I SPECIAL ISSUE I
U.P. ASSESSMENT PROJECT
ON THE
STATE OF THE NATION
THE FAILED
DECEMBER COUP
View from the UP Community
BELINDA A. AQUINO
Editor
University a/the Philippines
Office of the Vice President for Public Affairs
in co,yunction with
Center for Integrative and Development Studies
Diliman, Quezon City
Maren 1990
About the Center For Integretlve end Development Studies
The UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIOS)
was established In September t 985 to promote Interdisciplinary and
Integrative studies on crttical topics bearing on development policies
and Issues. These studies should address slgnfficant concems 01
Philippine society In that they deal wnh problems whose understanding and resolution have Important Implications for the well-being
01 major sectors 01 the country.
The Center seeks to initiate and support broad research topics that
call for Innovative methodological approaches and muni-disclplinary
collaboration. While public policy questions are the primary concern
of lIP-CIOS, n also encourages basic research that Is needed to Inform
Intelligently the direction and substance of policy-oriented research.
The Center functions under the Office of the UP President, currently
Prof. Jose V. Abueva. For further Information, contact: Dr. C.rolln. O.
Hem.ndez, Director, UP-CIDS, PeED Hoefer, UP Dlllmen, Quezon City. Tel.
17-3540, 99-9691 and 97-6061 I~I 518.
Contents
t
'ntroductlon
I
II
N~.
T~e Failed Coup and the Politics of
Violence
1
By Belinda A. Aquino, Vice-Presidenf for Public
A!fal~s and Pr?fes~orof Political Science and
PUblic Admmlstratlon, University of the
Phlllppmes
1
,!
AbDut the National Assessment Project
The National Assessment Project was launched under UP President
Jose V. Abueva's initiative in late 1988 to inquire into the current state
Of the nation using eight vnal areas cf Philippine society. It seeks to
involve various faculty on all campuses to contribute, through research efforts, to the full and authoritative assessment of our nation:
ns people, their well-being, welfare, values, resources and Instnutions.
Part ONE
I,
j
Administered by UP-CIOS, the Project hopes to identify weaknesses and strengths in policies, programs and other measures that
are currently being epplied to the resolution of our national problems.
It is an ambitious undertaking, but given the extensive resources at
the University communny, n should be possible to generate wellthought out crniques and suggestions regarding the State 01 the
Nation.
The December Coup Attempt and the
State of the Nation
6
By J?se If. Abueva, PreSident and Professor of
PoMlcal SCIence and PUblic Administration
UniverSIty of the Philippines
Part Two
A Time for Hard Decisions
18
By the School of Economics, UP Diliman
For further information, contact UP-CIOS at the above address and
number
• • • • 0, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
.
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Emergency Powers for the President
. ~~.~e..
COllege of Law, UP Diliman
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29
•..•.••.....•..•..••.....•.....••..•
A Historic OPportunity to Renew
Democracy and Society
34
By th,!.SChoof of Labor and fndustriaf Relation
UP Dillman
s
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Self-Regulation not Repress/on
By the.COllege of Mass Communication
UP Dillman
•,
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1
I
INTRODUCTION
THE FAILED COUP AND THE
POLITICS OF VIOLENCE
I!
By Belinda A. Aquino
Vice President Cor Public Affairs and
ProCessor oC Political Science and Public Administration
University oethe Philippines
I
t is distasteful, Wnot frightening, but whether we like tt or not,
the coup d'etat (kudeta) has become part of the contemporary Filipino polttical landscape. The fact that we have
quickly incorporated the term kudeta Into our political
vocabulary is a sign that tts reamy is established in our day-to·
day lives. At the very least, tt has become a household word
in Philippine polttics, something we have to live wtth.
We are still feeling the effects a the coup attempt last
December, the bloodiest so far since the AqUino governmant
assumed power In February 1986, following the EDSA revolution. Years later, when we look back at the presidency of Cory
AqUino, we will readily see that tts distinguishing characteristic
was fts attempts to weather the polttics of violence spawned
by the overweening ambttions of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) leaders and their cohorts to rule Philippine society.
There are less than 800 days left to AqUino's term and the
general wish at least is that she last until the scheduled
presidential election in 1992. In a sense, this is a sad commentary on a presidency that was gloriously Installed by a "people
power" revolution not so long ago. We had such high, albeft
unrealistic, hopes for and expectations from tt. Perhaps that
was what was wrong all this time. Things were not going to
change simply because we had overthrown the dictator. Now
we see a popular presidency ending up In a lame-duck position trying to hang on until tts legftlmate expiration in 1992. The
persistent threats to fts axlstence have taken their toll. They
have reduced the energies of the current leadership to sheer
polttical survival. ft started wfth a bang, as the expression
goes. let us hope ft does not end up in tears as well as In
blood.
The 1989 kudeta has been the subject of profuse and
profound commentaries by media, academics, buslnass
2
3
groups, religious circles, International observers, and ordinary people. And as usual, In our own Filipino wey, we have
accepted the term as part of our everyday IWe, making Rthe
tRle of sklls and even associating RwRh the occasion of love,
e.g., "Valentine coup." We have become "Kudeta Country."
There is something in the Filipino polllical cuRure that converts serious events of a IWe-and-death nature, such as assassinations, kudetas, Insurgencies, etc., into material tor humor
and mundane conversations. And as we wrRe this, we are
certain there are already 35 jOkes that have been coined by
pundlls related to the last kudeta.
east Central Europe, eastern Europe with a small 'e,' and
above ell, Individual peoples, nations, and states." ("Eastern
Europe: The Year of Truth," The New York Review of Books,
February 15, 1990, p. 17).
The remarkable thing about all these revolutions on the
other side of the globe was the absence of violence, except in
the case of Romania. Instead, the young demonstrators In
East Berlin and Prague, for instance, laid candles on the
ground In front·of the police, reminiscent of our own EDSA
revolution In 1986.
But the 1989 kudeta In the Philippines was something else.
It was the anti-thesis of the non-violent revolutions in Eastern
Europe toward democratic rule. In Manila, the conspirators
were taking the 0pposlle tack of storming Malacanang on a
prelude to a poillics of violence. These self-styled RAM retormists are actually frustrated men intent on seizing power. Their
frustrations have accumulated since the waning days of the
Marcos regime when "people power" pre-empted their
original prospect of bringing down the dictator themselves.
They were robbed of their supreme moment of glory. They
had to try again, even under conditions of peace and
democracy. They have gone so far as to sound revolutionary
by calling themselves Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang
Makabansa (Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance) and Soldiers
of the Filipino People (SFP).
But on a more serious level, the kudeta last December really
jolted ordinary cRizens off their seats. nwas not so much that
II happened. Previous coup attempts, particularly the one In
August 1987, had somehow' created the sense that Rwould
happen again. It was the 1989 attempt's firepower and sophistication that brought home liS "stark reality" to the ordinary
Filipino. And while the 1987 putsch took only a matter of hours
to quell, II was taking days, in fact a full week, for the government 10 contain the 1989 one. Were II not for tho timely
"persuasion flights" (read: intervention) of the U.S. F-4 phantom jets from Clark Airbase on the Malacanang airspace, we
might be liVing under the aegis of a military junta today. This
is another issue altogether and we will not really delve into this
in this brief introduction.
Thus what comes out of all these is the increasing ability of
coup plotters to mount destabilization offensives wilh Impunity and the diminishing capacity on the pM of the civilian
leadership to pre-empt or prevent them. This is a damaging
impression that causes ordinary citizens to lose fallh in the
ablity of their leaders to protect them in times of grave crisis.
There is already so much lawlessness in other sectors to
begin wllh. The integrity of the civilian poillicalleadership Is at
stake in such slluations. Its vulnorability to the ever-shifting
currents of polhical Change is not something that re-assures
and strengthens the Filipino body poillic.
all a deeper level, what does II all mean-what has become
of Philippine politics? It is a season of seismic upheavals, of
polltical change, violent and otherwise, of turning points In
contemporary history. At the time that we were having our
taste ot a real kudeta lasl December, Eastern Europe was
undergoing lis own winter of severe political discontents. The
Iron Curtain came down, the Berlin Wall was torn open,
Romania executed lis long-standing tyrant, and Czechoslovakia installed a pla:ywright as head of state.
It is a time of revolutions, a "springtime of societies aspiring
to be civil," according to wrner Timothy Garton Ash. ·Civll"
translates to a lot of things: democratic, non-violent, free. ·If
we can no longer talk of communism," Ash continues, ·we
shculd no longer talk of Eastern Europe, at least with a capllal
E for Eastern. Instead, we shall have central Europe again,
I
f
To be critical of the RAM for their misbegotten dreams and
violent ambitions is not to endorse the Aquino government
without reservation. TLe latter too must be faulted for not
showing greater decisiveness in confronting the basic
problems of the country. By lis lapses and ineptness, rt has
exacerbated the conditions which promote structural violence
in the society. The drift, disarray and corruption in the civilian
leadership always Invlle attempts to grab power by organized
atternatlve groups. The concept of "civilian supremacy" Is
meaningless wllhout substance and integrity.
The ongoing debate on the latest kUdeta has not exhausted
all the answers to and explanations of the current Philippine
crisis. Its ramifications are still unfolding. And lis complexllies
are being unravelled by a presidential commission. Whatever
the findings are, the fact is, as we have indicated in the
beginning, the kudeta has become a familiar phenomenon on
the Filipino political scene.
In an effort to get a broader range of views on the matter,
University of the Philippines (UP) President Jose V. Abueva
sounded out the various UP constlluencles when the kudeta
struck last December. The response was quick and extensive.
ObViously the kudeta touched a raw nerve on the UP body
poillic. The collective response was one of shock and out~
rage. Some unlls which have been researching basic Philippine problems for sometime found this occasion as an
opportunity to articulate their suggestions for governmental
4
5
reform as a way to discourage future kudetas. Others confined themselves to analyzing the causes of the kudeta.
"Our worst enemy today Is our bed qualitiesIndifference to POb/1e affalrs, conceit, ambition,
selfishness, the pursuit Of personal advance..
ment, and r1val'Y-and that Is the maln struggle we are faced with.
This volume puts together the thinking, reactions, responses and reflections of a cross-section of the UP community
wnh regard to the failed December coup. These reactions
came in various forms-from one-page resolutions to 30page posnlon papers. The comprehensive article by President Abueva sets the tone for the volume. This first section
projects nine major points related to the meanings, lessons
and Implications of the failed coup. It analyzes the event in the
context of the state of the nation as a whole.
"We are going Into free elections, and an election bellie. Let us not allow that ballie to SUlly
the stili clean face Of our gentle revolution ... "
(The New York Review Of Books, 15
Februa'Y 1990, p. 22.)
With ~~e example Of Havel, It Is tempting to end with the
propoSitIon that more artists and Intellectuals should be
elected.l?resldents, prime ministers and chiefs of state. Havel
exemplilles ~he politics of morality, not violence. This is not the
moral!'Y of bom-agaln" Christian fundamentalism. It Is the
morality.of non-violent political change, the pursuit of peace,
the positive uses of power, and the forging Of a national
consensus in the context Of democratic pluralism.
The second section is composed of nine contributions from
various university campuses, schools and departments combining analysis, expressions of sentiment, and recommendations for reform. The lead article here, "A TIme for Hard
Decisions" by the School of Economics in UP Diliman, contains wide-ranging suggestions for social and economic
reform. It has been extensively quoted in various academic
and professional circles. The rest of the articles in this section
come from the constnuent university campuses In Manila, Los
Banns, and Visayas, and from specilic departments and colleges in UP Diliman.
The third part consists of shorter statements from various
colleges, departments, faculty, and a student leader. There Is
a unanimous condemnation of the December kudeta, but at
the same time there are criticisms of the performance and
excesses of the current civilian leadership.
We referred earlier to the peaceful revolutions In Eastem
Europe to dramatize the contrast wilh our own Increasingly
disturbing polnics of violence. It is filling to Include here parts
of a statement from neWly-Installed premier Vaclav Havel of
Czechoslovakia, a playwright of not only considerable
creativity but also of morality. In fact he believes porrtlcs
should be grounded on morality. Below Is an excerpt of his
New Year's Day speech:
"Masa'Yk founded his polilics on morality. Let
us t'Y In a new time and In a new way, to revive
this concept of polillcs. Let us teach both ourselves and others that politics ought to be a
reflection of the aspiration to contribute to the
happiness of the community and not of the
need to deceive or pillage the community. Let
us teach both ourselves and others that
polnics does not have to be the art of the possible, especially iI this means the art of
speculating, calculating, Intrigues, secret
agreements, and pragmatic manueverlng, but
that It also can be the art of the Impossible,
that Is the art of making both ourselves and the
world beller.
I
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,
. We wo~ld like to mention by way of ending that the pUblication of ~~IS volume has been supported by the UnIVersity of
the ~hllopplnes Center for Integrative and Development
StUdIes (UP-CIDS) In conjunction with the National Assessment Project on the State of the Nation. Since this volume Is
dealing with a topic that was not part of the original proposal
for ~he State of the Nation project, In the sense that It was not
anticipated, we are Issuing II as a Special Issue of the project
7
6
Against heavy odds, our economy seemed clearly to recover.
We strove to assert our sovereignty, independence and national identity. But the damage and setback of the previous
two decades, including a crushing $28-billion foreign debt,
and some basic and continuing problems of a longer period,
such as massive poverty, ineqUity, injustice, underdevelopment, a cultural inferiority complex, and a surging popUlation,
would continue to block or slow down the progress many of
us so badly sought. We realize more than ever how far we had
fallen behind the Newly Industrializing Economies of Taiwan,
South Korea, Singapore and Hongkong. Even other ASEAN
countries were advancing faster: Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.
PART One
THE DECEMBER 1989 COUP
ATTEMPT AND THE STATE OF THE
NATION: SOME LESSONS AND
IMPLICATIONS
Reflecting on ourselves and our predicament, by and large,
we appear unable as a people to achieve and hold on to a
solid consensus on our goals and purposes, to gain the larger
and longer view, to get our several acts together, to rise
above our selfish and parochial interests, to acl boldly and
resolutely enough to come to grips with basic national issues
and problems and reduce our dependency on other
countries, to assert strongly our national sovereignty, independence and self-determination to serve the best inlerests of
the majority of our people and not only of those who control
the levers of power and decision-making.
_:»:JJt4llll
Uy Jose ~ Abueva
Prf'sident and professor or Politicol Science and
Public Administration
Uni\ICr!':ity of the Philippines
n the months just before and especially during the sixth and
most deadly and destructive coup attempt of Decembef
1-7 1989 we saw our own ever more sharply and painfully as
a t'ragmented, violence-prone nation, a fragile, elitist
democracy, a dissonant cullure, a vulnerable and dependent
economy.
I
Ironically 1989 was a year of momentous change towards
world peace and democracy. In astonishment and awe,
humankind wllnessed a peaceful global revolution against
Communism in Poland, Hungary, East Germany a':ld
Czechoslovakia. Romania overthrew lis violent Communist
dictatorship. Earlier on, Chinese students and cllizens
demanded democratic reforms at TIananmen Square, but
were brutally suppressed. The East-West Cold War was ending the Berlin Wall made obsolete. Wllh inter-state tension
relax'ing, the prospects for democratization of societies im·
proved.
After the snap election and EDSA revolution In February
1986 we thought that unlled and peacefUlly, we had finally
broken the grip of the 14-year old Marcos dictatorship.
Despile the coup attempts, the Communist insurgency and
the MNLF, we had begun to revive our democratic instllutions.
Let us leave that fast, macro scanning and now focus on a
few perceptions and observations made vivid in the week of
the sixth coup artempt.
I
Point One. The fragility of our constitutional democracy and the instability of our politicat system derive from a basic problem: the
serious disagreement by significant mmtant constituencies concerning such fundamentals as the desired socio-economic and political
system and the manner of effecting political change and succession.
We know there are at least three groups Violently challeng·
ing our conSlllutional democracy: (1) the Authoritarian Right
(the military rebels and their political and business supporters,
inclUding some Marcos loyalists); (2) the Authoritarian Left
(CPP/NPA-NDF); and (3) the armed secessionist Muslim
rebels who continue to use force or the threat of violence to
pursue their ends. Other groups use peaceful means to influence, transform or replace the present system. Among
these are the Popular Democrats, the Liberal Democrats, the
8
9
Socialists, the proponents of the Mindanao Independence
Movement (MIM), and other moderately-inclined groups.
PoInt lWo: To repeat, most citizens all over the country want
aca
and peaceful means of resolving connicts and bringing about f::ces.
~ry changes. They therefore support our constitutional democracy
ey demand punishment for the rebels and their backers, especial:
Iy their leaders. At the same time the people are increasin Iy dis
satisfred and impatient with our government's performance. g
-
In contrast, in dynamically stable polijical systems, most
competing political groups accept those fundamentals I have
cited. They contend with each other peacefully, largely over
political leadership, the general direction of the government
and specific policies.
In the global surge toward peace and democracy, the
groups mounting the violent challenges to our constitutional
democracy are manifestly anachronistic, retrogressive and
parochial. Some Marcos loyalists and other ambijious
politicians opposed to President AqUino, in tactical alliance
with the military rebels, seek to grab political power and
govern through a mjJjtary~civilian junta. Like the Communists,
the fascist coalition of forces of the Right are defying the
desire for peace, democracy and non-violent change of
majority of the people, and exploiting their hardships and
dissatisfaction with the government.
There is empirical evidence that while the great majority of
Filipinos are pro-democracy and prefer peaceful change,
significant minorities are inclined to authoritarianism and
violent change. Thus, 67 percent of Metro Manilans surveyed
by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) on December 11-18,
1989 disagreed that the military rebels' reason justified the
December coup, but 30 percent agreed. Forty-eight percent
agreed that "the true objective of the rebels was to grab power
for themselves or civilian backers," but 24 percent disagreed.
Also about 48 percent disagreed with this statement posed by
the survey: "If the President is not performing her duties
properly, any group within the military has reason to overthrow her, even by force." But 28 percent agreed. Thus, we
have a significant number of people who are disloyal to
constitutional democracy, and the dUly-constituted government, and who condone the use of force in seeking changes
in our society.
It should be noted, however, that the survey covered only
500 respondents In the Metro Manila area.
These observations were borne out by an outpourin of
pUblic Opinion expressed in the media and in numerous ~ora
around the country In the wake of the failed coup. The rebels
and the" supporters were seen as power grabbers and mercenanes rather than reformers.
.The post-~oup survey of public opinion in Metro Manila
Clled above Indicated the following sampling of opinions:
• Coup attempt of 1989 even more unpopUlar than that
of 1987.
•
• Pro-government forces again seen as heroes and
rebels as villains.
I
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• Presidential performance rating bounces back up.
• Reb.el ration~lizations for coup have basis as factual
SOCial conditIOns, but do not justify coup.
• Rebel intentions no longer given benefit of the daub!.
• Public wants tougher disciplinary action against
rebels.
• Even if rebels won, the pUblic would not have collaborated.
• Call for (Vice-President Salvador) Laurel and (Senator
Juan Ponce) Ennle, not (President) AqUino, to resign.
When asked what reasons led to the coup attempt the
respondents cijed the fallowing:
'
• Very low pay/benefits of military (73%).
• Too much graft and corruption (69%).
• Difficult life for most Filipinos (69%).
• Hard to relay complaints to President (67%).
11
10
• Neglect of basic needs of Filipinos (660/0).
• Weak/indecisive leadership in military (63%).
• Favoritism in mifitary promotions (59%).
• Low regard for military by government officials (58%).
• Weak/indecisive leadership in government (57%).
• Communist-leaning high government officials (55%).
The putschists and their civilian allies timed the Decembe;
;~~gr~~dc~~~~e~~~;i~~n~d':n~~~~h~~~~: c~~~ft~~~;~~~I~d
citizen discontent regarding the governm e.nt. ~hpep~~~~:~SP
I I ted that they would have the peop le s s
.
~~~~~ of Economics identified these conditions as follows:
(a) a severe transport crisis; (b) power failure;
(cldissatisfaction among farmers ove~ lagging
real incomes and perceived discnml~at!on
against their sector; (d) ill-conceived and III-Implemented
salary-standardization. among
government empioyees; (e) recent Increases
in the price of fuel; (f) a perceived apathy on
the part of the three branche.s of governme~t
to address the issues affectln~ the people s
daily lives, especially the legislative and the executive, which have been preoccupIed With
petty political maneuvers and the expansion of
perquisites; and (g) a series of sc~ndals Involving government officials in possible cases
of graft and corruption. (See. ~Ch?OI of
Economics, "A Time for Hard DeCIsions , Dec.
6, 1989, in this issue.)
