East Pakistan, in lateNovember, did President Yahya Khan permit ‘preemptive strikes’ against Indian bases,
and even then, except for selective operations in Kashmir (The Chhamb), there was no
authorization of counter-offensive operations from West Pakistan.
11
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 12 -
Wars in 1965 and 1971 indicated to Pakistan that, if sufficiently provoked, India
could not be deterred either by the great powers or by the threat of conventional war. This
realization drove the 1972 decision by Prime Minister Bhutto to secure a nuclear arsenal.
From 1974 to 1987, Pakistan’s fear of escalation with a militarily superior and nuclearcapable India deterred the incitement of Kashmir and other dormant disputes. This is
indicated by Pakistan’s increasingly overt reference to nuclear weapons capability
through the 1987 Indian Brasstacks Exercise, the 1990 and 1993 crises, and the military
exercise in 1998.55
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan in the late-1980s to early 1990s
does not mark, therefore, a qualitative change in Pakistani strategy in Kashmir. Rather,
nuclear weapons permitted Pakistan to re-open the Kashmir question with substantial
assistance in equipment, training, and planning to local insurgents. Pakistan had
internalized the lessons of the 1965 misadventure in Kashmir into an understanding of its
opportunities for action within the context of a nuclear stability-instability paradox. Many
Pakistani civilian leaders believe that nuclear weapons provide it a fairly wide zone of
safety within which Pakistan can deploy both low and medium-intensity forces into
Kashmir with confidence that India would not engage in a symmetrical escalation.
V. Pakistan, Nuclear Weapons, and Kashmir
Pakistan’s intervention at Dras-Kargil was the result of a hybridized regime: a
civil-military coalition in which the popular interest in Kashmir was translated into
military policy. Strongly civilian (1949-1958) and military regimes (1958-1962) tended
instead to relegate Kashmir to international fora for arbitration, such as with the United
Nations.56
Op Gulmarg, the Pakistani operation to seize Kashmir in October of 1947, was a
plan formulated by the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Akbar Khan in
August-September 1947.57 The planning was conducted through segments of the military
but without consultation through the military chain of command to General Headquarters,
due in no small part to the fact that key positions were held by British officers, including
the post of Army chief.58 The British officers did not consider an independent Kashmir a
threat to Pakistan, and were therefore resistant to getting involved. The First Kashmir
War began when a tribal invasion of over 5,000 Muslisms, augmented, without official
military (GHQ) authorization, by Pakistani military advisors and officers, sought to
overrun Srinagar on October 20, 1947.59 It was only later, in April 1948, when Indian
troops were threatening conquest of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the Pir Panjal Range
that Pakistan’s British Army chief, General Gracey, obtained civilian permission to
advance the main force elements of the Pakistan army into Kashmir.60
Operation Gibraltar, the second Pakistani attempt to seize Kashmir in August of
1965, was developed without consultation with General Headquarters. Rather, it was
planned by the Kashmir Publicity Committee, established between January and March of
1964, under the influence of a civilian, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto.61 The Committee comprised
the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs (Aziz Ahmed Malik, also the Chairman), Defence, the
Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Chief of General Staff and the Director of Military
12
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 13 -
Operations, though these latter were excluded from the planning of Op Gibraltar itself.62
The Committee’s first sabotage operation in Kashmir in mid-1964, directed by Pakistan’s
military intelligence service without consultation with GHQ, was a failure.
