Narratives
Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola
2005
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Table of Contents
Villavicencio vs. Lukban [GR 14639, 25 March 1919] … 1
Moncupa vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-63345, 30 January 1986] … 2
In RE Habeas Corpus of Teodosio Lansang, et. al. Lansang vs. Gen. Garcia [GR L-33964, 11 December 1971] … 2
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] ... 5
Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons [GR L-30026, 30 January 1971] … 6
In RE Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rolando Abadilla. Abadilla vs. Ramos [GR L-79173, 1 December 1987] … 8
Feria vs. Court of Appeals [GR 122954, 15 February 2000] … 9
Ilusorio vs. Bildner [GR 139789, 12 May 2000] … 10
This collection contains eight (8) cases
summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student)
during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006
in the Political Law Review class
under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012.
Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002
and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006.
He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
398 Villavicencio vs. Lukban [GR 14639, 25 March 1919]
En Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 dissented in separate opinions
Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered
the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in
the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements
with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government
office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of
soldiers, At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of
police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had
neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on
board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The
two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. The vessels
reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were
prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. Just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros
were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to
Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them.
Some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work
in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to
return to Manila (7 of which became witnesses in the present case).
Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to acquire the persons of the
prostitutes shipped to Davao.
Held: A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of
that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without
either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and
where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right. Further, if the public official
is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed
has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The said officials, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of
liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Both on reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by
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the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
399 Moncupa vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-63345, 30 January 1986]
En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part, 1 reserves vote
Facts: Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on 22 April 1982 at about 10:50 p.m. at the
corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago
Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On 23 April 1982, on the allegation that he was a National
Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and
8 other persons. After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria,
Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales
of Quezon City, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both
investigators recommended the prosecution of Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree 33. Consequently, two separate informations
were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and the other for violation of PD 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused,
however, the cases filed were for violation of PD 885 as amended. Moncupa was excluded from the charge
under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. Moncupa's arraignment and further proceedings have not been
pursued, and yet, Moncupa's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Moncupa filed a petition for the
writ of habeas corpus. Juan Ponce Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar, Fernando Gorospe, and Jose Castro
contend that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied, as Moncupa may have
been released from his detention cell (i.e. temporary release).
Issue: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus has become moot and academic in view of
Moncupa's temporary release.
Held: Attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him, i.e. (1) His freedom of
movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside
Metro Manila. (2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in
case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. (3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition
that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives
nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." (4) He is required
to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. The reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the temporary release constitute restraints on the liberty of Moncupa. Such restrictions
limit the freedom of movement of Moncupa. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the
writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the ruling in Villavicencio vs. Lukban, which held that "a prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient," the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A
release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ.
400
In RE Habeas Corpus of Teodosio Lansang, et. al. Lansang vs. Gen. Garcia [GR L-33964, 11
December 1971]; also Arienda vs. Secretary of National Defense [GR L-33965], David vs.