Point Three. Civilian authority and our constitutional ~~mocrac'{"~~:
greatly dependent for their survival on the loyal Arme
orces
Philippmes. (AFP)
In the six coup attempts In nearly four years, the AFP as a
whole and the civilian police have demonstrated therr ~~~~
and commftment to our consmutional democracy an
~"
chosen leaders. And yet the December co~p attempt a~so
involved many more rebels, wfth greater frrepower, an a
much longer time to conclude. It resuned in greater losses in
lives and property and military resources and in discouraging
potentia/Investors and tourists. In the end the military rebels
In Makatl were allowed to "retum to the barracks· In their
uniforms and fully armed, marching like victors rather than
vanquished, proudly defiant and self-justified. Moreover, as
one commentator said: "The costs Of the last coup can only
be marginaRy indicated by the damage inflicted on material
property, or by the number Of military men and civilians killed
and injured, or even the shaltered nerves of a distraught
administration. The full costs of the coup can only be indicated by the damage ft has wrought on our national psyche.·
(Felipe B. Miranda, Newaday, Dec. 5, t989).
Against the reality that we have a new Constitution guaranteeing the privacy of civilian authority, the regular election of
national and local leaders, a mulli·party system, and a reform
and independent judiciary, It was apparent that the survival of
these newly restored democratic institutions hung in the
balance from December 1 to 7. Their survival depended critically on the capacity of the loyal Armed Forces, legally under
the civilian Commander-In-Chief but of course commanded
by the officer corps, to defeat the rebel forces. As the divided
military fought to determine the fate of our tragile democracy,
our civilian leaders were relegated to a secondary, supportIVe
role.
Only a few days earlier, the military had to face Muslim rebels
who threatened the peaceful and orderly conduct of the plebiscite on Muslim Mindanao autonomy. And the military also
still has to contend wfth the continuing assaults of the
CPP/NPA.
Clearly, most of our leaders and tltizens feel apprecla/lVe
and grateful to the defenders Of our freedom and democracy,
and favor belter treatment of and greater support to the
military and the police.
Point Four: Events and circumstances during the latest coup attempt
may have increased our dependence on US military assistance; this
has further consequences. We must resolve to reduce this dependency.
By the loss of our milftary hardware and by calling tor US
"persuasion flights" in support of the AFp, on the advice ot the
Secretary ot National Defense and the Chiet of Staff, an ar-
____
_
...:1~2:...
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13
act by President
on US
guably justWlable and certaInIy ~pu Iardependence
Aquino, we have probably Increase our n the US use 01
milttary. aSSlsbtancem·Tahyeh~:n;::nC:I::~~~ced. Related to
the AFP and the
our mllnary ases
orts to assert
this the close symbiotic relations betwet;ln.
US milttary could also complicate natlonallstlcleIJ . the US
our national sovereignty and Independence v s-a-Vls
.
We must continue to strengthen our milttary, Wlhlie graduThallye
. ..
e and law and order mprove.
r~duclng ns sIZe as
make tt more seW-reliant, lhat Is to
biggerta~k'i how:ver,~dent on the US lor milttary hardware,
~~i~nt~~gn
tr:Pn?ng. Severallor.ces In the milflary establishment IIseW agree to this proposnlon.
Point Five. Even as we deal forcelully with the Rightists, the govem.
ment, With the help of religious groups, non-govemmental organizations (NGDs), academics and civilian and military leaders, must
creatively and persistently search for peace and the reduction of
viQ/ence from every source.
P?:::O
:;J
For this purpose and lor a~~evln~o~~~~~::~~~~~o:;'~
goals we need to be reso e an
r aredness In
challenges we must meet is to ensure our p ep
. and
~:::;~~ ~~e;'~~~~ t~~~?;a:I~nb~f~~es~~~Js e~~~~~'~ases
a
~t~~~ef:f. ~~~v~~~~~~~~g~~s~~~:70rb~:~;~a:
y nt'
1991 Another is to decide not to negotiate
the US and other Iriendly countries to have ~ccess to th~ s~
repair and maintenance lacililies, the airports, t a~ 'n the
economic zones and industrial estates to be ?pera:. I ovanverted milllary bases. We need to be creatIVe an Inn
~~~n
~~:Ii~Rr~~~s~hi~~~d o~~~r~~~~e~n ~~~r:~~i~~ t~~~
nationalism and seW·determination, wllhout compromising n.
II
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If at all our leaders Independently decide tBpn:~g~~~~~
treaty a position many ,n the Senate and we ~ Xl
. nand
oppose, let that treaty be lor a. briel terminaate ensl~st ad.
them. .
h
ut 01 US use 01 our mllnary bases
ea~~eg~OUS
terllls lor the ~~~~~~::s ~~~o~~I:~~i~~~ l~n~
military and CIVIlian us~ 0
I '11I'es and resources
en
To be meaningfUl, President AqUino's proclamation 01 the
1990s as the "Decade tor Peace" should Soon lead to
Vigorous and imaginative inlliatives by the implementors so
that it does not become mere piOUS hope and empty rhetoric.
PoInt Six. More and more citizens demand participation and consul/ation in the making of decisions affecting their lives and well-being.
Government and private institutions must be more responsive. These
include some structural changes.
simullaneous conversion of base aCI I
during the extension and phase·out.
Given the accelerating momen~u~ o~~~~s ~~~~:~~e:~
cooperation between the USA an ted democratization the
,
. roved prospects lor world peace an
may agree to pUll out their lacilllies a.nd
bases by 1991 or shortly th~relafter'oIesft:c;:~~II~~ei~~e econ~
Amencans make commerCia use
verted bases.
tTl
Wllh respect to the armed groups tighting the government,
let us build peace 10llowing certain principles based on the
best available knowledge, lor example those summed up by
a UP historian as lollows: (a) recognize and eliminate the
causes ot the present COnflict, among which are repression
and explollation, misery and Inequality, or what is called
"structural violence"; (b) provide justice by restructuring the
ownership 01 Production, by redistributing land, capllal, and
income, and by restructuring the processes 01 power; (c)
negotiation and agreement are the best way to resolve con.
f1ict; (d) dialogue within mutually agreed guidelines; (e) set
limits on the use 01 violence and impose them on the parties
in conflict;
dissociate social, political, economic and other
structures trom the war system; (g) in sum, develop a poillics
(and I would add a cutture) 01 peace and not 01 conflict and
violence. (See Maria Serena I. Diokno, And the Fruit ofJustice
is Peace, Gumersii'ldo Garcia, Sr. Memorial lecture, National
Council ot Churches in the Philippines General Biennial Convention, Quezon City, 22 November, 1989.)
There are many signs ot this demand lor involvement and
partiCipation: the growth and actiVity 01 NGOs and othe,
people's organizations; the Inclusion ot sectoral representatives in various consunative and decision-making
bodies; the demonstrations and mutti-sectoral strikes; and
even the activllies and grievances 01 armed rebels. The lormal
instllUlions 01 government and privatI' institutions need to
t~oops IrO~t ~r
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14
15
open up channels of commu~ication whh. t~ose groups
peacefully demanding consuhatlon and partIcIpation. However there are essential norms and processes that must be
observed lest lawlessness and anarchy prevail. These are
subjects for mutual learning or social learnin~ by all part!es
concerned. Again, the need for creativity, patience, persIstence, goodwill.
One source of this imbalance leading to discontent and
frustration and even aggression, Is the expansive and roman·
tic rhetoric of the COnslhutlon, the laws, 8nd the polhicians.
Another is the Inability of the Government, because of hs
inefficiency and corruption, to provide more and better serv~9S. This causes public cynicism, apathy and alienation. A
thlld are the excessive and unrealistic demands on the
~overnment from all quarters high and low, near and far from
ns center. And these In turn arise from the people's strong
sense Of dependency and their exaggerated sense Of personal rights and entnrements. Correspondingly, many cilizens
and leaders have a weak sense of duty and obligation to the
nation and the common good. Our consthutional bill Of rights
is not balanced by a bill Of duties and obligations.
There is truth in the observation that Government as a
whole, especially the Senate and House of Representatives,
is dominated by substantially weailhy men and women. ~ot
surprisingly, policies and decisions favor the upper and mIddle classes. The benefrts of development cannot and do not
trickle down. Income, weailh and power are not redistributed
to the many who ale poor and marginalized. This has led to
the perception that ours is an elitist constitutional democracy.
It is extremely difficult for persons who do not have ample
resource3 to win in an p.leC1ion, given the high cost of running
a campaign and staying in olfice. The structure of the Congress and the electoral system make iI nearly impossible for
minority groups and smaller political parties to elect thell own
representatives to the Congress who w,ll respond to thell
interests and those of the lower classes.
I support the suggestion for a constitutional amendment to
change our form of government .into a semi-parliamentary
system. This means hav,ng a Presicfent as ChIef of State and
symbol of national unity and a Prime Minister as the Head of
Government and leader of a unicameral National Assembly. A
major feature of this parliament is the election of assembly
members in fewer and multi·member districts and by proportional representation of the contendi~g political parties. according to their combined votes. In thIS way, smaller politIcal
parties and minority groups w~1l hav.e a chance to ~Iect thell
candidates and influence publiC polley and leg,slatlon. In the
long 'un, political parties will be induced to stand for a disti.nclive program of government and be held accountable for n.
Point Seven. Effective demand for public services and benefits farl
exceeds actual and potential slJpply. Expectations far outrun available resources. More attention is focused on the allocation and expenditure side than on the income side of public finance.
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Our Consthutlon and laws promise all kinds of goods and
services to be provided by a supposedly generous and
respo!"sive Wenare S!ate. Unfortunately, our policy-makers
a!"d cnlzens ~r.e unw""nQ honestly to pay genuinely progressIVe and suffICIent taxes ,n order for the government to afford
to extend those benefits to the people. The biggest tax
evaders are professionals In private practice, businessmen
and other sen-emplOYed and otherwise well-educated and
well·to-do chizens. In other words, leaders and cilizens are
engaged in mutual deception and escapism that is not con~uclVe to a heailhy democracy, a productive economy, and a
JUst and humane soCiety.
Point Eight. ff we do not face our problems resolutely and with the
necessary sense of urgency, these problems will continue to exacerbate each other, making it all the more difficult to solve them. Ultimately, time is our prime resource because yesterday is irretrievable. Wa only have today and tomorrow and our problems are compounding.
Following are some major national problems which Interact
whh each other and could worsen In the absence of leaders
wilh the vision, commilment, and the ability to mobilize
popular support and resolve thesa problems:
• Population Explosion/Urbanization
• Weak national consciousness and consensus
• Environment Deterioration
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• Disunity/Fragmentatlon
• Unamployment
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• Elnist Democracy
• Indebtedness
• Injustice/Inequity
• Poverty
• Lawlessness/Violence
• Dependency
• Corruption/Weak Law Enforcement
• Powerlessness
• Inefficiency/Waste
• Ignorance
• Tax Evasion/Low and Regressive Taxation
• Apathy/Alienation
• Shortsightedness/Parochialism
• Language Problem
Point Nine. The military rebels and their allies are deluding themselves in thinking that they could govern the country if they succeeded
in taking power through violence. But our civilian feaders should
govern so as not to feed tho enemies of the state with the iffusion that
they can manage better.
Cnizens are In a sense partly to blame for our ills. But leaders
must bear greater rasponsibility because they are the ones
who should define our prohlems, seek courses of action to
deal with those problems, nnd mobilize support for those
courses of action and for their leadership. If our problems are
not rendered manageable by decisive progress and success,
there will be more want and suffering for the many and lillie
glory and no fun to those who shall govern the nation.
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As some UP faculty put n in a statement that Is also published in this volume, "for Government to enjoy the support of the
people, n must· earn It. Enough of rhetoric. Government must
now seriously attend to instnuting mechanisms for genuine
consultallon with the people and together wnh them, decide
in favor of the people rather than of outside or selected
Interests. Government must not seek comfort In victory for the
crisis is by no means over. Let n not view the coup attempt as
a mere setback or a loss of foreign investments. Government
must look upon the crisis as the time to seek new directions
In meeting the most basic problems of the people: rising
prices, unemployment, unjust wages, graft and corruption,
landlessness, power Shortage, transport crisis, potable water,
housing, malnutrnion, heavy debt burden, and so on. This,
too, is the lime to change Inert and indifferent government
officials who do not deserve the taxpayer's money." (See UP
Faculty, "Lessons from the December Coup. ")
19
18
I PARTTWO I
Dissatisfaction and Passivity
There Is no doubt the mllftary rebellion has fts own roots
peculiar to the politics and economics of the mllftary organization. We shall not speak on these here. What we address is
the presumption on the putschists' part that they couid count
on some popular support for their cause-aUhough apathy
would surely have sufficed.
A TIME
FOR HARD DECISIONS
From hindsight, ft is not difficuft to understand the liming of
the coup. The putschists struck at a time of relative weakness,
when significant pieces of the government's economic program had failed to fall Into place and various segments of the
popUlation had legftimate grievances against one or another
aspect of the government's program.
By the School of Economics
VI) Diliman
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introduction
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he latest attempt by military elements to seize state power
should be taken as linal proof that social and economic
reforms cannot be postponed. These reforms should be realized even as criminal responsibility is assigned and the guitty
punished.
Before this coup attempt, one could conveniently take comfort in the view that taking difficuU economic decisions and
redressing glaring social inequities were intemperate or unwise-or at least they could be postponed-because largescale changes would antagonize entrenched social interests
whose resistance could destabilize the government.
This comfortable view has been exploded by the recently
attempted putsch, which has capitalized precisely on the
administration's procrastination in resolving outstanding social issues, Us failure to take sides between conflicting class
Interests, and the often technically inconsistent policies Uhas
chosen to adopt. This state of affairs has allowed the plotters
to portray themselves as all things to all men: both revolutionary and conservative, both pro-poor and elitist, both
democratic reformist and totalitarian, and nationalists and
fair-haired boys all at once. Nevertheless Ushould be recognized by all that this action was no more than a sheer grab for
power.
That the December putschists could expect to ride to power
on such a nebulous and meager social agenda is less a
tribute to their audacity than an indictment of the
government's own aUernative program and pelformance,
which In many crucial aspects, have failed to gain the active
support of large segments of the population.
Especially In the metropolis, the putschists' main target, the
obvious sources of dissatisfaction were:
• a severe transport crisis manilested in a shortage of
public transport, inadequate infrastructure, and congestion;
• the power failure which crippled Industries and
households alike;
,I
• the widespread dissatisfaction among farmers over
lagging real incomes and perceived discrimination
against their sector;
• the III-formulated salary
government employees;
standardization
among
• the recent Increase in fuel prices jYhich threatened to
provoke strikes for higher transport fares and worker's
wages;
• a perceived apathy on the part of the three branches
of government to address the Issues affecting
people's daily lives, especially the legislative and executive, which have been preoccupied wilh petty
polilical maneuvers and the expansion of perquisiles;
and
• a series of scandals Involving government officials In
possible cases of graft and corruption.
All of these were occurring against a baCkdrop of doubledigft inflation, high Interest rates, and economic growth far
below planned targets. Apprehension was growing both on
the part of business which had to bear the rising cost of
capital, and workers whose real Incomes were being rapidly
eaten up by Inflation.
20
21
The economy's current vulnerability has baen aggravated
by the failure of the present debt strategy to achieve even the
modest financing goals tha negotiators set for themselves.
The new money from the commercial creditors for 1989-90
under the current scheme seems certain to fall far short of the
goal sei by the negotiators. This has placed a strain on the
balance of payments and on the exchange rate, which can ba
relieved only by choking the rest of the economy through a
regimen of high interest rates.
The present energy crisis Is mainly a failure of decisive
implementati?n. The decision not to operate the nuclear
power plant In 1986 was In fact followed by contingency
measures to replace the energy it was expected to generate
as well as by other plans to meet Increased demand. But lines
of authority were unclear, the bureaucracy was disorganiZed
and unwarranted interterence from external agencies made ;i
diff,cuh for these plans to be implemented on time.
These problems have provided the obvious focal points for
discontent and passivity among the populace. A!1d while they
are certainly not enough to Induce people to actively support
a putsch, they are dangerous enough In that they may
paralyze the people's resolve to support the present government.
We therefore' recommend a complete overhaul of the
Nallonal Power Corporallon (NAPOCOR) management
and the lines of decision-making of energy maUers.
The other issue on energy is the pressure on the NAPOCOR
from
creditors to raise user Charges in order to recover
costs. While there is much to be said in principle for cost
recovery. the requirement that users shoulder the entire burden of NAPOCOR'S debt-service is unreasonable.
"5
If we are not to relive the same experience, lessons must be
drawn and actions must be taken. The violence of th~ most
recent coup attempt has once more placed urgent social and
economic reforms on the agenda.
In what follows, we detail two types of reforms. The .first
deals with those which can be readily Implemented to reheve
Immediate problems; the second, those that ma~ b~ Imple·
mented only through some legislation or reorganizatIon. We
argue that all of these measures must ba taken as a whole.
There are no halfway measures: immediate problems merely
reflect more deeply rooted ones, ~nd none of thes~ F"!'easures
can be implemented without hurting some sector s Interests,
all of them entail sacrnices.
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Changing Personnel
There should be a change of personnel In order to match
persons with the demands of their posillons. For one, the
present assignment imposes too great a contlict at interest on
the occupants of key economic departments and agencies in
the government. For another, it has resuhed in poor performance due to incompetence.
Immediate Measures
Addressing the Transport Crisis
To illustrate: the appointment ot commercial bankers to the
Central Bank governorship which runs the risk of decisions
that favor commercial banks, given the sociological tendency
for people to identity with their own kind; the appointment of
people to oversee trade and industry when their families are
involved in cartels which enjoy priVileges that ought to ba
removed; the retention of agency heads who have clearly not
performed according to targets, or who have continuously
reduced targets in order to make their performance appear at
par (e.g. transportation and social wellare). Cases abound
not only among the upper echelons but also at lower levels.
The present transport problem has arisen due to the high
cost of replacement and spare parts of vehicles on the one
hand, and the regulation of fares, on the other. In the last f!JW
years this has led to the bankruptcy of several bus companoes
who were caught in the squeeze of controlled fares and high
prices of parts and replacement. The Importatl0!1 of cheap
replacements and parts (especially second·hand) IS effe~lve­
Iy prevented, however, by the existence of iii-conceIved
progressive manufacturing programs of the government.
We propose that Imports of vehicles and spare-parta for
use In public transport be freed from any kind of government regulallon or restriction.
Meeting Energy Needs
We propose that the servicing of NAPOCOR'S old loans
be assumed by the nallonal government, In exchange for
which Its management should be revamped. This solution
has been adopted. after all, in the rehabilitation ot PNB and
DBp, as well as for NAPOCOR itselt in the case ot the nuclear
power-plant loan. There is no reason Why it cannot be
adopted on a general basis. This move should help
NAPOCOR obtain new loans to expand capacity.
I
Formulating and Implementing Economic
Policy
22
Try hard as one might to lormulate sound policy advice,
however the effort is stililutile so long as the institutions and
arrange';'ents to implement them do not exist. This has been
the tragedy 01 the present administration. Complaints have
been rile that the management style 01 the admirristration
gives the impression that no one is in charge and that the
government, or even the administration, does not speak with
I
As lar as economic policy goes, this problem is publicly
manilested in the differences 01 opinion between the Departments of Agricuilure and 01 Trade and Industry over incentives; within the legislature, on debt policy; and between the
executive and legislative, over decentralization.
We propose that the NEDA Director General be
upgraded In his powers and responsibilities as prim'!s
inter pares with whom all department heads charged WIth
economic matters must coordinate. This secretary of
economic affairs should have the complete confidence 01 the
President; secretaries and heads 01 all other economic agencies should be appointed upon his recommendation.
This should help ensure consensus among the economic
departments and compel them to speak with one voice within
the Cabinet and in public.
Intermediate Policies
All the loregoing are measures that can be implemented
within the short period. However, many 01 them are linked to
larger issues that have been outstanding lor some time. For
example, the reliel 01 the transportation problem reqUires
imports of cheaper vehicles and parts, but this runs against
an existing industrial program. Said program then needs to be
reassessed. Similarly, the need lor better inlrastructure is
evident, but expenditures lor il lace the constraint 01 trade
deficit.
Even these difficuil problems will have to be addressed. The
period immediately after a lailed coup may not bo the most
opportune moment to do so. But we do not think that
decisions postponed will become any easier.
The Debt Problem
An important Incipient effect 01 the coup attempt has been
to increase uncertainty and reduce loreign capital flows to the
economy. One lorm 01 this may be reduced direct loreign
Investments. Or a reduction 01 loans from loreign commercial
banks, yet, even before the coup, grave doubts could already
be raised on whether pre-coup attempt estimates oIlinancing
gap would be bridged by loreign investments and loans.
