U T T E R W O R T H
I N E M A N
Electoral Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 417-439
Elsevier Science Ltd. Printed in Great Britain
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I n c e n t i v e s t o C u l t i v a t e a P e r s o n a l Vote:
a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas*
J O H N M CAREY
Department of Political Science, Harkness Hall, University of Rochester,
N Y 14619, USA
]~.KITHEW SOBERG SHUGART~
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of
California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a
personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal voteseeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank
on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes
independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party
vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has
the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation
rises if the electoral formula itseff fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if
the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
Electoral formulas have generally b e e n studied from the s t a n d p o i n t of their effects
o n allocating seats to parties. W e have n u m e r o u s studies of q u e s t i o n s such as the
n u m b e r of parties a n d the degree of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y associated w i t h different seat
allocation m e t h o d s (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967; Taagcpera a n d Shugart, 1989;
Lijphart, 1994). But allocating seats to parties is n o t all that an electoral formula
m u s t do; it m u s t also allocate seats to specific candidates w i t h i n parties. If a party
has m o r e candidates t h a n the n u m b e r of seats it wins, t h e n the electoral formula
m u s t specify a m e a n s for d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h candidates take the party's seats. Even
w h e n there is only o n e candidate p e r party p e r s e a t - - a n d therefore this p r o b l e m
seems n o t to e m e r g e - - t h e reason for there b e i n g only o n e candidate may rest in
a n o t h e r feature of the electoral law: the granting to the party of the right to b e s t o w
the party n o m i n a t i o n u n i q u e l y o n a candidate of its o w n choice.
H o w electoral formulas distribute a p r e c i o u s c o m m o d i t y , legislative seats, a m o n g
the m a n y candidates or p r o s p e c t i v e candidates seeking the c o m m o d i t y affects the
e x t e n t to w h i c h individual politicians c a n benefit by d e v e l o p i n g personal r e p u t a t i o n s
*An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1993. The authors
thank Michael Coppedge, Gary Cox, Mark P. Jones, Arend Lijphart, Steve Swindle, Michael
Thies, and George Tsebelis for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
*Shugart's research was supported by National Science Foundation grant number SES-9208753.
418
I n c e n t i v e s to C u l t i v a t e a P e r s o n a l Vote
distinct from t h o s e o f t h e i r party. In this article, w e p r e s e n t a m e t h o d for estimating the relative value to legislators (and c a n d i d a t e s for legislative seats) o f p e r s o n a l
r e p u t a t i o n s versus p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n s for a d v a n c i n g political careers. The m o d e l is
b a s e d o n just f o u r variables c o m m o n to all electoral systems: ballot control, v o t e
pooling, t y p e s o f votes, a n d district magnitude.
T h e first t h r e e o f t h e s e are t r i c h o t o m i z e d , e a c h t a k i n g o n l y t h r e e p o s s i b l e
values. BAttOT m e a s u r e s t h e d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l p a r t y l e a d e r s e x e r c i s e o v e r a c c e s s
to t h e i r p a r t y ' s label, a n d c o n t r o l o v e r b a l l o t r a n k in e l e c t o r a l list systems, eooE
m e a s u r e s w h e t h e r v o t e s cast in t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n are p o o l e d a c r o s s e n t i r e
p a r t i e s , o r a m o n g f a c t i o n s o r c a n d i d a t e s , o r are n o t p o o l e d at all. In t h e l a t t e r
c a s e c a n d i d a t e s are e l e c t e d to office s o l e l y o n t h e v o t e s t h e y e a r n individually.
VOTES m e a s u r e s t h e n u m b e r a n d t y p e s o f v o t e s cast; a single p a r t i s a n vote,
m u l t i p l e votes, o r a single v o t e b e l o w t h e p a r t y level. W e r a n k t h i r t e e n feasible
c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e s e v a r i a b l e s ordinally, a c c o r d i n g to t h e relative i n c e n t i v e s
e a c h c r e a t e s for c a n d i d a t e s to c u l t i v a t e p e r s o n a l , as o p p o s e d to party, r e p u t a t i o n s .
T h e f o u r t h variable, district m a g n i t u d e (M), has as m a n y intervals as t h e r e are
seats in a g i v e n legislature. M has t h e u n u s u a l - - a n d n o t p r e v i o u s l y o b s e r v e d - p r o p e r t y that it affects t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n in o p p o s i t e m a n n e r s ,
d e p e n d i n g o n t h e value o f BAn.OT. In all systems w h e r e t h e r e is i n t r a p a r t y c o m p e tition, as M grows, so d o e s t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n . Conversely, in systems
w h e r e t h e r e is n o i n t r a p a r t y c o m p e t i t i o n , as M grows, t h e value o f p e r s o n a l reputation shrinks. This feature o f M will b e e x p l a i n e d b e l o w .
The p r e m i s e that legislators a n d legislative c a n d i d a t e s have the i n c e n t i v e to cultivate a p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n rests o n a n o t h e r p r i o r a s s u m p t i o n c o m m o n in t h e literature o n legislative b e h a v i o r : that p o l i t i c i a n s are m o t i v a t e d b y t h e d e s i r e to s e e k
r e e l e c t i o n (Rae, 1971; M a y h e w , 1974; Epstein, 1967; Cain e t al., 1987; T a a g e p e r a
a n d Shugart, 1989). W e share this a s s u m p t i o n t h r o u g h o u t this w o r k . N u m e r o u s
p r e v i o u s studies have r e c o g n i z e d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i l e m m a that w e s e e k to
highlight t h r o u g h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f an o r d i n a l s c o r i n g system: that t h e r e is
f r e q u e n t l y a t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o l l e c t i v e e l e c t o r a l interests o f a given political
p a r t y a n d t h e individual e l e c t o r a l interests of t h e politicians w h o run for office
u n d e r that p a r t y label (Ames, 1992; Cox, 1987; Fiorina, 1977; Katz, 1980;
M c C u b b i n s a n d R o s e n b l u t h , 1994; Reed, 1994).
S o m e t i m e s individual politicians p r e f e r to take p o s i t i o n s o r a c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n
t h o s e that w o u l d m o s t b e n e f i t t h e i r p a r t y collectively. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is w i d e l y
a c k n o w l e d g e d that e l e c t o r a l rules s h a p e t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h individual politicians
can b e n e f i t e l e c t o r a l l y b y d e v e l o p i n g p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n s distinct f r o m t h o s e o f
t h e i r p a r t y (Fenno, 1978; Uslaner, 1985; J a c o b s o n , 1990; Mainwaring, 1991; G e d d e s
and Ribeiro Neto, 1992; Shugart a n d Nielson, 1993).
Political s c i e n c e has e s t a b l i s h e d s o m e basic t e n e t s o n t h e relative value o f
p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n u n d e r various e l e c t o r a l systems. F o r e x a m p l e , it is w i d e l y
a c c e p t e d that in o p e n list systems, p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is m o r e valuable to legislative c a n d i d a t e s t h a n in c l o s e d list systems (Sartori, 1976; T a a g e p e r a and Shugart,
1989; Ames, 1992). But t h e r e is n o systematic, universal m o d e l to a c c o u n t for the
value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n u n d e r t h e b r o a d range o f e l e c t o r a l rules a c c o r d i n g to
w h i c h legislators a r o u n d t h e w o r l d are e l e c t e d ) In this essay, w e p r o v i d e s u c h a
m o d e l . T h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e s y s t e m is that it is b o t h g e n e r a l i z a b l e a n d tractable.
That is, it c a n e n c o m p a s s all t h e existing e l e c t o r a l systems as w e l l as s o m e that d o
n o t exist (to o u r k n o w l e d g e ) b u t that are logically possible.
JOHN M CAREYAND MATTHEWSOBERG SHUGART
419
What is Being Estimated? A Word On Reputations
The model proposes a method to estimate the relative value to legislators (and
candidates to legislatures) of personal reputations versus party reputations for
advancing political careers. Both the concepts of personal and party reputation
warrant some explanation. First, if a politician's electoral prospects improve as a
result of being personally well k n o w n and liked by voters, then personal reputation matters. The more this matters, the more valuable personal reputation is.
Building personal reputation is frequently associated by U.S. political scientists with
legislative particularism--securing pork-barrel funding for projects that benefit
specific districts, and providing errand-boy services to solve individual constituents'
problems with government bureaucracy. Indeed, in many electoral systems, a strong
personal reputation within a limited electoral district is critical to electoral success
(Lancaster and Patterson, 1990), and providing particularism is a means of developing such a reputation. But personal reputations can be valuable in electoral
systems with large (even nationwide) districts as well, w h e n candidates are elected
from personal votes rather than from party lists. 2 Thus, the national celebrity
enjoyed by movie stars or athletes can translate into valuable personal reputation
in some electoral systems. The model presented here identifies the degree to which
electoral systems reward politicians' personal reputations, but does not distinguish
as to h o w that reputation is most effectively developed.
The idea of party reputation can refer to a number of different ideas, and so
warrants a little more explanation. Party reputations can vary widely across regions
within countries. Also, a party's reputation may be different at the level of electoral
district from what it is nationally. This article is concerned with party reputation
at the level of the electoral district. Districts, of course, can vary in magnitude from
single-member districts (SMDs) all the way up to a system where the entire nation
is one electoral district (like Israel). In the latter case, party reputation would refer
to a party's national reputation. The point is that our first three variables refer to
phenomena that work at the district level; our fourth variable, district magnitude,
identifies precisely the extent of that level. Party reputation, then, refers to the
information that party label conveys to voters in a given electoral district.
In referring to a tension between personal and party reputation, we are suggesting that there is a potential collective action problem for politicians in establishing
and maintaining party reputations (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Maintaining a
reputation requires that politicians refrain from taking positions or actions that
conflict with the party's platform. If the quality of her party's reputation is all that
matters to each politician's electoral prospects, then there is no p r o b l e m - - t h e r e is
no incentive to weaken party reputation by staking out independent positions. But
if electoral prospects depend on winning votes cast for the individual politician
instead of, or in addition to, votes cast for the party, then politicians need to evaluate the trade-off between the value of personal and party reputations.