Garcia [GR L-33973], In RE Habeas Corpus of Nemecio Prudente. Prudente vs. Yan [GR L33982], In RE Habeas Corpus of Gerardo Tomas [GR L-34004], Rimando vs. Garcia [GR LConstitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )
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34013], In RE Habeas Corpus of Sgt. de Castro. Rabago vs. Garcia [GR L-34039], In RE
Habeas Corpus of Oreta. Oreta vs. Garcia [GR L-34265], and Olivar vs. Garcia [GR L-34339]
En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 7 concur
Facts: In the evening of 21 August 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for 8 November 1971, 2 hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, 8 persons were killed and many more
injured, including practically all of the candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious,
injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them. On
August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation 889,
dated 21 August 1971, suspending "the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as
others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith." Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed by persons, who, having been arrested
without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation. On 30 August 1971, the
President issued Proclamation 889-A, amending Proclamation 889, suspending "the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained
for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion[,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] over acts committed by them
in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof [,] [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith]." Vicente Ilao
and Juan Carandang had been allegedly released from custody on 31 August 1971, "after it had been found
that the evidence against them was insufficient." On 1 September 1971, Cases L-33964, L-33965, L-33973
and L-33982 were jointly heard and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were
submitted from September 3 to September 9, 1971. Soon thereafter, or on 18 September 1971, Proclamation
889 was further amended by Proclamation 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities of the Philippines. On 25 September 1971, the
President issued Proclamation 889-C, restoring the privilege of the writ in 14 more provinces and 13 other
cities. On 4 October 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation 889-D, in 7 more
provinces and 4 other cities. As a consequence, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was still suspended
in 18 provinces (Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao del Norte, Lanao
del Sur, North Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, South Cotabato, Tarlac, and
Zambales), 2 sub-provinces (Aurora and Quirino), and 18 cities (Angeles, Baguio, Cabanatuan, Caloocan,
Cotabato, General Santos, Iligan, Iriga, Lucena, Manila, Marawi, Naga, Olongapo, Palayan, Pasay, Quezon,
San Jose, San Pablo). On 5 October 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33955, L-33973 and L-33982, a
resolution stating in part that the Court resolved that the cases be set for rehearing on 8 October 1971. On 8
October 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly with cases L-34004, L34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their
respective oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971. In the
meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the parties therein were heard
in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively. On 15 November 1971, the Solicitor General
filed manifestations — motions stating that on 13 November 13, 1971 the following petitioners were (a)
released from custody: (GR L-33964) Teodosio Lansang and Bayani Alcala, (GR L-33965) Rogelio Arienda,
(GR L-33982) Nemesio Prudente, (GR L-34004) Gerardo Tomas, (GR L-34013) Reynaldo Rimando, (GR L34039) Filomeno M. de Castro and Barcelisa de Castro, and (L-34265) Antolin Oreta, Jr.; (b) charged,
together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a violation of the AntiSubversion Act, in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City: (GR L-22982) Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito
Sison; (c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a violation of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal: (GR L33969) Rodolfo del Rosario, (GR L-33973) Luzvimindo David, and (GR L-33982) Victor Felipe, and
continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation 889, as amended, and praying that the petitions in GRs L33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution
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of the remaining cases.
Issue: Whether Proclamation 899, which suspended the writ of habeas corpus, is constitutional.
Held: The very tenor of the original proclamation and particularly, the circumstances under which it had been
issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the Philippines,
although the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having, in effect, stressed the
actuality of the intent to rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The pleadings,
the oral arguments and the memoranda of the public officers have consistently and abundantly emphasized —
to justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — the acts of violence and subversion
committed prior to 21 August 1971, by lawless elements, and the conditions obtaining at the time of the
issuance of the original proclamation. In short, Proclamation 889-A has superseded the original proclamation
and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature. Still, the Court has the authority to inquire
into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the
grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the
Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional.
The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it
postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension
of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art. VII of the Constitution,
"imminent danger thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." For from being full
and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted,
not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time
when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the setting or conditions mark, establish and
define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the
limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence
thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise,
the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution
could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility. As heretofore adverted to, for the
valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or —
pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof"; and (b)
public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation 889, as
amended, that both conditions are present. As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence attests abundantly
to the Communist activities in the Philippines aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the
immediate objective. There are no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines. All Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist
faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate
objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a
given time and in a particular place; and there is a New People's Army, other, of course, than the armed forces
of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a
rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such
announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a
declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual
commencement of hostilities. The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential
to the validity of the suspension of the privilege — namely, that the suspension be required by public safety.
Considering that the President was in possession of the pertinent data — except those related to events that
happened after 21 August 1971 — when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to
hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that
public safety and national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA
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were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the 245 KM chapters, all over the
Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing of
water mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter
how remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest. In case
of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution,
three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had,
already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result.
