American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference
Author(s): Noel H. Pugach
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jun., 1977), pp. 67-86
Published by: Organization of American Historians
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1888274 .
Accessed: 10/03/2012 00:14
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Organization of American Historians is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Journal of American History.
http://www.jstor.org
American
Friendsh4
forChinaandthe
Shantung
Question
at the
Washington
Conference
NOEL
H.
PUGACH
IOLLOWING the Paris Peace conference,the ShantungdisputebetweenJapanand China disturbed
worldleaderswho soughtto stabilize
international
relationsin theFar East and to developgreatercooperation
amongthe industrial
powers.Secretary
of StateCharlesEvans Hughes
triedinitiallyto isolate the Shantungissue fromthe othercomplex
diplomaticquestionsand to settlethe matterpriorto the Washington
conference.
This provedto be impossible.Hugheswas onlytechnically
correctin maintaining
thatthe "Shantungsettlement
lay outsidethe
Conference"and he lateradmitted
that"the successoftheConference
hung upon this settlement."'Hughes had also favoreddirectSinoJapanesenegotiations
witha minimumofUnitedStatesinvolvement.
It
was, therefore,
ironicthatthestatedepartment,
and especiallyHughes,
subsequentlyassumed a major role in resolvingthe disagreement.
Severalscholarshave notedthis,2buttheyhave notseen that,contrary
to Hughes' expectations,
Americanfriendship
forChinaexertedsignificantinfluence
on theactualtermsofthesettlement.
During the past two decades,historicalscholarshiphas tendedto
assailthepopularimageoftheUnitedStatesas thespecialbenefactor
of
Chinaand ardentdefender
oftheOpen Door. As partoftheircriticalexaminationof the mythsassociatedwithAmericaninvolvement
in the
Far East, scholarshave pointedout thatthe UnitedStatesgenerallyignoredthe China market,actuallycooperatedwiththe otherimperial
powersin despoilingChina, and acquiescedin numerousassaultson
Chinesesovereignty
and self-determination.
Their analysisprovidesa
Noel H. Pugachis assistantprofessor
ofhistoryin the University
ofNew Mexico. Researchfor
thisarticlewas partially
supportedby a travelgrantfromthe ResearchAllocationsCommittee
of
theUniversity
ofNew Mexico.
' Quoted in BettyGlad, CharlesEvans Hughes and the Illusionsof Innocence:A Studyin
AmericanDiplomacy(Urbana,1966), 293.
2 Thomas H.
Buckley, The United States and the WashingtonConference,1921-1922
(Knoxville,1970), 157-65; RussellH. Fifield,"SecretaryHughes and the ShantungQuestion,"
PacificHistoricalReview,XXIII (Nov. 1954), 373-85; Glad,CharlesEvansHughes,292-94.
67
68
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
usefulcorrectiveto the traditionalist
interpretation
of Sino-American
relations.3
And yet,it would be a mistaketo dismissAmericanfriendship
for
China as futilerhetoric,sheer hypocrisy,
naive idealism,or romantic
Sinophilism.For United States policy makersamitywas rooted in
Americanself-interest
as well as idealism.The pro-Chinese
elementin
the Departmentof State consideredAmericanfriendship
a valuable
diplomaticassetthathad to be cultivated.Paul S. Reinsch.EdwardT.
Williams,and othersarguedthatcontinuedChineseconfidencewould
enable the UnitedStatesto asserteconomicand politicalprimacyin
Asia, encouragethe development
of democracyand modernization
in
China,andcontainJapaneseand Europeanaggression.4
This viewwas sharedbypolicymakerswho weremorerestrained
in
theirenthusiasmforChinaor who refusedto choosesidesin Asia. For
example,minister
JacobGould Schurman,upon presenting
his credentialsto thepresident
ofChinain September1921, stressedthehistory
of
goodwilland justicethathad governedSino-American
relations.Schurman believedthathe truthfully
describedAmericanpolicyand feltthat
the Chinesehad to be remindedof it, becausePekingwas reluctantto
givefullrecognition
and supportto theFederalWirelessCompanycontract.5John V. A. MacMurray,who pridedhimselfon his toughmindedoutlookand warnedof the dangersof appearingto be antiJapanese,agreedthattheUnitedStatesand Chinahad parallelinterests.
"Our policiesdo runalongwithChina's good,and theyhave beenopposed by Japan:and in thatsense we are committed
to a pro-Chinese
policy," he noted;"But we are not pro-or anti-anybody
or anything,
JWarren1. Cohen,America'sResponseto
China:An Interpretative
HistoryofSino-American
Relations(New York, 1971); John K. Fairbank," 'American China Policy' to 1898: A
Misconception,"PacificHistoricalReview,XXXIX (Nov. 1970), 409-20; Tang Tsou, America's
Failurein China,1941-1950(Chicago,1963); Paul A. Varg, The Makingofa Myth:The United
Statesand China, 1897-1912 (East Lansing,1968); WilliamApplemanWilliams,"China and
Japan:A Challengeand a Choice of the NineteenTwenties,"PacificHistoricalReview,XXVI
(Aug. 1957), 259-79; MarilynBlatt Young, The Rhetoricof Empire:AmericanChina Policy
1895-1901(Cambridge,
1969).
Paul S. Reinsch,An AmericanDiplomatin China (GardenCity,N. Y., 1922); EdwardT.
Williamsto RobertLansing,April 13, 1918, Breckinridge
Long Papers(ManuscriptDivision,
Library
ofCongress).
' JacobG. Schurmanto CharlesEvans Hughes,Sept. 13, 1921, JacobGould SchurmanPapers
(CornellUniversity
Library,
Ithaca,N.Y.). In 1918, theChinesegovernment
had signeda contract
withthe FederalWirelessCompanyof San Franciscoto constructradiostationsin severalcities.
Oppositionfromotherforeignpowersand protestsby the Marconi Companythat the Federal
WirelessCompanyhad infringed
on itspatentrightsdelayedtheimplementation
oftheagreement.
The statedepartment
vigorouslysupportedthe FederalWirelessCompanycontractin orderto
protectAmericaneconomicinterests
and the securityofAmericancommunications
in the Pacific
and Far East.
4
American
Friendship
69
save as our own principlesand policiesare securedor injured."6The
in turn,thenotionofSino-American
Chineseencouraged,
in
friendship
orderto obtaindisinterested
or nonpolitical
assistanceand to thwartthe
"barbarians"threatening
China'sexistence.'
The settlement
of the Shantungquestionat the Washingtonconferencedemonstrates
that,withinthe constraints
of America'soverall
objectives,Americanfriendship
for China did shape officialUnited
Statespolicy.Hughes limitedthe extentof Americanintervention
on
behalfofChinaand categorically
ruledout theuse ofmilitary
force.Nor
did thesecretary's
pro-Chinese
advisersentertain
thethoughtofresorting to military
pressure.8
Still,thatpeculiarconcernwithdoingjustice
to ChinawhileservingAmericaninterests
produceda farmorefavorable
settlementfor China then had earlierseemed possible.Against the
backdrop
ofwidespread
publicsympathy
fortheChinese,China'sfriends
in thestatedepartment
playedan important
rolein determining
theoutcomeoftheShantungissue.
The UnitedStateshad reluctantly
acquiescedin theJapaneseseizure
ofShantungin 1914 andthetemporary
transfer
ofGermanrightsin the
provinceto Japanin 1915. Reinsch,the ardently
pro-Chinese
minister
to Peking duringmost of the Wilson administration,
and the other
friendsof China grudgingly
acceptedthe realityof wartimeexigencies.
But they looked to the postwarconferenceto restoreShantungto
China.9Theywereto be sadlydisappointed.
