The Invention of a Tradition: The Question of Arab Acceptance of the Zionist Right to
Palestine during World War I
Author(s): Charles D. Smith
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter, 1993), pp. 48-61
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
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THE INVENTIONOF A TRADITION
The Questionof ArabAcceptanceof
theZionistRightto Palestineduring
WorldWar I
CHARLESD. SMITH
An essay occasionedby the republicationof TheQuestionofPalestine:
British-Jewish-Arab
Relations,
1914-1918, by Isaiah Friedman.*
TheQuestionofPalestinefirstappearedin 1973. It contributed
to a tradition,encouragedalso by thelate Elie Kedourie,thatGreatBritain'sdealings
withArab notablesduringWorld War I were honestand direct. Summarizedas briefly
as possible,thistradition
arguesthatBritishofficialsin Cairo,
afterhurriedconsultationwiththe ForeignOfficein London,promisedthat
Charles D. Smith, formerly
of San Diego State University,
will become
chairmanof the Near East Studiesdepartment
at Wayne StateUniversity
in
September1993. He is theauthorofPalestineand theArab-Israeli
Conflict
(St.
Martin'sPress, 1988, rev. ed., 1992). This articlereflectswork on the
broadertopicof British-Arab
relationsduringWorld War I and how these
relations have been interpreted,then and subsequently,in historical
scholarship.Portionsof the researchforthis projectwere fundedby the
AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,the San Diego State UniversityResearch
Foundation,and the VirginiaFoundationforthe Humanities. The author
alone is responsibleforthe contentsor conclusionsfoundhere.
* Second,expandededition.New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction
Publishers,1992.
bibliography
to p. 426. Indexto p. 433. $24.95 paper.
LXV
+ 332 pages. Notesand
Jounial of PalestinieStudies XXII, no. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 48-61.
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THE INVENTION OF A TRADITION
49
certainArab lands of the OttomanEmpirewould be independentafterthe
war. These promises,neverembodiedin an officialtreaty,
werecontainedin
theHusayn-McMahon
correspondence
coveringtheperiodfromJuly1915 to
February1916. The correspondents
weretheSharifHusaynofMecca and Sir
HenryMcMahon,the high commissionerin Cairo, and the exchangesresultedeventuallyin the Arab Revoltof June1916.1
Accordingto thistradition,
subsequentBritishtreatieswithher European
allies,notablytheSykes-Picot
Agreement
of 1916 thatdistributed
theseArab
lands betweenBritainand France,fulfilledthe promisesof Arab independence made to SharifHusayn. Indeed, the agreement'snegotiators,
Mark
Sykesand GeorgesPicot,supposedlytold Husayn the detailsof the agreementin 1917 and gainedhis acceptanceofitsterms.LaterBritishor AngloFrenchassurances(1917-18) of Arab independence,in thisview,were not
inconsistent
withgreatpowerarrangements
forcontroloftheregionafterthe
war.2
A keyelementin thecreationof thistraditionhas to do with"The QuestionofPalestine." Palestinewas notmentionedin SharifHusayn'sfirstletter
to McMahonalthoughit fellwithintheboundariesof theArab stateor conof statesthathe proposed;no regionswere specified.Butin later
federation
exchanges,McMahonidentifiedareas and administrative
districtsas either
important
to theBritishand deservingspecial status(Baghdadand Basravilayets)or as territory
thathe soughtto reserveforFrancesuch as coastalSyria
(includingtheLebanon) and southeastAnatolia;Palestinewas neverreferred
to in thegive-and-take
overtheseproposals. Neitherwere the lands where
Britishpromiseswerequalifiedby a deliberately
to heroblivague reference
gations to "her ally, France." Husayn rejectedMcMahon's exclusionsin
principlewhile leavingtheirresolutionuntilwar's end.3
Friedmanand Kedourieboth argue,withwidelydiffering
emphases,that
Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi, a self-appointedintermediaryof Sharif
Husayn's,eitherdirectly
(accordingto Friedman)or indirectly
(accordingto
Kedourie) acknowledgedthatPalestinecould be excluded fromArab demands. They are in completeagreementthatSharifHusayn,when interviewedby David Hogarthin January1918, acceptedthe BalfourDeclaration
and the Zionistrightto Palestine.4 This articleis devotedto Friedman's
study,but I shall referwhereappropriateto Kedourieand to otherscholars
who, unlikeFriedmanand Kedourie,contribute
to thethesisoutlinedabove
moreby interpretation
of sources.5
thanby misrepresentation
in Israel,
Isaiah Friedman,a professorofhistoryat Ben-GurionUniversity
had firstsummarizedthisthesisin a 1970 articlethatappearedin theJournal
History
and in his rejoinderto commentson thatarticleby
of Contemporaty
ArnoldToynbee,who had been a memberof the PoliticalIntelligenceDein theBritishForeignOfficein 1918.6 Friedmanis also theauthor
partment
of Germany,
and Zionism,1897-1918 (1977), and is the editorand
Turkey,
annotatorofthefirsttwelvevolumes,spanningtheperiod1840-1920, of The
RiseofIsrael. A Documentary
Record(1988).
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50
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
This new editionof The Questionof Palestinereflectsthe additionof an
introductory
chaptertitled"BritishSchemesforthe Restorationof Jews to
Palestine,1840-1880." It reveals,accordingto Friedman,a long-standing
Britishinterestin restoring
theJewsto Palestine,an interestindicatingthat
the road to the BalfourDeclarationcould actuallybe tracedto the sixteenth
century(p. ix). Beyondthisnew introduction,
however,the textstandsas
publishedin 1973. The extensivebibliographyremainsas originallycompiled,meaningthatno scholarshipofthepast twenty
yearshas been considered. He has used BritishForeignOfficeand Cabinet documents,private
papers,and documentsfoundin the CentralZionistArchives.7
Accordingto Friedman,he began his researchbecause of questionsraised
by his reading of Leonard Stein's The BaifourDeclaration(1961). The
ofthebook lies in Friedman'stracingofBritish-Zionist
strength
contactsand
Zionistdiscussionsregardingtheirfutureaspirations.His materialadds to
Stein'sbut does not challengethe latter'sfindings.Bothbooks have been
superseded,forthemomentat least,on thebroadertopicof Zionism,ifnot
the BalfourDeclaration,by Vital'sZionism.The CrucialPhase.8
WhereFriedmangoes farbeyondSteinis in his extensiveinvestigation
of
thequestionofwhetherBritainhad, ifonlyinadvertently,
promisedPalestine
to the SharifHusayn of Mecca in the Husayn-McMahoncorrespondence.
Steinverybriefly
(pp. 266-69) dismissestheidea, arguingwithrespectto the
Anglo-French
Sykes-Picot
Agreement
of 1916 thatPalestine'sdesignationas
an international
zone under that agreementin no way violatedpromises
given to Sharif Husayn. He does not analyze the Husayn-McMahon
correspondence.
