Notes
IMPLEMENTING THE MISSING PEACE: RECONSIDERING
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of March 28, 2008, inmates at an overcrowded,
medium-security correctional institution in Three Rivers, Texas arose for
the start of a new day.' Within minutes, a vicious riot broke out among
several inmates.2 Although unclear how long the riot ensued, once
officials finally halted the disturbance, twenty-two inmates had suffered
serious injuries and one lay dead from his wounds.
While the reason
for the altercation initially seemed unclear, a source later revealed that
the violent outbreak likely resulted from an ongoing feud between two
rival prison gangs. 4 This riot, while occurring in Texas,5 could have
occurred at any correctional institution in the United States.
Since the 1950s, the number of prison gangs in U.S. correctional
institutions has expanded rapidly 6 and, consequently, so has the number
1. Guillermo Contreras et al., Gang Riot at Prison Leaves Inmate Dead; 22 Others
Hurt in Melee Officials Say Stemmed from Ongoing Rivalries, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 29,
2008, at B4.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Andrew J. Theis, Note, The Gang's All Here: How the Supreme Court's
Unanimous Holding in Wilkinson v. Austin Utilizes Supermax Facilities to Combat Prison
Gangs and Other Security Threats, 29 HAMLINE L. REv. 145, 147 (2006) (discussing a prison
gang riot in an Ohio correctional institution between three prison gangs); Joe Heaney, Gang
Riot Breaks Out at Prison, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 15, 1998, at 26 (discussing a prison gang
riot in a Massachusetts correctional institution between two rival Hispanic prison gangs that
injured three correctional officials).
6. See, e.g., John M. Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the PostindustrialEra, 24 CRIME &
JUST. 365, 399 (1998) (noting that "there has been a vast increase in the number of prison
gangs").
969
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LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
of prison gang members.7 Along with these increases in numbers,
correctional institutions have begun to experience greater problems
associated with prison gangs 8 and neighboring communities have begun
to fall victim to crimes perpetrated by prison gang members. 9 As a
result, not only do prison gangs threaten the safety of the correctional
institution, they also "pose a viable threat to the safety and security of
communities throughout the country."' 0
Surprisingly, few states have enacted legislation specifically aimed
at addressing the problems presented by prison gangs.ll While many
states have enacted legislation designed to discourage gang affiliation,
curb gang violence, and restore peace of mind to residents (anti-gang
legislation), 12 this legislation generally focuses on street gangs to the
exclusion of prison gangs. 1 3 As this Note will show, however, such
anti-gang legislation is not likely to have a meaningful impact on prison
gangs because of the distinctive differences between prison gangs and
street gangs.
In the absence of legislation, correctional institutions currently have
the daunting task of deciding how, if at all, to deal with the problems
presented by prison gangs. In response, correctional institutions have
developed a number of methods that attempt to eliminate prison gangs
by punishing inmates who engage in gang-related activities and
7. See, e.g., Mark Fleisher & Scott Decker, Going Home, Staying Home: Integrating
Prison Gang Members into the Community, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 65, 66.
8.
See, e.g., NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
2005 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT 5-6 (2005); NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR.,
NATIONAL
GANG
THREAT
ASSESSMENT:
2009, at
7
(2009),
available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/ngta2009.pdf; Gerald G. Gaes et al., The Influence of Prison
Gang Affiliation on Violence and Other Prison Misconduct, 82 PRISON J. 359, 381 (2002);
Maximilienne Bishop, Note, Supermax Prisons: Increasing Security or Permitting
Persecution?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 466 (2005); GEORGE W. KNOX, THE PROBLEM OF
GANGS AND SECURITY THREAT GROUPS (STG's) IN AMERICAN PRISONS TODAY (2005),
http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html.
9.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., CONNECTICUT DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 3 (2002).
10. David M. Allender & Frank Marcell, Career Criminal,Security Threat Groups, and
PrisonGangs: An InterrelatedThreat, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., June 2003, at 8, 9.
11. See Institute for Intergovernmental Research, Highlights of Gang-Related
Legislation
Spring
2008,
http://www.iir.com/nygc/gang-legis/highlights-gang-relatedlegislation.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) ("Only 10 percent of the states have enacted laws
that address gangs within correctional facilities.").
12. See generally Beth Bjerregaard, Antigang Legislation and Its PotentialImpact: The
Promisesand the Pitfalls, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 171 (2003).
13. Id.; cf Institute for Intergovermental Research, supra note 11 ("Only 10 percent of
the states have enacted laws that address gangs within correctional facilities.").
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
restricting the ability of members to interact. 14 As this Note will show,
however, while these methods have shown some success at reducing
misconduct within the correctional institutions, these approaches have
proven largely unsuccessful at either eliminating prison gangs or
reducing the other problems they present.
As a result, with the failure of anti-gang legislation to address
prison gangs and correctional institutions taking a lopsided strategy to
prison gang management, an ineffective approach has developed for
addressing the prison gang problem. For a more effective solution, this
Note will argue that correctional institutions need to implement
additional programs along with the methods already undertaken and that
state legislatures need to play a more active role. More specifically, this
Note suggests that correctional institutions and state legislatures need to
address the underlying causes of prison gang membership rather than
resorting exclusively to punishment.
Part II of this Note will concentrate on street gangs to lay the
foundation for demonstrating how street gangs differ from prison gangs
and why current anti-gang legislation will not effectively address prison
gangs. It will also survey anti-gang legislation, focusing on how such
legislation seeks to accomplish its purposes and whether it has done so.
Finally, this Part will outline the different suggestions proposed by
scholars to deal with street gangs more effectively.
Part III of this Note will focus on prison gangs. It will discuss the
prevalence of prison gangs in correctional institutions along with the
reasons why inmates often choose to join a prison gang. Furthermore, it
will discuss the activities that prison gangs generally engage in both
within the correctional institution and the community.
Part IV of this Note will focus on the various responses to the
prison gang problem and to what extent such responses have
accomplished their intended purposes.
It will look at anti-gang
legislation, focusing on why it is unlikely to have an impact on prison
gangs. In addition, it will also discuss the suppressive methods currently
implemented by many correctional institutions, what these methods have
accomplished, and why these methods fail to offer an effective solution
to prison gangs. Finally, it will suggest how correctional institutions can
better respond to prison gangs.
14. See Rick Ruddell et al., Gang Interventions in Jails:A National Analysis, 31 CRiM.
JUST. REV. 33, 36 (2006); Davis Forsythe, Gangs in California's Prison System: What Can be
Done? 4-12 (Jan. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=977010.
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LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
Part V of this Note will discuss in detail why state legislatures need
to become more involved with addressing the prison gang problem. It
will focus on the potential problems created by leaving complete
discretion with correctional officials and look at why an effective
solution to the prison gang problem requires legislative involvement.
Part VI of this Note will offer detailed suggestions for correctional
It will suggest programs that
institutions and state legislatures.
correctional institutions should consider implementing along with the
current methods and will discuss how these programs are likely to have
an impact on prison gang management. Furthermore, it will also discuss
strategies that legislatures should consider implementing in addition to
the correctional approaches. As a caveat, this Note offers no suggestion
as to the best approach but rather offers suggestions for programs and
explains how these programs could potentially provide beneficial results.
This Note is not intended to downplay the efforts of correctional
' 5
officials who "often are the ones brutally assaulted by prison gangs."'
Instead, the author hopes that this Note will "spur policy makers into
providing new and sorely needed resources to the field of American
corrections" and help correctional officials effectively deal with prison
gangs. 16
II. THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY STREET GANGS & CURRENT
RESPONSES
To understand why most anti-gang legislation does not adequately
address the prison gang problem, one must first recognize the
differences between street gangs and prison gangs as well as the purpose
and the inherent shortcomings of anti-gang legislation. Accordingly,
this Part will provide a brief overview of street gangs, with a focus on
defining street gangs and the prevalence of street gangs, and the various
legislative responses to street gangs, as well as those suggested by
scholars.
A. Identifying Street Gangs and Street GangMembers
Accurately identifying a street gang and a street gang member is
central to the understanding, discussion, and prevention of street gangs.
While seemingly straightforward, it has proven quite elusive as scholars
15.
16.
KNOX, supra note 8.
Id.
20L1
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
and legislators greatly disagree on the specific characteristics to
subscribe to street gangs and their members, thereby creating uncertainty
and major difficulties for law enforcement officials.
In modern, everyday language, the word "gang" is susceptible to
various, alternative interpretations depending upon the context of the
word's use. 17 Scholars, finding that dictionary definitions often ignore
key characteristics of street gangs, have advanced various definitions of
their own, each focusing on an alternative school of thought. 18 For
instance, Frederic Thrasher, a prominent sociologist, in his
groundbreaking study of street gangs in Chicago, offered an early
definition that focused on conflict and violence as the essential
characteristics. 19 According to Thrasher, a street gang comprises "an
interstitial group originally formed spontaneously and then integrated
through conflict. It is characterized by ... movement through space as a
unit, conflict, and planning., 20 Other scholars, however, place more
emphasis on the socialization process, omitting any focus on conflict or
violence "since changing levels of violence and criminality are what"
these scholars seek to explain. 2' The inability to reach agreement on this
issue continues the longstanding debate among scholars as to what
constitutes a street gang 2 2 and prompted one scholar to remark that "[n]o
one ever has advanced a definition of [street] gangs ...that most, much
less all, serious observers would embrace. 23 Other scholars likewise
17. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454 n.3 (1939) (citing four
definitions for the word gang); WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 786
(1996) (setting forth ten definitions for the word gang when used as a noun).
18. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453-54 (noting that "the meanings of... [the word gang]
in historical and sociological writings are numerous and varied"); Hagedom, supra note 6,
366-67 (discussing various definitions set forth by scholars); Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang
Ordinances After Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and
Equal Protection in the CriminalLaw, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 105 (2002) (noting that
"scholars do not agree on exactly what constitutes a gang"). See generally Malcolm W. Klein,
What are Street Gangs When They Get to Court, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 515, 516-18 (1997)
(discussing the general inability to provide a comprehensive definition of a street gang).
19. See Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
"CriminalStreet Gang Member, " 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 317-18; Hagedom, supra note
6, 370-72; Calvin Morrill et al., Telling Tales in School: Youth Culture and Conflict
Narratives, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 521, 522, 524-25 (2000).
20.
FREDERIC THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 46 (4th
abr. ed., 1963).
21.
Hagedorn, supranote 6, at 367.
22. See id. at 366-67 (stating the debate has been long and unsettled); Strosnider, supra
note 18, at 105.
23.
See C. RONALD HUFF,
Preface to GANGS: THE ORIGINS
AND
IMPACT OF
CONTEMPORARY YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES, at vii, vii (Scott Cummings &
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[Vol. 28:969
agree, suggesting that a uniform definition has yet to be developed
and
24
expressing doubts as to whether scholars can attain uniformity.
Like scholars, state legislatures in thirty-six states and the District
of Columbia have attempted to define what constitutes a gang but have
been hesitant to rely strictly on sociological definitions when developing
their own definitions. 25 This reluctance stems from the tendency of
sociological definitions to be both under and over-inclusive, for if these
"definitions [were] adopted for criminal law purposes, they [would be]
in danger of being held unconstitutional because ...they are not specific
enough.,26 More directly, the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties ... and a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
27 differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.
In response, state legislatures have constructed a variety of
definitions that spell out in detail the requirements for designating a
group as a street gang. While legislatures have been unable to reach
uniform agreement, the majority of definitions tend to pattern the basic
construction set forth by California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention (STEP) Act. 28 Under this formulation, a street gang includes
Daniel J. Monti eds., 1993).
24. See CHERYL L. MAXSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN:
GANG MEMBERS ON THE MOVE 1-2 (1998); WALTER B. MILLER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
THE GROWTH OF YOUTH GANG PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1970-98, at 7 (2001),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/181868-1.pdf ("Policymakers, law
enforcement personnel, social service agencies, researchers, and other groups have not been
able to reach consensus on this issue during the past 25 years, and current efforts to reach this
goal have thus far met with only limited success."); Daniel Ahn, Note, Profiling Culture: An
Examination ofKorean American Gangbangers in Southern California, 11 ASIAN L.J. 57, 61
(2004) ("[A] precise definition-sufficient for any situation-is unascertainable ....
");Suzin
Kim, Note, Gangs and Law Enforcement: The Necessity of Limiting the Use of Gang Profiles,
5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 265, 266 (1996) ("A precise definition of a gang neither exists nor is
attainable because definitions vary depending on the ultimate purpose of the authority creating
the definition.").
25. Institute for Intergovernmental Research, supra note 11.
26.
Robert A. Destro, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 790 (1994).
27. Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
The general
constitutionality of street gang legislation is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion
of the constitutionality of anti-gang legislation, see generally Beth Bjerregaard, The
ConstitutionalityofAnti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31 (1998).
28.
See Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 179 (noting that despite the difficulty in
20101
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
any formal or informal association of three or more individuals,2 9 which
has as one of its primary purposes the commission, or attempted
commission, of criminal activities. 30 The association usually must also
have a common identifiable color, name, sign, or symbol 3' and members
who, individually or collectively, engage or have engaged in criminal
gang activity.3 2
Common understanding would suggest that an individual who
maintains involvement or association with a street gang qualifies as a
street gang member. While some states have followed such an
approach,3 3 many states have slightly modified this basic assumption. In
these latter states, for an individual to qualify as a street gang member,
he or she must affiliate with a street gang or participate in a pattern of
street gang activity,34 and meet a minimum number (generally two) of
other statutory criteria.35 While the number of other statutory criteria
accurately defining a street gang, most states' statutes defining a "street gang" are patterned
after California's STEP Act); Strosnider, supra note 18, at 107 (finding that many states
pattern their statutory scheme after the California STEP Act).
29. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 1999); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 301.3(d)(1) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (2009). But see NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 193.168(7) (West Supp. 2009) (setting forth no minimum number of
individuals); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856(F) (West 2002) (requiring five or more
individuals).