Japanesedelegatescame to Versailleswith not only secretAllied
pledgesof supportforJapan'sclaimsbutalso a treatywiththecorrupt
militarist
regimein Peking,signedin September1918, forthepurpose
of developing
the ShantungRailwayas a jointSino-Japanese
enterprise.
Nevertheless,the friendsof China counted on sympatheticworld
opinionand WoodrowWilson's moralleadershipto rescuethe Chinese
and to wrestShantungfromJapan.Leavingnothingto
government
chance,Reinschand the Far Easternadvisersat the Paris conference
repeatedly
warnedthe Presidentof the need to returnthe Shantung
Railwayand economiccontrolin theprovinceto China. "To disappoint
6 JohnV. A. MacMurray,note [Aug. 1921], JohnV. A. MacMurrayPapers (Princeton
University
Library,
Princeton,
N.J.).
' Forexample,see Young,Rhetoric
ofEmpire,12, 81, 231.
8 CharlesE. Hughes, "MemorandumforMr. MacMurray," Jan. 26, 1922, 793.94/1265,
GeneralRecordsofthe Department
ofState,RG 59 (NationalArchives);Merlo J. Pusey,Charles
EvansHughes(2 vols.,New York,1951), II, 505-06.
9 Reinsch,
An AmericanDiplomatin China,123-49. Forthegeneralbackground,
see RussellH.
Fifield,WoodrowWilsonand the Far East: The Diplomacyof the ShantungQuestion(Hamden,
Conn.,1965).
70
The Journalof AmericanHistory
herwillmeanirreparable
injuryto our goodnamein theFAR EAST,"
Williamsadvisedthe Americanpeace delegation.GeneralTaskerBliss,
speakingalso forRobertLansingand HenryWhite,toldWilson:"If we
supportJapan's claims,we abandonthe democracyof China to the
domination of the Prussianized, militarismof Japan.... We shall be
sowing dragon's teeth.... Peace is desirable, but there are things
dearerthan peace-justice and freedom."10In spiteof these appeals,
Wilsonrespondedto otherfactors:the pressureof the Allies, the fear
that Japan would withdrawfromthe conference,and his own rationalization
thatthe League of Nationswould rightthe matterin the
end. The Treatyof VersaillesawardedJapanall former
Germanrights
and preferences
in Shantung,includingthe railway,in returnfora
promiseto restorethe leaseholdof Kiaochowto China undercertain
conditions.
l
Seriousconsequencesfollowed.The stunnedChinesedelegationrefusedto signthe peace treaty,and Chineseresentment
and nationalism
explodedin the May FourthMovement.Wilson's abandonmentof
Chinaand his disavowaloftheAmericanminister'sassurancesbrought
in June 1919. "Ashamed to look a Chinesein
Reinsch'sresignation
the face," WilliamshastilyleftParis. Withoutconcealingtheiranger,
Reinsch,Lansing,and StanleyK. Hornbeck-a technicaladviser-insistedthatWilsonask Japanforguaranteesthatit wouldrestoreShanwhentheJapanesedemurred,
was
tungtoChina.The President,
chagrined
denounced
dealta farheavierblowwhenthepublicandCongressseverely
factorin theSenate's
theShantungdecision,whichbecamean important
rejectionof the Versaillessettlement."2The San FranciscoChronicle,a
Republicannewspaperand a frequent
advocateof close economicrelationswithJapan,editorialized:
"The Presidentdoes not seem to us to
0
Paul S. Reinschto Lansing,Dec. 12, 1918, 893.77/1696, GeneralRecordsoftheDepartment
ofState;E. T. Williamsto Lansing,Jan. 28, 1919, E. T. Williamsmemo,April9, 1919, E. T.
Williamsto WoodrowWilson,April24, 1919, TaskerBliss to Wilson,April30, 1919, Edward
T. WilliamsPapers(University
ofCalifornia,
Berkeley);E. T. Williamsto Breckinridge
Long,May
5, 1919, LongPapers.
E. T. Williamsto Long,May 5, 1919, Long Papers;Thomas Millardto Reinsch,June23,
1919, Paul S. Reinsch Papers (WisconsinState HistoricalSociety,Madison); MacMurray,
memorandum
on Shantung,July21, 1919, MacMurrayPapers.
2 Reinschto Wilson,June 7, 1919, 123.R271/101, General Recordsof the Department
of
State;Reinschto Lansing,July24, 1919, Reinschto Wilson,Sept. 5, 1919 (probablyneitherwas
sent),ReinschPapers;E. T. Williamsto Long,May 5, 1919, LongPapers;StanleyK. Hornbeckto
Wilsonand Lansing,May 27, 1919, StanleyK. HornbeckPapers(Hoover Institution
on War,
Revolution,and Peace, StanfordUniversity,Stanford);Hornbeckto Wilson, June 5, 1919,
ibid.; Hornbeck,"OutstandingQuestionsRelatingto Far EasternAffairs,"July24, 1919, Frank
Polk Papers(Yale UniversityLibrary,New Haven); Wilson to Lansing,June 20, 1919, ibid.;
Lansingto Baron NobuakiMakino,June28, 1919, ibid.; EdwardHouse Diary,Aug. 7, 1919,
EdwardHouse Papers(Yale University
Library).
American
Friendship
71
statethe real issue. It is a moralissue. It is not assumedthatin the
futureany more than in the past we shall go swashbuckling
about
righting
all wrongsin theworld.The objectionmadeis thatwe should
notbecomea formalguaranteeing
partyto whatthePresident
intimates
andunofficial
personsassertis an abominable
villainy."13
WithShantungalreadyin itspossession,Japaneseofficials
pressedthe
Chinese government
to enterinto bilateralnegotiations.They were
eager to validatethe Versaillesaward and arrangeforthe returnof
Kiaochowto China. The tottering
Pekingregimerefusedtheseovertures;it talkedinsteadof takingthe matterto the League of Nations.
in theUnitedStateswereineffective
because
Meanwhile,China'sfriends
oftheextendeddebateand eventualrejectionbytheSenateofthepeace
14
treaty.
Americanleaders,however,recognizedthata quick and just resolution of the Shantungissue was a necessarypreludeto comprehensive
ofFar Easternproblems.Schurman,who was notconsidered
settlement
a Sinophile,statedbluntlyduringhis visitto Japanin 1920 that"the
wayto restoreShantungwas to restoreit and thesoonerthiswas done,
on publicsentiment
in theUnitedStates."
thebetterwouldbe theeffect
He didnotspelloutthetermsoftherestoration,
butin thecourseofthe
Senate's consideration
of his nominationas ministerto Pekingin the
of his inspringof 1921 he againremindedSenatorJamesWadsworth
transfer
ofShantungto China.'5
sistenceupontheimmediate
The summoning
of the Conference
on the Limitation
of Armaments
in July1921 and the inclusionofFar Easternquestionson the agenda
highlighted
the Shantungissue. It emergedas "probablythe mostimportantFar Easternquestionthatcalledforsolutionin 1921." To preventChinafromraisingthequestionat theWashington
conference,
the
Japaneseambassador,Kijuro Shidehara,asked Hughes to urge the
Chineseto enterintobilateraltalks.Hughes,attempting
to getJapanto
on theagenda,expressed
attendtheconference
withoutprioragreement
himself.But he explicitly
interestin the proposalwithoutcommitting
statedthatbeforeextendingits good officesthe UnitedStatesmustbe
San FranciscoChronicle,
Sept.20, 1919.
