Lecture notes 5
5. Northern Ireland 3: History – the ‘Troubles’
Origins
The 1960s represented a period of growing self-assurance amongst Northern Catholics,
which caused them to articulate their rights more frankly.1 On the Protestant side, a
gradual shift in attitudes occurred towards more tolerance and inter-communal
integration. Although the Northern Irish government promised far-reaching institutional
reforms and the eradication of Catholic discrimination, all attempts to reconcile the
Catholic minority failed due to the paucity of support within the Unionist Party.2 Hence,
nationalist grievances and impatience grew and entrained the formation of civil rights
pressure groups; the most prominent among them was the Northern Irish Civil Rights
Association (NICRA), founded in 1967. Initially, these pressure groups aspired to “raise
awareness of inequality and pressurise … [the unionist government] into conceding
fundamental reforms.”3 The NICRA organised peaceful street protests, which posed a
new threat to the unionist government, as it could not easily avail itself of the police
force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), to suppress the demonstrations.4 However,
the marches developed a momentum of their own and frequently turned into violent
clashes with the RUC. By early 1969 NICRA’s leadership changed its strategy and almost
all of the liberal founding members were replaced by “young, militant, radical, Catholic
working-class activists.”5 This confirmed unionists’ suspicions that the NICRA’s objective
was to support the republican fight for Irish unification. As a consequence, the military
campaigns by loyalist paramilitary organisations like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)6
found more ready acceptance among the unionist community. The UVF sought to
destabilise the unionist government led by Terence O’Neill, whom it held responsible for
pushing forward pro-Catholic reforms. Reverend Ian Paisley and his Protestant Ulster
Party, which was renamed into the Democratic Ulster Unionist Party (DUP) in 1971, were
also extremely opposed to O’Neill’s policy. Paisley chaired the Ulster Constitution Defence
Committee (UCDC), an ultra-fundamentalist exclusively Protestant organisation, which
spearheaded the resistance against O’Neillism. Paisley had an exclusive view of evangelic
Protestantism, which denied Northern Catholics equal civil rights and also sympathised
with loyalist paramilitaries to combat Irish Catholicism.7 A national opinion poll survey
indicated that a disproportionately high share of Protestant working class people,
especially from Belfast, sympathised with Paisley’s fundamentalist ideas.8 O’Neill was
reluctant to introduce a structural reform and instead hoped that long-term economic
improvements would make the Catholic minority to accept the existence of the Northern
Irish state. O’Neill’s policies led to the belief shared by the majority of both Protestants
and Catholics that community relations between Protestants and Catholics had improved,
1
The most prominent civil rights organization which openly raised the issue of Catholic discrimination under the
Unionist regime was the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ), founded at the beginning of 1964. The CSJ
published various reports and thus raised awareness for the disadvantaged position of Catholics in Northern
Ireland in Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Its most important report was: Campaign for Social Justice,
Northern Ireland: The Plain Truth. 2nd ed. Castlefields, Dungannon: The Campaign for Social Justice in
Northern Ireland , 1969. See also Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (Houndmills and
New York: Palgrave, 2001), 76.
2
Barton 110 – 117.
3
Cf. Bardon.
4
Kennedy-Pipe 40 – 41.
5
Barton 133.
6
Connolly 563 – 564. The UVF was originally established in 1913 to coordinate the paramilitary campaign of
Ulster Unionists against Home Rule. It was revived in 1966. as a loyalist paramilitary force. During the
‘Troubles’, the UVF’s activities were primarily targeted on sectarian assaults upon the Catholic community of
Northern Ireland.
7
Paul Arthur, Government and Politics of Northern Ireland, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1994), 93 – 95.
8
Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 254 –
255.