30. The primary purpose requirement varies considerably among states. In some states,
the statute requires participation in criminal activity but does not provide any enumerated list
of specific activities or offenses. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(1) (West Supp. 2010); N.Y
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 301.3(d)(1) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35121(a)(1)(A) (2006). In other states, the statute contains a catalogue of specific offenses. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 1999) (referencing twenty-three specific criminal acts);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.22(9) (West 2005) (referencing twenty-one specific criminal acts).
31. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-801(c)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.Y COmP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 301.3(d)(1) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.41(A)(2)
(LexisNexis 2010). But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-103(3) (2005) (making no requirement
of a common symbol, color, or name).
32. The criminal activity requirement varies considerably among states. Compare LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1404(A) (2005) (requiring pattern of criminal gang activity), and N.Y
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 301.3(d)(1) (2009) (same), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74103(3) (2005) (requiring predicate criminal acts), and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (2009)
(same).
33. See N.Y CONP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 301.3(d)(2) (2009) (defining "gang
member" to mean "any individual who is part of, associates with, or otherwise affiliated with
a gang as defined" by the statute); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-44-3(c) (West 1999); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 939.22(9g) (West 2005).
34. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8502(2) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A1(2) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-121(2) (2006). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-105(8) (2010) (making no requirement for affiliation or participation; instead, requiring
satisfaction of two of the listed criteria).
35. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
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[Vol. 28:969
varies by state,36 the list generally includes: self admission of street gang
affiliation; 37 identification by a reliable informant; 38 identification by a
parent or guardian; 39 residence in a known street gang area, adoption of
the street gang's dress, hand signals or tattoos, and association with
other known street gang members; 40 physical evidence, such as
photographs or documentation; 41 and more than one arrest in the
company of known street gang members for gang-related activity.4 2
Although state legislatures have attempted to add clarity to these
notoriously imprecise terms, the inability to set forth any uniform,
objective definitions has received criticism from both law enforcement
officials and scholars alike. Law enforcement officials have argued that
uniform definitions are needed in order to enforce anti-gang legislation
meaningfully. 43 As one Illinois police officer stated:
[The multitude of definitions] does little to help the law enforcement
community reduce the ever-increasing threat of [street] gangs and their
criminal activities. By agreeing upon a uniform definition of what constitutes
a criminal [street] gang, what describes a person as a member/associate of a
[street] gang, and what unlawful acts comprise gang-involved crime, the law
enforcement profession can begin the difficult, but not impossible, task of
America's young
menace
reversing the current
•
.. 44that has engulfed many of
people and their communites.
8502(2) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1OA-1(2) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
35-121(2) (2006).
36. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West Supp. 2010) (eleven criteria); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1OA-1(2) (2006) (seven criteria); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-121(2)
(2006) (seven criteria).
37. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(9)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3)(a)
(West Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8502(2)(a) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-1OA-1(2)(a) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-121(2)(A) (2006).
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3)(c) (West Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 221OA-1(2)(b), (d) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-121(2)(C) (2006).
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3)(b) (West Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-
121(2)(B) (2006).
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(2)(d), (e), (f) (West Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-8502(2)(c) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A-1(2)(c) (2006); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-35-121(2)(D) (2006).
41. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8502(2)(e) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A1(2)(f) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-121(2)(G) (2006).
42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8502(2)(d) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10Al(2)(e) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-121(2)(F) (2006).
43. See Destro, supra note 26, at 789 (noting that "valid data collection is unavailable
and interagency cooperation is hindered without" uniform definitions) (internal quotations
omitted).
44.
Mike Langston, Addressing the Need for a Uniform Definition of Gang-Involved
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
977
Scholars have also voiced concern over the seemingly unbridled
discretion that legislative definitions thrust upon law enforcement
officials.4 5 According to these scholars, such discretion increases the
potential for discriminatory enforcement 46 and may ultimately
undermine the legislation's purported goals.47 In addition, scholars have
argued that the statutory criteria often ignore important social factors,
such as teenagers innocently adopting clothing styles and symbols
commonly used by street gangs and, conversely, street gangs adopting
popular cultural symbols, such as team logos or designer emblems. 8
Failure to recognize this reality, scholars argue, may result in
overemphasis on innocent behavior and abusive enforcement.49
To remedy the noted shortcomings, Beth Bjerregaard recommends
that legislatures reconsider the characteristics and language used to
For example,
define street gangs and street gang members.5 0
Bjerregaard suggests reducing the emphasis on the individual's social
ties and the area of the individual's residence while including factors
other than an individual's attire or tattoos.5 1 Moreover, Bjerregaard
advises that legislative "[d]efinitions should attempt to focus on hardcore, committed gang members," by requiring police to consider the
"frequency of association" and "the presence of at least three ... criteria
so that no two factors such as clothing and area of residence are enough
to identify someone as a gang member., 52 Although Bjerregaard's
proposals may have some merit, legislatures have thus far ignored these
Crime, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb. 2003, at 7, 7.
45. See, e.g., Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and
Application of California'sAnti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L 101, 110 (2006);
Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 180-81 (noting that "the enumerated gang indicators are
extremely open to interpretation and provide law enforcement officers with little guidance and
broad discretion in enforcing the statutes").
46. Baker, supra note 45, at 110 ("The lack of a consistent and workable definition of
,gang member' . . . encourages arbitrary enforcement of gang laws by police agencies ...
many of whom disagree as to what constitutes 'gang membership' for purposes of monitoring
gang activity at the street level."); Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 180-82 (noting that "youth
often 'become gang members based on law enforcement guesswork"').
47. See Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 185 (stating that "for a statute to have a
reasonable expectation of achieving its intended goals, those creating it must have knowledge
of the behavior that they are attempting to alter") (internal citations omitted).
48. Id. at 182-83; Strosnider, supra note 18, at 108 (noting that when enacting street
gang legislation "legislators often act without understanding gangs very well").
49. Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 183.
50.
51.
52.
Id.
1d. at 185.
Id.
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suggestions.
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3
B. Prevalence of Street Gang Activity in America
Over the past forty years, the prevalence of street gangs 54 in the
United States has increased drastically. 55 For instance, during the 1970s
nineteen states reported street gangs within their borders 56 but by the end
of the twentieth century that number increased to include all fifty states
and the District of Columbia.57 Today, nearly 3550 jurisdictions
throughout the United States have reported experiencing street gang
problems to a certain degree, with officials estimating that nearly
58
788,000 street gang members are active among 27,000 street gangs.
While these findings show an overall decrease since 1996, 59 the number
of street gangs and street gang members has begun to increase since
2002.60
During this same period, there has also been an increase in the
amount of illegal activity attributable to street gangs,6 1 including the
53. See H.B. 2623, 48th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008), 2008 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.
150 (H.B. 2623) (Westlaw) (amending definitions but leaving "criminal street gang" and
"criminal street gang member" substantively unchanged).
54. As mentioned above, there is considerable disagreement as to what constitutes a
street gang. See supra Part II.A. Therefore, to determine the prevalence of street gangs, this
Note has relied on information compiled by the United States Department of Justice in various
studies conducted on youth gangs. While youth gang, as used in these studies, does not
entirely comport with the definition of street gang, it has been defined in a manner that
excludes groups that are not typically considered part of the street gang genre, such as prison
gangs and motorcycle gangs. See ARLEN EGLEY, JR. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
1999-2001,
at 4
(2006),
available at
NATIONAL
YOUTH
GANG SURVEY
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/209392.pdf (setting forth the definition of youth gang).
Therefore, these studies produce the best estimate regarding the number and trends of street
gangs.
55.
56.
57.
58.
Id. at 10 (Figure 6).
MILLER, supra note 24, at 2.
Id.
ARLEN EGLEY, JR. & CHRISTINA E. O'DONNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP
FACT SHEET: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2007 NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SURVEY 1 (2009),
availableat http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/225185.pdf.
59.
See EGLEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, at v (estimating 846,000 gang members and
30,800 gangs active in the United States in 1996); EGLEY, JR. & O'DONNELL, supra 58, at 1;
Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California'sStep
Act, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 679 (2009) (noting that "[g]ang membership [has]
declined by almost 100,000 individuals from 1996-2004").
60.
See EGLEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, at 14-16 (estimating 731,500 gang members
and 21,500 gangs active in the United States in 2002).
61.
See NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 6 (noting that "[s]treet gangs
that operate throughout most of the country are a significant threat" to the community);
20101
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
distribution of illegal substances, 62 prostitution, 63 and gang-related
homicide. 64 Of all the illegal activity attributed to street gangs,
homicide remains the greatest threat, especially affecting major cities
that have a longstanding history of street gangs. 65 For example, between
1981 and 2001, Los Angeles, California reported over 10,000 gangrelated homicides that accounted for roughly 16% of all the city's
homicides.66 Similarly, between 1991 and 2004, Chicago, Illinois
reported over 3400 gang-related homicides, which accounted for
approximately 33% of the city's homicides. 67 Despite these findings,
however, recent estimates suggest that gang-related homicides might be
declining. 68
Overall, while longitudinal studies suggest an overall decrease in
the total number of street gangs and street gang members since the mid1990s, recent evidence suggests that street gangs have regained
momentum. 69 Even assuming the number of members stabilized, street
Matthew J. Cannata, Note, Achieving Peace in the Streets: How Legislative Efforts Fail in
Combating Gang Violence in Comparison to Successful Local Community-Based Initiatives,
35 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 255-56 (2009) (noting that "the
increase of violent crimes committed in the United States . . . is partly due to the spread of
criminal street gangs and the willingness of gang members to commit acts of violence")
(internal quotations omitted).
62. EGLEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, at 33-34; NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra
note 8, at 6; Beth Bjerregaard, Gang Membership and Drug Involvement: Untangling the
Complex Relationship, 56 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 25-27 (2010) (concluding that gang
involvement had an effect, though minimal, on the sale of drugs by members); Cannata, supra
note 61, at 256. But see JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, JUSTICE POLICY INST., GANG
WARS: THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT TACTICS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC
SAFETY STRATEGIES 59 (2007) (suggesting that law enforcement officials overestimate gang
involvement in drug distribution).
63. Kit Roane, Gangs Turn to New Trade: Young Prostitutes, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1999, at 23.
64. See generally EGLEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, at 25-32.
65. See id.
66. See George Tita & Allan Abrahamse, Gang Homicide in LA, 1981-2001, AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL: PERSPECTIVE ON VIOLENCE PREVENTION (Cal. Attorney Gen.'s Office,
Sacramento, Cal.), Feb. 2004, at 1, 5 (Table 1).
67. CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, CHICAGO CRIME TRENDS: GANG-MOTIVATED MURDERS
1991-2004, at 1 (2005).
68. See Richard Winton & Jill Leovy, L.A. Gang Killings Drop 32%, L.A. TIMES, June
1, 2007, at B-l; Daniel J. Chacon, 18% of City Homicides Gang-Related, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Jan. 20, 2007, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2007/jan/20/18-of-cityhomicides-gang-related. But see Kevin Johnson, FBI Reports Increase in Violent Crime in
2005, USA TODAY, June 13, 2006, at A4; Tony Manolatos, City's Homicide Rate Dips for
'07; Despite Overall Drop, Gang Killings Went Up, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 1, 2008, at
BI.
69. See supra notes 54-60.
QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
gangs continue to presents a myriad of problems to communities and
residents. In response, many state legislatures have enacted some form
of anti-gang legislation while scholars have offered a number of
alternative suggestions. 70
C. Approaches to Street Gang Management
1. Anti-Gang Legislation
In reaction to the street gang problems plaguing communities
throughout the United States, along with increased pressure from
constituents, "every region of the United States and ninety-two percent
of all states have enacted anti-gang legislation.", 71 The major focus of
most anti-gang legislation thus far has been on suppressing criminal
street gang activity, 72 aiming to deter street gang violence by removing
the immediate source-gang members-and controlling gang
membership, growth, and expansion through the use of increased
penalties and punishment. 73 Statutes rely primarily on the efforts of law
gang
enforcement officials and direct these officials to arrest and remove
74
sentences.
prison
long
serve
"to
community
the
from
members
Statutes patterned after the suppression approach take several
different forms. One form seeks to reduce street gang membership by
criminalizing the recruitment, or attempted recruitment, of individuals
into street gangs.75 These statutes vary widely regarding the types of
activities that constitute an offense and the level of punishment
attributable to the offense.7 6 For example, some statutes require the
70.
See Hofwegen, supra note 59, at 679-80.
71. Id.; see Institute for Intergovernmental Research, supra note 11 (noting that "46
states and the District of Columbia . . . have enacted some form of legislation relating to
gangs").
72.
See Rebecca Rader Brown, The Gang's All Here: Evaluating the Need for a
National Gang Database, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 295 (2009) (noting that
"suppression legislation continue[s] to be [one of] the most popular tactics nationwide" for
addressing street gangs).
73. See Tona M. Boyd, Comment, ConfrontingRacial Disparity:Legislative Responses
to the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571, 577 (noting that "gang
suppression methods . . . are characterized by targeting neighborhoods with greater police
presence and more aggressive enforcement of public ordinances").
74. IRVING SPERGEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INTERVENTION: PROBLEM AND RESPONSE 8 (1994).
75.
GANG SUPPRESSION AND
See Louis Holland, Note, Can Gang Recruitment be Stopped? An Analysis of the
Social and Legal Factors Affecting Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 J. CONTEMP. L 259, 261-63
(1995) (discussing the motivation behind Arkansas' recruitment statute).
76. See generally Bart H. Rubin, Note, Hail, Hail, the Gangs are All Here: Why New
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
recruiter, in an attempt to compel street gang membership, to use or
threaten the victim with force or violence,77 while other statutes punish
attempted recruitment in the absence of any force or threat 78 but
aggravate the criminal charge or penalty if the recruiter uses them.79
80
Some statutes also provide stiffer punishments for subsequent offenses
or offenses that involve a minor.8' Another form includes those that
punish actions undertaken or performed in furtherance of the street
gang's activities. These statutes may reclassify the offense, 82 provide
for an enhanced penalty, 83 or treat the act of committing the crime in
furtherance of a street gang as a separate criminal offense from the
underlying offense. 84
Overall, while these measures provide law enforcement officials
and prosecutors with a wide array of tools to combat street gangs,
research suggests that they have proven largely ineffective, especially in
major cities, in accomplishing their intended goal of deterring street
gang membership. 85 Instead, some have suggested that these legislative
measures may actually strengthen street gangs and "mak[e] U.S. cities
more dangerous" by "strengthen[ing] gang ties, rais[ing] [gang
86
members] stature and further marginaliz[ing] angry young men.,
Even in communities that have seen a decrease in street gang activities
"it is not clear whether the decline was due to [the] changed police
York Should Adopt a Comprehensive Anti-Gang Statute, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2059-70
(1998) (discussing the recruitment statutes of various states).
77. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.160(a) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-802(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN § 874.05(1) (West Supp. 2010); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN.
§71.022(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
79. See D.C. CODE § 22-951(a), (c) (West Supp. 2010) (enhancing the criminal
punishment from up to $1000 fine and/ or 6 months imprisonment to up to $10,000 fine
and/or 10 years imprisonment for use of force or threat); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.3 (2004)
(enhancing criminal charge from a class 1 misdemeanor to a class 6 felony for use of force or
threat).
80. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 874.05(2) (West Supp. 2010) (increasing the criminal charge
from a 3rd degree felony to a 2nd degree felony for second or subsequent offense); TEXAS
PENAL CODE ANN § 71.022(c) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (same).
81.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-26 (d) (LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.3(A)
(2009).
82. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1OA-2 (2006).
83. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-404 (2009).
84. See MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-804 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-06.2-02 (1997).
85. GREENE & PRANiS, supra note 62, at 5-6; SPERGEL ET AL., supra note 74, at 7-8;
Boyd, supra note 73, at 577.
86. Antigang Crackdowns are Ineffective, Report Says, L.A. TIMEs, July 18, 2007, at
B6; see also GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 62, at 5.
QUINNIPIAC
LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
strategies [of employing suppressive strategies] or [the] alternate but
unrelated structural changes in the community environment, such as
more legitimate jobs becoming available." 87
Thus, suppressive
measures, while beneficial in theory, have failed to provide an adequate,
long-term solution to the street gang problem.88
2. Scholars' Recommendations for Prevention and Intervention
Strategies
Scholars have criticized anti-gang legislation for placing
unequivocal focus on punishment while ignoring the underlying causes
of street gang membership. 89
In order to diminish street gang
membership and eliminate street gang activity, these scholars suggest
shifting focus to the "factors that place [an individual] at risk for gang
involvement," 90 which include family/social structure and social and
economic opportunities. 91 According to these scholars, anti-gang
legislation should increase education and community activities, improve
92
housing in at-risk areas, and modify ineffective legislative measures,
thereby addressing the underlying factors early on to provide a long-term
solution and eliminating the need to deal with street93 gang members after
they become heavily involved in the gang lifestyle.
In response, some communities have implemented school-based
programs that educate youth about the dangers of gang involvement and
help them build character to resist peer pressure. 94 Similarly, the Boys
and Girls Club of America has developed an out-of-school prevention
program that offers juveniles an opportunity to participate in "structured
87. SPERGEL ET AL., supra note 74, at 8.
88. See, e.g., Hofwegen, supra note 59, at 692-95 (discussing how the California STEP
Act "has not been a successful tool in the war on gangs").
89. See Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 187.
90. Id.; see David M. Allender, Gangs in Middle America: Are They a Threat, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT
BULL.,
Dec
2001,
at
1,
7-9,
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/decOlleb.pdf, Brian W. Ludeke, Malibu Locals
Only: "Boys will be Boys, " or DangerousStreet Gang? Why The CriminalJustice System's
Failureto Properly Identify Suburban Gangs Hurts Efforts to Fight Gangs, 43 CAL. W. L.
REV. 309, 3 54-60 (2007).
91. See, e.g., Allender, supra note 90, at 8; Hofwegen, supra note 59, at 695-700.
92. See Allender, supra note 90, at 8.
93. The feasibility of implementing such measures, however, is questionable and may
require an entire overhaul of society.
94. NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, supra note 8, at 14-15; FinnAage Esbensen, PreventingAdolescent Gang Involvement, JUVENILE JUST. BULL., Sept. 2000,
at 1, 7, availableat http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ojjdp/182210.pdf
20101
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
recreational, educational, and life skills programs.., geared to enhance
communication skills, problem-solving techniques, and decisionmaking
abilities" 95 and provides participants with a number of supports typically
sought and afforded by fellow gang members. 96 Overall, these programs
have demonstrated success in deterring at-risk juveniles from joining
street gangs, improving
social behavior and interactional skills, and
97
reducing crime rates.
Despite the potential for success, prevention and intervention
98
programs largely remain untapped resources for state legislatures.
Several reasons may suggest why legislatures have thus far remained
reluctant to utilize them. First, the complexity of prevention and
intervention methods makes these methods costly endeavors. 99 Second,
the effects of these methods are gradual and may take years to realize, if
realized at all.100 Third, these programs may fail to recruit the
individuals most in need of the services. 101 As a result, state legislatures
are understandably cautious to invest a large share of tax dollars into
costly programs with uncertain and unpredictable success rates.
In conclusion, street gangs continue to present problems to many
American communities. Over the past decade, nearly every state
legislature has responded by undertaking efforts to address street gangs.
Thus far, however, the success of these legislative measures remains
speculative, leading scholars to question the wisdom of such legislation
and suggest that the efforts will prove largely unsuccessful in the end.
With this backdrop in mind, the Note now shifts focus to the main topic:
prison gangs.
95.
Esbensen, supra note 94, at 8.
96. AMY J. A. ARBRETON & WENDY S. MCCLANAHAN, PUB./PRIVATE VENTURES,
TARGETED OUTREACH: BOYS & GIRLS CLUBS OF AMERICA'S APPROACH TO GANG
PREVENTION
AND
INTERVENTION
19-23
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ppv.org/ppv/publications/assets/148-publication.pdf.
97. See, e.g., id. at 25-29; THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS: BEST PRACTICES CTR.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BEST PRACTICES OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN: GANG INTERVENTION
& GANG VIOLENCE PREVENTION 2006, at 25-26, 95 (2006).
98. See, e.g., Ludeke, supra note 90, at 354-60; Claudia Rowe, Anti-Gang Bill: Penalty
Over Prevention Removal ofProgramsto Steer Youth Away from Crime DisappointsBackers,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 13, 2008, at B5.
99.
100.
101.
Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 188.
Id.
See Cannata, supra note 61, at 253 (noting that many of the "targeted youths were
sent to jail" and "became more engrossed in the gang culture").
QUINNIPIAC
LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
III. PRISON GANGS WITHIN AMERICA'S CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
When asked, many people would likely assume that a prison gang
02
is simply an incarcerated street gang or a subdivision of a street gang.1
This assumption, however, would be false. Although street gang
members may unite to establish a prison gang, 0 3 prison gangs ultimately
function as independent criminal gangs.104 Several notable distinctions
between the two types of gangs will illustrate that these gangs are not
synonymous and that "complete
comparisons cannot be drawn between
' 10 5
prison and street gangs."
First, street gangs often develop in a community "with a focus on
10 6
loyalty and turf protection in their immediate neighborhoods."'
Although members may recruit new members during periods of
incarceration, 10 7 a street gang is generally concerned with localized
criminal activities, such as "rivalry for drug sales ... [and] competing
with other gangs."' 1 8 A prison gang, on the other hand, forms and
establishes its main infrastructure within the correctional institution. 1 9
As "the overall goal for prison gangs is success within the prison
system," l 0 any additional infrastructure established outside of the
correctional institution is done to further the criminal enterprise within
the correctional institution and to "provid[e] financial assistance and
102. See JEAN M. MCGLOIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STREET GANGS AND
INTERVENTIONS: INNOVATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING WITH NETWORK ANALYSIS 1 (2005)
(noting that "the line between prison and street gang is becoming muddied"); David S.
Rutkowski, Note, A Coercion Defensefor the Street Gang Criminal:Plugging the Moral Gap
in Existing Law, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 162 (1996) (noting that
"the distinction between prison and street gangs has blurred").
103. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 9, at
3 (noting that the "Los Sollidos
[prison gang]
formed in the early
1990s from two
Connecticut-based street gangs: Ghetto Brothers and Savage Nomads"); Sharon Campbell,
One Clique: Why Rivals on the Street become Allies Behind Bars, CORR. TODAY, Feb. 2009,
at 36, 36.
104. Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 10-11.
105. Rutkowski, supra note 102, at 161.
106. James P. Sullivan, Gangs, Hooligans, and Anarchists-The Vanguard of Netwar in
the Streets, in NETWORKS AND NETWARS 99, 103 (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds.,
2001); see also NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7 ("Currently, most street
gangs are local-level gangs that operate in single locations."); Campbell, supra note 103, at
36.
107.
NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, supra note 8, at 6; Cannata,
supra note 61, at 252 n.78.
108. Sullivan, supra note 106, at 103.
109. DERRICK WATKINS & RICHARD ASHBY, GANG INVESTIGATION: A STREET COP'S
GUIDE 116 (2006); see also NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supranote 8, at 7.
110.
WATKINS & ASHBY, supra note 109, at 116; see also infra Part III.B.1.
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
communication" to members who remain incarcerated."1 '
Second, scholars have proposed a variety of explanations for why
individuals choose to join street gangs, with "the most common
explanation" concerning "[t]he failure of family and similar support
mechanisms" to provide individuals with support in times of crisis. 1 2 In
other words, individuals who do not "have responsible adults on whom
they can rely" may turn to a street gang for support."l 3 On the other
hand, the correctional institution's atmosphere and the inmates' need for
safety play a major role in compelling individuals to join a prison
gang.' 14 For example, the risk of imminent attack from fellow inmates
combined with a latent mistrust of correctional officials induces some
inmates to seek out other means of protection.15 As a result, inmates
who have no previous gang affiliation, street or prison, may choose to
join a prison gang to secure protection." 6 In addition, the prison gang
also provides members with education that enables them to further their
life of crime beyond the correctional institution and with job
opportunities upon release." 7
As the foregoing demonstrates, prison gangs are an entirely
separate type of gang. Therefore, it is improper to equate each gang as
one in the same and to assume simply that problems associated with one
type of gang are necessarily the same as those of the other.
ll.
Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 10.
112. Ludeke, supra note 90, at 330-3 1.
113. Id.at 332.
114. See, e.g., Victor A. Casillas, Identifying and Supervising Offenders Affiliated with
Community Threat Groups, FED. PROBATION, June 1994, at 11, 12 (noting that "prison gangs
begin as mutual protection groups"); Fred Burton & Ben West, The Barrio Azteca Trial and
TREE,
Nov.
21,
2008,
the
Prison
Gang-Cartel Interface, NEWSPAPER
http://newspapertree.com/opinion/3119-the-barrio-azteca-trial-and-the-prison-gang-cartelinterface (noting that "[p]rison gang membership affords a certain amount of protection" to
members of the prison gang).
115. See Mark Fleisher & Scott Decker, An Overview of the Challenge of Prison Gangs,
CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 1, 5 ("In institutions where prison management
controls on inmate crime and violence are weak and where prisons routinely violate inmates'
civil rights... it may be understandable that inmates form tips and cliques to ensure their own
physical safety.").
116. Pila Martinez, Novel Attempt to Curb Prison Gang Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 21, 1999, at 2 ("Many inmates who hadn't previously been exposed to gangs
[are] recruited and, after serving their sentence, [ally] with the gang outside of prison walls.");
KNOX, supra note 8.
117. See infra Part III.B.1.
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LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
A. Prevalence ofPrison Gangs
Scholars have long recognized the natural tendency for inmates to
The first
form prison gangs within correctional institutions. 1 8
documented prison gang-the Gypsy Jokers-appeared in a Washington
State penitentiary in the early 1950s"19 and since then numerous prison
gangs have developed in state and federal correctional institutions
throughout the United States. 120 Today, correctional officials have
identified almost 480 active prison gangs, including at least five that
operate nationally. 121
This natural tendency for inmates to form prison gangs stems from
the inmates' innate distrust of correctional officials and their belief that
the correctional institution lacks adequate control over inmate crime and
violence. 122 Prison gangs have developed to provide inmates with an
opportunity to unite with others, "organize to fight back, and enhance
their own status and control."' 123 Overall, a prison gang offers an inmate
to the perceived lack of protection
an alternative form of protection
24
offered by correctional officials. 1
118. DENNISE ORLANDO-MORNINGSTAR, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL NEEDS
at
available
(1997),
1
GANGS
PRISON
BULLETIN:
OFFENDERS
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/snobull2.pdf (noting that "[iln correctional institutions,
there is a natural tendency for inmates to form groups"); Victor A. Casillas, Identifying and
Supervising Offenders Affiliated with Community Threat Groups, FED. PROBATION, June
1994, at 11, 12 ("The tendency of inmates in correctional institutions to form formal and
informal groups has long been a fact of prison life.").
119. ORLANDO-MORNINGSTAR, supra note 118, at 1; Casillas, supra note 118, at 12.
120. Jeffrey P. Rush, Gangs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 344, 346
(Marilyn D. McShane et al. eds., 1996); Casillas, supra note 118, at 12; see Fleisher &
Decker, supra note 115, at 4; Hagedorn, supra note 6, at 399 (noting that "there has been a
vast increase in the number of prison gangs").
121. NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7; Rush, supra note 120, at 346;
Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 4; Bill Wallace, 5 Inmate Gangs Dominate California's
PrisonSystem, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2005, at A12.
122. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 4.
123. Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain Confronting the Coming
Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 551 (1997); see also
Burton & West, supra note 114 ("Prison gangs are endemic to prison systems, where safety
for inmates comes in numbers .... Prison gang membership affords a certain amount of
protection ...").
124. See Casillas, supra note 118, at 12 (noting that "prison gangs begin as mutual
protection groups"); Haney, supra note 123, at 550-51 (noting that inmates form prison gangs
for member protection); Joseph J. Marchese, Managing Gangs in a Correctional Facility:
What Wardens and Superintendents Need to Know, CORR. TODAY, Feb. 2009, at 44, 46; Joan
Petersilia, Californias CorrectionalParadox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST.