Maintaining party reputations is a collective action problem for politicians. The
severity of the problem is determined by electoral rules, but among politicians
themselves, there is no means of ensuring cooperation in maintaining a collective
reputation. Those w h o control access to the party label at the district level,
however, have an interest in the quality of party reputation. The careers of these
party leaders are dependent on the collective electoral fate of the party, rather than
that of individual politicians. If a coherent party label benefits the party collectively
420
I n c e n t i v e s to Cultivate a P e r s o n a l Vote
w i t h i n a district, t h e n l e a d e r s have an interest in d i s c o u r a g i n g i n d e p e n d e n t a c t i o n
by politicians. T h e ability o f p a r t y l e a d e r s to e n f o r c e c o o p e r a t i o n a m o n g p o l i t i c i a n s
in m a i n t a i n i n g p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n d e p e n d s on t h e s a n c t i o n s l e a d e r s can i m p o s e o n
politicians w h o b r e a k p a r t y ranks.
W h e n w e s p e a k o f a t e n s i o n b e t w e e n p e r s o n a l a n d p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n , then, w e
are referring to t h e p o t e n t i a l conflict b e t w e e n individual p o l i t i c i a n s a n d districtlevel p a r t y leaders. F e a t u r e s of p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n o u t s i d e o u r m o d e l are n e e d e d to
u n d e r s t a n d any conflicts that m a y exist b e t w e e n leaders o f o n e district and t h o s e
o f a n o t h e r o r b e t w e e n local and national leaders. W e e s t i m a t e only t h e ability o f
(district-leveD p a r t y l e a d e r s to e n f o r c e c o o p e r a t i o n in m a i n t a i n i n g p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n
and, conversely, the i n c e n t i v e s for politicians to c o m p l y .
What We Demonstrate
W e p r e s e n t a m e t h o d o f evaluating e l e c t o r a l formulas b a s e d o n f o u r variables: ballot
control, v o t e p o o l i n g , t y p e o f votes, a n d district m a g n i t u d e . M t h o u g h t h e s e
variables d o n o t c a p t u r e all of the p o s s i b l e subtleties in e l e c t o r a l formulas, 3 t h e y
are t h e p r i n c i p a l factors i n h e r e n t in t h e e l e c t o r a l s y s t e m a c c o u n t i n g for the value
o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n to legislators. 4 T h e first t h r e e variables, BALLOT, POOL, and
W~TES, can e a c h take t h r e e p o s s i b l e values, 0, 1, o r 2, d e p e n d i n g on h o w strong an
i n c e n t i v e e a c h c r e a t e s for politicians to cultivate p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n s . T h e h i g h e r
t h e score, the g r e a t e r t h e incentive. T h e r e arc t w e n t y - s e v e n (39) p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e values o f t h e s e t h r e e variables. F o u r t e e n o f t h e s e c o m b i n a t i o n s ,
h o w e v e r , d o n o t r e p r e s e n t logically p o s s i b l e o r p r a c t i c a l e l e c t o r a l systems. That is,
t h e r e arc c e r t a i n values o f o n e variable that p r e c l u d e certain values o f o n e of t h e
others. Thus w e are left w i t h t h i r t e e n feasible c o m b i n a t i o n s o f o u r first t h r e e
variables. W e p r e s e n t a rank o r d e r i n g of t h e s e t h i r t e e n c o m b i n a t i o n s , from that
w h i c h g e n e r a t e s t h e least i n c e n t i v e to cultivate a p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n to that w h i c h
g e n e r a t e s t h e g r e a t e s t incentive.
T h e f o u r t h variable, M, can r a n g e f r o m a m i n i m u m value o f 1 (SMD) to a
m a x i m u m d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e n u m b e r o f scats in t h e legislature. Given the large
n u m b e r o f p o s s i b l e values o f M for any legislature, i w o u l d n o t l e n d itself w e l l to
i n c l u s i o n in t h e rank o r d e r i n g system. T h e r e is also a n o t h e r , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , r e a s o n
that M is n o t i n c l u d e d in t h e ordinal ranking o f systems. M has t h e u n u s u a l p r o p e r t y
that its effect on the value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is different, d e p e n d i n g o n the
value o f BALLOT. This is n o t t h e case for any o f the o t h e r t h r e e variables, v i s - a - v i s
e a c h other. That is, c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , an i n c r e a s e in BALLOT, POOL, o r VOTES always
i n c r e a s e s t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n . O n l y M has t h e p r o p e r t y that t h e direction of its effect o n t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e value o f
a n o t h e r variable.
II. An Ordinal Scoring System
S c o r i n g BALLOT~ POOL, a n d
VOTES
T h e first variable, BALLOT, m e a s u r e s t h e d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l p a r t y l e a d e r s e x e r c i s e
o v e r a c c e s s to t h e i r p a r t y ' s label. T h e r e are t w o e l e m e n t s to this variable: c o n t r o l
o v e r p a r t y e n d o r s e m e n t s , a n d c o n t r o l o v e r ballot r a n k in e l e c t o r a l list systems.
These elements together determine the degree of authority leaders exercise over
JOHN M CAREY AND MATFHEW SOBERG SHUGART
421
rank-and-file politicians t h r o u g h c o n t r o l over ballots. W h e n leaders exercise strong
ballot control, the i n c e n t i v e for a p o l i t i c i a n to cultivate a p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is
m i n i m i z e d ; b u t w h e n ballot c o n t r o l is weak, p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is m o r e valuable.
BALLOT is scored as follows:
O: Leaders p r e s e n t a fixed ballot, voters m a y n o t 'disturb' list;
1: Leaders p r e s e n t party ballots, b u t voters may 'disturb' list;
2: Leaders do n o t c o n t r o l access to ballots, or rank.
A score of 0 indicates t w o things. First, party leaders c o n t r o l n o m i n a t i o n s , a n d thus
w h i c h politicians b e n e f i t from the party's e n d o r s e m e n t . Second, party leaders determ i n e the o r d e r of the party's list of candidates o n the ballot, and this o r d e r c a n n o t
be altered by voters. W h e n ~ALLOT= 0, leaders have m a x i m u m c o n t r o l over ballots,
voters choose a m o n g parties rather t h a n individual candidates, a n d so the value of
p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n s is m i n i m i z e d .
A score of 1 indicates that leaders c o n t r o l w h i c h politicians secure the party's
e n d o r s e m e n t , b u t that voters can d e t e r m i n e w h i c h candidates are elected by selecting from a m o n g the candidates p r e s e n t e d by the party. This necessarily implies
c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g candidates w h o share the same party label, and so indicates
that p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n will be valuable.
A score of 2 indicates that leaders c o n t r o l n e i t h e r party e n d o r s e m e n t s n o r ballot
lists. In such systems candidates m i g h t gain ballot access by paying a registration
fee, b y collecting signatures, t h r o u g h primaries, or t h r o u g h some c o m b i n a t i o n of
these methods. The key p o i n t is that politicians t h e m s e l v e s d e t e r m i n e their ballot
access by acting as individual political e n t r e p r e n e u r s . Party leaders are marginalized, a n d the value of p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is maximized.
T h e n e x t variable, toOL, m e a s u r e s w h e t h e r votes cast for o n e candidate of a given
party also c o n t r i b u t e to the n u m b e r of seats w o n in the district by the party as a
whole. POOL is scored as follows:
O: Pooling across w h o l e party;
1: Pooling at sub-party level;
2: No pooling.
W h e n Poor = O, a vote for any candidate of a given party is c o u n t e d first as a vote
for the w h o l e party list for the p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g h o w m a n y seats are to be
allocated to the list. s Such systems i n c l u d e list PR systems in all three of their m o s t
c o m m o n variants: (1) closed-list, in w h i c h voters vote directly for the list, as in
Spain; 6 (2) open-list, in w h i c h voters indicate their p r e f e r e n c e for o n e or m o r e
candidates w i t h i n lists, as in F i n l a n d since 1955; 7 a n d (3) multiple-list, in w h i c h
voters vote for o n e of several lists of candidates p r e s e n t e d u n d e r the n a m e of the
same party, as in F i n l a n d before 1955 and Uruguay. s In each of these variants,
h o w e v e r , the vote is cast, votes for all candidates or lists are p o o l e d to d e t e r m i n e
h o w m a n y seats the party as a w h o l e wins. In addition, w h e n parties p r e s e n t only
o n e candidate in a SMD election, votes are effectively ' p o o l e d ' across the w h o l e
party, w h e r e each party p r e s e n t s a fixed list c o n t a i n i n g the n a m e of o n e candidate. 9
W h e n votes are p o o l e d this way, a c a n d i d a t e ' s f o r t u n e s d e p e n d o n the ability of
h e r entire party to attract votes. The party r e p u t a t i o n , then, is at a p r e m i u m relative
to p e r s o n a l reputation.
W h e n POOL = 1, votes are also pooled, b u t they are p o o l e d across candidates or
across factions, rather t h a n across entire parties. Pooling across candidates takes
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Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote
place u n d e r the single transferable vote formula ( i n c l u d i n g its SMID variant, the
alternative vote), w h e r e voters c a n designate to w h o m their votes should be transferred if they are n o t n e e d e d to elect their first choice, or if their first c h o i c e is
too u n p o p u l a r to be elected. Pooling also takes place at the sub-party level in
C o l o m b i a ' s personal-list formula, w h e r e the vote, w h i c h m u s t be cast for an individual list, is p o o l e d a m o n g m e m b e r s of that list, b u t n o t across o t h e r lists from the
same party. W h e r e p o o l i n g o c c u r s at the sub-party level, candidates d e p e n d o n their
ability, or their faction's ability, to attract votes i n d e p e n d e n t of the party as a whole,
so p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is m o r e valuable t h a n w h e n POOL = O.
W h e n POOL = 2, n o vote p o o l i n g occurs at all, a n d candidates are e l e c t e d entirely
by virtue of their p e r s o n a l ability to attract votes. Clearly, u n d e r such conditions,
the value of p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is at its greatest relative to the collective reputation of the party. Such systems i n c l u d e the single n o n t r a n s f e r a b l e vote (SNTV)
formerly used in Japan, a n d systems that use p r i m a r y elections that allow voters to
select from a m o n g candidates w i t h i n parties.
The VOTES variable distinguishes a m o n g systems in w h i c h voters are allowed to
cast only a single vote for a party, m u l t i p l e votes, or a single vote for a candidate.
