DONOSIOCI POLITIKE BACAJU POGLED NA "ŠVEDSKI MODEL"
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iz stranih medija DONOSIOCI POLITIKE BACAJU POGLED NA "ŠVEDSKI MODEL" Financial Times - 22.09.2008. Christopher Brown-Humes preuzimanja kolaterala po tim kreditima, Securum se našla sa neobičnim portfolijem aktive - gde su bile zgrada britanske ambasade u Burmi, avio čarter operater u Zimbabveu i skijaška vila u SAD - kao i imovina u Evropi i švedske industrijske operacije. Securum je dobila injekciju kapitala od Skr 42 milijarde i 15 godina da proda svoju aktivu. Ustvari, uz pomoć ozdravljenja tržišta nekretnina i akcija sredinom 1990-tih godina, Stokholm bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� K ada se govori o "švedskom modelu" ne misli se uvek na način na koji je Švedska rešila svoju akutnu bankarsku krizu početkom 1990-tih godina. Način na koji je Švedska postupila - naročito usvajanje modela dobra banka/loša banka veoma je relevantan za spasavanje finansijskog sistema koji se primenjuje u SAD. Lombard Street Research je naslovio svoje istraživanje u petak, 19.09.2008. godine, sa "Hank i Ben uče švedski". Maca je došla na vratanca početkom 1990-tih godina posle masovnog gomilanja kredita koji se ne otplaćuju u celom švedskom bankarskom sistemu. Pet od sedam najvećih banaka je zatražilo podršku države ili ogromne injekcije kapitala od svojih akcionara. Dve banke - Nordbanken i Gota Bank - preuzela je država i merdžovala ih. Od ključnog značaja za očuvanje poverenja bila je blanko garancija kreditorima - ne akcionarima - koji je Švedska dala za celo bankarsko tržište krajem 2002. godine i držala je skoro četiri godine. Posle preuzimanja Nordbanken, država je ubacila Skr 67 milijardi loših kredita u lošu banku koja je nazvana Securum. Posle �� from foreign media POLICY CHIEFS HAVE AN EYE ON "SWEDISH MODEL" Financial Times - 22.09.2008. Christopher Brown-Humes W bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� hen people talk about the "Swedish model", they are not usually referring to the way that Sweden resolved its acute banking crisis in the early 1990s. But the way Sweden acted - and in particular its adoption of the good bank/bad bank model - is highly relevant to the financial system bailout now being implemented in the US. "Hank and Ben learning Swedish" was how Lombard �� Street Research headlined its latest piece of research on Friday. Like the current US financial crisis, the origins of the Swedish banking crisis lay in the credit markets - which were deregulated in 1985 - and in a finance and real estate bubble that eventually collapsed. The chickens came home to roost in the early 1990s a�er a massive pile-up of non-performing loans across the Swedish banking system. Five of the country’s seven biggest banks required state support or huge injections of capital from their own shareholders. Two banks - Nordbanken and Göta Bank - were taken over by the state and eventually merged. Crucial to maintaining confidence was the blanket guarantee for creditors - not shareholders - that Sweden put under the whole banking market in late 2002 and kept in place for nearly four years. A�er taking over Nordbanken, the state dumped Skr 67bn of non-performing loans into a bad bank called Securum. A�er taking over the collateral behind them, Securum eventually found itself with an extraordinary portfolio of assets - they included the British Embassy building in Burma, an air charter operation in Zimbabwe and a skiing lodge in the US - as well prestala je sa radom posle samo pet godina tokom kojih je povratila Skr 13 milijardi. Što je još važnije, medjutim, švedska reakcija na krizu koštala je poreske obveznike vrlo malo, ako ih je uopšte koštala - još jedan razlog zašto su donosioci politike u SAD zainteresovani da razgovaraju sa donosiocima politike koji su bili direktno uključeni u raščišćavanje švedskog loma. Mada je Švedska na početku potrošila oko Skr 65 milijardi da podrži sistem, dobila je natrag najveći deo novca. Veliki deo je došao iz dividendi i reprivatizacije Nordbanken na kraju. Država i dalje drži 19,9 procenta udela u Nordea banke čiji je sada deo Nordbanken posle niza pan-Nordic