1
NOT FOR QUOTATION OR CITATION WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S WRITTEN PERMISSION.
PAPER PREPARED FOR SEMINAR MAY 2003
Challenges to the New World Order: Anti-globalism and Counter-globalism
Erik van Ree
University of Amsterdam
e.v.ree@hum.uva.nl
November 2002
Introduction
The hypothesis to be discussed in the present paper is that globalisation marks and redefines not only
the present world order but also the radical social movements that turn against it. Since, roughly,
1980 radicalism has become more “globalist”. Resistance movements focus much more than before
on the problem of globalisation, making either the promotion of (alternative forms of) globalisation
or, conversely, the struggle against it a focus of their attention.
The new point about present-day radical movements would not be that they perceive a global
opponent. That has always been the case. The communists, for example, always saw the whole of
world capitalism as their enemy. Anti-colonial movements realised that they faced a colonial world
system. Nevertheless, in practice these movements did in each separate country aim primarily for the
overthrow of the locally governing powers. They set it as their task to create independent nationstates or, having overthrown the government, to provide these states with another politico-economic
system. The present struggle, however, is no longer in the first place oriented towards changes within
a certain state. It has the world system as such - embodied either in real institutions such as the WTO
or in a phantastic hidden world government - as its target. The goal is either to transform or to destroy the world centre. This change of focus of radical social movements is, furthermore, expressed
in their mode of operation. The new counter-movements, even those inspired by nationalism, are no
longer organised on a national basis or as co-operative efforts of national sections, but in a transnational, global way. They operate as networks without nationality, mobile brigades looking out for
national arenas where they can “touch down”.
2
I will carefully distinguish between “globalisation” and “globalism”. Whereas the former
concept refers to a process the world is allegedly going through, the latter characterises a point of
view. Whereas globalisation refers to trends in the political, economic, ecological and other aspects
of the world order, globalism is a characteristic of (some) ideologies. Globalisation is strictly speaking no part of the hypothesis, which holds that, regardless of the reality or irreality of the globalisation phenomenon, radical movements increasingly believe that such a process is occurring and focus
their actions on influencing it; i.e. they become ever more “globalist”. Nevertheless, we can obviously not do without a background discussion of globalisation.
Globalisation
Whether we live in an era of globalisation is not only a question of empirical fact but also of interpretation and definition. Most scholars would not object to an overall view of development in which the
relatively open world economy of the Gold Standard, under the Pax Britannica, was followed by a
period of relative renationalisation after 1914. After the Second World War national parochialism
gradually retreated again. From, roughly, 1980, a process of liberalisation and deregulation of international trade, investment and capital movements highlighted a new globalising trend.1 But the consensus on the significance of these broad trends is a relative one. Whether we accept the present era
as one of true globalisation or merely as one of renewed internationalisation partly depends on our
definitory framework.
One approach is to define globalisation broadly as a process of world-wide spreading of people and cultural phenomena and increasing contacts between countries. According to David Held,
globalisation occurs when the spatial organisation of social relations and interactions is transformed
in such a way that “transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and
the exercise of power” are generated. Interconnectedness is moving up from the local, through the
national and even regional level, to global (i.e. interregional and transcontinental) levels.2 In Jan Aart
Scholte’s definition, globalisation refers to “supraterritoriality”: the advent and spread of social spaces in which distance, borders and location have become relatively irrelevant. Supraterritoriality takes
several forms. Technologies allowing us to, virtually or really, cover large distances in very little or
no time. Economic corporations without a home base, researching, producing and marketing their
products on a world scale. Globally organised finances. Global organisations, movements and gov-
1
See: Hanagan, 2000
2
Held et al., 1999: 16. Compare: Tomlinson, 1999: 2f
3
ernance agencies. Man-made ecological phenomena affecting the whole world. Global consciousness: symbols, events, solidarities.3
The drawback of Held’s and Scholte’s definitions is that they do not explicitly address the
question of whether and how globalisation can be distinguished from extreme forms of internationalisation. Provided that it is of global scope, intensified international interaction qualifies as globalisation. This seems unfortunate. The nation-state is the main framework into which humanity has in
recent history organised themselves. Therefore, in order to be able to appreciate the real scope of the
processes presently going on, we would do good to include the overcoming of the nation-state in our
definition of globalisation.4 For Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, to distinguish between internationalisation and globalisation is the point of departure. In an inter-national economy, despite growing integration into the world market, national economies remain the principal entities. In a globalised economy, the international economic system becomes as it were autonomous, subsuming and
determining what remains of national economies. On these criteria, in Hirst and Thompson’s view,
the world economy is still inter-national. Likewise, international systems of governance remain based
on the national state. The state’s powers have been reduced, but it remains the only source of legitimacy of the international organisations to which it grants part of its sovereignty.5 According to Linda
Weiss, globalisation means that the nation-state is no longer important, the “displacement of ‘national’ (and therefore ‘international’) networks by ‘transnational’ networks of economic interaction.”
