Divided Government and Party Responsiveness in the American States
David W. Prince
University of Kentucky
Department of Political Science
dwprin0@pop.uky.edu
Prepared for presentation at the 2000 Southern Political Science Association
annual meeting, Atlanta, Georgia
November 8-11, 2000
Divided government has been the subject of much research. The majority of this
research has focused on the Congress with less attention paid to the states. Most
prominent among the exceptions is the work of Fiorina (1994), in which he examines the
impact of professionalism on divided government in the states. The states are becoming
more important in an era of policy devolution. Given that more decisions are being
shifted back to the states, an examination of the policy making process at the state level
becomes more pertinent.
Research on divided government has focused on the causes (Fiorina 1994;
Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty 1996; Sigelman, Wahlbech, and
Buell 1997; Wattenberg 1991) and consequences (Alt and Lowrey 1994; Cox and
McCubbins 1991; Franklin and Hirczy de Mino 1998; Gilmour 1995; Jones 1994; Kelly
1993a; Kernell 1991; Lohmann and O’Holloran 1994). This research focus on the later
question of the consequences of divided government. If divided government does not
impact policy outcomes, then the causes are of little interest. However, if divided
government impacts policy then the question of why divided government occurs is an
important research question. If divided government impacts policy and we determine why
divided government occurs, then we can offer recommendations to make divided
government more or less likely to occur and gain greater insight into legislative outputs.
The traditional view of parties is that they are more likely to enact legislation
when they have unified control of the government. Divided government creates obstacles
to lawmakers thus making legislation more difficult to enact. Edwards, Barrett and Peake
(1997) found that important bills are more likely to fail during periods of divided
government. Coleman (1999) analyzed party responsiveness under unified and divided
1
government and concluded that unified government is significally more productive than
divided government.
Mayhew (1991) challenged the conventional view of the cohesiveness of parties
under unified government. He found that legislation was as likely to be enacted during
periods of unified government as divided government. Other research has supported
Mayhew’s argument (Jones 1994, 1997). Jones found that the Congress and the president
were able to enact significant legislation under divided government. Quirk and Nesmith
(1995) argue that gridlock is most likely when the parties are debating highly ideological
issues and there has been no significant shift in public opinion and political pressure.
Quirk and Nesmith (1994) suggest that circumstantial factors such as the budget deficit,
issue complexity, and an uninformed public have a greater impact on gridlock than
divided classes of significance. The top two categories are “landmark” and “major”
legislation. Enactment of major legislation does not appear to vary significally between
divided and unified government, but the enactment of landmark legislation differs from
about two to three statutes per congressional term.
This paper will examine the question of whether parties matter at the state level. I
hypothesize, consistent with Mayhew, that the enactment of legislation is as likely to
occur under divided government as unified government. This research will allow us to
generalize beyond the single case of the national government. The states exhibit a variety
of characteristics of political ideology, party identification, political culture, institutional
structure and so forth. Expanding our research beyond the national level will allow us to
begin the process of developing a unified theory of divided government. Additionally,
this research will provide further insight into the question of party decline. It is
reasonable to assume that divided government would be less significant in a weak party
2
system. An insignificant relationship between legislative enactments and divided
government provides additional evidence that parties are on the decline in the United
States.
The primary research hypothesis for this study is divided government does not
adversely effect the passage of legislation in the states. The hypothesis is consistent with
David Mayhew’s (1991) findings at the national level. The analysis of this paper will be
conducted on two levels. First, an empirical analysis will test the importance of divided
government in the passage of legislation. The second, part of the analysis, conducted in
future research, will be a content analysis of various newspapers in order to supplement
the empirical analysis. The qualitative analysis will allow us to identify the important
issues confronting the legislature and gain some insight into the effect of institutional
structure on legislative success.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is the percent of bills introduced by the
legislature that pass and become law. The percentage of bills enacted serves several
purposes. First, it allows us to obtain a standardized measure across legislatures. The
states have varying agendas with some states facing a wider multitude of issues. For
example, the state legislature in California is likely to have more issues before it than the
Wyoming legislature, therefore, the use of the percent of bills enacted will allow us to
account for the scope of the agenda under consideration. Resolutions are excluded from
the analysis because they tend to be about inconsequential or unimportant issues.
Mayhew (1991) has recognized the importance of only examining significant legislation;
therefore, the inclusion of resolutions in the model would bias our findings toward the
3
research hypothesis. Resolutions are often procedural motions passed by unanimous
consent, and therefore, party influences would likely be masked.