Of the two (2) other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. In view of the foregoing, it
does not appear that the President has acted arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation 889, as amended, nor that the
same is unconstitutional.
401 Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968]
En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur
Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a
Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the
market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his
address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the
Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told
Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City.
Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car
mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio
however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo
Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and,
after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a
third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was included in the plan. He furnished the name of
Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson
Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his
Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected
the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21,000.00), they
went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter,
they went to see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of sale.
After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and
Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant
in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers
remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated
that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should
be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the
note bearer. Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to
pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared
after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They
went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately
reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On November 14, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the
name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual
alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a
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Thunderbird car (Motor H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together with its accessories worth
P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who
have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial commenced before the
judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. When trial opened, the
prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial
proceeded, with "Fiscal Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February 1965,
the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused except Roger Chavez, who was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not more than 14 years, 8 months and
1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to
pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo
Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car. The sentence was promulgated on 8
March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals
resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June 1968, the Court of
Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal,
directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the
Court of Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment
below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in the alternative, prayed for grant of the alternative remedies of
certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file
brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court for the reason that
he was raising purely questions of law.
Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for the court’s disregard of Chavez’
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed
of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not
preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For the writ of habeas
corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty
is at stake. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case presents a clear picture
of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." Further, a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final and
valid judgment of conviction for another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was
prosecuted and convicted.
402 Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons [GR L-30026, 30 January 1971]
First Division, Fernando (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concur in separate opinion to which 2
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joined, 2 more concur in separate opinions, 2 took no part
Facts: Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on 5 May 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Gaudencio Agapito,
Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the
first two, on 8 March 1954 and, as to the third, on 15 December 1955. Lastly, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial
also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on 12 January 1954
penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions.
Each of them has served more than 13 years. Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez (reaffirmed by People vs.
Lava), the supreme Court ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed
with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no such complex offense. The fear that the Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons ruling stands as an obstacle to
their release on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted Gumabon, et.al. to ask that it be appraised anew and, if
necessary, discarded.
Issue: Whether habeas corpus the appropriate remedy where the accused had served the full term for which
they could have been legally committed, and in light of the Hernandez ruling.
Held: The writ of habeas corpus' latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be
avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on
judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of
physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid
sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation
from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment. The liberality with which the judiciary is to
construe habeas corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was
demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen. Likewise in Conde v. Rivera, one that broadens the field of the operation
of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles
the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." The writ of habeas corpus is
the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered wit the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected. Where,
however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. Thus, the continued incarceration after the 12-year
period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when
others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. Where a
sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the
excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule
being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so
much of the sentence as was valid. The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable
to the accused is the writ of habeas corpus. Insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic
affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable
decision holds true. Gumabon, et. al. clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their
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release.
403
In RE Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rolando Abadilla. Abadilla vs. Ramos [GR L-79173, 1
December 1987]
En Banc, Gancayco (J): 13 concur
Facts: On 27 January 1987, a group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radiotelevision broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon
City, ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional government. While the takeover might
have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On 29 January
1987, the mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and the possession of the facility was restored to
the owners and managers thereof. Soon thereafter, the military authorities conducted an investigation of the
matter. On 18 April 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility
in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either.
After the incident, the military authorities also conducted an investigation. The first investigation was
concluded on 12 March 1987. The investigation disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radiotelevision facilities. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel
Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him for
violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition 1, Article of War 94) in relation to Article 139 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of PD 1866, and such other offenses that may be warranted by the
evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel. The investigation conducted on "The
Black Saturday Revolt" ended on 27 May 1987. It was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was
also involved in the mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation also recommended that the
case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against the Colonel. The
Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly. Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were
conducted. On 4 May 1987 or some two weeks before the second investigation was concluded, Major General
Renato De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the
arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. On 21 May 1987, AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos
issued General Orders 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. On 7 July
1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Slight Physical Injuries with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla (Criminal Case
0237558). On 27 July 1987, a combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary arrested
Colonel Abadilla. He was detained first in Camp Crame in Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort
Bonifacio in Makati. On 30 July 1987, another Information, this time for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City against
Colonel Abadilla. The case was assigned to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (Criminal
Case Q-53382). On the same date, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their
minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus
and Bart Joseph, went to the Supreme Court and filed the Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity
of the detention of Colonel Abadilla.