On these criteria, we now have strong internationalisation of the world economy rather than real
globalisation. The state remains pivotal.6
Irrespective of the accuracy of Weiss’s and Hirst and Thompson’s empirical conclusions,
their definition of globalisation has the advantage of sharply setting it off from intensified internationalisation. In Ulrich Beck’s conceptual framework, too, “globality” or “world society” is “the totality of social relationships which are not integrated into or determined (or determinable) by national-state politics.” “Globalisation” is the process leading up to globality, “the processes through which
sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors”.7 However, it
would be insufficient to identify globalisation simply with transnationalisation. The latter process
3
Scholte, 2000: 3. 16, 46-61
4
For an argument against taking the nation-state as the main point of departure in the analysis of globalisation,
see: Robertson (1992: 58, 77-8, 104, 175)
5
Hirst/Thompson, 1999: especially: 8-13
6
Weiss, 1999: 10-1, 169, chapters 6, 7
7
Beck, 2001: 10-1, 87-8. See also: Rosenau (1990). Castells’s (1996: 92) definition of a “global economy”
with the capacity to work “as a unit in real time on a planetary scale” does not state but implies the overcoming of the nation-state as a significantly limiting factor. Malcolm Waters (2001: 5, 21-5, 60-1, 212f) defines
globalisation in general terms as a social process in which the constraints of geography recede. But he distinguishes two consecutive stages: internationalisation and globalisation strictly speaking.
4
does not necessarily assume global scope. Combining Beck’s focus on the overcoming of the nationstate with Held’s strictures on the necessarily interregional and transcontinental scope of the process,
I will, then, define globalisation (leading up to the condition of globality) as transnationalising processes with a world-wide scope. Globalisation can be interpreted as the climax of internationalisation,
the latter process being taken to an extreme where it reaches a new quality in which the constituting
national elements are lost. Globalisation means that economic, ecological, cultural and other processes can no longer be understood in terms of interacting national processes but only as one integrated
global whole. Idealtypically, globalisation ends in the creation of a single supranational sovereignty –
a world state.
Globalisation is not only a subject for scholarly debate, it is a politically charged subject.
There is by now a substantial body of literature aiming not only to increase our knowledge of the
process but also to influence it.8 But for our present purpose the main question is whether, measured
against the above definition, globalisation is a reality. Most scholars would agree that national sovereignty seems at present to be subjected to some kind of erosion.9 But the consensus is flimsy. As we
saw, Weiss and Hirst and Thompson hold that the world economy must still be analysed in terms of
interacting national economies. They also tend to deny that globalisation is at present undermining
the nation-state as the main political framework.10 Held and others take the intermediary position
that, whereas the sovereign nation-state remains in business, its powers are being redefined and reconstructed. The state remains strong, but is enveloped in a messy network of overlapping international and supranational agencies - a “new medievalism”.11 Anthony Giddens, Kenichi Ohmae and
others insist that transnational forces are undermining the significance of borders and the political
8
For accounts sympathetic to neo-liberal globalisation, see Friedman (2000), Naisbitt (1995) and Ohmae
(1994). For critical accounts from a left-wing perspective: Korten (1996), Mander/Goldsmith (1996),
Hardt/Negri (2000), Rupert (2000), Klein (2000), Falk (2000), Hertz (2001), Hirst/Thompson (2000), Beck
(2001), Barber (1996) and Scholte, 2000. Other critical accounts: Stiglitz (2002), Soros (2002) and Kaplan
(2000: xiii, 80-98).
9
For a careful analysis of five factors (in the fields of law, polity, security, identity and economy) that are at
present eroding the powers of the nation-state, see: Held (1997: chapters 5, 6)
10
Compare Gilpin (1987). Wallerstein’s (1974) and Kennedy’s (1989) great analyses of global division of
labour and politico-military interaction preserve the individual states as the actors operating within the global
whole.
11
Held et al, 1999: 77-86, 436-44. See also: Clark (1999). Woods (2000: 4-5, 10-12) argues that globalisation
does erode the power of the nation state, but that weak states are much more affected, whereas strong one are
often able to influence and shape the form globalisation takes to their own interest. See also: Berger and Dore
(1996) and Buelens (1999). Rosenau (1990) argues that the global structure is bifurcated between a weakening
but still strong world of states and a complex, multifaceted world of transnational actors on supra- and subnational levels.
5
sovereignty of states.12 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri even observe a “new global form of sovereignty”, though not yet a world state. “Empire” has no territorial centre of power. Hybrid and flexible, it is “composed of a series of national and supranational organisms under a single logic of
rule”.13
Culturally too, the reality of “world society” is a complex question. Should we, for example,
treat the global spread of American commercialism as indicative of globalisation? On our strict definition this is doubtful. After all, this world culture remains marked by the culture of one particular
nation.14 Mike Featherstone dismisses the whole idea of a homogeneous world culture. At present
cultural processes no longer longer fit in the container of the national state, but transnational phenomena typically remain locally coloured and are not free of national characteristics.15 John Tomlinson analyses “deterritorialization”, with cultures increasingly on the move across the globe. But the
result is often a “hybridization” of national cultures, typically from western-commercial and nonwestern traditions.16
In summing up, no serious scholar doubts the fact that the national state is at a minimum
challenged by global, transnational processes – economic, ecological, cultural and other – and that
elements of supranational governance begin to appear. But the reality of completely globalised phenomena remains questionable. It seems that we more typically have quasi-globalised phenomena that
are still heavily marked by nationality and international interaction.17 There is no emerging consensus
about the depth of the globalising process. The question of whether globality is only dimly visible at
the horizon, or whether nations and national states are by now engaged in a real process of being
overcome is unsolved.