Friedmandoes so at greatlengthin orderto assert,as had Steinand later
Verete,thatPalestinehad been reservedby McMahon.9 Indeed, Friedman
contendsthattheYoungArabParty,withwhichHusaynhad been in contact
in 1914-15,was itselfwillingto cede not onlyPalestinebut muchof coastal
Syriaand the Lebanon, along with most of Iraq. What Arab nationalists
reallywantedas an independentstate,accordingto Friedman,was merely
the narrowstripin Syriadefinedby the citiesof Damascus, Homs, Hama,
and Aleppo and extendingsouthwardto includetheregioneast oftheJordan
and theArabianpeninsula;existingBritishlinksto
River,laterTransjordan,
Aden and the Gulf shaykhdomswould be acknowledged.Friedmanthus
claims, as did Kedourie,thatthe Sykes-PicotAgreementfulfilledBritain's
promisesmade to Husayn in 1915, especiallyin McMahon's letterof 24
October.10
were acceptedby both
Accordingto Friedman,McMahon's reservations
SharifHusaynand MuhammadSharifal-Faruqi,who "themselvesexcluded
it was not a
[Palestine]fromtheirdesideratasince,unliketheSyrianinterior,
purelyArab territory"
p.
330).
Indeed,
"Al-Faruqi
specificallymen(QP,
tionedPalestineby name when excludingit, as well as the Syrianlittoral,
fromthe area destinedto become an Arab state"(JCH,p. 199; see also pp.
105-7). They did this because Palestinewas inhabitedby membersof a
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THE INVENTION OF A TRADITION
51
"foreignrace,"meaningabout 100,000Jews(QP, pp. 84, 330).1" Friedman,
and Verete,thusarguethatPalestinewas partof the "northwest"regionreserved,but not referred
to as such, by McMahon in his 24 October 1915
letterto Husayn. In fact,the "northwest"regioncomprisedthe areas west
and northof Damascus,Homs,Hama, and Aleppo thatMcMahondeclaredto
be not "purelyArab." This reservation
supposedlymetwithHusayn'sand
al-Faruqi'sapproval.12
Furtheracceptance came in Husayn's apparentrecognitionof Zionist
claims to Palestineduringthe visitof David Hogarthto Jidda in January
1918. BothFriedmanand Kedourierejectthe claim made by GeorgeAntonius thatHogarth'sdepictionof the BalfourDeclarationalteredits original
meaning. Hogarthhad toldHusaynthatthedeclaration,
in Britain'sopinion,
guaranteed"the economicand politicalfreedomof the existingpopulation"
(emphasis added), whereasthe originaltextmentionedonly the "civil and
religiousrightsof the non-Jewish
population."13
KedouriestatesthatHogarthsimply"reiterated"the BalfourDeclaration
clauses,but Friedman,while agreeing,movesto higherground. In his view,
"legallythe HogarthMessage could not overrulean earliercommitment
of
greaterweight"(QP, p. 328), and in any case, "The PalestinianArabs had
not the statusof hostswhose approvalof theJewishNationalHome had to
be solicited;theJewshad an unalienablerightto Palestineindependently
of
Arab wishes" (QP, p. 330).
Thereis, forFriedman,a juridicalqualityto Zionistclaimsindependentof
Arab acceptancewhich,he insists,did occur. At the same time,Friedman
stressesthatArabsin general,and Palestiniansin particular,
had no rightto
challengeBritish-French
"legitimate
interests
in theregion"(QP, p. 67), and
thatthe ZionistsservedBritain'simperialinterestsfar more than did the
Arabs; indeed, Friedmannotes approvinglythat "Zionism thus helped to
legitimiseBritain'spositionin Palestine,which otherwisewould have been
based solelyon military
has
conquest"(QP, p. 305). The argument
therefore
fouraspects: British-French
rightsto decide thefateof theregionin pursuit
oftheirlegitimate
imperialinterests;
theblendingofZionistgoals and British
imperialambitions;Jewishrightsto Palestineindependentof Arab wishes;
and in anycase explicitArabacceptanceofPalestine'sexclusionfromland to
be consideredArab.
I have elaboratedFriedman'sarguments
withquotationsbecause his book
purportsto be a workofdisinterested
scholarship.He refersto officialdocumentsto back his contentions,
and declaresat the end of his responseto
ArnoldToynbeethat"Whetheror not the subjecthas any politicalbearing
[sic],is notforme to say. Forme itwas and remainsan academicissue and I
hope I treatedit in thatspirit"(JCH,p. 201). Disputesoverthemeaningof
McMahon's24 Octoberletterhavecreateda "myth"regarding
thepositionof
PalestinebetweenAraband Jew,accordingto Friedman,but Britain'srecord
was "clean."
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52
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
Unfortunately,
Friedman'sown recordis not as clean as he would like
Britain'sto be. He has manipulatedsources,omittingmaterialfromsome
and misrepresenting
others,in orderto reach his conclusions. As a result,
thisbook,whendealingwithArabissues,does notmeeteventhemostbasic
professional
standardsexpectedof scholarlyinquiry.I will elaborate,noting
certainerrorsas well as buttressing
mychargeof manipulationof sources.
Friedman'streatment
of the Husayn-McMahoncorrespondenceis deeply
flawed. First,whenreferring
to thematterofwhatArabindependencesignified,he argues(QP, p. 66) thatit essentiallymeanttheindependenceof the
Muslimholyplaces. He confusesone yearwithanotherhere,statingthatSir
EdwardGrey'scommunicationof 14 Aprilto thiseffectled directlyto the
ArabRevoltofJune1916. Gray'scommunication
was dated 14 April1915, a
yearearlier.Furthermore,
its statusas an officialstatement,
whileprotecting
the Britishgovernment,
did not mitigatethe impactof Britishpropaganda
leafletsthathad been droppedoverthe Hijaz, Palestine,and Syriasince December1914 promisingindependenceto all theseregionsin orderto draw
the Arabsto the Britishside. In otherwords,theboundariesof Arab independenceclaimedby theSharifHusaynin his firstletterto HenryMcMahon
thelands promisedto be independentin theBritishleaflets,as
approximated
distinctfromGrey'spronouncement.
Far more serious is the questionof whetherPalestinewas promisedto
SharifHusaynin theHusayn-McMahon
correspondence.Myown positionis
thatof Britishofficials,includingArthurBalfour,who believedthatit had
thatis, by notbeingspecifically
excluded. There
been, ifonlyinadvertently,
is littledoubtthattheBritishintendedto reserveit fordisposal,in agreement
withFranceifnecessary.Thereis also littledoubtthattheallies reservedall
issues fordisposal accordingto theirneeds at the end of thewar,regardless
of promisesmade to thirdparties,or, in Britain'scase, to her ally France.
Imperialpowerhad its prerogatives
and, in Balfour'sview at least,required
no apologies. What is remarkableis how eagerFriedmanand Kedourieare
of
to apologizeforthispowerby arguingfora purity,
as opposed to sincerity,
motivesnot feltby mostBritishofficialsat the time.
How does Friedmandeal withthissubject? Let us firstaddresshis claim
thatal-Faruqiand HusaynexcludedPalestinefromthe lands theyclaimed
shouldbe Arab. For evidence,Friedmanrefersto a "Memorandum[on the
in Cairo,
YoungArabParty]"by GilbertClayton,head ofmilitary
intelligence
dated 11 October 1915.14 He relies on this memorandumforhis further
contentionthatthe Young Arab Partywas willingto take only Damascus,
Homs,Hama, and Aleppo,leavingPalestineand westernSyriato theFrench,
and Iraq to the British.He buttresseshis statementsby referencesto two
letterssentby MarkSykeson 20 and 22 November1915, thefirstto London
and the second,not identified
by Friedman,to PercyCox in Basra.