Department
ofState,ForeignRelationsofthe UnitedStates1920 (3 vols.,Washington,
1935),
I, 814; BainbridgeColbyto CharlesTenney,April8, 1920, 793.94/1082a, GeneralRecordsof
ofState;Tenneyto Colby,April14, 1920, 793.94/1083,ibid.;RolandMorristo
theDepartment
Colby,April 23, 1920, 793.94/1084, ibid.; Tenneyto Colby,June1, 1920, 793.94/1088 and
793.94/1091,ibid.
15 Report
on a luncheongivenbytheCouncilon ForeignRelations,July14, 1920, FredRogers
to MacMurray,Aug. 10, 1920, MacMurrayPapers;Schurmanto Sen. JamesWadsworth,
May
16, 21, 1921, ArthurJ.Brownto WarrenG. Harding,April14, 1921, SchurmanPapers.
13
14
72
History
ofAmerican
The Journal
a fair
and mustbe assuredthatJapanwouldoffer
givenfullinformation
fromhis conversations
ofaffairs
Sensingthedrift
and liberalsettlement.
to the
AlfredSze, the Chineseminister
officials,
withstatedepartment
16
UnitedStates,suggestedthatHughesmediatetheconflict.
Sze and Schurman
Hugheswas notanxiousto mediate.He informed
in disposingoftheissue,
interested
thattheUnitedStateswas primarily
of the impasseat Paris,and thatit
thatit wishedto avoid a repetition
could not act as an advocateforeitherChinaor Japan.In fact,Hughes
to China nor hopefulof a settlesympathetic
was neitherparticularly
ofstatebelievedthattheChinese
to China.The secretary
mentfavorable
had prejudicedtheircase by signingthe 1915 and 1918 agreements
annoyedwithChinese
concerningShantung.He was also increasingly
American
all ofwhichthreatened
disorganization,
politicaland financial
When,at the last minute,Peking
loans and futureeconomicinfluence.
defaultedon a loan fromthe Continentaland CommercialTrust and
SavingsBank, Hughes angrilydirectedSchurmanto warnthe Chinese
stepsto remedythesituation,America
thatunlesstheytookimmediate
period.This
wouldclose its moneymarketsto China foran indefinite
and responsibility
ofsucha lackofauthority
would"createa conviction
...
as cannot but affectmost adversely the position of China at the
conference."Hughes, moreover,was sensitiveto the
forthcoming
degreeof pressurethatcould be appliedto the Japanese.In conversationswithhis advisers,Hughes stressedthe need fora genuinecompromiseand expressedhis own viewthatJapanshouldbe givena share
in therailway.
But therewas anotherside. Hughes realizedthatresolvingthe Shanhissuccessin bringtungmatteras wellas otherissueswoulddetermine
with
a generalaccommodation
ing stabilityto the Far East, effecting
formulated
Japan,and testingJapan'swillingnessto acceptAmerican
in China. Moreover,his desireto restore
groundrulesforcompetition
orderand unityto China, to set the consortiumin operation,and to
secureChinesecompliancewiththewishesoftheFederalWirelessComin
of Americangood willand influence
the retention
panynecessitated
China. Hughes also understoodthat the Senate's approvalof the
woulddependon a successfulresolutionof the
conference
Washington
of State, ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1921 (2 vols., Washington,
1 Department
withAlfredSze," Aug. 13,
1936), 1, 613-17; MacMurray,"Memorandumon a Conversation
1921, 500.A4/128, GeneralRecordsof the Departmentof State; HenryBeerits,"Far Eastern
Questions: The WashingtonConference,"Charles E. Hughes Papers (ManuscriptDivision,
ofCongress);E. T. WilliamsDiary,Aug. 11, 1921, WilliamsPapers;Buckley,The United
Library
159-60.
Conference,
Statesandthe Washington
American
Friendship
73
Shantungquestion.Americanpublic opiniondemandeda settlement
to China.17
thatat leastappearedto be favorable
Hughes whenthe Japaneserevealedtheir
These realitiesconfronted
on September8, 1921.18 Althoughtheymade
termsforsettlement
some concessionsin otherareas,the Japanesestillinsistedupon joint
ownershipand operationof the Shantungrailroadand minesas wellas
continuedJapanesepolicingoftherailway.
Seizingon Hughes' requestfora detailedanalysisoftheJapaneseproexpertsnow joinedhandsto opposeHughes'
posals,statedepartment
MacMurray,head Qfthe Far
positionand to revealJapaneseduplicity.
concernedwiththedefenseofAmerican
EasternDivision,was primarily
ofthebalanceofpower.The two
and therestoration
rightsand interests
majortechnicaladvisersin theAmericandelegationto theWashington
conference,however,also had deep emotionalattachmentsto the
at theUniverChinesecause. Williams,on leave fromhis professorship
and
and Hornbeck,a politicalscientist sometimeadsityof California,
nursedbittermemoriesof the American
viserto the statedepartment,
and
betrayalat Paris. They remainedsuspiciousofJapaneseintentions
of Shantungto
methods,and theymaintainedthata totalrestoration
of
Chinawas required,bothas a matterofjusticeand fortheprotection
in China.19
interests
America'slong-range
of September10, and Hornbeck'sof SepWilliams' memorandum
dissected
carefully
tember15, to whichMacMurrayattachedcomments,
HughesofWilson'serror-ignoring
theJapaneseproposals.Reminding
the significance
of Japaneseeconomicrights-Hornbeckstated:"The
thepearlofthewholematteris
kernel,themeat,thepiee de resistance,
the railway.... Give Japan the ShantungRailway and you give her the
Better yield
instrument for recovering all that she gives up....
than yield the railway." All threeadvisersinsistedthat
everything
17 Beerits,
"Far EasternQuestions,"HughesPapers;E. T. WilliamsDiary,Aug. 1, 13, 1921,
WilliamsPapers; Departmentof State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1921, 1, 621;
Buckley,The UnitedStates and the WashingtonConference,159-61; Glad, CharlesEvans
Hughes, 292-94; Fifield,"SecretaryHughes and the ShantungQuestion," 373-75; William
ApplemanWilliams,"China and Japan,"263-64.
of a conversationbetweenHughes and Kijuro Shidehara,Sept. 8, 1921,
18 Memorandum
793.94/1316, GeneralRecordsof the Departmentof State; Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions,"
HughesPapers.
19 MacMurray
Memorandumon Shantung,July21, 1919, MacMurrayPapers;E. T. Williams
Diary,Aug. 1, Sept. 10, 13, 1921, WilliamsPapers;MacMurrayto Hughes,Sept. 10, 15, 1921,
of State;E. T. Williamsto
793.94/1291 and 793.94/1284, GeneralRecordsof the Department
Hughes,Sept. 10, 1921, 793.94/1291, ibid.; "Memorandum:On Japan'sProposalsConcerning
and Substance"(preparedby Hornbeck),Sept. 15, 1921, 793.94/1284,
Shantung-Negotiations
ibid.; Akira Iriye,AfterImperialism:The Searchfor a New Orderin the Far East, 1921-1931
1965), 14.
(Cambridge,
74
History
ofAmerican
The Journal
and
controloftherailway,in bothitsoperation
Chinaobtainunqualified
policing,and thatit becomepartof China's unifiedrailroadsystem.If
a loan throughthe
theyadvisedfinancing
Japanhad to be compensated,
also asked
Bankers.