The value to legislative candidates of p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is lowest in the first case,
m o d e r a t e in the second, a n d highest in the last. VOTES is scored as follows:
O: Voters cast a single vote for o n e party;
1: Voters cast votes for multiple candidates;
2: Voters cast a single vote b e l o w the party level.
W h e n VOTES= O, voters simply c h o o s e o n c e from a m o n g the various parties, as in
Rae's n o t i o n of a 'categoric' vote.l° U n d e r these conditions, party r e p u t a t i o n is high,
a n d there is relatively little i n c e n t i v e for candidates to cultivate a p e r s o n a l reputation. Examples are closed-list systems of any district m a g n i t u d e , i n c l u d i n g SMD
plurality systems in w h i c h the party s u b m i t s a 'list' of o n e candidate.
W h e n VOTES= 1, voters c a n cast m o r e t h a n o n e vote. 11 This can h a p p e n either
w i t h i n a given e l e c t i o n or over time. Voters might b e allowed to cast votes for a
certain n u m b e r of candidates either w i t h i n party lists, or across parties as in a
p a n a c h a g e or multi-seat plurality system. A transferable vote also allows voters to
express p r e f e r e n c e s for m u l t i p l e candidates, b u t to give an ordinal r a n k i n g to
them. 12 Alternatively, voters m i g h t bc allowed m u l t i p l e votes over time, as w h e n
primaries are used to d e t e r m i n e n o m i n a t i o n s , or w h e n run-off elections are used
to select from a m o n g top c o m p e t i t o r s in a first r o u n d of voting. 13 U n d e r all of these
systems, the fact that votes are cast for individual candidates m e a n s that a politician's p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is m o r e valuable t h a n w h e n votes are cast only for
parties. However, w h e n m u l t i p l e votes are cast, p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is n o t as
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y i m p o r t a n t relative to party r e p u t a t i o n as w h e n all candidates are
c o m p e t i n g s i m u l t a n e o u s l y for the same indivisible s u p p o r t of each voter. W h e n
m u l t i p l e votes are cast simultaneously, the candidates from o n e party can r u n as a
bloc, rather t h a n r u n n i n g against each other. W h e n a separate p r i m a r y d e t e r m i n e s
n o m i n a t i o n s , intraparty c o m p e t i t i o n takes place a m o n g a subset of all candidates,
b u t party r e p u t a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t in the general election. Finally, in run-off elections,
s e c o n d r o u n d c o m p e t i t o r s n e e d to b r o a d e n their appeal b e y o n d the core g r o u p of
voters w h o s e s u p p o r t allowed t h e m to survive the first r o u n d .
W h e n VOTES= 2, finally, each voter casts o n e vote, either for a candidate or a
party faction. This describes, a m o n g others: single n o n t r a n s f e r a b l e vote (SNTV),
JOHN M CAREY AND MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART
423
d o u b l e s i m u l t a n e o u s vote, alternative vote systems, a n d open-list PR. In all these
systems, intra-party c o m p e t i t i o n takes place s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h i n t e r p a r t y c o m p e tition. Voters c a n n e i t h e r spread their s u p p o r t across m e m b e r s of the same party
n o r across m u l t i p l e parties. Everyone c o m p e t e s against e v e r y o n e else at once.
U n d e r these c o n d i t i o n s , p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is at a p r e m i u m relative to party reputation.
In this s c h e m e , VOTES= 1 is n o t m e r e l y a residual category. A l t h o u g h it is true
that there are i m p o r t a n t differences a m o n g systems in w h i c h voters have m u l t i p l e
votes, all the systems that w e characterize as VOTES= 1 differ f u n d a m e n t a l l y from
those in w h i c h voters get only o n e vote. The difference is that the v o t e r ' s s u p p o r t
is divisible) 4 T h e logic is similar for runoffs, or c v c n for list systems w i t h m u l t i p l e
p r e f e r e n c e votes: voters may e x p r e s s a m o r e qualified p r e f e r e n c e , or vote for their
first a n d s e c o n d (or possibly further) choices.
Feasible C o m b i n a t i o n s o f BALLOT, POOL, a n d VOTES
Each of these first three variables is scored a c c o r d i n g to three possible values. As
a result, there are t w e n t y - s e v e n possible c o m b i n a t i o n s of values o n these three
variables. However, m a n y of these c o m b i n a t i o n s are logically i n c o n s i s t e n t . For
e x a m p l e , if voters cast a single, party vote ( V O T E S = 0 ) , t h e n it m u s t be that parties
p r e s e n t fixed ballot lists that voters do n o t disturb (BALLOT= 0). T h e scoring system
is m a d e m o r e tractable, then, by establishing a set of rules to eliminate c o m b i n a tions of values o n BALLOT, POOL, a n d VOTES that r e p r e s e n t logically impossible
electoral systems. The three rules are:
Rule #1: If VOTES= 0, T h e n BALLOT= 0;
Rule #2: If BALLOT= 0, T h e n pool. = 0;
Rule #3: If BALLOT= 0, T h e n VOTES#2.
T h e first rule was just explained. Rule #2 states that if parties p r e s e n t ballots that
c a n n o t b e altered by voters, t h e n votes m u s t b e p o o l e d across the w h o l e party.
Pooling b e l o w the party level, or n o pooling, m e a n s inevitably that party lists are
n o t fixed. Pooling at the party level, t h e n , is a necessary c o n d i t i o n for ballots to be
fixed; a l t h o u g h the reverse does n o t hold.
Rule #3 states that if parties p r e s e n t fixed ballots, t h e n it c a n n o t be that voters
cast a single vote b e l o w the party level. This is straightforward in that any vote at
the sub-party level implies a choice a m o n g those w h o are seeking or have already
s e c u r e d the party's e n d o r s e m e n t . If voters arc given such discretion, t h e n it c a n n o t
b e that leaders are p r e s e n t i n g fixed ballots.
These three rules t o g e t h e r eliminate from c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h i r t e e n of the twentyseven possible configurations of values for BALLOT, POOr, and VOTES. A n o t h e r c a n b e
ruled out o n the g r o u n d s that it is implausible. That configuration is o n e in w h i c h
VOTES = 2, b u t BALLOT= P O O L = 1. This configuration w o u l d describe a system of multiple lists, b e c a u s e voters cast a single vote b e l o w the party level (VOTES= 2) a n d there
is also p o o l i n g b e l o w the party level (POOL = 1). However, the configuration also tells
us that parties d e t e r m i n e w h i c h lists c a n r u n u n d e r the party label (BALEOT= 1). It is
highly implausible that a party that can c o n t r o l its label a n d p r e s e n t lists that can
w i n m o r e t h a n o n e seat each w o u l d p r e s e n t m o r e t h a n o n e list p e r district, although
it is logically possible. A party that has the BALLOTc o n t r o l to decide h o w m a n y lists
to r u n surely w o u l d choose to r u n just one, w h e n there is n o p o o l i n g at the party
424
Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote
level. O n l y if 'lists' w e r e r e s t r i c t e d b y l a w to o n e c a n d i d a t e e a c h in a system for
w h i c h M > 1 w o u l d parties have to e n d o r s e m u l t i p l e lists, in w h i c h case w e have
SNTV. 15 W e n o w t u r n to t h e task o f ranking t h e r e m a i n i n g t h i r t e e n configurations.
A n O r d i n a l R a n k i n g o f S y s t e m s A c c o r d i n g to BALLOT, POOL, a n d VOTES
T h e t h i r t e e n c o n f i g u r a t i o n s are s h o w n in Table 1 a n d d e s c r i b e all feasible e l e c t o r a l
systems a c c o r d i n g to t h e interval e s t a b l i s h e d for e a c h variable. T h e same configuration often d e s c r i b e s m o r e t h a n o n e e l e c t o r a l system, for t w o reasons. First, a given
e l e c t o r a l f o r m u l a u s e d in a s i n g l e - m e m b e r district m a y have a different c o n v e n t i o n a l
n a m e t h a n t h e s a m e f o r m u l a w h e n u s e d in a m u l t i m e m b e r district. Thus Table 1
identifies e x a m p l e s o f e a c h f o r m u l a in b o t h s i n g l e - m e m b e r and m u l t i m e m b e r
districts.16 W h e r e a cell for e x a m p l e is left blank, it is b e c a u s e w e k n o w o f n o empirical referent. Second, a l t h o u g h the o r d i n a l s c o r i n g system is inclusive, e a c h p o s i t i o n
in t h e o r d e r n e c e s s a r i l y g r o u p s t o g e t h e r systems that vary s o m e w h a t . F o r e x a m p l e ,
b o t h a multiple-list system a n d an o p e n list s y s t e m m a y a l l o w a single v o t e b e l o w
t h e p a r t y level (for factional lists in o n e case, c a n d i d a t e s in the o t h e r ) a n d b o t h
involve p o o l i n g at t h e p a r t y level. T h e systems are n o t identical, b u t a p p e a r to b e
in this model. T h e lack o f a s e p a r a t e rank for e a c h s y s t e m is n o t a w e a k n e s s ,
h o w e v e r . By g r o u p i n g systems a c c o r d i n g to t h e critical variables, t h e m o d e l
highlights similarities a m o n g e l e c t o r a l systems that can be o v e r l o o k e d in a less
systematic analysis. M o r e o v e r , if t h e variables are d e s i g n e d well, t h e n w h e n systems
share a given configuration, t h e y s h o u l d also p r o v i d e a similar trade-off for politicians b e t w e e n t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n a n d p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n .
The c o n f i g u r a t i o n s in Table 1 are r a n k e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i n c e n t i v e s e a c h c r e a t e s
for p o l i t i c i a n s to cultivate p e r s o n a l , as o p p o s e d to party, r e p u t a t i o n s . The first listed
creates t h e least incentive, w h i l e t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n i n c r e a s e s u n d e r
e a c h successive configuration, all else equal. To rank the configurations, w e b e g i n
w i t h t h e e l e c t o r a l f o r m u l a that p r o v i d e s t h e least value for p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n o n
e a c h o f t h e variables (0,0,0). Then, w e c o n s i d e r t h e i m p a c t o f altering any o f the
variables, w i t h t h e goal o f identifying the feasible c o n f i g u r a t i o n that i m p l i e s t h e
smallest i n c r e a s e in the value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n . This p r o c e s s is r e p e a t e d until
all t h i r t e e n feasible c o n f i g u r a t i o n s are ranked, f r o m l o w e s t to h i g h e s t a c c o r d i n g to
the value of p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n . Ultimately, the p r e c i s e ranking can be d e t e r m i n e d
only w i t h r i g o r o u s e m p i r i c a l testing, as w e discuss in o u r conclusions. F o r n o w , let
us p r e s e n t o u r m e t h o d for d e t e r m i n i n g ranks, e x p e c t i n g ( a n d h o p i n g ) to p r o v o k e
s o m e dissent from o u r readers.