The dependent variable included in this study makes it difficult, in many
instances, to predict the direction of the relationship between the explanatory variables
and the dependent variable. The anticipated direction of the relationship is clearer when
examining the raw number of enacted bills. A legislature which is more active may have
a lower percentage of bills enacted simply because they introduced a larger number of
bills.
Explanatory Variables
Divided Government
Divided government is the primary explanatory variable in this study. Divided
government occurs when opposing parties occupy different components of the
government. If the governor, the state house and the state senate are controlled by the
same party, divided government is coded as 0 indicating that there is unified government.
If different parties control two of the three components, the variable is coded as 1
indicating divided government.
Governor’s Party
The first control variable included in the model is the party of the governor. The
variable is coded as 1 if the governor is a Democrat and as a 0 if the governor is a
Republican. The party that controls the governorship should affect legislation regardless
of the party that controls the legislature. The governor often takes the lead in setting the
agenda for the state. Republicans and Democrats have different legislative priorities and
4
different philosophies of government. A Republican governor is expected to be less
active than a Democrat and will therefore propose less legislation.
The proposal of less legislation does not necessarily indicate there will be fewer
enactments as a percent of proposals. The Republican agenda may be more focused than
the Democratic agenda; therefore, while the actual number of enactments may be less as
a percent of proposals, they may be higher under a Republican administration.
Additionally, to help account for the relationship between the affects of divided
government and the governor’s party an interaction variable is included in the model.
Legislative Strength
The legislative strength of the parties is expected to impact legislative success.
One of the tasks of the party leaders is to prevent defection by their party members on
legislative votes. The thinner the legislative majority, the greater the difficulty
confronting the party leadership in enacting its agenda. If a party has more seats in the
legislature it is easier to enact their agenda because party defectors do not have as great of
an impact as when the party holds a sizable legislative advantage.
The relationship between legislative success and number of seats, however, is not
always linear. If a party has 95 percent of the seats then the battle becomes within the
party instead of between the parties. Interparty fighting may have the same adverse affect
on the passage of legislation as intraparty disagreements. Interaction terms between the
Democratic majority in both houses and divided government will be included in the
model to account for the impact of the size of the legislative majority on legislative
success.
5
Two interaction variables will be included in the analysis. The interaction variable
allows us to distinguish between various types of divided government. Divided
government can take the form of two types. First, divided government with a divided
legislature is likely to behave differently than divided government where one party
controls the executive and the opposing party controls the legislative branch. In a unified
legislature where the governor has weak veto power the legislature may operate in much
the same fashion as it would under unified control. However, if there is a divided
legislature the parties have to rely on the opposing party to pass legislation.
The first variable will be calculated for the state house as follows:
(Percent of Seats Held by Majority Party)(Dummy for Senate Control), where
Same Party Control in senate = 1
Divided Part Control in Senate = 0
If the same party controls both houses then the interaction variable indicates the percent
of seats held by the majority party in the house. On the other hand, if the opposing party
controls the state senate, then the interaction variable will be equal to 0. In the same
manner that the interaction variable is calculated for the house, an interaction variable is
calculated for the senate. The inclusion of the interaction variables will allow a
determination if divided legislative control has a negative impact on legislative
enactments. Additionally, the interaction terms will lend evidence to address the question
of whether the size of the legislative majority matters. It is expected that the greater the
6
legislative majority, the easier the task of enacting legislation. However, the size of the
legislative majority is not as important if the opposing party controls the other chamber.
Professionalism
The effects of professionalism are controlled in this study. Fiorina (1994) identifies
professionalism as a possible correlate with divided government. Legislative
professionalism is also expected to affect the passage of legislation. More professional
legislatures take on a wide range and number of issues and, therefore, it is expected that
the more professional a legislature, the less successful the parties in enacting legislation.
Squire (1992) recognizes three measures of professionalism- length of session,
compensation and staff. Legislatures that are more professional are higher paid, meet for
more days, and have a larger number of staff.
The three indicators of professionalism are included in the model. Compensation
is the salary the member makes for each year and the per diems received. The length of
session is the number of days the legislature met during that session. If the state house
and the state senate met for a different number of days an average of the two houses is
included in the model. Session length may have a two-fold impact on enactments. First,
the longer a legislature meets the greater the opportunity for members to consider
legislation and to discuss a wider range of bills. Conversely, shorter sessions may
increase the urgency to consider legislation quickly, and therefore legislators may be less
apt to introduce non-significant legislation that takes valuable time and has little chance
of passing.