Mag. Bert Preiss
page 1 (4)
11.11.2006
Lecture notes 5
yet they did not weaken their fundamentally opposed political outlooks and ideologies.9
Thus, facing resistance even in his own party, O’Neill resigned, eventually, in April 1969,
leaving the unionist party behind in a state of weakness and dissension.10
Outbreak
At that time, Londonderry, or Derry, as the Catholics prefer to call Northern Ireland's
second major city, was the centre of violent clashes between armed nationalist and
unionist groups. The traditional annual parades, held by the Orange Order,11 brought
sectarian riots to further escalation, with violence erupting throughout the province. After
all, the unionist government saw no other way of restoring peace and order than calling
for aid of the British army. Finally, in August 1969, British troops arrived in Northern
Ireland.12 The presence of the British army outraged republicans and furthered the
emergence of the Provisional IRA (PIRA).13 When its members, the so-called
‘Provisionals’, launched their military campaign, they aimed by means of paramilitary
force to “drive the ‘Brits out’ and establish a thirty-two county Irish Republic.”14 Besides,
their short-term objective was to destabilise the unionist government and to persuade
the Irish Republic to intervene in Northern Ireland.
Although there was a growing feeling of solidarity with the nationalist minority in the
North, the Irish government did not want to get directly entangled in the conflict.15 The
PIRA had more success in provoking loyalist paramilitaries to retaliatory violence. Most of
these attacks were committed by the Ulster Defence Association (UDA).16 Meanwhile, the
British government pressurised the unionist leadership into introducing institutional
reforms that would eventually eliminate Catholic discrimination. There was some hope for
political settlement, when two new parties were founded: the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP), who was committed to constitutional nationalism, and the nonsectarian Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI).17 Nonetheless, all these
developments did not have the necessary effects to reconcile the Catholic community,
since wide-ranging constitutional and political changes failed, due to the resistance of the
majority of Unionist Party members.18 Thus, a growing number of nationalists,
particularly young working-class people from suburban regions, felt attracted by the
PIRA. The fateful decision of the unionist administration in August 1971 to introduce
internment of terrorist suspects without prior trial as well as the aggressive conduct of
the British army in enforcing this order, fuelled paramilitary violence and alienated
9
According to Rose’s study, 65% of Catholics and 56% of Protestants believed that community relations got
better under O’Neill’s government. Rose 300 – 301. On the ideological rift between the communities see Frank
Burton (1979) “Ideological Social Relations in Northern Ireland.” The British Journal of Sociology, 30, 1: 61-80.
10
Hennessey 161 – 162.
11
Connolly 415. The Orange Order is a Protestant political society established in 1795 to celebrate the memory
and the victory of the Protestant King William of Orange in 1690 at the Boyne. Despite several attempts of
dissociation, the Order still remains closely linked to Ulster unionism and its political leadership.
12
Hennessey 162 – 167.
13
Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, Northern Ireland’s Troubles: The Human Costs (London:
Pluto Press, 1999), 11 and 14. The PIRA was founded in 1970 as a splinter group by members of the IRA,
expressing their dissatisfaction with the apathetic attitude and leftwing policy of the ‘Official IRA’. Yet, despite
several clashes between the two factions, the ‘Officials’ remained the official voice of the entire republican
movement.
14
Barton 140. See also Brendan O’Brien (1995) The Long War: The IRA & Sinn Féin – from Armed Struggle to
Peace Talks (Dublin: The O’Brien Press, 1995), 89 – 90.
15
Barton 146. In September 1969 the then Taoiseach [Irish Prime Minister] Jack Lynch defined the policy of the
Republic of Ireland regarding to Northern Ireland as a long-term objective “of seeking unity through agreement
in Ireland between Irishmen (Jack Lynch. The Situation in the Six Counties of the North-East Ireland. Dublin:
Irish Government, 1969, 2; available online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/docs/lynch/lynch69.htm).”
16
Connolly 560. The UDA evolved from Protestant vigilante groups in 1971 and started its assassination
campaign in response to IRA sniping and bombing attacks. It soon became the largest loyalist paramilitary unit.
17
Initially, the two parties absorbed the bulk of the electorate of the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP),
which eventually evaporated in 1987. For a brief account of the NILP, see John Cannon, ed., The Oxford
Companion to British History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 692.
18
Hennessey 184 – 187.