12
Castells (1996: chapter 2); Ohmae (1994); Scholte, 2000: 135-8; Giddens, 2000: chapter 1
13
Hardt/Negri, 2000: xii
14
See: Ritzer, 2000: 172-9; Waters, 2001: 196-201
15
Featherstone, 1990: 1. Smith (1990: 180, 186) notes that national cultures are rooted in common memories of
their participants. As there are no “world memories” usable to unite humanity the prospects for a homogenous
world culture remain bleak. Of transnational movements, the so-called “Pan” nationalisms, mostly regional in
scope and having common a memory base, are possibly most viable.
16
Tomlinson (1999: chapter 4). See also: Giddens (2000: chapter 1) and Nederveen Pieterse (1995). Appadurai
(1996: chapter 1, 32f ) analyses the “diasporic public spheres” created by the combined effect of modern electronic media and mass migrations. While cutting across the nation-states, the global diasporas preserve or acquire local and national marks. See Roland Robertson (1995) on “glocalisation”. See also: Lash/Urry (1994:
chapter 11). Samuel Huntington (1998) sees the world as deeply divided between cultural lines as ever. World
cultures are not strictly speaking based in nations, but they are certainly for a part nationally coloured. Peter
Berger discusses the phenomenon of “alternative globalizations; that is, cultural movements with a global
outreach originating outside the Western world”. Just like American global culture, these alternatives preserve
national marks. Berger/Huntington, 2002: introduction.
17
Compare Clark (1999: 37-9)
6
Globalism
The term “globalism” is mostly used to denote a point of view. Beck defines it as “the neoliberal
ideology of world-market domination”. Beside this “affirmative globalism” there is also the “‘negative’ globalism” of those taking refuge against globalisation in various forms of protectionism mainly conservative, green and red. Whereas the Left exalts the social state, the Right the national
state.18 Scholte’s “globalists” believe that the world has become thoroughly globalised. They are
either neo-liberals strongly supportive of globalisation, moderate reformists, or self-proclaimed enemies of the process. These latter “radicals” come in two varieties. Whereas “global socialists” resist
globalisation only in its present form and hope to continue it on radically different foundations, “traditionalists” hope to reverse the process. The latter count among their ranks religious revivalists,
reactionary and old-style-socialist nationalists and radical environmentalists.19 In rough accordance
with Scholte’s use of the term, I will define globalism as the desire to further, redirect or reverse the
process of globalisation. In the context of the present article I am neither interested in the neo-liberal
advocators of the process in its current form, nor in its social-democratic reformers. My interest focusses on those either hoping to radically reverse or to radically redirect it.
With Dirk Barrez I agree that, though widespread, the use of the term “anti-globalisation
movement” to refer to those of the radical left who work towards an alternative model of globalisation - not to its reversal - is confusing.20 Hardt and Negri, extreme representatives of the so-called
“anti-globalisation movement”, refuse to except this title, writing: “Globalization must be met with a
counter-globalization, Empire with a counter-Empire.”21 I propose to call the variety of radicalism
(irrespective of its left- or right-wing character) aiming to reverse globalisation: “anti-globalism”.
And the variety aiming to put it on an alternative track: “counter-globalism”.
Elaborating, then, on the hypothesis of the globalist development of radicalism, we expect
internationalist class struggle movements to have most easily developed in a counter-globalist direction. The same goes for feminism with its transnational gender orientation, as well as for fundamentalists from universalist religions like Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Jewish, Hindu and perhaps
also Protestant-Christian fundamentalists may be more open to national concerns and may therefore
have developed in anti-globalist directions. We may expect right-wing patriotic and racist movements, as well as subnational regionalists of left and right, to have redefined themselves along anti-
18
Beck, 2001: 9-10, 88, 129
19
Scholte, 2000: 17, 34-9. Compare Waterman’s (1998: 210-3) analysis of three ideal-type responses to global-
isation: celebration, rejection and critique/surpassal.
20
Barrez, 2001: 61
7
globalist lines. Though environmentalism seems a fine candidate for counter-globalist utopianism, its
right-wing variety, with its mythology of the “soil”, may have turned anti-globalist. All this would
produce the following hypothetical matrix. Refining the hypothesis of the post-1980 globalist development of radical movements, this matrix must, of course, be only an approximation of a much more
complex reality. The categories of social movements distinguished here can in reality not be divided
into sich neatly separated boxes.22
Leftist
Counter-globalism
Class
Rightist
Struggle
Movements;
Environmentalism; Feminism
Roman-Catholic,
Orthodox,
Buddhist and Islamic Fundamentalism
Anti-globalism
Regionalism
Patriotism-Racism;
ism;
Regional-
Environmentalism;
Protestant, Jewish and Hindu
Fundamentalism
Assuming that globalisation would have significantly undermined the national state - which we have
seen remains a moot point - populations will seek alternative instruments to control their own destinies. In this model, the undermining of the national state would have created a vacuum filled up by
the new globalist movements. Anti- and counter-globalist movements would be triggered into action
by the same process but respond in opposite ways. Anti-globalists consistently reject the undermining
of the national state, and struggle to bolster it and restore its power. Counter-globalists, too, deplore
the fact that the national state can no longer protect the population, but, recognising the inevitability
of the process of globalisation, they hope to create a new and juster global sovereignty to replace the
powerless national state.
21
Hardt/Negri, 2001: 207, also: 115
22
Robertson’s (1992: 78-81) matrix divides world images along two axes: whether they favour Gemeinschaft
or Gesellschaft; and whether they are one-worldist or anti-globalist, i.e. whether the world should be united into
one or divided up into separate states. For the American context, Rupert (2000) distinguishes between two
types of radical resistance against present-day globalisation: the cosmopolitan and democratically-oriented left
and the nationalistic, far-right Patriots. As a model, this does not leave much room for left-wing anti-globalism
and right-wing counter-globalism. Castells’s (1997: 8f) distinction between “resistance identity” and “project
identity” correlates neither with the left/right nor with the anti/counter-globalist dichotomy.