Aside from Bhutto, other strong supporters of further infiltration into Kashmir
included the Foreign Secretary, and the Pakistani commander in Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir, Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, Commander if the 12th Infantry Division,
who himself had close ties with domestic constituents in the region, and ultimately was
given the responsibility for planning Op Gibraltar by Ayub Khan.63 The Director of
Military Operations, General Gul Hassan, and the GHQ, were excluded from the
planning of Op Gibraltar.64 Consequently, the Chief of the General Staff and sitting
member of the Committee, General Malik Sher Bahadur, cautioned against Operation
Gibraltar.65
Ayub Khan reviewed the plans for Operation Gibraltar, prepared by General
Malik, at Murree on 13 May 1965.66 It was at this meeting that Ayub Khan tasked GHQ
with new military plans, but he did not link these operations in any systematic way.67
According to General Mohammad Musa, “We [GHQ] never accepted the assessment of
the Foreign Office that India would not cross the international borders as a result of
Operation Gibraltar.”68 He recommended that the operation be postponed until proper
arrangements could be made for guerilla warfare, such as the raising of two new
divisions, but was rejected by Bhutto.69 As a precaution for war it believed inevitable,
GHQ did proceed with a reorganization of some of its key units, including the formation
of the under-strength 6th Armoured Division from the organic armored units in the
infantry division.70
Altaf Gauhar has complained, “How could Ayub authorise a major military
operation based on the same flawed pattern [as the operations in early 1964]?”71 Again,
Pakistani intelligence had not consulted local leaders.72 According to Gul Hassan, the
Corps Commanders were not informed, and would likely have rejected Operation
Gibraltar.73 Even the Air Force was excluded from deliberations and planning.74 Op
Gibraltar, which ultimately included the infiltration of 7,000 Special Service Group and
volunteers into Kashmir in August 1965, failed dramatically and triggered the escalation
that led to the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
In contrast, the Rann of Kutch dispute, distinct from Kashmir, was viewed by the
Pakistan military within the context of Indian encroachment along the Indus River valley,
and therefore of strategic value.75 Consequently, the Rann of Kutch border war in April
of 1965 was under the close direction of GHQ, almost to the exclusion of the civilian
authorities.76 Neither Bhutto nor the foreign office was solicited and therefore could not
inform Ayub Khan that, as a consequence of Pakistani actions in the Rann, the U.S.
would impose an embargo, which it did shortly thereafter.77 Although Ayub had warned
General Mohammad Musa to restrain his brigadiers, the commander on site, General
Tikka Khan, the commander in the battle, falsified the timing of his initial sitreps because
he believed that the government would prematurely call for a cease-fire for fear of
escalation.78 The Rann of Kutch episode indicated that the military was favorable to a
plan of confrontation with India that made use of its perceived tactical advantage in
armored strength, and that this did not include Kashmir.
13
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 14 -
Similar to Op Gibraltar, the 1999 Dras-Kargil operation was more likely the
product of a hybrid military-civilian-intelligence coalition including military factions that
did not necessarily receive approval for their operations through GHQ in Rawalpindi.
Claims that the military’s coup against the Sharif government were linked to the latter’s
termination of the Kargil operation are less convincing than Sharif’s preceding and more
general interference with the military’s autonomy.79 These included the forced
resignation of Army chief Jahangir Karamat a year earlier, and the replacement of
General Pervaiz Musharraf on October 12, 2000 by General Ziauddin.80 The subsequent
arrest of Lt.Gen. Khawaja Ziauddin, the chief of ISI (inter-service intelligence) and the
most likely director of operations in Kargil, for cooperating with Sharif in an attempt to
displace Musharraf, indicates that there were serious policy differences between
Musharraf and Ziauddin, and more generally GHQ and the intelligence services over
Kashmir.
On the civilian side it appears that President Nawaz Sharif had approved of the
operation in order to placate both his Muslim League Party and the influential
fundamentalist Jama'at party who were pushing him for action on Kashmir.81 He may
have logrolled on this policy with Pakistan’s influential military intelligence services,
which have an institutional interest and investment in the operations in Kashmir. Whether
Sharif initiated the plans or whether he responded favorably to plans presented to him by
the ISI remains unclear, but his ignorance of the operation is unlikely and has since been
refuted by members of his own political party.82 All of Lt. Gen. Ziauddin, the Director
General of ISI, lt. Gen. (Retd) Javed Nasir, the principal adviser to Nawaz Sharif on
intelligence matters who was himself the Director General of the ISI during Nawaz's first
tenure, and Brig. (Retd), Imtiaz, principal Adviser, Internal Security, who was himself
Director of the Intelligence Bureau during Nawaz Sharif's first tenure, were all handpicked by Nawaz after the resignation of Gen. Jehangir Karamat as the army chief.83
It is equally unlikely that Musharraf was unaware of the operation, though GHQ
may indeed have been excluded in the planning or authorization of it. Sharif is probably
not exaggerating, though, when he claims the Pakistan Air Force, Navy, and Corps
commanders were not notified of the operation.84 Musharraf had commanded several
battalions of the SSG over a period of seven years, making it very likely that he was
familiar with the planning characteristics of infiltration operations in Kashmir. He was
also appointed Director of Military Operations, indicating complete familiarity with all
Pakistani war plans. However, the conversation recorded by India’s Research and
Analysis Wing indicates involvement in the execution of the operation by Musharraf and
his Chief of the General Staff, Lt.Gen Mohammad Aziz, but not its origin or
authorization.85 He had certainly stated his support for continued support of the
insurgents, as indicated by him during his visit to the Siachen on January 29, 1999. 86
However, there is no indication that he took the nuclear tests to indicate any new
opportunity for action, or certainly not credence in the stability-instability paradox.