207, 234 (2008) (noting that many inmates join prison gangs for protection).
20101
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
By providing an alternative form of protection, prison gangs have
been increasingly successful at recruiting new inmates to join, especially
inmates with no previous gang affiliation. 125 In addition, despite the
boundaries between street and prison gangs, an incarcerated street gang
member may choose to join a prison gang for protection 116 and to
increase the member's rank within his street gang. 127 For a low-level
street gang member, "[m]embership in a prison gang is the ultimate
promotion ....If there is such a thing as becoming an icon in the
[street] gang world, this is as close as it comes."' 2 8 Upon release, street
gang members often return to their street gang but, in the event of
becoming incarcerated again, the prison gang may reaccept the street
gang member. 129
A common myth is that most inmates are members of a prison
gang;' 30 however, this is generally untrue as a "majority of prison
inmates are not gang-related." 13' Correctional officials, though, have
encountered tremendous difficulty in trying to estimate the total number
of prison gang members. 132 One major setback inhibiting an accurate
estimate is the "significant variations" that exist between classification
systems used by correctional institutions "both within and between
states."' 33 For example, although correctional officials typically refer to
a prison gang as a Security Threat Group (STG), 134 a phrase that
generally encompasses "a wide variety of groups posing special risks"
including prison gangs, 35 no precise, uniform definition has been set
125. See Martinez, supra note 116, at 2 (noting that "[many inmates who hadn't
previously been exposed to gangs [are] recruited" to join prison gangs); KNOX, supra note 8
(finding that an overwhelming majority of correctional institutions "are aware of inmates
joining or being recruited into a [prison] gang while incarcerated").
126. Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 10-11.
127. Alfonso J. Valdes, PrisonGangs 101, CORR. TODAY, Feb. 2009, at 40.
128. WATKINS & ASHBY, supra note 109, at 110.
129. Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 11.
130. Cf Sara Burnett, Prison Gangs, Racial Tension Volatile Mix, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/apr/22/prison-gangsracial-tension-volatile-mix ("[l]t is a myth that all prisoners are in a gang.").
131.
Chad R. Trulson et al., Gang Suppression & Institutional Control, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, Apr. 2006, at 26, 26.
132. Id. (noting that "[d]ata on the number of gang-related inmates may be one of the
most elusive figures").
133. Id.
134. Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 9-10.
135.
MARK S. FLEISHER, COMM'N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS,
GANGS
2
(2006),
CORRECTIONAL
CONTEXT
OF
PRISON
SOCIETAL
AND
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/fleisher-mark-s.pdf.
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LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
forth to describe a STG.136 Furthermore, "even where authorities agree
on what it means to be a prison gang member, that definition may not
square with the understanding of the inmates themselves, and it may
remain difficult to determine which inmates meet the agreed upon
characteristics."' 137 Finally, a variety of other factors-the correctional
institution's denial of prison gangs, the absence of a prison gang
intelligence unit and identification process, loss of information, and
secrecy among prison gang members-hinder an accurate estimate.38
For these reasons, the total number of prison gang members currently in
correctional institutions throughout the United States remains
39
unknown. 1
Despite the absence of any official findings, some scholars have
estimated that the number of prison gang members may reach close to
400,000 inmates, 140 but estimates based on current statistical datainmate populations and the percentage of inmates believed to belong to a
prison gang-produce lower estimates. For example, at the end of 2007,
the United States incarcerated nearly 1.6 million individuals in federal
and state correctional institutions 4 ' and studies indicated that an
estimated 11% to 15% of inmates were involved in gang-related
activity. 142 Combining the two sets of data reveals that 176,000-240,000
inmates may belong to a gang inside America's correctional institutions.
Even this estimate may be inflated, as much of the statistical data makes
between prison gang members and street gang
no distinction
43
1
members.
136. For examples of various STG definitions, see ARIZ. DEP'T OF CORR., SECURITY
available at
41
(2001),
EVALUATION
PROGRAM
(STG)
GROUP
THREAT
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/197045.pdf; Forsythe, supra note 14, at 2 (setting
forth the American Correctional Association's definition); KNOX, supra note 8.
137. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 2.
138. See Rush, supra note 120, at 347; Petersilia, supra note 124, at 234.
139. E.g., Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 66 (noting that "[t]he number of prison
gangs and prison gang members currently in American prisons is unknown").
140.
Id.
141.
HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN
2007, at 2 (2008), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf.
142. See NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, supra note 8, at 5-6
(estimating 11.7% of federal prisoners, 13.4% of state prisoners and 15.6% ofjail inmates are
gang members); Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 33 (estimating 13% ofjail inmates are gang
members). But see Trulson et al., supra note 131, at 26 ("[S]trictly prison based gang
members account[] for 1.2 percent of all state and federal prison inmates."); Burnett, supra
note 130 (citing a 2001 Bureau of Prisons report estimating that 9% of federal prisoners were
involved in gang activity).
143. See, e.g., NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, supra note 8, at 5-6
(making no distinction between incarcerated street gang members and prison gang members).
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
Although no concrete data exists regarding the total number of
prison gang members, many experts nevertheless believe that prison
gang membership continues to increase, which in turn "lead[s] to serious
144
problems that are likely to become increasingly more intractable."
These serious problems alluded to by scholars have an impact on both
the correctional institution and the communities.
B. The Problems Presentedby Prison Gangs
1. Prison Gang Activities Within CorrectionalInstitutions
Within the correctional institution, "managing the effects of prison
gang activity" remains "one of the most difficult... challenges" facing
correctional officials. 145 The reason that correctional officials have such
difficulty is that prison gangs are involved in a variety of disruptive
activities. 146
For instance, prison gangs are often associated with violent
behavior. A 2001 study of over 80,000 male inmates, of which nearly
9% were identified prison gang members, concluded that prison gang
membership increases the likelihood that an inmate will engage in
violent behavior and other forms of prison misconduct. 147 Other studies
have verified these conclusions by finding that "prison gangs are the
148
most likely group of inmates to commit . . . violent infractions."'
Surprisingly, the 2001 study found that the length of prison gang
membership "was consistently negatively related to all forms of
misconduct," suggesting that older members are less involved in
misconduct. 149 The authors of the study were quick to admit the fallacy
of such a conclusion since prison gang members with longer tenure have
likely risen to the rank of "'supervisor' and therefore [are] .. .more
likely to give orders related to violent and other misconduct rather than
144. Petersilia, supra note 124, at 235; see J. David Donahue, Institutional Management
of Security Threat Groups, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 2006, at 8, 8; Hagedorn, supra note 6,
at 399.
145. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 68.
146. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 43 (finding that prison "gang members challenged
the operations of. . . [correctional] facilities through illegal or disruptive behaviors and a
greater involvement in violence").
147. Gaes et al., supra note 8, at 364, 370, 381.
148. Bishop, supranote 8, at 466; see Hagedorn, supra note 6, at 399 (noting that "prison
gang members are more likely to be more violent that nongang inmates"); Petersilia, supra
note 124, at 228-32.
149. Gaes et al., supra note 8, at 374.
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commit the misconduct [themselves]."' 150 Therefore, the change, from
performing to ordering, likely results from correctional officials
monitoring older members more closely and the older members'
establishment of loyalty. 15 1 As a result, older prison gang members are
likely more involved, though less directly, in the prison gang's violent
activities than studies may suggest.
In addition to violent misconduct, prison gangs often engage in
many forms of "income-producing 'rackets' or illegal enterprises,"
including "drugs, sex, food, clothing, loan sharking, gambling, extortion
and protection.' 152 To carry out their illegal enterprises, prison gangs
establish an elaborate system of distribution and supply, both within and
outside of the correctional institution, 153 and may use family members or
dishonest correctional officials to smuggle contraband into the
correctional institution. 154
Overall, prison gangs seek to secure
economic control within the correctional institution by exploiting the
additions of other inmates. 155
These activities have a significant impact on the correctional
institution by threatening the safety of correctional officials and the
orderly operations of the correctional institution while also adding to the
challenge of keeping correctional institutions contraband free. 156 As a
result, correctional institutions must expend considerable resources to
address them, resources the correctional institution may not have readily
57
available. 1
Beyond obvious misconduct, prison gangs also thwart the
correctional institution's rehabilitative process by serving as a trade
school where members assist one another in learning new skills in the
150. Id.
151. Id. at374-78.
152. KNOX,supra note 8; see NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, supra
note 8, at 5-6; NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7 (noting that "prison gangs
often control drug distribution within correctional facilities"); Fleisher & Decker, supra note
115, at 5.
153. See NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7 ("Prison gangs often
control drug distribution within correctional facilities and heavily influence street-level
distribution in some communities.").
154. See Reginald A. Wilkinson & Anthony Delgado, Prison Gang and Drug
Investigations:An Ohio Approach, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 2006, at 36,37-40.
155. Id. at37.
156. Id. at36.
157. Cf Chris Megerian, Jail Gangs are Called a Growing Menace, STAR-LEDGER, July
19, 2009, at 17 (noting that correctional officials in New Jersey are "losing ground in the fight
to control gangs in New Jersey prisons because they don't have enough... funding").
20101
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
trade of crime. For example, the La Nuestra Familia 158 teaches members
how to properly conduct themselves outside of the correctional
institution, including how to speak, dress, and act, so that each member
may perform criminal activities with less suspicion and more success. 159
Experienced members act as mentors by instructing less knowledgeable
members in the proper, functional way to commit prosperous crimes,
such as armored car robberies and home burglaries. 160 In addition,
because of their heavy involvement in the drug trade, prison gangs
16
provide members with employment opportunities following release. 1
For many inmates, due in part to low educational levels, receiving such
an education or job opportunity, which provides the inmate with an
opportunity to earn income
upon release, increases the desirability of
62
joining a prison gang. 1
2. Prison GangActivities Beyond CorrectionalInstitutions
The effects of prison gangs have also spread beyond the
correctional institution into the community. For example, when an
inmate decides to join a prison gang, the inmate makes an "ultimate
commitment... [of] lifelong membership.,' ' 63 Upon release, the prison
gang expects and requires non-incarcerated members to remain loyal to
the prison gang by providing support to members who remain
158. The La Neustra Familia ("the Family"), made up of mostly Hispanic Americans,
originated in California correctional institutions in the late 1960s and is generally regarded as
one of the major national prison gangs. See Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 4. Since its
inception, the Family continues to grow in membership and has spawned affiliate prison
gangs.
CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF
CRISIS 196-98 (2000).
159. See All Things Considered: Gangs Reach Out of Prison to Commit Crimes
(National
Public
Radio
broadcast
March
7,
2005),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=4525733.
160. Id.
161.
NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7; Allender & Marcell, supra
note 10, at 10.
162.
See SHAWN BUSHWAY, URBAN INST., REENTRY AND PRISON WORK PROGRAMS 5
(2003) ("Most incarcerated individuals have extremely low levels of educational achievement
and very limited job skills."). Recent estimates indicate that approximately "[75% of]
America's state prison inmates are high school dropouts" while "[59% of] America's federal
prison inmates did not complete high school." MARY REIMER & JAY SMINK, NAT'L
DROPOUT PREVENTION CTR., INFORMATION ABOUT THE SCHOOL DROPOUT ISSUE: SELECTED
FACTS
&
STATISTICS
8
(2005),
available
at
http://www.dropoutprevention.org/pubs/pdfs/SchoolDropoutFacts-2005.pdf
163. Valdes, supra note 127, at 40.
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incarcerated. 164 The prison gang ensures compliance by assuring
members that "if they fail at their assigned task the punishment could be
worse than death." 165 As many inmates "have extremely low levels of
educational achievement and very limited job skills,"' 166 the nonincarcerated member will usually provide support "through the proceeds
will likely
of... street crimes." 167 This means that members of society 68
fall victim to the crimes perpetrated by prison gang members.
Furthermore, prison gangs also "heavily influence street-level
[drug] distribution in some communities" throughout the United
States.169 As highly organized criminal enterprises, prison gangs have
developed into reliable drug distributors for street gangs who generally
lack the organizational structure necessary to exist as a self-sufficient
drug distribution operation. 7 ° The influence that prison gangs exert
over drug distribution not only contributes to the drug problem plaguing
the community but also increases violent disputes between rival street
gangs that compete for the supply.171
As a result, prison gang activities contribute to the demise of
communities by increasing the amount of criminal activity occurring
within the community. As the number of prison gang members
returning to the community increases, so does the likelihood that the
community will experience an increase in illegal activities attributable to
prison gang members.17 2 Therefore, to reduce the potential impact on
communities, efforts must be undertaken to reduce the number of prison
gang members returning to the community. Given "the fact that most
inmates are eventually released," these efforts must work to discourage
164.
Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 10.
165.
166.
167.
Valdes, supra note 127, at 40.
Bushway, supra note 162, at 5.
GangsOrUs.com, Initiation, http://www.gangsorus.com/initiations.html (last visited
on Aug. 2, 2010).
168. See, e.g., Chris De Benedetti, Prison Gangs Reaching Through Bars, May, 27,
2003, OAKLAND TRIB., at Headline News (finding that "the violence that permeates a prison
gang member's life sometimes becomes local residents' problems").
169. NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7; see also Allender & Marcell,
supra note 10, at 10.
170. NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7; Allender & Marcell, supra
note 10, at 10.
171. Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 10.
172. See generally DAVID E. OLSON ET AL., ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. AUTH.,
RESEARCH BULLETIN: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GANG MEMBERSHIP AND INMATE
RECIDIVISM (2004), availableat http://www.icjia.org/Public/pdf/Bulletins/gangrecidivism.pdf
(discussing recidivism rates of gang members and non-gang members in Illinois).
20101
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
prison gang affiliation.