What do thedocumentsactuallysay? A samplingof quotationswill illustrateFriedman'sstyleand his accuracyof representing
documents. First,
Claytonin his memorandumquotes al-Faruqito the effectthat
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THE INVENTION OF A TRADITION
53
They[YoungArabParty]
realisethatto attempt
tocarry
outtheideaofan
ArabEmpirein itsentirety
is probably
outsidetheregionofpractical
politicsatpresent,
andhe atanyrateappreciates
thefactthatEnglandis bound
byobligations
to herAlliesin thiswar....
El-Farugi
statesthata guarantee
of theindependence
of theArabian
withan institution
ofan
Peninsula
wouldnotsatisfy
them,
butthistogether
increasing
measure
ofautonomous
government
underBritish
guidanceand
in Palestine
control,
and Mesopotamia,
wouldprobably
securetheirprogramme.Syriais of courseincludedin theirprogramme
buttheymust
in thisregion,although
El FarugiderealisethatFrancehas aspirations
claresthata Frenchoccupation
ofSyriawouldbe strenuously
resisted
by
theMohammadan
people.Theywouldhowever
no doubtseekEngland's
of theSyrianquestionin a
good offices
towards
obtaining
a settlement
manner
as favourable
as possibletotheir
viewsandwouldalmostcertainly
pressfortheinclusion
ofDamascus,Aleppo,HamaandHomsin theArab
In El Farugi'sownwords"ourschemesembraceall the
Confederation.
butifwe cannothaveall
Arabcountries
including
SyriaandMesopotamia,
we wantas muchas we canget...." [Clayton
concluded
that]theinfluenless
tialleadersappearopento reasonand readyto acceptconsiderably
ambitious
whichthemore
schemesthanthatwhichtheyhaveformulated,
enlightened
allowtobe beyondtheirhopesat present.
It will be seen thatPalestineas well as Mesopotamiaare mentionedspecificallyas essentialrequisitesforguaranteesofArabindependence,to be developed underBritishtutelage,
withSyriahoped forin itsentirety.On theother
hand, the Damascus,Homs, Hama, Aleppo line is the minimumthe Arabs
will settleforin Syria,alongwithPalestineand Mesopotamia.Claytonnotes
twicethatthe Arabs recognizethattheycannot achieve all theirgoals "at
present."
We can contrast
thismaterialwiththeversionbased on theClaytonmemorandumthatFriedmanpresents(QP, p. 82;JCH,pp. 105-7). In theformer
sourcehe states:
Al-Faruqi
conveyed
theimpression
thattheaimsof [the]societieswere
moderate.
Theyfully
realisedthattheestablishment
ofan ArabEmpire,
as
they
visualised
it,wasentirely
[emphasis
added]outsidetherealmofpractical politics:inal-Faruqi's
ownwords:"ourschemeembraces
all theArab
butifwe cannothaveall,we
countries,
including
SyriaandMesopotamia,
wantas muchas we can get." Theyappreciated
thatin theregionsin
to herAlliesand they
questionEnglandwas boundby herobligations
theFrench
wouldrecognise
positionin Syria[emphasisadded]. The pointon
whichtheYoungArabswouldnotbudgewas theinclusion
ofDamascus,
Aleppo,Hamaand Homsin theArabConfederation.
Otherwise,
Clayton
noted,theleadersoftheArabsocieties
were"opentoreasonandreadyto
less ambitious
schemethanthatwhichtheyformuaccepta considerably
lated"earlier.
Friedmandoes not mentionPalestinein thisquotationalthoughhe claims,
relyingon this memorandum,that al-Faruqi specificallyexcluded it from
Arab demands(QP, pp. 82-84; JCH, pp. 105-7, 199). As we can see, he
specifically
includedit. The Arabsdid not "recognisetheFrenchpositionin
Syria"accordingto Clayton.He notedthattheywereawareof French"aspirations"thereand wouldoppose them. The Arabsdid notsee theirdreamof
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54
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
an empireas "entirely"impractical
nor did theyabandon it; theywerewilling,in Clayton'swords,to defertheseambitions"at present,"meaningfor
the moment.
Friedmanthenpursuesthisthemefurther,
arguingthatal-Faruqi,in conversationswithMarkSykes,acceptedan Arabstatelimitedto thefourSyrian
cities, the futureTransjordan,and Arabia. He thus recognizedseparate
Frenchand BritishspheresofinfluencewhereArab aspirationsforindependence were renounced,meaningPalestine,coastal Lebanon and Syria,and
Iraq (QP, p. 83;JCH, pp. 106-7).'5
Thereis no evidencefortheseassertions.Sykesstatesin his firstletterthat
the Arabswould grantthe Frenchconcessionaryprivilegesin Palestineand
Syria,thesame in Iraq fortheBritish.It is clear,thoughimplicit,thatthisis
withinthe framework
of an Arab stateor statesgrantingsuch concessions.
No mentionof Damascus,Homs, Hama, or Aleppo as reservedforan Arab
stateis made. This meaningis clarifiedin Sykes'secondlettertwodayslater,
to Cox, wherehe statesthattheArabsdesirean independentstateor confederationincludingthe"vilayetsofDamascus,Beirut,Aleppo,Mosul,Baghdad,
and Sanjaks of Urfa,Deir Zor, Jerusalem."This independencewould be
"qualified" for reasons of protectionand assistance by agreementswith
Franceand GreatBritain,but appointment
of Britishor Frenchofficialswas
subjectto Arab approval. Friedman'sinterpretations
are thusuntenable.
It is important
forFriedmanto establishthesepoints,helpedby rearrangementof chronology,
because theylead to his basic contentionthatPalestine,
bybeingceded to theFrenchby theArabs,was willinglyexcludedfromArab
lands beforeMcMahon wrotehis letterof 24 October 1915 to the Sharif
Husayn.16 Thus, McMahon supposedlyassumed Palestine'sexclusionand
so informedthe foreignsecretary,
Sir EdwardGrey,on 26 October.
As Friedmanpresentsthematter(QP, pp. 85-86;JCH, p. 109), McMahon
wrote the followingdispatch that Friedmanreproduceswith an ellipsis
inserted:
I amnotawareoftheextent
ofFrenchclaimsin Syria,norofhowfarHis
Majesty's
them.Hence. . . I have
Government
haveagreedto recognise
endeavoured
toprovideforpossibleFrenchpretensions
tothoseplacesby
a general
modification
totheeffect
thatHis Majesty's
canonly
Government
giveassurances
in regard
"inwhichshecan actwithout
tothoseterritories
to theinterests
detriment
ofherallyFrance."
Friedmanthendeclaresthat"The territory
aboutwhichMcMahonwas dubious as to theextentofFrenchclaimsbeingrecognisedby theBritishGovernmentwas Palestine,or morepreciselythe Sanjak ofJerusalem"(p. 86). He
concludesthatas theBritishhad reservedPalestinefortheFrench,withArab
on thesegrounds,not
approval,theZionistclaim to Palestinewas legitimate
simplyon thebasis of theJewishrightto thatland.