8
Peter Kloos analyses how globalisation triggers “local identity movements” on ethnic or religious bases such as the Tamil Tigers, ETA, IRA and Zapatistas. Such movements tend to make use
of transnational forms of organisation, such as the drug and weapon trade and the Internet.23 Similarly, according to Appadurai, deterritorialization - whether of Hindus, Sikhs, Palestinians or Ukrainians
- is at the core of “a variety of global fundamentalisms, including Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism” as well as of “separatist transnational movements”. Diasporic populations invent virtual homelands of their own, like the Sikh “Khalistan”.24 Compare this to Castells’s analysis that in the new,
globally connected “network society” people’s control over their own destinies decreases, with institutions and even whole countries being “switched off” at will. Increased insecurity creates a search
for new identities – embodied in radical movements and communities on religious, ethnic, territorial,
national, social, evironmental or sexual bases.25
However, radical movements triggered into life by the globalising process are not automatically globalist. They may well remain, for example, simply fundamentalist or nationalist. Occasionally “territorialisms” can develop into what Don Kalb calls “explicit antiglobalist grand narratives” or
“fully fledged alternatives to one-worldism”, but that need not necessarily happen.26 Riuhei Hatsuse
notes that, in response to the Western model of globalisation, the Islamic, Hindu and Sinic worlds
develop their own “versions of counter-globalism” - “a twin of globalism”. For example Islamism
and the idea of the East Asian Economic Caucus. Huntington’s civilisational clashes are, then, “confrontations between globalism and counter-globalism”.27 But whereas Islamism with its alternative
world order qualifies as counter-globalist, East Asian regionalism hardly does.
Under our hypothesis we are looking for movements with “an explicitly globe-oriented perspective”, defined as one “which espouses as a central aspect of its message or policy a concern with
the patterning of the entire world.”28 To be anti-globalist, a movement needs to be more than merely
nationalist. The focus of its effort must be not on the articulation of the national character but on the
prevention of this character from being diluted into a world community. Anti-globalism does not
focus on the struggle for dominance of one’s own nation over other nations, but on defending one’s
23
Kloos, 2000: 283, 289, 293. Compare discussions by Claire Sutherland (1999) and Niels Lange (1999) on the
ways globalisation, with decreasing capabilities of the nation-state, may further or influence sub-state, regional
nationalism. See also: Waters, 2001: 193-5
24
Appadurai, 1996: 38-9. Waters (2001: 187-96) discusses two adaptive responses on the part of ethnic groups
to globalisation: “translation”, a new, syncretistic cultural creation, and “tradition”, a return to the roots.
25
Castells, 1996: Prologue; Castells, 1997. Barber’s (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld closely parallels this argument.
See also Zygmunt Bauman’s (1998) analysis of mobile global elites and “localised” poor seeking refuge in neotribalism and fundamentalism.
26
Kalb, 2000: 5-6
27
Hatsuse, 1999: 4, 10-1
28
Robertson, 1992: 79
9
nation against the rise of a global sovereignty. Conversely, only those “internationalist” movements
may be validly called counter-globalist which have in fact stopped being internationalist, aiming for
an integrated, nationless world and focussing their efforts on creating a world state. In sum, though
globalisation triggers counter-movements, such movements need not necessarily be driven by globalist concerns. Restrictedly defined, it is not self-evident that globalism has come to dominate presentday radicalism.
Pre-1980 globalist traditions
Finally, in order for us to be able to properly test our hypothesis of increasingly globalist orientations
among radical movements during the past two decades, our findings must be measured against the
state of affairs before that time. In the Western world, affirmative globalism, one-worldism in its
various forms, continues the problematic of the ancient “cosmopolitanism”, defined by Thomas
Schlereth as an attempt “to transcend chauvinistic national loyalties”. Whereas “internationalism”
aims merely for friendly association of nations “without sacrifice of national character”, the true “citizen of the world” is distinguished by a readiness to borrow from other lands and civilisations. 29
Classical thinkers sceptical about the state as a parochial construction, particularly the Stoics, envisioned rational human beings as citizens of one virtual “cosmopolis”, under one universal law of
nature.30 Early Christian ideology contained cosmopolitan sentiments too. The Old Testament expresses the worldview of one nation time and again overwhelmed by universal empires. Its final ideal
is the world-wide kingdom of God. With its equal appeal to Jews and Greeks, its own Kingdom of
God, and its recognition of the legitimacy of the Roman empire - the universal state of the day - the
New Testament is more unambivalently cosmopolitan in spirit.