N o n e o f t h e t h r e e variables is clearly the m o s t o r least i m p o r t a n t , u n d e r all conditions, in d e t e r m i n i n g the value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n . T h e i m p a c t o f c h a n g i n g t h e
s c o r e o f o n e variable d e p e n d s o n t h e c u r r e n t values o f t h e others. T h e r e f o r e , o n e
c a n n o t s i m p l y b e g i n b y varying t h e least i m p o r t a n t variable, w h i l e h o l d i n g the
o t h e r s constant, t h e n t h e s e c o n d least i m p o r t a n t , a n d so on, to establish t h e rank
o r d e r i n g o f systems. Rather, b e c a u s e t h e i m p a c t o f variables is c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e
values o f others, e a c h j u m p b e t w e e n c o n f i g u r a t i o n s m u s t b e d e f e n d e d o n its o w n
terms. Fortunately, w i t h o n l y t h i r t e e n intervals, this p r o c e s s r e m a i n s tractable.
(a) Closed-list F o r m u l a with One Round. Personal r e p u t a t i o n is least i m p o r t a n t
u n d e r c l o s e d list, single r o u n d e l e c t i o n s (0,0,0). Here, p a r t i e s p r e s e n t f i x e d ballots,
and v o t e r s are a l l o w e d a single o p p o r t u n i t y to c h o o s e a m o n g parties. In s u c h a
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system, t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n to a p o l i t i c i a n is d r i v e n e n t i r e l y b y M and
is l o w e s t w h e n M = 1. ( W e r e t u r n to t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f M b e l o w . ) Systems w i t h M
= 1 a n d c l o s e d 'lists' (i.e., o n e c a n d i d a t e p e r p a r t y p e r district, w i t h p a r t y l e a d e r s
d e t e r m i n i n g w h o that c a n d i d a t e is) i n c l u d e Britain ~7 and, for m o s t seats, Mexico. 18
For systems in w h i c h M > 1, this c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s the closed-list PR systems of
Israel, Spain, a n d n u m e r o u s countries. Also i n c l u d e d are various f o r m s o f list plurality, w h e r e t h e p a r t y that gets t h e m o s t v o t e s takes all M seats, as in t h e f o r m u l a
u s e d b y m o s t states for t h e U.S. Electoral College. Less c o m m o n l y , a closed-list
system m a y p e r m i t t h e plurality p a r t y to take s o m e f i x e d share o f t h e seats less
t h a n M, w i t h t h e s e c o n d largest p a r t y taking t h e rest o f t h e seats. Such a formula,
k n o w n as t h e Saenz Pefia law, w a s f o r m e r l y u s e d for the A r g e n t i n e C h a m b e r o f
D e p u t i e s and b e g a n to b e u s e d in t h e M e x i c a n Senate in 1994.
(b) Closed-list Formula with Two Rounds. T h e smallest i n c r e a s e in p e r s o n a l reputation a m o n g feasible c o n f i g u r a t i o n s is to a l l o w m u l t i p l e v o t e s (0,0, l). W h e r e ballots
are f i x e d b y p a r t i e s a n d p o o l i n g takes p l a c e across parties, this i m p l i e s a multir o u n d e l e c t o r a l system. In SMDs, F r a n c e is t h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t e x a m p l e . Mali
c u r r e n t l y uses this closeddist m a j o r i t y f o r m u l a in multi-seat districts (Vengroff,
1994). T h e i n c r e a s e in t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n h e r e is d r i v e n b y t h e
fractionalization o f p a r t y systems that run-off systems g e n e r a t e relative to singler o u n d systems (Shugart a n d Carey, 1992). In t h e s e c o n d - r o u n d c a m p a i g n , candidates m u s t b r o a d e n t h e i r appeals, thus e v e n c a n d i d a t e s r u n n i n g o n a c l o s e d list m a y
have s o m e i n c e n t i v e to cultivate p e r s o n a l votes, n o t to differentiate from e a c h
other, b u t b e c a u s e t h e y m u s t e x p a n d t h e i r v o t e s b e y o n d the base that t h e i r p a r t y
r e p u t a t i o n brings t h e m . Still, w i t h p a r t y l e a d e r s c o n t r o l l i n g ballot access, a n d v o t e s
p o o l e d across parties, t h e i n c r e a s e d value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n u n d e r m u l t i p l e
r o u n d systems is t h e smallest p o s s i b l e jump.
(c) Open-list Formula with Multiple Votes. T h e n e x t smallest i n c r e a s e is to vary
t h e value o n BALLOTs u c h that lists are still c o m p o s e d b y p a r t y leaders, b u t v o t e r s
m a y e x p r e s s p r e f e r e n c e s for s o m e c a n d i d a t e s o v e r o t h e r s (1,0,1). That c a n d i d a t e s
c a n i m p r o v e t h e i r e l e c t o r a l c h a n c e s b y a t t r a c t i n g p e r s o n a l votes, e v e n at t h e
e x p e n s e o f o t h e r s o n t h e i r p a r t y ' s list, m e a n s that t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a tion i n c r e a s e s u n d e r this system. But t h e fact that v o t e r s are a l l o w e d m u l t i p l e
v o t e s - - u s u a l l y s o m e n u m b e r less t h a n M, b u t s o m e t i m e s M v o t e s - - m e a n s that
c a n d i d a t e s o f a g i v e n p a r t y c a n r u n as a bloc, a n d so v o t e r s are n o t f o r c e d to
identify o n e c a n d i d a t e as p r e f e r r e d a b o v e all others. 19 Such a variant o f PR w a s
u s e d in Italy b e f o r e t h e r e f o r m s o f 1993 ( s e e Katz, 1980). B e c a u s e o f t h e multip l e - v o t e p r o c e d u r e , this f o r m u l a m a y s e e m i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h s i n g l e - m e m b e r
districts. H o w e v e r , if w e relax t h e a s s u m p t i o n that v o t e r s m u s t b e given n o m o r e
t h a n M votes, it c o u l d apply. A n e x a m p l e w o u l d b e if t h e seat w a s a w a r d e d to t h e
p a r t y w i t h t h e m o s t v o t e s a n d v o t e r s c o u l d v o t e for as m a n y c a n d i d a t e s as t h e y
w e r e willing to e x p r e s s ' a p p r o v a l ' of, w i t h t h e seat g o i n g to t h e m o s t a p p r o v e d
c a n d i d a t e w i t h i n t h e p l u r a l i t y party. 2°
(d) Single Transferable Vote with Party Endorsements. T h e n e x t value that can b e
v a r i e d to i n c r e a s e t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is the s c o r e o n POOL (1,1,1). If
p o o l i n g takes p l a c e b e l o w t h e p a r t y level, it is n o l o n g e r so that all m e m b e r s o f a
p a r t y b e n e f i t w h e n e v e r a v o t e is cast for o n e o f t h e i r p a r t y ' s candidates. Voters m a y
JOHN M CAREYAND MATTHEWSOBERG SHUGART
427
v o t e for m u l t i p l e c a n d i d a t e s , b u t b e c a u s e p o o l i n g d o e s n o t take p l a c e at t h e level
o f t h e p r e f e r r e d c a n d i d a t e s ' parties, v o t e r s are a s k e d to d e s i g n a t e a rank o r d e r i n g
o f t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . This c o n f i g u r a t i o n d e s c r i b e s w h a t is k n o w n as t h e single transferable v o t e (STV) formula, w h e r e v o t e r s cast o r d i n a l p r e f e r e n c e v o t e s for m u l t i p l e
candidates. 21 Surplus votes, a n d t h o s e that are cast for losing c a n d i d a t e s , are transf e r r e d to l o w e r - r a n k e d c a n d i d a t e s w h o are still in c o n t e n t i o n for a seat. In singlem e m b e r districts, this f o r m u l a is usually called t h e alternative v o t e (or, in Australia,
majority-preferential). U n d e r this formula, b e c a u s e v o t e transfers entail a f o r m o f
v o t e p o o l i n g across c a n d i d a t e s , p o l i t i c i a n s f r o m t h e s a m e o r allied p a r t i e s c a n r u n
as a bloc, a p p e a l i n g to v o t e r s to cast s e c o n d a n d third p r e f e r e n c e v o t e s for t h e i r
copartisans, b u t t h e i r ability to w i n seats d e p e n d s e n t i r e l y o n h o w m a n y p e r s o n a l
v o t e s t h e y receive.
(e) Open-list, Single Vote. W e n o w have o u r first systems in w h i c h v o t e r s cast a
single v o t e b e l o w t h e p a r t y level, e i t h e r for an individual c a n d i d a t e o r a factional
list. This i n c r e a s e s t h e value of p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n b e c a u s e c a n d i d a t e s c a n n o
l o n g e r r u n as teams, s e c k i n g to share t h e v o t e s o f p a r t i c u l a r voters. Each c a n d i d a t e
o r list stands a l o n e in t h e q u e s t for e a c h v o t e r ' s single vote. Party r e p u t a t i o n still
m a t t e r s significantly, h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e all c a n d i d a t e s o f any p a r t y p o o l v o t e s - m e a n i n g v o t e s for any c a n d i d a t e o r list i n c r e a s e t h e p a r t y ' s overall v o t e - - a n d
b e c a u s e it r e m a i n s t h e p a r t y that d e t e r m i n e s w h i c h c a n d i d a t e s m a y use the label
(1,0,2). Such variants o f PR are u s e d in Chile and Poland, w h e r e v o t e r s v o t e for a
single c a n d i d a t e , a n d in Uruguay, w h e r e v o t e r s v o t e for a list w i t h i n t h e party. This
f o r m u l a m a y b e a p p l i e d in s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts as follows: v o t e r s v o t e for a
c a n d i d a t e a n d t h e w i n n e r is d e t e r m i n e d as t h e c a n d i d a t e w i t h t h e m o s t v o t e s w i t h i n
t h e p a r t y that r e c e i v e d t h e m o s t votes. This rule is a p p l i e d in p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s
in U r u g u a y (and, in 1985, in H o n d u r a s ) a n d goes b y t h e s o m e w h a t m i s l e a d i n g n a m e
of d o u b l e s i m u l t a n e o u s vote. 22
(39 Plurality Formula with Party Endorsement and Candidate Voting. At this
p o s i t i o n (1,2,1) w e have o u r first f o r m u l a w i t h an a b s e n c e o f any v o t e p o o l i n g .