The final indicator of professionalism included in the model is staff. There are three
categories of staff- personal staff, district staff, and shared staff. Since theoretically,
7
personal and district staff are more important than shared staff, they are weighed more.
For each type of staff a score was calculated equaling zero if none were present, one half
if part-time staff were present and one if full time staff were present. Each state was
given a score based upon whether each of the three categories were full-time or part-time.
Shared staff were weighed half of what personal and district staff were weighed. This
resulted in a scoring ranging from zero, indicating no staff, to 2.5 designating full-time
staff in each of the three categories. A state that had part-time staff in each of the
categories would receive a score of 1.25.
Election Year
Legislatures tend to be more active in sessions immediately following an election.
This trend is likely to occur regardless of whether there is a shift in the partisan balance
of the legislature. If the incumbent party wins reelection, then they are likely to claim
they have a mandate from the voters and, therefore, become more active in the legislative
arena. In the same vein, a new party also feels they have a mandate to change policy and
will be eager to enact its agenda. On the other hand, election years may result in a more
narrow legislative scope. Legislators may only consider bills that are the most critical and
save non-critical legislation to after the election. The magnitude of the number of bills
will likely be greater when party control changes, however, in either case it is expected
that a legislature will be more active immediately following an election than prior to the
election. It is unclear how increased activism after the election translates into change in
the percentage of bills enacted.
A variable is included in the analysis to indicate if it is an election year. Most
states conduct governor and state legislative races in the same year. The election year
8
variable indicates if there is a governor’s election. It becomes more difficult to enact
legislation in the year before an election. For example, it is easier to enact a tax increase
immediately following an election than before an election; therefore, legislators will
postpone a decision to raise taxes until after an election. The parties in a legislature often
attempt to block legislation in an election year so the opposing party does not receive
credit for passage, thus increasing electoral success. The variable is coded as a 1 if it is an
election year and as 0 if it is not an election year. Fewer enactments are expected to occur
in election years but as previously stated it is unclear how this translates into the
percentage of bills passed.
Veto Power
The veto power of the governor is expected to affect the enactment of legislation.
It is expected that less legislation will be enacted under divided government when the
governor has the veto. Additionally, some governors have stronger veto powers than
others. It is hypothesized that less legislation will be enacted when the governor has a line
item veto. Additionally, a supermajority required to override a veto increases the power
of the governor’s veto. A governor with a line item veto that requires a supermajority
would be in a stronger position to influence the legislation that is passed. The greater the
veto power of the governor, the more difficult it is for the legislature to pass bills under
divided government. Even when the governor does not use the veto the threat of the veto
still makes it more difficult to pass legislation. Three indicators of veto power are
included in the model. The variables are coded as a 1 if there is a veto, line item veto and
supermajority to override and as a 0 if not present.
9
Ideology
It is expected that the more liberal a state the more active the legislature.
However, it is difficult to determine how the impact of ideology given the limitations of
dependent variable discussed earlier. The measure created by Berry, Ringquist, Fording,
and Hanson (1998) is included in the model to count for the differences in ideology
among the states. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) created a dynamic
measure of ideology. Their measurement is an improvement over the static measure of
Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993). Their measurement is based on roll call voting
scores of state congressional delegations, the outcomes of congressional elections, the
partisan division of state legislatures, the party of the governor and other various
assumptions. The measure of Berry et al, contrary to the belief of many scholars, reveals
that ideology varies more from year to year than is recognized.
In order to gain greater purchase on the effects of ideology, both the Berry et al.
measure and the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) will be included in the model. The
two indicators measure different aspects of ideology. The Berry et al. measure captures
short term variation in ideology, while the Erikson Wright and McIver (1993) measure is
not sensitive to short term upheavals in the electorate.
Party Identification
The party identification of a state should play a role in legislation enacted in the
states. I expect that Democratic states have a more active legislative agenda than
Republican states. Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) formulate a measurement of state
party identification derived from an aggregation of CBS/NYT polls conducted from 1976
to 1988. The aggregation of data helps to overcome the problem of small sample sizes of
10
many states when single year data is used. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) recognize
the changing nature of party identification across time. While it would be preferable to
have a dynamic measurement for each year considered in the study difficulties in
obtaining adequate sample sizes makes formulating a dynamic measure extremely
problematic. Additional work needs to be conducted to determine approaches that will
allows us to establish a dynamic measure of partisanship, however, due to data
considerations and a lack of a better measure, the index formulated by Erikson, Wright
and McIver will be incorporated into the analysis. The measure indicates a mean score of
party identification ranging from –100 indicating total Republican identification to 100
indication Democratic identification. These mean scores will be included in this analysis
as an indicator of partisan strength.