The problemis thatthematerialobscuredby theellipsisreads as follows:
thetownsofDamascus,Hama Homs and Aleppo
"[Hence]whilerecognising
as beingwithinthecircleofArabcountries...." McMahonnevermentions
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THE INVENTIONOF A TRADITION
55
Palestinein theletter,and Friedmanhas had to use an ellipsisin thequotationin orderto obscurethatfactand to claim thathe did. He thusfalsifies
himself.'7Such a misthedocument,unlikeVeretewho simplycontradicts
of a documentviolatesall scholarlycriteria.
representation
Furthermisuseof documentsappearsin Friedman'sand Kedourie'sconto Palestine'sexclusionfrompostwar
tentionthatArabs agreedspecifically
This led bothto statethatDavid Hogarth,based
independentArabterritory.
in Cairo, presentedthe details of the BalfourDeclarationin full to Sharif
Husaynand thatthe latteracceptedthem,meaningthathe recognizedthe
Zionistrightto Palestine. As notedabove, thisargumentreliedon the conclusionthatto tell Husaynthatthe politicalrightsof the PalestinianArabs
would be protectedwas identicalwiththe intentof thedeclaration.This in
of Hogarth'sreitselfis untrue.Beyondthis,however,is the representation
portof his visit.
Friedmandoes not quote fromHogarth'sreport.He merelyargues(QP,
pp. 328-29; JCH, pp. 196-97) thatHogarth'smessagedid not departfrom
theBalfourDeclarationand thatHusayn"[came]to termswithit." Kedourie
assented" to Zionist
goes further.He statesthatHusayn "enthusiastically
overthe BalfourDeclaration
settlement
in Palestineand was "[unconcerned]
and Zionistaims" (AAL,pp. 190-91).
statement.Kedouriecitesportionsof Hogarth'sreThis is an important
theentirematter.He quotes
portbutomitsa keysentenceand misrepresents
as statingthatHusayn"probablyknowslittleor nothingof
Hogarthcorrectly
the actualor possible economyof Palestineand his readyassentto Jewish
settlement
thereis notworthverymuch.""8 Buttheparagraphin fullreads
as follows:
norwasI inJewstateinPalestine
TheKingwouldnotacceptan independent
[emstructed
towarnhimthatsucha Statewascontemplated
byGreatBritain
phasisadded]. He probablyknowslittleor nothingof the actualor
of Palestineand his readyassentto Jewishsettlement
possibleeconomy
adthefinancial
thereis notworth
verymuch.ButI thinkhe appreciates
withtheJews.
vantages
ofArabcooperation
thathe withheld
withholdsHogarth'sacknowledgment
Kedourietherefore
fromHusaynthenatureofZionistgoals whichhe knewHusaynwould repudiate;thisenables Kedourieto claim thatHusaynwas unconcernedoverZionistaims. While not an insertionof ellipses to obscurematerial,thisis a
of a document and a violation of scholarly
serious misrepresentation
standards.
in Palestinein a context
What Husaynacceptedwas Zionist"settlement"
whereArab politicalas well as economicinterestswere apparentlyguaranteed by the Britishin lightof Hogarth'smessage,a major alterationof the
intentionof the BalfourDeclaration. Antonius,not Kedourie,is correcton
thismatter.Where Antoniuserrsis in assumingthiswas a sincereBritish
"assurance"oftheirown intentions.Rather,theHogarthmessagewas a necdesignedto ensureArab acquiescencein Britishexessarycircumlocution
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56
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
pansion into Arab lands and to retainHusayn's cooperationagainst the
Turks.19
In the same vein,Chaim Weizmanntold the AmirFaysal in June 1918
thattheZionistshad no wish to createa Jewishgovernment
in Palestineand
promisedfinancialassistanceas had Hogarthto Husayn. He did so in order
to gain Arab acceptanceof the BalfourDeclarationand in orderto prevent
Arabsfromresisting
Britishoccupationoftheregionnow thatthedeclaration
had been publicized. This is a good exampleoftheZionistserviceto British
imperialgoals to whichFriedmanalludes and aboutwhichWeizmann,who
consistently
stressedthe complementarity
of British-Zionist
objectives,himselfcomplainedat times.20
Palestine,therefore,
was neitherspecifically
promisedto SharifHusaynnor
specifically
excludedby HenryMcMahon. It did fallwithinthe boundaries
definingArab independencerequestedin Husayn'sfirstletterto McMahon,
and it was logicalforhim to expectthatit retainedthatstatus. Conversely,
Palestinewas apparentlypledgedto be Jewishin 1917, witha Jewishstate
beingtheultimategoal accordingto thespirit,butnotthetext,oftheBalfour
Declaration;thewordingof the documentwas ambiguous.2"
WhetherSharifHusaynor AmirFaysalwouldhave everagreedto a Jewish
statethatdenied PalestinianArabstheirrightto a separatepoliticalentityis
anotherquestion,one thatcannotbe givena definitive
answer. The sources
do show,however,thattheiracceptanceofJewishsettlement
in Palestinein
1918 was predicatedon Britishrecognitionof PalestinianArab political
rights.In addition,theZionistgoal ofa Jewishstatein Palestinewas omitted
fromHogarth'spresentation
to SharifHusayn,because Hogarthknewhe opposed it. The aim was specifically
denied by Weizmannto AmirFaysal.
Thereis no doubtthatFaysal,at the peace conferencein 1919, excluded
Palestinefromthe area to fallwithintheindependentArab stateenvisioned
forSyria.Nevertheless,
thatdid notdenythepossibleexistenceofa separate
Arab politicalentityor Arab sovereignty
in Palestine;specificmentionof
Palestineas a Jewishstatedoes not appear in the Faysal-WeizmannagreementofJanuary1919. What Faysaldid recognizewas "the moralclaimsof
theZionists"and thattherewere "conflicting
claims,"but he knew thatthe
PalestinianArabswere "theenormousmajority"and presentedArabsas believing that their "interests[regardingPalestine] .
.
. may safelybe leftin the
hands of the BritishGovernment."22
It seems clear thatboth sides were maneuvering
to gain greatpower acceptanceof theirobjectives.In Faysal'scase, he also wishedto hold out the
forhis anti-French
efof receivingZionistfinancialcontributions
possibility
fortsin Syria,as he had been encouragedto expectby Weizmann. Thus he
could statein an interview
withLe Matinin March 1919 thathe opposed a
in Palestineand, at therequestofWeizmann,declare
Jewishcommonwealth
Arabsympathy
withZionistaspirationsin a letterto Felix Frankfurter
shortly
afterwards.In all of this,PalestinianArabviewswere ignoredbecause they
wereknownto oppose Zionistgoals,whichforsome includedtheexpulsion
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THE INVENTIONOF A TRADITION
57
of theArab populationto make roomforincomingJewishimmigrants;
this
had been publicizedduring1918.23
It is clearthatArab notables,on thebasis of information
givenby British
officials,
distinguished
betweenJewishimmigration
(settlement)and a Jewish state: thesewerenotsynonymous
to them,as suggestedby Friedmanand
Kedourie. Conversely,
Zionistleaderswere frankin theirdiscussionswith
Britishand otherEuropeans,as opposed to Arabs,notingthatJewishimmigrationwould lead eventuallyto a Jewishstateonce a Jewishmajoritywas
achieved. Britishofficialshad no illusionson the matter.
It is equallyclear,therefore,
thatthe traditionof Arab acceptanceduring
World War I of the exclusionof Palestinefromareas to fall under Arab
sovereignty,
as based on the sourcesused by Friedmanand Kedourie,is an
invention,
one thathas requiredan imaginative
interpretation
and exploitationof documentsnot consonantwithscholarlypractices.
This inventionhas also requiredan assault on interpretations
given by
GeorgeAntonius,which as noted have been describedas "worthless"by
Kedouriewithrespectto the Hogarthversionof the BalfourDeclaration. A
recentcriticalessay on AntoniusarguesthatTheArabAwakening
"is more
of a sustainedargumentthana history."This is essentiallywhat
suggestive
Friedmansays of Vital's work. The appraisalapplies in some instancesto
Kedourie'sworkon thissubjectand certainly
to Friedman'sQuestionofPalestine,the lattertwo authors'greaterscholarlyparaphernalianotwithstanding.