Hornbeck
or theAssociationofChinese
Consortium
MacMurrayto counselHughes to be patientwiththe Chineseon the
FederalWirelessCompanycontract.Japanand Britain,he pointedout,
and personal
werepressingChinaforconcessionsbeforetheconference,
It
unreasonableness.
fortheChinese
wereresponsible
and partyconflicts
ratherthanweaken
oftheUnitedStatesto strengthen
was in theinterest
The Far Easternadvisersconcededthat
China beforethe conference.
opened,
China mightindeedobtainbettertermsbeforethe conference
to
but theydeclared"that it wouldbe a mistakeforthisGovernment
thatChina negotiatewith
place itselfin the positionof recommending
Japanon the basis of theseproposals,at least untilwe have received
ofseveraloftheterms.' 20
assurancesofthepurport
satisfactory
Through their memorandaand conferenceswith Hughes, these
thatJapanhad to be pressedfor
ofChinaconvincedthesecretary
friends
When the Japaneseambassadorcalledon
a moregeneroussettlement.
of September15, 1921, the secretaryexHughes on the afternoon
pressedhis disapprovalof joint ownershipof the railwayand declared
that,in view of Chineseoppositionand the tenorof Americanpublic
of
opinion,the UnitedStatescouldnot assumethemoralresponsibility
urgingit on China's delegates.Hughes' positionelicitedan admission
fromShideharathatJapan'sproposalswerenotfinal.Takingadvantage
of thisopening,Hughes askedfora plan "by whichChina would be
oftherailwaybymaking
able to obtaincompletecontroland ownership
advisers,however,had
Far
Eastern
The
compensation."2
reasonable
proofthatthe proposalswere presentedto China as "Japan's utmost
concession."Thus, theywarnedHughesthatit was necessaryto place
was
thathis government
on the publicrecordShidehara'sstatements
notinflexible.22
In its replyof October 5, the Chinese governmentrejectedthe
and declaredthatJapan'sconcessionswere
Japaneseproposalsoutright
20 E. T. Williams
Diary,Sept. 13, 15, Nov. 22, 1921, WilliamsPapers;MacMurrayto Hughes,
ofState;
Sept. 10, 15, 1921, 793.94/1291 and 793.94/1284, GeneralRecordsoftheDepartment
E. T. Williamsto Hughes, Sept. 10, 1921, 793.94/1284, ibid.; "Memorandum:On Japan's
and Substance," Sept. 15, 1921, 793.94/1284,
ProposalsConcerningShantung-Negotiations
ibid.;HornbecktoMacMurray,Sept.10, 1921, HornbeckPapers.
21 Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions," Hughes Papers; E. T. WilliamsDiary,Sept. 15, 1921,
ofState,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates1921,I, 619-20.
WilliamsPapers;Department
22MacMurrayto Hughes,Sept. 17, 1921, attachedto 793.94/1285, GeneralRecordsof the
of State:MacMurrayto Hughes,Oct. 3, 1921, 793.94/1288, ibid.; MacMurrayto
Department
Hughes.Oct. 7. 1921, 793.94/1297,ibid.
Friendship
American
75
hesitatedto give groundsforthe
inadequate.The Chinesegovernment
withJapan,it was recognizintonegotiations
suspicionthat,byentering
or was sellingout China's
ing the validityof the wartimeagreements
theChinesealso tendedto relyon the
Witha certainnafvete,
birthright.
and the beliefin Americansupportto solve all of theirproconference
blems,andespeciallytheShantungquestion.
comitselfadded further
The conditionof the Chinesegovernment
civil war,and struggles
plications.Weakenedby financialbankruptcy,
among warlords,the government-headedby PremierChin Yunp'eng-was on the vergeof falling.This preventedForeignMinister
the conflict
and aggravated
the conference
W. W. Yen fromattending
The internalsplit,largelybetweenV. K.
withintheChinesedelegation.
Koo and Sze, was causedby personalfactorsand ambitions,
Wellington
The Koo
attitudes
towardtheconference.
and differing
partyallegiances,
in Peking,wantedto enlarge
strength
faction,whichhad considerable
the Hughes agenda and refusedto negotiatethe Shantungdispute
because it amounted"to an admissionthatthe Japanesehave some
rightto be there." The second group, led by Sze and styledthe
on mattersthatoffered
"realists" by Lansing,wantedto concentrate
the bestchanceof successand wishedto avoid alienatingworldpublic
theyargued,was to getJapanout
consideration,
opinion.The primary
andthatmeantdiplomatic
negotiations.23
ofShantung,
ThroughoutOctober1921, Hughes stuckto his policyof isolating
in the
the Shantungissue and avoidingdirectAmericaninvolvement
dispute.He would assistonlyin bringingthe two sides
Sino-Japanese
together.To the distressof the Chinese,he stillinsistedon immediate
thoughhe allowedthattheymight
negotiations,
directSino-Japanese
"collaterallybutnotpartoftheConference."
continueat Washington,
Williamsand MacMurrayalso agreedthatit would be dangerousfor
China to raise the Shantungquestionat the conference.The state
Schurmanto tellthe Chinesethatthey
instructed
therefore
department
norcounton theconshouldnot bringthe issue beforetheconference
of
23 Schurman
to Hughes,Sept. 26, 1921, 793.94/1195, GeneralRecordsof the Department
State; Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1921, I, 622-24;
MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations,"March20, 1936, HornbeckPapers;E. T. Williams
Diary,Oct. 12, 24, 29, 30, 1921, WilliamsPapers;RobertLansingDiary,Oct. 26, 1921, Robert
LansingPapers(ManuscriptDivision,Libraryof Congress);New York Times,Sept. 13, 1921;
MinutebySirWilliamTyrrell,Sept.30, 1921, on BeilbyAlstonto LordGeorgeN. Curzon,Sept.
27, 1921, F3604/132/10in FO 371/6620 (Public RecordOffice,London);Minute by Victor
by Chineseminister,Oct. 10, 1921, F3734/132/10,ibid.;
Wellesleyon memocommunicated
Minutes by Tyrrelland Wellesley,Sept. 16, 1921, F3399/132/10,in FO 371/6619, Public
RecordOffice.
76
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
ference to settle every problem. "God helps those who help
themselves,"Schurmanreminded
ForeignMinisterYen.24
Meanwhile, the state departmentwas concernedthat the antiJapaneserhetoricand advice of officialand unofficial
Americanand
Britishadvisers,who had attachedthemselves
to theChinesedelegation,
would preventreconciliation.
Individualssuch as B. Lenox Simpson,
ThomasMillard,JohnC. Ferguson,
and ReinschdenouncedJapaneseaggression,gave out misleadinginformation
on Americanpolicy,and advocatedan uncompromising
standon directnegotiations
with Japan.
The state department
and the BritishForeignOfficenonethelessattemptedto restrain
theiractivities.MacMurray,forexample,persuaded
Reinsch,whowas thenservingas counselorto theChinesegovernment,
a telegramto Pekingofficials.
to modify
The originalmessagedeclared
on Shantungwould weakenChina's positionin the
thatnegotiations
eyesofAmericanpublicopinion.25
foundsupportin London.BritishFar Easternexperts
Hughes' efforts
believedthatit was necessaryto obtaina reversaloftheShantungaward
and a comprehensive
settlement
oftheSino-Japanese
dispute.For many
monthstheyhad hopedthattheUnitedStateswouldtakethe initiative
whiletheForeignOfficeremaineddiscreetly
in thebackground.
Because
oftheAnglo-Japanese
allianceand Britain'sroleat theParisconference,
Britishdiplomatsconcededthattheycouldnotintervene
in thedispute.
"We shouldonlyreaptheodiumofbothsides," AssistantSecretary
of
StateVictorWellesleyobserved.The ForeignOfficewas irritated
bythe
and
uncompromising
attitudeof Chineseofficials
on directnegotiations
was encouragedbythetoneoftheJapaneseproposals.And yet,it agreed
concessionsand couldno longer
thatJapanwouldhaveto makefurther
counton Britishsupportforclaimsto Shantung."For our part,we feel
we have unwittingly
beena partyto a greatinjusticeto China," Miles
Lampsondeclaredin a memorandum
on Shantung.In orderto maintain
China's integrity,
BritishFar Easternexpertsconcludedthat Japan
would have to give up controlof the ShantungRailwayin favorof a
generalschemeof unification.