According to Brian Cloughley, “ [Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Pervez]
Musharraf has never been a nuclear hawk. As a soldier he realizes more than most the
terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange.”87 Musharraf must have succeeded in his
December 1998 request to place nuclear weapons under the reorganized authority of the
14
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 15 -
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), headed by himself.88 However, similar to 1947
and 1965, the Pakistan army did not seem united: much as Malik had commanded the
infiltrators in Op Gibraltar for Asyub, so GOC Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA)
was made overall in-charge of operations in the Kargil sector in 1999. It is unclear from
the evidence whether Musharraf was as removed from the operation as Generals Gracey
and Musa had been in 1947 and 1965 respectively, or whether he had actively planned it.
Musharraf’s professional difference with Ziauddin, the ISI chief, may have
indicated a deeper divide. The Pakistani intelligence community had a vested interest in
Kashmir and a deep involvement in domestic Pakistani politics. If preceeding operations
are taken to animate gaps in the Kargil operation, then the ISI had a large role to play in
the Kargil operation. However, while it had withheld less under Sharif than the Bhutto
regime, even Bhutto had faced the option of a Kargil-like operation.89 Benazir Bhutto
admits that an operation similar to Kargil was proposed (but not by whom) under her
tenure as Prime Minister but that a policy committee concluded that while Kargil could
be captured by force, it could not be diplomatically held, and the plan was therefore
discarded.90 Most Western intelligence sources suggest that the Kargil infiltration was an
operation conceived, planned and executed by the ISI under the over-all direction of
Lt.Gen. (Retd) Javed Nasir, Principal Adviser to Mr.Sharif on intelligence matters, with
the logistic and firepower support of the Pakistan army.91 “Since Lt.Gen. Nasir works
from the residential office of Mr.Sharif and has been a close personal friend of Mr.Sharif
for nearly a decade, he would not have undertaken such an operation without the
approval of Mr.Sharif.”92 The planning for the Kargil Operation apparently began in
January of 1999.93 The infiltrators probably deployed sometime before May 6, when
Indian patrols made contact with them.94
Conclusion
Orthodox deterrence predicts that nuclear-armed states would avoid disputes for
fear of escalation to nuclear war. Existential deterrence shrouds the threshold of nuclear
response, but it too predicts that states act with caution for fear of escalation to a nuclear
war. The stability-instability paradox predicts that stable nuclear forces cancel out their
mutual influences, permitting contact between previously restrained conventional forces.
The occurrence of the Dras-Kargil operation under the nuclear umbrella is best explained
by the context of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Domestically unstable states are
most likely to produce hybrid governments that both select disputes on the basis of
domestic legitimacy, and escalate them as rapidly as military professionals. Hybrid
regimes underestimate the dangers of escalation because the civilian influences
overpower professional military knowledge of the outcome. The theory also indicates two
danger zones: hybrid governments, whether military on civilian, or civilian on military,
that are the consequence of low civilian control of their armed forces; and periods after a
new military government has begun to lose its legitimacy and seeks to form a hybrid
coalition with important domestic political groups. Since the 1990s Pakistan was in the
first danger zone; Musharraf’s government may be approaching the second danger zone.
