1
Adrianople, battle of
A. D. LEE
The battle of Adrianople (August 9, 378 CE), in
which a Roman army suffered a crushing
defeat by Gothic forces (see GOTHS) and the
emperor VALENS died, was described by one
contemporary as the worst Roman defeat since
Cannae (Amm. Marc. 31.13.19; see CANNAE,
BATTLE OF). It is usually seen as an important
step in the hemorrhaging of Roman power
during late antiquity, although there are
dangers of oversimplifying its significance.
The battle was the culmination of events
which began two years earlier when Valens
agreed to a Gothic request to cross the Danube
en masse and settle in the northern Balkans.
Roman exploitation of the immigrants provoked a Gothic revolt which local Roman
forces struggled to contain, prompting Valens
to return from the eastern frontier with elite
army units in the summer of 378. Despite
being urged by some to await the arrival of
his co-emperor Gratian from the west with
reinforcements, Valens decided to tackle the
Goths on his own in the Thracian plain,
150km west of Constantinople – a fatal
decision influenced partly by faulty intelligence which underestimated the size of
dispersed Gothic forces, but also by Valens’
apparent determination not to share the
kudos of anticipated victory with Gratian.
Much uncertainty surrounds the details of
the battle itself, even though it forms the climax of the best source for this period,
AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS’ history; his classicizing
pretensions and his concern to use Adrianople
as a foil to the emperor Julian’s achievements
in another battle (Strasbourg, 357; Kelly 2008:
313–16), resulted in a battle description which
does not lend itself to tactical analysis. The two
sides apparently engaged by accident before
either was fully ready, and the Roman left
wing then advanced too far, and was isolated
and destroyed, leaving the left flank of the
Roman center vulnerable. Gothic pressure
constricted the fighting space to the point
where Roman troops were too densely packed
to fight effectively. By nightfall, Valens was
dead and two-thirds of the Roman forces had
been slaughtered (Amm. Marc. 31.13.18) – but
two-thirds of what number? Conservative estimates put Valens’ army at no more than twenty
thousand Roman troops, but data for units missing after 378 imply a figure closer to forty thousand (Lenski 2002: 339), which is also more
consistent with the manpower problems evident in the following years. Gothic numbers
are also problematic, but are unlikely to have
been significantly larger than Roman forces.
The defeat owed more to poor decisionmaking by Valens than to any deterioration in
the quality of Roman troops, and the empire still
had substantial armies deployed elsewhere.
However, the loss of so many experienced troops
could not be made good quickly, and Valens’
successor THEODOSIUS I proved unable to defeat
the Goths, eventually reaching an agreement in
382 which allowed them to settle in the Balkans
in return for providing units for the Roman
army. Crucially, the Goths retained a degree of
independence not previously conceded to such
immigrants which, within a decade, was to
create increasing problems for the empire
(see ALARIC).
SEE ALSO:
Army, late antiquity.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Burns, T. S. (1973) “The battle of Adrianople:
a reconsideration.” Historia 22: 336–45.
Heather, P. (1991) Goths and Romans, 332–489:
122–56. Oxford.
Kelly, G. (2008) Ammianus Marcellinus: the allusive
historian. Cambridge.
Kulikowski, M. (2007) Rome’s Gothic wars from the
third century to Alaric: 123–43. Cambridge.
Lenski, N. (2002) Failure of empire: Valens and the
Roman state in the fourth century A.D.: 320–67.
Berkeley.
The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, First Edition. Edited by Roger S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine,
and Sabine R. Huebner.
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.