993
17 3
IV. RESPONSE TO PRISON GANGS
A. Legislative Response
While nearly every state has enacted some form of legislation
aimed at the problems created by street gangs, relatively few states have
enacted specific legislation aimed at prison gangs. 174 States that have
enacted such legislation generally delegate the responsibility of
addressing prison gangs to the correctional institution. 175 For example,
Colorado provides:
The warden of each correctional facility should, wherever possible, take such
measures as are reasonably necessary to restrict the confinement of any person
with known past or current affiliations or associations with any security threat
group [prison gangs included].., so as to prevent contact with other
inmates .... The warden should.., also take such measures as are reasonably
necessary to prevent recruitment of new
76 security threat group members from
among the general inmate population. 1
This means that in the absence of legislation, or in response to a broad
grant of authority, correctional institutions must decide how, if at all, to
address the prison gang problem.
Furthermore, the anti-gang legislation that most states have enacted
is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on prison gangs. Recall that the
primary focus of such legislation is to discourage gang involvement and
gang affiliation by punishing gang-related behavior with stricter
penalties, including imprisonment, and to reduce gang membership by
separating the gang member from his gang. 177 While the ability of antigang legislation to accomplish these goals with respect to street gangs
173. Id.
174. See Institute for Intergovernmental Research, supra note 11 ("Only 10 percent of
the states have enacted laws that address gangs within correctional facilities.").
175. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-1-109(2)(a) (West 2006); 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/3-2-5(c) (West 2007) ("The Department [of Corrections] shall create a gang
The [gang intelligence] unit shall... gather information regarding the
intelligence unit ....
inmate gang population, monitor the activities of gangs, and prevent the furtherance of gang
activities through the development and implementation of policies aimed at deterring gang
activity.").
176. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-1-109(2)(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
177. See supra Part II.C.1.
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remains speculative,178 it is doubtful to have an impact on prison gangs
for several reasons.
First, as prison gangs use correctional institutions to recruit new
members, sending more individuals to prison to serve longer prison
sentences will only increase the recruitment pool from which prison
gangs may recruit and the likelihood that an inmate will choose to join a
prison gang. In addition, because prison gangs establish their main
infrastructure within the correctional institution, if a non-incarcerated
prison gang member receives a prison sentence for gang-related
activities, he will be returned to prison and consequently to his gang.
Thus, anti-gang legislation actually has the reverse effect of its intended
goal with respect to prison gangs. Rather than reducing the opportunity
for recruitment and separating the prison gang member from his gang,
the legislation actually increases the number of potential recruits and
reunites the prison gang member with his gang.
As a result, the legislative response to prison gangs has been almost
non-existent. The legislation that has been enacted does little more than
explicitly direct correctional officials to handle the problem or does little
to discourage prison gang affiliation or reduce prison gang involvement.
Without an effective legislative response, correctional institutions have
developed a number of methods for addressing the prison gang problem.
B. CorrectionalInstitution Response
Many correctional institutions have responded to the absence of
legislation, or broad grants of authority, by developing a number of
Largely, correctional
methods for addressing prison gangs.' 7 9
institutions have sought to secure the safety of correctional officials and
other inmates by removing the immediate threat presented by prison
gangs and by monitoring prison gang activities. Below, this Part
considers the effectiveness of the three major responses taken by
correctional institutions-segregation, diesel therapy, and the use of
informants (collectively suppressive methods)-in accomplishing their
intended goals and in reducing prison gang membership. At the outset,
however, it should be noted that "there has been very little empirical
178. Bjerregaard, supra note 12, at 178 ("Although antigang legislation was enacted with
ambitious objectives, it is unclear that such legislation has been or will be an effective tool to
address [street] gang-related problems.").
179.' See Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 36 (noting a 2002 study in which "76% of
prisons" and "44% ofjails" reported using one or more programs to deal with prison gangs).
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
research into
whether [these] particular prison gang control methods are
' 80
effective."'
1 81
1. Segregation ofPrison Gang Members
Many larger correctional institutions segregate prison gang
members from the general inmate population 182 in separate holding areas
for an extended period. 183 In segregating prison gang members, the
correctional institution hopes to reduce the "[gang] leader's ability to
recruit or influence other [gang] members,"'' 84 disrupt interactions
between prison gang members, and reduce misconduct attributable to
Thus far, studies have indicated that
prison gang members. 185
segregation has fulfilled only one of these intended goals.
Segregation has proven successful at reducing violence and other
misconduct attributable to prison gangs. For instance, after Texas
initiated a segregation program, the state witnessed a reduction in
assaults and other violent acts perpetrated by prison gang members
against inmates and correctional officials.' 86 Furthermore, the Arizona
Department of Corrections saw a decrease in the number of infractions
generally attributed to prison gangs, such as assaults, drug violations,
threats, fights, and riots, during a six-year period after implementing
similar segregation initiatives. 187 Finally, a 2004 study found that
180. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 4.
181.
The Constitutionality of segregating prison gang members is beyond the scope of
this paper. For more on this topic see, e.g., Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert:
Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to ConstitutionalDiscourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
111, 127-34 (2008); Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners,37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRiM.
PROC. 944 (2008); 72 C.J.S. Prisonsand Rights of Prisoners§ 24 (2008).
182. See Rush, supra note 120, at 351; Trulson et al., supra note 131, at 28-30 (noting
that the Texas prison system has used segregation to reduce prison gang violence).
183. For instance, in California's Security Housing Unit located at Pelican Bay, inmates
in segregation are restricted to their prison cells "every day for up to twenty-three hours."
Donald Specter, Prison Reform: Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 125, 132 (2006). Segregated inmates spend the remaining one hour in
another enclosed holding area either alone or with other segregated inmates. Ruddell et al.,
supra note 14, at 36.
184. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 36; see also Trulson et al., supra note 131, at 30
(noting that segregation makes "it more difficult for [prison gang members] to influence and
prey on the general prison population").
185. Rush, supra note 120, at 351.
186. See Trulson et al., supra note 131, at 28-30 (finding that "the suppression methods
employed by the Texas prison system effectively addressed [prison] gang-related violence").
187. See Forsythe, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that "assaults fell 53%, drug violations fell
76%, threats fell 58%, fighting fell 97%, and rioting fell 78%").
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segregating prison gang members effectively reduced illegal,88disruptive,
and violent conduct generally engaged in by gang members. 1
Despite its success in reducing misconduct, segregation has not
For example,
proven successful in accomplishing other goals.
segregation has not been able to prevent prison gang members in
segregation from contacting members outside of segregation.' 89 By
continually developing new methods, forms, and means of
communication, 19 prison gang members in segregation have been able
to remain one step ahead of correctional officials who attempt to
intercept and confiscate communications.' 9' This means that, while
segregation removes the physical threat that an individual prison gang
member presents to the correctional institution, it does little to limit the
prison gang's activities as a whole.
In addition, segregation has not proven successful at eliminating or
reducing the size of prison gangs for two reasons. 192 First, prison gangs
have adapted to segregation by developing a practice of succession and
replacement.' 93 When the correctional institution separates a prison
gang member and prevents outside communication, a prison gang simply
replaces the separated member.' 94 As a result, removing a prison gang
member disrupts a prison gang's activities and decreases it size only so
long as it takes to find a replacement.
Second, although segregation does reduce prison violence, namely
by removing inmates who are often responsible for the "increased levels
188. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 41.
189. See Specter, supra note 183, at 132 ("It is commonly understood that, while locked
in segregation, gang leaders continue to control the illegal activities of their members both
within the prison and in the outside community."); Julia Reynolds & George Sanchez, Prison
Gang Case Puts Role ofFBI Informants Under Scrutiny, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 29, 2003, at AI
(finding that "[d]espite being locked down 23 hours a day... [prison] gang leaders" have still
been able to "send out orders").
190. See ORLANDO-MORNINGSTAR, supra note 118, at 6-7.
191. See Reynolds & Sanchez, supra note 189 (describing how prison "gang leaders have
used elaborate communication systems to send out orders [out of segregation], including
writing coded messages disguised as love letters, using urine as invisible ink and sending
letters marked 'legal mail' to a nonexistent law firm"); All Things Considered: Gangs Reach
Out of Prison to Commit Crimes, supra note 159.
192. See Specter, supra note 183, at 132 (finding that "it is clear that [segregation has]
not succeeded in eliminating gangs or their influence").
193.
See Peter M. Carlson, PrisonInterventions: Evolving Strategies to Control Security
Threat Groups, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 10, 21-22 (noting that "[i]f a gang
leader is neutralized by transfer ... the group names new leadership"); Trulson et al., supra
note 131, at 30.
194. Carlson, supra note 193, at 21-22.
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
of violence,"'' 95 and thereby removes one of the reasons an inmate may
choose to join a prison gang,' 96 it does not remove the belief that the
correctional institution lacks adequate control over other inmate crime
and violence. 197 Inmates who continue to believe that "loners ... are
vulnerable to being physically attacked or preyed upon" and who believe
that correctional officials cannot protect them against such attacks will
still seek out a prison gang for an alternative form of protection
notwithstanding
the fact that the more violent offenders have been
98
removed. 1
2. Diesel Therapy
Many correctional institutions also implement diesel therapy as a
method for addressing prison gangs.1 99 Diesel therapy tries to eliminate
prison gang affiliation by separating prison gang members through
transfers to different correctional institutions. °°
In Arizona, for
instance, the correctional institution gives prison gang members the
choice of renouncing gang affiliation or being shipped to another
If the prison gang member chooses not to
correctional institution.
renounce, the correctional institutions transfers him to a correctional
institution where he is believed to be less likely to maintain gang
affiliations.20 2 Thus, "a white supremacist would likely end up in [a]
prison system where the majority of inmates were black or Hispanic. 2 3
Whether diesel therapy actually breaks up the prison gang in the
original institution remains unclear. What has become clear, however, is
that transporting prison gang members to a new correctional institution,
where the members become minorities, results in spreading the prison
gang to the new institution.20 4 This should come as no surprise when
195. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 2; see also Gaes et al., supra note 8, at 381 (concluding
that "gang affiliation increases the probability of violence and other misconduct" of inmates).
196. See supra notes 114-15.
197. See Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 4; Marchese, supra note 124, at 46.
198. See Marchese, supra note 124, at 46; Ruddell et al supra note 14, at 35.
199. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 36; see also GEORGE W. KNOX, NATIONAL GANG
CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF GANGS AND SECURITY THREAT
GROUPS (STGS) IN ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION: RESULTS OF THE 1999 ADULT
CORRECTIONS SURVEY(1999), http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/page7.htm (finding that 79.7% of
adult state correctional institutions reported using diesel therapy to control gang problems).
200. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 8.
201. Martinez, supra note 116, at 2.
202.
203.
Id.
Id.
204.
Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 8 ("In fact, transferring a high-ranking prison
QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28:969
one recalls that inmates generally create prison gangs for protection.205
When a prison gang member arrives at a new institution where he is a
minority, he faces the challenge of protecting himself.206
The
opportunity then presents itself to recruit and unite with other minorities
to form a prison gang for the protection of its members.2 0 7
The spread of the prison gang Dead Man Inc. (DMI) illustrates the
effect that diesel therapy may have on the receiving correctional
institution. DMI began as a small, predominantly white prison gang in a
Maryland correctional institution in the early 1990s. 20 8 As the gang
became notorious for "carrying out contract killings for other prisoners,"
correctional officials sought ways to limit DMI's effect. 20 9 The eventual
solution became to separate DMI's three founding members by
transporting two of them to correctional facilities in Texas and
Louisiana.21 ° Instead of reducing the size of DMI, however, diesel
therapy actually spread DMI beyond Maryland into Texas
and
2 1
Louisiana, increasing membership to over 10,000 nationwide. 1
3. Informants
Many correctional institutions also use informants, many of whom
are members or former members of a prison gang, to gather information
about and to monitor the activities of prison gangs.21 2 The use of
informants has helped correctional institutions to stop potential
disruptive activity before it occurs and to secure convictions related to
prison gang activities.
For example, the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction's informant program led to more than
sixty-five federal indictments in less than two years after
implementation, including indictments against former correctional
gang member could be the impetus to transfer his prison gang to yet another institution.");
Rush, supra note 120, at 351; Martinez, supra note 116, at 2.
205. See supra notes 114-17.
206. See Campbell, supra note 103, at 36 (noting that in the correctional institution
"inmates of a race that is outnumbered often believe that they are targeted by the more
dominant race").
207. Martinez, supra note 116, at 2.
208. Peter Hermann, Dead Man Inc., BALTIMORE SuN, Apr. 24, 2009,
http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/blog/2009/04/dead_man_inc.html.
209. Gregory Kane, Gang Role in Prison Fight No Surprise, BALTIMORE SUN, June 9,
2007, at
210.
211.
212.
38-40.
B1.
Hermann, supra note 208.
Id.
See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 116, at 2; Wilkinson & Delgado, supra note 154, at
2010]
PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
officials who smuggled contraband for prison gangs.213 In addition,
California used informant testimony to convict two high-ranking
members of the Aryan Brotherhood for "criminal activities that [went]
back almost thirty years., 2 14 Finally, in what has been dubbed
Operation Black Widow, the FBI used an informant to secure federal
indictments against members of the La Nuestra
Familia, "ranging from
' 215
racketeering to witness tampering to murder."
While the use of informants has its advantages, correctional
officials may encounter difficulty when trying to persuade a prison gang
member to work as an informant since prison gangs consider such an act
punishable by death. 216 Once a member becomes a known informant,
his sole form of protection against retaliation becomes the correctional
officials-the same officials he once believed were unable to keep him
safe and influenced his initial decision to join a prison gang.21 7
Therefore, correctional officials face the difficult challenge of
convincing the prison gang member that they can provide sufficient
protection.
In addition, the "blood in, blood out" prerequisite that some prison
gangs require for membership may prevent correctional officials from
planting an informant.21 8 The "blood in-blood out" requirement requires
a prospective prison gang member to kill or violently assault an
individual, usually a rival prison gang member, before being admitted to
the prison gang. 219 The requirement not only demonstrates the
prospective member's loyalty but also assures other members that the
recruit is not an informant. 220 The only way for a member to quit the
gang is "blood out"--death. 22' As a result, correctional officials would
213. Wilkinson & Delgado, supra note 154, at 37, 40.
214. Randy L. Harrington, Death Penalty Phase Begins for Aryan Brotherhood Prison
Gang
Members,
CAL.
CHRON.,
Aug.
29,
2006,
http://www.califomiachronicle.com/articles/view/12976.