15
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 16 -
The theoretical implication is that the widespread belief that nuclear weapons
instill a gradual commitment to orthodox deterrent strategies may be flawed. 95 This
‘technological determinism’ is belied by the case of Pakistan, which suggests that not all
states draw the same lessons from technology. For example, deducing solely from
technical characteristics, nuclear weapons are also ideally suited for limited gains
strategies because they instill the greatest fear of escalation, yet the conventional wisdom
is that they have not so been used.96 Instead, nuclear stability relies on perceptions of
interest – it is not the automatic outcome of possessing arsenals. The character of
deterrent stability is determined largely by the types of regimes in possession of nuclear
weapons.97
The policy implication is that on balance, it could be in India’s interest to effect
an introduction of nuclear deterrence into the Kashmir dispute, and thereby to
recredibilize Indian retaliation against Pakistan. Pakistan must be convinced that it cannot
dislodge India from Kashmir because of the latter’s nuclear deterrent which would most
certainly come into play in a confrontation involving invasive conventional forces. The
technical way of doing this is for India to adopt a flexible response strategy by making
nuclear weapons usable in a tactical sense against Pakistani battlefield operations, to
introduce this as doctrine, and then to openly deploy these weapons into the Corps
formations of the Indian military, including its Kashmir garrison. This would require
amending the India’s Draft Report on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, which outlines a strategy
of “credible minimum nuclear deterrence” (para 2.3) “based on a triad of aircraft, mobile
land-based missiles and sea-based assets” (para 3.1) “to permit adequate retaliatory
capability should deterrence fail” (para 2.1). India’s commitment to a policy of no first
use (para 1.5) and its stated intention to bolster conventional forces to raise the threshold
of the use of nuclear weapons (para 2.7) would have to be qualified with the addition of
tactical nuclear weapons.98
Adopting a flexible response strategy may transmit a clear message to Pakistan
that the threshold of Indian nuclear response has been lowered. This, however, would
entail a higher risk of further nuclearizing the conflict. Fortunately, India appears to have
opted for more conservative and we believe, a responsible strategy. India is apparently
prepared to incur the cost of higher volatility in terms of conventional warfare in order to
minimize the risk of a nuclear confrontation. As well, the Indian government is providing
both Pakistan and the international community an unambiguous evidence of its firm
commitment to maintain a nuclear capability for emphatically defensive purposes.
‘Pak Alleges LoC Crossover’, Times of India, 23 Jan 2000; ‘Shelling on LoC Continues:
Pakistan Takes Appropriate Measures’, Dawn, 24 Jan 2000; ‘South Asia’s Ugly Truce’,
The Economist, Jan 29 2000.
2
Julian West, Electronic Telegraph, (May 30,1999)
3
Thérèse Delpech, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the New World Order: Early Warning from
Asia?’, Survival, 40 (1998-1999), p.61.
4
For the debate between the orthodox nuclear deterrence theorists and proliferation
alarmists, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); See, for example Robert Jervis, The Illogic of
American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp.19-46; Bernard
1
16
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 17 -
Brodie et al. The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946); Patrick Morgan,
Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Bernard Brodie, ‘The
Development of Nuclear Strategy’, in Steven E. Miller (ed.) Strategy and Nuclear
Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.3-21; Lawrence Freedman,
‘The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists’, in Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and
Felix Gilbert (eds.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.735-778; Edward Rhodes, Power and
MADness – The Logic of Nuclear Coercion (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989).
5
Richard Betts, ‘Nuclear Peace and Conventional War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 11
(1988), p.83
6
Herman Kahn, On Escalation (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p.246; Patrick James
and Frank Harvey, ‘Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: Superpower Cases, 19481979’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22 (1989), pp.523-545.
7
Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution – Statecraft and the Prospect of
Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p.24
8
Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University,1960), pp.207229
9
This should be more so, given India and Pakistan’s respective deterrent purposes in
initiating their nuclear weapons program. See Raju G.C. Thomas, ‘Should India Sign the
NPT?’, in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley (eds.) Beyond 1995: The Future of the
NPT Regime (NY: Plenum Press, 1990), p.139; For a view in which domestic and
symbolic concerns determine proliferation, see Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build
Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, 21
(1996/1997), pp.54-86.
10
According to orthodox deterrence theory, where the threat of escalation exists, disputes
will be resolved according to the balance of interests and resolve, which is determined by
the balance of credibility. See Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, p.152;
Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1987), pp.14-16
11
T.V. Paul, ‘Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts’, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 39 (1995), pp.696-717.
12
Greg J. Gerardi, ‘India’s 333rd Prithvi Missile Group’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 7
(1995), p.363; ‘India’s Artillery is a Force in Its Own Right’, Jane’s Defence Weekly,
(1996), p.35
13
François Heisbourg, ‘Prospects for Nuclear Stability between India and Pakistan’,
Survival, 40 (1998-99), p.84
14
Neil Joeck, ‘Tacit Bargaining and Stable Proliferation in South Asia’, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 13 (1990), pp.77-91; See especially Devin Hagerty, ‘Nuclear
Deterrence in South Asia – The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis’, International Security, 20
(1995/1996), p.87; Brahma Chellaney, ‘After the Tests: India’s Options’, Survival, 40
(1998-99), p.105; Varun Sahni, ‘Going Nuclear: Establishing an Overt Nuclear Weapons
Capability’, in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.) India and the Bomb – Public
17
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 18 -
Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996),
pp.92-93
15
Although existential and opaque deterrence theories are dissimilar, they both rely on
the notion of uncertainty creating deterrence. An opaque nuclear state is one which
actively discourages public debate on the issue of its nuclear arsenal, and prefers to
present itself as a 'doctrineless'. At the same time it seeks to leave the existence and
deployment of its nuclear weapons ambiguous, so that their visibility remains below the
political significance threshold of its adversary. In effect, it seeks to avoid the
provocation of an arms race or nuclear research among its neighbors. See Benjamin
Frankel (ed.) Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications
(London: Frank Cass, London, 1991); See especially Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in
South Asia’, p.87; Existential deterrence operates on the assumption that just a few
nuclear weapons are sufficient to preserve the peace despite changes in doctrine,
technology or numbers. See McGeorge Bundy, ‘Existential Deterrence and Its
Consequences’, in Douglas MacLean (ed.) The Security Gamble: Deterrence in the
Nuclear Age (Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984).