The Roman-Catholic tradition continued the ideal of global unity, combining the universal
church with the universal Roman empire. Augustinus’ City of God is probably the most important
intellectual expression of this. Among Western-European medieval thinkers, notably Pierre Dubois
and Marsilius of Padua, the universal Christian state continued to be propagated. Dante hoped for a
world confederation of states and cities under one global monarch.31 The original Roman empire was
followed by the Byzantine, Holy Roman and Russian empires. With its division into autocefalous
patriarchates and liturgical use of national languages, the national is stronger among the Orthodox
than among Roman-Catholics. Nevertheless, Orthodoxy’s national element remained subordinate
compared to its universalism. Philotheus of Pskov’s theory of the “third Rome” proclaimed Moscow
29
Schlereth (1977: xi-xii)
30
Heater (1990: 8-13); Schlereth (1977: xvii-xx)
31
Heater, 1990: 13; Scholte, 2000: 64; Schlereth, 1977: xxi
10
the new universal empire, inheritor of Rome and Byzantium and extending “to the ends of the earth
in the Orthodox Christian faith”.32
During the Renaissance, cosmopolitanism was reinvented in Western Europe by humanists
Montaigne and Erasmus. Leibniz was Europe’s most celebrated seventeenth-century cosmopolitan.33
But eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking combined universalism with the notion of mankind’s
division into unique nations of equal right. Herder’s thought embodies this ambivalence. The duality
allowed Enlightenment philosophers to emphasize either the internationalist or the nationalist element. Anti-cosmopolitanism was in Western Europe most famously represented by Rousseau.34 In
early nineteenth-century Russia, Vissarion Belinskii was notable as a Westerniser who at the same
time resented “humanist cosmopolitans”.35 Both men defended the need of every state to nurture its
own national character and to prevent it from being diluted into a grey, global melting pot. On the
contrary, Kant envisioned a “Cosmo-political Institution” - a confederation of states based on a treaty
to prevent war permanently, and having one “cosmopolitan law”, to which the rational individual was
more obliged as a man than he was to the law of his own state as a citizen.36 Paine, Schiller, Condorcet, Turgot, Hume, Franklin and Voltaire were among the many who contributed to “cosmopolitan
humanism”.37 Post-Second World War “world federalism” was partly inspired by this tradition.38 But
late twentieth-century radicals are unlikely to have been.
Communism
In what follows I will highlight some of the radical globalist traditions from the early nineteenth century onwards until the 1980s, focussing selectively on the Western world and on developments within communism, fascism and Christian fundamentalism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels foresaw a
unified communist world. Their globalism was nevertheless qualified. The global fuson of states
would automatically result from world revolution, rather than being something to be actively worked
32
Anderson, 1967: 72-3. See also: Utechin, 1963: 20
33
Schlereth (1977: xxii-xxv)
34
Heater, 1990: 40, 54
35
Walicki, 1979: 121-7, 135-46. Before him, the Freemason Nikolai Novikov was committed to the ideal of
universal human brotherhood, while at the same time a patriot strongly defending Russian national traditions
against Francophile universalism. Ibid: 14f
36
Held (1997: 226-31). Heater (1990: 54-5)
37
Heater (1990: 53-6); Scholte (2000: 64-5); Schlereth (1977). The cosmpolitan tradition was continued by
Saint-Simon, arguing for a pan-European government and universalistic humanism, and after him by Auguste
Comte. Waters, 2001: 7
38
Heater (1990: 140-4)
11
for as a separate concern. Moreover, though this is a hotly debated issue, proletarian internationalism
contained nationalist elements. Marx and Engels were generally sympathetic to the patriotism of
“great nations” such as the Germans, French, Poles and Hungarians. And, even though envisioning
simultaneous world revolution, the proletariat was expected to initially take power in each country
separately. Nation-states might survive during the transitional period preceding communism.39
During the 150 years long history of the Marxist movement both globalist and anti-globalist
tendencies occurred. Anti-cosmopolitanism was in the early workers’ movement represented by the
non-Marxist Ferdinand Lassalle. His approach was in the early twentieth century continued by the
Hamburg National Bolsheviks Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolffheim, for whom communism was
a means to further national authenticity and German patriotism.40 Soviet communism initially assumed a globalist orientation. The USSR was considered the nucleus of a world state, with ever more
proletarian states joining up. The World Socialist Soviet Republic should eventually organise the
global economy as one integrated whole, with nations fusing into one.41 Though divided into national
sections and dominated by one of them, the Communist International was supposed to function as a
single integrated world party. The International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War formed a practical
application of the globalist spirit.
The most globalist of tendencies among early communists was probably the Leftism of Nikolai Bukharin, Karl Radek and Iurii Piatakov, who began to formulate their views during the First
World War. Propagating the slogan of “away with frontiers”, they pictured world revolution as a
completely simultaneous process of the proletarians of all countries, “who break down the frontiers
of the bourgeois state, who remove the frontier posts”. They envisioned the proletarian world state as
an integrated economy from the beginning, and rejected the principle of national self-determination.42
Rosa Luxemburg partly shared their views.43
Stalin, however, did not believe in the possibility of co-ordinating the world revolutionary
process from one centre on a day-to-day basis. In 1943 the Comintern was abolished. Believing in the
vitality of the national principle, the Soviet dictator found the World Soviet Republic no viable option for the foreseeable future. After the Second World War, Soviet-controlled Eastern-European
states were not annexed to the USSR. Autarky was the best economic model. In his later years, Stalin
opened a principled attack on “national nihilism” and “cosmopolitanism”, and on world federalism as
a capitalist fraud. For a long time to come, humanity would remain divided into separate nations,
each of which should actively nurture their own character and prevent it from being drowned in pan39
For various viewpoints on these issues, see: Bloom (1941), Connor (1984), Davis (1967), Herod (1976),
Munck (1986), Nimni (1991), Rosdolsky (1986), Szporluk (1988)
40
Dupeux, 1985: chapter v; Schüddekopf, 1960: 107-20
41
Goodman, 1960: chapter II
42
Kowalski, 1991: 32-5; Pipes, 1954: 47; Gankin/Fisher, 1940: chapter II
43
Smith, 1999: 12; Hentze, 1975: 71f, 95f, 119f
12
human culture. Increasingly, Jews were considered those most given to cosmopolitanism.44 Some
radical communist leaders, notably Kim Il Sung with his “Juche” principle, and also Ceausescu and
Pol Pot, copied Stalin’s anti-cosmopolitanism.45 Mao Zedong’s national “self-reliance” may also be
placed in the Stalinist tradition. But destalinised communism moved towards a more standard internationalism.