merdžera. Tajna uspeha Securuma bila je u tome što je ona imala aktivan pristup svojim investicijama da bi maksimizovala vrednost a ne da vidi sebe kao kompaniju za likvidaciju. Jan Kvarnstrom, nekadašnji glavni direktor Securuma, uvek je bio uveren da druge zemlje mogu da uče iz švedskog iskustva. Jednom je izjavio: "Morate brzo uhvatiti osnovnu aktivu, uspostaviti kontrolu nad tokom novca i upravljati aktivom da bi se sa njom ostvarila dodatna vrednost. Vrlo je važno dokazati na tržištu svoje profesionalne sposobnosti umesto da vas vide kao otpad za aktivu." JEDNOSTAVAN NA PAPIRU, ALI PLAN MOŽE BITI SLOŽEN ZA IZVRŠENJE P lan za spasavanje hipotekarnih kredita na papiru je jednostavan: dodeljuje Trezoru SAD veliku količinu novca i mnogo slobode kako da ga potroši. Ali, verovatno je da će biti mnogo složeniji za sprovođenje. Plan daje Trezoru ček od blizu USD 700 milijardi da kupi poremećenu aktivu od finansijskih institucija koju može prodati ili držati do dospelosti. Imaće široku slobodu u pogledu toga koju aktivu da kupi i po kojoj ceni i šta da radi sa njom. Ovlašćenja koja traži Trezor omogućiće da se obuhvat spasavanja šiti tokom primene. Mada plan na početku obuhvata kupovinu hipotekarne aktive - stambene i komercijalne u formi hartija od vrednosti ili kredita - sekretar Trezora će imati ovlašćenje da kupi i drugu aktivu ako je potrebno. Ukupan pul američkih hipoteka iznosi oko USD 12.000 milijardi. To bi sugeriralo da USD 700 milijardi koje je Trezor namenio uključuju hartije od vrednosti strukturirane na bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� Financial Times - 22.09.2008. Alan Bea�ie, Washington and Henny Sender and Aline van Duyn, New York �� as European property and Swedish industrial operations. Securum was given a Skr 24bn equity injection and 15 years to dispose of its assets. In fact, helped by a recovery in property and stock markets in the mid-1990s, it ended up being wound down a�er just five years. By that time it had recouped nearly Skr 13bn. More important, however, Sweden’s response to the crisis meant it cost the taxpayer very li�le, if anything - another reason why US policymakers have been keen to talk to some of the decision-makers who were directly involved in clearing up the Swedish mess. Although Sweden originally spent about Skr 65bn to shore up the system, it got most of the money back. Much of this came from dividends and the eventual re-privatisation of Nordbanken. The government still holds a 19.9 per cent stake in Nordea, the bank that Nordbanken is now part of following a series of pan-Nordic mergers. One secret to Securum’s success was that it took an activist approach to its investments to maximise value rather than just seeing itself as a liquidating company. Jan Kvarnström, a former chief executive of Securum, always felt other countries could learn from the Swedish experience. "You have to get your hands on the underlying assets quickly, get control over the cash flow and manage the assets to add value to them. It is very important to prove your professional credentials to the market and not to be seen simply as an asset dump" he once said. SIMPLE ON PAPER, BUT PLAN COULD BE COMPLEX TO EXECUTE Financial Times - 22.09.2008. Alan Bea�ie, Washington and Henny Sender and Aline van Duyn, New York bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� T �� he mortgage rescue plan is simple on paper: it gives the US Treasury a large chunk of money and a lot of discretion about how to spend it. But it is likely to turn out to be much more complex to execute. The plan gives the Treasury something close to a $700bn blank cheque to buy troubled assets from financial institutions and either sell them on or hold them until they mature. It will have wide discretion about which assets to buy and for what prices, and what to do with them a�erwards. The powers sought by the Treasury also allow the scope of the rescue to be widened as it goes along. Although the plan initially involves buying mortgage assets - both residential and commercial, in the form of securities or loans - the Treasury secretary will have the power to buy other assets as necessary. The total pool