16
Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper
No.171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p.16
17
Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia’, p.85, 87
18
See for example Hagerty’s elaboration on the difficulties faced by the Coalition forces
in eliminating Iraq’s SCUD launchers during the 1991 Gulf War: ‘Nuclear Deterrence in
South Asia’, p.84
19
See David Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’,
International Security, 21 (1996/1997), p.93; Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental
Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Peter Feaver,
Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); for a critique, see Bradley Thayer, ‘The Risk of
Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay’, Security Studies, 3 (1994), pp.428-493.
20
As cited in Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p.20; See also Kenneth
Boulding, ‘Confession of Roots’, International Studies Notes, 12 (1986), p.32
21
Steve Fetter, ‘Correspondence – Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani
Crisis’, International Security, 21 (1996), p.77
22
Šumit Ganguly, ‘Freeze: Halting the Testing and Development of Nuclear Weapons’,
in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.) India and the Bomb – Public Opinion and
Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p.74
23
For a discussion of the stability-instability paradox, see Jervis, The Illogic of American
Nuclear Strategy, pp.148-157. He states: “It is a commonplace that American strategic
nuclear forces cannot deter subversion, Soviet assistance to revolutionary movements, or
even the use of force in areas of little importance to the West…,” p.150; Glenn Snyder,
‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury (ed.) Balance of
Power (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965), pp.185-186; Glenn Snyder
refers to Arthur Lee Burns, ‘From Balance to Deterrence,’ World Politics, 9 (1957),
pp.494-529; See also Jerald Combs, ‘The Compromise That Never Was: George Kennan,
Paul Nitze, and the Issue of Conventional Deterrence in Europe, 1949-1952’, Diplomatic
18
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 19 -
History, 15 (1991), pp.361-386; Hanson Baldwin, ‘Strategy for Two Atomic Worlds’,
Foreign Affairs, 28 (1950), pp.386-397; A.J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S.
Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1986); Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977); Matthew Ridgway, Soldier (New York:
Harper, 1956), p.324; cited in Aaron Friedberg, ‘Why Didn’t the United States Become a
Garrison State?’, International Security, 16 (1992), p.119; There is also the point that
‘once attacked, a rationally calculating player has nothing substantial to gain by massive
retaliation’, although this will only apply after India and Pakistan can guarantee that
nuclear weapons will cripple each other. See John Steinbrunner, ‘Beyond Rational
Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions’, World Politics, 28 (1976), p.231
24
Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, p.186
25
Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, p.199
26
Robert Jervis, ‘Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War’, Political Science
Quarterly, 108 (1993), p.246; Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp.187-203.
27
Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p.21
28
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966),
pp.121-122 Jervis posits three reasons for strategic stability in the Cold War
confrontation that are weak in the Indo-Pakistani confrontation: the perception of a
positive-sum game, the mutual perception of defending the status quo rather than
expansion, the evident restraint in the Cold War, and the perceived high costs of war: The
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution.
29
William Kennedy, “The Defence of China’s Homeland,” in Ray Bonds (ed), The
Chinese War Machine (London: Salamander, 1979), 93-113
30
Andrew L. Ross, “Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World,” Armed Forces
and Society 13 (Summer 1987), 562-4.
31
On the impact of military influences on governing coalitions, see Jack Snyder, Myths of
Empire – Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), 3160; David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996); David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the
Making of the First World War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996).
32
On this discussion, see Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and
Evidence,” in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and
Charles Tilly (eds.), Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1989), 261; David C, Rapoport, “The Political Dimensions of Military
Usurpation,” Political Science Quarterly 83 (December 1968), 551-572; Aaron S.