Now that the autonomous capilal inflows are likely to be
reduced, the advantages 01 asserting the country's interest
over that 01 the loreign banks have become even greater. We
contend that the country at this time still has the political
leverage iI had in early 1986 to seek a renegotiation of the
terms 01 its package with the commercial creditors.
one voice.
What is needed at the very least is coherence in the
economic policies enunciated by the executive branch, although we should not overlook the necessity lor s.imitar action
within the legislature and between the legIslatIve and the
executive. This is quite apart from the correctness 01 the
policies adopted, an issue we treat below.
23
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We recommend the eppolntment 01 a new and lUll-time
negotiating team whose Immediate goal Is to reduce the
country's net resource transler to Its lorelgn creditors to
enable It to close Its linanclng gap. In relation to commercial bank loans, putting a debt cap or going Into temporary
arrears should be a part 01 the new team's set 01 options,
We believe that the aftermath 01 the putsch-i1 used wisely
presents a unique opportunily lor the country to improve
considerably the terms 01 its agreement wilh the commercial
banks. Such an opportunity should not be squandered, as the
country did in 1986.
The Exchange Rate
As lor the currency's value Itsell. however, II should be
set at a low enough level to deliver the domestic
producers and make our products competitive abroad as
well,
Having said this, we stress the lollowing: Depreciation will
always cause some inllation through higher prices lor imports
and to this extent will also hurt the people, especially in the
urban areas. However, it should be clear that iI depreciation is
to work, some real incomes must be cut, and adjustments in
consumption must be made (especially Irom tradeable to
nontradeable goods). The gain is that more people would be
employed in producing substitutes lor imports and producing
lor exports.
The required depreciation must be accompanied by a
removal 01 Inlrastructure bottlenecks II the maximum
benellts Irom It are to be derived, More employment opportunities will be opened within a shorter time iI the government
simultaneously solves the crises in transport, energy and
other infrastructure services. Otherwise the inflation which
normally accompanies depreciation will be unnecessarily
prolonged.
24
25
In order to cushion the Inflationary effects and distribute
the burden of adjustment more equhably, the government
should reduce Indirect taxes, especially on fuel. This is
also in line wijh our recommendation below to make the tax
system mora progressive.
mend that the composition of the Monetary Board be
overhauled to reduce the participation of Cabinet members to a minority. Only the NEDA Director-General should
sit as an ex-officio member.
Finally, in regard to fiscal policy, we caution agalnat a
sudden surge In government consumption spending at
this time, even If some pork-barrel methods seem attractive
after a fresh threat to political stabilijy. The noise about the
revival of pump-priming activijies such as the Countryside
Employment Development Program at this time is particularly
worrying. While these may have been appropriate in 1986
when there was large excess capacijy, they are uncalled for
today when no slack exists; they are rather likely to lead to
inflation or a worsening payments deficij, or both. Such a
move would be partiCUlarly unwise if the foreign financing gap
IS not closed through the appropriate debt policies.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Another priorijy in the field of policy should be to revamp
monetary policy and move away from the present high-interest rate regime. High Interest rates have been maintained
mainly through the auction of T-bllls beyond what Is required to finance fiscal deficits and through large reverserepurchase agreements, under which the Central Bank
borrows from commercial banks. Together with bottlenecks In Infrastructure, the restrictive monetary policy
has prevented Investment and hence output from keeping
up with demand thereby giving rise to Infiationary pressures. Infiatlon In turn has caused the erosion of real
wages. Implicitly violating the social pact and fueling discontent and mistrust In the ranks of wage-earners.
There are two infiuences working to keep interest rales high.
One is related to the debt problem: because foreign financing
is unavailable and foreign reserles are low, the Central Bank
and the government have had to resort to issuing high-yielding T- biils to prevent speculation on the currency and cover
the budget deficits. If the debt problem were resolved more
satisfactorily and no nominal level of the exchange-rate was
targeted, then the CB wouid be less obliged to resort to high
Tbiil rates to keep liqUidity down and to prevent exchangerate speculation.
But the second aspect of high interest rates relates to the
large margins between commercial bank lending and deposit
rates; this also contributes distinctly to discouraging investments. The existence of such wide spreads indicates a high
degree of concentration or monopoly power in the financial
sector, and this is something the CB is abetting by erecting
barriers to entry in the commercial banking system. CB currently emphasizes the rehabilitation of insolvent banks. This is
itself an empty barrier since ij forces new investors to take
over bad portfolios. The implications of this policy are worse
in the case of rural banks, since this means a further reduction
0: the credit made available to the countryside.
Industrial Policy
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Quite apart from the relaxation of monetary policy, therefore,
we recommend that the Central bank revamp Its policy
regarding entry Into the banking system and adopt more
liberal rules to break the existing cartel In the financial
system.
To effect the required changes in monetary. exchange rate,
and debt policies, and in line with the Constitution, we recom-
I
The high degree of concentration in industry and the
government's implicit sanction for this has been one of the
most potent examples used to argue that the government is
for .the rich and not for the poor. Even as the poor must pay
Indlfect taxes and take cuts in real incomes through inflallon
large amount of taxes are being foregone by the governmeni
rn the form of incentives given to big business.
There is a general perception that the Board of Investments
(BOI) has served less to promote than to restrict, and then
despite i1s large discretion, ij has not designed a coherent
industrial program in any event. Surprisingly, this view Is now
shared even by businessmen themselves, proof thaI those
who manage to avail of such privileges are restricted to a
small coterie.
We propose that the BOI be abolished as an Independent body. and that the entire system of Investment
Incentives be re-examined with a view to their elimination.
Henceforth, industrial priorities should, Wat all, be set indicatively by NEDA without the need for incentives. The elimination of 801 tax credits should replace tax revenues forgone
from fuel taxes or generate revenues for required pUblic investments. Barriers to entry In Important cartellzed Industries such as shipping, cement, flour, among others,
should be removed.
Tariffs should be set af a low uniform rate mainly for revenue
purposes to eliminate discretion and discrimination against
potentially viable industries. The exchange rate should
replace tariffs and nontarlff barriers as the appropriate
and nondiscriminatory measure of protection,
26
27
The protection given to the III-conceived progressive
manufacturing programs, especially for cars and truclla,
should be phased out within a short period. The protection
given to these industries in the form of prohibftions on imports
should immediately be replaced by a simple tariff.
acquisitions, Which is a long way from actual land valuation
and transfer. Plans for support services for beneficiaries are
hazy and blurred.
The government should give priority to solving the centuries-old land tenure problem of the rural populace It
shoul.d concretize the call for people's participation in ihe
agrar!an reform process by directing the Department of
Agranan Reform. (DAR) to take seriously the operation of the
Barangay AgrarIan Reform Committee (BARC) to ensure
popular repre;sentation of genuine peasants' o;ganizations
and rural.'olk. ,n the comminees, and to ensure their genuine
partlclpatoon In the process of imprOVing land tenure, helping
program beneficl8nes and resolution of conflicts.
Finally government should devote tts industrial promotion
efforts where ft can do the most good and where they are
most needed, namely, supporting scientific and technological
research, acquisitions, and dissemination of information.
Progressive Taxation of Assets and Incomes
The charge tI,at the government is only for the big finds
support in the current system of taxation. This system relies
heavily on indirect taxes which hit the poor more than the
affluent. By contrast, there is a consensus that income taxes
are not collectively being collected, and that taxes on wealth,
especially on landed property, me too low. Certain onerous
features of the tax structure, especially those that discriminate
against the poor, should be removed. For example, the dif·
ferential treatment of fixed and nonfixed incomes penalizes
the low-income classes. The final tax on interest income also
favors the more affluent, since their marginal tax rates would
cortainly be much higher than 20 percent.
We recommend that taxes on property be raised and that
the tax on Interest Income be treated as a withholding tax,
rather than the final tax. The elimination of tax credits
through the BOI and the entire omnibus incentives code
should also provide additional revenue for the government.
It is remarkable that dnspite perennial calls for improved
collection efforts, no major tax evader has been prosecuted,
much less imprisoned.
We propose Instead to reduce the discretion of
bureaucrats In the disposition of tax-evasion cases and
leave these to the impartial operation of the penal code.
Agrarian Reform
Nowhere is the government's lack of political will for social
reform clearer than in the field of agrarian reform. More impor·
tant than the Garchttorena estate scandal and the fuss over
Congress' reluctance to confirm the new agrarian reform
secretary is that the actual process of transferring land to the
tiller is proceeding too slowly and has too narrow a scope.
Two years after the enactment of the agrarian reform law, most
beneficiaries are still confined to rice and corn lands. Agrarian
reform has hardly touched sequestered and foreclosed lands.
Agricultural lands of more than 50 Ilectares (Which are not rice
and corn lands) are only starting to be given notices of
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Other Problems
•
Other problem areas are no less important but space does
not allow .os to address them iii this paper. Among the more
pressIng Issues are: population, natural resources and en.
Vlronment, the quahty of education, and the lag in technology.
We reiterate our earlier statement: These reforms are interdependent and must be regarded as i\ whole. A piecemeal
Implementation would cause possibly unforeseen outcomes
or worse, lead to outcomes which are socially unjust.
'
Conclusion
Our newly regained democracy has just survived the most
senous threat thus far to tts existence. It is said that the
presence ?f large .threats often cements solidarity among
nor,,:,~lIy dIsparate Interests, enabling them to undergo great
sacrfflces and subsume selfish concerns under a higher goal
The recent coup anempt was such a threat. The call to all 0;
us, eSpec!ally to those who are in posllions of power, Is to take
the long vIew and reahze that our survival is bound up with the
Just resolution of our nation's problems. We must answer the
call now.
RUPERTa P ALONZO
RAUL V. FABELLA
ARSENIO M. BALICASAN
MARIA SOCORRO H. GOCHOCO
CARLOS C. BAUTISTA
ALEJANDRO N. HERRIN
DANTE B. CANLAS
29
28
JOSEPH Y. LIM
RAMON L. CLARETE
SOLITA C. MONSOD
EMERGENCY POWERS
FOR THE PRESIDENT
ROLANDO A. DANAO
MANUEL F. MONTES
EMMANUEL S. DE DIOS
FIDELINA B. NATIVIDAD
JOSE ENCARNACION, JR.
By the College or Law
UP Dilimao
EDITA A. TAN
FELIPE M. MEDALLA
GWENDOLYN R. TECSON
CASIMIRO V. MIRANDA
(The authors are faculty. members 01 the UP Schoo) 01
Economics. This paper, which supersedes a preliminary version dated 8 December 1989, is the resun 01 a workshop held
on 6-8 and 14 December 1989. E. de Dios selVed as rapporleur.)
Grant of Emergency Powers to the President
n the light 0.1 the existing national emergency, as declared
by the President, Congress should enact an Emergency
Power Act vesting the President with full powers to carry
out a declared national polley of ensuring polltlca',
economic and social atablllty throug!,out the nation, In
pursuance 01 the declared principle in Sf!l:Iion 5, Art. II 01 the
Constnution that "Ihe maintenance of peace and order, the
protection oflife, liberty andproperty and the promotion of the
general we"are are essential for the enjoyment by al/ the
people of the blessings of democracy. "
I
Such a measure may be attained through enactment 01 a
law passed by Congress, upon certification by the President,
of the necessity for such a measure in the light of existing
national emergency, as declared by Executive Order No. 503
series of 1989. (Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, Const.).
Such law should set forth the following or similar provisions:
Section 1. The recent coup d'etat attempt
staged by rebels from the Armed Forces and
the present economic crisis have created a national emergency which makes n necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers
in order to meet the emergency.
Section 2. Pursuant to the provisions 01 Ar·
ticle VI, sec. 23(1) of the Constnution, the
President Is hereby authorized, during the existence 01 the emergency, to adopt, promul.
gate end enforce measures as she may deem
30
31
necessary to carry out the national policy
declared in Section 1. Accordingly, she Is,
among other things, empowered to take
measures: (a) to prevent, suppress and
eliminate conditions wnhin the Armed Forces
of the Philippines causing or likely to cause
anempts at any coup d'etat, mutiny or similar
disturbance; (b) to regulate the national
economy, including among others: (1) to ensure the delivery of essential services to the
people and to facilitate the free and continuous
movement of goods; (2) to regUlate rents and
the
prices of prime commodities; (3) to
prevent hoarding, monopolization and private
controls affecting the supply, distribution and
movement of commodities required in agriculture and industry; (c) to maintain peace and
order, protect life, liberty and property and
promote the general welfare; and (d) to exercise such other powers as she may deem
necessary to enable the Government to fulfill
tls responsibilities and to maintain and enforce
its authority.
Section 3. The President shall issue rules and
regulations to carry out the purposes of this
Act. The rules and regulations herein enacted
shall be in force unless otherwise provided in
said rules and regulations or until repealed or
amended by Congress.
Section 4. The President may designate any
officer in any department, bureau or office,
agency or inslrumentality of the Government
for Ihe purpose of adrninistering this Act and
carrying out its objectives.
Section 5. Any person violating the measures
and rules and the regulations adopted and
promulgated by the President under this Act
shall be punished by imprisonment of not
more than 5 years or by a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos.
Section 6, The President shall report to Congress from time to time the measures adopted
under this Act.
Section 7. The grant of emergency powers
under this Act shall be for a period of one year
from the approval of this Act, unless sooner
withdrawn by Congress.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect immediately upon lis approval.
Emergency Measures That may be Adopted under
such Act
• Estabf/shlng Spec/af Mllltaty Dfstrfcts:
The President may, by Executive Order, create special
military districts in any area wllhin the Philippines, where
disturbed conditions of peace and order present a serious
threat to political, economic and social stability. In any such
special military district, the President may take any of the
following measures, or all of them: (a) assign new military
units created through partial Mobilization of the Reserve
Army; (b) assign units formed from components of the regular
Arnled Forces follOWing reorganization; (c) assign volunteer
units drawn from the Reserve Forces; and (d) assign local
militia organized by local governments in such area, pursuant
to authority granted such governments by Executive Order.
In any such Special Military District, the President shall
appoint District Commanders and officers of her own choice,
either from the Reserve Army or from the RegUlar Force.
• Creating a Palace Militaty Advlsoty Staff
The President may, by Executive Order, establish a Palace
Military Advisory Staff, to guide her in the issuance of directives to the Commanders of the Special Military Districts.
• Reorganizing the Armed Forces
The President, by Executive Order, could undertake a massive reorganization of the existing military units, to weed out
officers of dubious loyalty to the Constitution, who may be
retired wilh special incentive pay, or assigned to less sensitive
positions.
• Assigning PresIdential Representatives to Certain
Field Commands
For all mlltlary districts and military camps presenting any
condition affecting political or economic stability, the President as Commander in Chief, may require, by Executive Order
and implemented through general orders, all and any military
commander in such districts or camps, to consult wilh a
special representative of the President assigned to such district or camp. No order for the movement of troops may be
authorized by the commander, without wrinen clearance from
such Presidential representative, or from the President herself.
• Lowering the Retirement Age for FIeld Commanders
and Officers
32
33
Long Term Structural Changes
The President may, by Executive Order, fix a lower retirement
age than that fixed by existing law, for all field and camp
commanders and officers wnh the rank of major and up.
Liberal retirement incentives should be provided to all volun·
tary retirees.
Amendments to the Constnution to effect the following
changes are hereby proposed:
e Sem/-pllrlillmentary system, aimed 81 "ery sl1onl1 Ex·
• Commissioning of Reserve Office,.
ecutlve.
The President may, by Executive Order, place on active duty
for at least a year, reserve officers for assignment to field unns.
The proposed system should provide for a Unicameral
legislature consisting of 26 elected representatives from the
13 regions, 6 elected from the autonomous regions, and ex
officio membership of all provincial governors and cny
mayors. Elected members shall have a term of 8 years.
• Creallng II Metropo/ltlln Pollee Commllnd
The President may, by Executive Order, create a
Metropolitan Police Command, which shall take charge of
special police brigades for the security and protection of all
government centers and key offices, as well as public utilnies
and facilities, in Metro Manila and surrounding provinces. The
Pr~sldent shall have direct control and supervision over such
brigades. Such brigades shall be eqUipped with sunable arms
and eqUipment needed for the proper discharge of their func.
tions.
Medium Term Measures
• Conversion of the AFP Into a citizen armed force, liS
mandated by the Constitution (Art. XVI, Sec. 4). Rear.
ganizallon of the present AFP Into e smaller regulllr
force.
The citizen armed force shall consist of regional militia and
the ~eserve army. The regional militia shall be on regular
tralOing through?ut the year during week-ends and holidays,
and may be available to assist the national police in maintainIng peace and order. The regular force shall be utilized only
against external aggression.
• Creallon of the national pollee force, which shall talre
charge of peace and order throughout the nation.
• Reorgenlzallon of the AFP officer corps, In connec.
tlon with special retirement law.
This isaimedat reducing the officer corps now existing, and
beefing n up With reservists on volunteer service. The phase.
out of the present officer corps from colonel upwards shall be
effected in three years.
• S/Ilng AFP camps and forts away from cente,. of
pop!J/atlon.
!
I
The President shall have a term of 8 years. In times of
emergency, he/she shall have the power to enact laws by
Executive Order. Such law shall take effect immediately, and
shall continue in full force until Congress shall provide other·
wise.
.
The President shall designate members of the legislature
who shall be his/her personal representatives in their respective regions, In the enforcement and implementation of national development policies.
• Land shall be a natlonaf resource, and may not ".
privately owned.
The government shall Instnute a long range system of
acquisnion by purchase and expropriation. Cullivation of all
publicly owned arable lands shall be by lease to Individual
farm famHies for parcels not In excess of five hectares, and to
cooperatives of farm families for parcels, and to cooperatives
of farm families for parcels not In excess of 200 hectares. 0
• A/I public ut/llt/es shall ba state owned, but ad·
ministered lind manllged through wo"'e,. coopera·
tlves.
35
34
devaluation threatening to fuel further price Increases, the
trade and balance of payments deflclls widening, and unemployment swelling again.
Those who were expecting the Aquino administration to
Instllute sweeping socio-economic reforms In the euphoric
people power days of t986 and 1987 have long been disappointed. Agrarian reform has become a mangled and scandal-ridden program. Mass housing and urban renewal
programs have not received the attention that they deserve.
And Philippine subservience to the dictates of foreign
credllors has not only been continued but also strengthened.
A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO
RENEW DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY
One of the most disaffected sectors of society is organized
labor. The sector's sentiments and opinions on a whole range
Issues are being ignored by both the executive and legislative branches of the government. One clear illustration of this
was the effort of our School In 1987 to gather the major groups
so that they could collectively flesh out their views on labor
relations, economic growth and development, and social jUstice and human rights-all in the context of strengthening the
country's newly-acquired democracy. The product of the
1987 workshops was the book Labor's Legislative Agenda
which was submitted to all members of the Cabinet and the
newly-elected Congress. But nellher the legislative nor the
executive branch of the government has responded so far.
By the School or Labor and Industrial Relations
UP Diliman
'?!
Walang puwang sa Isang demokrasya ang mga pamamaraan ng
kudeta. (COUP attempts have no place In a democracy.)
eizure of power by a minori1y through the barrel of a gun
is a mockery of a people's sovereign right to choosethelr
own government freely and peaceably. No matter how well-Intentioned, the leaders and organizers of the .latest coup
deserve condemnation. There is no room for military power
grabs in a democracy.
S
Nakatulong sa coup ang mga kahlnaan ng pamahalaan. (The
government's weaknesses helped launch the coup,)
The December 1989 coup nearly succeeded in toppling
down the Aquino government.
One reason for this Is the declining populari1y of the Aquino
administration. Unlike in the previous coup atte~pts, ~ere
was no popular outpouring of support for the admlnistratl0l"!'
As the media chronicled it, the civilians who came out of thelf
lIomes to be near the war zones came as spectators, not as
supporters.
In fact, the coup was launched at a time when a growing
number of the population, includil"!g supporters of t~~ Aquino
administration, was getting Impatient with the Inablii1y of the
government to deliver essential services In the areas of
transport, energy generation, communications ~nd cereal
distribution. There was a breakdown of public services amidst
widespread publlci1y on graft and corruption. And to top it all,
the economy was tottering, with the Innatlon rate r~nnlng at
double digitS, the oil price Increase and creepmg peso
..
And looking around, there Is no shortage of studies, seminars, workshops, symposia and conferences organized by
academic institutions, people's organizations, nongovernmental agencies and cause-oriented groups outlining
the kind of socio-economic reforms that the country urgently
needs. Yet, the response is ellher lukewarm or stony silence.
The government is obviOUSly not too keen on initiating radical
socio-economic reforms for fear of antagonizing the eille as
amply illustrated by lis ambivalent and piecemeal approach to
the legislation and implementation of land reform.