of US mortgages is about $12,000bn. That would suggest that the $700bn earmarked by the Treasury will include bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� kompleksne načine, ezoterične prirode što čini Wall Streeta. da je teško da se valoriziju, izjavio je Ira Jersey, Kombinacija stvarne trgovine, dilerskih analitičar u Credit Suisse. procena i modela sa varirajućim inputima dala Aktiva koju drže strane institucije biće je subjektivne sudove sa malo konzistentnosti podobna da učestvuje u šemi i mada je među firmama. kupovina prvobitno ograničena na one sa Otuda slični pulovi hipotekarnih hartija "značajnim operacijama" u SAD, ograničenje od vrednosti stoje u knjigama po dramatično može da se popusti ako su sekretar Trezora različitim nivoima kod raznih firmi na Wall i čermen Federalnih rezervi uvereni da je to Streetu. neophodno za stabilizovanje tržišta. Dino Kos, raniji zvaničnik Njujorškog Izazova će verovatno biti kada iz Trezora Feda koji sada radi u istraživačkom butiku budu tražili da se odredi aktiva koja će Portales Partners, izjavio je: "Uvođenje aukcije se otkupiti i koja će se cena platiti. Gde za utvrđivanje cena za prodaju doneće nešto je to moguće, cene će se utvrditi tržišnim jasnoće dok sada imamo samo nagađanja. Ali mehanizmima, kao što su "obrnute aukcije" ako je cena niža od one iz knjiga banaka, ohna kojima vlada kupuje najje�inije ponuđene oh." hartije od vrednosti. Douglas Elmendorf iz Brookins Institute Lawrence Levine, direktor u RSM ukazuje na to da aukcije mogu da funkcionišu McGladrey, izjavio je: "Nema sumnje da može efikasno samo kada je aktiva homogena. "Hartije biti neslaganja šta je vrednost ovih hartija od od vrednosti podržane hipotekom razlikuju vrednosti." se u pogledu verovatnoće otplate po osnovu Viši zvaničnik hipotekarnog Feda kaže da su kredita i po detalji o tome kako osnovu drugih će funkcionisati Predlog Trezora karakteristika." planirana olakšica Trezor može samo skicirani i da • Veličina Fonda: do USD 7000 milijardi da radi svoje je dikcija namerno na osnovu otkupne cene aktive (ne po vlastite procene ili neodređena. prvobitnoj vrednosti) može da angažuje Teže je pitanje investicionu firmu da li obolele • Vrste aktive: hartije od vrednosti za sud o tome institucije mogu podržane stambenim ili poslovnih koje hartije od priuštiti sebi hipotekama, uz pravo sekretara Trezora vrednosti da kupi udarac na svoje i čermena Feda da uključe i druge ako i po kojoj ceni. Za sumnjive bilanse bude potrebno. sada, verovatna ako se pokaže da struktura obuhvata su ove vrednosti • Način otkupa: tržišnim mehanizmima serije nezavisnih znatno niže od "gde je to moguće" uključujući obrnute trustova koje vode onih koje su sada aukcije. menadžeri aktive markirane. Do sada iz privatnog nije bilo stvarne • Podobnost za učešće: svaka finansijska sektora. transparentnosti institucija sa značajnim poslovanjem za Prodavci će u tome kako je SAD. verovatno dobiti bilo koja od ovih deo otkupne cene toksičnih hartija • Upravljanje: menadžeri fondova u novcu a deo u od vrednosti bila privatnog sektora koje imenuje Trezor. formi neke vrste valorizovana, kapitalne note, uprkos stranica • Trajanje: otkupno ovlašćenje traje dve čime će zadržati mučnih objašnjenja godine. Trezor ima diskreciono pravo neku izloženost u kvartalnim da odluči koliko dugo će držati i kada gubicima. izveštajima sa će prodati otkupljenu aktivu �� bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� �� securities structured in complex ways, the Wall Street quarterly reports. esoteric nature of which makes them difficult to The combination of actual trades, dealer value, said Ira Jersey, analyst at Credit Suisse. estimates and models with varying inputs has Assets held by foreign institutions will resulted in subjective judgments with li�le be eligible to participate in the scheme, and consistency across firms. although the purchases are initially restricted Hence similar pools of mortgage securities to those with "significant operations" in the US, have been carried at dramatically different that restriction too can be relaxed if the Treasury levels by different Wall Street firms. secretary and the Federal Reserve