Mag. Bert Preiss
page 2 (4)
11.11.2006
Lecture notes 5
Northern nationalists even further.19
The Fall of Stormont, Sunningdale and Direct Rule
After the events of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 in Derry, where thirteen unarmed
Catholics were shot dead by British soldiers.20 reprisals and attacks the failure of British
and unionist politics became apparent; in the end, the Stormont Parliament was
suspended and British direct rule was imposed on Northern Ireland. Thus, fifty years of
unionist rule were over and executive authority was transferred to a Secretary of State.21
The most violent year of the conflict with 467 casualties22 increased British efforts to
solve the conflict. In December 1973, the British government succeeded in its initiative to
form a power-sharing executive with the moderate political parties of Northern Ireland,
namely, the UUP, the SDLP, and the APNI. In the Sunningdale Agreement, nationalists
and unionists for the first time reached a compromise on the future status of Northern
Ireland by making it dependent on the majority wish of the people, whether they wanted
to remain part of the UK or become part of a united Ireland.23 Moreover, the agreement
contained a clause concerning the establishment of a Council of Ireland with a vaguely
defined role of participation in decision-making for the Republic. This ‘Irish dimension’
provoked unionist opposition to the new constitution and, likewise, only had little
supportive effects for the Catholic minority.24 In addition, the Sunningdale Executive was
vested with only limited legislative and executive powers, and lacked sufficient political
and public endorsement in Britain. As a response to Sunningdale, PIRA launched a heavy
bombing campaign in spring 1974. The Executive also faced fierce opposition within the
unionist community, which culminated in the general strike of the Ulster Workers’
Council.25 All these factors contributed to the fall of this “first cross-community cabinet
ever formed in Northern Ireland's history”26 on 28 May 1974. Direct Rule from
Westminster was reinstalled soon after this ‘intermezzo’ and for the ensuing ten years,
despite several attempts at devolution, the conflict persisted at a high level of violence.
On the nationalist side, the Sinn Féin party (SF), as the political arm of the IRA, became
increasingly popular among the Catholic minority, while the PIRA prepared for a long
armed struggle. The fatal hunger strikes of ten republican inmates of the Maze prison in
1981 represented a major turning point in that it provided the platform for the
Republican strategy of ‘the Armalite and the ballot box’, with the emergence of Sinn Fein
as a creditable force in Nationalist politics. The period is also characterised by the strong
emotional allegiance from Catholics and from world opinion which the prisoners’ protest
attracted. Thus it fuelled the support for the republican movement even more.27 The
unionists on their part sought to strengthen the union with Great Britain and bound
themselves closer to the British Conservative government, whereas the loyalist
19
Kennedy-Pipe 57.
It is recommended to read The Widgery Tribunal Report, published on April 19, 1972, in connection with the
Irish Government Assessment of the Widgery Tribunal Report, in order to put that event into context. The
shortcomings of the report claimed by the relatives of the victims of Bloody Sunday finally led to a re-opening
of the investigations. On 29 January 1998 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that there would be a
new inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Saville. However, after extensive hearings the final report is still
not published yet. For the present state of the inquiry see The Bloody Sunday Inquiry (http://www.bloodysunday-inquiry.org/).
21
Hennessey 206 – 208.
22
Malcolm Sutton, ed., An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969 – 1993: Bear in Mind these Dead
… (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994), 206.
23
For a full text of the Sunningdale Agreement, see Fionnula McKenna, research, “The Sunningdale Agreement
– December 1973.” CAIN Web Service (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm).
24
David George Boyce, The Irish question and British politics, 1868 – 1996 (London: MacMillan Press, 1996),
119.
25
Dixon, 150 – 153.
26
Barton 158.
27
The spokesperson of the hunger-strikers, Bobby Sands, who became a legend of the republican movement,
was elected as a member of the British parliament. He died on 5 May 1981. The hunger strikes finally ended on
3 October 1981. An extensive analysis of the hunger strikes has been carried out by Padraig O’Malley, Biting at
the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).
20
Mag. Bert Preiss
page 3 (4)
11.11.2006
Lecture notes 5
paramilitaries continued their violent attacks on nationalists. Meanwhile, the British
government took several steps to improve the economic and social situation of Northern
Ireland, although with only moderate success.28
28
Barton 176. For instance, the unemployment rate in the early 1980s, especially of male Catholic adults, was
consistently higher in the province and the regional growth rate remained at a substantially lower level than in
Britain.
Mag. Bert Preiss
page 4 (4)
11.11.2006