Antoniusmayhave inventedhis own traditionof an ongoingArab national
movementdatingback to the 1860s,a good exampleofthenationalistsearch
forantecedentspostulatedby Hobsbawm. Nevertheless,
his discussionof
Husayn'sviewofthecorrespondence
withMcMahonand thegeneraltenorof
developments
duringWorldWar I showsfarmorerespectforthesources,as
availableto him,thando theseotheraccounts,especiallyFriedman's.24
In his foreword
to thisedition,Friedmanthankshis publishersforreissuingthisbook: "Its republication
was long overdue." The blurbon theback
coverpromisesa sequel,also to be publishedby Transaction.It will demand
theclose attentionthatthisbook should have receivedon firstappearance,
especiallyif thereare key documentsquoted withellipses inserted.While
one shouldexpectthatinterpretations
thisassumesa
of evidencemaydiffer,
respectforthe sourcesthatis lackingin The QuestionofPalestine.Its main
contribution
is to show how not to use sourcesand how evidencecan be
misusedforpoliticalends.
is acceptedas
One would hope thatthe traditionto whichit contributed
false. One would also hope thatfuturediscussionson these topicswould
to sources,whateverinterpretaadhereto scholarlystandardswhen referring
tionsarederivedfromthem. Butthatwill demanda respectforthehumanity
ofindividualactorson bothsides,Arabas well as European,and recognition
thattheysoughtto achievewidelydivergent
objectiveswithina framework
definedby wartimeexpedienciesand imperialambition.Otherwisewe will
continueto see expressionsof contemptby scholarstowardsArabs thatre-
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58
JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES
flectculturally
whattheirblatantlyOrientalist
writingsstriveto validate,the
veryimperialismthecontextofwhichtheyshouldbe seekingto understand
and explain ratherthansimplydefend.
NOTES
1. The titleof thisarticlederivesfromthebook, The pondence,but is misleadingon thelatterwhenreferInvention
of Tradition,
editedby Eric Hobsbawmand ringto them.
Terence Ranger(New York: CambridgeUniversity With respectto Kedourieand Friedman,Kedourie
Press, 1983). In his introduction,
Hobsbawmnotes deals morefullyand accurately
withthesourcematerial
thattheidea refers
generally
to socialor nationaltradi- regarding
Palestinethandoes Friedmanand acknowltionscreatedto validatecontemporary
situationsand edgesitsinclusionin someofal-Faruqi'sterritorial
refpositions.Buthe observesalso that". . . all historians, erences. He thenarguesthatal-Faruqileftopen the
whatever
else theirobjectives,
are engagedin thispro- possibility
of compromise
whichcould excludePalescess inasmuchas theycontribute,
or not,to tine (see AAL, pp. 79-93ff.).Kedourieis adamant,
consciously
thecreation,
dismantling
and restructuring
ofimagesof however,on the compatibility
of the correspondence
thepastwhichbelongnotonlyto theworldofspecial- withtheSykes-Picot
Agreement,
and on Husayn'sacbut to thepublicsphereof man as a
ceptanceof thelatter,even thoughhe admitsthatthe
ist.investigation
politicalbeing. Theymightas well be aware of this transmission
of thedetailsmayhave been ambiguous
dimensionoftheiractivities"
(p. 13). 1 am suggesting (AAL,pp. 125-26;165-66forexample). Kedouriehad
in thisarticlethathistorians
can inventtraditions
or alreadyarguedthispointin his "Cairo and Khartoum
ofwhatindividuals
myths
orgovernments
did byeither on theArabQuestion,1915-1918,"republished
in Th7e
ignoring
evidenceor omitting
it fromsources. There- Chatham
HoiuseVersion
and OtherMiddle-Eastem
Studies
fore,in Hobsbawm'swords,theyarenotonly"creating, (Hanover,NH, and London: University
Pressof New
and restructuring
dismantling
imagesof thepast,"but England,1984),pp. 13-32,wherehe excoriatesBritish
doingthesameto thesourceson whichtheybase their officials
Forhis diswhoassumedanyincompatibility.
arguments.
cussionofthe1918 Hogarthvisitto Husayn,to be dis2. 1willrefer
totheSykes-Picot
Agreement
onlybriefly cussedbelow,see AAL,pp. 189-95,282-89.
(see belowandnotenos.5 and 10) as thisessayfocuses
This contradictory
treatmentof the issues, first
on questionsaboutPalestine.However,thecontempo- presenting
thesourcesrelatively
fullyand thenarguing
raryevidencesuggeststhatSykesmisledHusaynand againsttheirimplications,
of Kedourie.
is characteristic
did not inform
him in detailof the provisionsof the His inconsistencies
havebeen pointedout in a critical
to theclaimsofbothKedourieand reviewofAALby C. ErnestDawn,InternationalJournal
agreement,
contrary
Friedman.
ofMiddleEastStudies9, no. 1 (February
1978),pp. 1283. The Husayn-McMahoncorrespondencecan be
30.
foundin GeorgeAntonius,
TheArabAwakening,
Thereare important
differences
also in thequalificaAppendix A. Firstpublishedin 1938, the book has gone tionsofbothauthors.KedourieknewArabicand occathrough
variouseditions.I refer
to theCapricornpaper sionallyused Arabicsourcesin his studiesof British
edition(New York,1965), pp. 413-27. The keyletter policymaking.
Friedmandoes notknowArabicas evior appearingto define,territorial
defining,
guarantees dencedby his sources. Theirtonesvaryconsiderably.
and reservations
was thatofMcMahontoSharifHusayn Friedman
is urbane("The dispute.. . can nowbe comdated24 October1915.
fortably
resolved.. ." [p. 951) whereasKedourieoften
4. 1am moreconcerned
herewiththerepresentation
of directsunconcealedangerand contempt
at ArableadtheBalfour
Declaration
givento Husaynby Hogarth,
who appearedto agree
at ers and at the Britishofficials
thetimewiththeArabBureauin Cairo,thanwiththe with them regardingthe natureof Britishpromises
declaration
itselfor theeventsleadingup to it. I will (". . . therewas in Britaina miasmof guiltand selfnotebelow,however,
of penitenceand breast-beating
which
disputesin Zionisthistoriography incrimination,
overthebackground
to thedeclaration.
hung over relationswiththe Arab world" [AAL,p.
5. In particular,
Kedourie'sIn theAnglo-Arab
Labyrinth. 3181).