For a change,therefore,
the ForeignOfficewatchedHughes' handlingofissueswithapproval.And by theend
2 Schurman
to Hughes,Sept. 26, 1921, 793.94/1195, GeneralRecordsofthe Department
of
of State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1921, I, 620-21; CharlesW.
State,Department
Eliotto Curzon,Oct. 18, 1921, and minuteby Miles Lampson,Oct. 21, 1921, F3829/132/10,in
FO 371/6620. PublicRecordOffice.
" ThomasLamontto Hughes,Nov. 9, 1921, 893.51/3537, GeneralRecordsoftheDepartment
of State: MacMurray. memorandumof a conversationwith Reinsch, Sept. 20, 1921,
793.94/1289. ibid.,E. T. WilliamsDiary,Oct. 29. 30, 1921, WilliamsPapers;Alstonto Curzon,
Oct. 30. 1921. F4005/1635/10.in FO 371/6660,PublicRecordOffice.
American
Friendship
77
of October,the ForeignOfficethoughtthatBritish-American
cooperation mightresultin a satisfactory
solutionthroughconcurrentSinoJapanesenegotiations
at Washington.26
AftertheWashington
conference
assembled,thepressureon Chinese
officials
increasedand theyaccepteda face-saving
formula
workedout by
theUnitedStatesand GreatBritain.Directtalkson Shantungwouldbe
carriedon by the Chineseand Japanesedelegationsoutsidethe conference,butthe resultswouldbe reported
to theconference
in orderto
provideofficialrecognition
and moralforce.To reassurethe Chinese,
the talksweretermed"conversations,"ratherthannegotiations,
and
theydid not assumethe legalityof Japan'sstatusin Shantung.British
and Americanofficials
wouldbe present,butto satisfy
theJapanesethat
thetalkswereconfined
to thetwopartiesconcerned,
therewas to be no
collectiveinterposition
by the observers.Outsidethe formalconversations,however,Americanand Britishofficials
made use of numerous
opportunities
to suggestalternative
solutionsand to breakdeadlocks.27
Nevertheless,
the friendsof China remainedapprehensive.
Williams
triedto impresson Sir JohnJordan,one of the BritishFar Easternadvisersand lateran observerat theShantungtalks,that"therecould be
no justsettlement
thatleftJapanin possessionofthe railway."28From
Peking,SchurmanurgedHughes to be patientwiththe Chineseand
declaimedon the importance
of Americanfriendship
forChina: "Our
fundamental
policyofOpen Door in Chinashouldbe maintained
and appliedto newconditions.
Justin itselfit is equallyadvantageous
to China
and America.That policycombinedwithour unselfishdefenseof independenceand territorial
integrity
of China has won forAmericathe
good will of the Chinesepeoplewhichis an invaluableasset. We are
universally
regardedby theChinesepeopleas theirspecialfriend.Com26 MinutesbyWellesley,
May 18, 1921, F1548/132/10,in FO 371/6619,PublicRecordOffice;
MinutesbyCharlesW. Campbell,Sept. 14, 1922 and Wellesley,Sept. 16, 1921, F3399/132/10,
ibid.; Minutes by Wellesley,Sept. 30, 1921, F3604/132/10,in FO 371/6620, Public Record
Office;Lampsonmemo,"Shantung," Oct. 10, 1921, F4199/132/10,ibid.;MinutesbyWellesley,
Oct. 14, 1921, and Tyrrell,Oct. 15, 1921, F3768/132/10,ibid.; MinutebyTyrrell,Oct. 1921,
F3620/132/10,ibid.; WellesleyMemo, "General Surveyof PoliticalSituationin Pacificand Far
East with Referenceto the ForthcomingWashington Conference," Oct. 20, 1921,
F3823/2635/10,in FO 371/6660,PublicRecordOffice.
27 Beerits, "Far Eastern Questions,'' Hughes Papers; MacMurray, "Memorandum of a
Conversation
withSze," Aug. 13, 1921, 500.A4/128, GeneralRecordsof the Departmentof
State; MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations,"HornbeckPapers; Departmentof State,
ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1922 (2 vols., Washington,1938), I, 935-37; ArthurJ.
Balfourto Curzon, Nov. 25, 1921, F4350/132/10,in FO 371/6620, Public Record Office;
Minutes on Balfour to Curzon, Nov. 30, 1921, F4436/132/10 and Alston to Curzon,
F4437/132/10, by Basil C. Newton, Wellesley,and Tyrrell,Dec. 1, 1921, ibid.; Fifield,
"SecretaryHughesandtheShantungQuestion," 375-77.
28 E. T. Williams
Diary,Nov. 22, 1921, WilliamsPapers.
78
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
munityofrepublicaninstitutions
drawsthemcloserto us. Ifwe can aid
in strengthening
Chinese RepublicthroughConferenceor otherwise
America'spositionin Chinawillbe rendered
stillmorefavorable."29
The Subcommittee
on the Pacificand Far EasternQuestionsnow
maintainedthat Japan's title to Shantungwas invalidand that the
Japanesecould claim reimbursement
only for the expenses of the
military
expedition
and improvements.
An enduringpeace in theOrient
mustbe builton a "foundationofjusticeto China," thesubcommittee
declared;and, if the conferencewas to respectthe sovereignty,
inand integrity
ofChina,as providedin theRootresolutions
dependence,
(whichwereincorporated
intotheNine PowerTreaty),"it is imperative
that China's wrongs in the matter of these leases should be
redressed.'' 30
But is was Hornbeckwho adoptedthe most outspokenstand in
December1921. In a somewhatconfusedletter,whichmayor maynot
have been sent on to Hughes, Hornbeckmade Shantungthe test of
justiceand fairdealingin international
relations."Far betterno Shantung 'decision' thana 'decision' whichagain attemptsto fastenupon
theChinesean odiousimpairment
ofone ofthoserightswhichare vital
to nationalexistenceanywhere,an impairment
whichwill continueto
contribute
to the disintegration
of the Chinesestate," he wrote.Hornbeck also insistedthatin directtalks,China was no matchforJapan:
"Under the circumstanceswhich prevail,the Chinese are to the
Japaneseat the diplomatic
boardas a youthful
boxerwould
lightweight
be to a maturedandexperienced
in theprizering.'31
heavyweight
The Shantungnegotiations
beganon December1 and madeprogress
as longas thethornyquestionswerepostponed.32
But pressured
bytheir
advisersand by the Chinesestudentswho frequented
the delegation's
headquarters,
theChineseraisedtherailwayissuesoonerthanexpected.
Without withdrawingJapan's original plan for a joint venture,
Shideharaoffered
to sell the Japaneseshareifthe Chinesewouldagree
to a long-term
loanfromJapanesebankerson termsofcontrolsimilarto
ofJapaneseexperts
otherforeign
railwayloans-that is theappointment
Department
ofState,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates1921, I, 321.
Reportof theSubcommittee
on the Pacificand Far EasternQuestions.[Dec. 1921? Hughes
Papers.
t Hornbeck,''The ShantungProblemis Distinctand EasilyDistinguishable,"Dec. 8, 1921,
Hornheckto MacMurray,Dec. 8, 1921, Hornbeckto Hughes,Dec. 9, 1921, HornbeckPapers.