Klieman, “Confined to Barracks – Emergencies and the Military in Developing
Countries,” Comparative Politics 12 (January 1980), 143-163; Amos Perlmutter, “The
Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army,” Comparative Politics 1 (April 1969), 382404, 390; Amos Perlmutter, “The Military and Politics in Modern Times: A Decade
Later,” Journal of Strategic Studies 9 (March 1986), 5-15; S.E. Finer, “The Man on
Horseback – 1974,” Armed Forces and Society 1 (November 1974), 5-27, 19-25; Roger
W. Benjamin and Lewis J. Edinger, “Conditions for Military Control over Foreign Policy
Decisions in Major States: A Historical Exploration,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 15,
19
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 20 -
(March 1971), 5-31, 17; I.K. Feierabend and R.L. Feierabend, “Aggressive Behaviors
within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 10
(September 1966), 249-271.
33
Patrick M. Morgan, “Disarmament,” in Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to
the Politics of the World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993), 246.
34
Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy – The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign
Relations (New York: King Crown’s Press, 1958), 3; For critics of the association
between military socialization and foreign policy attitudes, see Samuel A. Kirkpatrick
and James L. Regens, “Military Experience and Foreign policy Belief Systems,” Journal
of Political and Military Sociology 6 (Spring 1978), 29-47.
35
Stuart Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate
War, 1816-1965,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (June 1992), 309-41; Other critics,
such as Rummel, have found that non-democracies are more prone to engage in severe
wars, but not with more frequency, than democracies. See R.J. Rummel, “Democracies
are less warlike than Other regimes,” European Journal of International Relations 1
(1995), 457-79; R.J. Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983), 27-71; See also J. David Singer and Melvin Small,
“The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” Jerusalem Journal of International
Relations 1 (1976), 65; Kenneth Benoit, “Democracies Really are More Pacific (in
General),” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996), 636-57; James Lee Ray,
Democracies in International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1995).
36
Or findings that assert that regime types do not affect war-proneness, see Quincy
Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); W.K. Domke,
War and the Changing Global System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Zeev
Maoz and N. Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 33 (1989), 3-35; Harvey Starr, “Why Don’t Democracies Fight
Each Other? Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop,” Jerusalem Journal of
International Relations 14 (1992), 41-59; Clifton T. Morgan and Sally Howard
Campbell, “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War – So Why Kant
Democracies Fight?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (June 1991), 187-211; D. Marc
Kilgour, “Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (June 1991), 266-84; Nehemia Geva, Karl DeRouen,
and Alex Mintz, “The Political Incentive Explanation of the ‘Democratic Peace’:
Evidence from Experimental Research,” International Interactions 18 (1993), 215-29;
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and
International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 146; Erich Weede,
“Democracy and War Involvement,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1984), 649-64;
Erich Weede, “Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement,” Journal
of Peace Research 29 (1992), 377-83; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, “Governance and
Democratization,” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.) Government
Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 250-71; Randolph M. Siverson, “Democracies and War
Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument,” European Journal
20
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 21 -
of International Relations 1 (1995), 481-89; Steve Chan, “Democracy and War: Some
Thoughts on Future War Agenda,” International Interactions 18 (1993), 205-13.
37
Bruce Bueno DeMesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair
Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” The American Political
Science Review 93 (December 1999), 791-807.
38
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 69.
39
Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 69-70.
40
Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 64-65.
41
Richard Betts, Soldier, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977), 5; Julian Schofield, “Militarized Decision-Making and War in
Pakistan – 1947-1971,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol.27, No.1 (Fall 2000), 131-148;
Julian Schofield and Michael Schatzky, “Military Regimes and Nuclear Deterrence in
South Asia,” in Hugh Johnston, Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, and John Wood (eds.),
South Asia – Between Turmoil and Hope (Montreal: Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute,
2000), pp.327-354
42
Betts, Soldier, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 217.
43
Betts, Soldier, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 5; See also Carson Eoyang, Shu S.
Liao, Douglas C. Hayden, and James W. Thomas, “Risk Preference in Military DecisionMaking: An Empirical Study,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 15 (Fall
1987), 245-61.
44
Morris Janowitz and Roger Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), 31, 100.
45
B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy (New York|: Meridian, 1991), 334-37
46
This does not preclude miscalculations, except that the overwhelming power of nuclear
weapons significantly decreases the margins of safety in military planning.
47
Richard Smoke, War – Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1977), 23-25; Ole R. Holsti, “The 1914 Case,” American Political Science Review 59
(June 1965), 365-378.
48
Morris Janowitz and Roger Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), 103.