T h u s e a c h c a n d i d a t e ' s c h a n c e of e l e c t i o n h i n g e s solely o n h e r o w n p e r s o n a l voted r a w i n g ability. W e e n c o u n t e r h e r e a n u m b e r o f variants o n t h e plurality formula,
all in w h i c h p a r t i e s c o n t r o l t h e use of t h e i r labels b y candidates. If M > 1 a n d v o t e r s
h a v e M votes, t h e s y s t e m is s o m e t i m e s k n o w n as ' m u l t i m e m b e r - d i s t r i c t plurality'
a n d s o m e t i m e s as ' b l o c v o t e ' . If the v o t e r has f e w e r t h a n M v o t e s h u t m o r e t h a n
one, it is called ' l i m i t e d v o t e ' . Cumulative voting, in w h i c h v o t e r s m a y c o n c e n t r a t e
m o r e t h a n o n e o f t h e i r v o t e s o n o n e c a n d i d a t e , is also i n c l u d e d here. Finally, if this
f o r m u l a is u s e d in a s i n g l e - m e m b e r district, it w o u l d b e w h a t is c o m m o n l y k n o w n
as t h e a p p r o v a l vote. A l t h o u g h p e r s o n a l v o t e s a l o n e d e t e r m i n e w h o w i n s u n d e r all
variants o f this formula, l e a d e r s h i p c o n t r o l o v e r e n d o r s e m e n t s p r o v i d e s a meaningful tool w i t h w h i c h to e n c o u r a g e c o o p e r a t i o n in m a i n t a i n i n g p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n . A n d
m u l t i p l e v o t e s i m p l y that c o p a r t i s a n s m i g h t s e c u r e s u p p o r t f r o m t h e s a m e voter,
a l t h o u g h t h e v o t e r is n o t r e q u i r e d to c h o o s e c a n d i d a t e s from o n l y o n e party.
(g) Open-list Formula with Open Endorsement and Multiple Votes. N o w w e have
o u r first f o r m u l a in w h i c h p a r t y l e a d e r s d o n o t h a v e t h e ability to select c a n d i d a t e s
(2,0,1). This is an open-list formula, h u t w i t h p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p c o n t r o l o v e r a c c e s s
to p a r t y lists r e m o v e d . W h e n l e a d e r s lack t h e legal a u t h o r i t y to d e n y c a n d i d a t e s t h e
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Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote
use o f t h e p a r t y ' s label o n t h e ballot, l e a d e r s are u n a b l e to c o e r c e p o l i t i c i a n s into
c o o p e r a t i n g to m a i n t a i n p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n . C a n d i d a t e s gain a c c e s s to lists b y virtue
o f t h e i r o w n e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l activities, s u c h as g a t h e r i n g signatures o r p a y i n g registration fees, r a t h e r t h a n at t h e d i s c r e t i o n of p a r t y leaders. U n d e r s u c h a system,
w h i c h has n o e m p i r i c a l referent, s o m e m o t i v a t i o n to m a i n t a i n a p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n
w o u l d survive b e c a u s e v o t e s are p o o l e d across parties, a n d b e c a u s e v o t e r s cast
m u l t i p l e votes, p e r h a p s for p a r t y blocs. But o p e n a c c e s s to p a r t y lists, c o u p l e d w i t h
p e r s o n a l votes, m e a n s that p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n s are i n c r e a s i n g l y valuable.
(h) Single-transferable Votes, Open Endorsements. At t h e n e x t rank w e r e m o v e t h e
p o o l i n g o f v o t e s at t h e level o f t h e party. Instead, v o t e s are p o o l e d at t h e level o f
c a n d i d a t e s w h o r e c e i v e p r e f e r e n c e v o t e s (2,1,1). STV w i t h n o l e a d e r s h i p c o n t r o l
o v e r t h e use o f a p a r t y n a m e w o u l d fit this d e s c r i p t i o n . C a n d i d a t e s gain a c c e s s to
t h e ballot o n t h e basis o f t h e i r o w n e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l activity. Voters cast ordinal
votes, w i t h e x c e s s v o t e s t r a n s f e r r e d to o t h e r candidates. Party label u n d e r this
f o r m u l a has m e a n i n g p r i m a r i l y as a c u e for v o t e r s to use in casting s e c o n d a n d third
c h o i c e v o t e s a m o n g l e s s e r k n o w n candidates; b u t c a n d i d a t e s w i n seats solely on
the basis o f p e r s o n a l votes, a n d p a r t y l e a d e r s lack the s a n c t i o n i m p l i e d b y ballot
control.
(i) Open list Formula with Open Endorsement a n d Single Vote. N o w r e m o v e t h e
ability o f c a n d i d a t e s to r u n as blocs, r e q u i r i n g e a c h to c o m p e t e for the indivisible
v o t e o f e a c h voter. Here w e find an o p e n list s y s t e m in w h i c h p a r t y l e a d e r s do n o t
c o n t r o l e n d o r s e m e n t s , a n d in w h i c h v o t e r s cast a single v o t e b e l o w t h e p a r t y level
(2,0,2). In Finland, for e x a m p l e , e a c h p r o s p e c t i v e c a n d i d a t e m u s t c o l l e c t signatures
f r o m voters. T h e n o m i n a t i n g p a p e r s identify o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s w i t h w h o m t h e candidate w o u l d like to f o r m an 'alliance.' Parties d o n o t have a n y formal role in nominations; as a result, m u l t i p l e alliances (lists) have a p p e a r e d w i t h i n t h e same party,
f r e q u e n t l y in t h e earliest elections, and s p o r a d i c a l l y since ( T 6 r n u d d , 1968). ~3 T h e
Brazilian system closely a p p r o x i m a t e s this configuration, w h e r e o n c e a p o l i t i c i a n is
e l e c t e d u n d e r a p a r t y label, he o r she c a n n o t b e d e n i e d a c c e s s to the p a r t y list in
s u b s e q u e n t e l e c t i o n s (Mainwaring, 1991). 24 W i t h this formula, the only factor
c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e value o f p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n at all is the fact that v o t e s are still
p o o l e d across all lists o r c a n d i d a t e s f r o m t h e party. H o w e v e r , l e a d e r s have no formal
s a n c t i o n s to e n c o u r a g e c o o p e r a t i o n in m a i n t a i n i n g p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n s . T h e value o f
p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is thus high.
(j) Plurality, Formula with One Endorsement a n d Candidate Voting. W i t h v o t e
p o o l i n g r e m o v e d , w e have systems like t h o s e u n d e r (f), above, b u t w i t h o n e important difference: p a r t i e s c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e w h i c h c a n d i d a t e s use t h e i r labels. Thus
t h e r e is n o l e a d e r s h i p c o n t r o l o v e r e n d o r s e m e n t s , n o p o o l i n g , a n d m u l t i p l e v o t e s
(2,2,1). The s y s t e m o f p r i m a r i e s u s e d in U.S. c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s in n e a r l y all
states is o f this type. T h e m u l t i p l e v o t e s are cast o v e r time: o n e in the p r i m a r y o f
a v o t e r ' s p r e f e r r e d party, a n d o n e in t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n c o n t e x t a m o n g the
p r i m a r y w i n n e r s from e a c h party. T h e so-called b l a n k e t primary, u s e d in Louisiana
for e l e c t i o n s to m o s t offices a n d in m a n y o t h e r U.S. states for special elections, is
really an o p e n e n d o r s e m e n t r u n o f f system. In t h e first r o u n d , a m a j o r i t y of v o t e s is
required. Because parties d o n o t c o n t r o l e n d o r s e m e n t s , t h e r e m a y b e m u l t i p l e
c a n d i d a t e s using any given p a r t y label. In t h e e v e n t that n o c a n d i d a t e r e c e i v e s a
JOHN M CARL-YAND MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART
429
majority, t h e t o p t w o c a n d i d a t e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f p a r t y affiliation, face e a c h o t h e r in
a runoff. T h e various o t h e r t y p e s o f s y s t e m listed u n d e r (f) are also r e p e a t e d here,
w i t h t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g in t h e n o m i n a t i o n s p r o c e s s : a p p r o v a l voting, b l o c vote,
l i m i t e d vote, a n d c u m u l a t i v e vote.
(k) Single Nontransferable Vote, Pa,~y Endo~ement. At this r a n k (1,2,2) w e have
o u r first system in w h i c h t h e r e is n e i t h e r v o t e p o o l i n g n o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of m o r e
t h a n o n e c a n d i d a t e sharing s u p p o r t f r o m t h e s a m e voter. Thus it really is a case o f
e v e r y c a n d i d a t e for herself. This f o r m u l a w a s u s e d in J a p a n t h r o u g h 1993 a n d is
also u s e d in Taiwan. T h e only i n c e n t i v e p r o v i d e d b y t h e e l e c t o r a l l a w to m a i n t a i n
a p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n is that the p a r t y c a n d e n y n o m i n a t i o n to a c a n d i d a t e w h o s e
p r a c t i c e s e x c e s s i v e l y u n d e r m i n e p a r t y c o h e s i v e n e s s , is Of all t h e systems in w h i c h
p a r t i e s c o n t r o l n o m i n a t i o n s , this is clearly the m o s t personalistic. T h e d i r e c t c o m p e tition a m o n g m e m b e r s o f t h e s a m e p a r t y p o s e s great difficulty to p a r t i e s a t t e m p t ing to e n s u r e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n t h e p a r t y to e n s u r e that v o t e s are a l l o c a t e d
efficiently to c a n d i d a t e s ( C o x a n d Niou, 1994; R a m s e y e r a n d R o s e n b l u t h , 1993).