TheMcMahon-Husayn
and ItsInterpreta- 6. Isaiah Friedman,"The McMahon-Hussein
CorreCorrespondence
tions,1914-1939 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity spondenceand the Questionof Palestine,"
Joumnalof
Press,1976), hereafter,
AAL,and MayirVeret6,"The Contemporary
History
5, no. 2 (April1970),pp. 83-122;
BalfourDeclarationand Its Makers,"MiddleEastern ArnoldToynbee,"The McMahon-Hussein
Correspon6
Studies (1970), pp. 48-76, republishedin Elie dence: Commentsand a Reply,"and Friedman'sreKedourieand SylviaG. Haim,eds.,Palestine
and Israel sponse, Journalof Contemporary
History5, no. 4
in the19thand 20thCenturies
(London: FrankCass, (October1970),pp. 185-201. As I willcompareFriedto therepublished
I
1982); pp. 60-88; I willrefer
article. manin his articlesand book,TheQuestion
ofPalestine,
Verete'serrorsare thoseof interpretation,
not of re- willreferto thesesourcesasJCH and QP, respectively.
material
tofitpreconceptions.
drafting
He is morecon- 7. The lack of revisionin itselfdetracts
from
seriously
cernedwiththe BalfourDeclarationthanpreliminary thescholarly
Arab
valueofthiswork..Briefly,
regarding
such as the Husayn-McMahon
developments
corres- nationalism
thereis no reference
to theworkofC. ErnestDawn whosearticlesfromthe1950sand 1960son
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THE INVENTION OF A TRADITION
59
theArabpartiesbeforeand duringWorldWar I were evaluationof Weizmann'srole,Friesel'sessayis more
publishedin one volumeas FromOttomanism
toArab- analytical.Especiallynoteworthy
is hisjudgmentthat
ism(Urbana,IL: University
ofIllinoisPress,1973). In
the "Historiography
dealingwiththe BalfourDeclaraparticular,
an essaywritten
forthevolume,"Hashemite tionmustbe one oftheclassicexamplesofprofessional
Aimsand Policyin theLightofRecentScholarship
on
myopia"(p. 220). He concludesthatmostanalysesof
Anglo-Arab
RelationsDuringWorldWar 1," pp. 87the BalfourDeclarationignorebroaderBritishpolicy
122, challengesFriedman's
arguments
as presented
in considerations
was of "seconin whichthedeclaration
hisJCH article. Kedourie,whose book appearedin daryimportance"at the time,and that"the storyof
1976, also ignoresDawn's workwhich,thoughnot British-Zionist
relations. . . is one of Zionistinitiative
benefiting
fromaccess to the originaldocuments,is
and British[qualified]consent"(pp. 222-23) where
morereliablethaneitherFriedmanor Kedourie.
Weizmann'srolewas crucial.
On British
diplomacy
duringthewar,amongtheimand deservedly
Stein'sworkremainshighlyregarded,
portant
studiesdisregarded
are: V. H. Rothwell,
British so. VitalpraisesSteinbut chastiseshimforhis relucWarAims
andPeaceDiplomacy,
1914-1918(1971); F. H.
tanceto passjudgments
(Zionism:TheCrucialPhase,p.
Hinsley,ed.,British
PolicyunderSirEdwardGrey 383), a faultconspicuously
absentin thereviewsofhis
Foreign
(1977) in whichthereare twopertinent
articles:Zara own workjust cited. In general,SteinpresentsdocuSteiner's"The ForeignOfficeUnderSir EdwardGrey, mentaryevidencewithoutpassingjudgment,though
1905-1914" and Marian Kent's "Asiatic Turkey, thereare exceptions,
as whendealingwithArablands
Agreement,
discussed
1914-1916";MarianKent,OilandEmpire:British
Policy withrespectto the Sykes-Picot
and Mesopotamian
Oil, 1900-1920 (1976); and David below.
French,BritishStrategy
and War Aims, 1914-1916 9. Vereteargues,withoutreference
to thespecificlet(1986).
[toHusayn]thatPalesters,thatMcMahon"intimated
On Zionism,supposedlythe strength
of thiswork, tine too could not be includedwithinthe limitsof
thereis no mention
ofthetrilogy
byDavidVital. I refer territories
regarding
which H.M.G. were preparedto
to TheOrigins
ofZionism
(1975); Zionism:TheFormative recognizeand supporttheindependence
oftheArabs."
Years(1982); and Zionism:TheCrucialPhase (1987), Thereis no evidenceforsuch an assertionand Verete
thebulkofwhichcoverstheperiod1914-1919.
none
Balfour
Declaration,"
p. 63).
provides
("The
FriedmanclearlydislikesVital'sworkand has writ- 10. QP, pp. 67, 81-86, 116-17,210;JCH,pp. 105-7,
ten a harshindictment
arofZionism:TheCrucialPhase. 119. Briefly,
established
theSykes-Picot
Agreement
He callsit "an historical
essayrather
thana solidpiece eas of directcontroloverArab lands by France(Mt.
ofresearch"and concludesthat"itdoes littlejusticeto Lebanon,northernPalestineand westernSyria)and
itstitle,letalonethesubjectitself"in hisreview"Zion- GreatBritain
(Iraq fromBaghdadsouthtoBasraand the
istHistory
Reconsidered,"
Studies
inContemporaryjewry
Gulf) alongwithregionsthatwouldbe supposedlyin6 (1990), pp. 309-14. Partof his angerlies in Vital's dependentbut thatwerereservedas spheresof influof previousscholarship,
supposednonrecognition
pre- ence foreithercountry.The Damascus-Homs-Hamasumablyhis own, thoughhe is listedin the biblio- Aleppogridand pointseastwerewithintheindependon
graphicalessay.
entspheresubjectto France,whichhad a monopoly
A morerestrained
butconsequently
moreimpressive advisors.Mostof Palestinewouldbe internationalized,
critique,with a broaderperspective,
is by Evyatar withBritainhavingcontrolovertheportsof Haifaand
Friesel("DavidVital'sWorkon Zionism,"Studies
as opinZi- Acre. The clearestdiscussionof thesematters,
onism9, no. 2 [1988],pp. 209-23),who concludesthat posed to eitherFriedmanor Kedourie,is stillJukka
despite"Vital'simpeccableresearchand elegantstyle, Nevakivi,Britain,France,and the Arab MiddleEast,
thestory
told... makespoorhistorical
sense." In con- 1914-1920(1969).
trast,Friedman'sinjuredtonedetractsfromhis arguofZionismhavereliedon Veretefor
Somehistorians
mentsagainstVital. Also, he is wrongin stressing theirinterpretation
of the Sykes-Picot
and
Agreement
toannexation
the accord. In fact,
(contra
Vital)British
ofterritory thusassumethatSykesregretted
antipathy
under the Asquith-Grey
saw theagreement
cabinet as he could have Sykesand British
officials
generally
relearnedbyreadingtheKentessayon "AsiaticTurkey" at thetimeas a victory
becauseinternationalization
notedabove. Forfurther
discussionsee noteno. 8.
movedthe bulk of Palestinefromthe scope of direct
8. Historians
of Zionismstilldebatewithgreatinten- Frenchcontrolas initially
demandedby Picot,and resitytheantecedents
andinspirations
oftheBalfour
DecservedkeyportsforBritishsupervision.See Verete's
laration. Vital extols Verete'sarticle,"The Balfour speculations("The BalfourDeclaration,"p. 66), and
and ItsMakers"(see noteno. 5), andjoins theirreiteration
Declaration
DecbyJehudaReinharz("The Balfour
himin downplaying
theroleofWeizmann'spersuasive laration,"p. 492 [see noteno. 8]).
talents.BothstressinsteadBritish
Thisassumption
leads Reinharzand Vital,bothrelyeagernessforsucha
declaration
withVitaloffering
an unfavorable
portrait ingon Verete,to arguethatone Britishmotiveforsubof Weizmann. Many others,includingFriedman, sequentlyissuingthe BalfourDeclarationwas "their
Friesel,and thiswriter,
considerWeizmann'sefforts
on
theFrenchfromPalestine,
a position
desiretoeliminate
balanceas morecrucialtoBritish
awarenessofZionism theywereentitled
toby. . . theSykes-Picot
Agreement"
and sympathy
forit thanany mereconsideration
relucof (Reinharz,p. 492). Thisis dubiousgivenBritish
theirown interests.
forPalestineafterissuing
tancetoassumeresponsibility
JehudaReinharz,"The BalfourDeclarationand Its thedeclaration
and thefactthatFrancehad no unilatMaker:A Reassessment,"
64
theagreement.