This is ironic. The 1986 people powerrevolution generated
mass enthusiasm preqisely because the masses were expecting the AqUino administration to usher in radical changes
in the various spheres of social life. The failure of the administration to attend to the needs of the masses by way of
efficient government services and socially-relevant reforms is
what accounts for lis growing unpopularity, which in turn, is
contributing to lis unstable existence.
Ang Hamon ng Bagong Kalagayan: Pagbabagong-Buhay. (The
Post-Coup Challenge: A Renewed Society)
This is why the main lesson that can be distilled from the
December 1989 coup and the February 1986 people power
revolution Is that a government is stable as long as it enjoys
37
36
the popular support of the masses. A government Is strong as
long as ns programs are ahuned to the needs and aspirationS
of the masses.
Hence, apart from the Immediate task of securing the stale
against coup plohers, the biggest challenge confronting the
administration Is how to renow ns ties wnh the popular forces
of the country, how government can be an eIlective instrument of the masses in realizing long-sought reforms in
society. In short, the challenge is how the government can
forge a new pal1nership with the masses In the overall task of
renewing democracy and society.
Fortunalely for the AqUino administration, the extraordinary
polnico-economic circumstances created by the coup provide n wnh a historic opportunity 10 launch a new reform
program and overcome the traditional elilist resistance to
such reforms.
The question, howevor, is: will the AqUino administratiOn do
such a thing? Is n ready to break the pahern of elnism, reform
vacillation, cronyism of a new kind, and toleration of inelliciency and corruption that have marked ns first three and a hall
years of governance? Is n now prepared to listen tothe voices
of labor and the marginalized sectors of society?
The next three months will show ~ the AqUino administration
is ready-and more importantly, willing to face the challenge
of this histprical crossroad in our nation's me.
Ang Panganlb ng Bagong Batas Mil/tar. (The Dangers of an
Empowered Military)
Meanwhile, there are ominous signs that the AqUino administration, after crushing the visible power grab ahemp! by
the rebel soldiers, is capnulating to the demands ofthe milllaPj
establishment to have a bigger say on national affairs. The
proposal empowering Malacaiiang with emergency powers is
tantamount to a proposal to clo!h the mililary establishment
wnh extra powers.
It should be noted that the present emergency was caused
by the divisions and arnbllions emanating from the military
establishment, and yet tho emergency powers being sought
are directed against the organized masses, in particular, the
trade union movement. Thus, n is ironic that the presidential
call for people power in support of constllutional democracy
is now contradicted by the presidential demand for emergency power&-a clear derogation of people power.
This brings us to a major flaw in the ripe of governance that
President AqUino has followed since the February 1986
revolution. She I,as reduced democracy to a question ofform,
fo a question of electoral politics dominated by treditional
politicians, to a tripartite system composed oI/egls/ature,
judiciary and executive branch. She has /all9f1.to app"!clate
t'le essence of a democracy: people patticlpatlon '" the
determination and Implementation of policies and p,,?grams
directly affecting their lives. Sha has faIled to institutionalize
people polVer in tha governmenf.
This is precisely the reason why the government is shaky.
This is also the reason why her government has beco"'!e
captive to tile dem~nds of th~ milnary e~tab"shment which 's
now seeking a bigger vOice III socIety. ThiS IS clearly
dangerous.
Already, organized labor, mod8rates, radicals together, have
articulated uneasiness over the proposed emergency
powers During the Martial Law period of Marcos, labor was
the main victim. Hence, labor cannot appreciate. why labor
rights have to be suspended in the na"'!e of a national emergency which they did not create rn the Iltst place. As rt IS, the
government, through the Labor Code, has ~uhicient powers
to stabilize industrial relations, especially In Industnes Involving so called national interest.
Labor finds II doubly ironic that the proposed emergency
powers are directed against the organized masses rather than
the coup ploners. Hence. tne argument raised by some sogments of society that the real objective olthe coup, successful
or not is to create an emergency snuation where the central
gover~ment, led by the civilians or not, can conc~ntr~e
powers in lis hands in pursuing an unpopular forelgn-II.",posed politico-economic program, such as the economIC
blueprints prepared by the World Bank-IMF group. ThiS was
the case during the Marcos period. Now, thIS scenano seems
to be being played out again in another !orm with the I?,adlng
actors resorting to all kinds 01 euphemrsms such as emergency powers without martial law. "
Paano llIyo Makakaahon sa Krlsls? (How Can We Overcome the
Crisis?)
._------
There are no easy answers to the present crisis.
Unfortunately, President Aquino's first majOr address after
the coup, in the EDSA rally last December 8, was a letdown.
It was a disappointment not because she poured out a lot of
virulent ahacks against her poillical enemies fike an enralled
hometown tradllional polnician but mainly becausa she failed
to outline a vision of Philippine sociaty in the post co.up-era.
What are the concrete measures and programs l;ile IS planning to undertake in order to stabilize society and
democracy? There were no clear answers.
39
38
In her second year In power, h will be recalled, she made the
following declaration:
.My mandate was not just to make a country
rich, but to make democracy work: To make It
work as a system of genuine popular par6cipation. To maka it meaningful to the lives of
tha common people by giving them jobs and
jus6ce work with dignity, health and education, a~d the reason to hope that. the future will
be better for themselves and the" children.
I believe that nowhere could you lind more effective cures
for the Ills ot the country-such as the haM of oppression, the
inclination to corruption, betrayal of the public interests-than
in the blessings of democracy: freedom, rights; transparent
dealings; and a government ot the people by the peC!ple
themselves." (See Corezon C. Aquino, State of the NatiOn.
Fooklen TImes Philippine Yearbook, 1987-88.)
But exactly, what has she done and what is she planning to
do to make the above mandate work, especially after the
coup?
On another level, one should also accept the fact that Philippine society is badly divided into contenllous factions. The
coup has even revealed that the threats to our democracy are
emanating not from the organized mas~es, whose clvilliberties the proposed emergency powers Will curta,l, but from the
violent divisions within the country's politico-economic eme.
Historically, these violent divisions within the elite camp are
partly a legacy of colonialism, which tried to divide the native
elite into two or moro contending camps which ahernated in
power (the ins versus the outs), wllh some subtle and not too
subtle support from the colonial masters. These divisions
were aggravated by Marcos when, in declaring Martial Law In
1972, he also declared war against his polhical and economic
rivals, whom he called tile oligarchs (and I~ter replaced whh
his cronies). Afterthe February 1986 revolutIon, the roles were
reversed and this time h was the Aquino camp declaring war
on Marcos' business and polhical associates, sequestering
their properties left and right and thus fuelling a never-ending
cycle of enmhies and revenge polilics whhin the camp of the
eille.
This cycle of violence must come to an end. And so does
the growing alienation of the governed from the government.
In Industrial relations, we have long learned that the two
basic ingredients that can bring about peace and stabilily
between two or more quaneling parties are: heahhy respect
for the other parties, and honest dialogue among the parties.
In our limiled analysis of Philippine society today, we believe
tllat these two elements are sadly lacking. There is no genuine
dialogue taking place between and among the different sec-
tors and worse, certain sectors cannot even tolerate each
other's biases.
One <;:Iear directi,?n of reform In the posf-coup era, therefore,
is the mstllutionallzatlon of pluralism in society. All polilical
parties and movements, Irrespective of their polhico- ideological tendencies, must be allowed to operate freely as long as
they do not advocato the violent overthrow oItha duly- consthuted authorily.. The military must be taught how to respect
pluralIsm and dlstmgUlsh betwoen legitimate dissent and
armed rebellion.
In the t~adhi?n of.democracy, we must allow the full airing of
contending Views In the open market of ideas.
We must also learn to conduct honest dialogues among
ourselves, learn from each other, and understand each other.
Somehow, through the process of social dialogue we must
learn to forge national consensus on how to renew ~ur society
within the framework of our democracy.
. Fin~liy, we must ~tress that time is running out. Our society
IS crying for sweeping reforms that must be put in place at the
soonest tIme poSSIble. Any temporizing is fatal. And making
hah- baked pIecemeal reforms Is useiess and dangerously
counter- productive.
To do all these, h will do well for the Aquino administration to
c~1I out on people power behind a concrete reform program
w,th which tM "'!ass?s can readily identify with. Failure to
respond to thIS hlstonc opportunily might bring the country
back to the dark ages of authorharianism and servhude.
41
40
tempted to take, and which n has In fact taken in the case 01
at least two radio stations-will not lead to Improved proIessionaland ethical standards, nay, only to a unnormny destructive 01 the free flow 01 Information, and therefore 01 the
people's democratic aspirations.
SELF-REGULATION NOT
REPRESSION
By the College or Mass Communication
UP Ililiman
he Philippine mass media are getting mixed reviews ~or
their performance in the Six-Day December Coup. ut
both the praise as well as crllicism have been exagge::~
tending to ellher beatify media practllioners as heroes t
hour, or to condemn them as licentious demagogues.
T
The truth is perhaps somewhere in between.
There is no denying the courage and prolessional commll·
ment of individual broadcasters, reporters, Phot09~l1el8
and cameramen who covered the events 01 the coup, en aI
the risk of their own lives.
There Is no denying either that some media practilioners In
both print and broadcast journalism went beyond their duty to
re ort the news and give II fair comment.. Howeve.r, some
bfcame unwitting purveyors of disinformatlon and I~S asifya
consequence of their failure to check .source~ an .ver
rumors. Still others, moved by their pC?III,cal boases,
deliberately disseminated false Information on an effort to
influence the outcome of events.
Both lapses deserve condemnation: the fir~t !or the un·
professionalism n betrays, the second for lis criminal mls~~
of mass media In the service 01 narrow partisan ends an n
violation of media's basic commnment to publiC interest.
These lapses must be recognized and appreciate~ by the .
profession lisen, which h~S the ultimate responslbllny ~
seeing to II that they are minimized, as well as by the pub
the media serve.
In saying this, we are moved by one realization: the. CC;lrrective mechanisms media need can come only from wnh,n tile
profession as well as the publiC, and not from government.
The closing down 01 radio and lV stations, as well as
newspapers- -an option government Is being more and more
This was a fundamental lesson from the martial law experience, of which both government and the people need no
reminder.
r
Yet, media are once again In danger 01 being a major
casuany 01 the latest pomical manifestation 01 the unresoived
Philippine crisis, as they were a casuany of the Marcos period.
We renerate that media repression will not serve the end 01
defending any avowedly democratic government, nor the
Interest of the publiC that government is committed to serve
and protect.
Now therefore, on the one hand, we call on President
Aquino and her milnary advisers as well as on Congress, tile
Judiciary and such agencies as the National Telecommunlca·
tions CommiSSion to reconsider the emerging government
policy 01 muzzling the press. We urge them to call to mind the
martial law experience and to realize that repression Inevllably
breeds resistance.
While we grant that some abuse 01 press freedom did occur
during the Six-Day Coup, we submn tl;at government cannot
deny freedom to some and still permn n for others-and that
media repression, no matter how Inllially selective, will inevnably lead to general repression.
We submit further that government even in the present crisis
has other options. Government, for example, has lis own
media facilmes which n can use to counter the disinforrnation
and falsehoods II claims are being disseminated by pro-rebel,
privately-controlled media organizations. The maximal use of
these faclillies, together wllh the still immense influence 01
government Over the majorny of broadcast and print media,
can in fact overwhelm rebel-friendly media organizations
wllhout the President's having to resort to such extraordinary
measures as the closure of media establishments.
Government is not so bereft of resources that II has to fall
back on the methods of dictatorship to address ns perceived
problems wllh media. We urge government to utilize those
resources In combatting the present threats to II, rather than
imperil the rights of the people and ns own future vlabilny.
On the other hand, we call on media to perform their obligation to diSCipline their erring members and to Impose necessary sanctions that will prevent the use 01 their vast powers In
the service 01 forces hostile to the democratic aspirations 01
the people. The press Is particularly duty-bound by generally
accepted standards to def9nd ns own freedom by tempering
ns enthusiasms wnh restraint, by exercising Judicious control
42
over the kind of Information Rdisseminates, and by adheri~g
to those standards of fairness, accuracy, and responsibility
the profession RseW demands of Rs practRioners, as these are
embodied In Rs Code of Ethics.
43
The press-media as a whole:-!l.lust ~erci~ these
restraints not only because irresponsibility and licentiousness
only give the enemies 01 free expression the excuse to
ro se the curtailment of press freed~. R Is ~Iso most
funramentally necessary because the dissemination 01
curate information is among media's most crucial public
duties.
TOWARDS CHANGES IN
GOVERNMENT
a~­
WRhout this commRment to seW-regulation, media will continue to be the first casuaUy 01 every polRical upheaval and
every crisis in Philippine society. They must reform-or
perish.
By the Colleae of Education
Vl'mlim••
T
he College of Education FaCUlty supports the Constitution
and rallios behind dUly constituted authority. We strongly
condemn violence as a means to effect change and we salute
the loyal soldiers who risked their lives in defense of
democracy.
In a free-wheeling discussion, we reviewed the chain of
events that might have precipilated the recent coup attempt,
e.g., poor delivery of basic services like electric power and
water, the government's failure to anticipate the coup, etc. The
ideas generated during the discussion may be summarized in
the following suggestions to the various sectors of Philippine
government and society.
For the Executive
• Declare a National Period of Mourning for the loss of
lives, property and the reversal of the democratic
gains we have made these past three years. Ours is a
pyrrhic Victory in which we all came out losers in a
no~win situation.
• Political leaders and coup plotters who instigated the
rebellion should be Investigated and punished.
• Cabinet members should tender their resignation,
which should be accepted by the President to enable
her to replace them with less self-serving indiViduals
. who will be more responsive to the needs of the
people.
• The President should listen to feedback on problems
like the poor delivery of basic services, monopolies
such as PLOT, and do something concrete about
them.
45
44
• The President should ellow the Investigation of her
relatives and close friends who are accused of corruption and of enriching themselves.
For All Filipinos
• Condemn all forms of violence.
For the Legislature
• Pass legislation for the support of families of the loyal
government soldiers who gave their lives in defense of
tile Const~ution and democracy.
• Inniate the public censure of pol~lcians who are guilty
of grandstanding, fence-sil1lng and Interceding for
violators of the law.
• Ban excessive overseas travels of members of the
legislature.
• Review the salary scale and allowances of legislators.
• Inniate legislation to censure ostentatious display of
wealth by government officials and their families and
encourage simple living.
For the Military
• The PMA may have become too pol~icized. the inst~u·
tion should introduce courses to be taught by civilians
with no militaristic orientation.
• Improve tho intelligence capability of the military to
predict unusual activities by certain sectors in the Inst~ution.
• Strengthen military capability to enSure the security
and safety of the whole country.
For the People (Particularly the UP
Community)
• Give financial aid to the families of soldiers who lost
their lives in dofense of the Constitution.
•
Raise specific questions directed to the President and
the different government offices regarding:
_ the clamor of the people for reforms;
_ corrupt or inept officials; and
_ changes to be made in the circle of advisers of
the President and top leaders of the country.
• Examine our consciences to find out where we have
been wanting.
• Rally behind President AqUino as the duly elected
head of our country.
• Develop a strong sense of national discipline.
47
46
d. Hindi rl~ n~lulutas ng gUbyerno ang mga lehill.
mong hlnalng ng mga karaniwang sundalo sa
buong AFp, bagay na nagagamil ng mga liwaling
elemento para sa kanilang pansariling interes.
PARA SA MAKABULUHAN AT
MABILIS NA PAGBABAGO
Isang Mariing Panawagan sa
Pangulong Corazon C. Aquino
;xmas
_OW::EG.A.W§.tu&:xaz.:az
Uep:trtamenlo ng
liP IJiliman
KaS3)'S3)'Un
• Malaki an!l aming pagkabahala sa pagkasangkapan ng
liang puliliko'l malalaas na upisyal·mililar sa mga pang.
karal1lwang sundalo.
•
Mala~i ang aming pagkabahala sa mga implikasyon ng
paghlngi ng dlrektang suportang mililar mula sa Eslados
Unidos. Ano ang kapalil ng pagtulong na i10? Sa aming
palagay. batay sa rekord ng gubyernong Pilipino sa
mal~.aliping pakikipag.ugnayan sa US, malakl ang epek.
10 11110 sa pagpapahina ng pansariling kapasyahan ng
gubyerno sa usapin ng pambansang soberanidad
unang·una na sa usapin ng mga base militar ng US sa
bansa.
• Malaki ang aming pagkabahala sa kawalan 0 di epek.
tibong. paglutas ng gUbyerno sa mga pambansang
sullranln al mga kaugnay na isyu bago naganap ang
kudela.
H
alid ng mga guro ng UP Departamento ng Kasaysayan
sa Panglilo ng Repllblika ng Pilipinas Corezon C. Aquino
ang sumusunod na pahayag ng pagkabahala al mga
rekomendasyon kaugnay ng naganap na kudeta. Layunin ng
pahayag na ito na makatulong sa anumang hakbangin ng
gllbyerno sa pagbabalik ng bansa sa normalic1ad at sa nation·
af reconstruction.
~ga
Pagkabahala ng Sayan na Dapat Isaalang-alang
• Malaki ang aming pagkabahal3 sa lumalaking panganib
ng paghaharing militar na magmumula sa Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) kahil matapos ang kudelang i10
dahil sa sumusunod na kalagayan:
a.
Wala pang garantiya sa lubos na pagkasugpo ng
mg3 elemenlong nagpakana ng klldela. Bakil
hindi ipab3tid sa bayan ang resuila ng negosas·
yon sa pagilan I1g mga rebeldeng mililar at ng
Iiderato ng AFP? Ano ang ibig sabihin ng "return
to tho barracks"?
b. Kaugnay nito, nakaamba ang pnganib na ang
state of nat;onalemergency ay lumungo sa martial
law kung hindi IBlaga masugpo ang mga nasa
Iikod ng kUdeta;
k.
Ang gubyerno ay maaaring kinakasang·kapan ng
isang military clique na nagnanais ng paghaharing
militar; maari ding pinupuwersa ng kudela ang
ganitong hakbang mula sa gubyerno.
• Malaki ang aming pagkabahala sa kakayanan ng gubyer.
no na lalagang makabalik sa normalidad bunga ng di
pagkalutas ng mga pambansang suliranin at dahil sa
kalagayan ngayon na ang gubyerno'y mislulang ipil sa
naglalabanang mga puwersa sa loob ng AFP at ng mismong gUbyernong sibil.
Mga Rekomendasyon Tungo sa National
Reconstruction
A. Kaugnay ng Mga Nasangkot sa Kudeta:
Nais naming ipahayag na malaki rin ang pananagulan ng
gubyerno sa mga nangyari. Nuon pa ma'y dapal ilong naging
delermlnado na tunay na usigin at parusahan ang mga utak
al puwersang nasa liked ng kudeta.
• TUkuyin al ihayag sa publiko ang mga puwersang
responsable sa kUdeta.
• Tunay na parusahan ang mga nasangkol sa kudeta.
• Gawing publiko ang pag-uusig sa mga kasangkol sa
kudeta.
49
48
OahU sa mga kakulangan nilo:
B. Kaugnay ng AFP
• Tugun"n ang mga lehnlmong hlnaing ng mga kawal
ng AFP tulad ng mga sumusunod:
a. Pagtataas ng sahod sa makatwirang antas;
b. Ibatay sa propesyonalismo ang promosyon ng
mga kasapl ng AFp, hign lalo ang mga junior
officers na tunay na tapat sa tungkulin sa bayan;
k. Ihayag sa publlko ang mga kahilingan ng RAM
tungkol sa mga repormang hinihlling nno para sa
AFP.
• Baguhin ang oryentasyon ng AFP. nayo no bilang
'sang hukbo na tunay na nagmamalasakn sa kapakanan at mga demokratikong karapatan ng samba·
yanang Pilipino, at hindi maging kasangkapan ng mga
puhtiko at dayuhang interes. Kaugnay nito, ang gani·
tong oryentasyon ay dapat maging bahagi ng formation at kurikulum ng mga kadete sa PMA at Iba pang
institusyong militar.
K. Kaugnay ng Pamamalakad ng Gubyerno:
Nais naming ipahayag na hindi na pwedeng palaging Isisl
sa nagdaang admlnist,asyong Marcos ang nagpapatuloy na
krisls pang-ekonomya't pampulitika. Panahon na para kUa·
lanIO ng kasalukuyang gubyerno ang mga kahinaan at pagkukulang nno:
• Sa aming palagay, kinakailangang baguhin ang gabl·
nete at palnan ng mga taong tunay na nagmama·
lasakn sa kapakanan ng taumbayan. Sila'y dapat ding
may tapang ng loob at kakayanang magsagawa ng
kailangang mga maka-mamamayang reporma kahn
no sumasalungat sa interes ng mga dayuhan 0 ng
mga makapangyarihan sa ating Iipunan.
