LIN HU
Arizona State University
Placement Director: Manjira Datta
Placement Coordinator: Joanne Pelton
Manjira.Datta@asu.edu
Joanne.Pelton@asu.edu
Office Contact Information:
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Main Campus
PO BOX 879801
Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
Lin.Hu@asu.edu
(602) 909-6756
Undergraduate and Master’s Studies:
MPhil, Economics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
BA and BSc, Economics and Mathematics, Wuhan University
Graduate Studies:
Arizona State University, 2008 to present
Thesis Title: “Essays on Political Economy”
Expected Completion Date: June 2014
References:
Professor Amanda Friedenberg (Advisor)
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Amanda.Friedenberg@asu.edu
(480) 727-7943
Professor Hector Chade
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Hector.Chade@asu.edu
(480) 727-4714
Professor Alejandro M. Manelli
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Alejandro.Manelli@asu.edu
(480) 965-4682
Professor Dan Silverman
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Dan.Silverman.1@asu.edu
(480) 965-4832
Other Studies:
Empirical Implication of Theoretical Models, University of Chicago, Summer 2011
Department of Politics, New York University (Visiting), Spring 2012 Research Fields:
Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics
(480) 965-6433
(480) 727-7931
Teaching Experience:
Instructor, Undergraduate Level, Arizona State University:
Summer 2010
Microeconomic Principles
Teaching Assistant, PhD Level, Arizona State University:
Fall 2013, 2010
Microeconomic Analysis I (PhD), Professor Edward Schlee
Spring 2011
Microeconomic Analysis II, Professor Madhav Chandrasekher
Spring 2012
Game Theory, Professor Amanda Friedenberg
Teaching Assistant, Undergraduate Level, Arizona State University:
Spring 2013
Intermediate Microeconomics Theory (Grader), Professor Ying Chen
Game Theory & Economic Behavior (Grader), Professor Ying Chen
Public Economics (Grader), Professor Dan Silverman
Fall 2012
Industrial Organization (Grader), Professor John McDowell
Fall 2011
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory (Grader), Professor Galina Vereshchagina
Spring 2009, 2010 Microeconomic Principles, Professor Nancy Roberts
Fall 2008, 2009
Macroeconomic Principles, Professor Matthew Croucher
Professional Activities:
Presentations:
“Ideology vs. Pork: Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Systems”
2014
Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association
2013
Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association
“Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Proposal Power”
2011
Empirical Implication of Theoretical Models, University of Chicago
Referee: Public Choice
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:
2012 Rondthaler Award (Outstanding Performance on Dissertation Research)
2011
NSF Funded Empirical Implication of Theoretical Models Fellowship
2010
Microeconomics Student Assistant Award, Arizona State University
2009
Hardison Award (Outstanding Performance on the Macroeconomic Qualifying
Exam), Arizona State University
2008-Present
Graduate Assistantship, Arizona State University
Working Papers:
“Ideology vs. Pork: Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Systems” (Job Market Paper)
In parliamentary democracies, the executive branch consists of a set of parties, called the Government. Across
parliamentary democracies, Governments differ in both the composition of the Government and government outcomes.
This paper asks how parliamentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government and
government outcomes. It addresses this question through structural estimation. Toward this end, it builds a model of
coalition formation in parliamentary democracies, where parties care about and bargain over both policy and office
perks. It estimates the model using data from western European parliamentary democracies. It uses the estimated
model to conduct counterfactual institutional experiments. The results have a number of important implications for
constitutional design. First, choosing an institution that maximizes government duration may come with significant
ideological losses for voters. On the other hand, choosing an institution that minimizes voters' ideological losses may
not come at a large cost in terms of government duration. Second, there are important synergies between institutional
rules. Whether adding a particular institution improves or worsens government outcomes often depends on the broader
institutional environment.
Work in Progress:
“Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Proposal Power”
Are high quality politicians more likely to have proposal power? I address this question by building a formal model, in
which legislators are more likely to have proposal power when they bring a larger expected future budget to the table.
In the model, if legislators have proposal power, then on average they get a higher level of pork for their districts (in
equilibrium). If they are high quality legislators, this implies that they are more likely to bring in more tax revenue, i.e.
bring in a larger budget for the following year. I first consider a benchmark case, in which a legislator can only invest
pork in one project. I show that a high quality legislator is more likely to be recognized as the proposer. I then consider
an alternative setting, in which a legislator can invest pork in multiple projects with different risk levels. I show that a
high quality legislator may be less likely (than a low quality legislator) to be recognized as the proposer.
“Voters and Governments: The Impact of Voters on Coalition Formation”
This paper views voters’ decisions as an endogenous component of the coalition formation process. It seeks to
understand how voter diversity influences the composition of coalitions and coalitional outcomes. This project is a
follow up to “Ideology vs. Pork: Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Systems.” Unlike the previous paper, this project
endogenizes voters' electoral decisions. Thus, the paper can speak to the effect of parliamentary characteristics and
institutions on welfare, based on the ideological make-up of voters.