The McMahon-Hussein
correspondence
Factsheet Series No. 140, Created: October 2011, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East
What is the McMahon-Hussein
Correspondence?
solely upon whether you will reject or admit the proposed
frontiers.”6
With the entry of the Ottoman Empire on Germany’s side
in Nov., 1914, many English officers stationed in the
Middle East believed that an Arab revolt against the
Ottomans would be key to bringing down Britain’s
Ottoman enemy. 1 As a result, Sir Henry McMahon,
Britain’s High Commissioner to Egypt, opened discussions
with Sharif Hussein of Mecca – an influential Arab leader
at the time. Throughout these discussions, McMahon
promised an independent Arab state – between Iran and
Egypt – to Hussein in return for an Arab revolt against the
Ottomans.2
The most important of the letters, which had the effect of
bringing the Arabs into the war on the British side, was
that written by McMahon on October 24th, 1915. In it,
with the key passage quoted below, McMahon pledges
the British to “recognise and uphold the independence of
the Arabs” in areas prescribed by Sharif Hussein:
Thus began what is known as the McMahon-Hussein
Correspondence, between Jul. 1915, and Jan. 1916,
wherein the British bargained with Sharif Hussein over
the terms under which the Arabs would revolt against the
Turkish Ottoman Empire.3 It is in this correspondence, the
Arabs assert, that the British conceded a future
independent Arab state should include the territory of
Palestine. The Arabs ultimately revolted against the Turks
in 1916, and fought in a series of campaigns which ended
with the capture of Damascus in Sept., 1918. The British
denial of any intent or promise to create an Arab state in
Palestine is the source of much Arab bitterness.
Why is there discrepancy between the
British and Arab interpretations over the
correspondence?
“The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs,
Hama and Aleppo [modern day Lebanon], cannot be said
to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted
from the proposed delimitation.
“Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to
the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab
Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.
“As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in
which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the
interests of her ally France, I am authorised to give you
the following pledges on behalf of the Government of
Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:
“THAT, SUBJECT TO THE MODIFICATIONS STATED ABOVE,
GREAT BRITAIN IS PREPARED TO RECOGNISE AND
UPHOLD THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ARABS IN ALL THE
REGIONS LYING WITHIN THE FRONTIERS PROPOSED BY
THE SHARIF OF MECCA.”7
The correspondence, which began in July of 1915, was
conducted in evasive language on both sides, with
effusive floweriness in the observance of official titles and
honorifics. The core of the correspondence, though,
concerns Arab demands for independence, and British
reluctance to commit to those demands. Specifically, the
British were reluctant to delineate the area of such Arab
independence.4 All of the correspondence was in Arabic,
with the British translating their original English text with
varying degrees of accuracy. 5
Sharif Hussein’s own letters were written in a style that
did not permit easy translation, however he clearly tells
McMahon that the issue of their negotiations “depends
Sharif Hussein of Mecca
Sir Henry McMahon
Was Palestine within the area of Arab
independence?
The name “Palestine” is not mentioned in the
correspondence between Sharif Hussein and McMahon.
Following the War, British Mandate Palestine subsumed
the Turkish Ottoman administrative regions of Sanjaq of
Jerusalem and part of the Vilayet of Beirut (see the map
opposite). In modern-day terms, this region includes all
of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
Finally, Antonius points out that – in arguments that
Britain made to France in other documents – Britain
mentions that Israel/Palestine could not be allocated to
the French. In justification, Britain argues that this region
had been reserved for an independent Arab state, as
follows:
The British said this territory was not included within the
area of Arab independence because McMahon’s letter
excluded “portions of Syria lying to the west of the
districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.” The
word “district”, claimed the British, was equivalent to
“vilayet.” The British argued that “since the ‘Vilayet of
Damascus’ included that part of Syria [now Jordan] which
lay to the east of the River Jordan, it followed that that
part of Syria [Palestine] which lay to the west of the
Jordan was one of the portions of territory reserved [i.e.
excluded] in McMahon’s phrase.”8 That is, the British
claimed that, since the Turkish district which included
Damascus was a long north-south district, the British
exclusion included all territory west of that Turkish district
– territory which includes modern-day Israel/Palestine.
George Antonius demonstrates that this argument is
untenable: “In the first place, the word districts …. could
not have been intended as the equivalent of vilayets,
because there was no such thing as the ‘Vilayet of
Damascus’, the ’Vilayet of Homs’ and the ‘Vilayet of
Hama’. There was one single Vilayet of Syria of which
Damascus was the capital, and two smaller administrative
divisions of which Homs and Hama were the principle
towns. Sir Henry McMahon’s phrase can only make sense
if we take his districts as meaning ‘districts’ in the current
sense of the word, that is to say, the regions adjacent to
the four cities, and his reservation as applying to that part
of Syria – roughly from Sidon to Alexandretta – which lies
to the west of the continuous line formed by those four
cities and the districts immediately adjoining them.”9
Further, Antonius argues that “[McMahon] refers to the
regions which he wished to exclude as being ‘in the two
Vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut’. Had he had in mind
Palestine, he would certainly have added ‘and the Sanjaq
of Jerusalem’. The fact that he did not goes to confirm the
conclusion that the only portions of Syria which it was
proposed at the time to reserve in favour of France were
the coastal regions of northern Syria [i.e. modern-day
Lebanon].”
“[Palestine] – must [therefore] in default of any specific
agreement to the contrary, necessarily remain within the
area of Arab independence proposed by the Sharif and
accepted by Great Britain. 10
1
Lawrence, T.E. “Seven Pillars of Wisdom”, Introduction to Chapters 1-7.
Egypt was at that time a de facto British protectorate, under nominal Ottoman
overlordship. The High Commissioner was effectively the ruler.
3
The correspondence is replicated in Antonius, George, “The Arab Awakening”,
1938, Appendix A.
4
Tom Segev opines that the British were either deliberately vague in their
wording to mislead the Arabs, or that is was just carelessness. “One Palestine,
Complete”, p46.
5
Antonius, p166-67.
6
Ibid. p168.
7
Ibid. p170.
8
Ibid. p78
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid. p. 179.
2