• Kaugnay nno, napapanahon nang tunay na isangkot
ang mga mamamayan sa pagbubuo ng mga patakarang may kinalaman sa kanilang mga karapatan at
kagalingan.
a. Kilalanin ang mga kakulangan ng Kongreso sa
pagbubuo ng mga patakaran at batayan ng mga
pagbabago sa Iipunan.
ij
Bigyan ng pagkakataong maging bahagi
ang mga non· governmental organizations
(NGO) sa pagbubuo ng mga patakaran at
programang magpapaunlad at magpapatatag ng bansa. Maraming NGOs na malaon nang kasangkot at epektibo sa mga
gawalng napatunayang mablsang nakatutugon sa mga suliranin at pangangailangan
ng pangkaraniwang mga mamamayan.
Marapat lamang na sangguniin, sa Isang
regUlar at Instllusyonal na paraan, ang mga
organisasyong no sa kapasidad na advisory units ng Tanggapan ng Pangulo at
ng iba't Ibang ahensyang pampamahalaan.
Ii) Sa pamamagllan ng isang Executive
Order, itayo ang mga consultative council
sa iba't ibang antas ng pamahalaan na
magsisilbing tunay na daluyan ng mga
hlnaing at mungkahi ng mga pangkaranlwang mamamayan kaugnay ng pagpapaunlad ng kanilang kalagayang pangkabuhayan at pagsulong ng kanilang mga
karapatang demokratiko. Ang mga consultative council ay bubuuin ng mga kinatawang pinili mismo ng mga tao sa kanikanilang komunidad at gagampan ng kanilang mga tungkulin sa paraang boluntaryo.
b. Dapat na maging maagap ang Pangulo sa pagdama sa pulso ng sambayanang Pilipino.
Napapanahon nang maging tunay na sensllibo
ang Pangulo sa mga hinlhiling ng iba't Ibang
sektor ng ating IIpunan tulad ng mga gure,
manggagawa, magsasaka, mangingisda, magaaral, at iba pa. Dapat isaalang-alang ng Pangu10 ang katotohanang ang batayan ng tunay na
pag-unlad ay ang pag-asa sa lakas ng mamamayan at sa sariling pagsisikap na malaya sa
pagdidikta ng mga dayuhan.
k. Kaugnay nito, dapat nang magpatupad ang administrasyong Aquino ng mga paraang pangekonomya na hindi nakaasa sa pangungutang
sa mga dayuhan.
d, Sa Kabila ng naihayag nang pagtulong ng Eslados Unldos sa pamahalaang Aquino, dapat na
IgIII nllo ang soberaniya at kalayaan ng Pilipinas
sa pamamagitan ng isang nagsasariling foreign
policy lalo na sa suliranin kaugnay ng mga base
milnar,
51
50
Mensahe sa Pangulong Aquino
Isang leksyon ang ninuturo ng madugo't mapinsalang
kudeta. Nagbabadya sa malapn na hlnaharap ang hign na
madugong pagtatangkang ibagsak ang pamahalaan kung
magpapatuloy ang di-mapagtatakpang pagwawalang-bahala
ng gubyernong Aquino sa Olga pambansang suliranin na
nananatili at patuloy na lumulubha.
Wala nang panahon sa pag.uurung-sulong sa pag·
papatupad ng kinakailangang Olga makabuluhang reporma.
Matagal nang umaasa at naghihintay ang buong sambayanang Pilipino sa katuparan ng Olga ipinangako ng Rebolusyong Edsa nuong Pebrero, 1986.
Nasa gUbyernong Aquino na ang responsibilidad kung
didinggin nito ang Olga kahilingang no ng bayanl
IKA-8 NG DISYEMBRE 1989
ZEUS A. SAlAZAR
MILAGROS C. GUERRERO
ELSIE S. RAMOS
ROMEO C. PILAR
MYRA ANGELI A GRIPALDO
MA. DOLORES CASTRO
SUGGESTIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
By UP Los Banos
Editor'. Note: UP Los Banos's response to the December coup
attempt was a reiteration of various suggestions and recommendations, particUlarly in the area of agriCUlture, land reform, rural
development, and human development that it has made in the pas/.
Vice Chancellor William G. Padolina put together these various
suggestions from the faCUlty and other sectors of the Los Banos
campus. The implication here is that Instituting these reforms
would help undercut the reasons for general discontent-reasons
which give rise to coup attempts and otller forms of unrest in the
country.
The Center for Policy and Development Studies and the College of
Human Ecology contributed to these recommendations for institutional reforms.
ROWENA T. QUINTO
MA. CECILIA A. SAMONTE
General Suggestions
FERDINAND C. LLANES
D. POLICARPIO
R. YUMUL
KHADIJA L. MAMORNO
BERNADEnE L ABRERA
OSCAR M. ALFONSO
DIOSDADO R. ASUNCION
D. V. TAYLO
• Accelerate Impfemental/on of the ComprehensIve
Agrarian Reform law (CARL)
Current ellorts involve the conversion 01 larmer-tenants into
. stockholders, but decision-making and corporate control
remain wnh the 10rmer landowners. This snuation must be
corrected and a more equnable arrangement must be
achieved.
We also suggest that adequate technical and economic
support system be provided by appropriate government
agencies to backstop farmers as they start to manage their
own allairs.
• Strengthen Ruraf Development Program
There is a general perception that the present overall rural
development program of the Aquino government is not doing
52
53
well. The programs of the kay departments Involved (Depart.
ment of Agrlcu~ure, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and Department of Agrarian RaIorm) are not well·
coordinated, and are even confused. In this regard, we sug·
gest the creation of a body that will have lull powers to
coordinate rural development eIIorts of both govemment
agencies and non·government organizations (NGOs).
and programs. Some of the most Important areas are discussed below:
• The bias of economic policies, notably trade and exchange rate policies, against agriCUlture must be
removed. Trade and exchange rate policies const~ute
the most palVasive source 01 the depression 01 production incentives in agricu~ure, thereby deflecting the
movement of much-needed capnal away from the
agrlcu~ural and rural sector.
Rural development must be based on sustainable agriculture to minimize or prevent damage to the environment.
Strong measures to control the raJe of explo~atlon of our
non·renewable natural resources (mineral deposns) must be
instnuted as soon as possible.
• Revamp CabInet and other vital government office.
We suggest that a serious revamp 01 the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Department 01 Trade and Commerce, Department 01 National Defense, Department 01 Education, Cu~ure
and Sports, Department of Social Work and Development,
Department of Agricunure and the Central Bank be considered. Former mMary personnel from government offices
should be scrutinized carefUlly and removed, II warranted.
• Adopt stranger pratecl/on pollc/e. In trade
Local producers must be protected against unfair competition posed by subsidized agricu~ural products of other
countries.
• Relorm taral/on system
Our present taxation system must be corrected because ~
places the tax burden on the middle class and the low-income
groups, both of which are usually fixed·wage earners. The
upper classes are not taxed as much as they should be.
• Reaffirm oppositIon to eIfens/on of the term 01
Military Base•.
The UP Los Banos commun~ remains committed to the
termination of the US mil~ary bases fOllowing the expiration 01
the MiI~ary Bases Agreement in 1991. We reaffirm our opposition to any extension of the agreement.
• Accelerate pre.ent e"orts to decentralize govern·
ment operal/on
Oparations 01 the national government and, where approprlate, government inst~utions including UP. must be
decentralized.
Suggested Policy Reforms for Rural Development
Sustained agricunural and rural development in the Philippines demands the inst~ution of Inter-related policy ralorms
I
• Public seelor spending on agriculture, particularly
public Investments In rural Infrastruelure supportive
01 Increased agricultural productivity and Incomes,
need to be Increased to levels commensurate with the
sector's contribution to national Income and employment. Examples of these investments are rural, roads,
ports, marketing facilities, electrification, communication,
and irrigation and drainage. Dev~lopme!'t in these areas
facilnates the carrying out of a Wide variety of econo""!,c
activnies in the rural and agricunural sector, thereby raising employment and household incomes, helping alleviate poverty, and promoting industrialization"throu~h
the expansion of the domestic market for Industrial
goods.
It Is worth not ing that transport costs in the cou~try
have been high compared to other Southeast ASIan
countries, due In part to the di,smal state of transp,?rt
infrastructure and selVices at the countryside. Industnal
policies conferring protection to local vehicle producers
and transport operators have also aggravated the snuation. In inter-island shipping, handling oosts In public
ports are onerous due largely to inefficiencies spawned
by the monopolistic arrangements in cargo handlin~ ~er­
vices. Such transport bottlenecks hinder the eII,clent
movement of goods and selVice and, more oflen than
not, translate into higher prices paid by consumers and
lower prices received by producers.
• Rural development requires the Intensification 01 reo
search and development to Increase agricultural
productivity and rural Incomes. Studies show that
returns to investments in agricunural research have been
particularly high, typically e~ceeding 35 p~rcent. It is hard
to imagine other typas of investments-In either private
or public sector-that would produce more favorable
rates of return. Unfortunately, the country's public expendnures on agricu~ural research, when expressed as a
proportion of the gross value added in agriculture, h~ve
bean low In relation to those of other ASian countries,
inclUding Pakistan and Bangladesh.
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55
• The pace of land reform and the delivery of support
services to farmers and rural workera need to be accelerated. The first is necessnated by the highly skewed
distribution of land ownership and operational holdings-rather unique in Asia and resembling the agrarian
structure in Latin America-and by the fact that the
poorest of the poor are the landless. As long as this
skewed landholding structure remains, an egriculture-Ied
development strategy will be unsuccessful in alleviating
abject poverty and high unemployment and underemployment. Any other growth strategy is unlikely to al.
leviate these problems unless addresses the question
of the poor's access to land and employment oppor.
tunliles.
n
• The level of social services covering education,
health, and nutrition, aimed at promoting rural welfare
and human capital development, has to be Increased.
Human capital development enhances the poor's prime
asset-their own labor-and, hence, their contribution to
national economic development.
Along this line, the following are our recommendations:
• Roads, Ports Facilities and Interisland Shipping. The
deplorable state of many roads points to giving the
highest priority to restoration and maintenance activllies.
Barangay roads directly serve the needs of farmers and
rural dwellers, yet amounts currently programmed for the
maintenance of barangay roads are only 35 to 40 parcent
of the required amounts. Rural roads must also be constructed to penetrate areas with higher concentrations of
poverty. Aside from the need for a larger budget for
roads and bridges, administrative reforms are necessary
to decentralize planning and financing. Infrastructure
development encourages local inllialive, promotes accountability and lower costs, and ensures the salisfaction
of local needs.
The efficiency of port facilities is essential to both domeslie and international trade. Tho CUrlent inefficiency of
Philippine ports arises from: (1) outmoded cargo handling facilities; (2) long ship turnaround time; and (3)
institutional constraints to efficient management. The first
two issues may be addressed via investments in modern
cargo handling eqUipment and the accelerated dredging
of harbors and ports. The management of port facilijies
by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) may be improved,
and port fees reduced, ff full autonomy for the PPA is
granted. To pay for the requirements in port operation
and maintenance, the PPA receives only a fraction of
collection from port fees. An allernative may be to auction the right to operate various Philippine ports to private
groups to allow competition to set efficiency standards in
port management.
By no means are these policy reforms and programs exhaustive of all areas and pOlicy concerns in rural development. But they are suggestive of the critical reforms and
programs that have to be underiaken to effectively get agricul.
ture and rural development mOVing.
Specific Policy Recommendations
Rural Infrastructure
Th~ inadeq~a':Y ,?f rural infrastructure, including communrcat,on facilltres, IS a serious obstacle to agricullural diversificali,?n and rurai in.dustrialization. Manila and nearby areas
have historically receIVed the major share of market infrastructure relative to the total investment in roads and bridges as
well as communication facilities.
'
A massive program ,?f infrastructure-building in the rural
areas Will have far-reaching benefits, such as: (a) employment
for landless households will be generated in the Short-run; (b)
the overall level of demand in the economy will be raised' (c)
new market opportunities for the economy's outputs wili be
opened; (d) the benems from more favcrable input-output
prices will be accorded to farmers; (e) consumers will face
lower costs of agricullural products; and (I) the cost of delivering economic and social services to the countryside will be
reduced.
• Postharvest Facilities. Philippine government and
society have a lot to gain from the diminution of postharvest losses. Investments could be enlarged and storage
facilities could be improved with mechanized handling
eqUipment. Education and training in loss prevention
techniques will also bring great returns. Budget allocations for postharvest technology, however, are almost
negligible in relation to the level of loss. Even in the case
of grains, the allocations are very small, and for fruns and
vegetables close to zero. Yet fruits and vegetables in
partiCUlar, have significant foreign exchange-earning
potentials. Of course, improvements in transport, roads,
rails, communications and shipping facilllies also reduce
postharvest losses. In addition, pricing and grading system for grains and perishables must be developed, introduced and enforced.
•
Irrigation. The expansion and upgrading of irrigation infrastructure are important requislles for improving land
56
57
productivity because they augment current land supply,
as well as enhance per-hectare yield. The former becomes possible through Increased cropping Intensity
and the latter resulls from the posllive complementarities
among modern rice varieties, optimal fertilizer application, and proper water management.
It should be noted, however, that Irrigation development
in the country is currently experiencing a deceleration
due to serious scarcity in financial resources and increasing cost of construction per unll area. Faced with
this dilemma, the government, through the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) , Is currently adjusting lis
development strategy by concentrating on the construction of small-scale irrigation projects and rehabililation of
existing systems which have deteriorated due to the poor
operation and maintenance as well as agroclimatic factors.
Given the major role of irrigation in increasing agricullural
output, as well as the decreasing share of government
allotments to irrigation development relative to the total
national bUdget, II is necessary to establish priority areas
for irrigation investment within the country which may
serve as agricultural growth points.
In this regard, there must be greater coordination with the
Department of Agricullure in terms of identifying these
areas where conditions of poverty. inequily and unemployment need to be alleviated. But II should be mentioned that greater budget allocations for irrigation investment must be made by the government ~ the country's
irrigation development is to improve over lis current state
of about 1.4 million hectares (or about 13% of total
potentially irrigable area).
There is also a need to develop an irrigation technology
which will be applicable to high-value agricultural crops,
which may permit farmers to diversity crop production as
well as realize higher farm incomes.
It is a well-known fact that irrigation projects require substantial amounts of investment. in terms of capital and
human resources. This is why II is of utmost importance
that these systems are operated, maintained and
managed properly. In order to ensure this. a continuous
and effective monlloring and evaluation of irrigation systems should be undertaken by an Independent agency.
Information thereby generated will serve as the basis for
identifying emerging problems confronting the irrigation
subsector. as well as provide the basis to develop allernative soltrtions to these problems.
• Strengthening Market Information and Export Promotion. The government should Improve lis marketing Information system not only for the tradllional crops (rice,
com. sugar, and coconut) but more especially for the
non-tradilional agricullural crops. II should provide (on a
regular basis) the agrlcullural sector as well as agrlculturaltraders, processors and exporters wllh vllat informa.
tion relating to market outlets, pricing, supply and
demand data, and market requirements. The public sec.
tor could seek the assistance of the media and nongovernment organizations In disseminating this Informa.
tion. In line wllh this, more Investments for the Improveme"!
the national (as well as Intemationa~ com.
mUOlcat,on system must be made to link up the rural
areas wllh the urban centers.
O!
AgriCUltural Resource Conservation and
Protection
The appalling condilions of the Philippine environment
wrought by cumulative relentless explollation of the nation's
nat~ral .resources, have moved the policymakers to formulate
legislation measures that adopt strategies for sustainable
development.
In the Phil!ppines, the present scenario is qulle alarming.
The worseOlng environmental deterioration has aggravated
poverty and hunger, particularly among those on marginal
subsistence. The pressing demands of a population that has
grown from 54 million to about 60' million In five years have
taken precedence over everything else. The drive for
economic recovery, the desperate struggle to meet payments
on external debts, and the poillical maneuverings of our
leaders have relegated crucial ecological concerns to the
background.
The following are key priority Issues and problems In the
agricultural resource conservation and protection:
• Soil erosion
• Land tenure/occupancy problems
• High cost of agrlcullurallnputs
• Reduced fertility of cullivated lowlands due to excessive Inorganic fertilization and pesticide application
• Conversion of agrlcullural land for residential and/or
commercial purposes
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58
• Lack of land classification
The following measures are Buggested:
• Protect productive cropland areas through land use
planning and zoning provisions which preve'nt their
development from non- agrlcuhural uses.
• Eliminate Incentives bulh Into price systems which encourage the use of expensive Inputs and provide
economic Incentives for ecologically sound management practices.
• Incorporate conservation principles Into all foreign-assisted agrlcuhural programs.
• Require stricter compliance w~h conservation requirements in the management of pasturelands and other
land use practices under government permns and
leases.
• Stop all conversion of remaining forests.
• Re-examine polici~s regarding land tenure of upland
communities wnhin public lands.
• Develop professional, technically-trained and sOCiallysens~ive field personnel to enforce national policies
and laws, as well as introduce ecologically sound
land-use management practices to the reSidents of
marginal lands.
Research and Extension
Research and extension are essential for the acceleration of
agricuhural production and rural development. They should
be linked strongly as their functions must Interlock to serve a
common clientel&-the farmer, and the end-user. They must
have proper and adequate supporl (in terms of funding,
facilnies, manpower, structure and policies) to be more effective and efficient.
At present, however, research and extension are compartmentalized. This has given rise to organizational and
operational weaknesses. There Is a need to strengthen and
systematize the interface of these two factors. Research and
extension are rather weak, as many of the programs/projects
are not responsive to the needs and problems of farmers,
especially the small farmers. Also, the conversion of the
Bureau of Agrlcuhural Extension (BAEx) Into Agrlcuhural
Training Instnute (ATI) does not answer the needs of the
farmers, as training Is only one component of our extension
program.
We propose the following recommendations:
• Inst~utionalize and rationalize research and extension
programs of the country Involving agrlcuhural.schools
and unlvers~ies w~h the DA and other agencIes. Th,s
would mean the development of a national research
and extension program coordinated by DA and SCUbased scientists and extension personnel.
• Establish strong linkage wrih NGOs in technology
transfer and utilization.
• Provide adequate funds for research and extension
programs.
Human Development
Genuine development policies must facilitate the rapid and
continuous improvement in the quality of life of our ~ople,
especially the poor and disadvantaged, through the satIsfaction of their basic needs.
The College of Human EcolOgy declares that.'he state must
assert ~s right to full and permanent sovereignty over our
country's wealth, natural resources and economic activnies.
Further, ~ should give prlor~ to the improvement of the rural
environment.
We propose the promotion of family education, covering
skills development for self-sufficiency a~d livelihood and
value formation/re-orientation, particularly ,n regard to family
roles and relatl.:Jns, family resource utilization and management, population education, child rearing, and care for the
elderly.
To these ends, the following are suggested:
• Pre-school programs in barangays should serve as
venues for value formation and re-orientation.
• Workshops, seminars, and individual family counseling in pilot barangays---particularly on the issue 'of
Responsible Parenthood, which covers Population
Educalio~should be held. Technical consuhancy
and implementation of programs in baranflays for
skills development for self-suffiCiency and livelihood
should be provided.
• Mobile Libraries in pilot barangays would contribute to
literacy and value formation among our people.
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61
disturbances can only result In misdirected courses of action
that will serve as mere palliatives.
LAST CHANCE TO RESTRUCTURE
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY
By UP Manila
Introduction
T
he recent coup attempt launched by misguided milnary
for~es deserves t? be denounced by all freedom-loving
peOple!n th~ most stn!'gent terms possible. The University of
the. Philippines Manila expresses its strong indignation
against this .sh!'meful pi?! by self-proclaimed messiahs to
undermine cIvilian authonty and Install a milnary dictatorsh'p
by~~
I
We say "NO TO THE COUP' as a means for redress of
gnevanc.~s by the military. We condemn the use of arms to
grab political power and overthrow the constnutional system
of government. It is obvious that the coup plotters bereft of
any clear program of government and unable to present a
viable alternati~e. to th.e present order, have sought to take
!'dvantage .Of ."sing dissatisfaction among the people and
Impos~ therr vIsionless will on the country. We refuse to allow
the military to appropriate the people's agenda for reform by
way of a coup.
We say "YES TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVILIAN
AUTHO~I1Y" and ~rm. our faith In democracy and peaceful
mec~anlsms for articulating alternative policies and programs
and, II necessary, for change of leadership in government.