49
Harold D. Lasswell, “The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison State,” in
Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R.M. MacIver, eds., Perspectives on a Troubled
Decade: Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1939-1949 (New York: Harper, 1950), 117125, 118; “The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today,” in Samuel Huntington, ed., Changing
Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 51-70; Jay Stanley,
“Introduction: An Invitation to Revisit Lasswell’s Garrison State,” in Jay Stanley (ed.),
Essays on the Garrison State (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 17-41, 23;
Jay Stanley and David R. Segal, “Conclusion: Landmarks in Defense Literature,” in Jay
Stanley (ed.), Essays on the Garrison State (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1997), 127-134, 128.
50
Robert A. Hanneman, “Military Elites and Political Executives,” Journal of Political
and Military Sociology 14 (Spring 1986), 75-89.
21
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 22 -
Raja Zulifikar, ‘FM: Pakistan to Upgrade Nuclear Deterrence’ The News (Islamabad),
26 Nov 1999
52
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine during the 1980s could be described as existential in the
sense that it sought an ambiguous capability that would facilitate the covert manufacture
of nuclear weapons.
53
Singh, 1965 War, p.27
54
Gen. Gul Hassan believed that the Pakistani forces should have escalated even sooner
than they did. Interview, April 23rd, 1999, Rawalpindi; This was not an uncommon belief
among Pakistan’s generals. Interview, Gen. Fazal Muqueem, April 25th, 1999,
Rawalpind; Gauhar, Ayub Khan, p.312, 316; Syed Abid Ali Bilgrami, ‘Limited War and
Likely Areas of Conflict’, Pakistan Army Journal, 1 (1959), p.33
55
Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Šumit
Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond – Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia
(New Delhi: Manohar, 1995), pp.10-11, 14, 28, 40-41, 53; C. Raja Mohan and Peter
Lavoy, ‘Avoiding Nuclear War’, in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak (eds.) Crisis
Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (NY: St.Martin’s
Press, 1995), p.32; Inderjit Badhwar and Dilip Bobb, ‘Game of Brinkmanship’, India
Today, 15 Feb 1987; ‘Indian Army to Gather on Pakistani Border’, The Montreal
Gazette, 13 Oct 1998; Evidence suggesting that the 1990 crisis was more serious than
later criticism is cited in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, ‘Indian Public Opinion
and Nuclear Weapons Policy’, p.3
56
Gen. Gul Hassan did not believe Kashmir had strategic value worth fighting over.
Interview, April 23rd, 1999, Rawalpindi; Kashmir’s strategic value, its headwaters for
irrigation and access to China, had already been secured in the First Kashmir War in
1947-1948. Interview, Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif, April 26th, 1999, Rawalpindi.
57
Akbar Khan (Maj Gen), Raiders in Kashmir (Karachi: Pak Publishers Limited, 1970),
p.8, 15-16
58
H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1985), p.443, cited in Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir – Portents of War –
Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.12
59
Bhupinder Singh, 1965 War (Role of Tanks in India-Pakistan War) (Patiala: B.C.
Publishers, 1982), p.xix-xx
60
Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, 98-99; interview with Armored Divisional
Commander at the battle of Sialkot and later Pakistan Foreign Minister, Gen. Yaqub
Khan, 28 April, 1999, Islamabad.
61
Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan – Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), p.316
62
Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan – Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), pp.318-319
63
V.D. Chopra, Genesis of Indo-Pakistan Conflict on Kashmir (New Delhi: Patriot
Publishers, 1990), p.73; Although GHQ did prepare military operations in anticipation of
the Indian reaction, it appeared that Gen. Akhtar Hussain Malik, the Pakistan commander
in Kashmir, had expected GHQ’s operations to occur in tandem with Op Gibraltar and
not simply in response to its failure: “Because of the impending Grand Slam Indian
51
22
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 23 -
concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull
out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe
more, in the process.” Interview, Col. Saeed Akhtar Malik (Gen. Malik’s son), 21 April
1999, Rawalpindi; Letter from Gen. Malik to his brother, dated 22 November 1967.