Journal
eral rightsin mostof Palestinethrough
ofModernHistory
of Iraqi origin,de(September
1992),pp. 455-99,especiallypp. 491-93ff., 11. Al-Faruqi,an Ottomanofficer
summarizes
theconflicting
and liststhere- sertedtotheBritish
sideat Gallipoliin August1915. A
viewpoints
viewessaysof Friedmanand Frieselcriticalof Vital's memberof theYoungArabParty,
he claimedto know
work(see noteno. 7). ThoughI sidewiththemin their of SharifHusayn'sdemandsforArab independence,
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60
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
whichhad just been receivedin Cairo. He was interviewedextensively
by British
officials
in Cairopriorto
McMahon'sletter
of24 October1915toSharifHusayn.
For an evaluationof al-Faruqi'sbackground
and his
credibility,
see EliezerTauber,"The RoleofLieutenant
MuhammadSharifal-Faruqi-New Lighton AngloArabRelationsDuringtheFirstWorldWar,"Asianand
African
Studies24 (1990), pp. 17-50.
Dawn (see noteno. 5) arguesthatal-Faruqihad very
littleimpacton McMahon'sletters
toHusayn,theoppositeof Kedourie'sand Friedman's
conclusions.Consequently,
theissueof al-Faruqi'scredibility
forDawn is
minimal. I agreegenerally,
but go further
to suggest
that the issue is of littleconsequencebecause the
sourcesshowthathe did notqualifyHusayn'sdemands
forterritory
significantly
and thatBritishofficialsin
Cairo werealreadyawarethattheArabswouldaccept
foreignadviceand protection
of theirnewlyliberated
regions;thekeywas greatpowerrecognition
ofthatindependence.Whereal-FaruqimodifiedHusayn'sdemands was in his apparentacceptanceof French
advisorsforSyriaand Palestine,whoseindependence
wouldbe recognized;
Husayninsistedon Britishtutelageonly. Butthisconcessionin talkswithMarkSykes
came afterthe 24 OctoberletterfromMcMahonto
Husaynhad beensent,notbeforeas Friedman
implies.
See mydiscussionbelow.
12. Friedmanand Veretestandalone in claimingthat
the "northwest"
areas whichwerenot "purelyArab"
includedPalestine.FriedmanlistsVerete'sarticlein
his bibliography
butnotin his footnotes.
The question
ofinfluence
remainsmoot,butitmustbe notedthaton
thecrucialquestionofPalestineand Friedman's
misuse
of McMahon'sletters;Veret6providesfull citations.
The reasonsforFriedman's
claim,one ofhiskeyinventions,willbe discussedbelow.
Veret6("The BalfourDeclaration,"
pp. 63 and 7980, noteno. 2) statesthatPalestinewas reservedbecause of Frenchinterests,
as does Friedman.The evidence he gives in his note, quoting McMahon's
to Damascus,Homs,Hama,and Aleppo,conreference
tradicts
thatcontention.
He is clearlyconfused
byreferences to an ArabiathatcontainedSyriaand Palestine
along with the Arabian peninsula. He concludes,
againsttheevidence,thatMcMahon's"northwest"
reof
gions includedPalestinebecause it was northwest
the Arabianpeninsula,even thoughthatdesignation
was quite distinctfromthe "Arabia"he himselfhad
noted,and eventhoughhe quotesMcMahonas indicating"thenorthern
coastofSyria,"quitea different
matterthantheArabianpeninsula.
All otherstudiesassume,rightly,
thatthese areas
meant those specificallyreferredto by McMahon,
namely"the districts
of Mersinand Alexandretta
[i.e.,
southeastAnatolia]and portionsof Syrialyingto the
west of the districts
of Damascus,Homs, Hama and
Aleppo. . ." (Antonius,
of24
p. 419, McMahon'sletter
October1915). As Kedourienotes,theargument
that
theword"district"
denotedherewilayaas an administrative
province,meaningthattheSanjakofJerusalem
was in thevilayet(wilaya)of Damascus,is untenable
(AAL,pp. 101-2).
13. QP, p. 328; AAL,pp. 189-91,282-84. Antonius
his claimin Th7e
put forward
ArabAwakening,
p. 268.
Kedourie,p. 284, dismissesit as "worthless."He returnsto thissubjectin "The ChathamHouse Version"
(The ChathamHouse Version,
p. 375), in which he
scornsBritish
officials
whobelievedthattheArabshad
been promisedPalestineand arguesthatHusaynhad
been fullyinformedof the BalfourDeclarationby
Hogarth.
14. Friedmanrefersto FO 371/2486/34982as his
source. The memorandum
can also be foundin the
ArabBureaufiles,FO 882/13.
15. Sykes'lettersare thefollowing:1. Telegram707
sentto FO forDMO, no. 19, 20 November1915. 2.
Sykes,Cairo,toCox,Mesopotamia,
22 November1915.
Bothcan be foundin theArabBureaufiles,FO 882/13,
pp. 437-43.
Kedouriediscussesboth the Claytonmemorandum
and al-Faruqi'smeetingwithSykesin AAL. His treatthe
mentis contradictory.
Firsthe quotes accurately
regarding
relevantportionof Clayton'smemorandum
to Palestineand Mesopotamia
(p.
al-Faruqi'sreferences
clear
80), butarguesthatthelatter'sviews"are neither
with
nordefinite."Then,whenreferring
tothemeeting
Sykes,he states(p. 83) thatal-Faruqiwas speaking
"quitea different
language"and claimedall ofPalestine
the
and Syria.Although
Kedouriestrivesto undermine
he
idea thatArabsshowedinterest
in theseterritories,
does presentthetextualevidencein thesecases,unlike
Friedman.
16. In QP, pp. 83-85, Friedmandiscusses the al1915 beforeturnFaruqi-Sykes
talksofmid-November
ing to McMahon'sletterof 24 October.He thenanaexpressedin
lyzes McMahon'sterritorial
reservations
the letterin lightof thosetalkswhichoccurredtwo
weekslater.
17. McMahon'stelegram,
alongwitha copyofhis letter to Sharif Husayn, can be found in FO
26 October1915. The relevant
por371/2486/34982,
tionsare quotedaccurately
in Kedourie,AAL,pp. 9899. It is worthnotingthatthisdispatchis quotedwithoutdeletionsin therelevant
volumeofTheRiseofIsrael
edited by Friedman:vol. 6, British-Zionist
Relations,
1914-1917 (New York: GarlandPress,1987), documentno. 35, pp. 121-24. ForVerete,see noteno. 12.
was
18. AAL,pp. 190-91. The Hogarthmemorandum
onibenmade
publishedin fullin Cmd. 5964,Statenments
Governmenit
t12e
year1918 in
durin2g
haffofHis Majesty's
regardto thefutureStatusofcertain
partsoftheOttoman
Empire,1939,Accountsand Papers,vol. XXVII,1938we areconcernedwithalso existin
1939. The portions
theArabBureaufiles,FO 882/13,and can be foundin
therelevant
volumeofTheRiseofIsraeleditedbyFried1918
in Palestine,
man: vol. 9, TheZionistCommission
(New York: GarlandPress,1987), documentno. 47,
pp. 122-23.