But at the sam~ time, we urge the duly-constlluted govern.
me~t under PreSident Corazon C. Aquino, the legislature and
the Judiciary to recognize their failure to provide a better Iiie for
the majority of Filipinos. They must accept the reality that
m.ountlng social, political and economic I/Is have caused the
alienation of many sectors of society from government.
. We therefore call on the government to confront the real
Iss~es and problems that weigh heavily against efforts for
national development. Failure to awaken to the root causes of
Political Issues
While the Constitution states that 'sovereignty resides in the
people and the government's authority emanates from them, •
there is a growing perception that government IIsell ;s becomIng isolated and estranged from majority of lis constlluency
because of incompetent and Insensilive Cabinet members,
grandstanding poillicians, vested Interest groups, and the
Intervention foreign powers.
Graft and corruption in government remain unabated. In
addition, opportunistic relatives of high-ranking officials are
once again on the loose. Peace and order conditions continue to deteriorate as evidenced by the increase in the crime
rate, the continuing Insurgency, the proilieration of private
armies, and forced evacuation of civilian residents from their
homes. Social justice remains unattained and human rights
violations persist. A sense of helplessness weighS down on
the ordinary cnizen. These internal problerns are aggravated
by a pervasive American presence which seeks to strengthen
lis influence over our national Ille.
The President should revamp her· Cabinet and fire the in·
competent and callous ones, as well as those identified wnh
vested interest groups. Big time grafters should likewise be
prosecuted and jailed. The President should stop her relatives
from being liabilities to her government. She must also review
the performance of her ruling coalnion and get members to
discard the ways of tradllional polnics.
ns
Members of Congress should cease their grandstanding
acts, set aside their personal Interests and address the
problems of their consliluents, particularly the lack of basic
services. Mechanisms for popular participation in policy formulation and Implementation should be put in place. Consultations with proper organizations and non-governmental
organizations must be held regularly. In fine wllh this, all
sectoral representatives to Congress should be appointed at
once in order to provide some balance in the composnion of
the elne-controlled Congress.
We urge more openness and tolerance in the discussion of
our national problems and in proposing solutions to them. All
points of view from various schools of thought must be
presented and argued provided these are done wnhin the
constitutional framework.
The anti-Insurgency campaign and the total war policy that
directs II must be re-examined. Negotiations for a ceasetire
wllh all warring groups must be inlliated and an eventual
peaceful sertlement of armed conflicts must be aimed at.
62
-
The leaders of the failed December coup should be identified, tried, and severely punished for their criminal act.
Politicians who have directly helped the coup must also be
dean wllh accordingly. Civinan courts should try the mililary
offenders to ensure an impartial trial. Mililary education, particularly the curriculum 01 the Philippine Mililary Academy
(PMA), should be reviewed and reoriented so that II does not
breed future coup plollers. The AFP as a whole badly needs
to be re-educated and redirected to the ways 01 democracy.
The executive and legislative branches of government must
be resolute in ending, once and for all, foreign dominance 01
and intervention In our national affairs. We should work
towards realiZing the constllutional mandate for an Independent and sovereign foreign policy that has our national
and people's interest as lis foremost concern.
Socio-economic Issues
Long standing socio-economic structures have been the
rnain cause of poverty and marginalization among the people,
partrcularly the peasant and labor sectors. Gross inequaltties
in income and wealth distribution, ownership and control over
land and other natural resources, and in access to basic and
support services continuously fuel disaffection and unrest.
8i9. business groups have established themselves in high
posItrons In government, dictating economic policy In support of their Own agenda. Transnational corporations and their
local partners exercise an overriding innuence over the direction of the Philippine economy. These same forces have also
participated In the degradation of the environment by their
ruthless and uncontrolled exploitation 01 our natural resources for profit.
Low incomes and rising prices plague wage earners-the
laborers, ordinary employees, and worker-professionals. The
controversial Salary Standardization Law (SSL) has only worsened wage ineguities as huge increases accrued to higher
offrclals, whrle minuscule raises or nothing at all went to the
rank-and-file employees.
The foreign debt issue remains a paramount concern. Our
debt negotiators have shown nothing but subservience to the
foreign credllors and to the dictates 01 the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). We are made
to pay foreign debts acquired and squandered by the preVIOUS Marcos regime at the cost of depriving our people 01 a
just and decent life.
No doubt sacrnices and ben-tightening are called for as we
strive to undo the damage wrought by !wenly years of misrule
and plunder. But II is an unwritten law that those who have
longer and faller bells should be the first to give up unnecesssry privileges and benellis. High government officials and
63
the business eille must discard their ostentatious IWestyles
and live humbler or simpler roves. They must forego salary
increases and higher prolll margiriS and instead redistribute
these among their low-salarted workers.
Agrarian tensions will persist unless government provides
a genuine land reform program that will completely restructure modes 01 land ownership. In this regard, President
Aquino must show the way by giving up her own family's
control over Hacienda Luislla. Agricunural support programs
must be rechanneled to serve the small direct producers
Instead of big agribusiness Interests and large-scale farms.
Economic policies and thrusts must be re-examined and
weaned away from subordination to foreign concerns_
Greater support must be accorded to small-scale and laborintenSive business enterprises.
Price control must be Imposed and stricUy enforced not only
in retail trade but also at the wholesale level. Minimum wage
levels must be raised to provide a decent livelihood for
workers. The SSL must be fOrmulated so as to grant greater
benefits to low Income employees. A rollback In oil prices
must be ordered and the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)
abolished. The foreign debt negotiators must be replaced wllh
those who would favor and work for our national interests.
Cultural Issues
The educational system has become too commercialized
and marketable college Courses produce graduates who are
totally insensllive to social concerns and end up serving
foreign and local corporations. Others eagerly desert the
country and work abroad. While economic condllions may
have forced such distorted priorllies, one can also point to the
fact that values of Philippine patriotism and nationalism are
not being assimilated properly at the classroom level by Our
school population.
The mass media, especially television and movies, glorffy
violence as the ultimate solution to contlict. Values extolling
foreign cuhures exercise a negative influence on young
minds.
A thorough revIew of the education system must be
conducted towards strengthening trsnsmlsslon
mechanIsms for positive 'ISlues such ss nationalism and
social consciousness. /I Is also recommended that media
review the content of /Is progrsms slong the same lines.
The UP Manila communffy considers this the last chance for
government 10 Ins!nute needed changes and bring about a
restructured society. II is also an opportunffy for the Filipino
people to harness their Indefatigable strength, tap their
boundless creativlly, and rise above the present crisis.
65
64
DECEMBER ", 1989
MINDA LUZ QUESADA
TAGUMPAY MANIQUIS
ASSESSING THE FAILED
COUP ATTEMPT
ANGELA P. SARILE
JULITA I. YABES
JOSE S. BAENS
SOFRONIO P. SAN JUAN
EDUARDO TADEM
By UP Visay.s
AMANTE CRUZ
CESARYABUT
MARIANO CAPARAS
JANUARIO ESTRADA
HORACIO ESTRADA
BERNIE BILLENAS
Ed/lor'. Nole: the following assessment of the failed coup attempt
In December 1989 was derived from the minutes of a meeting
among officle/s and faculty of the UP In the Visayas called by Chancellor Francisco Nemenzo shortly aIIer the coup. The facully who
a/lended the meeting came from the following units: Graduate
School, College of ArIs and Sciences (CAS), School of Management Development (SDM), end College of Fisheries (CF).
ARTURO PESIGAN
ERLINDA ORTIN
MARILOU REBULLIDA
AURORA YAPCHIONGCO
COOKIE DOMINGO
MICHAEL MAGTOTO
CRISTINA TORRES
ALBERTO ROMUALDEZ
ERNESTO O. DOMINGO
Causes of the Coup
president Corazon Aquino Is now encountering the usual
problems of pos!-revolutlona/y governments. All leaders
who acceded to power through non-constttutional means are
beset by problems of legttimizatlon and economic recove/y.
Indeed, tt Is much easier mounting a revolution than ruling the
count/Y afterwards.
Most revolutiona/y leaders handle challenges wtth an Iron
fist. President Aquino does not seem to have the stomach for
this: she used kid gloves in dealing wtth previous coup attempts. As a consequence, the ploners have tried again.
De-professionaAzatlon of the mlltta/y was Identified as a
legacy of the Marcos dictatorship. As borne out by the experiences of other Third World countries, when soldiers have
had the taste of power, tt Is difficutt to bring them back to the
barracks. Corruption In the civilian bureaucracy and among
politicians also provld9 the poltt~lzed soldier an excuse for
poltticallntervention.
Most COLAp leaders In the Philippines are graduates of the
Philippine Mlllta/y Academy (PMA). Perhaps, more
humanities courses should be Included In the PMA cur-
67
66
rlculum, On the other hand, humanttles and social science
courses may have contributed Immensely to the poIttlcallzation ot PMA cadets, (Soon after the Imposttlon of martial law,
Marcos ordered a revamp of the PMA curriculum and this
resuned In the insertion of more non-mililary courses, These
courses served to propagate Marcos's Filipino ide%gy.)
Perhaps the problem does not lie In the curriculum, The
professors who teach the non-milttary courses are an important faClor, If pOlillcal science, for example, Is taught by a
civilian professor with a milttarlstic bent, iI will not engender
appreciation for democratic values and Ideals,
Perhaps, too, the entire atmosphere on the PMA campus
nurtures a praetorian frame of mind, the belief articulated by
"Gringo" Honasan hlmseif that the milttary has the sacred
duty to save the nation from inept and corrupt poIi1iclans.
Hazing not only instills a strong sense Of brotherhood (esprit
de corps) which is useful in organizing a coup; if also warps
the minds of the cadets,
It was suggested that PMA cadets should be exposed to
non- milttary courses by enrolling at UP. Assuming this gets
the approval of PMA authortties, iI could dilute milttary discipline, similar to sending seminarians to a co-educational
institution to experience the real world,
The concept of military training has Indeed been changing
in other r-!)untries, The negative consequences ot a purely
military education Is being recognized, The Royal Milttary
Academy of Britain (Sandhurst) now offers only short
graduate courses ranging from six month,S to two years,
Applicants must have completed regUlar degrees In civilian
unlversilies,
Dunlroon, the Royal Australian Mllttary Academy, offers fouryear courses during which cadets simuifaneously work for a
Bachelor of Science degree at the Unlverstty Of New South
Wales, UNSW supplies the academy wilh civilian lecturers
and professors to teach the non-mllttary subjects. The latter
are chosen by the unlverstty, not by the mililary establishment;
and the universtty apparently sends to Duntroon the most
unmililarlstic types of academics, A few Duntroon faculty
members are unabashed leftists so the cadets are exposed to
all kinds of ideas, a trUly liberal education,
Motivations of the Plotters
Most Of us are Of the opinion that the coup plotters are
motivated by personal Interests, the drive fOr power, We see
Honasan as eccentric, power-oriented, hence, messianic, In
his interview wtth journalist Ninez Cacho-OrlVares, he projects
an Image of himself as a legendary hero who Is out to save
the nation,
But this might be a simplistic assessm~nt, Of a complex
personaltty. Like Honasan, most polilicians and reformers are
power-oriented, You cannot bring about reforms unless you
have power, As Machiavelli said, only a prophet armed succeods; the prophet unarmed is doomed to fail, Being poweroriented does not mean he is moved by selfish
considerations alone,
One who knows Honasan attested that the RAM leader is
fiercely idealistic, Most PMA cadets are imbued with idealism,
even if their ideals may be misplaced from our POint of View,
The honor system at the academy nurtures idealism,
Some Of uS take exception to a point made in the Diliman
manifesto that the plotters have no vision, no program, In a
long interview with another journalist, Cecilio Arillo, Honasan
actually spelled out some sort of program, We may disagree
with his assumptions, especially the assumption that the
mililary is best fitted to lead the development process, but let
us admtt that his vision is more coherent and better thoughtout than Cory Aquino's when she campaigned for the
presidency,
A participant pleaded, "Why not give RAM a chance, as we
have given Cory four years?" A mililary junta may be what we
need to achieve the stabiltty, order and discipline essenlJal for
national development, according to this one view,
The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM)
The RAM boys are mostly staff officers wilh no combat
experience, They enter the corridors of power immediately
after graduation from the PMA, Yet, all PMAers are reqUired to
spend at least two years of combat duties before they get staff
assignments, Honasan and Eduardo Kapunan (another RAM
leader), for example, have exemplary combat records,
Moreover, RAM includes PMA graduates in the field, They are
in fact the RAM's main source of strength,
RAM's image was tarnished by ils identification wilh Juan
Ponce Enrile, the Defense Minister in the Marcos regime,
Being a West Pointer, Fidel Ramos does not have much
influence among the PMAers, It is these PMA people who plot
coups, Enlisted men have only been used as pawns,
Honasan said in previous coups that the RAM boys are
Willing to die but reluctant to kill, Now, they are willing to die
and to kill,
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68
The US Factor
Some saw the December 1989 coup as a moro-mora orchestraled by the US to ensure retention of the bases. The fact
that few mililary people were killed in several days of intensive
fighting lends credibility to this suspicion.
Others put forward the opinion thal the moro-mora theory
oversimplifies a complex phenomenon. n implies thal there
are no real conflicts in the mililary, which is patently wrong.
More likely, the RAM boys timed the coup on the eve 01 the
bases talks, hoping iI would be easier to get US support since
President Aquino is unable to ensure retention of the bases.
This is different from saying that the US 9rchestrated the
whole thing.
Some of us justify President Aquino's request for US assistance to stop the onslaught of the rebels and regain control 01
the air on the principle that the first duty 01 the state is to
survive. Perhaps she also wanted to test the sincerity 01 the
US pledge to give all-Out support to her government.
Aquino's request for US mililary assistance may also be
justified in terms of valuss that transcend her government:
democracy and the presentation of internal sovereignty. As
for external sovereignty, a country under ils construction and
under international law has the right to seek foreign mililary
assistance to save ilseil or ils democralic instilutions.
It should be noted that Aquino's decision to seek US air
cover became necessary because, tradilionally relying on
Clark Air Base for protection from aerial aIlack by a foreign
power, our armed forces never bothered to provide for the
defense 01 the legilimate government against a faction 01 lis
own air force. Hence, the Malacal'\ang securtty group had no
anti-aircraft guns.
Moreover, the request for US assistance was unnecessary
because, as the government claims, iI had the P-5s 01 the 5th
Fighter Wing on ils side and iI had superiority 01 infantry.
These were more than enough to neutralize the air power 01
the rebels.
The request, justified or not, has weakened our bargaining
posilion vis-a-vis the mililary bases.
People's Power
There was no people's power this time. People converged
on the vicinity of fighting out 01 curiosity rather than to express
support for Cory. Because 01 graft and corruption, rtsing
prices, the oil price hike, salary standardization, etc., people
could not care less. In February 1986, by contrast, the people
were unlled against a common enemy. And there was a
credible ailernative. Now they would not risk their lives for
Cory, but neilher are they willing to die for Vice President Dey
Laurel.
Cardinal Sin called for preyer power, asked people to go to
the churches and pray. Based on radio reports, however, few
responded. Sin's credibility has been going down even
before the coup.
The comparison between the February 1986 revolution and
the December 1989 coup could be over-stretched. Perhaps
there is no basis for comparing the two wilh respect to
people's power. In February 1986 the government did not pull
a trigger, whereas Honasan and company In 1989 started
shooting.
There was shooting In February 1986, ailhough not as extensive; but the people were not scared. We have yet to
explain why people went out Into the streets In February 1986
but not In December 1989, I.e., not until after the coup.
Strategy
RAM tried utilizing people power, which explains why
rumors 01 an Impending coup spread before iI could be
executed. People who behaved like Marcos loyalists accompanied the rebels when they attacked Channel 4 and occupied the junction 01 EDSA and Quezon Avenue.
The timing was right. RAM explOlled discontent over the 011
price Increase, salary standardizallon, the PNP bill, etc. But
RAM might have gained broader support had iI wailed for the
full impact 01 the 011 price hike to hil tha pockets 01 everyone.
Now the government has a scapegoal. ncan blame the coup
for the deterioralion 01 the people's economic well·being.
The electronic media are a usual target 01 coups. In August
1987, Gringo's men captured Broadcast City and gained
tremendous propaganda mileage when a harmless-looking
lieutenant wllh fierce-looking subordinales began reading
mililary orders on Channel 9. The RAMboys failed to repeal
thal performance when they captured Channels 2 and 4 In the
first few hours 01 the coup. All TV channels have a system for
seil·disabling should a coup occur.
71
70
TEODORO LEDESMA
Rumor was spread by government propagandists that the
rebels were paid as much as P300 a day. Some find n easier
to concede that big businessmen must have been Involved.
For example, the Group of 40 led by lormer student aelivist
Jerry Barlcan Is reportedly sympathetic to RAM. Honasan,
Kapunan and other RAM leaders like Vic Batac, must have
extensive business contaels sincsthey all graduated lrom the
Asian Instnute of Management (AIM).
Treatment of Military Rebels
Rebels ought to be punished. One suggested that they
should be lined up against the wall and shot. But the junior
officers and enlisted men were just lollowing orders. Harsh
punishment should be confined to the top leadership, those
who consciously violated mililary discipline.
But how can the government punish those who returned to
barracks tully armed? How can II punish the leaders who were
apparently let loose and have gone underground?
Effects of the Coup
Cory Aquino may now be a hostage to the milllary. While
agreeing to return to barracks, the rebels have the capabilily
to resume fighting. They have a sword of Damoc/es over the
President and she may have to yield to their demands.
This is a set pattern. In previous coups, the mUllary emerged
more powerful than before. In her effort to placate the rebals,
she has given a lot 01 concessions to the mUllary.
The economic impael of the coup could only be disastrous.
The stock market could take a dip. Land values in, say, Cabu
must have tumbled, although the effect of the coup on real
estate has yet to be ascertained. As early as Thursday afternoon (November 30, 1989), coup rumors provoked a bank
run: P2 billion were withdrawn by depositors. The Central
Bank had to declare a bank holiday lor about two days.
The New People's Army (NPA) may be happier now that
mUnary is' weakened. So are the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) and the criminal elements.
FRANCISCO NEMENZO
LOURDES DE CASTRO
RODOLFO BALDEVARONA
LEAZAPANTA
TOMASITO TALLEDO
EMILITA AGBAYANI
PEPITO FERNANDEZ, JR.
TITA TORIO
JOSEPH LOOT
NYGIEL ARMADA
ROMMEL LAO
NATHANIEL SAMSOM
JACOBTIO
RAMON ZAMORA
72
PART Three
73
I
LESSONS FROM THE
DECEMBER COUP
..
By VI' Diliman t'aculty and StalT
W
e, the undersigned members 01 the University 01 the
Philippines community, condemn the latest coup attempt by RAM lorces and their supporters in and outside the
AFP. They mock democracy and invoke the name 01 the
people to hide their seW-serving motives. We also condemn
opportunist politicians and prolfteering businessmen who
capftalize on this national tragedy lor personal gain.
We affirm our adherence to the Constftution and democratic
processes and in this spirft support the duly constftuted
authority. We commend the loyal soldiers, the media who
were our vftal Source 01 inlormation, the Philippine National
Red Cross and other volunteers who risked their lives to ease
the conflict.
But we call on the Aquino Government to recognize fts own
failure in responding to the factors that caused the present
crisis. The lessons 01 the December coup are clear:
One, the way 01 a coup d'elal is not the way 01 democracy,
and ft will not obtain the support 01 the people. We cannot
allow the military to dictate the national agenda in the name of
the people.
Two, lor Government to enjoy the support 01 the people, ft
must earn ft. Enough 01 rhetoric. Government must now
seriously anend to instftuting mechanisms lor genuine can·
sultation wfth the people and together wfth them, decide In
lavor of the people rather than 01 outside or selected Interests.
Three, the Victory achieved through U.S. support is holtow
especially in the light of the upcoming negotiations on the
bases. Foreign intervention aggravates the problem and In·
suits our national dignity.
Government must not seek comfort In victory lor the crisIS
is by no means over. Lot ft not view the coup anempt as a mere
setback or a loss 01 loreign Investments. Government must
look upon the crisis as the time to seek new directions in
meeting the most basic problems 01 the people: rising prices,
unemployment, unjust wages, graft and corruption, landlessness, power Shortage, transport crisis, potable water housIng, ~alnutrltlon, heavy debt burden, and so on. thiS: too, Is
the tIme to change inept and Indifferent government officials
who do not deserve the taxpayers' money.
Government, however, cannot succeed alone. We, the
people, must work wfth the Government to strengthen our
democratic instftutlons end rebuild our nation,
We at the University pledge 10 peacelully resist any government that comes to power through milftary lorce or violence,
6 December 1989
Diliman, Quezon City
74
75
magpasiya sa pabor ng nakahlhigll a! hindi ng dayuhan 0
piling mga interes.