chairman "The introduction of an auction to establish believe it is necessary to stabilise markets. clearing prices will result in some clarity while The challenges are likely to come when we only have guesses now" says Dino Kos, the Treasury seeks to determine what assets a former NY Fed official who now works at are to be bought and what prices paid. Where research boutique Portales Partners. "But if possible, prices will be determined by market the price is lower than where these banks were mechanisms, such as "reverse auctions" where carrying them, oh-oh." the government buys the cheapest securities Douglas Elmendorf of the Brookings on offer. Institution points out that auctions only "There is no doubt there could be tend to work efficiently when assets are disagreement on what the fair value for these homogeneous. securities is" said Lawrence Levine, director at "Mortgage-backed securities differ in the RSM McGladrey. probability of mortgage repayment and other One senior characteristics" he Fed official says said in a recent that details of analysis. how the planned Treasury proposal: The Treasury facility will work could make its are still sketchy • Size of fund: up to $700bn based on the own assessment, and the language purchase price (not the initial value) of or hire an deliberately the assets investment firm, vague. to judge which A tricky • Type of assets: residential and securities to buy question is whether commercial mortgage-backed securities, and at what price. ailing financial with discretion for the Treasury At the moment, institutions can secretary and Fed chairman to add the likely structure afford the hit to others as needed involves a series their precarious of independent balance sheets • Mode of acquisition: through market trusts run by if those values mechanisms "where possible" including private sector asset prove far lower reverse auctions managers. than where they Sellers will are marked today. • Eligibility to participate: any financial probably receive Until now there institutions with significant operations a portion of the has been no real in the US purchase price in transparency cash and a portion in how any of • Management: private sector fund in the form of some these now toxic managers appointed by Treasury sort of capital securities have note, whereby been valued, • Duration: purchase authority lasts for they will retain despite pages two years, Treasury has discretion over some exposure to of tortured how long to hold and when to sell assets losses. explanations in acquired AMERIČKI PLAN DA SE ODBACI FER VREDNOST "UBIJA GLASNIKA" B anke nemaju alternativu za računovodstvo sa fer vrednošću, rekao je vodeći ekspert za standarde, pošto su američki kongresmeni predložili suspenziju kontroverznih pravila o "mark to market" kada su odbacili predlog vlade SAD o USD 700 milijardi iskupljenja. Dok je svet posrtao prema globalnoj finansijskoj krizi, eksperti su tvrdili da su problemi Wall Streeta poništili šanse da se IFRS preuzmu u SAD. Političari SAD su pokazali svoju odvratnost prema pravilima za mark-to-market. Republikanski kritičari plana Hanka Paulsena od USD 700 milijardi za spasavanje Wall Streeta smatrali su da je najbolje suspendovati fer vrednost. Torijevski ministar finansija vlade u senci, George Osborne, ove nedelje je ponovio to gledište pozivom za tromesečnu suspenziju mark-to-market. Torijevci kažu da aktiva treba da se valorizuje u skladu sa onim što banka očekuje da dobije od nje na duži rok. Republikanski komitet za studije je objavio da bi bilo bolje valorizovati aktivu prema njenoj "stvarnoj ekonomskoj vrednosti" a ne po vrednostima izvedenih iz "kratkoročne manije". Komitet, kojim predsedava predstavnik iz Teksasa Jeb Hensarling, pokušava da progura zakon koji suspenduje računovodstvo sa markto-market. Predlog je izbacio suprotstavljena gledišta o računovodstvu fer vrednosti u prvi plan globalnih debata o rešavanju finansijske krize. Eksperti međutim ističu da ne postoji alternativa. Ken Wild koji vodi IFRS u Deloi�u, kaže: "Stvarno ne mogu da vidim koju alternativu imamo". "Na mark-to-market svalila se paljba proteklih nedelja, ali u svemu tome tu je i element "ubij glasnika". Pre 15 godina, sve je vođeno po istorijskim troškovima. Reći "uzmimo prosek" na primer pogađa me kao nonsens. Računi moraju da budu objektivni." Peter Wyman iz PricewaterhouseCoopers kaže da ovaj pokret može da umanji uporedivost među bankama. JP Morgan je takodje objavio ove nedelje da ovaj pokret može da znači "ubjanje glasnika", dok predsednik Federalnih rezervi Ben Bernanke kaže da bi takav plan ustvari štetio poverenju investitora a ne obrnuto. Spektakularni događaji prošlih nedelja mogli su takođe da nanesu udarac saglasnosti o IFRS, tvrde neki. Istraživač iz Brisela sa Bruegel Institute naveo je: "Verovatno nije bilo mudro misliti da (IFRS) mogu biti prihvaćeni na tako brz način". Izvor blizak IASB-u saopštio je da oni razumeju da u tekućoj atmosferi ima odvraćanja od IFRS, ali bord nema podataka o ponovnim evaluacijama. Ako republikanski predlog zakona bude prošao, SEC će morati da podnese iscrpan izveštaj o računovodstvu mark-to-market u roku od 90 dana pošto predlog zakona postane zakon. bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� Accountancy Age - 1.10.2008. David Jetuach �� US PLAN TO DITCH FAIR VALUE "SHOOTS THE MESSENGER" Accountancy Age - 1.10.2008. David Jetuach bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� B �� anks have no alternative to fair value accounting, a leading standards expert has said, a�er US congressmen proposed suspending the controversial "mark-to-market" rules as they struck down the US government’s $700bn (£370bn) bailout. As the world lurched towards a global financial crisis, experts also claimed that the issues on Wall Street had damaged the chances of IFRS being taken up in the US. US politicians this week made clear their distaste for the mark-to-market rules. Republican critics of Hank Paulson’s $700bn bailout for Wall Street said that it would have been be�er to suspend fair value. Tory shadow chancellor George Osborne this week echoed the view with a call for a three month suspension of mark-to-market. The Tories say the assets should be valued according to what the banks "expect to get out of them over the long term". The Republican study commi�ee said it would be be�er to mark assets to their "true economic value" rather than according to values derived from a "short term mania". The commi�ee, headed up by Texas representative Jeb Hensarling, is trying to push through a bill suspending mark-to-market accounting. The proposal has brought the contest over fair value accounting to the forefront of global debates on resolving the financial crisis. But experts say there is no alternative. "I can’t really see what alternative you’ve got" said Ken Wild IFRS leader at Deloi�e. "Mark-to-market has taken some flak in recent weeks, but there is an element of "shoot the messenger" in all of this. 15 years ago, everything was done at historical cost. Saying, "let’s just use averages" for example strikes me as a bit of a nonsense. Accounts are meant to be objective." Peter Wyman of PricewaterhouseCoopers said the move would reduce comparability between banks. JP Morgan also said this week that the move would entail "shooting the messenger", while Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke has said any such plan would actually damage investor confidence rather than the other way around. The spectacular events of the last few weeks could have also dealt a blow to IFRS convergence, some are arguing. "It was probably not very prudent to think that [IFRS] could be adopted in such a swi� way" said a research fellow from the Bruegel institute, a Brussels-based think tank. A source close to the IASB said they understood there were distractions from IFRS in the current climate, but the board has no evidence of a re-evaluation. If the Republican bill is pushed through, the SEC will also have to submit an exhaustive report on mark-to-market accounting within 90 days of the bill becoming law. SLEDI BANKARSKA BOMBA? CBS News - 10.10.2008. Kim Lengle da zaštiti. To je kao kad bi stotine ljudi mogli da kupe polise osiguranja za kuće koje ne poseduju a ipak naplaćuju punu vrednost ako izgore. Opasnost nastaje kada kompanija bude u neizvršenju a prodavac - zato što se to ne traži od njega - nema novac da isplati kod neizvršenja. Investicione firme koje su trgovale različitim derivatima, kao što su CDS, naplaćivale su u proseku USD dve milijarde provizije kvartalno protekle dve godine. A trgovci koji govore za CBS News kažu da su ove transakcije bile najveće novčane krave na Wall Streetu, čak profitabilnije od hipoteka. Ove najnovije transakcije bile su shvaćene kao lak novac i bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� "Ovaj predlog zakona, po mom sudu, čini verovatnim buduće masovne iskupe na račun poreskih obveznika. Ako želite da se kockate, idite u Las Vegas. Ako želite da trgujete derivatima, nek vam bog pomogne." To je izjavio senator iz Severne Dakote, Byron Dorgan, sa govornice u Senatu - ne ove nedelje ili prošle nedelje, niti tokom poslednjih šest meseci tokom kojih je Wall Street u kolapsu - već 1999. godine. Četiri godine kasnije u pismu akcionarima, milijarder investitor Warren Buffet u svom upozorenju nazvao je derivate "oružjem za masovno uništenje koje kontrolišu ludaci". Kada su finansijski eksperti bili zabrinuti mehurom stanogradnje i hartijama od vrednosti podržanih hipotekom, Dorgan i Buffe� su bili usmereni na - što mnogi sada veruju da može biti veliki pad sledeće cipele - tržište kreditnih derivata, bolje poznato kao svopovi neizvršenja po kreditima. Ono što najviše brine finansijske insajdere je USD 54,6 hiljada milijardi rizičnih kreditnih derivata koncentrisanih kod nekoliko banaka koje su opstale. Svopovi neizvršenja po kreditima (CDS) su ugaoni kamen tržišta kreditnih derivata sa učešćem od preko 98 procenata kreditnih derivata. Njih je teško pojmiti, regulatori ih ignorišu i jadno su iskazani u bilansima. Pojednostavljeno, CDS su polise osiguranja za stvari kao što su obveznice, krediti i dugovi privrede. Ali dve su značajne razlike: prodavac CDS ne mora da ima novac da pokrije gubitke ako hartija od vrednosti ne bude izvršena i kupac ne mora da poseduje aktivu koju želi �� THE NEXT BANKING BOMB? CBS News - 10.10.2008. Kim Lengle bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� "This bill will, in my judgment, raise the likelihood of future massive taxpayer bailouts. If you want to gamble, go to Las Vegas. If you want to trade in derivatives, God bless you." That was North Dakota Senator Byron Dorgan’s statement on the floor of the Senate - not this week or last, or even during the last six months as Wall Street collapsed - but back in 1999. Four years later in a le�er to shareholders, billionaire investor Warren Buffe� followed with his own warning, calling derivatives "weapons of financial mass destruction" controlled by "madmen". While financial experts were concerned with the housing bubble and mortgage-backed �� securities, Dorgan and Buffe� were focused on what many now believe may be the next big shoe to drop - the credit derivatives market, be�er known as credit default swaps. What worries financial insiders most is the $54. 6 trillion of risky credit derivatives concentrated among the few banks le� standing. Credit default swaps (CDS) are the cornerstone of the credit derivatives market accounting for more than 98 percent of all credit derivatives. They are difficult to understand, ignored by regulators and poorly reported on balance sheets. In simplest terms, CDS are insurance policies on things like bonds, loans and corporate debt. But there are two big differences: the seller of a CDS doesn’t need to have the money to cover losses if the security defaults, and the buyer doesn’t need to own the asset it wants to protect. It’s as if hundreds of people could buy insurance policies on houses they didn’t own yet still collect the full value if it burns down. The danger comes when the company defaults and the seller - because he’s not required to - doesn’t have the money to pay out on the default. Investment firms that traded various derivatives, such as CDS, collected an average of $2 billion in fees each quarter over the past two years. And traders who spoke to CBS News said these transactions were the largest cash cows on Wall Street, even more profitable than mortgages. The newfangled transactions were