64
Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs (Karachi: Oxford UP, 1993), p.116-7
65
Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs (Karachi: Oxford UP, 1993), p.224
66
Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan – Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), p.321
67
P.S. Bhagat, The Shield and the Sword – India 1965 and After – The New Dimensions
(Calcutta: Statesman, 1967), p.28; The military must have been aware that a limited war
was possible or even likely in Kashmir. See Syed Abid Ali Bilgrami, “Limited War and
Likely Areas of Conflict”, Pakistan Army Journal, Vol.1, 1959, pp.31-38, p.33
68
Mohammad Musa, My Version – India-Pakistan War of 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis,
1983), p.44
69
Mohammad Musa, My Version – India-Pakistan War of 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis,
1983), p.3-4, 44
70
Mohammad Musa, My Version – India-Pakistan War of 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis,
1983), p.24
71
Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan – Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), p.314
72
Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs (Karachi: Oxford UP, 1993), p.226; Mohammad Musa, My
Version – India-Pakistan War of 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983), p.3
73
Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs (Karachi: Oxford UP, 1993), p.225
74
Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan – Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), p.322
75
Hari Ram Gupta, The Kutch Affair (Delhi: U. C. Kapur & Sons, 1969), 161; Khan,
Memoirs, 163-164.
76
Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), 301; Pakistan Army Chief, 1972-76, Gen. Tikka Khan, commander
at Rann of Kutch battle, recalls that he received his orders directly from Gen. Yahya
Khan, indicating that the proper chain of command was in use. Interview, 25 April 1999,
Rawalpindi. Brig Noor A. Husain does recall that Ayub warned his subordinates that he
did not want war over the Rann of Kutch. Interview, 27 April 1999, Rawalpindi.
77
Palmer, “The Defense of South Asia,” 898-929, 908.
78
Gen. Tikka Khan, interview, 25 April 1999, Rawalpindi.
79
“Pakistan’s New Old Rulers,” The Economist 353 (October 16th, 1999), 39.
80
“Nawaz Sharif’s Trial Ends Not With a Bang but With Two Life Sentences,” Crescent
International, April 16-30, 2000.
81
Sultan Ali Barq, Henry Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures Project, 14
July 1999; ‘Ex-Pakistani Generals Express Views on Kargil Situation’, The News
(Islamabad), 17 June 1999; Anwar Iqbal, ‘Ex-Generals: Kargil Pakistan's Disaster’, The
News (Islamabad), 19 July 1999; ‘Musharraf: Sharif Approved Army Patrols Into
Kashmir’, AFP (Hong Kong), 16 July 99
23
Julian Schofield and Reet Tremblay, “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear
Weapons and the Conflict over Kashmir,” Aakrosh – Asian Journal on Terrorism and
Internal Conflicts 4, No.11 (April 2001), 13-41.
- 24 82
The senior Vice-President of the Pakistan Muslim League, Ejaz ul-Haq, and son of
General Zia-ul Haq, stated that Sharif was fully involved as indicated by his presentation
of gallantry awards to soldiers fighting in the conflict with him. June 23, 2000, “PML
Leader Questions Sharif's Claims on Kargil Operation,” News Dispatches, New Delhi; 13
June 2000 Times of India, “Army Didn't Consult Him on Kargil, says Sharif.”
83
B. Raman, South Asia Analysis Group - Notes and Updates, 1999
84
“Sharif Vows to Spill Beans over Kargil,” AFP, Karachi, June 13 , 2000.
85
The Indian Express (12 October), 2000
86
B. Raman, South Asia Analysis Group - Notes and Updates, 1999
87
Brian Cloughley, Former Australian Defense Attache in Islamabad, Henry Stimson
Center, SAIF Cross-border Dialogue XII, October 18, 1999.
88
B. Raman, South Asia Analysis Group - Notes and Updates, 1999
89
B. Raman, South Asia Analysis Group - Notes and Updates, 1999
90
09 March 2000 Dawn ‘Nawaz deposes in Plane Case: Differences with Musharraf date
back to Kargil’
91
Julian West, Electronic Telegraph, (May 30,1999)
92
Julian West, Electronic Telegraph, (May 30,1999)
93
17 June 2000 - Times of India.
94
B. Raman, South Asia Analysis Group - Notes and Updates, 1999
95
For a very complete contrast of the optimist and pessimist views of proliferation, see
Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, p.89. The main
proliferation optimist is Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; ‘Nuclear Myths and
Political Realities’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), pp.731-745; ‘The
Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, 18 (1993), pp.4479.
96
Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1987), pp.212-233.
97
Peter R. Lavoy, ‘The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation – A Review
Essay’, Strategic Studies, 4 (1995), pp.695-753.
98
National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, ‘Draft Report on Indian
Nuclear Doctrine’, 17 August 1999; Ashok K. Mehta, ‘Evolve Politico-Military Nuclear
Doctrine’, The Pioneer (Delhi), 20 August 1998; Kanti Bajpai, ‘A Three-in-One
Doctrine’, Deccan Herald, 24 Sep 1999
24
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