During the First World War, Lev Trotskii defended the idea of a “republican United States of
Europe”, as the foundation of a “United States of the World”. Trotskii always continued to envision
the world revolution as a quasi-simultaneous process, stressing world-wide dependence of events.
His Fourth International (1938) had a globalist flavour.46 Later, Che Guevara was an organisational
globalist. World revolution was a supranational mobile unit, moving from Cuba to Congo to Bolivia.47 The Cuban operations in Angola and Ethiopia continued the Guevarist tradition, though these
were arguably cases of international solidarity rather than supranational projects. Lin Biao’s world
revolution - the world village encircling the world city - also followed a globalist model, transferring
the revolutionary strategy in one country to the world as a single whole.48 Rote Armee Fraktion and
Japanese Red Army ideologies resembled the Lin Biao type. Taking the world as one integrated theatre of class war operations, their terrorist armies operated as local representatives of one world revolutionary process.
Fascism
Much of early European conservatism had a cosmopolitan character, reflecting as it did the interests
and traditions of the European “feudal” families against Jacobin nationalism. But in the course of the
nineteenth century, right-wing authoritarianism turned nationalist. In that century, the idea of a world
conspiracy of philosophers, Freemasons, Illuminati, Rosicrucians and Jews that had been the secret
force behind the Puritan and French revolutions became well established. The 1905 Protocols of the
Elders of Zion, highlighting the leading Jewish role in the conspiracy and framing it in a story about
the coming of Antichrist as predicted in the Book of Revelation, was produced among the tsarist
intelligence apparatus. The Protocols were picked up by the Black Hundred, ultraright Russian
groups established in 1904-5 and combining Slavophile and anti-Semitic themes. In 1918 the Protocols were conveyed from Russia to Germany.49 Anti-Semitism and anti-Freemasonism were constitu44
Ree, van, 2002
45
Suh (1988: especially chapter 17); Buzo (1999); Kunze (2000), Chandler (1999)
46
Knei Paz, 1979: 140-4, 306-10, 316f, chapter 9; Frank, 1979
47
For Guevara’s early pan-Latin-Americanism, see: Castañeda, 1997: chapter 3; Anderson, 1997: chapters 4-10
48
Kau, 1975: 265-319, especially 300-1
49
Laqueur, 1994: chapters 2-4; Allensworth, 1998: 126-9; Carter, 1990: 30-5
13
tive elements of proto-fascist organisations such as Charles Maurras’s Action française, and easily
combined with the idea of a world conspiracy against the nation.50
In Roger Griffin’s definition, fascism is ultra-nationalism aiming for the rebirth of the nation
and the creation of a heroic new man. Fascism is racist by definition in that it excessively celebrates
the national community, but this does not make it necessarily racist in the biological sense.51 One
rough way to distinguish two types of fascists would be between those idealising racial purity and
those emphasizing cultural aims.52 Again according to Griffin, fascist ultra-nationalism is by definition opposed to cosmopolitanism and one-worldism. However, this does not mean that these themes
are necessarily central to all tendencies. Moreover, some fascisms combine anti-cosmopolitanism
with semi-universalist ideals, for instance Aryan racism or pan-Europeanism.53
The original Italian fascism lay towards the “cultural” end of the continuum. It shaded off
into ordinary military dictatorships through intermediary types like Francism and the Greek colonels
regime. Among such states, concerns about the need to defend the nation against the world conspiracy were strong – see for example Franco’s obsessions with a “masonic super State” controlling the
world’s democracies and threatening Spain’s independence.54 Among the nazis this concern was even
stronger. For them, the global conspiracy was headed by world Jewry. The Nordic, white, Aryan race
should be prevented from being dissolved into a hybrid world community, poisoned by Jewry. At the
same time, nazism contained a globalist ideal. Hitler’s racism was not completely pure - strong elements of German state nationalism were mixed in – but his end goal was supranational, Aryan world
government.55
After the war, fascist movements continued to exist in Europe and America. Schematically,
two tendencies can, again, be identified: neo-Nazism, following racist and Aryan doctrines, and the
more culturally oriented going under names like “Eurofascism”, the New Right and the Conservative
50
Carsten, 1982: 11-7
51
Griffin, 1995: 7
52
Griffin, 1993: 45, 48; Payne, 1980: 10-1, 53, 101
53
Griffin, 1995: 4, 7-8
54
Preston, 1995: 4, 12, 494, 550-1, 700
55
Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross movement shared fears of a Jewish world conspiracy. Only peoples “rooted in
the soil” were acceptable, not for those of drifting character like Jews and Gypsies. This typically anticosmopolitan model was complemented by a semi-globalist ideal, “con-nationalism”, under which Europe
would be united in a single “state of nationalities”. Szöllösi-Jauze, 1989: 230, 240, 243, 247. See also: Griffin,
1993: 138-9. In Corneliu Codreanu’s Iron Guard anti-semitism was even more central. Rumanian fascism believed in the Jewish world conspiracy of the Protocols. God – Codreanu was Orthodox - allotted every people
with a piece of soil of their own, in which they are rooted like a tree. See: Heystek, 1996: 116-21, 138-54. In
the 1930’s, the Jewish world conspiracy theory was defended in the United States by the nazi-related organisation Silver Shirts, with leaders William Pelley and Gerald Smith. See: Levin, 2002: 4