T h e r e is no e q u i v a l e n t for s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts, as a p a r t y that can c o n t r o l
e n d o r s e m e n t s c e r t a i n l y w o u l d n o t n o m i n a t e m o r e c a n d i d a t e s t h a n seats, given t h e
a b s e n c e o f pooling, z6
(!) Personal-list Formula. N o w w e r e m o v e t h e ability o f p a r t i e s to d e t e r m i n e w h o
t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s are, b u t a l l o w for s o m e p o o l i n g at the sub-party level. In s u c h a
s y s t e m (2,1,2), t h e o n l y p o o l i n g takes p l a c e w i t h i n t h e individual lists that c o m p e t e
w i t h i n a party. Because e a c h list is h e a d e d b y a c a n d i d a t e w h o n e e d n o t have
r e c e i v e d p a r t y e n d o r s e m e n t to use t h e p a r t y label, this system, u s e d in C o l o m b i a
( A r c h e r and Shugart, f o r t h c o m i n g ; C o x a n d Shugart, f o r t h c o m i n g ) , is b e s t d e s c r i b e d
as a p e r s o n a M i s t system. T h e limited p o o l i n g m a y a l l o w for t h e b u i l d i n g o f a p a r t y
r e p u t a t i o n b y s o m e c a n d i d a t e s , b u t it c o u l d just as easily lead to t h e w i n n i n g o f
m u l t i p l e seats b y c a n d i d a t e s c h o s e n b y s o m e h e a d o f a list w h o has n o loyalty to
p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , b u t is p e r s o n a l l y p o p u l a r .
(m) Single Nontransferable Vote, Open Endorsement. Finally, SNTV, m i n u s any
l e a d e r s h i p c o n t r o l o v e r a c c e s s to p a r t y lists (2,2,2), r e p r e s e n t s the zenith in t h e
value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n relative to p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n . Here, any p o l i t i c i a n c a n
r u n u n d e r any p a r t y label (or at least c a n n o t b e p r e v e n t e d f r o m d o i n g so b y p a r t y
leaders), a n d m u s t c o m p e t e w i t h all o t h e r p o l i t i c i a n s for e a c h v o t e r ' s single vote.
Seats are a l l o c a t e d b y p u r e p e r s o n a l plurality, w i t h n o p o o l i n g . U n d e r s u c h a system,
o u r t h r e e variables g e n e r a t e n o i n c e n t i v e to m a i n t a i n p a r t y r e p u t a t i o n at t h e
e x p e n s e o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n . This variant o f SNTV has an e q u i v a l e n t in singlem e m b e r districts: t h e plurality s y s t e m in w h i c h p a r t i e s d o n o t c o n t r o l e n d o r s e m e n t s
a n d thus m u l t i p l e c a n d i d a t e s m a y c o m p e t e u n d e r t h e s a m e p a r t y label, as has
f r e q u e n t l y b e e n t h e case in t h e Philippines. In this sense, t h e r a n k i n g has s e e m i n g l y
c o m e full circle, w i t h SMD plurality b e i n g o n e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n t s at e i t h e r
e n d o f t h e s c o r i n g system. H o w e v e r , the d i s t i n c t i o n is crucial. In t h e closed-list
variant, u s e d in Britain, p a r t y l e a d e r s are able to e n s u r e that only o n e c a n d i d a t e
a c c e p t a b l e to t h e m gets to use t h e p a r t y ' s label. T h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n
in s u c h a s y s t e m c o m e s only from t h e l o w m a g n i t u d e . T h e o p e n - e n d o r s e m e n t SNTV
a p p l i e d to s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts, as in t h e Philippines, m a y p e r m i t m o r e t h a n o n e
c a n d i d a t e to claim t h e s a m e p a r t y label, b u t t h e a b s e n c e o f v o t e p o o l i n g m e a n s that
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Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote
a vote for a candidate w h o is using the party label is not as good as a vote for the
whole party. Thus personal reputation stems not only from the low magnitude but
also from the inability of party to serve as the principal reference point for voters.
Next we consider the effect of district magnitude, M, in combination with each
of the above thirteen configurations.
The Effect o f District M a g n i t u d e o n P e r s o n a l R e p u t a t i o n
District magnitude, M, is treated separately from the other variables for two reasons.
First, the other variables describe methods of organizing voting and vote distribution. The variations on these methods are relatively limited, and they differ qualitatively. They lend themselves to description by interval variables that take a small
number of values, provided the intervals are clearly delineated and are logically
connected to the value of personal reputation. District magnitude, on the other
hand, does not lend itself to description by a small number of intervals. It is a
natural interval variable to begin with, with values ranging from 1 through the total
number of seats in the legislature. Imposing fewer intervals on M would require
imposing arbitrary cut-off points between intervals, and would needlessly throw out
information.
The second and more important reason for treating district magnitude separately
concerns the unique way in which this variable affects personal reputation-seeking.
The importance of magnitude on members' efforts to cultivate personal reputations
has been recognized before, but, to our knowledge, our argument about magnitude's differential effects under different allocation formulas is novel. For example,
speaking of one subset of means by which members attend to their personal reputations, Lancaster (1986, p. 70) says, 'because pork barrel projects are distributive
policies directed toward geographical constituencies, an electoral system's territorial inclusiveness may be linked to the degree of pork barrel activity.' In other
words, as districts become larger (in both magnitude and area), personal reputation-seeking (including but not limited to pork-barreling) declines. We agree with
Lancaster, but only for those systems in which there is no intraparty competition
(where BAL1.OT= 0). That is, as the number of copartisans on a given ballot list
grows, the relative importance of each individual candidate, and her personal votegetting ability, shrinks. As M grows in closed list systems, party reputation dominates
the personal reputations of list members in drawing voter support. This is consistent with Lancaster's notion that the party itself, rather than the voters in the
district, become the member's principal constituency.
On the other hand, our contention is that the relationship is reversed under all
other allocation formulas--that is w h e n BALLOT~ 0. Rather than decreasing, the
importance of personal reputation actually increases with magnitude in those
systems in which copartisans compete with each other for votes and seats. The
logic is that, as the number of other copartisans from which a given candidate must
distinguish herself grows, the importance of establishing a unique personal reputation, distinct from that of the party, also grows. As an aside, let us say that Lancaster
may be quite right about pork, p e r se, because pork-barreling refers to geographically targeted projects. These may indeed be less important as magnitude increases
under any allocation formula. However, even if, at very high magnitudes in systems
with intraparty competition, members engage in less pork, it is not because the
importance of establishing a personal link with voters is less important. Indeed, our
JOHN M CAREY AND MATI'HEW SOBERG SHUGART
431
a r g u m e n t is that s u c h links b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t at h i g h e r m a g n i t u d e s
u n d e r formulas for w h i c h BALLOT ~ O. T h o s e r e p u t a t i o n s m a y b e m o r e likely to b e
b a s e d o n s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n ability to d e l i v e r local p o r k , 2v s u c h as c e l e b r i t y status
in s o m e o t h e r e n d e a v o r p r i o r to e n t e r i n g politics, b u t o u r m o d e l d o e s n o t distinguish a m o n g specific m e a n s o f cultivating s u c h r e p u t a t i o n s .
T h e effect o f M o n t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n is d r i v e n b y t h e i m p e r a t i v e
( o r lack thereof, in c l o s e d list systems) o f p o l i t i c i a n s to distinguish t h e m s e l v e s f r o m
t h e i r c o p a r t i s a n s in o r d e r to b e e l e c t e d . T h e p r e c i s e relation b e t w e e n M a n d this
i m p e r a t i v e w a r r a n t s s o m e f u r t h e r clarification. T h e k e y d e t e r m i n a n t o f h o w m u c h
a c a n d i d a t e m u s t distinguish h e r s e l f f r o m c o p a r t i s a n s is actually d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e
ratio b e t w e e n t h e n u m b e r o f c a n d i d a t e s e n d o r s e d b y h e r p a r t y in that district and
M, r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t l y b y M. T h e h i g h e r t h e ratio, t h e g r e a t e r t h e n e e d for p e r s o n a l
r e p u t a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , as M a i n w a r i n g (1991) has n o t e d , o n e o f t h e features that
m a k e s Brazilian legislators m o r e p e r s o n a l i s t i c t h a n t h e i r Finnish c o u n t e r p a r t s is that
in Brazil p a r t i e s m a y n o m i n a t e u p to 1.5 times as m a n y c a n d i d a t e s as t h e r e are seats,
w h i l e in Finland p a r t i e s m a y n o m i n a t e o n l y M c a n d i d a t e s . T h u s e a c h Brazilian candid a t e faces m o r e c o p a r t i s a n s f r o m w h i c h she m u s t differentiate herself, e v e n w h e n
t h e m a g n i t u d e is t h e same.
Even w h e n parties m a y n o m i n a t e m o r e t h a n M c a n d i d a t e s , o r (less c o m m o n l y )
are r e s t r i c t e d to f e w e r t h a n M c a n d i d a t e s , t h e n u m b e r o f e n d o r s e m e n t s t e n d s to
rise w i t h M. T h e r e f o r e , it is M that is t h e f i x e d a n d identifiable d e t e r m i n a n t o f t h e
s c o p e o f intra-party c o m p e t i t i o n . T h e s i m p l e rule g o v e r n i n g t h e effect o f M is that
as M rises in c l o s e d list systems ( w h e r e ~ALLOT= 0), t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a tion declines; as M rises in all o t h e r systems, t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n
increases. It is p o s s i b l e to c o m b i n e this insight w i t h t h e r a n k o r d e r i n g s o f formulas in o r d e r to p r o v i d e a g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of e l e c t o r a l systems a c c o r d i n g to
h o w t h e i r values o n all f o u r variables s h a p e t h e value o f p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n , as
d e p i c t e d in Figure 1.
SNTV with open enOorsement
rn
L -
J
0
Q
d
open,st, mu~Pte voteS
b
a
medium
(SMD) magnitude
high
magnitude
very high
rnegnitude
C~mdet MaCrmude
FIG. l. C o m b i n e d effects o f BALLOT, POOL, VOTES a n d M o n
the value of personal reputation
432
I n c e n t i v e s to C u l t i v a t e a P e r s o n a l Vote
On the vertical axis of Figure 1 is represented the rank ordering of feasible configurations of BALLOT,POOL, and VOTESfrom Table 1. The greater the value of personal
reputation for a given configuration, the greater the value on the vertical axis. On
the horizontal axis, i ranges upward from 1 and, in principlc, has no maximum.