" The Sino-Japanese
negotiations
may be followedin Conversations
betweenthe Chineseand
JapaneseRepresentatives
in regardto the ShantungQuestion:MinutesPreparedby the Japanese
betweenthe Chineseand JapaneseRepresentatives
Delegation(Washington.1922); Conversations
in regardto the ShantungQuestion:Preparedby the ChineseDelegation(Washington,1923)
(JapanChina.ShantungConversations).
American
Friendship
79
in charge of the traffic,
accounting,and engineeringdepartments.
Shideharaactedlargelyon his own afterAmericanand Britishofficials
indicatedtheiroppositionto a jointventureand informally
suggested
sell
an
thatJapan
therailroad,retaining elementofsupervisory
control
of expertsin some of the majordepartments.
throughthe employment
To demonstrate
Japanesesincerityand reasonableness
and to prevent
Anglo-Americanmediation,the Japanesedelegationurged Foreign
MinisterYasuya Uchida to acceptthe proposedsolution.The Chinese
agreedto buy the Japaneseshare,but insistedon payingwithcash or
twelve-yeartreasurynotes and on employinga Japanesedistrict
engineeronlyuntilthenoteswereredeemed.
They reachedan impasse on December 20, and the talks were
suspendedfortwo weeks.Shideharahad overreached
himself,and the
delegationhad to consulttheForeignOffice.Americanofficials
triedto
calm Chinese fearsthat the Japanesewere temporizing
to gain advantagesfromChina on otherFar Easternmatters.MacMurrayurged
the Chinesenot to breakoffthe negotiations.
He declaredthatiftheir
good officeswere requestedHughes and ArthurJ. Balfourwould
a "most justand reasonablesolutionofthematter."Some
recommend
membersof the Americandelegationstrongly
supporteda cash settlementand Hugheswas tiringof theJapaneseattitudeon thisand other
issues. The BritishFar Easternexpertsalso saw further
evidenceof
Japan'sdesireto retainfullcontrolofShantungin its refusalofa cash
settlementand its demandfor the appointment
of a Japanesechief
engineer,traffic
manager,and chiefaccountant.For the most part,
however,theypreferred
to "leave it to the Americansto takethe lead
in objectingto anyfeatures
ofthesettlement
whichare unsatisfactory
to
China." Proposingto takefulladvantageof theJapanesedesireto appear reasonable,Hughes and the American ambassadorto Japan,
CharlesWarren,pressured
theJapaneseto sell therailroadto Chinaon
favorable
terms.33
"Ibid.; JapaneseDelegationto Yasuya Uchida,Nov. 27, Dec. 5, 8, 20, 1921, Recordsof the
JapaneseForeignOffice,MT 317, pp. 477-79, 728-30, 883-89, 1500-02, MT 306, pp. 101-04;
Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions,"HughesPapers;MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations,"
HornbeckPapers;E. T. WilliamsDiary,Dec. 17, 20, 21, 1921, WilliamsPapers;MacMurray,
memorandum
of a conversation
withSze, Dec. 15, 1921, 793.94/1239 1/2,GeneralRecordsof
theDepartment
ofState;MacMurrayto Hughes,Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1365,ibid.;Department
of State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1922, I, 937-39; Wellesleyto Lampson,Dec.
12, 1921, F4601/132/10,in FO 371/6620, PublicRecordOffice;Minuteby Newton,approved
by Wellesleyand Tyrrell,Dec. 19, 1921, F4726/132/10,ibid.; Note on a conversation
between
Lampsonand Tsuneo Matsudaira,Dec. 27, 1921, F135/69/10,in FO 371/7989, PublicRecord
Office.The authorthanksThomasBuckleyforsupplying
theEnglishtranslations
oftheRecordsof
theJapaneseForeignOffice.
80
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
When the negotiations
resumedon January4, 1922, the Japanese
Foreign OfficeacceptedShidehara's proposalto sell the Shantung
notes,or the
Railway,butit refusedto allowpaymentin cash,treasury
of the
ChineseBankers'Union notes.To preventthe totalbreakdown
talks,theJapaneseand Chineseagreedto turnto othermatters,which
were quicklyresolved.Two days later,when theyfacedanotherimacquiescedin the suggestionthat the
passe, the Japanesereluctantly
be requestedto reportto theirsuperiors
Americanand Britishobservers
on therailwayproblem.34
MacMurrayand Lampson,one of the Britishobserversat the Shantung talks, thereupondrew up three possiblecompromises-labeled
''A,'
''"B," and "C," -which they submittedseparatelyto the
Chinese and Japanesefor comment.No proposal was completely
proposition,
a fourth
acceptableto bothsides,butout oftheinterchange
It pro"D," emerged.This formedthe basis of the finalsettlement.
Chinesegovernment
videdforJapanto sell the railwayforfifteen-year
at China's optionafterfiveyears;duringthe
treasury
notes,redeemable
life of the notes, a Japanesetrafficmanagerand chiefaccountant,
nominated
byJapanand appointedbyChina,wouldbe employedunder
oftheChinesemanagingdirector.
MacMurrayalso perthesupervision
suaded the Chinese and Japaneseto resumethe Shantungtalks on
issues whilethe delegations
January11 to take up otheroutstanding
ponderedthevariousproposals.35
Meanwhile,the Washingtonconferencehad concludedmost of its
the
workand thedelegateswereanxiousto returnhome.Nevertheless,
reachedat Washington
by
mightbe threatened
treatiesand agreements
the failureto settlethe Shantungquestion.Hughes and MacMurray,
betbelievedthatthe differences
joined by theirBritishcounterparts,
was
weenthetwosideshad narrowedto thepointwherea compromise
notto lettrivialmattersblocka setpossible,and theyweredetermined
receivedfrom
tlement.They were furtherreassuredby information
in Tokyo and Peking.AmbassadorWarren
Americanrepresentatives
reported
thattheJapanesecould be inducedto sell the railroad,ifthey
were constantly
pressedand if the Chinesewould agree to "definite
terms." SchurmancabledthatForeignMinisterYen, who was willing
ShiantungConversations;Memorandumof interviewbetweenHughes and
* Japan/China,
Shidehara,Jan. 4, 1922, 793.94/1274 1/2, General Records of the Departmentof State;
MacMurrayto Hughes,Jan.18, 1922, 793.94/1365,ibid.
'" MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations,"HornbeckPapers; MacMurrayto Hughes,
Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1365 and /1366, GeneralRecordsof the Departmentof State; E. T.
WilliamsDiary,Jan. 12, 1922, WilliamsPapers;Balfourto David LloydGeorge,Jan.20, 1922,
F611/34/10.in FO 371/7974,PublicRecordOffice.
American
Friendship
81
and sacrificehis position,and PresidentHsuto takethe responsibility
Shih-ch'angwanted an immediatesettlementand recognizedthat
was theonlywayto bringit about.PremierLiang
Hughes' intervention
but was requiredto defend
Shih-yiwas also inclinedto compromise,
himselfagainst popular oppositionto negotiationswith Japan and
againsthis politicalenemies.Installedin officeby Chang Tso-linand
and facingan imminent
Tuan Ch'i-juiin mid-December
financialcrisis
as theChineseNew Year settlement
dayapproached,
Liangwas afraidof
beingthrownout ofofficebyWu P'ei-fu,who accusedhimofplanning
to selloutChina.36
Hughes and Balfour,head of the Britishdelegation,werenow cona satisfactory
vincedthatplanD, or a modification
ofit,offered
solution
on
and was acceptableto Japan.Therefore, January18, 1922, they
in thenegotiations
buttactfully
to assurea
decidedto intervene
directly
thatsame
settlement.