14
Revolution.56 “Aryan” groups did not typically embrace a German oriention but more often a generalised Western or Nordic race concept. This semi-universalist orientation allowed them to establish
minuscule transnational organisations throughout the Western world. In an effort to bolster a Western
identity against the globalising world centre, Aryanism on occasion embraced paganism or IndoEuropean occultism.57 In America, Wesley Swift’s Christian Identity movement and Richard Butler’s
Aryan Nations began to refer to a Zionist Occupational Government: the Jewish world conspiracy
had actually taken over power.58 Among oppositional forces in Brezhnevite Russia there was an Aryan tendency too.59
The other strand of fascism did not work towards race war but defended an allegedly typically European heroism, sometimes fortified by elements of paganism. Important ideologues have been
Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist en Francis Yockey. The fear of a global Jewish conspiracy was perhaps less pronounced here than among the pure racists. Instead, the universalist element was stronger. Finding inspiration in the “Guibelline” tradition of thinkers like Dante, these fascists nurtured a
pan-European ideal of empire, uniting all European nations for world rule.60 They were further inspired by Heidegger, German “Conservative Revolutionists” Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck,
“National Revolutionaries” like Ernst Jünger, and left-wing nazis such as Otto Strasser.61 For their
anti-cosmopolitanism, they also had a strong Russian tradition to look back to. The nineteenth century pan-Slavist and anti-cosmopolitan Nikolai Danilevskii divided humanity into unmixable and absolutely distinct “historico-cultural types”.62 The “Eurasian” tendency of the early twenties of the twentieth century, initiated by Nikolai Trubetskoi, agreed with Danilevskii’s rejection of “pan-human”
56
Griffin, 1995: 313-5
57
Kevin Coogan (1999: chapter 30, 47) discusses the background of this tendency of European racism and
paganism in the ideology of Heinrich Himmler, Walther Darré and the Waffen SS.
58
See Levin, 2002: 4. For an overview of post-war far-right conspiracy ideologues and organisations in Ameri-
ca see: Rupert, 2000: 96-110
59
A. Fetisov saw history as the eternal struggle between the Jewish principle of chaos and the Germanic-Slavic
principle of order. Dunlop, 1983: 41-2. The main Aryan and neo-pagan fascists in Brezhnevite Russia were
Valerii Skurlatov and Valerii Emel’ianov, who newly popularised the Protocols. See: Allensworth, 1998: 224;
Laqueur, 1994: chapter 9; Carter, 1990: 109
60
See Coogan (1999)
61
For the pre-war Conservative Revolution see: Griffin, 1993: 91-4; Schüddekopf, 1960; Dupeux, 1976: 18-38;
Griffin, 1995: 96-115
62
Walicki, 1975: 503f, 513f. Danilevskii’s theory was prefigured in Apollon Grigor’ev’s work. See: ibid: 509-
13. The ultra-conservative, Orthodox, nineteenth-century Russian thinker Konstantin Leont’ev was another
principled opponent of cosmopolitanism. According to his theory, social organisms typically develop through
three stages of initial simplicity, flourishing complexity and equalizing mixture. Cosmopolitanism fits the last,
degenerative stage. See: Utechin, 1963: 165; Walicki, 1975: 517-22
15
universalism as a Romanic-Germanic fraud.63 Like Western Europe and the United States, Brezhnevite Russia, too, knew its anti-cosmopolitan fascists of the not strictly racist type.64
Christian fundamentalism
Among the various Christian fundamentalisms, too, cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan trends have
occurred. Given the cosmopolitan nature of this church, among Roman-Catholic fundamentalists
systematic anti-cosmopolitanism has been absent. After the Second Vatican Council (1962-5), a protest movement of “traditionalist” Catholicism emerged and had by the mid-1970s grown into a
worldwide phenomenon. The American professor of theology Gommar De Pauw, American Father
Francis Fenton, and French archbishop Marcel Lefebvre were leading figures. In this milieu, anticosmopolitan echoes were audible, when it was claimed that the church was undermined from within
by a Masonic-Jewish conspiracy.65
Orthodoxy carrying stronger national marks than Catholicism, among Russian religious
thinkers cosmopolitanism was never very popular. In the early nineteenth-century work of the young
Petr Chaadaev a cosmopolitan element was audible. History lay through mutual interchange of ideas
on the widest possible, global scale; nationalism retarded progress. But, typically, Chaadaev sympathised with Roman Catholicism.66 Another nineteenth century Russian philosopher to nurture the
cosmopolitan idea of mankind as a “collective organism” was Vladimir Solov’ev. Nations are mere
organs of humanity; they should “deny themselves” and serve God’s universal cause. Solov’ev expected the establishment of a Christian world state, perhaps preceded by Mongol world conquest and
the coming of Antichrist in the person of a World President. Typically, he, too, sympathised with
Roman Catholicism.67 Under the Brezhnevite regime, anti-cosmopolitan extremists like Gennadii
Shimanov, who hoped to bring the communist party and the Orthodox church together on a patriotic
63
Hielscher, 1993: 26-7; Thom, 1994: 65-7; Luks, 2000: 51; Utechin, 1963: 256. Eurasianism was continued in
the sixties and seventies by Lev Gumilev. See: Naarden (1996); Kochanek (1998)
64
In the 1970’s Sergei Semanov and Nikolai Ivanov developed a radical Russian patriotism, warning against
“cosmopolitanism” and the Jewish-Masonic conspiracy subverting the Russian state. Dunlop, 1983: 258-62.