seen as easy money and many traders had the a�itude that when it blows up, it’s someone "Niko ne zna gde su (kreditni derivati), čije bilanse oni mogu da ugroze ili koliki dodatni rizik oni predstavljaju za finansijske firme. Ipak, rečeno mi je da ovaj plan ne može da zahteva regulativu i transparetntnost ovih finansijskih tržišta jer u Kongresu i Beloj kući postoji otpor", izneo je Dorgan u izjavi objašnjavajući zašto nije glasao za iskup. Mnogi veruju da su banke koje su već pretrpele gubitke od fijaska sa subprajmom suočene sa lančanim stečajevima iz tržišta kreditnih derivata. "Ako tržište nastavi da se kreće u smeru u kome je išlo do sada imaćemo mnogo neizvršenja koja su opasna stvar" izjavio je Miller. Neki ekonomski analitičari predviđaju još veću paniku tokom nekoliko narednih meseci. Kako sve više korporacija ima neizvršenja i banke nalaze da ne mogu da se naplate po svojim ugovorima, može da nastupi nova runda gubitaka za fondove i finansijske firme koja će učiniti da u poređenju sa nedavnim gubicima po hartijama od vrednosti podržanih hipotekom izgledaju vrlo mali. bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� mnogi trgovci su imali stav da kad to pukne predstavlja problem nekog drugog. Danas, isti teškaši iz komercijalnog bankarstva mislili su da su najsigurniji, JPMorgan, Citigroup Inc. i Bank of America drže 92 procenta od svih obelodanjenih ugovora o kreditnim derivatima, prema Kancelariji kontrolora valute. Ali taj broj je samo procena jer najveći deo ovih ugovora su neregulisani - privatni, najvećim delom neobelodanjeni i teški za procenjivanje. "Nema sumnje da smo na ivici litice i da će neko da padne" izjavio je Harvey Miller senior partner u Weil, Gotshal & Manges koji sada nadgleda stečaj Lehman Brothers. Još ranije, 1999. godine, kada je tekla debata o legislativi senator Dorgan se protivio konsolidaciji komercijalnih i investicionih banaka. U stvari, on je podržao dva amandmana da se zabrani ovim mega bankama ... da investiraju u derivate. Danas, Dorgan izgleda da ima isti pristup. On je bio jedan od 25 senatora koji su glasali protiv iskupa od USD 700 milijardi. �� bankarstvo 9 - �� ���� else’s problem. Today, the same commercial banking heavyweights thought to be the most safe, JPMorgan, Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America, hold 92 percent of all the disclosed credit derivative contracts, according to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. But that number is merely an estimate because the overwhelming majority of these contracts are unregulated - private, mostly undisclosed and difficult to measure. "There is no question we are at the edge of the cliff and someone is going to fall off, " said Weil, Gotshal & Manges Senior Partner Harvey Miller who is currently overseeing the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Back in 1999 when the legislation was being debated Senator Dorgan opposed the consolidation of commercial and investment banks. In fact, he sponsored two amendments to prohibit these new mega-banks from … investing in derivatives. Today, Dorgan apparently feels the same way. He was one of 25 senators who voted no on the recent $700 billion bailout. �� "No one knows where [the credit derivatives] are, whose balance sheets they may threaten, or how much additional risk they pose to financial firms. Yet, I was told this plan could not require regulation and transparency of these financial markets because there was opposition in Congress and the White House" Dorgan said in a statement explaining why he didn’t vote for the bailout. With banks already suffering losses from the subprime fiasco, many now believe they face chain reaction failures from the credit derivatives market. "If the market keeps going in the direction it’s been going, you’re going to have lots of defaults which are dangerous things" said Miller. Some economic analysts predict even more panic over next few months. As more corporations default and banks find out they can’t make good on their contracts, a new round of losses for funds and financial firms could result and make the recent losses in mortgage-backed securities seem miniscule by comparison.