At an informal
meetingat Balfour'sapartment
afternoon,
theJapanesegavetheirtentative
approvalto planD. Hughes
and Balfourweresomewhatsuspiciousof theJapanesedemandforfurtherclarifying
talkson certaindetails,but theywereheartenedby the
was morefavorable
Japaneseresponse.Theybelievedthatthesettlement
to Chinathantheyhad previously
hoped;Japan,desiringto displayits
had clearlymadea substantial
peacefulintentions,
concessionin accepting Chinesetreasury
notesand in abandoningits originaldemandfora
jointventure.Furthermore,
Hughesand Balfourhad ascertained
that,in
viewofJapaneseprestigeand publicopinion,no morecouldbe obtained
fromJapanthroughdiplomatic
pressure.37
While theirFar Easternexpertscontinuedto doubtthe wisdomof
allowingJapanto appointthe chieftraffic
managerand accountant,
all of theirinfluenceon the anxious
Hughes and Balfourconcentrated
Chinese.Hughes took the lead in forcingthe realityof the situation
uponAmerica'sfriend.
Hughesinformed
Balfour,"that his idea was to
36 Beerits, "Far
Eastern,Questions," Hughes Papers; MacMurray, "The Shantung
Conversations,"HornbeckPapers;E. T. WilliamsDiary,Jan. 10, 12, 1922, WilliamsPapers;
Conversation
at Balfour'sApartment,
Memorandumof Informal
Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1300a,
General Recordsof the Departmentof State; Memorandaof InformalConversationsat the
Secretaryof State's Private House, Jan. 19, 22, ibid.; Balfourto Curzon, Jan. 8, 1922,
F127/69/10,in FO 371/7989,PublicRecordOffice;Eliotto Balfour,Jan.12, 1922, F235/69/10,
ibid.;Department
ofState,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates1922, I, 939-41.
3 HughesMemorandum
forMacMurray,Jan.26, 1922, 793.94/1265, GeneralRecordsofthe
ofState;Memorandum
at Balfour'sApartment,
Department
ofan Informal
Conversation
Jan. 18,
1922, 793.94/1300a, ibid.; Memorandumof a conversation
betweenBalfourand Hughes,Jan.
18, 1922, F480/69/10,in FO 371/7990,PublicRecordOffice;Balfourto LloydGeorge,Jan.20,
1922, F600/34/10,in FO 371/7970,ibid.; Department
ofState,ForeignRelationsofthe United
States 1922, I, 941-43, 963; Masanao Hanihara to Uchida, Jan. 24, 1922, MT 319, pp.
24351, 2603-2607.
82
History
ofAmerican
The Journal
put the Chinesein the positionof havingto acceptthe proposalas the
fromtheJapanese,or else to takethe
utmostwhichcould be extracted
ofnegotiations."Duringconverforthebreakdown
wholeresponsibility
sationsat Hughes' home, and in the course of Sze's interviewwith
WarrenG. Hardingon January25, theChineseweretoldthat
President
and thoseof the worlddemandedacceptanceof a settletheirinterests
mentalongthelinesagreedto byJapan.Therewouldbe no morearguing over pettydetails. LargelyignoringChinese counterarguments,
Hughes warnedthatChina riskedlosingAmericansupportas well as
Schurmanand BritishMinisterBeilby
the province.Simultaneously,
Alston were instructedto echo a similarultimatumto officialsin
Peking,iftheChinesedelegatesconsultedtheirsuperiors.38
At thispoint,theAmericanFar Easternadvisers,who werenotconmadeone moreeffort
sultedduringthefinalstagesofthe negotiations,
to intercedein China's behalf.On January12, 1922, Williamshad adand accepta Japaneseloan, ifit were
visedthe Chineseto compromise
shorttermand iftheJapaneseexpertcouldbe giventhemoreharmless
role of "technicaladviser." Plan D, however,troubledhim so much
thathe could not sleep. Williamstriedto findsolace in the factthat
Japanwould surrenderthe railroadafterfiveyears,but he concluded
of a Japanesetraffic
thatthe extendedloan periodand the appointment
manager would "fasten Japan permanentlyin Shantungand the
whichhe was "perJapaneseknewit." But it was Hughes' ultimatum,
of
himto takeissue withthesecretary
mitted"to read,thatprompted
state's policies. Williams warned MacMurray and Hughes of the
the successof plan D: civilwar in China,antidangersthatthreatened
Senaterejectionof
followed
by Japaneseintervention,
boycotts
foreign
of
the treaties,the historyof Japan'sbrokenpromises,the immorality
pressingChinainsteadofJapan,and thethreatto America'sgoodname
and a
appealedto bothAmericanself-interest
in China. His arguments
concernforjustice,but he emphasizedthe latter."It does not seem to
me thatwe, as loversof justiceand fairplay,can affordto urge the
ownerto acceptsuch a settlement,"Williamswroteto Hughes. He
no solutionat all to supportforJapaneseaggressionand the
preferred
38 MacMurray
of
to Hughes,Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1366, GeneralRecordsoftheDepartment
at the Secretaryof State's PrivateHouse, Jan. 19,
Conversations
State;Memorandaof Informal
22, 1922, 793.93/1300a, ibid.; Balfour to Alston, Jan. 22, 1922, 793.94/1258a, ibid.;
Departmentof State, Foreign Relationsof the United States 1922, I, 941-43, 945, 963;
Minute by Wellesley,Jan. 19, 1922, F141/69/10,in FO 371/7989, Public Record Office;
Jan.18, 1922,
betweenBalfourand Hughesat Balfour'sApartment,
MemorandaofConversations
F480/69/10,Jan.21, 1922, F547/60/10,in FO 371/7990,ibid.
American
Friendship
83
consequencesthat would follow."Let Japan bear the odium; why
shouldwe shareit," he askedMacMurray.39
Hornbeckalso protested
theoutlineofthesettlement
Separately,
that
On January12, he advisedMacMurraythatthemoment
was emerging.
had arrivedfortheUnitedStatesto procurea satisfactory
solution:"'All
the externalevidencespointto the conclusionthatthe psychological
a betteropportunity
thanhas ever
situationwhichnow prevailsaffords
previouslybeen presentedforthe success of whateverthe American
Delegationmaychoose to insistupon towardconclusivesettlement
of
the question." A week laterhe took his case to Hughes. Pointingto
reportsthatJapanesebusinessmen
wantedcash paymentfortherailway
and not bonds, he statedconfidently
that Japanwould give way if
pressed;buteven ifJapanrefused,
the responsibility
wouldnot reston
"I
Americanshouldersand theUnitedStateswouldsave itsreputation.
am veryreluctantto incurthe appearanceof beinginsistent,"he told
the opinionwhichI have
Hughes, "but I feelit my dutyto reaffirm
repeatedlyexpressedthat no 'settlement'of the Shantungquestion
whichleavestheJapanesein any measureofcontroloftherailwaywill
'40
be a realsettlement.'
This timetheintervention
ofChina's friends
was ineffective.
Hughes
rejectedthearguments
ofWilliamsand Hornbeckin a caustic,evenarrogant,statement.
It was deliveredindirectly
throughMacMurrayand
assertedthatthe secretaryknewwhat was rightin carryingout the
responsibility
thatwas his alone. He declaredthatthe Far Easternadviserswerenotin possessionofall ofthefactsandthattheyhadfailedto
takeintoaccounttheentiresituation.Hughesreminded
themthatwhile
theUnitedStatesremainedsympathetic
to thejusticeofChina's cause,
it could nevergo to war over Shantung.Explaininghis decisionto
MacMurray,Hugheswrote:"I am desirousto see Chinaobtainsatisfactionto thefulllimit.As I havesaid,theseare notmyterms,butit is the
whento agreeand
goodpartofcommonsenseto knowin a negotiation
not to lose greatresultsbecauseof sheerobstinacyon smallerpoints.I
have theresponsibility
ofdealingwithit becauseI am convincedthatif
China does not acceptthissettlement
she willlose Shantung,and I am
to saveitforher.''41
trying
39E. T. WilliamsDiary,Jan.6, 12, 19, 23, 24, 25, 1922, WilliamsPapers;E. T. Williamsto
MacMurray,Jan. 19, 1922, ibid.; E. T. Williamsto Hughes, Jan. 24, 1922, 794.94/1306,
ofState.