MGA LEKSYON MULA SA
DISYEMBRENG KUDETA
(Filipino Version of UP Dillman Statement)
=;;
&
K
inukondena ng mga miyembro ng komunidad ng
Unibersidad ng Pilipinas ang pinakahuling tangkang
kudeta ng puwersang RAM at mga sumuporta sa kanlla sa
loob a! labas ng AFP. Kinukutya nila ang demokrasya at
dinadahilan ang taumbayan upang Ikubll ang mga makasarili
nilang motibo. Kinukondena din namin ang mga oportunistang puilliko at mapagsamantalang negosyante sa paggamll
ng pambansang trahedyang 110 para sa personal nilang pakinabang.
Pinaninindigan namin ang Konstllusyon at mga demokratikong proseso, a! alinsunod sa diwa nllo'y sumusuporta
kam! sa mga nahirang na awtoridad. Plnupuri namln ang mga
sundalong naging tapat ng Konstitusyon, ang media na plnagmumulan ng mahalagang bailia a! Impormasyon, eng
Philippine National Rod Cross at iba pang mga bolunlaryo na
nagsapanganib ng kanilang buhay upang mabawasan ang
pinsalang dulot ng labanan.
Gayunman, nananawagan kaml sa Gobyarnong Aquino na
kilalanln ang sarili nllong kablguan sa pagtugon sa mga
suliraning pinag-ugatan ng kasalukuyang krlsls. Malinaw ang
mga leksyon ng Disyembreng kudeta.
Una, ang pamamaraan ng kudeta ay hindi pamamaraan ng
demokrasya. Hindi 110 kailanman makakakuha ng suporta ng
taumbayan. Hindi nalin maaaring pahintululan na ang mililar
eng siyang megdidikta ng pambansang adyenda sa ngalan
ng taumbayan.
Pangalawa, upang mapanalill ng Gobyerno ang pagtangkilik ng taumbayan, kailangang maglng karapaldapa! 110.
Tama na ang retorika. Kailangan asikasuhin sa lalong madaling panahon ang pagtfllatag ng mga mekanlsmo para sa
tunay na konsullasyon sa mga mamamayan, a! kaakiba! nila,
Pangallo, ang tagumpay na nakamll sa tulong ng Estados
Unidos ay walang halaga, lalung-Ialo na kung isasaalangalang ang nalalapll ng negosasyon sa base mililar. Ang dayuhang panghihimasok ay nagpapalala sa problema at humahamak sa aling pambansang dignidad.
Sa panahong 110, di dapat hanapin ng gobyerno ang kaginhawaan sa lagumpay pagka! dl pa tapes ang krisis. Huwag
nitong tanawin ang tangkang kudela na isang sagabal 0 di
kava pagkawala ng foreign investments. Ang krlsis ay dapal
magbunsod sa Gobyerno na maghanap ng mga bagong
direksyon upang matugunan ang mga pangunahing suliranin
ng mga mamamayan: ang tumataas na presyo ng mga
bilihin, kawalan ng trabaho, di makatarungang sahod, pangunguwalla at katiwalian sa gobyerno, kawalan ng lupa't tahanan, pagkakapos ng koryente, krisis sa transportasyon, kakulangan ng tubig na mainom, malnulrisyon, dayuhang ulang
na pabigal sa bayan, at iba pa. Napapanahon na ring palilan
ang mga walang silbi at pabayang opisyales na aksaya sa
pera ng taumbayan.
Ngunil di kakayanin ang laha! ng 110 kung ang Gobyerno'y
nag-lisa lamang. Kailangan ang tulong nating mga mamamayan sa pagpapalakas ng mga demokratikong institusyon
al sa muling pagbangon ng ating bayan.
Nanunumpa kaming nasa Unibersidad na tululan namin sa
mapayapang paraan ang anumang gobyernong aagaw ng
kapangyarihan sa pamamagitan ng dahas 0 puwersang militar.
6 Disyembre 1989
Diliman, Lungsod ng Quezon
77
76
,J'
REAFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT
TO DEMOCRAC'{, PEACE AND UNITY
•
JUS
By UI' Los Banos Faculty
, .Thereas, the latest coup attempt staged by misguided
l" elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines supported by some civilians, has resulied in:
• the incalculable loss of lives and Injury to hundreds of
combatants and innocent civilians;
AFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRAC'{,
THE RULE OF LAW, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNT'{, AND SUPPORT FOR
THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITY
By College of .::ducation Faculty
UP Diliman
• the senseless destruction of government and private
property;
• the generation of undeserved fear and anxiety among
our people;
'.]HEREAS, we believe in democracy, peace, brotherl' , hood and unity;
• the polarization in the mil~ary hierarchy and the civilian
populace; and
WHEREAS, we support and uphold the 1987
and the duly constituted authorities;
• the setback of the gains achieved in the national
economic recovery efforts.
WHEREAS, we are deeply shocked and outraged by the use
of violence to overthrow the present government;
Whereas, these deplorable results have undermined our
WHEREAS, we are deeply grieved by the loss of innocent
lives, the senseless destruction of property, the sowing of
fear and anxiety among our people. not only here but in many
parts of the world;
f~ndamental values and rights as enshrined in the Const~u­
tlon;
Whereas, the attempted coup has derailed our efforts
towards the promotion of unity and the peaceful means of
effecting reforms in our society;
Therefore, we, the faculty and staff of UP Los Banos, strongly c.onde":"n the coup and other forms of violence as a means
of ,"st~utlng changes in our country and we reaffirm our
commitment to consmutional democracy, peace and unity.
Signed by 874 members of
UP Los Baiios Faculty and
Staff.
Const~ution
WHEREAS, we share the despair of our people over the loss
of economic gains that we have painstakingly achieved since
1986;
WHEREAS, the image of peace-loving Filipinos projected
during the EDSA revolution has been brutally shattered;
NOW, THEREFORE, We, the faculty of the College of
Education:
CONDEMN in strongest terms the blatant use of force to
usurp power from the dUly consmuted author~ies as well
as the use of civilians as shields/leverage to gain their
objective;
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REGISTER our vehement objections to a mllnary or any
other form of dictatorship as an anernatlve of constnutional democracy; and
DENOUNCE some countrymen who instead of rallying to
the defense of our ConstnUlion fanned the coup d'etat by
their expression of support for the rebels.
ON THE OTHER HAND:
We express admiration, esteem and gratnude to President Cory Aquino, the military leadership, and the
courageous soldiers who stood loyal to the Constitution
and sacrificed their lives to defend and save democracy
in our land.
We also salUle the valiant and generous men and women
of the Philippine National Red Cross, the Department of
Health, the mass media (especially DZRH, Radio Vernas,
all TV stations), the Department of Social Wellare and
Development,the Department of Tourism, local officials
and civic and religious groups who made their service~
available under hazardous situations and 'whose actions
have made us unwavering in our faith in God, country
and people.
INSTITUTING
GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS
FOR BETTER SERVICE
By Cesar Saldana
Dean, College orUusiness Administration
T
his Is a brief statement suggesting some measures and
mechanisms designed to respond more speedily to
people's concerns In the area of business and industry.
Mechanism No.1: Allow for direct access by the President to the
people on economic concerns.
In this manner, the President can see II the policies affecting
business and industry genuinely reflect the best Interests and
welfare of the people or the sell-Interests of the few and their
more visible representatives.
There are already existing mechanisms for formulating
economic policies affllL1ing the people's wellare. However,
these are only through the Congressional representatives and
through the Cabinet agencies. Congress Is limned by tha
well-known problems of vested Interests and lobby organizations. The Cabinet Is known to be preoccupied wnh stop-gap
measures and more immediate concerns of government.
There is a need for a more Independent and direct way
whereby top leadership-the President and the leaders of
Congress-can get a diagnosis of the people's economic
needs and concerns. This will validate and strengthen the
existing mechanisms. At the same time, new insights are
generated by the Chief ExecUlive's exposure to firsthand
Information from her contact with her people. Thus, Implementing actions tend to be more sensitive to the underlying concerns of the peeple and long-ranging in effects.
Mechanism No.2: Develop constructive industrial policies and
programs specifically direcfed at the poor and underprivileged
sectors of society.
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Many of the ongoing policies and programs of the govern·
ment are rational, but only from the viewpoint of the overall
economic well·being of the country. One can see that most of
these policies are about large-scale Inflows of foreign investments, expanded Industrial output, development of the financial sector and the like. These can bring economic
development but stili perpetuate the unequal distribution of
weallh currently existing in the country today. The social
malaise prevailing over the last 20 years reflacts the failure of
economic development policies in eddresslng the social
equity aspact.
Historically, the poor end underprivileged sectors have
benefned only as by-products of E1Conomlc development
programs rather than as the Intended beneficiaries of the
programs. This was seen, for Instance, during the Marcos
regime which relied on technocrats for lis economic development programs. The Aquino administration has not fallen Into
the same trap. However, II appears to have been unwillingly
taking a passive approach on the social/economic equity
aspect of development. The attempted December coup indicates that such passivity shall be equally disastrous and
cannot be an adequate response to the true demands of
Philippine society.
THE NEED FOR REFORM
By College or Business Administration Faculty
UP Diliman
he latest coup coming after five previOUS attempts, Is
symptomatic Of deep-seated problems in th~ Philip~ine
body politic. While there is a need to conduct a~ inqUIry Into
the grievances of certain segments in the mlillary establishment, which fuel such acts of rebellion, there is. clearly a
need for the leadership of this country to act deCIsIvely on
many fundamental problems and issues in Philippine society.
T
Below are some aspects of our national life, which the
current leadership might consider as areas of relorm.
• Government Bureaucracy: Its size, tenure of govern·
ment employees and conflicts among Cabinet members.
• Social Services: Basic services and national population
program.
• Education: Filipino history values, language and cullure,
and tertiary education.
• Local Government: The issue of federalism and local
autonomy.
• Judiciary: Judicial reform and prosecution of grafters.
• Military. Involvement In decision-making and personnel
benelils.
• Economic Policy: Rural development, trading of basic
commodllies BOI reorientation, imports and smuggling
regUlations, ~rikes, foreign participation.
• Legislature: Coordination of bicameral legislation.
• Information: Communications and information dissemination on the programs, achievements, and problems of
the government.
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Many proposed solutions ara of a shot-taon nature that can
be undertaken Immediately with: no resistance from a large
sector; no large financial outlays; ImmedlateMslble
resuftslbeneffts; and may be done administratively whhln exIsting laws.
BIENVENIDO ARAGON
A CALL TO STRENGTHEN OUR
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
ERLINDA ECHANIS
RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ
ROY YBANEZ
By the Department or Political Science
College or Social Sciences and Philosophy
UP Diliman
"X 7HEREAS, this government came to power through the
t' t' 1986 people's power;
WHEREAS, the Filipino people ratified the 1987 Constllutlon
that provides the national goals and the framework 01 government;
WHEREAS, the President swore to abide by this Constllutlon and pursue the national goals and interests but seems to
have neglected several of these goals;
WHEREAS, this has given rise to widespread discontent
culminating in this violent and most serious coup against her
three-year old government;
WHEREAS, the Department of Poillical Science of Ihe
UnlVerslly of the Philippines believes In a democratic state
and In peaceful and consthutional change in society;
Now therefore, we the undersigned facuhy of the Universlly
of the Philippines strongly condemn:
• The use of violence to change the dUly constlluted
government of the Republic of the Philippines;
• Opportunist poIhicians who are capllalizing on this na·
tlonal tragedy to further their own personal ambllions;
• The manipulation of enlisted men by the rebel mHllary
leaders for their own polhlcal objectives;
•
Proflleering businessmen who are taking advantage of
these tragic events for their personal gains; and
• The Interference of fOreign milllary and civilian elements
in Philippine affairs.
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Believing that the Filipino people cherlsh democratic principles, we strongly support:
• To refrain from further foreign borrowing and reduce the
automatic allocation for servicing our external debt;
• The principles of democracy and non-violence;
• To break up monopolies such as PLDT, Meralco, PAL
and allow quaJnied companies to compete and operate
• The duly constnuted democratic government of the
Republic of the Philippines, and lis efforts towards
peaceful and constllutional change;
the same services;
• To enunciate a clear-cut foreign policy In consonance
wnh our national Interest.
• The loyal soldiers of the government who have laid down
their lives to ensure the safety of our Republic and our
people;
We call on Congress to provide enabling laws and implement provisions to confront and take immediate action on
Issues such as social justice, inequnies, high rate of population growth and related problems.
• The media for facilnating communications between
government and the people, and the government and the
rebels;
We call on the polnicalleaders:
• The volunteers for risking their lives to help our suffering
countrymen who have been caught in the crossfire; and
• To respect and preserve the integrity of the military in the
effective performance of their duties;
• The people for offering to serve as negotiators to
facilitate the restoration of peace.
In the aftermath of this violent coup, the Department of
Political Science hereby brings to the atlention of the President of the Philippines:
• Her failure to provide decisive, sensnlve and responsive
leadership;
• Her administration's failure to ensure the continuous and
satisfactory delivery of basic social services to the
people.
We urge the President of the Philippines therefore:
• To select competent and responsible cabinet officials,
presidential advisers, milnary and other government officials, and periodically assess their performance wnh a
view to replace them when the public interest so requires;
In this connection we urge that all cabinet members
tender their Immediate resignation to give the President a
free hand in selecting more qualWied, competent and
commilled public servants;
• To look into the legnimate grievances of the milnary, give
full material and moral support, upgrade their condnions
and purge their ranks of corrupt officials;
• To review and recommend the necessary changes In
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) wnh a view
to Increase productivity and Improve the people's walfare;
• To reduce excessive polilicking and help stamp out grail
and corruption in all ns manifestations.
I
We call on our government to heed the legitimate grievances and complaints of all concerned and to make government
more sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people.
We call on all Filipino people to unne in the task of
strengthening our democratic instnutions, rectifying iniqunies,
and healing the wounds caused by this tragedy and of
rebuilding our nation.
We pledge to undertake massive civil disobedience should
any government be established in the Philippines through
military force or any form of violence.
Signed by Department faculty
present during meeting except
one.
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I
RESPONSE TO THE
DECEMBER COUP ATTEMPT
2
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By the ",purtm'Dt or Anthropology
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
UP Uiliman
, Jjolence as a means of inst~utional change is a dangerous
l' tool. It is a two-edged sword that may as easily turn upon
its wielders with as much devastating effect as upon those on
whom ~ is used. It costs lives, lives that may prove useful in
building a nation. When used as a means of settling grievances and/or attempt to alter instnulions, the violation of the
democratic processes existing, ~ must be condemned.
The use of forco by the RAM to achieve their objectives is all
the more to be condemned. Such use of force works oulside
of the existing processes for bringing aboul change.
Yet, while we condemn the use of violence by the RAM, ~
must be noted that this is the seventh and by far the bloodiest
of all the attempts to seize power by the RAM. Such persistence must mean either of two things:
1. There is indeed something seriously wrong with the
management of the government that precip~ated such a
drastic action on the part of the RAM,
2. Certain elelments within the mil~ary establishment wish
to restore their former preeminence under the past
regime.
In case of 1, the following points must be raised:
a. The coup attempt must not be viewed as an isolated
fact by ~selt, bul within the wider context of the social,
economic and political situation of the country.
b. The reasons given by the rebels for their attempted
coup include, among others, a perception that the
management of the government is deteriorating due
to the widespread inefficiency, corruption, nepotism
and grail.
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c. These perceptions are part of a wider view among our
people that the government is indeed suffering from
these ills and therefOre a Change must be made within
. the government set-up.
.
d. Such a point of view of the situation leads to
demoralization; and when that demoralization creeps
Into the ranks of those charged with the defense olthe
state, It produces people willing to risk their lives in
rebellion in order to bring aboul change.
Quelling the coup alone is nof enough; ~ is merely treating
the symptoms of a deeper malady. For complete recovery, the
roots of the malady have to be traced and removed completely.
. I.n light of the situation, It is suggested that the government
In~late a program of seff-examination and selt-cleaning in
order to restore its credibility to the Filipino people.
Specijjcally, the following are suggested:
a. That the government identify and remove those officials gUilty of misuse of their office for personal gain,
as well as those found inefficient and incompetent for
their office, regardless of who they may be and their
relationship to those In power.
b. That the government, especiany the President, appoi~t officials Widely known to be honest, upright, full
of. VIsion, integrity and blameless in fheir public and
private lives. Such officials should not be officeseekers bul yet, when appointed, may nevertheless
carry oul a good job.
c. That the government Initiate measures fo ensure that
dishonest people will have no chance to gain office.
d. That the government Initiate a program that will enable
the country. to reCOVer from the effects of grall, corruptIon, iefflclency and nepotism that are currently
demoralizing the nation.
These suggestions are made in the hope that It the government. pays close attention to the needs of Its people, the
condrtlons that create a coup attempt will no longer exist.
On the other hand, in case 2 above, the following points may
have to be raised:
a. The military has a very serious and demanding
obligation-the defense of the state.
b. As such, their role is that of service to the people not
of lording It Over the people.
'
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It is thus suggested that:
1. Measures be taken to improve the condnions of employ.
ment of the milnary personnel.
2. Steps be taken to truly rpofessionalize the AFP ~uc~ that
people who may inniate coups for personal gain will not
prevail.
Both scenarios are to be considered together. Any atte'!1pt
to bring about change that will improve the lot of the Fllrplno
people must not be merely cosmetic, but must go deep Into
the heart of the problems facing our society.
Yet when both points have already been examined, there
remains a third and no less vnal point-the Intervention of the
UnUed States in what is essentially an internal struggle. The
credibility of the present government, having already been
damaged by the successive coup attempts, Is further era<!ed
by Us request for outside milUary assistance. When an out~lde
force is asked to intervene in matters that are essentIally
internal to the nation:
a. There is violation of our internal sovereignty;
b. The credibilily of the governme~t in handling the C?UP
attempts will be weakened. ThIS has senous Implrcations regarding Us future capabilily to handle future
uprisings, and
c. The bargaining posilion of the government regarding
the negotiations of the future of the US bases In the
country is also weakened, Inasmuch as the government now has a debt to the Unned States, which the
latter can call in at any time. By far, this is the most
serious blunder of the government.
In addnion to the need for change as noted In the first two
points, the third point, that of the US intervention, must be
condemned in the strongest terms p<;>ssible. In the Iulu.re, !he
government must not allow the repetillon of such a humllralong
experience.
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ILANG MGA REKOMENDASYON
TUNGKOL SA KUDETA
Dg Departamento ng Sosyolohiya
UP Diliman
P
ansamantalang nananahimik ang ating kapaligiran mula
sa dagundong ng mga eroplano at putok ng mga baril.
Ano ba ang magagawa ng pamahalaan upang ang ganUong
kaguluhan at ang pananakn at pagpatay ng mga inosenteng
Pilipino ay tuluyan nang matlgil?
• Oahil ang pamahalaan ay pamahalaan ng mamamayan,
kaUangang makinig ang mga nanunungkulan sa puna at
suhestiyon ng sambayanan. Ang posisyon ng hindi aka
lumatanggap ng unsolicited advice ay posisyon ng
isang aroganteng tao na hindi kumikilala sa maaaring
kontribusyon ng nakararami.
• Mag-aapat na taon nang nanunungkulan ang pamahalaang Aquino subalil sa paningin ng milyon-milyong
Pilipino, ang kanilang kapakanan ay isinasawalangbahala ng Gabinete. Kailangang painan ang Gabinete ng
mga taong tapat a! sensnibo sa pangangailangan ng mamamayan. Mahalagang sagutan ang mga krisis ng trans·
portasyon, elektrlsidad, sobrang taas ng bilihin at napakababang sahod ng marami. Sa usapin ng badyet ng
pamahalaan, tuunan ng pansin ang Salary Standardization Law na kung saan Iibo-Iibong kawani ng pamahalaan ang hindi nakinabang. Sa laha! ng 110, kailangang ang Gabinete na tumningin na pangunahin ang
interes ng Pilipino, lalong-Iao na ang mga nangangailangang masa.
• Tigilan na ang korapsyon sa pamahalaan, hindi lang sa
sama kundl sa kongkretong gawa. Bilang modelo, kailangang pangunahan no ng Pangulo at ng Kanyang
pamilya a1 mga kamag-anak. Paalisin ang mga kamaganal< ng mga opiSyaJ sa kanilang posisyon a! tUligsa'r.
a-g """93 i,-fi<Je"C8 peddle.-s r"l8 g.r..<;a:rA ng pa<'g&a'1
""<; '--n:; sro-src =a= sa sa-ii r-ri2n; ~a:::~cr.