The value of personal reputation for each configuration in a SMD, then, is represented by its vertical intercept. As M grows for all configurations in which BAI.LOT
# 0, SO does the value of personal reputation. 28 The relationship is illustrated by
the positive slope on the line leading from each of these intercepts. For the two
configurations where BALLOT= 0 , the slope is negative, illustrating the negative
effect of M on the value of personal reputation. These two configurations are also
those with the lowest intercepts to begin w i t h - - t h a t is, they generate the least
incentives for politicians to cultivate personal reputations at any m.
III. D i s c u s s i o n
In concluding, it is important to emphasize what this model claims to be and what
it definitely is not. First, we want to reiterate that our rank ordering of the value
of personal reputation, with its empirical examples, pertains strictly to electoral
systems, rather than to government systems as a whole. Clearly, other factors
besides electoral rules affect the value of personal reputation. Foremost among
these is constitutional type. Generally, if an assembly's primary function is to select
and maintain in office an executive dependent on parliamentary confidence, we
can expect party cohesion to be more important, and personal reputation thereby
less, than w h e n the origin and survival of the executive is independent of the assembly (Shugart and Carey, 1992). So, c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , personal reputation will be more
important in a presidential than in a parliamentary system. The model developed
here, however, focuses exclusively on electoral rules, leaving the systematic incorporation of other variables, like constitutional system, to subsequent research. Our
claim is simply that w h e n all other things are equal, then altering the electoral rules
alters the value of personal reputation as shown in Table 1.
Second, the graphic representation of electoral systems in Figure 1 is schematic.
The ranking of BALLOT,POOL, and VOTES is merely ordinal, and the spacing on the
vertical axis between each configuration of the variables has no meaning. Likewise,
the specific slope of the lines emanating from each configuration of variables as M
increases is arbitrary. The model makes only two claims about these lines. One is
that whether they turn upward or downward indicates whether the value of
personal reputation relative to party reputation increases or decreases as M
increases. The other is that none of the lines intersect as M increases. 29 The bottom
line is that the model must remain at this level of abstraction until it can be tested
by operationalizing the dependent variable--the relative values of personal and
party reputations.
In order to test the model, data would have to be available across a broad range
of countries with various electoral systems. There are a number of ways in which
the dependent variable might be estimated, although all present methodological
problems. The problems fall mainly along three lines: data are unavailable, data are
extremely costly to collect, or data only partially describe the dependent variable.
Promising, but unavailable, proxies are the most common. For example, ideally,
public opinion polling data would reflect the level of name recognition of legislators among the electorate. But even where polling data are available, they are
JOHN M CAREY AND ]~IATFHEW SOBERG SHUGART
433
unlikely to be reliable and comparable across countries on this specific topic. Wc
could also examine the degree to which candidates from traditionally underrepresented social groups, such as w o m e n and ethnic minorities, are able to gain election
on the basis of votes cast for them directly (Rule and Shugart, unpublished).
However, this is an imperfect method, as many other factors may affect the degree
of representation of such groups (Rule, 1987). Moreover, in some cases, the process
by which personal votes are cultivated so favors those 'insiders' w h o have ready
access to costly campaign resources that a high dependence on personal reputation may actually correlate with higher barriers to representation of 'outside'
groups, including w o m e n and ethnic minorities (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, forthcoming; Reed, 1994; Shugart, 1994).
Another method might be to rely on records of legislative votes. Students of U.S.
politics estimate the independence of legislators from their parties with roll call
voting data. But recorded votes are rare in many legislatures (Carey, 1993), so this
approach is not promising for a broadly comparative study. Similarly, campaign
spending data could shed light on the relative importance of personal versus party
reputations. The ratio of campaign funds raised and spent by individual candidates
to those spent by parties could serve as an indicator of the relative importance of
reputations. Again, however, the variance across nations in campaign finance laws 30
and enforcement mean that reported levels of spending are unlikely to reflect actual
spending accurately.
Other methods of estimating the dependent variable could be costly, but are feasible. One rough proxy would be amendments offered to legislation. Amendments
can be a form of particularism, w h e n they seek to modify the effects of legislation
for a specific group or region (Ames, 1987, 1992). They can also be vehicles for
self-promotion for the legislators w h o offer them. The more valuable is personal
reputation, then, the more amendments we should see offered to legislation. Of
course, merely counting amendments would be a mind-numbing task, and it does
not take into account their substance, nor the variations in rules that determine
legislative procedure. However, even the raw number of amendments offered can
serve as an indicator of h o w legislators organize their institution. And if legislators
organize themselves so as to serve their own career interests (Mayhew, 1974), then
the raw number of amendments could indeed shed light on the value of personal
reputations.
Along these same lines, the internal organization of legislatures offers another
promising means of estimating the value of reputations. Legislative committees are
forums in which individual politicians can establish reputations and claim credit for
accomplishments independently from their parties. The prominence and autonomy
of committees relative to party caucuses within legislatures, then, could serve as
an indicator of the dependent variable. The principal challenge to this approach
would be to establish a uniform means of estimating committee autonomy across
legislatures.
Policy o u t c o m e s - - o r policy 'styles'--are another potentially interesting dependent variable. As we discussed, more attention by legislators to personal reputation
would generally lead to more 'pork' in a country's budgets (Lancaster, 1986;
Lancaster and Patterson, 1990). Where, on the other hand, party reputation matters
more, policymaking should be more 'efficient' (Cox, 1987; Shugart and Carey,
1992) in the sense that voters vote on the basis of broad policy options rather than
on the basis of promised particularistic benefits. Relatedly, the efforts of candidates
434
I n c e n t i v e s to C u l t i v a t e a P e r s o n a l V o t e
to cultivate personal reputations can lead them to engage in corruption, mainly
because the great expense of wooing voters on the basis of particularism encourages candidates to seek to maximize private contributions beyond those legally
permitted. The recent experiences of Brazil (Geddes and Ribeiro Neto, 1992) and
Japan (Reed, 1994) and probably Italy all suggest that electoral incentives were a
major factor in these countries' extraordinary corruption scandals. However, high
levels of corruption can be found even in some systems that do not provide for
particularistic campaign incentives (Venezuela, for example). Moreover, establishing measures of either corruption or the more 'benign' pork-barrel spending crossnationally will be extraordinarily difficult.
One other policy variable that may deserve attention is the overall degree of
economic liberalism in trade and industrial policy. Protection of domestic production and outright state ownership permit politicians to cultivate the loyalty of
'special interests,' to provide patronage, and to raise money for campaigns, which
tend to be especially expensive in systems that mandate intraparty competition.
However, many factors besides the electoral system contribute to a country's
relative deviation from an ideal type of a liberal economy. Still, it may be possible
to find a relationship between electoral rules and degrees of economic liberalism
that are greater or less than would be predicted on the basis of more conventional
variables, such as level of development, size of domestic market, or the opportunity structure created by prevailing levels of world or regional trade. For instance,
Italy long retained levels of protection and state ownership far greater than its
European Union partners, which would be expected on the basis of our tentative
hypothesis about the effects of electoral incentives on economic policy. Japan's
high levels of protection may be explicable in part by its electoral system (Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth, 1993). These suggestions about the effects of our variables on
policy are very tentative, but do suggest directions for future research.
This essay establishes a theoretical model for evaluating the relative values to
legislators of personal versus partisan reputations, based on electoral rules. The
advantages of the model are its simplicity and its generalizability. The variables
employed are straightforward and generate a relatively simple scoring system that
nevertheless describes a broad array of different electoral systems. Moreover, the
rank ordering of systems, and their interaction with district magnitude, are
intuitively appealing. One of the more interesting results is the argument that the
effects of increasing district magnitude on the value of personal reputation are
opposite under closed list systems to those under all other types of electoral system.
The main challenge presented by this article is to develop a means of measuring
the dependent variable, so as to test the model empirically. Although we identify
an array of possible methods to do this, they are generally costly, and will have to
await future research. We welcome any comments or suggestions as to h o w this
work might proceed.
Notes
1. Myerson (1993), although using a very different methodology, addresses the related
problem of identifying conditions under which politicians will favor special interest
groups, as opposed to pursuing policies that distribute benefits equitably across all
voters.
2. The upper house of the Japanese parliament was a good example prior to the adoption
of closed party lists for that portion of the house that is elected nationally.
JOHN M CAREY AND ]~lATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART
435
3. For example, w e do not deal w i t h p r o p e r t i e s of electoral systems such as the p r e s e n c e
of public financing, or restrictions o n reelection. On the latter, see Carey (1993).
4. Apart from electoral rules, the m o s t i m p o r t a n t institutional factor d e t e r m i n i n g the value
o f reputations is regime type, such as presidential, parliamentary, or o t h e r forms o f
g o v e r n m e n t (Shugart and Carey, 1992). In this article w e hold all such o t h e r factors
constant.
5. Of course, w h e n votes are cast for party lists in the first place, rather than for candidates or factions, this condition also holds. See the VOTESvariable below.
6. In Spanish-language sources, the t e r m generally used is listas cerradas y bloqueadas,
m e a n i n g closed and b l o c k e d lists. Some sources use the t e r m 'fixed lists' (Bogdanor,
1983). What the English-language literature generally calls o p e n lists are called in Spanish
listas cerradas y no bloqueadas, w h e r e 'closed' refers to the a b s e n c e o f cross-party
p r e f e r e n c e voting (panachage), rather than an a b s e n c e of any p r e f e r e n c e voting.
7. There are different d e g r e e s o f o p e n n e s s , i.e., different d e g r e e s to w h i c h personal prefere n c e votes can change the o r d e r of candidates. See Carstairs (1980), Crewe, (1981). W e
do not a t t e m p t to capture these sorts o f variation. If candidates realistically can e x p e c t
to change their rank o n the list by building a p e r s o n a l reputation, t h e n w e e x p e c t the
system to r e s e m b l e t h o s e in w h i c h personal votes alone d e t e r m i n e the o r d e r of election.
If, instead, p r e f e r e n c e votes are unlikely to alter a candidate's c h a n c e s of election, w e
e x p e c t the system to r e s e m b l e a closed-list system. See Rule and Shugart (forthcoming),
for a discussion of h o w to operationalize t h e s e finer distinctions a m o n g p r e f e r e n c e - v o t e
systems.