215. Trulson et al., supra note 131, 26-27.
216. Wilkinson & Delgado, supra note 154, at 38.
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. Although no empirical study has conclusively established the requirement's
existence, many correctional officials are convinced that the requirement does in fact exist.
Florida
Department
of
Corrections,
Major
Prison
Gangs,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/gangs/prison.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2010); cf FLEISHER,
supra note 135, at 4 ("No statistical data exists to disprove the adage 'blood in, blood out."').
219. John M. Broder, Trial Begins for Members of Aryan Prison Gang, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2006, at Al8.
220. GangsOrUs.com, Initiation, http://www.gangsorus.com/initiations.html (last visited
on Aug. 2, 2010).
221.
SUE MAHAN, BEYOND THE MAFIA: ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE AMERICAS 190
1000
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have to allow a potential informant to violently wound, and possibly kill,
another inmate in order to gain admittance into the prison gang. Even
assuming the prison gang allowed a potential informant to join without
doing so, the informant would still face the possibility of death for
working as an informant.
Furthermore, beyond these difficulties, there are concerns related to
the information provided by informants.
As informants provide
information to correctional officials in return for rewards, "the prospect
of receiving such rewards provides informants with a very strong
motivation to lie deliberately, or at the very least provide inaccurate
information, about ...fellow prisoners. 222
Thus, an informant may
give information "to frame someone for a crime which the informant
himself committed" 223 and, since correctional officials have a limited
ability to verify the information's reliability, he may get away with a
very serious crime. 224
As the foregoing demonstrates, the suppressive methods have
allowed correctional institutions to reduce misconduct attributable to
prison gangs, better monitor prison gang activities, and briefly disrupt
prison gang activities. These methods, however, have not proven
successful either at eliminating prison gangs or at decreasing the
incentive to join or remain a member of a prison gang. The failures of
these methods means that society remains vulnerable to the activities of
prison gang members.
As previously discussed, while the prison gang's main
infrastructure remains within the correctional institution, the prison
gang's overall "success inside a correction[al] [institution] largely
depends on an [additional] infrastructure on the outside to further [the]
criminal enterprises, [and] provid[e] financial assistance. 225 This
means that as prison gangs continue to grow and operate within the
correctional institutions, they will continue to grow and operate outside
of the correctional institution. Furthermore, by requiring lifelong
membership and teaching members how to perform lucrative crimes,
non-incarcerated members will likely provide support through the
commission of these crimes.
(1988); Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 4-5; Ruthowski, supra note 102, at 162 (noting
that "once a convict commits to... [a prison gang] the only way out is death").
222. Christopher Sherrin, Jailhouse Informants, Part I: Problems with Their Use, 40
CRIM. L.Q. 106, 110-11 (1997).
223. Id. at Il1.
224. See Wilkinson & Delgado, supranote 154, at 38.
225. Allender & Marcell, supra note 10, at 10.
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
A 2004 study of recidivism rates among gang-affiliated and nongang-affiliated inmates in Illinois further illustrates this point.2 26 The
study found that "[g]ang members were more likely than non-gang
members to get rearrested, were rearrested more quickly following
release from prison, were rearrested more frequently, and were more
likely to be arrested for violent and drug offenses than non-gang
members. 227 Furthermore, the study found that gang members were
more likely to be rearrested for a new offense, instead of a simple parole
violation,2 2 8 and were more likely to be rearrested for a drug-related
offense or a violent crime. 229 These findings suggest that prison gangs
prepare members for further criminal involvement and that nonincarcerated prison gang members, required to support incarcerated
230
members, may resort to illegal activities, such as drug distribution.
As a result, society remains at an increased risk from drug and violent
crimes until prison gang membership can be brought under control.
The problem with suppressive methods is that they ignore the
underlying causes of prison gang membership. Inmates generally
choose to join a prison gang for safety. With safety being the biggest
underlying motivation, the fear of punishment from correctional officials
does little to displace the fear of attack created by other inmates,
especially if inmates already doubt the ability of correctional officials to
protect them. This leads to a Hobson's choice: join a prison gang for
safety and receive punishment from correctional officials or abstain from
prison gang membership and risk attack from other inmates.
Furthermore, suppressive methods overlook the realities that prison
gang members face. For instance, an inmate who already belongs to a
prison gang faces a near-certain death sentence if he renounces his gang
affiliation. When faced with the choice of segregation and diesel
therapy or severe punishment from the prison gang, the prison gang
member is likely to select the choice with the least drastic consequences.
In addition, many inmates, especially those with a low educational level
226. OLSON ET AL., supra note 172. While the study draws no clear distinction between
prison and street gang members, prison gang members are clearly considered within the study.
See id. at 3.
227. Id. at 4.
228. Id. at 6 ("[G]ang members were more likely to get rearrested for a new crime
following their release than non-gang members ....
").
229. OLSON ET AL., supra note 172, at 5 ("[G]ang members were more likely that nongang members to have at least one new arrest for a drug crime ... and were also more likely
to have at least one new arrest for a crime of violence.").
230. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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and little job success, and those likely to return to prison, are likely to be
attracted by the opportunity to learn to perform lucrative crimes.
Without additional programs focusing on the underlying causes and
realities, a low likelihood exists that inmates will abstain from prison
gang membership or "that gang-affiliated inmates [will] be prepared for
a lawful lifestyle outside of prison. ' ' 231 Therefore, to address the prison
gang problem more effectively, correctional institutions need to combine
These additional
suppressive methods with additional programs.
programs need to address the underlying causes of prison gang
membership and prepare prison gang members for a lawful lifestyle.232
V. INCREASING LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT
To better address the prison gang problem, in addition to
correctional institutions implementing additional programs, state
legislatures need to become more involved. As discussed below,
increasing legislative involvement strengthens the state's overall
response by addressing several key shortcomings created by the current
approach followed by most states.
First, not all correctional institutions are financially capable of
implementing methods necessary to control prison gangs. As should
come as no surprise, managing prison gangs increases the costs borne by
the correctional institution.2 33 Therefore, the approach a correctional
institution will develop largely depends on the resources, both internally
231. Fleisher& Decker, supra note 115, at 7.
232. Id. (noting that "[w]ithout in-prison treatment, education and vocational training, the
likelihood that gang-affiliated inmates [will] be prepared for a lawful lifestyle outside of
prison is low"). In Part VI, this Note will consider the types of programs correctional
institutions should consider implementing along with suppressive methods.
233. See Trulson et al., supra note 131, at 30. As a small example, consider the expense
of constructing new holding cells to segregate prison gang members. Since "the average cost
of building a [holding] cell is $54,000," and may even "exceed $100,000 with interest," the
construction of just twenty new holding cells would cost more than one million dollars.
Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent
Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 417 (2004); see also Chuck
Colson & Pat Nolan, Prescriptionfor Safer Communities, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 387, 388 (2004). While theoretically a correctional institution could segregate
prison gang members in unoccupied portions of the institution, the current overcrowding of
American correctional institutions makes this an unrealistic option. See, e.g., WILLIAM J.
SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 9 (2009); Hadar Aviram,
Comment, Defining the Problem, 7 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 161, 162 (2010) (finding
that California "prisons are estimated to operate almost at 200 percent of their design
capacity").
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
and externally, that the correctional institution has available. 3 4 If the
correctional institution lacks necessary funding, it may be unable to
implement basic precautionary measures. 235
Furthermore, some correctional institutions may choose not to
implement policies for addressing prison gangs because they are
unaware or in denial of the severity of the prison gang problem. As one
study found, "some administrators are not aware of the scope of the
problem, are in denial, deliberately underreport the percentages of
[prison] gang-involved inmates, or do not regard [prison] gangs as
problematic. 236 In such a case, a correctional institution may take
inappropriate or ineffective actions with respect to the management of
prison gangs.23 7
By working with correctional officials and adopting legislation,
state legislatures can alleviate the above-mentioned concerns. More
specifically, state legislatures may consult with correctional officials to
determine if an increase in budgetary funding is necessary in any
particular correctional institution to ensure that such an institution has
appropriate funding available and has the ability to take appropriate
In addition, the state legislature may enact legislation
actions.
developing, or requiring the development of, uniform policies and
procedures for the management of prison gangs and thereafter require
that each correctional institution adopt such policies and procedures.
This would help to ensure that each correctional institution has in place a
strategy for managing prison gangs and watching for their development.
Second, as the Stanford Prison experiment demonstrated,23 8
234. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 36.
235. See Megerian, supra note 157 (noting that correctional officials in New Jersey are
"losing ground in the fight to control gangs in New Jersey prisons because they don't have
enough... funding").
236. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 43.
237. See KNOX, supra note 8 (survey finding that 84.9% of correctional officials believe
that tougher laws are necessary to control gang problems in prison).
238. See generally Craig Haney et al., InterpersonalDynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1
INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 (1973); Phillip G. Zimbardo et al., The Mind is a
FormidableJailer:A Pirandellian Prison, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 8, 1973, at 38.
A brief background of the Stanford Prison Experiment is necessary to understand
how it relates to the present discussion. During the experiment, volunteer students were
randomly selected to play an assigned role as either a prisoner or a guard. Haney et al., supra,
at 73. While participants were given little information, guards were left with considerable
discretion to control the prisoners and to ensure prisoners followed the rules. Id. at 74-75.
Within a matter of days, a sharp divide developed between the participants. The participants
identified as guards appeared to have "become sufficiently involved in their roles so that they
now enjoyed the extreme control and power which they exercised and were reluctant to give it
up." Id. at 81. Guards began to redefine prisoner rights as privileges, which had to be earned
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providing correctional officials with unguided discretion may result in
an abuse of power, the development of policies and procedures that
frustrate the rehabilitation process, and "promote aggressive and violent
behavior by correctional personnel.,
239
As discussed above, prison
gangs often engage in various activities that attempt to shift the balance
of power in their favor, with correctional officials constantly struggling
to maintain order. 240 These activities result in correctional officials
enacting policies intended to shift the balance of power in the officials'
favor. 4 1 Such policies, if not properly considered, may result in the
marginalization of prisoners' rights and inhumane treatment of
prisoners, 22442 which thereby increases inmates' mistrust of correctional
officials and pushes them toward prison gangs for protection.2 43 As a
result, while officials intended for the policies to afford correctional
officials more effective control, they may ultimately push some inmates
toward prison gangs and decrease the officials' control.
This further illustrates how the involvement of state legislatures
may strengthen the response to prison gangs. As state legislatures have
the ability to evaluate the necessary requirements to give correctional
officials more control, when necessary, they may increase funding and
staffing to provide correctional officials with the power they need,
without forcing them to resort to abusive tactics. State legislatures can
also pass, or establish a committee to recommend, guidelines for
managing prison gang members and provide correctional officials with
greater guidance, thereby further decreasing the likelihood that officials
will establish abusive polices or procedures.
Finally, legislative involvement is needed to develop programs
beyond the correctional institution, the importance of which cannot be
by obedient behavior. Id. at 94. The most aggressive guards became role models with other
guards soon emulating their behavior. Haney et al., supra, at 94. As a result of the guards'
behavior, some prisoners developed negative attitudes about themselves and the guards. Id. at
86-87. Prisoners responded to the guards' behavior in various ways, including rebellion and
division among the prisoners. Id. at 94-95.
Although the Prison Experiment was a general study that did not concentrate on
prison gang and correctional officials' relations, it provides a pertinent example of the abuses
that may result when power is unevenly divided between opposing groups.
239. Specter, supra note 183, at 127; see also Haney et al., supra note 238, at 93-94.
240. See supra Part III.B.1.
241. See GORDON HAWKINS, THE PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 82-84 (1976).
242. See Specter, supra note 183, at 128-31 (discussing how abuse of power at Abu
Ghraib and Pelican Bay resulted in abuse of prisoner rights).
243. See Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 5 ("In institutions where . . .prisons
routinely violate inmates' civil rights ... it may be understandable that inmates form tips and
cliques to ensure their own physical safety.").
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
overstated.244 As scholars have noted, "no published reports suggest that
prison-based gang suppression and intervention [methods] have the
effect of reducing gang involvement and gang crime in communities
after the release of prison-affiliated inmates., 245 Therefore, "although
correctional [methods] can attempt to reduce the prevalence of gangs
and control their criminal behaviors within [correctional] institutions,
these.., programs need to be supplemented with a corresponding
increase in community-based
gang-intervention programs to support
246
prisoner reentry.,
The realities inmates face after leaving the correctional institution
suggest why correctional-based programs alone fail to offer an effective
solution. Upon release, many inmates return to the community to "face
low wages... and few realistic opportunities to earn [high] wages. 24 7
This results not only from low levels of education and limited job
experiences but also from the stigma associated with being a former
inmate. 248 The stigma makes it particularly difficult for the inmate 249
to
reintegrate into society or to find a meaningful source of employment.
Facing unemployment or low paying jobs, along with "low levels of
244. See Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 44.
245. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 68 (emphasis added).
246. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 44 (emphasis added).
247. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 70.
248. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 125 (2007) (noting that "being convicted
of a crime and sent to prison carries a stigma, and being a criminal can become a person's
master status"); Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 70 ("Former inmates are stigmatized by
their 'ex-con' status, which reinforces the ... notion of them as outsiders .... ).
As a small example of just how strong the stigma conviction and incarceration may
carry, consider the experience of Michael Vick. Once the highest paid player in the National
Football League (NFL), Vick plead guilty to federal dog fighting charges in August 2007.
Judy Battista, N.F.L. Opens Door to Vick, Though Not All the Way, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2009, at B1O; Jerry Markon & Jonathan Mummolo, Vick Pleads Guily, Calls Dogfighting a
'Terrible Thing,' WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at Al. After serving eighteen months in
prison, Vick sought to return to the NFL, only to meet with a strong public outcry against his
return. See, e.g., Les Carpenter & Mark Maske, How Vick Got a Second Chance in NFL;
Quarterback Finds Mentor in Dungy, New Team in Eagles, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2009, at
Al; Michael Vick's NFL Return, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2009, at A13. After the NFL fmally
reinstated him, Vick signed with the Philadelphia Eagles for $1.6 million, a drastic change
from the ten-year, $140 million contract he signed with the Atlanta Falcons prior to his
conviction. Carpenter & Maske, supra; Vick, Eagles Agree to 2-Year Deal, ESPN, Aug. 14,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4397938; Michael Vick Leaves Prison for
Home
Confinement,
CNN,
May
20,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/20/michael.vick/index.html.