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• Hindi lang ang executiva branch eng kallangang baguhin. Kallangang mag-rebyu rln ang Sanado at Kongreso
ng kanilang nagawa. Itong nakaraang laon, Iinadtad ng
iskandalo ang mga 110 suballl hanggang ngayon ay
walang makllang kongkralong solusyon ang mamamayan. Sar/wa pa sa mga lao ang gun-smuggling na
hanggang ngayon ay hindi pa naaaksyunan.
• Panlndlgan.ang atlng kalayuan bllang lsang malaya, nagsasariling bansa sa pamamagnan ng paglutol sa paklkialam ng mga Amerlkano. Hindi papayag ang mga mamamayang Pilipino na manatiling sunud-sunuran layo sa
kagustuhan ng pamahalaang Eslados Un/dos at /ba
pang bansang may interes sa Pilip/nas.
• Hign sa lahat, magsagawa ng batayang reporma sa ating
bansa. Ipatupad ang tunay na repormang agraryo, pam·
bansang Industriyalisasyon, isaalang·alang ang kapa·
kanan ng manggagawa sa pamamagilan ng pagtaas ng
suweldo. Patibayin ang awtoridad ng pamahalaang sibil·
van sa ating bansa. I<augnay nito, pag·aralan allpatupad
ang mga mekanismo para sa malawak na paglahok ng
mga mamamayan sa iba't ibang aspalo ng pagpapalak·
bo ng pamahalaan.
BELEN 1.G. MEDINA
CAROLYN M. ANONUEVO
MA. CECILIA 1. MEDINA
ESTER B. DE LA CRUZ
LUZVIMINDA B. VALENCIA
JINKY LEILANI C. DEL PRADO
MARIA LYRA S. ESTARIS
ARACELI DE LEUS
ISULONG ANG
DEMOKRASYA AT KASARINLAN
By the College or Social Work and Community Development
UP Diliman
S
a harap ng matinding krisis na iblnunga ng huling kudeta
laban sa pamahalaan, kami sa College 01 Social Work and
C~mmunity Developmenl (CSWCD) ng Unibersidad ng
P,hpIOas (UP) ay nagpapahayag ng aming koleklibong
paninlndigan para sa pamamayani ng demokrasyang
konstitusyonal.
Naniniwala kami na ang naghahari ng isang huntang mil/tar
na siyang ibubunga ng kudela ay labag sa demokratikong
proseso at nagbibigay ng kapangyarihang magdikla sa iilan
ng walang pag· sangayon ng laumbayan.
GAYUNMAN, ANG KUDETA AY DAPAT IUGNAY DIN SA
KAHINAAN, KABULUKAN AT PANG-AABUSO NG GOBYER·
NONG AQUINO NA PINAGMUMULAN NG MALAWAKANG
DiSKONTENTO AT KAHIRAPAN. ANG PAGSANDIG NITO SA
ESTADOS UNIDOS PARA MAGTAGUMPAY AT MANATILI SA
KAPANGYARIHAN AY NAGBUKAS NG PINTO PARA SA MAS
MATINDING PAKIKIALAM NG DAYUHAN SA USAPING PAN·
LOOB AT PAGSUKO NG PAMBANSANG KASARINLAN
(SOVEREIGNTY) SA AMERIKA.
Sa harap ng ganllong kalagayan, hinihingi namin ang
sumusunod:
• Bi~yan n!l karapatang. parus~. ang mga nagrerebeldeng
militar b,lang pagb,blgay dun sa pangangailangang
maging tapal ang lahal sa Saligang Batas;
• Iwasan ang paggamn ng mga kapangyarihang pam·
pamahalaan na makalalabag sa mga demokratikong
karapalan ng mga mamamayan tulad ng pagdedeklara
ng batas militar at pagsuspindi sa writ of habeas corpus.
,
•
,1
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• Ireorganlsa ang gobyerno, lalo na ang gabinete, at maglagay ng mga opisyal na may napatunayang Integrldad,
kakayahan, at katapalan sa panunungkulan sa bayan.
• Tugunan ang mga pangunahing pangangailangan. ng
mga mamamayan, ibaba ang presyo. ng .mga blllhln,
iayos ang mga serbisyong I?ampubllko, Is~katupar~n
ang demokratlkong pagpapasrya,. at tanggahn ang d,s·
krimlnasyon, nepotismo at pabornlsmo laic na sa pa·
suweldo at promosyon sa hanay ng mga emplyeado ng
gobyerno, kasama na ang mililar.
• Ilaguyod ang tunay na kasarinlang pangkabuhayan sa
pamamagllan ng pagpapatupad ng tunay na repormang
agraryo al pambansang Industriyafisasyon.
• Magkaroon ng malawakang paglilinis ng pamahalaan 81
masinop, demokraliko at bukas (transpare~l) na pangangasiwa ng kaban ng bayan. Kaugnay n~o, dapal.na
mas bigyan ng prayoridad ang panloob na pangangallangan ng bansa kaysa sa pagbabayad ng utang panlabas.
• Pag-ibayuhin ang mga programa. al mga palakarang
magbibigay buhay sa aling pansa,,11 at pagpapallbay sa
ating pambansang kasarinlan. Labanan .nalin ang dayuhang pakikialam laic na ng Estados Un,dos, at kumllos
tun go sa pagtatanggal ng mga base mililar ng Estados
Unidos sa Pihpinas.
Nananawagan kami na magkaisa at kumilos ang mga
mamamayan sa loob at labas ng Unibersidad ng Piliplnas
upang ipaklla ang pagtanggi sa kudeta at pagkalig sa mga
prosesong demokratiko na nakapaloob sa Konsl~usyon.
SIYAM NA MGA MUNGKAHI
By tbelostitute orUbrary Scieoce
UP Dillmao
A
ng naganap na kudeta sa atlng bansa at ang pagnanais
na makuha ang goblerno sa pamamagllan ng dahas ay
Isang palantandaan na maramlng bagay sa atlng gobierno
ang ~a~at paillan 0 baguhin. Ang ating pangarap na kalayaan
'!f hond, maglgong ganap kung ang ating mamamayan ay
hllld' nagkakaisa at hindi mafigaya. Ang kalayaan ay hindi
madallng langkilikin. Ito ay nangangailangan ng sakripisyo
buhat sa mamamayan upang 110 ay mamalagi sa atin. Kaila·
ngan ding Ipagtanggol 110 kahll magbuwis ng buhay upang 110
ay hindi mawala.
Buh~t nang maibafik ang aling kalayaan al ang demokrasya
sa Plhponas, ay nagkaroon ng maraming sufiranln ang atlng
b~n~~ na kung tutuusin ay nagmula pa sa dating rehlmen,
h,ndl no napuksa bagkus ay plnaglbayo pa ng mga maruruml
ang budhl na walang inaafigta kung hindi ang kanilang sariling
kapakanan. Ang Isang malaklng sufiranin ng ating bansa ay
a~g patuloy na pagsasamantala ng lIan nating kaOObayan sa
!!',ng bayan-ang graft at corruption na para bang naglng
,sang pang· araw·araw na pangyayan. Hindi uunlad ang
bayan dahll 110, sa harrp na sa bayan mapunta ang kiniklla 0
ang maga Inuutang, ay sa mga bulsa lang ng mapagsamantala napupunta, laic na doon sa may matataas na katungkulan
sa pamahalaan. Ang lahat yala ng sakll na panlipunan ay
nag-uugat dllo dahil ang plnakabuod ng graft/corrupt/on ay
ang pagpapayaman ng i1an nating kaOObayan, samantalang
ang nakararaml (85%) ay mahlhirap at umaasa lamang sa
kakarampot na suweld~lsang kayed /sang tuka, wika nga.
Hindi la~ang a!1g mga tao sa gobierno ang nagsasamantala, kundo magong ang mga ganid na mangangalak~
slnasamantala nila ang krisls--IIinataas nila ang presyo ng
mga pangunahlng bllihln. Sa halip na tulungan ang bayan ay
laic pa nilang plnahlhirapan.
'
Ang Filipino ay mabutlng tao, mapagtlis, malulungin at may
magandang k.alooban. at takot sa Poong Maykapal. Ngunil.
slya ay naglQlng skeptic81 kung sa parrgld-Iigid nlya ay 100
ang kanlyang naklkila, nadarama at nararanasan.
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Narho pa ang mga mungkahlng napagkalsahan ng "'!ga
guro sa ILS na inihahain bilang tugon sa mga sullranlng
nabanggh.
•
Puksain ang graft and corruption sa pamahalaan.
ugat ng maraming sakh na panlipunan.
no ang
PERILOUS PEACE *
• Dapat lang na ibalik ang hatol na kamatayan 0 capital
punishment, maging ang mga grafters ay matakot. Idagdag pa rin sa capital punishment ang mga sumusunod
na karumal- dumal na krimen: pagbibili ng bawaJ na
gamot (drug trafficking); panggagahasa (rape); pegbebenta ng mga babae 0 batang babae sa prostitution;
pagpatay (murder); pangungulimbat (hold-up, rObbety);
profiteering at iba pa.
•
Imiendahan ang Saligang Batas. Pag-aralang mabuti ang
nasasaed doon. Idagdcg dho ang hatol na kamatayan.
• Pag-aralang mabuti ang National Language Policy. Imbls
na pagkaisahin ang bansa ay tila nagiging "divisive" pa
ho.
• langat ang kabuhayan ng mga mahlhlrap. Magtatag ng
mga industriya para may mapasukan ang mga tao. Idag·
dag dho ang manpower training. Ang nangyayarl ay
umaalis ang mga skilled workers at professionals upang
kumha ng malaki sa Ibang bansa, dahil wala silang opor.
tunidad dito sa atin.
•
Ibalik ang "Kadiwa" para sa mahihirap. Itaguyod ang
tunay diwa ng kooperatiba sa mga kanayunan at
siyudad.
•
Bagur,ln ang Istraktura ng milhar upang mailayo sa
sobrang pulitika. Gawing Citizen Army. Baguhin din ang
istraktura ng PMA. Magtayo ng isang akademiya para sa
ROTC.
• Limhahin and pagbibiyahe sa ibang bansa ng mga
kongresman, senador, Presidente, Bise Presidente, mga
miyembro ng gabinete upang makatlpld.
•
Ruben Carranza, Jr.
Editor, Philippine Collegian
Pagbhiwin ang lahat ng mlembro ng gabinete. Huwag
ibalik ang mga walang silbi sa bayan.
Ang Isang tao, kung may bahay, kahh malih lang, may
trabaho 0 pinagkikhaan, at kumakain siVa ng tallong beses sa
isang araw ay hindi mahihikayat na magalsa laban sa bayan.
Ang Filipino ay matiisin, kaya't kailangang siVa ay tulungan ng
ating pamahalaan at ng mga mayayaman sa atlng bansa. Ang
social justice nl Pangulong Quezon ay dapat haguyod.
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n less troubled times, there would be cause for celebration
and hope.
We are entering a new decade,ten years closer to the next
millennium. But here In this tragic land of old, belhgerent
Gringos, the celebrations are muted. We can only ho~
against hope that the forces of fascism have been sllenced-ff
not forever, at least for time enough for us to catch a breath of
peace.
That, however, is wishful thinking.
The peace that now reigns is uneasy. It is a soldier's truce,
nothing permanent, always fragile, ready to be.Shattered
again and again by the brute force of polhical ambnlon. Why
do these unfformed tyrants persist? What gives them the right
to seil- righteously call themselves the Soldiers of the Filipino
People? What makes them think we can forget the blood they
have extracted from the known and nameless martyrs they
have tortured, maimed and salvaged in the name of their
dubious cause?
But tyranny is not the monopoly of fascists.
Our peace has been broken, too, by warlords and flOlhicians
who find h only too tempting to resist the opportunity to use
the threat from the extreme right to dIsmantle the gaIns of the
legal left. What is in real Emergency here is the State of our
harried lives, harassed as we are by crammed buses and long
brownouts, low wages and rising prices.
No Presidential Proclamation will solve those problems.
Phantom jets will not scare them away. They can fill up EDSA
from Baclaran to Monumento with a desperate mass fed by
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Philippine Collegian Special Issue edhorial of
December 1989.
97
96
illusions of change. But our country will never find its peace
for as lo.ng as its government remains in the hands of the few
who believe that salvation can only come from elsewhere but
never from the people themselves.
'
There ~i11 be no peace this year and in the years to come,
!'I0 respne fr:>m the brutalhy of Incessant coup plotters and
,nept governance, things remain as they are: a country that
Is a neo-colony, a people who remain powerless a
democracy of the few who violently fight for power. For' as
long as these remain, ours will remain a perilous peace.
n
ANNEX
I
CHRONOLOGY OF KUDETA
(COUP ATTEMPT)
November 29 - December 8, 1990
November 29
10:45 p.m.
Scout Rangers of the 14th Scout Ranger Co.,
1 st Scout Ranger Regiment stationed at
Tagaytay Chy sabotage AFP communication
system near abandoned construction of
Palace in the Sky; proceed to Fort Bonnacio.
November 30
Morning
13 rebel Scout Rangers in civilian clothes
going back to Tagaytay apprehended by
Capital Regional Command (Capcom)
troops.
5 p.m.
Entire Armed Forces placed on nationwide
red alert.
10 p.m.
Gen. De Villa announces discovery of a
grand design by forces led by dismissed Lt.
Col. Gregorio Honasan "to disturb the peace,
tranquillhy, 'and well-being of the people."
11-12 p.m.
Troop movement sightjngs reported.
December 1
12:15 a.m.
Three V-l50 light commando tanks with
rebels on board sighted at Villamor Air Base
by Air Force Intelligence. Rebels seize control of the Manila Domestic Airport and the
NAIA, closing air trallic to and from Manila.
98
1 a.m.
1:21 a.m.
1:30 a.m.
2 a.m.
99
Troops at Sangley Point loin ranks
soldiers.
or rebel
Maj. Gen. Jose de Leon under siege by two
Marine companies wnh 200 soldiers· Inside
Villamor Air Base.
Defense Secretary Fidei V. Ramos reports In
a radio broadcast that rebel soldiers had
taken over Villamor Air Base.
Two ten-wheeler trucks sighted at Cubeo,
Q.C., heading toward TImog Avenue. Rebel
soldiers at Bohol Ave. and Mother Ignacla St.
put Channels 2 and 4 on siege.
2nd Army Division based at Camp Caplnpln,
Taney reinforce Camp AgUinaldo. Rebel
SikOrsky helicopter retreats.
12:10·
12:15 p.m.
Two rebel Tara-Tara planes bomb Camp
Aguinaldo; hit dispensary, quarters or Gen.
De Villa, and Injure two doctors and a soldier.
12:30 p.m.
Soldiers In two armored personnel carriers
near Nlnoy Aquino Park, Q.C. surrender to
rebels.
1 p.m.
PAF F-S jets destroy two Tora-Tora planes
and Sikorsky gunship and a Norman Britten
Islander of rebels In "retaliatory air anacks" at
Sangley Point Air Station in Cavite.
1:45 p.m.
Rebel troops fight Capeom soldiers along
Coastal Road leading to Cavne.
2 p.m.
Rebels take control of Quezon Bridge; Capcom troops guarding Ayala Bridge leave.
2:50p.m.
President Corezon Aquino announces request by Defense Secretary Ramos and Gen.
De Villa for US "persuasion" flights In support or government forces.
5:25 p.m.
President Aquino announces on T.Y. "we
have gonen American fighter (planes) to join
us in the fight for freedom." Government forces retake Sangley Air Station.
or TV Channels 2
2:30a.m.
Gunshots heard In vicinity
and 4.
2:40a.m.
Big explosion heard Inside Fort BonWacio'
rebel forces guard all entrances to the camp. '
3:45 a.m.
Firefights break Olrt Inside Vlllamor Air Base;
fire breaks out near HQ of 205th PAF helicopter Wing.
6 a.m.
Wnh bazooka an~ automatic weapons,
government
soldiers
assaun
rebels
entrenched in Channels 2 and 4.
6:45a.m.
Three Tora-Tora planes bomb Malacanang.
10 a.m.
Re~el troops hn Channel 9 tower, temporarily
cuttmg off broadcast.
10 a.m.
UP President Jose Y. Abueva calls by
telephone from Cebu City deploring the coup
anempt and expressing support for the
Aquino government.
midmorning
Commodore Domingo Calajate leads
takeover of The Logistics Command (LogCom) in Camp Aguinaldo.
11:10 a.m.
Rebels anack Camps Crame and Aguinaldo.
Rebel aircraft bomb Camp Crame, senlng PC
headquarters on fire. A Sikorsky helicopter
strafes Camp Aguinaldo.
morning
12:05 p.m.
Rebo!s seize the Mactan Airbase in Cebu and
Legezpi CI/y airport.
December 2
,
;;;;,
Rebel forces calling themselves Reformisfs claim victory
over Aquino government; announce establishment or a
provisional government-composed of three cashiered
military officers and four civilians-and of a mill/ary chain of
command with HQ at Fort BonWaclo.
whole
morning to
noon
Second bloody dey of fighting at Blue Ridge
and Whl/e Plains, L1bis area in Q. C. where
rebel troops converge for the high push into
Camp AguinaldO.
noontime
President Aquino In a press conference
rejects Idea or negotiation with rebels, calls
them "treacherous cowards;" threatens to
hunt down rebels and bring them to justice,
as well as "root out those who have given aid
and comfort to these tral/ors:
100
Some 500 rebel soldiers move out of FOrt
Bonnaclo to the Makatl Commercial center
across EDSA through McKinley Road, Forbes Park. They take pasilions In high-rise
buildings Including the Twin Towers which
seIVed as their HQ.
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101
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December 6
President Aquino forms Commission to look Into the circumstances surrounding the latest kUdela, especially the
Involvement of mililary and civilian officials and private Individuals. Mililary officials express "optimism" for smooth
return to mililary control of about 400 mutinous soldiers holed
out In Makatl after ceaselire Is forged.
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December 3
I,
Mililary announces launching of "mopping up" operations
against pockets of resistance In Fort Bonnaclo, Makatl's commercial and financial distrlets, and Maetan Air Base In cebu.
12:308.m.
President AqUino declares national emergency to
strengthen government's hand in dealing with rebellious soldiers and skyrocketing prices of prime commodllies caused
by hoarding and proflleering.
The RAM-SFP launch their offensive "suicide
attack on (Gate 1 of) Camp Aguinaldo"; are
repulsed. Failure of pre-dawn attack and subsequent surrender of Gen. Marcelo Blando,
7th Infantry Division chief based at Fort Magsaysay In Laur, Nueva Ecija, deals fatal blow
to coup attempt.
More than 1,000 foreigners marooned for four days In highrise hotels and apartments In Makatl's "war zone" evacuated
to safety.
afternoon
In a press conference at Intercontinental Hotel In Makatl,
Nacionalista Party leaders Including opposilionist Sen. Juan
Ponce Emile ask the President to step down and give way to
"a government of national unity."
Fighting continues well into the night as remnants of the
estimated 2,000 troopers who participated in the putsch make
their last stand in Makat!.
to cushion impaet of heavy wllhdrawals touched off by
putsch.
Gen. De Villa extends "grace period" for settlement of Mac-'
tan takeover by rebels. Air, sea and ground offens" e by
government troops to recapture Maetan Air Base temporarily
called off as Cebu Archbishop Ricardo J. Cardinal Vidal asks
for a last chance to settle matter peacefUlly.
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December 7
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7 a.m.
December 4
Brig. Gen. Jose Comendador, leader of rebel troops at
Mactan refuse to surrender and threaten to blow up all aircraft
on the island, Including five F-5 jet fighters, n they are attack·
ed.
Three foreigners die; hundreds more are trapped In luxury
hotels and restaurants. Entrenched in 22 high-rise buildings
In the country's financial center, rebels shoot II out wllh
government forces.
December 5
Government troops "liberate" 12 Makatl buildings held by
rebel soldiers; negotiations for evacuation of thousands d
tourists trapped in luxury hotels fail; Central Bank pumps 0VfI(
a billion pesos into the banking system in two banking days
Rebel soldiers, chanting "no surrender, the
fight goes on," return to barracks from their
Makatl stronghold.
DecemberS
Mililary moves for "final assaull" on some 400 rebel soldiers
In Maetan Air Base in Cebu following failed negotiations between civic/religious leaders and rebel leador Air Force Gen.
Comendador.
Last pocket of rebel resistance against government collapses as 300 mutineers return to their unlls from Mactan alter
one week under the same "return to barracks" terms extended
to putschists who occupied Makatl buildings.
Comendador, leader of rebels who occupied Maetan Air
Base, surrenders to Armed Forces Visayas Command chief
Brig. Gen. Renato Palma.