See also Dunlop (p.218) on Viktor Chalmaev’s warnings against having a mad passion for things foreign.
65
Dinges, 1994: 66-78, 89-92
66
Anderson, 1967: 197-8; Walicki, 1975: chapter 3
67
Walicki, 1975: chapter 15; Utechin, 1963: 176-7. Dostoevskii’s ideal of “universal humanity” is more or less
exclusively embodied in the Russian people, which has the mission to spread it world-wide. He is therefore
arguably a nationalist rather than a cosmopolitan thinker. See: ibid: 551f; Utechin, 1963: 87-90. See also N.F.
Fedorov’s remarkable ideas about world unification. Utechin, 1963: 177-9. See also Danilevskii’s dream of a
pan-Slav empire, and Leont’ev’s ideal of a restored Byzantine empire. See: Shenfield, 2001: 28-9
16
and anti-Zionist platform, defended Russia against the Masonic-Jewish world conspiracy and the
Satanic forces.68
The universalist character of the Christian faith notwithstanding, the Protestant tradition has
always been linked to nationalism. Following an interpretation brought from Great Britain to the
United States by John Nelson Darby in the nineteenth century, American Protestant fundamentalists
read the books Daniel and Revelation as indicating that the Roman Empire would be restored. The
new world ruler, Antichrist, would take control of a restored state of Israel. After a period of “Tribulation” and the battle of Armageddon, Christ would establish his world-wide kingdom.69 The establishment of the League of Nations triggered the fears of a world government – the new Rome. In
their majority Protestant fundamentalists were pro-Zionist - the creation of a new Israel was part of
the prophecy. But as Antichrist was expected to rule Israel, leader of the Defenders of the Christian
Faith Gerald Winrod concluded in the nineteen-thirties that he would be a Jew, leading a conspiracy
to rule the world. Anti-cosmopolitanism has always been stimulated among American Protestant
fundamentalists by the belief that the United States are a “city on a hill” ordained by God as the light
to the nations.70 Outside established Protestantism, Sun Myung Moon’s “Unification Church”, arising
in Korea in the 1950s and then spreading to the West, is relevant in the present context. The movement’s globalist goal included the establishment of a Kingdom of God, in which “there will be no
need for passports”.71
In conclusion of this brief survey, pre-1980 radicalism contained significant globalist themes.
Two things strike the eye. First, all three ideologies discussed here nurtured anti- as well as counterglobalist notions. Communism knew powerful anti-cosmopolitan trends; fascism knew its own globalist ideals; and to put Roman-Catholic and Orthodox fundamentalists among the counter-globalists
and Protestant among anti-globalists is too schematic. Assuming that pre-1980 globalism provides
indications for later developments, our hypothetical matrix will, indeed, turn out to be overly simple.
Second, globalist concepts developed among these movements were for a part overlapping and interconnected. The hope for a future world state is in the Western world rooted in the idea of the “universal empire”, repeating the traditions of the Roman Empire and the biblical Kingdom of God. The
Christian fundamentalists return us, of course, directly to biblical mythology. Fascists have on
occasion absorbed Christian apocalyptics too, beside the political, “Roman” tradition of empire.
However, in the cases of Aryan world rule and the communist world republic, links with these two
original traditions are less direct. The converse fear of an evil world state, central to many Christian
fundamentalist doctrines, is rooted in biblical apocalyptics too. The fascist myth of the Jewish-
68
Laqueur, 1994: 67, 70; Allensworth, 1998: 163; Carter, 1990: 106-9
69
Ammerman, 1994: 6-7, 16-7; Harding, 1994: 57-63; Weber, 1979: 9-12, 17, 21-4, 106-8; Sandeen, 1970:
chapters 1-3
70
Ammerman, 1994: 23, 35, 40; Weber, 1979: 126, 128, 145-7
17
Masonic world conspiracy is linked but not completely reducible to this: the Antichrist theme is not
always included, and mostly other elements, for example biological anti-Semitism, are added. Again,
in communist anti-cosmopolitanism the world conspiracy returns, but in yet another translation: antiSemitism is included but the doctrine is framed in more straightforwardly patriotic terms, lacking the
religious and biological undertones.
Conclusion
Perhaps somewhat perversely, I have in the present paper attempted to shed some initial doubts on
the tenability of the hypothesis of the increasing significance and centrality of globalist concerns
among post-1980 radical movements. First, it is still a point of debate whether globalisation has
reached a stage where the nation-state is undermined to such a degree that it would trigger powerful
anti- and counter-globalist movements, hoping either to counter the trend of diminishing state power
or to develop alternatives to it. Second, even if the globalising process is powerful enough to trigger
all kinds of identity movements in response, this need not necessarily make such movements explicitly “globe-oriented”, to use Roland Robertson’s term. And, finally, even should we observe a powerful globalist orientation of present-day radical movements, we must still avoid the rash conclusion
that we have discovered a new trend. Among the ideological movements discussed here – communism, fascism and Christian fundamentalism – important globalist elements have been present
long before 1980.
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