249. See CLEAR, supra note 248, at 125-27; Dan Rodricks, Dealing, Gangs, Jail,
Release-Now What?, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 26, 2006, at B I; A Stigma that Never Fades,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, at 40.
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social support,' ' 250 an inmate may feel drawn to a prison gang offering a
paying job in the drug trade or through involvement in other criminal
activity. 251 Therefore, instead of searching for lawful employment, an
inmate may choose to join a prison gang and "within hours
252 or minutes of
corner.,
street
a
on
drugs
selling
be
home..,
returning
In summary, the failure to acknowledge these realities and provide
inmates with services or programs upon release increases the attraction
of joining and remaining a member of a prison gang. Even those prison
gang members willing to undertake the treacherous act of renunciation
will likely reconsider if there are few incentives following release.
Therefore, to discourage prison gang membership more effectively,
legislatures should address these concerns through the establishment of
community-based programs that help inmates reintegrate into society.
VI. IMPLEMENTING SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES
This Part of the Note offers suggestions for correctional officials
and state legislatures, focusing on the additional programs mentioned in
Part IV and the broader community programs mentioned in Part V.
These recommendations, by no means exhaustive, are meant to
underscore some of the more important recommendations.
A. Additional CorrectionalInstitution Programs
As discussed in Part IV, suppressive methods alone have not
proven successful at eliminating prison gangs or reducing the number of
prison gang members, mainly because these programs ignore the
underlying causes of prison gang membership. While eliminating
correctional institution violence and inmate crime would surely diminish
the appeal of the prison gang's alternative form of protection, this is not
a realistic recommendation. Other programs, however, focusing on why
inmates join, remain members of, and choose not to relinquish ties to
prison gangs, may in fact have an impact on an inmate's choice.
250. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 70.
251. See OLSON ET AL., supra note 172, at 5 (finding that after release, "gang members
were more likely that non-gang members to have at least one new arrest for a drug crime");
Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 70; All Things Considered: Gangs Reach Out of Prison to
Commit Crimes, supra note 159.
252. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 66.
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
1. Integration Opportunities
To encourage inmates to renounce prison gang affiliation, the
correctional institution should consider implementing programs that
focus on breaking down the mentality of us versus them created by the
This mentality has resulted particularly from the
prison gang.
organization of prison gangs along racial or ethnic lines, 253 which
25 4
discourages members from interacting with other, non-similar inmates
and creates ongoing feuds that require the "member ...[to] be an active
part of the solution." 25 5 Therefore, breaking down this mentality will
require the correctional institution to implement a program of staged
integration between rival prison gang members, providing them with an
opportunity to interact with one another. The Pendleton Juvenile
Correctional Facility, a maximum-security juvenile corrections facility
in Pendleton, Indiana,256 uses an integration program for juvenile street
gang offenders that could serve as a viable model.25 7
The Pendleton program segregates known juvenile street gang
members from the general population in a separate unit.25 8 Once in
segregation, the Pendleton program works to help members become
acquainted, break down perceived barriers between them, and recognize
253. NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 7; Klein, supra note 18, at 517;
Petersilia, supranote 124, at 234 n.20.
254. For example, the Aryan Brotherhood originated in California's San Quentin prison
during the 1960s as a way to protect Caucasian inmates from attacks by African-American
inmates. See, e.g., Rush, supra note 120, at 348. The Aryan Brotherhood continues to base
membership primarily on race and has been connected with race wars and ordering the deaths
of African American inmates. NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 8, at 28; David
Grann, The Brand; How the Aryan BrotherhoodBecame the Most Murderous Prison Gang in
America, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2004, at 157, 158-59, 171; Ina Jaffe, Aryan Brotherhood
2006,
28,
NPR,
July
Murder,
of
Leaders
Convicted
Other examples of prison
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5591170.
gangs organized along similar lines include the Black Guerilla Family, the Mexican Mafia, La
Neustra Familia, and the Texas Syndicate. Fleisher & Decker, supra note 115, at 4; Rush,
supra note 120, at 345; Florida Department of Corrections, Major Prison Gangs,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/gangs/prison2.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
255.
Campbell, supra note 103, at 36. For example, the Mexican Mafia and La Nuestra
Familia "have a history of violence against each other," id. at 37, which began over forty
years ago with a "confrontation... over an inmate's stolen shoes." Rush, supra note 120, at
345. The Mexican Mafia and the Texas Syndicate have feuded "for control of the illegal
narcotics trade within eight state systems and the Federal Bureau of Prisons." Rush, supra
note 120, at 349.
256. Pendleton Juvenile Correctional Facility, http://www.in.gov/idoc/2431.htm (last
visited Aug. 2, 2010).
257. Lockup: Pendleton Juvenile (MSNBC broadcast Feb. 11, 2008).
258. Id.
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similarities rather than differences. 259 To accomplish this, members
participate in discussion groups and work together in the performance of
various chores.2 60 According to correctional officials, the program has
shown success at increasing peaceful interaction among rival gang
members. 26'
While the Pendleton program deals with juvenile street gang
members, it demonstrates that an integration program has the potential to
break down the mentality of us versus them and facilitate peaceable
relationships between rival gang members. In dealing with prison gang
members in an adult correctional institution, an integration program has
even more potential for success. The increased potential for success
results from the fact that prison gang members often choose to join their
criminal organization while in prison and generally for protection from
other inmates.262 If prison gang members are segregated in a protective
environment with other inmates whom they learn to trust, the need to
remain affiliated with the prison gang for protection greatly decreases.
2. Job Trainingand Education
To discourage inmates from joining a prison gang, the correctional
institution should focus on providing structured job training and
educational opportunities to all inmates. 263 As previously discussed,
prison gangs often serve as a makeshift education for members and a
source of potential employment following release.2 64 By increasing
available job training and educational opportunities, correctional
institutions can eliminate one of the incentives for joining a prison gang.
While many correctional institutions already provide educational
opportunities to inmates in the form of General Educational
Development (GED) programs or vocational training programs,26 5
259.
260.
Id.
Id.
261. Lockup: Pendleton Juvenile, supra note 257.
262. See Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 35 ("The loners ... are vulnerable to being
physical attacked or preyed upon.") (internal quotations omitted); Burton & West, supra note
114 ("Prison gangs are endemic to prison systems, where safety for inmates comes in
numbers.... Prison gang membership affords a certain amount of protection ... ").
263. Christy A. Visher, Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons About
PrisonerReentry, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 93, 96 (2007) (finding that most inmates from a
survey "reported that they needed job training... or more education").
264. All Things Considered: Gangs Reach Out of Prison to Commit Crimes, supra note
159; see supra Part III.B. 1.
265.
See
EMPLOYMENT
AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO WORK: THE
available at
OF
PRISONER
REENTRY
8-9 (2004),
DIMENSIONS
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
studies of these programs suggest that they do not currently offer
significant incentives. For example, GED programs, which prepare
inmates for the GED Exam
266
and provide important social skills for
reintegration, 267
have questionable long-term benefits. A study of the
GED program implemented by the Florida Department of Corrections
found that nearly 10,000 of the 144,000 high school dropouts who
entered a Florida prison between 1992 and 2000 obtained a GED
degree.268 The study concluded, however, that a GED degree did not
provide inmates with any appreciable financial benefit upon release:
It appears that white offenders have little to gain from a prison-based GED
program; there are no statistically significant earnings differences by GED
status ....Meanwhile, minority group members who obtain a GED show
consistently higher post-release earnings than minority dropout offenders with
no prison-based GED-related education in the first two post-release years6an
year.
earnings advantage that consistently falls to near zero after the second
Furthermore, vocational training programs, which teach inmates a
marketable skill similar to a trade school, also suffer from drawbacks.2 7 °
Most vocational training programs focus on training inmates for jobs in
"less-desirable... industries that already have large labor pools" and
use "obsolete or inadequate equipment.", 271 As a result, the correctional
institution "rarely teach [inmates] up-to-date skills, ' 272 which means that
http://www.urbaninstitute.org/UploadedPDF/411097_FromPrison-toWork.pdf.;
John
H.
Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, Prison-BasedEducation and Re-entry into the Mainstream Labor
Market 2 (Princeton U., Working Paper No. 489, 2004), available at
http:/www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/489.pdf (noting that "83 percent of the state
correctional facilities in the U.S. offered 'secondary education programs,' of which the
primary type are GED preparation programs").
266. See Emily Sweeney, Enrolled in a School of Hard Time: In Prison, GED
Preparation Classes are in Great Demand Among Inmates, BOSTON GLOBE, May, 22, 2008,
at 3; Tyler & Kling, supra note 265, at 2. The GED exam "provides adults who did not
complete a formal high school program the opportunity to certify their attainment of high
school-level academic knowledge and skills." GEN. EDUC. DEV. TESTING SERV., GED
TESTING FACT SHEET 1 (2008). The exam covers reading, writing, math, science, and social
studies. Id. The exam consists of multiple-choice questions and essays while taking just over
seven hours to fully complete. Id.
267. Sweeney, supra note 266 ("The more thoughtful the individual is, the more likely
they're going to think about the consequences of their actions before committing the actions.
And that, in the end, will create fewer crimes, fewer victims, fewer people back in jail.").
268. Tyler & Kling, supra note 265, at 3, 8.
269. Id. at 23.
270.
TODD R. CLEAR ET AL., AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 357 (8th ed. 2009).
271.
272.
Id.
Id.
QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW
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273
participants are not likely to earn more money than non-participants.
To provide a stronger incentive, the job training and education
program provided by the correctional institution should mimic the
education offered by the prison gang. In addition, these programs
should provide inmates with a realistic opportunity to achieve
meaningful employment and success upon release. In other words, just
as a prison gang teaches members how to properly conduct themselves
upon release and provides members with knowledge, skills, and
mentors, 27 4 so should the educational program provide these qualities to
the prison gang member.
Accomplishing this will first require strengthening the current
programs offered by correctional institutions. Correctional institutions
need to revamp the vocational training programs to include "specificskill building programs. ' 275 Such programs should teach inmates job
skills beyond "general institutional maintenance jobs, which do not
necessarily help [inmates] develop useful job skills. ' 276 Furthermore,
with society's productivity increasingly relying on technology and more
2 77
industries implementing and updating the technology they employ,
after being disconnected from mainstream society for an extended
period, some inmates may relate to the sentiment of Brooks Hatlen from
The Shawshank Redemption: "I can't believe how fast things move ' 2on
78
the outside.... The world went and got itself in a big damn hurry. ,
Therefore, with these changes making it difficult for inmates to function
in the work environment, the correctional institution should also provide
small training classes and introductions to new technology. 279 Beyond
the correctional institution, there should also be a corresponding increase
273. See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR & GERALD G. GAES, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
PREP: TRAINING INMATES THROUGH INDUSTRIAL WORK PARTICIPATION, AND VOCATIONAL
AND APPRENTICESHIP 19 (1996) ("There were no statistical differences in the average wages
earned between the[] two groups.").
274. See supra II.B.2.
275. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 265, at 21.
276. Id. at276.
277.
See Michael R. Pakko, Investment-Specific Technology Growth: Concepts and
Recent Estimates, REVIEW, Nov. 2002, at 37 (noting that "productivity growth since the mid1990s has been attributed to improvements in technology").
278.
THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Columbia Pictures 1994).
279. See Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 70 (noting that it may be difficult for an
inmate to obtain employment in a highly competitive market with the advance changes in
technology). Consider, for example, the recent growth in self-checks now used in many stores
throughout the United States. Dhruv Grewal et al., Retail Success and Key Drivers, in
RETAILING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS 23 (Manfred Kraffl &
Murali K. Mantrala eds., 2006).
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
1011
in support programs to help inmates find employment following
release.280
This combination-training on the inside and job opportunities on
the outside-creates an educational system similar to that provided by
the prison gang. It in turn offers inmates a more realistic choice than the
current programs.
3. Tattoo Removal System
To assist inmates who ultimately renounce prison gang
membership, the correctional institution should provide a tattoo removal
program. Tattoos serve an important role in the prison gang subculture,
as they represent "[t]he gang ethos of 'blood in, blood out'-the idea
that the prospective member must kill someone as the price of admission
to the gang and cannot leave except by dying himself' and embody the
sign "of permanent belonging to the gang., 281 A prison gang member
who wears a tattoo thus signifies his association with and loyalty to a
particular prison gang.
Once the inmate decides to quit the prison gang, however, the tattoo
becomes more of a Scarlett letter.282 For instance, because prison gangs
generally consider renunciation punishable by death, the tattoo then
becomes a target for other members and a constant reminder of the
Additionally, following release from
member's abandonment.2 83
incarceration, prison gang tattoos further the stigma associated with
incarceration and make it increasingly difficult for the former gang
member to obtain a job.284 Unless removed, prison gang tattoos have the
potential to "crush[] a former gang member's hope of finding a job or
forging a new life" after renouncing membership.285
Providing prison gang members with the opportunity to have
280. The community-based programs are discussed in the next section.
Signs of Belonging and the Transience of Signs,
281. Gang Tattoos:
http://www.linagoldberg.com/gangtattoos/ (last visited on Aug. 2, 2010).
282. See Alicia T. Rozycki, Prison Tattoos as a Reflection of the Criminal Lifestyle and
Predictor of Recidivism 169 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University) (on file
http://etd.lib.ttu.edu/theses/available/etd- 11012007author),
available at
with
082837/unrestricted/RozyckiAliciaDiss.pdf ("Those who acquire gang tattoos, in particular,
may struggle with rehabilitation, even if they are no longer a gang member.").
283. See Gangland: Aryan Brotherhood (History Channel broadcast Nov. 1, 2007);
Lockup: Return to PelicanBay (MSNBC broadcast Nov. 19, 2005).