Political Culture
Elazar (1966, 109) defines political culture as “ the particular pattern of
orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded.” The political
culture of a state appears to be one of the overriding factors in shaping political structure
and the electoral behavior of a state. A measurement of political culture is included in
the study to account for the differences in the political orientations of the states. Elazar
(1966) identifies three political cultures in the American states – individualistic,
moralistic, and traditionalistic1. A moralistic state is a commonwealth where government
can play a positive role in the lives of citizens. In contrast, an individualistic state is a
marketplace and a traditionalistic state sees government’ s role as maintaining the existing
1
For classification of individual states, see Elazar (1966). Elazar also further divides states into categories
indicating leanings toward a specific culture. Additionally, Nardulli (1990) examines political subcultures
of states, however due to the aggregate this study the three major categories of Elazar are efficient.
11
order. Moralistic states are more pro government, therefore, it is expected that more
legislation will be enacted in moralistic states than in traditionalistic or individualist
states. Conversely, traditional states see government’ s role as maintaining the status quo;
therefore it is expected that the level of enactments will be lower in traditional states.
Two variables of political culture are included in this study. First, a dummy
variable indicating if the state is moralistic and second a dummy variable indicating if the
state is traditionalistic. An important assumption is made that political culture is stable
across time. There is little evidence that political cultures change greatly across time.
Two separate variables are included due to the non-continuous nature of political culture.
Methods
This study will examine regular sessions of all state legislatures from 1978 to
1998 with the exception of Nebraska, which unicameral legislature renders it analytically
distinct from the other states. Special sessions are excluded from the analysis. Special
sessions often deal with very specific issues and, therefore, are not representative of the
normal legislative pattern. The sample is chosen because a 20-year period provides an
adequate range to determine the effects of divided government independent of contextual
situations. Additionally, future research should expand the data set, thus allowing us to
make inferences about divided government and party responsiveness in the individual
states.
An OLS model will be run with legislative enactments as a percent of total bills
introduced as the dependent variable. Divided government is the primary explanatory
variable with controls for governor’ s party, election year, veto, line item veto,
12
supermajority, compensation, length of session, staff, ideology, party identification, and
political culture included in the model. Additionally, interaction variables between the
party of the governor and divided government as well as between the legislative majority
in each house and divided government will be included in the model. Future analysis will
be supplemented by a content analysis of various newspapers to determine if the accounts
are consistent with the findings of the empirical analysis.
Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are a concern in cross sectional time series
studies. Different methods have been developed to deal with the concerns of these types
of studies. One common approach employed to deal with these problems is generalized
least squares. However, Beck and Katz (1995) argue that generalized least squares results
in inaccurate standard errors that cause overconfidence of the results of the study 2. Beck
and Katz (1995) propose an alternative method for addressing the problems inherent in
cross sectional time series studies. They argue that ordinary least squares is superior to
the generalized least squares, and that a superior approach to dealing with cross sectional
time series data is OLS with panel corrected standard errors.3 This paper will employ the
approach set forth by Beck and Katz (1995). Ordinary least squares will be run with panel
corrected standard errors. From this analysis, hopefully, some insight will be gained into
the question of the impact of divided government.
OLS estimators do not make efficient use of the data in the presence of
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity common in cross sectional time series data. The
corrected standard errors provide more accurate estimates of the variability of the
parameter estimates. Parks (1967) advocated the use of feasible generalized least squares
2
See Parks (1967) for an explanation of the generalized least squares method
3 See Beck and Katz (1995) for a detailed explanation on the calculation of panel-corrected standard errors.
13
to combat the problems inherent in cross sectional time series data. The Parks method
involves two transformations. The first to eliminate the serial correlation of the errors and
the second to eliminate the contemporaneous correlation of the errors. The Parks method
is successful in correcting for heteroscedasticity, however, the solution is problematic as
a solution for autocorrelation.
The Parks (1967) method is only useful when the number of time periods is as
large as the number cross sectional units or in most cases considerably larger than the
number of time periods. This is rarely the case in political science research. For example,
a study that examines all fifty states would have to look at what happens across at least
fifty years. It is more common to have a situation in which we examine all the states
across a five or ten year time period. This paper examines all the states across twenty
years, and therefore, use of the Parks method is problematic. Given the limitations of the
Parks method it is necessary to look for alternative approaches to dealing with the
problems of cross sectional time series data.