Issue: Whether Colonel Abadilla's confinement is illegal because under Article of War 70, a person subject to
military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.
Held: Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel Abadilla was a
military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to military law. Section 10 of the Manual for CourtsMartial, AFP, which discusses court-martial jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be "The general
rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers, and others in the military service of the
Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense
committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service."
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Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section, to wit "So also, where a
dishonorably discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his
dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense." This
exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon
the orders of his superior officers, and his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a
dishonorable discharge. Section 1 (b) of PD 1860, as amended, even acknowledges instances where military
jurisdiction fully attaches on an individual even after he shall have been separated from active service, which
provdes that "all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit
any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried
by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated National Police can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from
the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law."
Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or
Sedition) which is a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him,
which satisfies the requirement of Article of War 70, which provides that a person subject to military law can
be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War. Thus, as the
detention of Colonel Abadilla under the circumstances is not illegal, the Petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
404 Feria vs. Court of Appeals [GR 122954, 15 February 2000]
Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur
Facts: Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present by reason of his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret
Viviene Carmona. Some 12 years later, or on 9 June 1993, Feria sought to be transferred from the Manila City
Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the
Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of
the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then
discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response
to the inquiries made by counsel of Feria, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of
Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case 60677
could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been
lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on 3
November 1986. On 3 October 1994, Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with
the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the
ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional
right to due process. In its Resolution dated 10 October 1994, the Second Division of the Supreme Court
resolved (a) to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to order the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila to conduct an immediate raffle of the case among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to require
[1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to set the case for hearing on 13 October 1994, try and decide the
same on the merits and thereafter furnish the Supreme Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, et. al. to make a return of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on
12 October 1994 and appear personally and produce the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on said date
and time of hearing to the Judge to whom the case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine National
Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to serve the Writ and Petition, and make a return thereof
as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to appear personally and escort the
person of Norberto Feria y Pacquing at said date and time of hearing. The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of
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the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on 15 November 1994, after hearing, issued an Order dismissing
the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of
the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. Feria duly appealed
said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on 28 April 1995, rendered the Decision affirming the decision of
the trial court with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the
peculiar facts of the case" Feria may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without
submission of the requirements. With the motion for reconsideration being denied for lack of merit, Feria filed
the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the
accused would render the judgment of conviction void, or would it warrant the release of the convict by virtue
of a writ of habeas corpus.
Held: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful
authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as
to such excess. 15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process. Herein, based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court,
there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as the legal basis
for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".
Further, the records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge
Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that Feria was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on
11 January 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. As a general rule, the
burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the
return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for
the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has
the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Since the public officials have sufficiently shown
good ground for the detention, Feria's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102
of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become
final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged,
its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order
that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.
405
Ilusorio vs. Bildner [GR 139789, 12 May 2000]; also Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139808]
First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur
Facts: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On 11 July 1942, Erlinda Kalaw
and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they
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separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala
Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in
Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6
children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (present age, age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50);
Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). On 30 December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s
arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg
instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, USA. As a
consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated. On 25 February 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the
latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On 31 May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On 11 March 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that Erlinda I. Bildner and
Sylvia K. Ilusorio-Yap refused Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. After due hearing, on 5 April 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision, ordering Bildner and Yap to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio
and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, and ordering the writ of habeas corpus
previously issued be recalled and the petition for habeas corpus be denied due course. Hence, the two
petitions, which were consolidated and are jointly decided.
Issue: Whether a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss.
Held: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral. Herein, there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
The crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made
may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing
people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Still, with his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will
deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus
where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
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