284. Janice Podsada, Gang Members' Tattoos can be Lifelong Shackles; Doctor Aids
Those Wanting Clean Slate, Skin, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 7, 1995, at B1;
Rozycki, supra note 282, at 169.
285.
Podsada, supra note 284.
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tattoos removed offers an additional incentive to renounce gang
membership. Tattoo removal programs, which "are basically nonexistent in American adult correction[al] [institutions] today," would
allow a prison gang member, who wants to leave the gang and start a
new life, the opportunity to have indentifying marks of association
removed in a safe way286 without forcing the inmate to consider
dangerous removal methods.2 87 In addition to being beneficial, the
system may also be economically feasible to the correctional institution
' 288
since "[p]hysicians often volunteer for this kind of work, pro bono.
4. Potentialfor Success?
While many correctional institutions do not currently supplement
suppressive methods with additional programs, a small number of
correctional institutions do. 289 Correctional institutions experimenting
with additional programs have implemented various types of programs,
including integration and counseling, and most have shown an overall
reduction in gang membership and a lowered recidivism rate among
participants. 290
For example, the Connecticut Department of Correction has
developed the Close Custody Program, a mixture of suppressive
methods and additional programs, which encourages inmates to
renounce membership with a Security Risk Group. 291 To accomplish
this goal, the Close Custody Program uses segregation along with a
three-phrase rehabilitationprogram that holds inmates accountable for
their actions and teaches them "coping skills" to reintegrate with the
general inmate population and society.292 So far, the program has
proven successful. Of the more than 5200 participants, 92% have
completed the program without becoming "re-involved with a prison
286.
KNOX, supra note 8.
287. Rozycki, supra note 282, at 169 ("Some [former prison gang members] may be so
eager to remove these tattoos that they resort to becoming amateur surgeons themselves using
painful and potentially hazardous means.
288. KNOX, supra note 8.
289. See id. (finding that "the vast majority" of correctional institutions (84.3%) do not
have "any special programs to help their inmates quit gang life").
290. See Specter, supra note 183, at 126-31; Forsythe, supra note 14, at 9.
291.
NORTHERN CORR. INST., CLOSE CUSTODY PROGRAM-SECURITY RISK GROUP
THREAT
MEMBER
7-9
SAFETY
http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/pdf/northemascc.pdf.
292.
Id. at 7.
(2008),
available
at
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
Security Risk Group either once released or while still incarcerated. 2 93
Similarly, the New Jersey Department of Corrections operates the
Security Threat Group Management Unit (STGMU) program.294 The
three-phase STGMU program requires gang-affiliated inmates "to
participate in programs ...[that teach them] alternatives to violent
behavior, cognitive development and non-violent living" and to
"renounce their Security Threat Group affiliation (i.e., gang
membership). 29 5 While the overall success of this program has not
been fully studied, correctional officials have reported that gang-related
violence within the correctional institution has declined.296
These programs demonstrate that the incorporation of additional
programs into the correctional institution's management of prison gangs
addresses the prison gang problem more effectively than suppressive
methods alone. The introduction of such programs will require
appropriate staffing, funding, and planning, and, consequently, will
require correctional institutions to work closely with the state legislature
to address these areas. The programs introduced in Connecticut and
New Jersey along with the additional suggestions here should be further
studied and refined to meet each state's unique needs.297
B. UndertakingEfforts Beyond the CorrectionalInstitution
As mentioned at the outset, the establishment of successful
programs in the correctional institution, while important, should be
supplemented with community-based programs that help inmates, and
more specifically former prison gang members, reintegrate into
society.2 98 As with correction-based programs, community-based
programs need to focus on the underlying causes of prison gang
membership.
of
Correction,
Recidivism,
293. Connecticut
Department
http://www.ct.gov/doc/cwp/view.asp?a=1492&Q=305970&doc (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
294. RICHARD GREENBERG, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, DO No HARM: A BRIEFING
PAPER ON THE REENTRY OF GANG-AFFILIATED INDIVIDUALS IN NEW JERSEY 8 (2007),
availableat http://www.njisj.org/documents/DoNoHarmAugust2007.pdf.
295.
296.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 10.
297. One of the most notable weaknesses involves returning prison gang members who
renounce membership to the general population.
298. Ruddell et al., supra note 14, at 44.
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1. IncreasingEmployability and Employment Opportunities
To reduce the attraction of joining a prison gang to secure
employment, state legislatures need to consider implementing programs
that address the reasons inmates cannot secure meaningful, lawful
employment following release.299 One of the major reasons that an
inmate may have trouble securing legal employment concerns the
"serious medical, mental health, and substance abuse problems" that
personally affect the inmate. 300 As studies have shown, "a significant
proportion of state prisoners" suffer from these problems, which in turn
"limit[s] their readiness or ability to participate in the labor market. 3 1
Furthermore, these problems have been shown to interfere with the
inmate's ability to participate in "productive, prosocial activities.' 30
2
Therefore, if inmates are "released into environments that are illprepared to support a positive transition and full of risks and
likely "to continue their involvement with
challenges," these inmates are
' 30 3
the criminal justice system."
To address these serious problems, then, the state legislature should
establish or fund community-based programs 30 4 that continue the
rehabilitative services initially provided to the inmate during
incarceration. 30 5 Such programs should focus on the individual needs of
each inmate by providing "a range of programs and interventions [that]
can be drawn upon as needed ...
with the types of services delivered
299. See JOAN PETERSILIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHEN PRISONERS RETURN TO THE
COMMUNITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 3 (2000) ("The majority
of inmates leave prison with ... few job prospects. One year after release, as many as 60
percent of former inmates are not employed in the legitimate labor market."); Fleisher &
Decker, supra note 7, at 72; Visher, supra note 263, at 96 ("Finding employment is the single
largest concern reported by men and women before they are released from prison.").
300. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 265, at 10-11.
301. Id.; see Visher, supra note 263, at 95-96.
302. SOLOMON ET AL., .supranote 265, at 11.
303. Id. at 1.
304. See Visher, supra note 263, at 96 ("Unfortunately, most state correctional systems
are not able to provide the level of treatment or diversity of services that prisoners need
because of lack of resources and difficulty in convincing [state] legislators to fund programs
and services for prisoners.").
305. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, DRUG TREATMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2001) (finding that
"[a]pproximately 73% of local jails provide drug treatment or programs, with 32.1%
providing detoxification, 29.6% providing drug education, and 63.7% providing self-help
programs"). But see Visher, supra note 263, at 95 ("Despite high levels of drug use, half or
fewer [inmates] receive drug treatment while incarcerated.").
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
dictated by a case plan" that is developed for each inmate. 30 6 As studies
have demonstrated, where initiatives are taken to treat inmates for these
problems, both during and after incarceration, a major reduction in
recidivism rates and, consequently, an ability to reintegrate into society
results. 307
Another reason an inmate may have trouble securing legal
employment following release is that the inmate lacks marketable skills
or was unemployed prior to incarceration.30 8 Furthermore, the inmate's
"status as a former prisoner," a stigma beyond the inmate's immediate
control, may "cause[] concerns among potential employers" who then
show reluctance to hire former inmates. 30 9 Therefore, to address these
problems, state legislatures need to establish employment programs that
further the opportunities initially created within the correctional
institution to "increas[e] the attractiveness of former [inmates] to
potential employers," and "reduc[e] the costs.., absorbed by employers
hiring former [inmates]. ' 3 10
To make former inmates more attractive to employers, the state
legislature should establish community-based programs to work in
conjunction with the job training and education programs implemented
in the correctional institution. These programs should aim to
improve[] former [inmates'] self-presentation skills through interview
rehearsal and resume preparation ... increas[e] their reliability through job
readiness programs and apprenticeship arrangements . . [and] alleviat[e] some
of the logistical challenges that interfere with the ability to hold a job through
[the] provision of concrete supports such as transportation, child care, and
housing assistance. 311
These programs provide inmates with the skills they will need, in
addition to job training, to realistically attract the attention of potential
employers.
306. Visher, supra note 263, at 96.
307. See id.; American Psychological Association, Inmate Drug Abuse Treatment Slows
Prison's Revolving Door (Mar. 23, 2004), http://www.apa.org/research/action/aftercare.aspx.
308.
See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 265, at 9 (finding that "21 and 38 percent of
[inmates are] . . . unemployed just prior to being incarcerated"); Fleisher & Decker, supra
note 7, at 70 (noting that many inmates "entered prison with poor work skills, little education,
and alienated from high-paying employment").
309.
SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 265, at 13; see also Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7,
at 70 (noting that many inmates "entered prison with poor work skills, little education, and
alienated from high-paying employment").
310.
SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 265, at 21.
311.
Id.
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To increase the incentive for employers to hire former inmates,
programs should be established to "screen[] potential employees to
ensure suitability, provid[e] supervision and case management 3of12
employees, and leverag[e] wage supplements or subsidized bonds."
This reduces the costs incurred by employers in hiring former inmates
and makes such hiring more beneficial for the employer.
By increasing the inmate's employability and the employment
opportunities available, these programs reduce stresses that could
potentially lead an inmate to seek out a prison gang for employment.
Inmates who have a realistic opportunity of securing legal employment
may be willing to change their behavior and avoid "people and situations
that could get them into trouble," including a prison gang. 313
2. Improving Support Systems in the Community
An inmate returning to the community following incarceration
often faces many of the same problems and temptations that the inmate
faced prior to incarceration,3 14 as well as new ones, including family
troubles.3 15 In addition, the inmate often lacks a social support system to
encourage the inmate to refrain from engaging in illegal activities. 3 16 As
a result, the inmate may quickly revert to old habits and reengage 3in
17
illegal activities, especially if the inmate is a gang member.
Therefore, facing reincarceration, an inmate has a strong incentive to
join a prison gang for support upon reentry to the correctional institution.
In recognition of these realities, and to discourage prison gang
affiliation, legislatures need to broaden community-based programs
beyond the individual inmate to include the inmate's family and the
community to which the inmate will eventually return. Such programs
would need to include mentoring services that "provide support for new
behaviors and attitudes" to encourage the inmate to engage in socially
beneficial behavior rather than illegal activities. 318 In addition, as many
inmates are likely to live with family members immediately following
312.
Id.
313.
314.
315.
Visher, supra note 263, at 97.
Fleisher & Decker, supra note 7, at 70.
See, e.g., CLEAR ET AL., supra note 270, at 308; CHRISTY VISHER ET AL.,
CLEVELAND STAKEHOLDERS' PERCEPTION OF PRISONER REENTRY 1-4 (2007).
316. See Visher, supra note 263, at 97 (noting that inmates "disproportionately return to
neighborhoods with few.., role models").
317. See generally, e.g., OLSON ET AL., supra note 172.
318. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., REENTRY: HELPING FORMER PRISONERS RETURN TO
COMMUNITIES 43 (2005).
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PRISON GANG MANAGEMENT
release, the family members may face anxiety and stress related to the
increased financial burden. 31 9 To help alleviate these family problems,
programs are needed to provide family members with "assistance of
their own to help support individuals who are returning from prison and
looking to them for financial and other assistance., 320 Finally, efforts
are also needed to encourage other community organizations to work
with inmates and provide them with a strong social support system from
the community as a whole.
By improving support systems in the community, state legislatures
will provide prison gang members with an additional incentive to
renounce gang ties. An inmate who believes that his family and
community will fully support him upon return has a greater incentive to
renounce detrimental affiliations. Moreover, if the inmate believes that
he has a realistic opportunity for success, and thus a decreased likelihood
of returning to the correctional institution, he has less need to remain
affiliated with a prison gang that primarily provides protection to
members during incarceration.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prison gangs have developed into a dominant presence in
To the
correctional institutions throughout the United States.
correctional institutions, these groups represent a continuous threat to the
safety of correctional officials and other inmates as well as a source of
much of the illegal activities occurring within the institution. To the
community, these groups represent the cause of much of the drug
problem plaguing the community as well as a potential cause of other
dangerous, illegal activities. For the individual prison gang member,
however, these groups represent a source of security as well as a
potential future employer.
Thus far, correctional institutions have been entrusted with the
responsibility of responding to the concerns of the correctional
institution and community. The correctional institutions' response has
focused almost exclusively on suppressing prison gang activities and
making it more difficult for prison gang members to interact. While the
success of these efforts to reduce prison gang violence remains
questionable, these efforts have not proven successful at eliminating
prison gangs or reducing prison gang membership. As a result, with
319.
320.
Visher, supra note 263, at 97-98.
Id. at 98.
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LAW REVIEW
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prison gangs continuing to operate, both within the correctional
institution and the community, the concerns of the correctional
institution and society have not been alleviated.
As this Note has demonstrated, to alleviate the concerns of the
correctional institution and society more effectively, both the
correctional institution and the state legislature need to take additional
steps. These additional steps must focus on what has been largely
overlooked with the use of suppressive methods; namely, the elimination
of prison gangs by encouraging inmates to either renounce prison gang
membership or forego it altogether.
Offering inmates such encouragement will require both the
correctional institution and the state legislature to implement programs
that address the underlying causes of prison gang membership. While
the strongest underlying cause of prison gang membership--fear for
inmate safety-cannot be easily addressed, other remote causes lend
themselves to being more easily addressed. It is to these causes that the
correctional institution and the state legislature need to shift focus.
A legislative-correction based response requires dealing with the
prison gang problem on multiple levels: inside and outside of the
correctional institution. Within the correctional institution, programs
need to go beyond punishing prison gang members and instead offer the
gang member an opportunity, as well as a reason, to renounce or forego
prison gang membership. Beyond the correctional institution, programs
must respond to the challenges prison gang members face upon release
that may heavily influence any decision to join, or remain a member of,
a prison gang.
The reality remains that the struggle against prison gangs cannot be
remedied overnight and no single approach will work effectively in
every setting. Yet, as the approaches currently implemented have not
proven successful at alleviating the concerns of the correctional
institution and community, the opportunity to experiment with a new
response to prison gangs presents itself. A response that is more mindful
of the desires of the correctional institution, the community, and the
inmate who faces the choice of joining or foregoing affiliation with the
source of concern is needed.
By: Sean E. Boyd*
* J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Marshall University, May
2007.