8. In Finland, each list was restricted to a m a x i m u m o f t h r e e candidates ( t w o after 1935).
Thus, in most districts, the larger parties w o u l d have to run m o r e than o n e list each if
they w e r e to take full advantage of their voting strength. In Uruguay, each list may have
as many candidates as there are seats from the district. In b o t h systems, a candidate may
a p p e a r on m o r e than o n e list in the same or in different districts. On Finland, see
T6rnudd, 1968, p. 57; on Uruguay, Gonzalez, 1991.
9. This is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Taagepera and Shugart's observation that SMD plurality systems
are equivalent to closed list PR elections in w h i c h m = 1.
10. Note that Rae referred to this feature as 'ballot structure,' but w e speak of t w o variables,
o n e referring to ballots and the o t h e r referring to votes. Rae's c o n c e p t of an ordinal vote,
as the o p p o s i t e o f a categoric vote, is so broad that it a c c o u n t s for n u m e r o u s variations
o n n o n c a t e g o r i c votes that may affect the degree o f personal vote. Our scoring system
allows us to differentiate, for example, transferable votes, from o t h e r forms o f prefere n c e votes.
11. It may b e confusing that voters cast m o r e than o n e vote w h e n the variable VOTE takes
the value 1. However, recall that t h e s e scores are purely ordinal. The score 1 simply
m e a n s that a given electoral formula provides m o r e incentive o n the basis of the VOTE
variable to cultivate a personal vote than a formula o n w h i c h VOTES= O, but less than
o n e for w h i c h VOTES= 2. The n u m b e r s t h e m s e l v e s have no cardinal meaning. We could
just as easily assign values of 10, 100, and 1000.
12. This feature o f a transferable vote is c a p t u r e d by a score of 1 on POOL. The score o n
VOTES simply tells us that voters are able to e x p r e s s p r e f e r e n c e s for m o r e than o n e candidate.
13. The same system could allow b o t h forms o f multiple voting. In m u l t i m e m b e r district
majority systems such as those formerly used in Belgium and Switzerland, voters had M
votes in the first round. Any seats not filled by candidates garnering a majority of votes
cast w e n t to a s e c o n d round, w h e r e voters again could cast as many votes as t h e r e w e r e
seats left to b e filled. See Carstairs (1980).
14. The effect of a change from multiple to single vote can b e seen in some journalistic
a n e c d o t e s from the Jordanian election o f 1993. According to the Los Angeles Times of 9
N o v e m b e r 1993, u n d e r the previous (limited-vote) system, voters t e n d e d to cast their first
vote o n the basis of clan, their s e c o n d on the basis o f constituent service, and only their
third on ideology. Candidatcs t e n d e d to run o n 'tickets.' U n d e r the n e w SNTV system,
surveys o f voters suggested that voters w o u l d cast their single votes on the basis of
services and patronage, to the benefit of p r o - g o v e r n m e n t candidates. Voters could no
longer have their cake (expressing an ideological p r e f e r e n c e for an opposition candidate)
and eat it, too (retaining constituent services provided by the p r o - g o v e r n m e n t members).
436
Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote
15. The reason parties that can control the use o f the label will refrain from endorsing more
than one list in the a b s e n c e of vote pooling across all lists is that having multiple
e n d o r s e e s raises the s p e c t e r o f errors: either failing to n o m i n a t e the optimal number, or
failing to equalize votes across an optimal number. See Cox and Niou (1994) for a discussion of errors u n d e r SNTV and Cox and Shugart (forthcoming) for an e x t e n s i o n of the
c o n c e p t to Colombia's personal-list system.
16. This observation is w o r t h noting, as do Taagepera and Shugart (1989), in underscoring
the p o i n t that systems that a p p e a r to be based o n different principles of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
can differ o n n o t h i n g m o r e than M. The most familiar e x a m p l e is closed list PR vs. SMD
plurality. The point is testimony to the i m p o r t a n c e of m in d e t e r m i n i n g the nature of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o v i d e d by any given electoral system.
17. Formally, such control has b e e n in place only since party names w e r e placed o n the
ballot alongside the n a m e s o f candidates, making it m o r e implausible that a selfn o m i n a t e d candidate could claim to be a given party's c h o i c e w h e n he in fact was not.
In practice, this had not b e e n a p r o b l e m for some time, given the discipline parties develo p e d as early as the Victorian age (Cox, 1987).
18. All seats in the Mexican c o n g r e s s are e l e c t e d according to closed lists, but not all are
from SMDs.
19. U n d e r some systems (panachage) voters may even c h o o s e candidates from m o r c than
o n e party list. Vote pooling at the party level means that voters w h o exercise this o p t i o n
are increasing the total party vote for each party w h o s e candidates they select. Thus,
just as is the case w h e n voters must c h o o s e candidates all from the same list, a vote for
any candidate is a vote for the list on w h i c h the candidate was nominated. Panachage
o p e n s up the possibility of blocks of candidates running across party lines, p e r h a p s
t h e r e b y anticipating post-election coalition possibilities.
20. This is a variant on the approval vote. However, as characterized by its advocates, the
approval vote w o u l d not involve pooling candidates' votes on the basis of party, as w o u l d
the system w e describe. (See Brains and Fishburn, 1978).
21. It is ironic that the system is k n o w n as single transferable vote, while w e see it as a
system w i t h multiple votes. The vote is 'single' only in the sense that it is used to elect
only one candidate, but voters are actually casting votes for several candidates.
22. In Uruguay, the same vote is applied in b o t h the presidential and congressional election.
Votes are cast for a faction (sublema) of a party (lema), h e a d e d by a particular presidential candidate, but are p o o l e d at the party level. Thus, w h a t Uruguayans term the
'double simultaneous vote' applies to the w h o l e electoral system, and not just to the
presidential election. The incentive such a system generates for factional leaders to cultivate personal s u p p o r t a m o n g voters is the same as that u n d e r o p e n list with a single
vote.
23. A question that arises h e r e is w h y t h e r e w o u l d b e multiple lists if candidates nominate
themselves and therefore party leaders do not control the label. The reason is that the
decision o f candidates to form an alliance must be mutual. Thus a r e n e g a d e may be
d e n i e d - - n o t by the party organization, but by o t h e r p r o s p e c t i v e candidates w h o are
c o m m i t t e d to the party. However, like-mined candidates may form an alliance of dissid e n t s using the same party label. That this practice is so rare is testimony to the salience
of party labels, w h i c h stems from factors o t h e r than the electoral formula. Still, 'the
campaign is carried out in a highly individualistic fashion' (T6rnudd, 1968, p. 58), as our
m o d e l w o u l d predict.
24. This provision is k n o w n as candidato nato, literally 'birthright candidate' (Mainwaring,
1991). Those w h o lose u n d e r t h e party label are not g u a r a n t e e d future list positions,
nor can first-time candidates gain access to the party list w i t h o u t approval of a local
party organization. Thus, the score of 2 on BALLOTapplies to i n c u m b e n t politicians in
Brazil.
25. In its actual use in Japan, the majority party is able to act m o r e c o h e r e n t l y than its low
ranking in Table 1 w o u l d imply b e c a u s e of a n o t h e r factor that is outside the s c o p e of
our scoring system: J a p a n ' s parliamentary system and the incentives that maintaining a
cabinet gives to building a party reputation. Still, the salient feature about J a p a n e s e
elections from the s t a n d p o i n t of this m o d e l is that legislators maintain their o w n
p e r s o n a l c a m p a i g n organizations (koenkaO. See Curtis, 1988; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth
(1992).
JOHN M CAREY AND MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART
437
26. COX a n d Niou ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) state that t h e SMD plurality system is identical to SNTV,
w i t h district m a g n i t u d e as the only aspect that is varying. W e agree that this is a meaningful characterization. Howevcr, in o u r scoring system, SNTV requires a single vote below
t h e party level (and n o pooling). If a party n o m i n a t e s only o n e candidate in a singlem e m b e r d i s t r i c t - - a s it will if it c o n t r o l s the use of its l a b e l - - t h e n t h e formula in q u e s t i o n
by definition c a n n o t take a value of 2 o n VOTES.
27. W e w o u l d not go so far as to claim that pork-barreling c a n n o t b e a m e a n s of cultivating a p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n e v e n in very-high-magnitude systems. After all, o n e way in
w h i c h m e m b e r s c o p e w i t h intraparty c o m p e t i t i o n is by carving o u t bailiwicks, w h i c h
are de facto sub-districts w i t h i n t h e large allocation district. M e m b e r s t h e n p r o v i d e p o r k
to t h e i r p e r s o n a l bailiwicks. See Ames (1992) a n d Katz (1980). Such b e h a v i o r seems to
b e characterizing C o l o m b i a n senators since that nation m o v e d to a single n a t i o n w i d e
district for its senate.
28. Except for the M = 1, t h e values o n the horizontal axis are left u n d e t e r m i n e d . T h e r e is
n o theoretical m a x i m u m for i . W e c a n n o t simply use t h e n u m b e r of seats in t h e total
legislature (S) as the m a x i m u m in a m o d e l i n t e n d e d to apply cross-nationally. For a
c o u n t r y w i t h a single n a t i o n w i d e district, w h e r e M = S, assembly size is i n d e e d that
c o u n t r y ' s m a x i m u m value, b u t t h e r e is n o r e a s o n w h y t h e value of personal r e p u t a t i o n
for any given allocation formula w o u l d b e greater w h e n a given M is t h e w h o l e legislature versus w h e n it is just o n e district a m o n g several. (Recall that w e are only estimating t h e value of p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n at the district level.)
29. W e are s o m e w h a t less a d a m a n t a b o u t t h e s e c o n d claim, and w e l c o m e c o m m e n t s .
30. W e w o u l d e x p e c t c a m p a i g n finance provisions to b e partly e n d o g e n o u s to the electoral
rules, as rules giving candidates incentives to cultivate a personal vote w o u l d also lead
t h e m to prefer to raise t h e i r o w n funds, r a t h e r t h a n b e d e p e n d e n t o n central party
leaders. However, w e recognize that politicians may n o n e t h e l e s s o p t to delegate
c a m p a i g n finance decisions to a central authority w i t h i n t h e party, so this variable must
b e seen as at least partly i n d e p e n d e n t .
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