Beck and Katz (1995) propose the use of ordinary least squares with panel
corrected standard errors. The correction takes into account the contemporaneous
correlation of the errors. In order to test the performance of the corrected standard errors
Beck and Katz perform a Monte Carlo analysis which shows that the panel corrected
standard errors outperform the Parks estimates and were more accurate in the presence of
panel heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The authors conclude that the use of OLS
coefficients with panel corrected standard errors do not result in less accurate estimates in
comparison with standard OLS, however, in many cases provide much more accurate the
standard errors generated by OLS.
14
Results
The model supports the hypothesis that divided government does not significantly
affect the passage of legislation in the state legislatures (see Table 1). This analysis
extends the work of Mayhew (1991) to the state level and supports his national level
findings. Divided government is found not to be significant, however, the sign of the
coefficient indicates a lower percentage of enactments under unified government. This
finding seems to be counterintuitive, however, divided government likely results in more
closed rules in which the party has carefully crafted the legislation prior to it being sent to
the floor since the minority party controls another component of the government. In a
unified government scenario the details of legislation can be hammered out on the floor
instead of within the committee. Additionally, open rules result in more amendments
thereby increasing the number of bills being considered. In turn, with legislative details
being worked out on the floor, you are more likely to see legislation being defeated due
to the increased volume. This underlines the need for future research to find ways to get
at the impact of divided government on significant legislation.
[Table 1 About Here]
The findings also revealed that more professional legislatures enact a lower
percentage of legislation. Staff, competition and session length all result in lower passage
rates.4 However, only staff is significant in the model at a .05 level.5 This finding seems
reasonable, given the fact that staff are directly involved in the legislative process. If a
4
Staff and compensation are correlated at a .54 level.
Staff and session length are correlated at a .21 level
Compensation and session length are correlated at .37 level
15
legislature has a large staff, it can draw up more legislation since the workload can be
delegated to members of the staff. The breath of issues considered by New York and
California give the legislature more issues to considered and, therefore, more opportunity
to vote against legislation. The third professionalism measure included in the model is
session length. The length of session is not significant, but it has the same sign as the
previous indicators of professionalism.
The presence of a veto and a line item veto were both significant. The presence of
a veto resulted in a lower level of bills being enacted. Additionally, the line item veto also
served to curtail the enactment of legislation. A supermajority present to override a veto
was not significant in the model, however, it exerted a positive influence on enactments.
The party of the governor did not statistically effect the enactment of legislation.
Additionally, the interaction variable between the party of the governor and divided
government as well as interaction variables created for the house and senate were not
significant. Election years were found to contain higher levels of legislative enactments.
This finding may be the result in a more narrow legislative scope in election years. In
election years legislators may only consider those bills that are the most critical and save
non-critical legislation to after the election.
The two ideology variables included in the model behaved in the same direction,
however, the dynamic model created by Berry et al. had a significant effect6. The more
conservative the state the more legislation enacted. The Berry measure captures short5
When each of the three indicators of professionalism are included in the model individually they are each
significant with a negative sign. Removal of two indicators of professionalism results in the house
interaction variable being significant with a positive slope coefficient.
6
The Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) ideology
measures are correlated at a .71 level. Removal of the Berry measure from the model results in the EWM
measure being significant. Both ideology measures are significant when included separately in the model,
however, only the Berry measure is significant when both measures are included in the model at the same
time.
16
term variation in ideology, while the measure of Erikson, Wright and McIver captures the
portion of ideology that is abiding. This finding on the surface is not consistent with the
conservative philosophy of less government, however, the measurement of the dependent
variable discussed previously makes it difficult to determine the causal direction of the
relationship. The finding reveals that legislators are subjected to short term swings in the
ideology of the citizens. When the electorate is more conservative less legislation is
enacted. Conversely, when the electorate is more liberal they demand more government
action. The party identification of the state was not significant in the analysis.
Moralist states were found significally more likely to enact legislation than
traditionalist or individualist states. This finding is consistent with Elazar’s
operationalization of political culture. Moralist states are more likely to favor government
solutions to societal problems. This finding offers evidence that legislation is driven by
the context of the situation in which it operates. Additionally, this provides evidence that
legislators respond to the desires of the people. In moralist states citizens generally want
government to perform a wider variety of functions and, therefore, respond to the desires
of the people a more ambition legislative agenda is pursued.