GeneralRecordsoftheDepartment
Jan. 16, 1922, HornbeckPapers;Hornbeckto MacMurray,Jan.
40 Hornbeckto MacMurray,
23, 1922, ibid.; Hornbeckto Hughes, Jan. 23, 1922, 793.94/1309, GeneralRecordsof the
ofState.
Department
41 Hughes,Memorandum
forMacMurray,Jan.26, 1922, 793.94/1265,GeneralRecordsofthe
ofState;E. T. WilliamsDiary,Jan.27, 1922, WilliamsPapers.
Department
84
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
Somewhat chastened, Hornbeck expressed his appreciationfor
Hughes' viewsand his reliefthatthe UnitedStateshad not presented
termsto China, whichwas not entirelytrue. Hornbecknevercompletelyescapedthe influenceof Reinsch,his mentorand formerproofWisconsin;buttheyoung,practicalChinaexfessorat theUniversity
career.Hornbeckreplied
pertalso harboredambitionsfora diplomatic
to MacMurray:"He [Hughes]madethedecision,and thatbeingdone,
his view becomesmine."42 There is no evidencethat Williamsrespondedto Hughes. In his diaryentryof January26, 1922, Williams
forMacMurmerelynoteda summaryofthesecretary'smemorandum
on Harding'slectureto Sze: "It is
ray.But a dayearlierhe commented
takethisstep." Hurt,angry,
a thousandpitiesto see our government
and suspicious,Williamswas anxiousto pack his bags and returnto
Berkeley.43
approval.
The Chinesedelegationacceptedrealitiesand recommended
AfterLiangrequestedsickleaveand Yen was appointedactingpremier,
authorizedthe delegationto accede to the
the Chinese government
On January30 and 31, theChineseand Japanese
Shantungagreement.
the finaltermson the railwayand on February4,
delegatesnegotiated
1922, theysignedtheShantungtreaty.44
DexterPerkinspointedout thatthe
With the benefitof hindsight,
Washingtonconferencegave Japan the substanceof the Shantung
its controlof the provincesettlement-plusthe meansof prolonging
conYet mostcontemporaries
whileChinareceivedonlythe shadow.45
China did much betterthanexcludedthat,giventhe circumstances,
Americanadvisersto
one oftheofficial
pected.WestelW. Willoughby,
that
statedthat,considering Japanwas in actual
theChinesedelegation,
thatChinawonan
possessionoftheprovince,"it is easilydemonstrable
WhileReinschwas distressed
thattheFar
almostcompletevictory."46
Easternarrangements
gave China far less than it deserved,he also
thespheresof
grantedthatmuchprogresshad beenmadein eliminating
42
of
Hornbeckto MacMurray,Feb. 8, 1922, 793.94/1336, GeneralRecordsoftheDepartment
State.
43 E. T. Williams
Diary,Jan.26, 27, 28, 1922, WilliamsPapers.
Eastern Questions," Hughes Papers; Memorandum of an Informal
44 Beerits, "Far
ofState,
ofState's PrivateHouse, Jan.30, 1922, ibid.;Department
at theSecretary
Conversation
ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1922, I, 948-60; Fifield,"SecretaryHughes and the
ShantungQuestion," 384-85. For the termsoftheShantungtreaty,see ForeignRelationsofthe
UnitedStates1922, I, 948-60 andChina,ShantungConversations.
(Boston,
45 Dexter Perkins,CharlesEvans Hughes and AmericanDemocraticStatesmanship
1956), 110.
46 WestelW. Willoughby,
A Report(Baltimore,1922), 327.
Chwina
at theConference:
American
Friendship
85
And, writingin 1922,
influenceand gettingJapanout of Shantung.47
was "not a bad
Ge-Zay Wood arguedthatthe Shantungsettlement
likemostofthe
bargainforChina."48Indeed,theShantungsettlement,
at the Washingtonconference,
gave
otherFar Easternarrangements
fromthe
Chinathepotentialto regaincertainaspectsofitssovereignity
otherpowers.
Several factorswere responsiblefor China's partialvictory.Enin the
ofAmericanpublicopinionand friends
couragedbythesympathy
to
comChinese
opposition
and
aware
of
the
rising
statedepartment,
promise,the Chinesestoodfirm.Instead,Japanmademostoftheconcessionsbecauseof a desireto improveits imageand its relationswith
thefears
theUnitedStates.SenatorThomasWalsh's reportunderscored
of Japanesediplomatsthat the Senate mightrejectthe Washington
mantreatiesunlesstheShantungquestionweresettledin a satisfactory
ner.49Hughes probablyexploitedJapaneseobjectivesand fearsmore
haverealized.
thanhistorians
and idealism,
Because of the convergenceof Americanself-interest
theUnitedStates,withtheassistanceofBritain,was able to exertitsinto China.This was notat all apparent
favorable
fluencefora settlement
in thesummerof1921. Hugheshad at firstbeeninclinedto believethat
a compromise
solutionentaileda Japanesesharein therailway,butthen
Aided by sympathetic
publicopinion
the friendsof China intervened.
in theSenate,theysucceededin educatingHughesto the
and rumblings
it to
ofreturning
oftheShantungRailwayand thenecessity
importance
and frommidChina.At severalcriticalpoints,especiallyin September
Decemberto earlyJanuary,theysucceededin puttingJapanon the
defensive.
werereachedand
However,whenthelimitsofJapanesecompromise
theJapanese-American
was threatened,
Chinawas forcedto
relationship
make the finalconcessions.Hughes feltthat he was actuallylooking
of perafterChina's bestinterests."We cannottakethe responsibility
in which,byour failingto supportthebestseta stateofaffairs
mitting
tlementobtainable,Japanwould remainin Shantungforan indefinite
Drawingthesame contime," he arguedto Williamsand Hornbeck.5"
4 Reinschspeech beforethe Creve Coeur Banquet,Peoria,Illinois,Feb. 22, 1922, Reinsch
Papers.
Question:A Studyin Diplomacyand WorldPolitics(New York,
48 Ge-ZayWood,The Shantung
1922), 275.
Conference,
164.
Statesand The Washington
49 Buckley,The United
forMacMurray,Jan.26, 1922, 793.94/1265,GeneralRecordsofthe
50 Hughes,Memorandum
ofState.
Department
86
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
clusion, Schurmanexplainedto ForeignMinisterYen that "while
Americanssympathized
withChina theywere,as he knew,a practical
peoplewho believedin adjustingdifficulties
insteadofpursuingthemto
catastropheand theywould findit unintelligible
and unpardonable
if
Chinarefused
an offer
whichgavehereverything
she askedin fiveyears
andnearlyeverything
at once.""
Weak friendshave oftenfoundAmericansympathy
a double-edged
sword.On the one hand,the UnitedStateshas wieldedit againsttheir
enemies.On the other,Americahas used thisweaponagainstfriends
and allieswhenit perceivedthatgreaterinterests
wereat stake.Overall,
in thecase oftheShantungsettlement,
Chinabenefited
fromAmerican
andsympathy.
friendship
S1
ofState,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates1922, I, 944.
Department