19. As observedin noteno. 13,Antoniusargues(Arab
of the
Awakening,
p. 268) thatHogarth'spresentation
deBalfourDeclarationto Husaynwas a "fundamental
to the "civil
parture"fromthe document'sreference
and religiousrightsof the non-Jewish
population."
Kedouriedisputesthis(AAL,pp. 282-84),arguingthat
of
theHogarthmessagewas "no morethana reiteration
analtheBalfourDeclaration...," and thatAntonius's
versionwith
ysiswas "worthless."ClearlytheHogarth
to theeconomicand politicalfreedomof
its reference
the Arab population,approvedby the Britishgovernmentin ordertodeceiveHusaynand reassurehim,was
nota reiteration
oftheBalfourDeclaration.Kedourie's
unfortunate
reference
appliesmoreto his own analysis
thanto thatof Antonius.
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61
THE INVENTIONOF A TRADITION
20. Weizmann'sconversationwith Faysal can be
foundin theArabBureaufiles,FO 882/14. His resentmentat beingunableto speakopenlyabouttheintentionto createa Jewishstatein Palestine,in orderto
allayArabsuspicions,
and at beingattackedbyJewsas
"beingso moderate"
appearsin FO 608/100/174594,
a
recordofthe"FifthMeeting
oftheAdvisory
Committee
on Palestineheldat theresidenceoftheRightHonorable Herbert
Samuel,"10 May 1919,p. 17.
21. In particular,
thedeclaration's
reference
to "theesin Palestineofa nationalhomefortheJewtablishment
ishpeople. . ." as opposedto theoriginalZionistdraft
whichrequestedthatBritainaccept"theprinciplethat
Palestineshouldbe reconstituted
as thenationalhome
of theJewishpeople." Steingivesextensivetreatment
of theseissues,includingthetextsof all draftsof the
BalfourDeclaration(The BayourDeclaration,
p. 664).
Although
Steinrejectsthenotionof an Arabclaimto
Palestine,
he does includetherelevant
material
suchas
Hogarth'scommenton withholding
knowledgeof a
JewishstatefromHusayn(p. 633) and Weizmann's
statement
to Faysalthatno Jewishgovemment
was intended(p. 638).
22. Quotedfroma conversation
withEdwinMontagu,
secretary
ofstateforIndia,27 December1918,inAAL,
p. 222. A reviewof Faysal'scontactswiththeZionists
intothe mid-1920sconcludesthatFaysalunderstood
boththeadvantages
(financial)and thedangers"ofZionismto the Arabsin generaland to the Palestinian
Arabsin particular"
and that"he did notfullyaccept
theZionistprogramme,
as mostZionzists
understood
itexcept forthebriefest
of moments"(emphasisin original). NeilCaplan,"FaisalIbn Husainand theZionists:
a Re-examination
withDocuments,"Initermationial
HisReview
tory
5, no. 4 (1983),pp. 561-614;thequoteis on
p. 569. Justwhenthatbriefmomentwas is notclear
fromthedocuments,
buttheyindicate,
during1918-20,
his assumption
thatall Palestinian
wouldbe prorights
tectedand at timesthatArabsovereignty
fromDamascus wouldprevail.Caplannotesthepossibility
thatthe
Faysalletterto Frankfurter,
discussedbelow,was actually writtenby T.E. Lawrence without Faysal's
knowledge.
23. The textsoftheFaysal-Weizmann
and
agreement
theFaysalletterto Frankfurter
can be foundin Walter
Laqueurand BarryRubin,eds., TIreIsrael-Arab
Reader.
A Documentary
East Conflict
History
(New
oftheMidcdle
York: PenguinBooks,1984),pp. 18-22. This edition
correreverses
thechronology
oftheHusayn-McMahon
and implies
spondenceand theSykes-Picot
Agreement
thatthediscussionsoccurred
The Mcsimultaneously.
Mahonletterto Husaynof 24 October1915 is placed
afterthe May 1916 exchangeof lettersbetweenGrey
and Cambon. In general,theLaqueur-Rubin
treatment
of WorldWar I omitsa greatdeal, and the editorial
commentsoccasionallymislead. Thereare no docu-
ments included noting British or Anglo-French
to theArabs.
promisesof independence
Weizmann'sown discussionof the Faysal-Frankfurter
exchange,alongwithhis accountofthepresentacan
tionof Zionistobjectivesat thepeace conference,
andPapers
ed., TheLetters
be foundin BarnetLitvinoff,
vol. 1, seriesB, August1898-July
ofChainiWeizmann,
1931 (New Brunswick,NJ: TransactionPublishers,
notes,p. 220,n. 7, regard1983),pp. 220-38. Litvinoff
ofJanuary1919,
agreement
ing the Faysal-Weizmann
bothbecause of his sense of bethat"Subsequently,
of
trayalat the Peace Conferenceand interpretations
statehoodgivento Zionistdemands,[Faysal's]attitude
to
especiallyin itsreference
wavered."This is correct,
theagreebutFaysalrepudiated
theissueofstatehood,
oftheSyrianNationalCongress,
mentat theinsistence
in his attitude.
ratherthansimplywavering
espousedparticularly
The issue of Arab "transfer,"
byIsraelZangwill,is discussedin ChaimSimons,InterArabsfrom Palestinie,
nationalProposalsto Transfer
Survey(Hoboken, NJ: Ktav
1895-1947: A Historical
they
Co., 1988),pp. 34-46. The difficulties
Publishing
createdforWeizmannwho saw suchpublicproposals
in
FO
appear
for forcedemigrationas dangerous
608/100,174594,citedin noteno. 20.
"Ambi24. The essayin questionis byMartinKramer,
in
tion'sDiscontent:The DemiseofGeorgeAntonius,"
TheGreatPowersin theMiddleEast,1919-1939,Uriel
Dann, ed. (New York: Holmesand Meier,1988), pp.
405-16;thequoteis on p. 405. Kramer'sviewofAntoat worstopenlycontemptuniusis at bestpatronizing,
ous in the best Kedourieanmode. See especiallyhis
reviewof DerekHopwood,ed.,StudiesinArabHistory:
TheAnitoanius
1978-87(New York: St.Martin's
Lectuires,
Press, 1990), in MiddleEast Studies28, no. 3 (July
1992),pp. 592-95,in whichhe suggeststhatAntonius
made by
was duplicitousbecause of representations
forwhichKramerstrivesto attriothers,responsibility
butetohimwithout
evidence.AlbertHourani'sassessin thebook
mentofAntoniusand TheArabAwakening
Kramerreviews,pp. 21-40, is more balanced and
scholarly.
AntoniusrecallsRashid
Kramer'seagernessto vilify
thatwithrespectto Islamand Arab
Khalidi'sjudgment
to reduceideologyto
there"is a tendency
nationalism,
on the partof its
the pettiestof personalmotivations
leadingSylviaHaim as well as Kedourie
formulators,"
forpersonalfailings
to introduce"a toneof contempt
describedin detailtwhichare]thencloselylinkedtothe
ideasoftheseindividuals"
("ArabNationalism:HistorAmericani
Historical
Reical Problemsin theLiterature,"
view96, no. 5 [December19911,p. 1370). In other
is to impugn
words,to impugntheworthofindividuals
the ideas/movements
theyespouse and to implicitly
validatewhattheyoppose,an ideologicalstanceitself.
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