Discussion
Mayhew (1991) has rejected the use of non-significant legislation in the
evaluation of the impact of divided government. The task facing researchers at the state
level is much more daunting. Roll call votes are generally not available at the state level
in the way it is nationally. A possible approach to a determination of significant
legislation within the states is a content analysis of various newspapers. At the end of a
17
legislative sessions newspapers often publish a summary of the work of the legislature
indicating the significant bills that were considered during that session.
An examination of several newspapers provides some evidence that the
conclusion reached previously is likely to hold, even if significant legislation is
considered. In Tennessee the major issue confronting the state legislature during the 1999
session was tax reform. The tax reform proposals dominated the legislature and the
divided government present was unable to work out a compromise on the issue.
However, beyond tax reform nearly every other piece of significant legislation was
enacted into law. The spokeswoman for the governor was quoted as indicating “ The
Governor feels the General Assembly did act on important issues.” (de la Cruz 1999).
The legislature acted on a variety of issues including creating the Department of Labor
and Workforce Development, reforms to the state health care plans, laws to protect the
elderly from deceptive advertising, and education reforms.
The examination of the Tennessee session supports the research of Quirk and
Nesmith (1994), in which they argued that divided government has it greatest impact on
the consideration of “ landmark” and “ major” legislation. Divided government definitely
killed the “ major” issue of tax reform in Tennessee, however, other significant pieces of
legislation were enacted despite the presence of divided government.
An examination of the California general assembly provides an alternative
examination of the impact of divided government on the passage of legislation.
Democrats in California were excited about their legislative prospects when Gray Davis
became governor and they no longer had to deal with Pete Wilson. Democrats riding the
wave of excitement from their electoral victory that unified government in California
were expecting to enact legislation that had been bottled up by the governor for years.
18
However, despite their optimism the legislative session was less than rewarding with only
a small portion of the Democratic agenda becoming law. The Democrats found it was
just as difficult to enact legislation under divided government.
The cases of Tennessee and California offer some evidence that divided
government does not necessarily indicate legislative success. Future research needs to
expand on the analysis of Tennessee and California to include a sample that is
representative both across states as well as across time. A detailed content analysis on
various newspapers will enable us to create a data set of significant enactments that can
be examined empirically and systematically.
Conclusions
The model set forth in this paper behaved in the expected manner. Divided
government was not significant in effecting the passage of legislation. Constituent based
factors seemed to exert a great deal of influence in determining legislative outcomes.
States with conservative patterns of identification were less likely to pass a large
proportion of legislation than more liberal states. Legislators appear to reflect the views
of the citizens of the state. These changes are often short term, therefore, swings in
legislative agendas can vary greater from one session to the next.
The research conducted in this study also provides evidence that parties are on the
decline and that they are not necessarily the key actor in determining the legislative
destiny of the state. Legislators are not responsive only to the party but have a much
broader constituency to which they react.
As discussed previously future research needs to concentrate on approaches to
determining significant legislation within the states. The content analysis of newspaper is
19
a possible approach to address the concerns of Mayhew. This expanded analysis will,
hopefully, alleviate some of the problems associated with the inclusion of all legislation
that was part of this analysis. Additionally, an expansion of this current study to include
more sessions will allow us to make determination of the impact of divided government
in the various states.
20
Table 1
Percent of Enactments 1978-1998
Divided
Government
Governor’s
Party
(Divided Govt.)
(Governor
Party)
Interaction
Election Year
Compensation
Staff
Length of
Session
Veto
Line Item Veto
Supermajority
Ideology (Berry
et.all)
Ideology (EWM)
Party
Identification
House
Interaction
Senate
Interaction
Moralist
Traditionalist
Constant
N=720
Ordinary Least
Squares
Unstandardized
Coefficients
-1.660607
Panel-Corrected
Standard Errors
Significance
2.202637
0.451
-.8414309
2.44855
0.731
2.170447
3.117007
0.486
3.258851
-.0001123
-.1806397
-.0043106
1.341832
.0000595
.0603747
.0096927
0.015
0.059
0.003
0.657
-9.288694
-4.372938
2.488706
-.2964274
3.99464
1.691364
1.675352
.0534219
0.020
0.010
0.137
0.000
-.1257864
.0664819
.1192046
.0915591
0.291
0.468
.1467448
.0920467
0.111
-.1151734
.0924674
0.213
10.1137
1.160425
53.95805
1.610625
2.168445
6.300533
0.000
0.593
0.000
21
References
Alt, James E., and Robert Lowry. 1994 “ Divided Government Fiscal Institutions and
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